Holding

The injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and the supervening complications did not break the chain of causation, so the conviction under s.302 IPC stands.

Summary

The appellant Maniklal Sahu and three co‑accused were convicted of murder under s.302 IPC for throwing the victim Rekhchand Verma from a terrace and assaulting him, resulting in injuries that led to septic shock, pneumonia and paraplegia, and the victim died nine months later. The High Court reduced the conviction to attempt to murder under s.307 IPC, holding that the death was due to lack of proper medical treatment and the long interval broke the causal chain. The Supreme Court examined the medical evidence and held that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that the supervening complications were attributable to those injuries, so the chain of causation was not broken. It reiterated the principles governing the limbs of s.300 IPC and the relevance of intention, knowledge and causation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, restoring the conviction under s.302 IPC.

Issues considered

Whether the death of the victim, occurring nine months after the assault, can be legally attributed to the injuries for purposes of s.302 IPC or whether the case falls within s.307 IPC (attempt to murder).
Whether the supervening complications (septic shock, pneumonia, paraplegia) break the chain of causation, thereby affecting liability under the murder provisions of the IPC.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304, s. 307

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court committed any error in bringing the case within the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” punishable u/s.307 IPC on the ground that the deceased-R died after a period of nine months from the date of the incident. Headnotes† Penal – Intention to cause death – Death occurs after several days of complications – Principle that Courts must remember: Held: If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other

Subjects

Section 307 of IPCSection 300 of IPCSection 302 of IPCFirst limb of s.300 of IPCThird limb of s.300 of IPCFourth limb of s.300 of IPCFatal injuryIntention to cause deathDeath occurring after several daysSeptic shock with bilateral pneumoniaPost traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegiaInfected bedsore hepatic dysfunctionMedical treatmentSupervening causesInjuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature

Judgment

[2025] 10 S.C.R. 212 : 2025 INSC 1107

Maniklal Sahu
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 5578 of 2024)
12 September 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court committed any error in bringing the case
within the ambit of “attempt to commit murder” punishable u/s.307
IPC on the ground that the deceased-R died after a period of nine
months from the date of the incident.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – First limb of s.300 – Fatal injury –
Intention to cause death – Death occurs after several days of
complications – Principle that Courts must remember:
Held: If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was
to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of
septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is
undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of s.300 of
the IPC. [Para 69(a)]

Penal Code, 1860 – Third limb of s.300 – Injuries sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature – Intended
injuries – Death occurs after complications – Principle that
Courts must remember:
Held: If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established
that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death
might have occurred after septicaemia or other complications had
supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under
the third limb of s.300 of the IPC and the accused is therefore
liable to be punished u/s.302 of the IPC. [Para 69(b)]

* Author
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 213

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

Penal Code, 1860 – Fourth limb of s.300 – Injuries imminently
dangerous to life – Death occurs after complications – Principle
that Courts must remember:
Held: If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous
to life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other
complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would
squarely fall under the fourth limb of s.300 of the IPC, provided, the
other requirements like knowledge on the part of the accused, etc.
are satisfied and so the accused would be liable to be punished
u/s.302 of the IPC – Here also, the primary cause of the death is
the injuries and septicaemia. [Para 66(c)]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – When injuries inflicted were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death –
Relevancy of skilful and efficient medical treatment:
Held: In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that
skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result
is wholly irrelevant. [Para 66(d)]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – When the supervening causes
are attributable to the injuries caused – Whether the person
inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death:
Held: If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused,
then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death,
even if death was not the direct result of the injuries. [Para 66(e)]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 – The Courts to distinguish two types
of cases i.e. first where the intervening cause of death, like
peritonitis, is only a remote consequence of the injury and
second where the complication which is the intervening cause
of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury:
Held: Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the
exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first, where
the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote
and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can be
said that the injury is one which may, in particular circumstances,
result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature
be likely to lead to it – Secondly, where the complication which
is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable
214 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

sequence to the injury – In that event, the probability is very high
indeed, amounting to practical certainty i.e., death is a result in
due course of natural events – A deep abdominal thrust with a
knife followed by injury to the internal organs is practically certain
to result in acute peritonitis causing death – It is clearly a case of
murder u/s.302 and not merely of culpable homicide. [Para 66(f)]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – The Courts are to always look into
the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased
and infer whether assailants intended to cause death of the
deceased, irrespective of the medical evidence:
Held: Even when the medical evidence does not say that any
one of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the
Court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of
the deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to
cause death of the deceased – If none of the injuries alone were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of
the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause his death. [Para 66(g)]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – What is significant is whether
death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would
have occurred in due course:
Held: What the courts must see is whether the injuries were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to
cause such bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to
cause death although death was ultimately due to supervention
of some other cause – An intervening cause or complication is
by itself not of such significance – What is significant is whether
death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would have
occurred in due course. [Para 66(h)]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – When the death is delayed due
to later complications – The Courts must consider the nature
of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances:
Held: Where death is delayed due to later complications or
developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury,
complications or the attending circumstances – If the complications
or developments are the natural, or probable, or necessary
consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 215

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

its result, the injury could be said to have caused death – If on
the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken, or if there
is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of
cause and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too
remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death – If
the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference
that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing
from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection
is proximate. [Para 66(i)]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 and s.307 – Allegation that appellant
along with the other co-accused threw victim-deceased from
the terrace of the house and thereafter assaulted him with sticks
and fisticuffs – Victim died after nine months from the date
of incident on account of septicemia and pneumonia leading
to cardiorespiratory arrest – In such circumstances, s.302 of
IPC was added – Trial Court convicted appellant and the co-
accused for the offence of murder and were sentenced to life
imprisonment – However, the High Court altered the conviction
of the appellant herein and the other co-accused from s.302
of the IPC to one u/s.307 of the IPC and sentenced them to
undergo 7 years of rigorous imprisonment – Correctness:
Held: In the present case, as per the oral testimony of the
three doctors referred, the cause of death of deceased-R was
cardiorespiratory failure – The injuries suffered by him at the time of
assault lead to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post traumatic
spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsore hepatic
dysfunction – The injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and would come
under clause “Thirdly” of s.300 of the IPC – The deceased ultimately
died having not recovered from the injuries – The presence of the
supervening cause in the circumstances will not alter the culpability –
In the case in hand, there had been no such considerable change of
circumstances as to snap the chain of causation – The High Court
erred in recording the finding that the deceased succumbed to the
injuries suffered by him due to lack of proper treatment – There is
absolutely no evidence in this regard – According to the High Court,
since, the deceased died after about nine months from the date of
the incident due to lack of proper treatment the case is not one of
murder – This finding is erroneous – The High Court committed
a serious error in bringing the case within the ambit of attempt to
commit murder punishable u/s.307 of the IPC. [Paras 67, 68, 70]
216 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Penal Code, 1860 – s.307 – Ingredients to constitute the offence
of attempt to commit murder:
Held: The most important ingredient to constitute the offence
of attempt to commit murder punishable u/s.307 of the IPC is
the intention or knowledge – To bring home guilt against an
accused under this provision, it is necessary for the prosecution
to establish that the intention of the accused was one of the
three kinds mentioned in s.300 of the IPC – A person commits
an offence u/s.307 of the IPC when he has the intention to
commit murder and in pursuance of that intention, does an act
towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act
is the penultimate act or not – The provision requires that the
act must be done with such intention, or knowledge, or in such
circumstances that if death be caused by that act, the offence
of murder will emerge. [Para 30]

Case Law Cited
Prasad Pradhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh [2023] 1 SCR
241 : (2023) 11 SCC 320; Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat
[2001] Supp. 4 SCR 378 : (2002) 1 SCC 22; State of Haryana v.
Pala & Ors. [1996] 1 SCR 1022 : (1996) 8 SCC 51; Jagtar Singh
& Anr. v. State of Punjab (1999) 2 SCC 174 – relied on.
Sudershan Kumar v. State of Delhi [1975] 2 SCR 520 : (1975) 3
SCC 831 – referred to.
Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, 1969 SCC OnLine Ker 46;
Emperor v. Vasudeo Balwant Gogte, 1932 SCC OnLine Bom 1;
In re, Maragatham (Madras High Court); In re, Periaswami
C.A. 166 of 1961 (Mad); Nga Moe v. The King, AIR 1941 Rang
141; In re, Doraswami, 1943 SCC OnLine Mad 208 – referred to.
Reg. v. Cassidy (1867) 4 Bom. H.C. (Cr. C.) 17; R. v. Whybrow,
1951-35-Crl. Appl. 141; R v. Grimwood 1962-(3)-AER. 285; Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, 1961-AC. 290; Brintons Ltd. v.
Turvey, 1905 AC 230, 233, the Earl of Halsbury L.C.; R. v. Holland
(1841) 2 M and Rob 351; (1904) 1 Cri LJ 909 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals
Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 11th
Edn. Vol. 1, at page 232; The Essentials of Modern Surgery by
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 217

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

Handfield Jones and Pokitt, V Edn]; Mayne’s Criminal Law of India,
4th Edn., at p. 477; Male’s Pleas of the Crown, Volume I, page
28; Russel on Crime, 12th Edn., Vol. 1 at page 28 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Section 307 of IPC; Section 300 of IPC; Section 302 of IPC; First
limb of s.300 of IPC; Thirs limb of s.300 of IPC; Fourth limb of
s.300 of IPC; Fatal injury; Intention to cause death; Death occurring
after several days; Septic shock with bilateral pneumonia; Post
traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsore
hepatic dysfunction; Medical treatment; Supervening causes;
Injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
5578 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.07.2024 of the High Court
of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 607 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Padmesh Mishra, Ms. Vastvikta Bhardwaj, Ms. Neelam Singh,
Vijant.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Shivam Ganeshia, Ms. Akanksha Singh, Ambuj
Swaroop, Kapil Katare, Prashant Singh, Ms. Rajnandani Kumari.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
218 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ..................................................................... 2
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT ............... 3
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE 4
D. ANALYSIS .................................................................................. 5
i. When is an offence said to be made under Section 307 of
the IPC ........................................................................ 12
ii. Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after
some delay ............................................................. 23
E. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 39

1. This appeal is at the instance of a convict accused and is directed
against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of
Chhattisgarh dated 30.07.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 607 of 2023
(hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”) by which the High
Court partly allowed the Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant herein
and altered the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code (for short, “the IPC”) into one under Section 307
of the IPC.
2. It appears from the materials on record that four persons including
the appellant herein were put to trial for the offence of murder of
one Rekhchand Verma in the Sessions Case No. 21 of 2022 arising
from the First Information Report bearing No. 0061 of 2022 dated
22.02.2022 registered with the Saja Police Station, District Bemetara,
State of Chhattisgarh for the offence punishable under Sections 458,
294, 506(B) and 323 of the IPC respectively.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. It is the case of the prosecution that on the fateful day of the incident
the appellant herein along with three other co-accused trespassed

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 219

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

into the house of the deceased and dragged him upto the terrace of
the house and flung him down. After the deceased was thrown down
from the terrace, the appellant and other co-accused assaulted him
with sticks and fisticuffs. The injured was shifted to the hospital in a
very critical condition. Dying declaration of the deceased was recorded
vide Ex. P-22 in which he named the appellant herein and the other
co-accused. The deceased also made oral dying declarations before
the doctors who attended him medically in the hospital.
4. It appears that the injured Rekhchand Verma survived for about nine
months from the date of the alleged incident. Ultimately, he died
on 08.11.2022 on account of septicemia and pneumonia leading
to cardiorespiratory arrest. In such circumstances, Section 302 of
the IPC came to be added. The case was committed to the Court
of Session. At the end of the trial, the appellant and the three co-
accused came to be convicted of the offence of murder and were
sentenced to life imprisonment.
5. The appellant herein along with co-accused, namely, Rupesh Kumar
Sahu preferred Criminal Appeal No. 607 of 2023 in the High Court
whereas the Criminal Appeal No. 866 of 2023 was preferred by
Gulsan Sinha and Criminal Appeal No. 1151 of 2024 was preferred
by one Chavendra Patel.
6. All the three criminal appeals referred to above were heard by
the High Court and those were partly allowed vide the Impugned
Judgment and order passed by the High Court. As stated above,
the High Court altered the conviction of the appellant herein and
the other co-accused from Section 302 of the IPC to one under
Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo 7 years of
rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/-.
7. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant Maniklal Sahu
is here before us with the present appeal.

B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant vehemently
submitted that the High Court ought to have acquitted the appellant
herein of all charges rather than altering the conviction from one
under Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC. The principal contention
canvassed on behalf of the appellant herein is that the cause of death
has no nexus with the injuries suffered by the deceased at the time
220 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

of the alleged assault on him. In other words, the learned counsel
laid much stress on the fact that the injured died after about nine
months from the date of the incident. Second argument canvassed
on behalf of the appellant is, that the eyewitnesses are not reliable
witnesses. They are interested witnesses being PW-1 Satish Verma,
brother of the deceased; PW-11 Vikas Verma, another brother of the
deceased; and PW-12 Gautahiri Bai Verma, mother of the deceased. It
was argued that they had no occasion to witness the alleged assault.
9. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant would submit that there being merit in
his appeal, the same may be allowed and the appellant may be
acquitted of all the charges.

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State,
while vehemently opposing this appeal, submitted that the High Court
committed a serious error in altering the conviction under Section 302
of the IPC into one of attempt to commit murder punishable under
Section 307 of the IPC.
11. However, the learned counsel fairly submitted that the State has not
preferred any acquittal appeal in this regard. In such circumstances,
he submitted that let the conviction of the appellant herein for the
offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC be maintained.

D. ANALYSIS
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the Impugned Judgment and order?
13. We do not propose to reappreciate the entire oral evidence on record.
We have looked into the oral testimonies of PW-1 Satish Verma,
brother of the deceased; PW-11 Vikas Verma, another brother of the
deceased; and PW-12 Gautahiri Bai Verma, mother of the deceased
respectively. They are all eyewitnesses to the incident. There is no
good reason for us to disbelieve or discard their evidence.
14. We only propose to examine in the present appeal whether the High
Court committed any error in bringing the case within the ambit of
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 221

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

“attempt to commit murder” punishable under Section 307 IPC on the
ground that the deceased Rekhchand Verma died after a period of
nine months from the date of the incident. Unfortunately, the exercise
which we propose to undertake is ultimately going to be academic as
there is no acquittal appeal filed at the instance of the State. However,
we should not ignore or overlook the gross error committed by the
High Court. We must explain, why the High Court is wrong in its view.
15. We must start with the medical evidence on record. The prosecution
examined PW-9 Dr. Sheetal Kaushal. Dr. Sheetal Kaushal in his
examination-in-chief has deposed under:-
01- “I was posted as Medical Officer at Community Health
Centre Saja from 22.06.2020 to 16.06.2022.
02- On 22.02.2022 at 11.14 pm, the injured Rekhachand
Verma, son of Radheshyam Verma, age 19 years, resident
of Boratra, Police Station Saja, was brought to me for
examination by constable Indraman Nishad number 274
of Police Station Saja at Community Health Center Saja,
in which, during his examination, I found that:
1. The said injured person said that he was pushed
down from the roof and beaten up and the condition
of the said injured person was serious and his blood
pressure was very low. The said injured person was
in a semiconscious state and the smell of alcohol
was coming from his mouth.
2. The above injured person had a lacerated wound
measuring 8 cm x 0.5 cm x 1 cm in the temporal parietal
region of his head, which was bleeding profusely.
3. The above patient was having pain in his throat and
was having difficulty in moving his throat. I had advised
him to get an X-ray done and also advised him to get his
head checked by a neurosurgeon.
4. The injury was very serious so the correct opinion about
the nature of the injury could have been given only after
examination by a neurosurgeon and a radiologist. The
condition of the patient was so serious that I advised him
to be immediately taken to a higher centre.
222 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

5. The above injuries sustained by the above victim can be
caused by falling from the roof and hitting the head with a
hard or blunt object and the nature of the said injury can
be determined only after treatment by the NCCT head and
neurosurgeon and radiologist. In this regard, the medical
examination report prepared by me is Ex.P. 06, part of
which is signed by me.
03- On 25.02.2022, I was informed by the police station
in-charge Saja by sending a memorandum that the injured
Rekhachand Verma was referred to a higher center for
advanced treatment and NCCT Head, Neurosurgery,
Cervical X-ray was advised, who was admitted to Mekahara
Raipur on 23.02.2022, then to DKS Hospital Raipur and
on 24.02.2022 he was admitted from DKS Hospital to
MMI Hospital Raipur, where the victim is admitted in ICU.
Whose MRI scan has been done, the part below the waist
of the injured has become numb, due to which there is a
possibility of spinal cord fracture, so give opinion on the
following two points-
1. What is the nature of the injury suffered by the
victim?
2. Was it possible for the injured person to die due
to the injury?
I had written in reply to the above questions that, 1) “The
nature of injury can only be determined by a Radiologist
and Neurophysician and Neurosurgeon.” and 2) “Yes, it was
possible.” The Curie report prepared by me in this regard
is Ex.P. 07, which bears my signatures on parts A to A.
04- On 24,03,2022, the police station in-charge Saja sent a
sealed stick along with a memorandum for testing and asked-
1. Could the injury sustained by Rekhachand Verma
have been caused by the confiscated stick?
2. Are there blood stains on the said stick?
3. Any other opinions?
I had examined the sealed stick along with the above
mentioned memorandum sent by the police station
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 223

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

in-charge Saja, whose length and size I have mentioned
by drawing its picture and after examining the said stick,
my opinion is that 1) “Such injuries can be inflicted on the
injured Rekhachand with this type of stick.” and 2) “I did
not find any blood stains on the stick.” In this regard, the
query report prepared by me is Ex.P. 08, which bears my
signatures on parts A to A.”
There is practically no cross examination of Dr. Sheetal Kaushal.
16. We now look into the evidence of Dr. Twinkle Chandrakar, PW-24.
Dr. Chandrakar in her examination-in-chief has deposed as under:-
“01- I am posted as Assistant Professor in Sri Sankaracharya
Institute of Medical Science, Junwani Bhilai, District-Durg
(CO) for the last two years.
02- On 21.10.2022 at 10:35 P.M. the injured/deceased
Rekhchand Lodhi father Radheshyam Verma age 22
years resident Boratara Tehsil Saja District Bemetara was
brought to me for treatment at Shankaracharya Institute of
Medical Science, Junwani Bhilai Hospital. On examining
him I found that-
01. The condition of the said injured was very serious
and he had no movement and sensation in both his
legs due to which he was unable to walk and he
had trouble breathing and his blood pressure was
very low, he was not urinating and he was suffering
from vomiting and diarrhea and he also had fever.
The said injured had movement in both his hands.
02. There was a wound in the hip of the injured
person which was filled with pus.
03. The injured person had weakness in both his
hands and legs. The injured person had anaemia
and there was swelling in his body.
04. The said injured person was being given oxygen
with the help of a ventilator and medicines were being
given to maintain blood pressure and due to blood
loss, blood was transfused and antibiotics were given
and the wound on his hip was being treated.
224 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

05. The patient’s condition was not satisfactory and
the patient was becoming unstable.
03- I had admitted the said injured/ deceased on 22.10.2022
in Shankaracharya Hospital Junwani, who died during
treatment on 08.11.2022 due to Septic shock with bilateral
pneumonia with post traumatic spinal cord injury with
paraplegia with infected bedsore with hepatic dysfunction.
The entire treatment of the said deceased Rekhachand
was done by the medicine unit of the hospital under my
guidance and his discharge summary has been prepared
by Junior Doctor Richa Sharma, which is , Ex.P. 28, on
which my signature is on part A and my seal and seal are
on parts B to B. Along with the said discharge certificate,
the photocopy of the entire bedhead ticket related to the
treatment of the said deceased in our hospital is of total
137 pages and a death certificate was issued by our
hospital in relation to the death of the above deceased,
the death certificate is Ex.P. 29, on which my signature is
on part A to A and my seal and seal are on parts B to B.
04- On 29.11.2022, the police station in-charge of police
station Saja sent letter no. / Th.Pr. / Saja / 702-A / 2022
regarding providing opinion by curating the discharge
certificate and bedhead ticket of deceased Rekhachand
Lodhi. In crime number 61/2022 of police station Saja and
asked the following question-
1. On the night of 22.02.2022 at about 8 o’clock, the
accused beat up Rekhachand Verma with sticks and
fists and threw him from the roof onto the CC road
with the intention of killing him, due to which his spine
was fractured. The deceased died during treatment
at Shankaracharya Hospital on 08.11.2022. Did the
deceased die due to fracture in his spine?
2. If deceased Rekhachand died due to some other
reason, please give your clear opinion?
05- In order to answer the said query, after examining
the discharge certificate of deceased Rekhachand and
the bed head ticket related to his treatment, I have given
this statement that, 1) In the history of the said injured, on
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 225

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

22.02.2022, due to spinal cord injury, there was paraplegia
and the said deceased had weakness in both hands and
legs due to which the patient became bedridden and
there was infection in the wound of his hip, due to which
it is possible that the death of patient Rekhachand was
due to spinal cord injury. 2) While answering the query
question number 02 of the police station incharge, I have
written such an opinion in my query report Ex. P. 30
which is the memorandum of the police station in-charge
dated 29.11.2022 on the page that, A-Septic shock with
Bilateral Pneumonia. B-Post traumatic Spinal Cord injury
with Paraplegia infected bedsore hepatic dysfunction. That
is, the patient Rekhachand died due to the same reason
which I have mentioned in the answer to query question
no. 01. My signature is on parts A to A of the query report
Ex. P. 30.”
Once again, there is practically no cross examination of Dr. Twinkle
Chandrakar.
17. In the last, we should look into the oral evidence of Dr. Abhishek
Shrivastava, PW-28. Dr. Abhishek Shrivastava in his examination-
in-chief has deposed as under:-
“01- I am posted as Senior Medical Officer In Government
Hospital, Supela Bhilai, District Durg from 01.01.2021 till
date.
02- On 09.11.2022 at 12:30 PM, deceased Rekhchand
Radheshyam Lodhi, age 22 years, resident of Boratara,
District Bemetara, was presented from Shankaracharya
Hospital, father late Junwani, District Durg, for post-
mortem by constable number 484 Evan Baghel of Police
Outpost Smriti Nagar Police Station Supela, to Government
Hospital, Supela Bhilai, District Durg. The said body was
identified by Satish Lodhi, Rajendra Yadu and constable
Evan Baghel.
03- The postmortem of the said dead body was started
by me on 09.11.2022 at 12:30 P.M. The said dead body
was of a male, which was wrapped in a white cloth and
was lying straight on the postmortem table. The body of
the said deceased was stiff and cold. There was injury
226 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

on the entire back portion of both the thighs of the said
deceased and there was injury on his left ankle as well.
There was bedsore on the entire lower back of the said
deceased, the size of which was 4 x 3 cm.
04- The deceased was of normal height and his skull,
cranium, vertebrae, brain and spinal cord were congested.
There was fluid present in the right and left lungs of the
deceased. There was a clot in the heart of the deceased.
The diaphragm, intestine, mouth and esophagus and
pharynx of the deceased were normal and his spleen,
kidney were pale and urinary bladder was empty and
genitals were normal. There was half-digested food in the
stomach of the deceased and half-digested food and stool
was also present in his small intestine and large intestine.
05- On the basis of the results and experience
obtained from the postmortem of the said deceased
Rekhachand, it is my opinion that the said deceased died
of cardiorespiratory attack due to septic shock, which
was caused by infection of the injuries in the body of
the deceased. The time of death of the said deceased
was between 18 to 36 hours and the injuries found on
the body of the said deceased were before his death
(antemortem). In this regard, the postmortem report
prepared by me is Ex.P. 34, which bears my signatures
on parts A to A, B to B and C to C.
Cross-examination by Shri Balram Sahu, Advocate for
accused Gulshan and Chavendra:-
06- On being asked whether septic shock can occur in the
absence of treatment) the witness said that it is possible
if necessary antibiotics are not given during treatment.”
(Emphasis supplied)

There is practically no cross examination of Dr. Abhishek Shrivastava.
18. Thus, the injured was brought to the hospital on 22.02.2022 in a
very critical condition. According to Dr. Kaushal (PW-9), the injured
was in a semi-conscious state. He was bleeding profusely due to a
very serious head injury.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 227

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

19. What is discernable from the medical evidence on record, in the
form of oral testimonies of the three doctors referred to above, and
the documentary evidence in the form of postmortem report and
the injury certificate Exhibit P-34 is that the deceased died due to
complications from paraplegia following spinal cord injury which
resulted in systemic infection and multi-organ failure. Exhibits P-28,
P-29 and P-34 respectively make it clear. It is ultimately the septic
shock resulting from infected pressure sores which in turn arose from
the spinal injury sustained in the incident that proved to be fatal.
20. The deceased also suffered from pneumonia. According to the
medical experts, this pneumonia was the direct result of the long
drawn medical treatment which was given to the deceased over a
period of nine months.
21. All the three medical experts examined by the prosecution are clear
in their oral testimony that the deceased died during treatment
on 08.11.2022 due to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post
traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsores
leading to hepatic dysfunction. The ocular version of the eyewitnesses
corroborates with medical evidence on record.
22. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, we now proceed to consider the
understanding of the High Court while altering the conviction.

i. When is an offence said to be made under Section 307 of
the IPC
23. The High Court while altering the conviction under Section 302 to
one under Section 307 of the IPC recorded the following findings
as contained in paragraph 35 of the Impugned Judgment. Para 35
reads thus:-
“35. No doubt, the injuries caused by the appellants to
the deceased were grievous in nature. He died due to
septic shock with bilateral pneumonia with post traumatic
spinal cord injury with paraplegia with infected bedsore
with hepatic dysfunction. Due to spinal cord injury,
there was paraplegia and the deceased had weakness
in both hands and legs, due to which the deceased
became bedridden and there was infection in the wound
of his hip. Due to which, it is probable that the death
of deceased Rekhchand Verma was due to his spinal
228 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

cord injury. Rekhchand Verma was firstly referred to the
Community Health Center, Saja, the doctor there referred
him to Mekahara Hospital, Raipur and from there he was
shifted to DKS Hospital and thereafter he was again
shifted to MMI Narayan Hospital, Raipur and finally he
was shifted to Shankaracharya Hospital, Durg where
he died. As such, due to lack of proper treatment, he
died after about 9 months of the incident. Therefore, the
case of the appellants falls within the purview of Section
307 of the IPC and not under Section 302 of the IPC.
Even otherwise, the trial Court has already convicted the
appellants for offence under Section 307/34 of the IPC
for the same offence, therefore, there is no necessity to
convict them also for offence under Section 302/34 of
the IPC.”
24. We have noticed over a period of time that the courts get confused
while determining the exact nature of offence, more particularly, when
there is a long interval between the date the victim suffered injuries
and the date of his death.
25. We must first look into the relevant provisions of the IPC. Sections
299, 300 and 302 of the IPC respectively read as under:-
“Section 299. Culpable homicide.—Whoever causes death
by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or
with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by
such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.
xxx
“Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily injury,
the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed
to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper
remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been
prevented.”
Section 300. Murder.—Except in the cases hereinafter
excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which
the death is caused is done with the intention of causing
death, or—
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 229

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause
the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—
3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, or—
4thly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause
death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and
commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk
of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
xxx
Section 302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits
murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for
life, and shall also be liable to fine.”
26. To come within the definition of Section 299 IPC, the act of the
accused should cause death and it must be (a) with the intention of
causing death, or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injuries
as is likely to cause death, or (c) with the knowledge that he is likely
by such act to cause death. The question when a person could be
said to have caused death by his act needs to be answered taking
into consideration the Explanations 1 and 2 respectively to Section
299 of the IPC.
27. The simpler case is where death results directly and immediately from
the act itself. Equally, when death ensues as a natural or necessary
consequence flowing from that act, there can be no hesitation in holding
that the act caused the death. For “Thirdly” of Section 300 to apply
the requirement is, that the injury inflicted should be found sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, a high degree of
probability, in the ordinary way of nature, that death would ensue on the
injuries. The difficulty arises when there are recognisable contributory
causes leading to death, and the Court is called upon to consider in
such case the relative effect and strength of the different causes in
bringing about the effect i.e., the death, and then to ascertain whether
the responsibility of the death could be assigned to a particular act
which is not as proximate, or immediate.
230 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

28. Section 307 of the IPC reads as under:-
“Section 307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any
act with such intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would
be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused
to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable
either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as
is hereinbefore mentioned.”
29. An offence under Section 307 IPC has the following essential
ingredients:-
(i) The death of a human was attempted;
(ii) That the death was attempted to be caused, or caused in the
consequence of the act of the accused; and
(iii) That the act was done with the intention of causing death; or that
it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as:
a. the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or
b. was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by
doing an act known to him to be so dangerous that it must
in all probability cause:
i. death, or
ii. such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
30. Thus, from the above, the most important ingredient to constitute
the offence of attempt to commit murder punishable under Section
307 of the IPC is the intention or knowledge. To bring home guilt
against an accused under this provision, it is necessary for the
prosecution to establish that the intention of the accused was one
of the three kinds mentioned in Section 300 of the IPC. A person
commits an offence under Section 307 of the IPC when he has
the intention to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention,
does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether
that act is the penultimate act or not. The provision requires that
the act must be done with such intention, or knowledge, or in such
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 231

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

circumstances that if death be caused by that act, the offence of
murder will emerge.
31. It is clear as noonday that causing an injury that would endanger
life is not an essential condition for the applicability of Section 307
of the IPC. Even if the injuries inflicted are simple in nature, that by
itself cannot be a ground for acquittal, if the offence otherwise falls
under Section 307 of the IPC.
32. The word “intent” means design, or determination with which a person
acts. It presupposes knowledge. It is the purpose to use particular
means to effect certain result. The “act” referred in Section 307 of
the IPC attempted to must be with the “intention” of killing a human.
Intention is a state of mind which cannot be proved by direct evidence
as a fact; it can only ordinarily be inferred from proved facts. It may
be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent
to the incident or occurrence, or on admission. We say so because
it shows the presence of will in the act which consummates a crime.
The relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered.
We have supplied a suggestive, and not exhaustive list:-
1. the nature of the weapon used;
2. the manner in which the weapon was used;
3. the part of the body where the injuries were inflicted;
4. the nature of the injuries caused;
5. the opportunity available which the accused gets.
33. We may quote with profit one very erudite decision of the High Court of
in the case of Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, reported in 1969 SCC
OnLine Ker 46, wherein the Court illustrated the metrics by which
intention and knowledge can be inferred. It was held that intention
can be inferred from the circumstantial evidence of the case, such as
the motive, the preparations made, the declarations of the offender,
the weapon used, the persistent of the assault, and the nature of the
injuries inflicted, and its position. In the IPC, the word “intention” is
understood in the context of the consequences of an act, and not in
relation to the act. The Court lucidly elaborates that the presence of
intention is gathered when an act is done deliberately or purposely,
it is not contingent on the resultant effect. Most importantly, the
232 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

inference lies in reading of the consequences from the eyes of a
reasonable man. The relevant observations read thus:-
“16. Intention and knowledge are a man’s state of mind;
direct evidence thereof except through his own confession
cannot be had; and apart from a confession they can be
proved only by circumstantial evidence. In other words,
they are matters for inference from all the circumstances
of the case such as the motive, the preparations made, the
declarations of the offender, and, in the case of homicide,
the weapon used, the persistence of the assault, and
the nature of the injuries actually inflicted as also their
location. In the case of what are generally described as
unpremediated offences or as offences committed on the
spur of the moment, intention may be contemporaneous
with the physical act, at best of just an instant before, and is
generally to be gathered from the nature and consequences
of the act and the attendant circumstances. It is here that
the much criticised maxim that every man is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his act
comes into play.
17. Like most words, the word, “intention” is capable of
different shades of meaning. In the Penal Code, 1860
it is used in relation to the consequences of an act, the
effect caused thereby, not in relation to the act itself—the
voluntariness required to constitute an act is implied by
that very word. Thus, in the case of murder, the intention
required is (omitting clause secondly of S. 300 which
rarely comes into play) the intention of causing death
or the intention of causing bodily injury sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, more or less
the malice aforethought of the English law, the former
being generally described as specific intent or malice and
the latter as implied malice or sometimes as constructive
malice, though the use of the latter term seems open to
criticism. It seems to us clear from the illustrations to Ss.
88, 89 and 92, that the Code uses the word, “intention”
in the sense that something is intentionally done if it is
done deliberately or purposely, in other words, is a willed
though not necessarily a desired result or a result which is
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 233

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

the purpose of the deed. The surgeon of the illustrations
certainly does not desire the harm that may be caused;
nor is that his purpose. Nevertheless, the provisions
of the sections show that he could have intended the
harm, and is saved from being a criminal only by those
provisions. Likewise a man who shoots another in the
heart and kills him in self-defence might not desire, on
the contrary might very much dislike, causing the latter’s
death. His purpose is not to cause death but to save
himself. Yet his case falls squarely within the first clause
of S. 300—he has undoubtedly caused death by doing
an act with the intention of causing death—and is saved
from being a murderer only by S. 100. Lang v. Lang(1955)
A.C. 402 rather than Rex v. Steane(1947) K.B. 997 at
1004 or Hosegood v. Hosegood66 The Times L.R. 738
illustrate the sense in which the word, “intention” is used
in S. 300 of the Penal Code, 1860—of course none of
these cases was construing that statute. And, once you
dispense with desire or purpose, it follows that foresight
of the consequences of an act gains the upper hand in
determining whether the consequences were intended or
not. And, the foresight of a particular person is prima facie
to be gauged by the foresight of an ordinary, reasonable
man, in other words, by what is sometimes disparagingly
referred to as the objective test or external standard—as
if that were enough to condemn it—of the reasonable and
probable consequences of the act.”
(Emphasis supplied)

34. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC it is not essential that
bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted.
Although, the nature of injury actually caused may often give
considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention
of the accused, yet such intention may also be deduced from other
circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained
without any reference at all to the actual wounds. The provision
makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if
any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the
person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which
the culprit would be liable under the provision. It is not necessary
234 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be
sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the
person assaulted. What the courts have to see is whether the act,
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge
and under circumstances mentioned in the provision. An attempt in
order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient
in law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof.
35. An offence under Section 307 IPC is made out even though death
does not ensue, more pertinently, even if no harm ensues. The phrase
employed in the provision, “if he by the act caused death”, imports
that the act in question must possess the potential to cause death.
An act intrinsically incapable of causing death cannot constitute
the offence under this provision. We had the benefit of referring to
Reg. v. Cassidy, reported in (1867) 4 Bom. H.C. (Cr. C.) 17, which
emphasizes upon the same in the following words:-
“The first two heads are framed under S. 307. The words
of that section are:— “Whoever does any act with such
intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances,
that if he by that act caused death he would be guilty of
murder, shall be punished, “& c. Now it appears to me,
looking at the terms of this section, as well as at the
illustrations to it, that it is necessary, in order to constitute
an offence under it, that there must be an act done under
such circumstances that death might be caused if the act
took effect. The act must be capable of causing death in
the natural and ordinary course of things; and if the act
complained of is not of that description, a prisoner cannot
be convicted of an attempt to murder under this section”.
(Emphasis supplied)

36. This decision was criticised by Beaumont, C.J. in Emperor v.
Vasudeo Balwant Gogte reported in 1932 SCC OnLine Bom 1,
but the learned Judge’s conclusion expressed in the following words
seems to us much the same:-
“But if you have an act done with a sufficiently guilty
intention and knowledge and in circumstances which do not
from their nature afford a defence to a charge of murder,
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 235

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

and if the act is of such a nature as would have caused
death in the usual course of events but for something
beyond the accused’s control which prevented that result,
then it seems to me that the case falls within S. 337.”
37. From the above exposition of law, there is no gainsaying that the
assault shall be capable of causing death. In R. v. Whybrow (1951-
35-Crl. Appl. 141) the accused by a device constructed by him
administered electric shocks to his wife while she was in a bath.
Parker, J. directed the jury that if he did so, intending to kill his wife
or to do her grievous bodily harm he would be guilty of attempt at
murder. The Court of Appeal held that this was a wrong direction.
Observing that if the charge is one of attempt at murder, the intention
to kill is the principal ingredient of the crime. Lord Goddard C.J.,
expressed himself thus:-
“Therefore, if one person attacks another, inflicting a wound
in such a way that an ordinary, reasonable person must
know that atleast grievous bodily harm will result and
death results, there is the malice aforethought sufficient
to support the charge of murder. But, if the charge is one
of attempted murder, the intent becomes the principal
ingredient of the crime. It may be said that the law which
is not always logical, is somewhat illogical in saying that,
if one attacks a person intending to do grievous bodily
harm and death results, that is murder; but if one attacks
a person and only intends to do grievous bodily harm,
and death does not result, it is not attempted murder, but
wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm. It is not
really illogical because, in that particular case, the intent is
the essence of the crime while, where the death of another
is caused, the necessity is to prove malice aforethought,
which is supplied in law by proving intent to do grievous
bodily harm.”
(Emphasis supplied)

38. In R v. Grimwood (1962-(3)-AER. 285), the accused had been
convicted by the Central Criminal Court of attempt to strangle his
wife with intent to murder her. No verdict was taken from the jury on
two other counts, namely, attempt to suffocate his wife with intent to
236 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

murder and assault occasioning her actual bodily harm. In the course
of his direction to the jury the learned Judge, relying on Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Smith (1961-AC. 290), observed:-
“He is put before you by his counsel as an ordinary normal
minded man, and so you should take it in this case that he
is an ordinary normal-minded man. The Law is that in the
case of an ordinary normal man it does not matter what
that man contemplates at the moment at all. The test is
whether what he did was of a kind where death might well
have been the natural and probable result of what he did.”
(Emphasis supplied)

39. On appeal from the above conviction, Lord Parker, C.J. delivering
the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal observed that the Court
was clearly of the opinion that nothing that was said in Smith (supra)
had any application to the offence of attempted murder. Adverting
in particular, to the direction to the jury extracted supra, the Lord
Chief Justice observed:-
“One further matter should be mentioned, and that is
that certainly in regard to the first passage which I have
quoted in the summing up it might well have led the jury
to suppose that, even if they were satisfied that all that
the appellant intended to do was to cause grievous bodily
harm, yet if death might well result from such grievous
bodily harm an intent to murder had been proved. That
again, if that impression was conveyed, was quite clearly
a wrong direction. In R. v. Whybrow1951-35-Crl. Appl. 141
Lord Goddard, C.J. dealt with that very point.”

ii. Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues
after some delay
40. The theory of causation should be kept within reasonable limits at
both ends. The question when there are latter complications would be,
whether such complications are the natural or likely consequences of
the injury, the ordinary course it takes before death causes. That the
consequences are labelled as a supervening condition or disease,
given a name and shown as the immediate cause of death will not
efface from the chain of events and causes the original injury, if
death is its ultimate result. At the end, all death is brought about by
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 237

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

coma, syncope or asphyxia, the synchronised and interdependent
functioning of the brain; the heart and the lungs maintaining life.
Death may properly be attributed to coma, syncope and asphyxia,
but the cause cannot stop there. The stoppage of one of them will
be quickly followed by the stoppage of the action of others and by
cessation of life. In Brintons Ltd. v. Turvey, 1905 AC 230, 233,
the Earl of Halsbury L.C. while considering the phrase “accident
causing injury” observing that “we must be on our guard that we are
not misled by medical phrases to alter the proper application of the
phrase, because the injury inflicted by accident sets up a condition
of things which medical men describe as disease” stated:-
“An injury to the head has been known to set up septic
pneumonia, and many years ago I remember when that
incident had in fact occurred it was sought to excuse
the person who inflicted the blow on the head from the
consequences of his crime because his victim had died
of pneumonia and not as it was contended, of the blow
on the head. It does not appear to me that by calling the
consequences of an accidental injury a disease one alters
the nature or the consequential results of the injury that
has been inflicted.”
41. In the same case at p. 234, Lord Mac-naghten observed:-
“The accidental character of the injury is not, I think,
removed or displaced by the fact that, like many other
accidental injuries, it set up a well known disease, which
was immediately the cause of death, and would no doubt
be certified as such in the usual death certificate.”
42. However, for culpability, as stated in Mayne’s Criminal Law of
India, 4th Edn., at p. 477 “it is indispensable that death should be
connected with the act of violence not merely by a chain of causes
and effects but by such direct influence as is calculated to produce
the effect without the intervention of any considerable change of
circumstances.” The learned commentator referring to R. v. Holland,
(1841) 2 M and Rob 351; (1904) 1 Cri LJ 909, observed at page 476:-
“The real question was whether in the end the wound was
the cause of death.”
(Emphasis supplied)
238 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

43. He refers to Explanation 2 to Section 299 as substantially producing
the rule enunciated in Male’s Pleas of the Crown, Volume I, page 28,
to the following effect:-
“If a man receives a wound, which is not in itself mortal,
but either for want of helpful applications or neglect thereof
it turns to a gangrene or a fever, and that gangrene or
fever be the immediate cause of death, yet this is murder
or manslaughter in him that gave the stroke or wound,
though it were not the immediate cause of his death, yet
if it were the immediate cause thereof, and the fever or
gangrene was the immediate cause of his death, yet the
wound was the cause of the gangrene or fever, and so
consequently is causa causans.”
(Emphasis supplied)

44. The learned author observes at p. 475:-
“Where an injury of a dangerous character has been
inflicted, which might possibly not have been fatal, but
the sufferer declines to follow proper treatment, or is
injudiciously treated, or sinks under an operation which
might possibly have been avoided, the person who inflicted
the injury is considered in law to have caused the death
which results.”
(Emphasis supplied)

45. In R. v. Holland (supra), the deceased who had received a cut
on the finger did not follow the advice of the surgeon to have it
amputated. Subsequently, lock-jaw set in because of which he died.
Evidence was let in that if he had submitted to an operation, his life
would probably have been saved. But Maule, J. held that that was
no defence.
46. In Russel on Crime, 12th Edn., Vol. 1 at page 28 it is stated:-
“There is however, the different, although allied, point that a
particular man’s conduct may not have been the sole cause
of the actus reus, it may have been a contributory cause.
In such circumstances, it would seem that a safeguard
against injustice should take the form of a direction to the
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 239

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

jury that they should not convict unless they are satisfied
that actus reus would not have occurred but for the accused
man’s participation in the matter.”
47. Proceeding it is observed:-
“The actus reus, on the above definition is an event, and
any particular event may be found to have been produced
by the combined effect of a number of factors any one of
which may be regarded as a cause of the event provided
that this event would not have taken place had that factor
not existed. In such a situation a man may be held to have
caused the actus reus of a crime if that actus would not
have occurred without his participation in what led upto it.”
(Emphasis supplied)

48. Referring to indirect causation, it was observed by the Madras High
Court In re, Maragatham:-
“But how far can indirect causation to be recognised as
operative, in criminal jurisprudence? A glimmer of light
is thrown upon this problem in the case law relating to
explanation 2 to Section 299, I. P. C. If, after the blow
or act of injury impugned as homicidal, a distinct set of
circumstances arises causing. a new mischief, then the
new mischief will be regarded as the causa causans and
not the original blow: R. v. Flynn. (1867) 16 WR 319 IR,
cited in Ratan’s Culpable homicide p. 8”. But the question
is hardly free from subtle difficulties.”
(Emphasis supplied)

49. The difficulty of deciding between proximate and remote cause or
for finding out causa causans was cut through by the rule of English
common law that a man who had received injury from another was
not considered to have been killed by him, unless death followed
within a year and a day after the injury. But there is no such rule in
the Indian Penal Code. While referring to the theory of causation
which provided the simple test of guilty in the early period of criminal
law, in Russel on Crimes, 12th Edn., Volume 1, the learned author
observes at page 28 that the drawing of a line between proximate
240 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

causes and remote consequences is unscientific, but appeared to
be the only way of avoiding decisions of a cruelty offensive to moral
feelings before the doctrine of mens rea as a legally essentially
ingredient in criminal liability appeared.” The learned author states
at p. 40:-
“The new test (foresight of consequences) is found in the
requirement that the accused person, when pursuing the
line of active conduct (or passive) in cases where there is
a legal duty to action which resulted in the harm for which
he is charged (i.e., the actus reus) must have been aware
that certain sped fled harmful consequences would or
could follow. Such a test arises naturally from the adoption
of the ethical approach to the problem of crime, since in
many minds it is hard to see any moral blame, meriting
the infliction of punishment, in a man who has pursued a
line of conduct without appreciating that it would produce
mischievous results.”
(Emphasis supplied)

50. In the footnote at page 412, the learned author observes that
the unscientific differentiation between proximate and remote
consequences of a man’s conduct was probably due to the lack of
clear definition of mens rea which would have rendered innocuous
a remote claim of causation; since the more remote the cause the
less possible it would be to establish that the prisoner intended or
realised the result.
51. The problem of supervening cause intervening arose for consideration
In re, Periaswami, C.A. 166 of 1961 (Mad). In that case, the accused
whipped out his knife and stabbed the deceased in his abdomen
in the course of a sudden quarrel. The deceased had a tear in his
stomach and an incised cut in the liver. He was under treatment for
17 days and was having a sinus through which he was discharging
bile and some pus. Due to the constant discharge of bile and pus,
the abdomen suddenly burst. The abdomen was sutured, but he
did not recover. In the opinion of the doctor, the deceased would
appear to have died of septic peritonitis as a result of the injuries to
the stomach, liver and pancreas. It was contended for the accused
that the deceased died not as a result of the wounds inflicted by the
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 241

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

accused, but on account of some other causes, which intervened, in
the course of treatment. After examining the case law, it is observed
that the accused inflicted the injury on the vital part of the body, and
that there was no definite evidence that death was due to other
independent supervening causes. It was held that death was due
to an injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, and that death was ultimately due to the supervening
of septic peritonitis and the accused was directly responsible for
causing death. It was found on the evidence, that, though there was
culpable homicide, yet it was a case falling under Part II of Section
304 of the IPC.
52. The decision in Nga Moe v. The King, AIR 1941 Rang 141, is again
illustrative:-
“The injury indicted by the accused on deceased’s head
was not such as to entail any serious consequences to a
person in normal health. The wound had healed up to the
end of seven days in the hospital but the deceased had
temperature and on this account was advised to remain
in hospital until temperature had subsided. Contrary to
medical advice, the deceased left hospital. Subsequently
as a result of the formation of an abscess on the brain the
deceased died. But no death would have resulted, if he had
not insisted on leaving the hospital against medical advice.
His death really ensued because of his weak physical
condition due to his suffering from chronic malaria and
because his powers of resistance to infection had been
much lowered by that disease. No abscess would have
formed on the brain if the deceased had been in normal
state of health and he died from abscess and not from
the injury which had only a remote connection with the
abscess. The immediate cause of the deceased’s death
was his debilitated condition for which the injury was in
no way responsible.”
53. It was held in the circumstances that the accused was guilty of causing
simple hurt punishable under Section 324 of the IPC. Dunkley, J.
observed at P. 144:-
“Therefore, it cannot be held that the act of the appellant
caused the death of the deceased. The only case in
242 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

which the infliction of an injury of this nature under similar
circumstances could be held to amount to culpable
homicide or murder is a case falling within Clause 2 of
Section 300, I. P. C. namely, if the act is done with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender
knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to
whom the harm is caused. If there had been evidence
to show that the appellant was at the time aware of the
state of the deceased’s health and therefore knew that
even a slight injury was likely to result in his death, his
act might have been brought under this clause, but there
is no such evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

54. The following observations of Roberts, C.J. in the case are apposite in
the circumstances of the present case. The learned Judge observed:-
“It really is plain common sense that, if a man strikes
another such a blow as will not in the ordinary course of
events cause more than simple hurt, he is answerable
for causing simple hurt and, for no more. No doubt, the
natural effect of some grave wounds, if not medically
treated, is septic inflammation, if death proceeds from this
in the ordinary course the offender is prima facie guilty
of murder; if death is merely the likely result of such an
injury, it is culpable homicide. But here the dangerous
condition which supervened was an unlikely consequence
of a blow comparatively trivial in character although the
weapon was a dangerous one. The fact that a dangerous
weapon is used is often and may be indeed generally,
a matter to be taken into account in deciding questions
of intention; but circumstances after cases, and, having
regard to the medical evidence here as to the wound itself
it is impossible to say that there was an intention to cause
death. The offence could not therefore amount even to
culpable homicide.”
(Emphasis supplied)

55. The leading old case is In re, Doraswami, reported in 1943 SCC
OnLine Mad 208, where the principle is thus enunciated:-
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 243

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

“In my view, the test is whether the cause of death is to be
directly associated with the act. Whether it be a deliberate
act in criminal cases or an accident in cases of workmen’s
compensation it is, I think, well known that the ultimate cause
of death in a large number of cases is pneumonia. It would
be a strange position if a man who inflicts a wound causing
almost immediate death should be guilty of murder, whilst a
man who inflicts a very similar wound from which pneumonia
supervenes should not. On the facts of this case, it is clear
to me that the deceased man, in spite of his physique which
is said to have been exceptionally robust, died as a direct
result of the injuries inflicted upon him by the appellant; and
that the appellant intended his death is evident from the
facts. The result was not as immediate as he intended and
not perhaps quite in the manner that he intended. But in the
process of nature, in spite of medical attention, one of the
well known perils from a wound supervened, namely, blood
poisoning, and the deceased died. The chain of causation
is in my view direct.”
(Emphasis supplied)

56. In Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence,
11th Edn. Vol. 1, at page 232, it is stated:-
“A wound may cause death either directly or Indirectly.
A wound operates as a direct cause of death when the
wounded person dies either immediately or very soon
after its infliction, and there is no other cause of death.
In wounds which cause death indirectly the deceased
survives for a certain period, and the wound is complicated
by inflammation embolism, pneumonia, tetanus, or some
other mortal disease which is a consequence of the injury.
Cases which prove fatal by reason of surgical operation
rendered imperatively necessary for the treatment of
injuries presuming that these operations have been
performed with ordinary skill and care, also fall into this
category.... It would be no answer to a charge of death
from violence to say that there was disease in the body of
the victim unless the disease was the sole cause of death.”
(Emphasis supplied)
244 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

57. At page 238, the learned author observes:-
“Certain kinds of injuries are not immediately followed by
various consequences: but an injured person may die after
a long or shorter period and his death may be as much a
consequence of the injury as if it had taken place on the
spot. An aggressor is as responsible as if the deceased
had been directly killed by his violence provided the fatal
result can be traced to probable consequences of the
injury....Death may follow a wound, and be a consequence
of that wound, at almost any period after its infliction. It
is necessary however, in order to maintain a charge of
homicide, that death should be strictly and clearly traceable
to the injury. A doubt on this point must of course lead to
an acquittal of the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)

58. Septicemia is described by the medical experts as the condition which
results where the circulation becomes flooded with bacteria, either
due to the failure of local defensive reactions at the site of infection or
to delayed or inadequate treatment. According to the learned author,
every penetrating wound except those inflicted by the surgeon is
potentially infected, though a certain period elapsed before invading
organisms actually establish themselves become embedded in the
tissues to multiply and form toxins. [See: The Essentials of Modern
Surgery by Handfield Jones and Pokitt, V Edn]
59. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court in Prasad
Pradhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2023) 11
SCC 320, this Court stated in paragraphs 30 and 31 respectively
as under:-
“30. During the hearing, the appellants’ counsel had urged
that Vrindawan died 20 days after the attack, and the lapse
of such a time shows that the injuries were not sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. On this
aspect, there are several judgments, which emphasise
that such a lapse of time, would not per se constitute a
determinative factor as to diminish the offender’s liability
from the offence of murder to that of culpable homicide,
not amounting to murder.[…]
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 245

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

31. There can be no stereotypical assumption or formula
that where death occurs after a lapse of some time, the
injuries (which might have caused the death), the offence
is one of culpable homicide. Every case has its unique
fact situation. However, what is important is the nature of
injury, and whether it is sufficient in the ordinary course
to lead to death. The adequacy or otherwise of medical
attention is not a relevant factor in this case, because the
doctor who conducted the post-mortem clearly deposed
that death was caused due to cardiorespiratory failures, as
a result of the injuries inflicted upon the deceased. Thus,
the injuries and the death were closely and directly linked.”
(Emphasis supplied)

60. In the case of Sudershan Kumar v. State of Delhi, reported in
(1975) 3 SCC 831, this Court dealt with the case of acid pouring. In
the said case, this Court was called upon to consider the question as
regards the nature of the offence committed by the appellant therein
in causing death of one Maya Devi by pouring acid on her body.
After 12 days from the date of incident the victim therein died. It was
argued on behalf of the appellant that death of Maya Devi was not
the direct result of the injuries caused by the acid burns but was on
account of some supervening circumstances not resulting from the
injuries and, therefore, the appellant therein could not be held guilty
of murder. This Court while negativizing such contention observed
that the injuries caused by the appellant therein were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death and the appellant was
accordingly held guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302
of the IPC.
61. In Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2002)
1 SCC 22, the interval between the date of the incident when the
deceased sustained burns and the date of her death was a fortnight.
It was argued on behalf of the appellant therein that the death of the
deceased had no direct nexus with the burn injuries as during the
interregnum period some other complications cropped up as a result
of which the victim succumbed. While negativizing such contention,
this Court observed as under:-
“16. Harping on an answer given by PW 12 in cross-
examination that death of the deceased had occurred due
246 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

to “septic” learned Senior Counsel made out an argument
that such septic condition could have developed on
account of other causes. Mere possibility of other causes
supervening during her hospitalisation is not a safe premise
for deciding whether she would not have died due to the
burns sustained on 21-10-1988. The cause of death can
be determined on broad probabilities. In this context we
may refer to a passage from Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence
and Toxicology, dealing with death by burns:
“As already mentioned, death may occur within 24 to
48 hours, but usually the first week is the most fatal.
In suppurative cases, death may occur after five or
six weeks or even longer.”
17. In Om Parkash v. State of Punjab [(1992) 4 SCC 212]
the victim was set ablaze on 17-03-1979 and she sustained
burns with which she died only 13 days thereafter. The
assailant was convicted of murder and the conviction was
confirmed by this Court.
18. It is preposterous to say that the deceased in this case
would have been healed of the burn injuries and that she
would have contracted infection through some other causes
and developed septicemia and died of that on 15-11-
1988. Court of law need not countenance mere academic
possibilities when the prosecution case regarding death of
the deceased was established on broad probabilities as a
sequel to the burns sustained by her. Hence we repel the
contention of the learned counsel on that score.”
(Emphasis supplied)

62. In State of Haryana v. Pala & Ors., reported in (1996) 8 SCC 51,
this Court had the occasion to explain the difference between the
primary effect of the injuries and the secondary effect of the injuries.
In the said case, the victim was hit on his head three times and after
the victim had fallen the other accused had beaten him thrice on
his chest and abdomen. The victim was taken to the hospital; he
died several days later in the hospital. In the said case the doctor’s
opinion as regards the cause of death was as follows:-
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 247

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

“Cause of the death was due to Septicemia, which resulted
as a result of the head injury and was sufficient to cause
death in ordinary course of nature”
63. It was contended on behalf of the accused before this Court that the
offence would not fall under any of the limbs of Section 300 of the
IPC. This question was considered in the light of further information
given by the doctors which is as follows:-
“Septicemia is the direct result of the head-injury. This is
not a disease. In other words, head injury is the cause
of death.”
64. The trial court convicted the accused applying Clause 3 of Section 300
under Section 302 of the IPC. On appeal the High Court applied
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and altered the offence of murder
into culpable homicide not amounting to murder and convicted the
accused under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In appeal before this
Court, in paragraphs 3 and 4 respectively, of the judgment the Court
held as follows:-
“3. On the other hand he contended that when death
was due to septicemia, it cannot be referable to the
cause of the death in the ordinary course of nature due
to ante-mortem injuries and that, therefore, the offence
of murder has not been made out. In support thereof, he
sought to place reliance on Lyon’s Medical Jurisprudence
for India (Tenth Edition) at page 222. It is stated therein
that “Danger to life depends, primarily, on the amount of
haemorrhage, on the organ wounded, and on the extent
of shock; secondarily, on secondary haemorrhage, on the
occurrence of septicemia, erysipelas, tetanus, or other
complications. In answering the question whether a wound
is dangerous to life, the danger must be assessed on the
probable primary effects of the injury. Such possibilities as
the occurrence of tetanus or septicemia, later on, are not to
be taken into consideration”. Though the learned counsel
had not read the latter part of the opinion, the medical
evidence on record do clearly establish that septicemia is
not the primary cause and the death was due to injuries
caused to the deceased and they are sufficient to cause
248 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

death in the ordinary course of nature. Septicemia would,
therefore, not be taken into account.
4. Clause 3rdly of Section 300 IPC envisages that if the
act is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to
any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
it would be murder coming under Section 300 IPC and
that, therefore, it would not be culpable homicide under
Section 299 IPC. When the accused emerged from their
house and beat with deadly weapon on the head and other
parts of the body and death occurred as a result of the
injuries, it must be inferred that the attack on vital parts
of the body was intended to be caused with an intention
to cause death. Intention is locked up in the heart of the
assailant and the inference is to be drawn from acts and
attending circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)

65. In Jagtar Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, reported in (1999)
2 SCC 174, this Court was called upon to decide as to whether
the offence would fall within the scope of Section 302 of the IPC
when the death was due to septicemia. It was argued on behalf
of the accused persons that septicemia had occurred because of
the improper treatment given. It was further contended that if there
had been proper treatment the deceased would not have died. This
contention was negatived by the Court referring to Explanation 2 to
Section 299 of IPC which reads as follows:-
“Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily injury,
the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed
to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper
remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been
prevented.”
66. In paragraph 7 of the judgment this Court held as follows:-
“7. Having given our anxious consideration to the first
contention of Mr. Gujral, we do not find any substance in
it. It is true that Naib Singh died 16 days after the incident
due to septicemia, but Dr M.P. Singh (PW 1), who held
the post-mortem examination, categorically stated that the
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 249

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

septicemia was due to the head injury sustained by Naib
Singh and that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. From the impugned
judgment, we find that the above contention was raised
on behalf of the appellants and in rejecting the same, the
High Court observed:
“It is well settled that culpable homicide is not murder
when the case is brought within the five exceptions
to Section 300 Penal Code, 1860. But even though
none of the said five exceptions is pleaded or prima
facie established on the evidence on record, the
prosecution must still be required under the law to
bring the case under any of the four clauses, firstly to
fourthly, of Section 300 Penal Code, 1860, to sustain
the charge of murder. Injury 1 was the fatal injury.
When this injury is judged objectively from the nature
of it and other evidence including the medical opinion
of Dr M.P. Singh (PW 1), we are of the considered
view that the injury was intended to be caused
with the intention of causing such a bodily injury by
Harbans Singh, the appellant on the person of Naib
Singh which was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death….”
On a perusal of the evidence of PW 1 in the light of
Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC, we are in complete
agreement with the above-quoted observations of the
High Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)

67. In the present case, as per the oral testimony of the three doctors
referred to above, the cause of death of deceased Rekhchand was
cardiorespiratory failure. The injuries suffered by him at the time of
assault lead to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post traumatic
spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsore hepatic
dysfunction. The injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and would come
under clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 of the IPC. The deceased
ultimately died having not recovered from the injuries. The presence
of the supervening cause in the circumstances will not, in our view,
250 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

alter the culpability. In the case in hand, there had been no such
considerable change of circumstances as to snap the chain of
causation. It would have been quite a different matter if the original
injuries had healed meanwhile or ceased to be dangerous to life and
the fatal complications had set in unexpectedly. If that would have
been so, the appellant herein would then at any rate be entitled to
the benefit of doubt as to the cause of death.
68. We are taken by surprise as to on what basis the High Court has
recorded a finding that the deceased succumbed to the injuries
suffered by him due to lack of proper treatment. There is absolutely
no evidence in this regard. Not a single suggestion in this regard
was put by the defence counsel in the cross-examination of the
doctors. Even otherwise this aspect is wholly irrelevant in view of
Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC. In other words, according to the
High Court, since, the deceased died after about nine months from
the date of the incident due to lack of proper treatment the case is
not one of murder. This finding in our opinion is erroneous. On one
hand, the High Court believes that the cause of death was due to
injuries suffered by the deceased, and on the other hand, takes the
view that as he died after nine months due to lack of proper treatment
the offence would fall within Section 307 of the IPC.

E. CONCLUSION
69. We may highlight few broad principles that the courts must keep
in mind.
a. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was
to cause death, though the death occurred after several days
of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet
it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of
Section 300 of the IPC.
b. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is
established that those injuries were the intended injuries,
though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or
other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused
would squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the
IPC and the accused is therefore liable to be punished under
Section 302 of the IPC.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 251

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

c. If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to
life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other
complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would
squarely fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC,
provided, the other requirements like knowledge on the part of
the accused, etc. are satisfied and so the accused would be
liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Here also,
the primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia.
d. In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that
skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal
result is wholly irrelevant.
e. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused,
then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death,
even if death was not the direct result of the injuries.
f. Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the
exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first,
where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only
a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury;
then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular
circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary
course of nature be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the
complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a
practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In that event, the
probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty
i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events. A deep
abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal
organs is practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing
death. It is clearly a case of murder under Section 302 and not
merely of culpable homicide.
g. Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one
of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to
the Court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the
body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants
intended to cause death of the deceased. If none of the injuries
alone were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
the death of the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death.
252 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

h. What the courts must see is whether the injuries were sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such
bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to cause death
although death was ultimately due to supervention of some other
cause. An intervening cause or complication is by itself not of such
significance. What is significant is whether death was only a remote
possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course.
i. To sum it up, where death is delayed due to later complications
or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the
injury, complications or the attending circumstances. If the
complications or developments are the natural, or probable,
or necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably
contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have
caused death. If on the other hand, the chain of consequences
is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new
mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or
the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be
said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a
fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused
by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the
injury itself, since causal connection is proximate.
70. In view of the aforesaid, all that we can say is that the High Court
committed a serious error in bringing the case within the ambit of
attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 of the IPC
on the ground that the victim survived for almost nine months from
the date of the incident, and died on account of pneumonia and
other complications during the course of treatment and not due to the
injuries suffered at the time of assault. We do not agree with the view
expressed by the High Court in the Impugned Judgment and order.
71. In the circumstances referred to above, we reach the conclusion that
there is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
72. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan