Holding

A forward‑caste individual cannot become a member of a Scheduled Caste or Tribe merely by marriage; the claimant must prove strict community acceptance, and without such proof reservation benefits cannot be claimed.

Summary

The first respondent, a Rajput woman, married a Scheduled Caste man and fraudulently obtained a Scheduled Caste certificate by birth, which was later cancelled. She contested a Delhi municipal corporation election for a seat reserved for Scheduled Caste women and was declared elected. The appellant, another candidate, filed an election petition alleging that the respondent was not a Scheduled Caste member. The District Judge held the certificate was obtained by fraud and the election void; the High Court reversed, accepting that marriage acceptance by the husband’s family sufficed for caste change. The Supreme Court dismissed the High Court’s view, holding that a forward‑caste person cannot acquire Scheduled Caste status solely by marriage and that the burden of proving community acceptance lies on the claimant. Consequently, the election of the respondent was declared void and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant had locus standi to maintain the appeal.
Whether a person belonging to a forward caste can acquire Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe status solely by marriage.
Whether acceptance of the marriage by the husband’s family (biradari) constitutes acceptance by the community for purposes of reservation.
Whether the constitutional reservations under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are distinct from those under Articles 330 and 332 in determining eligibility for a reserved seat.
Whether the election of the respondent to the reserved seat is void.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 15(4), s. Article 16(4), s. Article 330, s. Article 332, s. Article 341
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 106
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 116-C

Subjects

Scheduled CasteReservationMarriageCaste conversionMunicipal electionBurden of proofEligibilityArticles 15(4) and 16(4)Articles 330 and 332

Judgment

A MEERA KANWARIA
v.
SUN ITA AND ORS.

DECEMBER 8, 2005

B [S.B. SINHA AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 15(4), 16(4), 330 and 332-
Status of Scheduled Caste-Claim-For the purpose of contesting election
for Municipal Corporation on reserved seat-By a candidate belonging to
C upper class Hindu by birth and acquiring status of Scheduled Caste by
marriage-Marriage accepted by elders of family-No proof of acceptance
thereof by the community-Certificate on the basis of her being Scheduled
Caste by birth found to have been issued on wrong declaration-Held: A
person who is a high caste Hindu and not subjected to any social or
D educational backwardeness, cannot ipso facto become a member of Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe by reason of marriage a/one-Acceptance of
marriage by elders offamily cannot be said to be acceptance by community-
In absence of the strict proof that her marriage has been accepted by the
community, she cannot be allowed to defeat the very provisions made by the
State for reserving certain seats for disadvantaged people-The burden to
E prove the change to the special class claiming protective discrimination will
be on the person who affirms the same-Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act,1957-Evidence Act,1872-Section JOI.

Respondent No.l, a Rajput by caste married a member of Scheduled
F Caste. She applied for and obtained a certificate of her belonging to Scheduled
Caste by birth. On complaint against grant of the same, an inquiry was made,
and it was found that the certificate was issued on the basis of wrong
declaration. The certificate granted in her favour was cancelled.
She contested an election for the Municipal Councilor on a seat
G reserved for a Scheduled Caste woman. She was declared elected. Appellant
lost the election. One 'K' filed an election petition under Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 praying that the appellant be declared elected as
respondent No.I could not have been considered to be belonging to Scheduled
Caste by reason of her marriage alone. Appellant was arrayed therein as

650
H
MEERA KANWARIA v. SUNITA 651

respondent. District Judge allowed the petition holding that the respondent A
had manipulated a Scheduled Caste Certificate and she could not be said to
have acquired the status of Scheduled Caste on account of her marriage with
a Scheduled Caste person. She filed writ petition wherein High Court held
that judgment of District Judge was unsustainable because the first
resl'Ondent was accepted by her husband's family and the community; i>nd that
principles of reservation contained in Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the B
Constitution would be different in a case wherein an individual claims benefits
that might be due to a person belonging to Scheduled Caste.

In appeal to this Court, first respondent inter a/ia raised preliminary
objection as regards appellant's locus standi to file the appeal on the ground
that the appellant had neither filed written statement nor advanced any oral C
arguments before trial court.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The plea objecting locus standi of appellant to file the appeal
is not sustainable. The appellant in the present case, took part in the election D
petition through her counsel, although she might not have filed a Written
Statement. She was a necessary party. A prayer was made in the election
petition that she be declared elected. The election petition succeeded in part.
In the appeal preferred there-against by the First Respondent, the Appellant
alone was the contesting respondent. One of the prayers made in the Election
Petition, was to her benefit. She filed the present appeal only because she is E
aggrieved by the decision of the High Court [656-E]

Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy and Ors., (1980] 4 SCC 62, distinguished.
2.1. A person who is a high caste Hindu and not subjected to any social
or educational backwardness in his life; by reason of marriage alone cannot F
ipso facto become a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. In absence
of any strict proof he cannot be allowed to defeat the very provisions made by
the State for reserving certain seats for disadvantaged people.
(660-G; 661-A)

2.2. The finding of fact arrived at by the District Judge that her marriage G
had taken place as per Vedic Hindu Rites and her marriage has been accepted
by her Biradari meaning thereby that elders of her husband's family only
cannot be held to be the same as that she had been accepted by the community
of her husband. It is one thing to say that a lady belonging to a forward caste
has been accepted by the community to which her husband belongs; but it is
H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A another thing to say that her marriage has been accepted only by her
husband's family. The question as regard change of caste in view of her
marriage although may be relevant in relation to Hindus, but when the
question of change of caste is referable to the category belonging to a special
class of citizens who require protective discrimination and affirmative action,
a different rule will apply. T'le burden of proof therefor indisputably would be
B on the person who affirms the same. (661-B, E, F)

Punit Rai v. Dinesh Chaudhary, (2003) 8 SCC 204, relied on.

E. V. Chinnaiah etc. v. State ofA.P. and Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 394 and State
of Kera/a and Anr. v. Chandra Mohanan, (2004) 3 SCC 429, referred to.
c
2.3. In terms of the rules framed under the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act, it was not necessary for the first respondent to produce the caste
ci.:rtificate at the time of filing of nomination as a declaration in foat behalf
subserves the purpose. But such a caste certificate was necessary having
D regard to the fact that in the event a dispute or doubt arises as regard the
question as to whether the conditions precedent for filing the nomination are
fulfilled or not. The Returning Officer was required to arrive at a prima facie
finding that the candidate belonged to Scheduled Caste. She applied for grant
of a Scheduled Caste Certificate on the basis that she was Scheduled Caste
by birth. Her claim has been found to be incorrect. Unless it is established as
E of fact that she had been accepted as a member. of Scheduled Caste by the
community as contra-distinguished from acceptance of her marriage by her
husband's family, she cannot claim the benefit of her reservation. (662-B-D)

Sabha Hymayathi Devi· v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy and Ors., (2005] 2
SCC 244 and Sandhya Thakur v. Vim/a D<!Vi Kushwah and Ors., JT (2005) 1
F SC 556, relied on.

C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and Ors., (1976] 1 SCC 863; The
Principal, Guntur Medical College, Guntur and Ors. v. Y. Mohan Rao, (1976)
3 SCC 411 and Kai/ash Sankar v. Smt. Maya Devi, (1984) 2 SCC 91,
G distinguished.

N.E. Horo v. Smt. Jahan Ara Jaipal Singh, AIR (1972) SC 1840;
lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, S.C.& S. T. and Ors., JT (2005) 12 SC 569,
referred to.

3. High Court committed a manifest error in coming to the conclusion
H
MEERA KANW ARIA v. SUN ITA [SINHA, J.] 653

that the purposes of reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the A
Constitution, on the one hand, and Articles 330 and 332, on the other, are
different. (664-D)

Sabha Hymayathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy and Ors., (20051 2
sec 244, relied on
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7306 of2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2004 of the Delhi High Court
in C.M.(M) No. 1241 of2004.

Ms. Pinky Anand, Rajesh Ranjan, D.N. Goburdhan and Ms. Geeta C
Luthra for the Appellant.

R.K. Jain, Vipin Gogia, Ms. Jaspreet Gogia and Ghurinder Pal Singh for
the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.

Background fact :

The First Respondent herein was Rajput by caste. She married one E
Ghanshyam on 09.12.2000, who was a member of Scheduled Caste. The marriage
was performed as per Vedic Hindu Rites. She applied for and granted a
certificate of being belonging to Scheduled Caste by birth by the Sub Divisional
Magistrate (S.D.M.), Rajouri Garden, New Delhi, describing her as a daughter
of Ramaye, who in fact was her husband's elder brother's father-in-law.
F
An inquiry was caused to be made by the Sub Divisional Magistrate
upon receiving a complaint that the said certificate contained wrong declaration
as she was daughter of one Chinna Singh and not of Ramaye. The said
allegatio~s were found to be correct. It was also found that the First
Respondent's Jethani's name was also co-incidentally Sunita. On the said
premise, the certificate granted in her fav~ur was cancelled by an order dated G
10.07.2002 and a criminal case under Sections 406, 420, 469 and 471 of the
Indian Penal Code was registered. The said criminal case is still pending.

Election Proceedings :
The First Respondent herein contested an election for the Municipal H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Councilor from Ward No.20, Subhash Nagar Ward of Municipal Corporation
of Delhi, Assembly Constituency No.13, a seat reserved for a Scheduled
Caste woman. She was declared elected. The Appellant herein was also a
candidate. Whereas the First Respondent got 14,757 votes, the Appellant
herein got 13,755 votes.

B One Krishan Lal filed an election petition before the District Judge,
Delhi in terms of the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957,
wherein, inter a/ia a prayer was made to the effect that the Appellant herein
be declared elected. The contention of the election petitioner in the said
proceedings was that as the First Respondent herein was born in an upper
caste family, 'ihe could not have been considered to be belonging to Scheduled
C Caste by reason of her marriage only. :rite Appellant indisputably was arrayed
as Respondent No.2. In the said proceedings, the learned judge, inter alia,
framed the following issues :

"4. Whether the respondent No. I belongs to a scheduled caste
category ?
D
5. Whether the respondent No. I acquired the status of scheduled
caste by virtue of her marriage with a Jatav notified as scheduled
caste category for the purpose of her eligibility to contest municipal
election in Delhi ?
E 6. Whether the election of respondent No. l as a municipal councilor
from Ward No.20 is liable to be declared void on facts mentioned
to the petition ?
7. If issue No.6 is decided in affirmative whether respondent No.2
is entitled to be declared elected from Ward No. 20 as municipal
councilor ?"
F
Issue Nos. 4 and -S were taken up for consideration together. Relying,
inter alia, upon a decision of this Court in Mrs. Valsamma Paul v. Cochin
University and Ors., AIR (1996) SC 1011, the learned Judge opined:

"25. In view of the above testimony of respondent No.1 in her
G cross-examination, no manner of doubt is left in my mind except to
hold that respondent No. I has manipulated a scheduled caste
certificate by hoodwinking the legal process. By no means she can be
said to have acquired the status of scheduled caste merely because
of her marriage with scheduled caste person. Hence, both these issues
H are decided against respondent No. I"
MEERA KANW ARIA v. SUNITA [SINHA, J.] 655
Having regard to the aforementioned findings, the election of the First A
Respondent herein was held to be void and of no effect and was consequently
set aside. Issue No.7 was, however, not pressed.

High Court Proceedings :

A writ petition was filed there-against by the First Respondent before · B
the Delhi High Court. The High Court in its judgment noticed several decisions
of this Court and opined that as the First Respondent was accepted by her
husband's family and biradari, the judgment of the learned District Judge was
unsustainable. The High Court distinguished Valsamma Paul (supra) on the
premise that 'principle of reservation contained in Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of C
the Constitution of India would be different in a case wherein individual
claims entitlement to other benefits that may be due to a person belonging
to Scheduled Caste'. It was furthermore opined that the learned District Judge
committed an error in not accepting the contention of the First Respondent
that she had not been accepted by the community of her husband. Subsequent
cancellation of the Scheduled Caste Certificate by the S.D.M. was held to be D
irrelevant.

Maintainability of the Appeal :

Mr. R.K. Jain, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
First Respondent, at the outset, would take a preliminary objection as regard E
the Appellant's locus standi to maintain this appeal drawing our attention to
the findings of the learned Trial Judge that the Appellant herein did not file
any written statement noF any oral arguments were advanced on her behalf.
Strong reliance, in this behalf, has been placed on Thammanna v. K. Veera
Reddy and Ors., [1980] 4 SCC 62. We are not persuaded to accept the said
contention. F
In Thammanna (supra), this Court found that at no stage of the
proceedings, the Appellant before it took any part in the proceedings. Having
regard to Section 116-C of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it was
held that the person would be entitled to maintain an appeal if the following G
conditions are satisfied :

"(I) that the subject-matter of the appeal is a conclusive determination
by the High Court of the rights with regard to all or any of the
matters in controversy, between the parties in the election petition,

(2) that the person seeking to appeal has been a party in the election H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A petition, and
~-

(3) that he is a "person aggrieved", that is a party who has been
adversely affected by the determination."

As of fact it was found that condition nos. I and 3 had not been
B satisfied .holding :

" ... Before the High Court the appellant did not, at any stage join the
contest. He did not file any written statement or affidavit. He did not
engage any counsel. He did not cros:;-examine the witnesses produced
by the election-petitioner and the contesting Respondent I. He did
C not appear in the witness-box. He did not address any arguments. In
short, he did nothing tangible to participate in the proceedings before
the High Court."
,_
It was further noticed therein that the Appellant was not a necessary party .
to the election petition and, thus, it was not obligatory for the election
D petitioner to join· him as a respondent.

The said decision has no application in the instant case, as the Appellant .)-
,,._

herein took part in the election petition through her counsel,. although she
might not have filed a written statement. She was a necessary party. A prayer
was made in the election petition that she be declared to have been elected.
E We have noticed hereinbefore that the election petition succeeded in part. In
the appeal preferred there-against by the First Respondent, the Appellant
alone was the contesting respondent. Prayer (b) made in the Election Petition,
was to her benefit. She filed the present appeal only because she is aggrieved
by the decision of the High Court.

F Contentions :

On merits Ms. Pinky Anand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the Appellant, submitted that the judgment of the High Court is
unsustainable as the same runs counter to a three-Judge Bench decision of
G this Court in Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy and Ors.,
[2005] 2 SCC 244 wherein one of us (Balasubramanyan, J.) was a member.

It was urged that the certificate obtained by the First Respondent was
a fraud on the Constitution. Reliance, in this behalf, has been placed on
Lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, S.C. & S. T. and Ors., JT (2005) 12 SC 569.

H
MEERA KANWARIA v. SUNITA [SINHA, J.] 657
Mr. Jain, on the other hand, would submit that in the facts and A
.1 circumstances of this case, the alleged fraud committed by the First Respondent
would not be deterrent for the purpose of holding that she became a member
of the Scheduled Caste as her marriage was accepted by the community.
Placing strong reliance on the decisions of this Court in C.M Arumugam v.
S. Rajgopal and Ors., [1976] I SCC 863, The Principal, Guntur Medical
College, Guntur and Ors. v. Y. Mohan Rao, [1976) 3 SCC 411 and Kai/ash B
Sankar v. Smt. Maya Devi, [1984] 2 SCC 91, itwas argued that in view of the
finding of fact arrived at by the High Court that she had been accepted by
the community, the impugned judgment should not be interfered with.

It was submitted that even in the decisions of this Court in Sabha
Hymavathi Devi, (supra) and Lillykutty (supra), the question which fell for C
consideration was as to whether upon marriage by a girl belonging to a
forward class with a boy who belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe,
the caste will change as thereby she stands transplanted in her husband's
family.

Findings of the District Judge :
D

Before adverting to the questions of law raised before .us, we. would
notice the findings of fact arrived at by the learned District Judge. The learned
District Judge relied upon a circular letter of the Central Government wherein
it was stated : E
"The guiding principle is that no person who was not a scheduled
caste/tribes by birth will be deemed to be member of scheduled caste
,•
or scheduled tribe merely because he or she married person belonging
to scheduled or scheduled tribes.
F
N.E. Haro (supra) was also distinguished on the ground that therein the
lady who married a person belonging to Munda tribe had proved the custom
by which she was admitted in tribunal community after her marriage, which
fact is absent in the instant case, stating :

" .. .It shall be significant to mention that respondent No.I in her cross- G
examination has admitted that her marriage had taken place as per
Vaidic Hindu Rites and no special ceremony was held either before or
at the time of marriage or after her marriage for conversion of her caste
from Rajput to Jatav. She further testified that no panchayat or Jatav
Community was held to accept her as a member of Jatav caste. However,
H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A the respondent No. I has testified in para 3 of the affidavit Ex.R- I filed
in her evidence-in-chief that she was fully accepted by the Biradari/ ..
f.
Community of Jatavs as its member. In order to prove her said point
the respondent No. I has examined her father-in law, husband and
three more releatives of her husband who all have testified that they
had accepted the marriage of respondent No. I with a Jatav husband
B and that they had attended that wedding. Confronted with this
situation, the counsel for the petitioner asked respondent No. I in her
cross-examination to explain the word "Biradari" used in her affidavit
Ex.Pl. Since clarified the meaning of word "Biradari" employed by her
in para 3 of her affidavit RI by saying that by the word "Biradari" she
C means elders of her husband's family. This position taken by
respondent No. I in her cross-examination does not vindicate her point
that she was admitted into Jatav Community by any custom or any
other Hindu Tradition."

Caste issue :
D
It is not disputed that the marriage took place as per Vedic Hindu Rites.
The marriage was attended by her father-in-law, husband and three more
relatives, who stated that they had accepted the marriage with her Jatav
husband and they had attended that wedding. The term "Biradari" has also
been explained by the First Respondent stating that the same denotes elders
E of her husband's family. It is one thing to say that a lady belonging to a
forward caste has been accepted by the community to which her husband
belongs; but it is another thing to say that her marriage has been accepted
only by her husband'.s family. The question as regard change of caste in view
of her marriage although may be relevant in relation to Hindus, but when the
F question of change of caste is referable to the category belonging to a special
class of citizens who require protective discrimination and affirmative action,
a different rule will apply. The burden of proof therefor indisputably would
be on the person who affirms the same.,

In Punit Rai v. Dinesh Chaudhary, [2003] 8 SCC 204, wherein one of
G us was a member, this Court opined :
.,
"On behalf of the respondent, the citation of certain decisions has
also been furnished but those decisions would be of no help to the
respondent. Reliance has been placed upon Jeet Mohinder Singh v.
Harminder Singh Jassi1 where it has been held that a party upon
H whom the burden lies to prove a fact, but fails to discharge his onus,
MEERA KANWARIA v. SUNITA [SINHA, J.] 659

it is not open for him to bank upon the plea of non-examination of A
witness by the other ·party. The appellant, it was held, cannot be
permitted to derive strength from the weakness of the case of the
other party. We feel that this case would not be applicable in the facts
and circumstances of the case in hand. On the other hand, the onus
to prove facts within the special knowledge of Respondent 1, would
lie upon him alone to prove those facts. We have already held that B
best evidence of the respondent's case that his mother was a Pasi has
been withheld. In this connection, we may peruse Section 106 of the
Evidence Act also which reads as under:

"106. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."" C
It was further opined :

"Determination of caste of a person is governed by the customary
laws. A person under the customary Hindu law would be inheriting
his caste from his father. In this case, it is not denied or disputed that D
the respondent's father belonged to a "Kurmi" caste. He was, therefore,
not a member of the Scheduled Caste. The caste of the father, therefore,
will be the determinative factor in absence of any law.

This Court held that the State will have no jurisdiction to reserve a
constituency for a person who does not belong to the reserved category for E
whose benefit it was constituted except by way of a legislation, stating :

"If a customary law is to be given a go-by for any purpose
whatsoever and particularly for the purpose of enlarging the scope of
a notification issued by the President of India under clause (1) of F
Article 341 of the Constitution of India, the same must be done in
terms of a statute and not otherwise."

Reference, in this connection, may be made to a Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in E. V. Chinnaiah etc. v. State ofA.P. and Ors., [2005]
1 sec 394, wherein it was held :
G
"Reservation must be considered from the social objective angle,
having regard to the constitutional scheme, and not as a political
issue and, thus, adequate representation must be given to the members
of the Scheduled Castes as a group and not to two or more groups
of persons or members of castes. H
660 SUPRl!JlVIE COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A The very fact that the members of the Scheduled Castes are most
·· backward amongst the backward classes and the impugned legislation
having already proceeded on the basis that they are not adequately
represented both in terms of clause (4) of Article 15 and clause (4) of
Article 16 of the Constitution, a further classification by way of micro-
classification is not permissible. Such classification of the members of
B different classes of people based on their respective castes would
also be violative of the doctrine of reasonableness. Article 341 provides
that exclusion even of a part or a group of castes from the Presidential
List can be done only by Parliament. The logical corollary thereof
would be that the State Legislatures are forbidden from doing that. A
c uniform yardstick must be adopted for giving benefits to the members
of the Scheduled Castes for the purpose of the Constitution. The
impugned legislation being contrary to the above constitutional scheme
cannot, therefore, be sustained."

The burden must be fully discharged beyond all reasonable doubts. In
D NE. Horo, (supra), this Court held:
"Even if a female is not a member of tribe by virtue of birth. She
having been married to a tribal after due observance of all formalities
and after obtaining the approval of the elders of the tribe would
belong to the tribal community to which her husband belongs on the
E analogy of the wife taking the husband domicile."

Yet again in Valsamma Paul, (supra), it was held :

"A candidate who had the advantageous start in life being born
· in forward caste and had march of advantageous life but is transplanted
F in backward caste by adoption or marriage or conversion, does not
become eligible to the benefit or reservation either under Article 15(4)
or 16(4), as the case may be. Acquisition of the status of Scheduled
Caste etc. by voluntary mobility into these categories would play
fraud on the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign constitutional
policy under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution"
G
It is, therefore, beyond any doubt or dispute that a person who is a high
caste Hindu and not subjected to any social or educational or backwardness
in his life; by reason of marriage alone cannot ipso facto become a member
of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. In absence of any strict proof he
cannot be allowed to defeat the very provisions made by the State for
H
MEERA KANWARIA v. SUNIT A [SINHA, J.] 661
reserving certain seats for disadvantaged people. A
The High Court may or may not be right in holding that no special
ceremony was required for conversion from upper caste to Jatav, but the
finding of fact arrived at by the learned District Judge that her marriage had
taken place as per Vedic Hindu Rites and her marriage has been accepted by
her Biradari meaning thereby elders of her husband's family only cannot be B
held to be the same as that she had been accepted by the community of her
husband.

We may notice that in State of Kera~a and Anr. v. Chandra Mohanan,
[2004) 3 SCC 429, a three-Judge Bench after noticing the said decisions
~~= c
"The customary laws of a tribe not only govern his culture, but
also succession, inheritance, marriage, worship of Gods etc. The
characteristics of different tribes despite the fact that they have been
living in the same area for a long time are different. They indisputably
follow different Gods. They have different cultures. Their customs are D
also different."
It was further observed :

"Before a person can be brought within the purview of the
Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, he must belong to a E
tribe. A person for the purP,ose of obtaining the benefits of the
Presidential Order must fulfil the condition of being a member of a
tribe and continue to be a member of the tribe. If by reason of
conversion to a different religion a long time back, he/his ancestors
have not been following the customs, rituals and other traits, which F
are required to be followed by the members of the tribe and even had
not been following the customary la'_¥s of succession, inheritance,
marriage etc. he may not be accepted to be a member of a tribe. In this
case, it has been contended that the fafuily of the victim had been
converted about 200 years back and in fact the father of the victim
married a woman belonging to a Roman Catholic, wherefrom he again G
became a Roman Catholic. The question, therefore, which may have
to be gone into is as to whether the family continued to be a member
of a Scheduled Tribe or not. Such a question cap be gone into only
during trial.".

H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A In Lillykutty, (supra), Thakker, J., speaking for the Division Bench
clearly held that once a certificate is cancelled, the election is also liable to -
be cancelled. It may be true that in terms of the rules framed under the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, it was not necessary for the First Respondent
herein to produce the caste certificate at the time of filing of nomination as
a declaration in that behalf subserve the purpose. But such a caste certificate
B was necessary having regard to the fact that in the event a dispute or doubt
arises as regard the question as to whether the conditions precedent for filing
the nomination are fulfilled or not. The Returning Officer was required to
arrive at a prima facie finding that the candidate belonged to Scheduled
Caste. She applied for grant of a Scheduled Caste Certificate on the basis that
C she was Scheduled Caste by birth. Her claim has been found to be incorrect.
Unless it is established as of fact that she had been accepted as a member
of Scheduled Caste by the community as contra-distinguished from acceptance
of her marriage by her husband's family, in our opinion, s~e cannot claim the
benefit of her reservation.

D We, therefore, with respect, express our disapproval to the findings of
the High Court.

In Sobha Hymayathi Devi, (supra), it was held

" ... First of all, we must point out that the High Court, in our view,
E has rightly held that there was nothing to show that the marriage of
the appellan~ with Appala Raju took place in the customary mode
followed by the Bhagatha community. On the other hand, as noticed
by the High Court, the available evidence tends to indicate that the
marriage was more in the form followed by Sistu Karnams, the
community to which her father belonged. Secondly, as noticed by the
F High Court, there is nothing to show that the appellant was accepted
by the Bhagatha community of Bhimavaram as a member of that
community. As. discussed by the High Court based on the evidence
in the case,. t6'e indication available was that the appellant hardly
resided in Siii~avaram village to which her maternal grandfather
G belonged anJ there was no occasion for that community to treat her
as a membe'r of that community. There is also nothing to show that
the appeilant follo~ed the way of life of that community."

Overruling N:'E. Horo v. Smt. Jahan Ara Jaipal Singh, AIR (1972) SC 1840,
it was held :
H
MEERA KANWARIA v. SUNITA [SINHA, J.] 663
" ... Even otherwise, we have difficulty in accepting the position that
A
a non-tribal who marries a tribal could claim to contest a seat reserved
for tribals. Article 332 of the Constitution speaks of reservation of
seats for Scheduled Tribes in Legislative Assemblies. The object is
clearly to give representation in the legislature to Scheduled Tribe ,
candidates, considered to be deserving of such special protection. To
permit a non-tribal under cover of a marriage to contest such a seat B
would tend to defeat the very object of such a reservation. The
decision of this Court in Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University supports
this view. Neither the fact that a non-backward female married a
backward male nor the fact that she was recognised by the community
thereafter as a member of the backward community, was held to enable
a non-backward to claim reservation in terms of Article 15(4) or 16(4)
c
of the Constitution. Their Lordships· after noticing Bhoobum Moyee
Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry and Lulloobhoy Bappoobhoy
Cassidass Moo/chund v. Cassibai held that a woman on marriage
becomes a member of the family of her husband and thereby she
becomes a member of the caste to which she has moved. The caste D
rigidity breaks down and would stand as no impediment to her
becoming a member of the family to which the husband belongs and
to which she gets herself transplanted. Thereafter, this Court noticed
that recognition by the community was also important. Even then, this

- Court categorically laid down that the recognition of a lady as a
E

-
member of a backward community in view of her marriage would not
be relevant for the purpose of entitlement to reservation under Article
16(4) of the Constitution for the reason that she as a member of the
forward caste, had an advantageous start in life and a marriage with
a male belonging to a backward class would not entitle her to the
facility of reservation given to a backward community. The High Court F
has applied this decision to a seat reserved in an election in terms of
Article 332 of the Constitution. We see no reason why the principle
relating to reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) laid down by this
Court should not be extended to the constitutional reservation of a
seat for a Scheduled Tribe in the House of the People or under Article
332 in the Legislative Assembly. The said reservations are also G
constitutional reservations intending to benefit the really
underprivileged and not those who come to the class by way of
marriage. To the extent the decision in Horo6 can be said to run
counter to the above view, it cannot be accepted as correct. Even
otherwise, in the absence of evidence on the relevant aspects regarding H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A marriage in tribal form and acceptance by the community, the decision
in Horo cannit come to the rescue of the appellant. ..."

In Sandhya Thakur v. Vim/a Devi Kushwah and Ors., JT (2005) 1 SC
556, this Court held :

"In the light of the decision in Valsamma Paul v. Cochin
B University and Ors., (supra) and our decision rendered today in Sobha
Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy, which were heard along
with this appeal, it must be held that the appellant, who by birth did
not belong to a backward class or community, would not be entitled
to contest a seat reserved for a backward class or community, merely
c on the basis of her marriage to a male of that community ...."

The High Court, thus, committed a manifest error in coming to the
conclusion that the purposes of reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of
the Constitution, on the one hand, and Articles 330 and 332, on the other, are
different.
D
Sobha Hymavathi Devi, (supra), thus, although recognized that in a
given case acceptance of such a marriage by the community may be held to
subserve the purpose but in no uncertain terms held that reservation of a seat
for a Scheduled Tribe in the House of the People or under Article 332 in the
E Legislative Assembly are constitutional reservations.

In all the decisions relied upon by Mr. Jain, namely, Arumugam (supra),
--
Mohan Rao, (supra) and Kai/ash Sonkar (supra), this Court was concerned
with conversion and re-conversion having taken place while the person
concerned was minor. In such a case, the doctrine of revival of the caste was
·F applied. We, however, as at present advised need not dilate further on the
said question as nothing tum out therefrom for the purpose of this case. ·

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained which is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. No costs.

K.KT. Appeal allowed.