Supreme Court of India
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR.versusSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 683
- Decided
- 8 August 2023
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The FIR does not disclose any cognizable offence and, being frivolous, vexatious and motivated by personal vendetta, must be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined an FIR registered under Sections 395, 504, 506 and 323 IPC alleging that the appellants assaulted the complainant, seized Rs.2 lakh and forced signatures on a stamp paper during a land dispute. The Court considered whether the FIR disclosed the ingredients of dacoity, criminal intimidation or intentional insult, and whether the delay of over a year in lodging the FIR, together with the alleged fabricated nature of the complaint, warranted quashing. It held that the FIR did not disclose any offence of dacoity, that the allegations under Section 504 were unsupported, and that the case fell within the parameters for quashing set out in Bhajan Lal. The Court emphasized the need for strict construction of penal statutes and the duty to prevent abuse of process. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the criminal proceedings arising from the FIR were quashed.
Issues considered
- Whether the FIR, on its plain face, discloses the commission of dacoity punishable under Section 395 IPC.
- Whether the FIR discloses a case of criminal intimidation under Sections 504 and 506 IPC.
- Whether the delay of more than one year in lodging the FIR, without specific date and time, undermines confidence in the FIR.
- Whether the FIR falls within any of the parameters for quashing laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
- Constitution of Indias. Article 226
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 323, s. 390, s. 391, s. 395, s. 503, s. 504, s. 506
Subjects
FIR quashingSection 482 CrPCdacoitycriminal intimidationSection 504 IPCdelay in FIRabuse of processBhajan Lal teststrict constructionIndian Penal Code
Judgment
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 313 : 2023 INSC 683
CASE DETAILS
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2340 of 2023)
AUGUST 08, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: In the instant case wherein FIR was
registered u/ss. 395, 504, 506 and 323 IPC against the appellants, the
questions which arose for consideration are whether the said case falls
within the parameters laid down for quashing the FIR; whether the
plain reading of the FIR discloses commission of the offence of dacoity
punishable u/s. 395 IPC; whether any case of criminal intimidation
punishable u/ss. 504 and 506(2) IPC is made out; and whether the
allegations levelled in the FIR inspire any confidence considering the
delay of one year in lodging the FIR.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – FIR – Quashing
of – FIR alleging that to settle a land dispute the informant and his
brother visited the house of the appellant on their own free will wherein
the appellant and the other co-accused assaulted the informant and
his brother, forcibly took Rs. 2 lakh from the informants’ pocket
and thereafter took their signatures forcibly on a blank paper – FIR
registered u/ss. 395, 504, 506 and 323 IPC – High Court declining to
quash the FIR – Correctness:
Held: Entire case put up by the informant on the face of it appears to
be concocted and fabricated – Multiple FIRs have been registered against the
appellant and the other accused over a period of time which attract wreaking
vengeance out of private or personal grudge – Continuation of the criminal
case arising from the FIR would be nothing but abuse of the process of the
law – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court set aside and the
313
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
criminal proceedings arising from the FIR quashed – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.
395, 504, 506 and 323. [Paras 29, 30, 35 and 36]
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 395 – Punishment for Dacoity – FIR alleging
that to settle a land dispute the informant and his brother visited
the house of the appellant wherein the appellant and the co-accused
assaulted the informant and his brother and forcibly took R. 2 lakh from
the informants’ pocket – Registration of FIR for the offence punishable
u/s. 395, 504, 506 and 323 IPC – Correctness:
Held: s. 395 is not applicable to the instant case – Prosecution
blindfoldedly and without understanding the true purport of the offence
of “dacoity” registered the FIR for the offence punishable u/s. 395 – None
of the ingredients to constitute the offence of dacoity disclosed – Entire
case put up by the first informant appears to be fabricated – At the time of
alleged incident, taking away of Rs. 2 Lakh from the pocket of the informant
forcibly by the accused persons would not fall within the ambit of the words
“for that end” occurring in s. 390 – Even according to the informant, with
a view to settle the land dispute, the informant and his brother visited the
house of the appellant on their own free will and volition – It is only after
reaching the house of the appellant that the entire incident is alleged to have
occurred. [Paras 17 and 18]
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 390 – Robbery – Theft when amounts to
robbery:
Held: Three ingredients mentioned in s.390 must always be satisfied
before theft can amount to robbery – Firstly, the offender must have
voluntarily caused or attempted to cause to any person death or hurt or
wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant
wrongful restraint – Secondly this must be in order to the committing of the
theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry
away property obtained by the theft – Thirdly the offender must voluntarily
cause or attempt to cause to any person hurt etc., for that end, that is, in
order to the committing of the theft or for the purpose of committing theft
or for carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the
theft. [Paras 14 and 15]
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 504 – Intentional insult with intent to provoke
breach of peace – Necessary ingredient u/s. 504:
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 315
AND ORS.
Held: Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount
to an intentional insult within the meaning of s. 504 if it does not have the
necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit
a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused
intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or
knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace
– Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the
facts and circumstances of that case – There cannot be a general proposition
that no one commits an offence u/s. 504 if he merely uses abusive language
against the complainant. [Paras 25 and 26]
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 506 – Offence of criminal intimidation –
When:
Held: Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it
must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to
the complainant – On facts, to settle a land dispute the informant and his
brother visited the house of the appellant on their own free will wherein the
appellant and the other co-accused assaulted the informant and his brother,
forcibly took Rs. 2 lakh from the informants’ pocket and thereafter took
their signatures forcibly on a blank paper and FIR was registered u/ss. 395,
504, 506 and 323 – Prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable
u/s. 506 may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not u/s.
504 – In the FIR, all that the informant has stated is that abusive language
was used by the accused persons – What exactly was uttered in the form of
abuses not stated in the FIR – One of the essential elements constituting an
offence u/s. 504 is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting
to intentional insult – Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is
necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the
use of those words amounted to intentional insult – In the absence thereof,
not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult present
– Thus, case of criminal intimidation punishable u/ss. 504 and 506(2) not
made out. [Para 29]
Interpretation of statutes – Penal statute – Interpretation of:
Held: Must be strictly construed – Court must see that the thing charged
is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain
the words. [Paras 19 and 21]
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
FIR – Quashing of – Invocation of inherent powers u/s. 482 CrPC
or extraordinary jurisdiction u/Art. 226 of the Constitution – Duty of
the court:
Held: Whenever an accused seeks quashing of the FIR or the
criminal proceedings essentially on the ground that such proceedings are
manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive
for wreaking vengeance, in such circumstances the Court owes a duty
to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely – It would not be
just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/
complaint alone for the purpose of the alleged offence are disclosed or
not – In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to
look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record
of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care
and circumspection try to read in between the lines – Court is empowered
to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/
registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course
of investigation. [Para 26]
FIR – Importance and object of:
Held: FIR in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece
of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at
the trial – Object of insisting upon lodging of the FIR to the police in respect
of commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the
circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual
culprits and the part played by them as well as names of the eye witnesses
present at the scene of occurrence. [Para 32]
Delay/ Laches – Delay in lodging FIR – Ground to quash FIR:
Held: Delay in the registration of the FIR, by itself, cannot be a ground
for quashing of the FIR – However, delay with other attending circumstances
rendering the entire case put up by the prosecution inherently improbable,
may at times become a good ground to quash the FIR and consequential
proceedings – If the FIR, like the instant one, lodged after a period of more
than one year without disclosing the date and time of the alleged incident
and further without any plausible and convincing explanation for such delay,
the accused cannot defend himself in the trial – Allegations are too vague
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 317
AND ORS.
and general – In the absence of all this material, the State cannot prove its
case against the accused persons. [Paras 32 and 33]
Criminal Law – Criminal antecedents of the accused – Effect of,
on the criminal proceedings:
Held: Criminal antecedents of the accused cannot be the sole
consideration to decline to quash the criminal proceedings – An accused has
a legitimate right to say before the Court that howsoever bad his antecedents
may be, still if the FIR fails to disclose commission of any offence then the
court should not decline to quash the criminal case – Initiation of prosecution
has adverse and harsh consequence for the persons named as accused –
Thus, the requirement and need to balance the law enforcement power and
protection of citizens from injustice and harassment must be maintained –
State owes a duty to ensure that no crime goes unpunished as also owes a
duty to ensure that none of its subjects are unnecessarily harassed. [Para 34]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604: [1990] 3 Suppl.
SCR 259; Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 476; Karuppa
Gounden v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1918 Madras 821; Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafiluddi
Manjhi, (1900-01) 5 C.W.N. 372; King Emperor v. Mathura Thakur, (1901-
02) 6 C.W.N. 72; King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR
78; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522:
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 147; Directorate of Revenue and another v. Mohammed
Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370: [2007] 12 SCR 906 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2340 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2022 of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in CRLMWP No. 15174 of 2022.
Appearances:
Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv., Mohd. Zahid Hussain, Ms. Jemtiben A.O,
Utsav Sehgal, Ms. Mumtaz Javed Shaikh, Advs. for the Appellants.
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
Ms. Garima Prasad, Sr. A.A.G., Brijendra Chahar, Sr. Adv., Vishwa
Pal Singh, Aviral Saxena, Rabindra Lokhare, Ms. Shweta Yadav, Abhinav
Agrawal, Harsh Pratap Shahi, Ms. Manvi Dikshit Sharma, Ashutosh
Bhardwaj, Prateek Rai, Shubham Saxena, Akash, Naman Raj Singh, Ashish
Pandey, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is at the instance of the original accused Nos. 1 and 2
resply of the First Information Report (FIR) being the Crime Registration
No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered with the Mirzapur Police
Station, District Saharanpur, State of U.P. for the offences punishable under
Sections 395, 504, 506 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and is directed
against the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated
17.10.2022 in the Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 15174 of 2022
by which the High Court rejected the Writ Petition filed by appellants herein
thereby declining to quash the aforesaid FIR.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The respondent No. 4 herein namely Ram Kumar lodged FIR No.
224 of 2022 for the offences enumerated above at the police station also
referred to above. The FIR reads thus:-
“… The undersigned Ramkumar son of Sadhuram is a resident of
Kasimpur, P.S. Mirjapur. I want to submit that Haji Iqbal, his son
Javed, Wazid, Alishan, Afjal and brother of Iqbal namely Mehmood
Ali forcefully started to tell us since long that our land bearing Khasra
No. 256/1 situated at Village Mayapur belongs to them. It is in the
year 2021 when time for cultivation arrived, that myself and my
brother Rajkumar went to the house of Iqbal, son of Abdul Wahid at
Mirjapur. We requested him that you people are disturbing the peace
and tranquility of us. We said, we were destitudes. It is on that Iqbal,
his brother Mehmood and his sons namely Zabed, Wajid, Alishan and
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 319
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
Afjal became very furious on us. They started using abusive language
against us. We requested them to stop uttering abusive language. It is at
that time all these persons assaulted us with their hands and fists for a
long time. It is thereafter they on a point of pistol put on my forehead,
they took away Rs. 2 lakh kept in my pocket forcefully. Thereafter, all
these people stated that if we would talk of this to any one, they would
kill all the members of our family. It is then Iqbal told me to sign the
stamp paper. After terrorizing and threatening us, they compelled we
both brothers to put our signatures on the stamp papers. We being
robbed, we returned silently to our home. We thereafter communicated
the present fact before our family members. It is however due to fear of
these persons, none of the members of our family supported us against
these persons. After thinking a lot and mustering courage, I have
come down before your police station for lodging the present report.
Applicant Sd/-Rajkumar 19.09.2022-Ram Kumar s/o Sadhuram r/o
Kasimpusr, P.S. Mirjapur, District Saharanpur, M.No. 9758031420.”
(Emphasis supplied)
4. Thus the FIR as aforestated reveals that the first informant is a
resident of village Kasimpur, Mirzapur, District Saharanpur. His name has
been recorded as a tenure holder of agricultural land bearing Khasra No.
256/1 situated at village Mayapur, District Saharanpur. He has alleged that
the appellants herein alongwith few other co-accused have been putting
forward wrong claim of being the owners of the land bearing Khasra No.
256/1. It is his case that sometime in the year 2021, he along with his brother
namely Rajkumar had visited the house of the appellant No. 2 herein situated
at Mirzapur to request him not to interfere with their lawful possession and
ownership of the land in question. It is his case that at that point of time the
appellants herein and other co-accused hurled abuses to the first informant
and his brother Rajkumar and all the accused thereafter assaulted the first
informant and his brother with hands and fists. It is further alleged that at
that point of time the accused persons on the point of a gun forcibly took
away Rs. 2 Lakh from the pocket of the first informant. The accused persons
are also alleged to have threatened the first informant that if he would talk
to anyone about the incident, then all his family members would be killed.
In the last, the first informant has alleged that the accused persons forcibly
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
obtained signatures of the first informant and his brother on a plain stamp
paper. After the alleged incident, the first informant and his brother Rajkumar
left the house of the appellant No. 2 herein.
5. It is pertinent to note that for the incident alleged to have occurred
in the year 2021, the FIR was lodged in the year 2022. It is also pertinent
to note that in the FIR, no date and time of the alleged incident has been
stated. No plausible explanation was offered by the first informant as to why
there was inordinate delay in lodging the FIR.
6. The appellants herein went before the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad and filed Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 15174 of 2022
and prayed for the quashing of the FIR in question. The High Court declined
to entertain the writ application and rejected the same observing as under:-
“Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned A.G.A
for the State respondents.
The relief sought in this petition is for quashing of the F.I.R.
dated 19.09.2022, registered as Case Crime No. 0224 of 2022, under
sections 395, 504, 506, 323 I.P.C., Police Station Mirzapur, District
Saharanpur.
Learned AGA opposed the prayer for quashing of the FIR, which
discloses cognizable offence.
Perusal of the impugned first information report prima facie
reveals commission of cognizable offence. Therefore, in view of the law
laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana
and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 and
M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR
2021 SC 1918 and in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.3262/2021
(Leelavati Devi @ Leelawati & another vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh)
decided on 07.10.2021, no case has been made out for interference
with the impugned first information report.
Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed leaving it open for the
petitioners to apply before the competent court for anticipatory bail/
bail as permissible under law and in accordance with law.”
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 321
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid, the appellants
are before this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
7. Mr. Siddhartha Dave, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants in the written submissions filed by him has stated as under:-
“1. The Petitioners who are Accused Nos. 6 and 1 respectively in FIR
No. 224 of 2022 have filed the present Special Leave Petition against
the impugned judgment and final order dated 17.10.2022 passed by
the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc.
Writ Petition No. 15174 of 2022, whereby the Hon’ble High Court has
dismissed the said Writ Petition filed by the Petitioners under Article
226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of FIR No. 224 of
2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered under Sections 395, 504, 506 & 323
of the Indian Penal Code against six accused persons namely, Mohd.
Iqbal alias Bala (Petitioner No. 2 herein), Mehmood Ali (Brother
of Petitioner No. 2), Afjal (Son of Petitioner No. 2), Alishan (Son of
Petitioner No. 2), Javed (Son of Petitioner No. 2), and Mohammad
Wajid (Petitioner No. 1 herein and son of Petitioner No. 2) at Police
Station Mirzapur, District Saharanpur.
2. The allegation in the said FIR No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022
is that the Complainant Ram Kumar (Respondent No. 4 herein), who
is a resident of Village Kasimpur, Mirzapur, District Saharanpur, is
recorded as a tenure holder of land situated at Khasra No. 256/1,
Village Mayapur, Mirzapur, District Saharanpur. It is further alleged
that the accused Haji Iqbal (Petitioner No. 2 herein) and his sons
Javed, Mohammad Wajid (Petitioner No. 1 herein), Alishan, Afjal
and his brother Mehmood Ali had earlier claimed that the said land
bearing Khasra No. 256/1 belonged to them. In the year 2021, when
the Complainant and his bother Raj Kumar went to Petitioner No.
2’s house situated at Mirzapur, Saharanpur and requested him not to
disturb the peace and tranquility of their land upon which Petitioner
No. 2 Iqbal, Mehmood Ali, Javed, Petitioner No.1 Mahmood Wajid,
Alishan and Afzal abused the Complainant and thereafter they
assaulted him and his brother Raj Kumar with their hands and fists.
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
It is further alleged that the accused persons then pointed a pistol on
the Complainant’s forehead and forcibly took an amount of Rs. 2 lakh
from the Complainant’s pocket. The accused persons threatened the
Complainant that in case he told anyone about the incident then all
his family members will be eliminated. It is further alleged that the
accused persons forcibly got the signatures of the Complainant and his
brother on a blank stamp paper and after being robbed of their money
the Complainant and his brother quietly returned home.
3. It is respectfully submitted that the alleged First Information
Report is absolutely false and frivolous, and on a reading of the
said FIR, the off ence of dacoity is clearly not made out against
the Petitioners. It is highly doubtful that the Complainant, who
was aware of the criminal history of Petitioner No. 2 Iqbal, would
go to the house of the accused Petitioner No. 2 with a huge sum
of money, that is, Rs. 2 lakh in his pocket and after the alleged
incident would remain silent for one year. Although it is alleged
that the Complainant and his brother Raj Kumar were assaulted by
the accused persons however there is no injury or medical report
whatsoever to substantiate the said allegation.
4. The allegations in the First Information Report are not only vague
but also highly improbable given that except for the bald allegation that
the incident occurred in the year 2021, there is no mention of the date
and time of incident in the FIR. The said incident allegedly occurred
in the year 2021, while the FIR has been lodged after an inordinate
delay of 1 year, that is, on 19.09.2022. On a reading of the FIR it is
evident that the entire dispute is with respect to the land situated at
Khasra No. 256/1, Village Mayapur, Mirzapur, District Saharanpur.
It is pertinent to submit that the Petitioners are neither the owner of
the land nor have they got anything to do with the said land and there
was therefore no question of the Petitioners having threatened and
assaulted the Complainant.
5. It is submitted that after the change of Government in the State of
Uttar Pradesh in the year 2017, the ruling party came to power and
immediately after the change of the Government the Petitioners along
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 323
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
with their family members were falsely implicated in more than 30
criminal cases at the behest of the ruling party. The Petitioners are
being unnecessarily harassed by the State machinery including the
Police. Although the Respondent State is heavily relying upon the
criminal cases registered against the Petitioners and their family
members to show that they are habitual offenders but till date the
petitioners have not been convicted by any Court of law and moreover
every time the Petitioners or their family members gets protection
(anticipatory bail or stay of arrest) from either this Hon’ble Court or
the Hon’ble High Court, the local police immediately registers false
cases against them.
6. It is submitted that the alleged Look Out Notice dated 10.05.2022
was issued much prior to the registration of the present FIR No.
224 of 2022 which was registered on 19.09.2022 and as such is
inconsequential.
7. It is respectfully submitted that the alleged First Information Report
has been maliciously instituted at the behest of the present ruling party
in the State of Uttar Pradesh to wreak vengeance and to settle political
scores with Petitioner No. 2 Mohd. Iqbal alias Bala as he belongs
to a rival political party and he was also a Member of Legislative
Council from the period 2011 to 2016. Petitioner No. 2 Mohd. Iqbal
alias Bala belongs to a respectable family of Saharanpur and he is
running several Charitable Institutions.
8. The allegations made in the First Information Report do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case under Sections 395, 504,
506 and 323 IPC against the Petitioner and thus, the FIR is liable to
be quashed. It is pertinent to mention that even after the charge sheet
has been filed, the petition for quashing of a FIR is well within the
powers of a Court of law [Please see: Anand Kumar Mohatta and
another VS. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home & Another
(2019) 11 SCC 706 at paragraph 14 & 16]
9. For the reasons mentioned above, the Special Leave Petition may
be allowed and the order of the Hon’ble High Court refusing to quash
the FIR No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 be set aside.”
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
8. Ms. Garima Prasad, the learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the State of U.P. in her written submissions has stated as under:-
“A. NO AFFIDAVIT OR VAKALATNAMA FILED BY ACCUSED
IQBAL @ HAJI IQBAL @ BALA, ACCUSED MEHMOOD AND
DILSHAD - NO RELIEF CAN BE GIVEN TO PETITION FILED
BY THIRD PARTIES
• That the instant SLPs have been filed by a third party. The Accused
Iqbal @ Haji Iqbal @ Bala nor the other petitioners have signed the
vakalatnama and affidavit and Iqbal is absconding from the law. Even,
the Writ Petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. filed before the Hon’ble
High Court, has not been signed by Iqbal himself. No relief can be
granted to those who have not approached this Hon’ble Court.
• Accused Iqbal has absconded from the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble
Court and has in all likelihood absconded from the country. It is
humbly submitted that a person who is not within the jurisdiction of
this Hon’ble Court and has not signed any affidavit or vakalatnama,
cannot be entitled for any relief.
Ï% The accused have selectively brought only a few cases before this
Hon’ble Court leaving the more heinous and gross cases.
B. Iqbal @ Haji Iqbal @ Bala is the Most Wanted Criminal in the
area of Mirjapur District Saharanpur creating terror in the minds of
the citizens. He is a known sand mafia, land grabber having grabbed
Government Land, Forest Land, Poor Farmers’ Land and built a
university namely Glocal University, Saharanpur in the area of
more than 700 Acres. The Office of Senior Superintendent of Police,
Meerut Zone, Meerut, vide its office memo dated 11.02.2023, has
declared Iqbal @ Bala a most wanted criminal with a prize money
of Rs. 1,00,000/-
• PROTECTION OF EARLIER DISPENSATION: It is evident that
the Crime world of Accused Iqbal and his family has grown over the
past decades with support of earlier dispensation/Government(s), and
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 325
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
that is why the criminal cases registered against him in the years 1990
– 1993, were withdrawn by the earlier Government(s). The Accused
Iqbal terrorized the people, he is a known name of terror in the area of
District Saharanpur or Western State of Uttar Pradesh, due to which,
no FIR(s)/Criminal cases were registered against the Accused Iqbal
and his family members.
• LOOK OUT NOTICES: The accused Iqbal is absconding from the
process and the number of Look Out Circulars were issued against
him. But the Accused Iqbal has not appeared even once in any case
and has already absconded. A person who does not cooperate with
the investigation, no relief can be granted to him.
• NOTICES U/S SECTION 41: A large number of notices under
section 41A Cr.P.C. have been issued in a large number of cases. were
issued to the accused Iqbal @ Bala, despite the service of notices, the
Accused Iqbal neither appeared nor joined the investigation in any
criminal case.
• HISTORY SHEETER GANGSTER GANG LEADER : The
Accused Haji Iqbal @ Mohd. Iqbal @ Bala is a history-sheeter, gang
leader, known name of terror, if any relief to be given to such type of
criminals, who are publicly involved in rape cases, dacoity cases,
fraud cases, land grabbing cases, extortion cases etc will send a wrong
message/signal to the society and those persons/victims who come
against these wrongdoers will never get justice and no one will ever
raise their voices against these criminals in future.
• So far as concerned, admitted with the change of Government,
complainant/terrifi ed people, aggrieved peoples, have been able
to come forward to lodge or register complaints against the
Accused Iqbal. Due to illegal support of earlier Government(s),
no complaint or criminal cases were registered against them. Now,
they have come forward to register their grievances. In the present
Government, the number of aggrieved People, Terrifi ed People/
Complainant(s) have been able to come forward to register or
raise a voice against the Accused Iqbal. On the basis of criminal
complaint(s) actions were taken against the Accused Iqbal and his
family members.
• Even, if these are false cases, the honest or law abiding persons
should join the investigation but the accused Iqbal is evading all notices
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
and has not joined any investigation in any criminal case, and hence
Look Out Notices have been issued.
• It is pertinent to mention here that in all criminal cases, the
complainants are different and the crime is different and some accused
are also different.
• Further, it is pertinent to mention that the Accused Iqbal and his
family regularly threatened the witnesses.
• The Accused Iqbal should be called upon to submit and appear
before this Hon’ble Court or any court of law.
• The Accused Iqbal is a land mafia, sand mafia, rapists, gangster.
• The Accused Iqbal started committing fraud, theft and robbery cases
in the initial days. Eventually, he became involved in the illegal mining
cases and became a gang leader. Thereafter, the Accused Iqbal started
to grab the forest land as well as government land in the District of
Saharanpur. His family members and close associates also started to
grab the land of the poor people.
• The Accused Mohd. Iqbal @ Bala is the mining mafia in western
part of state of Uttar Pradesh and several number of criminal cases
are registered against him and his family members.
• The Accused Mohd. Iqbal, Resident of District Saharanpur and Ex-
Member, Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council (BSP MLC) is involved in
the various criminal activities. The main allegations against Mohd.
Iqbal are as follows:
• Amassed disproportionate assets;
• Incorporated a number of sham companies under the Companies
Act, 1956, many of which have dummy directors or fictitious
shareholders;
• Used Golbal University in Saharanpur (located in exceeding area
more than 700 acres, where he is the founder Chancellor and managed
by the Abdul Waheed Educational and Charitable Trust, a trust set
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 327
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
up in in his father’s name with his family members as its trustees,
for creating assets out of money illegally earned through the mining
contracts.
• The Accused Haji Iqbal @ Bala and his family members are involved
in illegal mining cases, land grabbing cases, fraud cases and other
criminal cases including rape, dacoity and others.
• The Accused Iqbal @ Bala, being Gang leader, and his gang
members are criminal minded persons and indulges in anti-social
activities and the Petitioners, to gain the illegal money, are involved in
illegal mining business, grabbing the government and non-government
land by taking illegal possession.
• It is submitted that the fact that the complaints may have been
initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself ground for
quashing the criminal proceedings.
• That the section 482 of the Cr.P.C. provides:- “482. Saving of
inherent powers of High Court — Nothing in this Code shall be deemed
to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code,
or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice.”
• That this Hon’ble Court has held in Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State
of U.P. reported as (2008) 8 SCC 781, that inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr. P. C has to be exercised sparingly, carefully
and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself.
• That further, it is pertinent to mention that this Hon’ble Court has
held in case Mrs. Dhanalakshmi Vs R. Prasanna Kumar, reported as
AIR 1990 SC 494 that in exceptional cases, to prevent of the powers of
Court, the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under
section 482 Cr. P.C. quash criminal proceedings. However, interference
would only be justified when complaint did not disclose any offence,
or was patently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive.
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
In the present case, the FIR/Crime No. 122/2022 U/s 376, 323, 354(A)
IPC & Section 7, 8 of POCSO Act, 2012 was registered at P.S. Mahila
Thana, District Saharanpur disclosed the glaring facts and there are
serious allegations against the Accused Iqbal and other accused. The
facts of the FIR No. 122 of 2022 prima facie reveals commissions of
cognizable offence.
The Accused Haji Iqbal @ Bala has been involved in more than 45
criminal cases including rape cases, illegal mining, land grabbing,
fraud cases, assault cases and other criminal cases since 1990. The
first FIR was registered against the Accused Iqbal in 1990 i.e. FIR No.
57 of 1990 U/s 379, 411 IPC and Section 26 of Forest Act at Mirzapur
Police Station. However, due to earlier Government(s) supports, no
legal actions were taken against the Accused Iqbal and his family
members. The following criminal cases are registered against the
Accused Iqbal are as follows:-
Sr. FIR/Crime Under Section Police Station District
No. No.
1. 57 of 1990 379, 411 IPC and section 26 Mirzapur Saharanpur
Forest Act
2. 53 of 1991 379, 411 IPC and section Chilkana Saharanpur
4/10 Forest Act
3. 217 of 1993 147, 323, 504, 506 IPC Behat Saharanpur
4. 302 of 2016 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC Ecotech third Gautambudh
Nagar
5. 196 of 2017 420, 406, 506 IPC Mirzapur Saharanpur
6. 246 of 2017 452, 323, 504, 506, 354, Sadar Bajar Saharanpur
147, 148, 386, 420, 467,
468, 471, 120B IPC
7. 39 of 2018 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC Janakpuri, Saharanpur
8. 52 of 2018 147, 148, 149, 352, 504, Sadar Bajar Saharanpur
147, 148, 386, 420, 467,
468, 471, 120B IPC
Section 3(2)(5)A SC/ST Act
and Section 7 Criminal Law
Amendment Act
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 329
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
9. 65 of 2018 403, 447, 506, 120B IPC Mirzapur Saharanpur
10. 165 of 2018 2/3 Gangster Act Mirzapur Saharanpur
11. 177 of 2019 420, 504, 506, 467, 468, Mirzapur Saharanpur
471 IPC
12. 178 of 2019 406, 342, 392, 504, 506, Mirzapur Saharanpur
354 IPC
13. 587 of 2019 120B,167, 467, 468, 471 Sadar Bajar Saharanpur
IPC
14. 519 of 2021 420, 466, 467, 468, 471, Behat Saharanpur
120B IPC
15. 83 of 2022 2/3 Gangster Act Mirzapur Saharanpur
16. 97 of 2022 504, 506, 386 IPC Mirzapur Saharanpur
17. 101 of 2022 504,506 IPC Mirzapur Saharanpur
18. 102 of 2022 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC Mirzapur Saharanpur
19. 89 of 87-88 Badkala Forest
Range
20. 29 of 89-90 Badkala Forest
Range
21. 173 of 89-90 Badkala Forest
Range
22. 53 of 91 4/10 Forest Act Behat Saharanpur
23. 70 of 91-92 Behat Saharanpur
24. 71 of 91-92 Behat Saharanpur
25. 72 of 91-92 Behat Saharanpur
26. 103 of 1992 379, 411 IPC and 26 of Behat Saharanpur
Forest Act
27. 104 of 1994 379, 411 IPC and section 26 Behat Saharanpur
of Forest Act
28. 105 of 1992 379, 411 IPC and section 26 Behat Saharanpur
of Forest Act
29. 32 of 2001 147, 148, 306 IPC Yamuna Nagar, Yamuna
Nagar,
Haryana
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
FIR No. 224 of 2022 U/s 395, 504, 506, 323 IPC:-
c) The Petitioners and other accused robbed the Complainant and his
brother and got the signature on stamp papers of the aforementioned
land forcefully.
d) Further, it was alleged in that due to terror of the Petitioners
and their family, no other family members have supported to lodge
the complaint, but after seeing that the other aggrieved persons are
taking action against the Petitioners and their family members, the
complainant decided to lodge the complaint against the Petitioners
and other accused persons for the said criminal incident.
e) The Investigation Officer also recorded the statement of the
independent witnesses and collected the other material evidence
against the Petitioners and other accused persons, which prima facie
shows that the Petitioners ad other accused persons have committed
the serious offences.
f) The Investigation has been completed and chargesheet is ready to
file against the Petitioners but due to stay order dated 28.11.2022 of
this Hon’ble Court, the chargesheet could not be submitted.
SUBMISSIONS IN RESPECT OF DELAY
a) The impugned first information report prima facie reveals
commission of cognizable offences and which inspire confidence that it
is clear from the contents of the FIR that serious crime was committed
by the Petitioners and other accused persons.
b) The Dacoity is defined under section 391 IPC, which stipulates that
when five or more persons conjointly or attempt to commit a robbery
or, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or
attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present and aiding
such commission or attempt, amount to five or more, every person so
committing, attempting or aiding, is said to commit “dacoity.
c) Further, the robbery has defined under section 390 IPC, which
stipulates that Theft is “robbery” if, in order to the committing of the
theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to
carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end,
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 331
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt
or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of
instant wrongful restraint.
In the present case, the other accused persons (total 6 accused persons)
have looted & extorted the complainant. The contents of the FIR prima
facie reveals that the Complainant, when they visited the house of the
Petitioners, he was looted and wrongful restrained by the Petitioners.
The petitioners and the other accused persons, as such, prima facie
involved in the offences as mentioned in the FIR.
d) Recently, this Hon’ble Court has held in case Mahendra Prasad
Tiwari Vs Amit Kumar Tiwari & Anr reported as 2022 SCC Online
SC 1057 held that delay is registration of the FIR is not a ground to
discharge.
e) This Hon’ble Court has held in case Thakur Ram v. State of
Bihar, reported as (1966) 2 SCR 740, that barring a few exceptions,
in criminal matters the party who is treated as the aggrieved party is
the State which is the custodian of the social interests of the community
at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for
bringing the person who has acted against the social interests of the
community to book.
f) This Hon’ble Court has held in case Sheonandan Paswan v. State
of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288
17. It is undoubtedly true that the prosecution against Dr.
Jagannath Mishra was initiated by the successor government of
Karpoori Thakur after Dr. Jagannath Mishra went out of power.
But that by itself cannot support the inference that the initiation
of the prosecution was actuated by political vendetta or mala
fides because it is quite possible that there might be material
justifying the initiation of prosecution against Dr. Jagannath
Mishra and the successor government might have legitimately
felt that there was a case for initiation of prosecution and that
is why the prosecution might have been initiated. There would
be nothing wrong on the part of the successor government in
doing so and the prosecution cannot be said to be vitiated on
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
that account. This is precisely what Hidayatullah, J. speaking for
the Constitution Bench pointed out in Krishna Ballabh Sahay v.
Commission of Enquiry [AIR 1969 SC 258 : (1969) 1 SCR 387,
393 : 1969 Cri LJ 520] :
“The contention that the power cannot be exercised by the
succeeding Ministry has been answered already by this Court
in two cases. The earlier of the two has been referred to by the
High Court already. The more recent case is P.V. Jagannath
Rao v. State of Orissa [AIR 1969 SC 215 : (1968) 3 SCR 789]
. It hardly needs any authority to state that the inquiry will be
ordered not by the Minister against himself but by someone
else. Where a Ministry goes out of office, its successor may
consider any glaring charges and may, if justified, order an
inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will become a law unto
itself and the corrupt conduct of its Ministers will remain
beyond scrutiny.”
These observations afford a complete answer to the contention urged on
behalf of Dr. Jagannath Mishra that this Court should not interfere with
the withdrawal of the prosecution because the successor government
of Karpoori Thakur or Sheonandan Paswan was actuated by political
motivation or vendetta.”
9. Ms. Garima Prasad brought to the notice of this Court that the
investigation has been completed and charge sheet is ready to be filed
against the appellants and other co-accused, however, due to the interim
order passed by this Court on 28.11.2022, the Investigation Officer has
not been able to file the charge sheet before the concerned trial court.
ANALYSIS
10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the following questions fall
for the consideration by this Court:-
1. Whether the plain reading of the FIR discloses commission of the
offence of dacoity punishable under Section 395 of the IPC? To put it
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 333
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
in other words, even if the entire case of the prosecution is believed
to be true, whether the ingredients to constitute the offence of dacoity
punishable under Section 395 of the IPC are disclosed?
2. Whether any case of criminal intimidation punishable under Sections
504 and 506(2) of the IPC is made out?
3. Whether the allegations levelled in the FIR inspire any confidence
considering the fact that the FIR was lodged in the year 2022 for
the alleged offence of the year 2021 and more particularly, without
furnishing any details as regards the date and time of the alleged
incident?
4. Whether the case on hand falls within any one of the parameters
laid down by this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
AIR 1992 SC 604, for the purposes of quashing the criminal case?
DISCUSSION
OFFENCE OF DACOITY:-
11. The offence of dacoity falls within Chapter XVII of the IPC which
relates to Offences Against Property. Section 390 explains what is “robbery”.
It explains, when theft is robbery and when extortion is robbery. Section
390 along with illustrations reads thus:-
“Section 390. Robbery.—In all robbery there is either theft or
extortion.
When theft is robbery.—Theft is “robbery” if, in order to the
committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying
away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the
offender, for that end voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any
person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or
of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.
When extortion is robbery.—Extortion is “robbery” if the offender,
at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the
person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that person
in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
restraint to that person or to some other person, and, by so putting
in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to deliver
up the thing extorted.
Explanation.—The offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently
near to put the other person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt,
or of instant wrongful restraint.
Illustrations
(a) A holds Z down, and fraudulently takes Z’s money and jewels from
Z’s clothes, without Z’s consent. Here A has committed theft, and, in
order to the committing of that theft, has voluntarily caused wrongful
restraint to Z. A has therefore committed robbery.
(b) A meets Z on the high road, shows a pistol, and demands Z’s
purse. Z, in consequence, surrenders his purse. Here A has extorted
the purse from Z by putting him in fear of instant hurt, and being at
the time of committing the extortion in his presence. A has therefore
committed robbery.
(c) A meets Z and Z’s child on the high road. A takes the child, and
threatens to filing it down a precipice, unless Z delivers his purse. Z,
in consequence, delivers his purse. Here A has extorted the purse from
Z, by causing Z to be in fear of instant hurt to the child who is there
present. A has therefore committed robbery on Z.
(d) A obtains property from Z by saying “Your child is in the hands
of my gang, and will be put to death unless you send us ten thousand
rupees”. This is extortion, and punishable as such: but it is not robbery,
unless Z is put in fear of the instant death of his child.”
12. Section 391 of the IPC defines “dacoity”. Section 391 reads thus:-
“Section 391. Dacoity. — When five or more persons conjointly
commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number
of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery,
and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt, amount
to five or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding, is
said to commit “dacoity”.”
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 335
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
13. Section 395 provides for punishment for the offence of dacoity.
Section 395 reads thus:-
“Section 395. Punishment for dacoity. — Whoever commits dacoity
shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine.”
14. Theft amounts to ‘robbery’ if, in order to the committing of
the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting
to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender for that end,
voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or
wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant
wrongful restraint. Before theft can amount to ‘robbery’, the offender
must have voluntarily caused or attempted to cause to any person death
or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or
of instant wrongful restraint. The second necessary ingredient is that this
must be in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft,
or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the
theft. The third necessary ingredient is that the offender must voluntarily
cause or attempt to cause to any person hurt etc., for that end, that is,
in order to the committing of the theft or for the purpose of committing
theft or for carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained
by the theft. It is not sufficient that in the transaction of committing
theft, hurt, etc., had been caused. If hurt, etc., is caused at the time of
the commission of the theft but for an object other than the one referred
to in Section 390, IPC, theft would not amount to robbery. It is also not
sufficient that hurt had been caused in the course of the same transaction
as commission of the theft.
15. The three ingredients mentioned in Section 390, IPC, must always
be satisfied before theft can amount to robbery, and this has been explained
in Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 476, in the following
words:-
“The words “for that end” in sec.390 clearly mean that the hurt
caused by the offender must be with the express object of facilitating
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
the committing of the theft, or must be caused while the offender is
committing the theft or is carrying away or is attempting to carry
away the property obtained by theft. It does not mean that the assault
or the hurt must be caused in the same transaction or in the same
circumstances.”
16. In Karuppa Gounden v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1918 Madras 821, which
followed two Calcutta cases of Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi,
(1900-01) 5 C.W.N. 372, and King Emperor v. Mathura Thakur, (1901-02)
6 C.W.N. 72, it has been observed at page 824 as follows:-
“Now it is our duty to give effect to the words “for that end”. It
would have been open to the legislature to have used other words
which would not raise the difficulty that arises here. The Public
Prosecutor has been forced to argue that “for that end” must be read
as meaning ‘in those circumstances’. In my opinion we cannot do
that in construing a section in the Penal Code. Undoubtedly, words
‘in those circumstances’ would widen the application of the section
and we are not permitted to do that. The matter has been considered
in two judgments of the Calcutta High Court one of which is reported
as Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi (1900-01) 5 C.W.N. 372.
Their Lordships put the question in this way:
“It seems to us that the whole question turns upon the words “for
that end”. Was any hurt or fear of instant hurt, that was caused
in the present case, caused for the end of the commission of the
theft? We think not. It seems to us that whatever violence was
used for the purpose of dispossessing the persons who were
already in possession of the premises in question and had no
relation to the commission of theft, although theft was committed
at the same time.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Ordinarily, if violence or hurt is caused at the time of theft, it
would be reasonable to infer that violence or hurt was caused for facilitating
the commission of the theft or for facilitating the carrying away of the
property stolen or for facilitating the attempt to do so. But there may be
something in the evidence to indicate that hurt or violence was caused
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 337
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
not for this purpose but for a different purpose. We are of the view that
prosecution has blindfoldedly and without understanding the true purport
of the offence of “dacoity” registered the FIR for the offence punishable
under Section 395 of the IPC and proceeded to even prepare charge sheet
for the offence of dacoity.
18. Even if we believe or accept the entire case put up by the first
informant, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of dacoity are
disclosed. Let us once again recapitulate the case of the first informant. The
incident is alleged to have occurred at the house of the appellant No. 2. It is
the first informant and his brother who are said to have visited one fine day
the house of the appellant No. 2. At that point of time, the other co-accused
are also shown to be present. There is no good or plausible explanation
coming from the first informant as to why he was carrying Rs. 2 Lakh in his
pocket. The entire case put up by the first informant appears to be fabricated.
Let us assume for the time being that the first informant was in fact carrying
Rs. 2 Lakh in his pocket and at the time of alleged incident, the amount was
forcibly taken away by the accused persons, whether this taking away of Rs.
2 Lakh from the pocket of the first informant would fall within the ambit of
the words “for that end” occurring in Section 390 of the IPC. The answer
is an emphatic “No”. Even according to the first informant, the dispute
was one relating to the agricultural land. The first informant says that he
is the lawful owner of the land in question, whereas, according to him, the
accused persons are wrongly claiming to be the lawful owners of the land.
With a view to settle this dispute, the first informant and his brother are said
to have visited the house of the appellant No. 2 on their own free will and
volition. It is only after reaching the house of the appellant No. 2 that the
entire incident is alleged to have occurred. We should be mindful of the fact
that we are dealing with provisions of a criminal statute, like the IPC. The
provisions of any criminal statute are to be construed and interpreted strictly.
19. The general rule governing the interpretation of penal statute is that
it must be strictly construed. Strict interpretation in the words of Crawford
connotes:-
“If a statute is to be strictly construed, nothing should be included within
its scope that does not come clearly within the meaning of the language
used. Its language must be given exact and technical meaning with no
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
extension on account of implications or equitable considerations; or
has been aptly asserted, its operation must be confined to cases coming
clearly within the letter of the statute as well as within its spirit and
reason. Or stated perhaps more concisely, it is close and conservative
adherence to the literal or textual interpretation.”
20. According to Sutherland, by the rule of strict construction it is
not meant that the statute shall be stringently or narrowly construed but it
means that everything shall be excluded from its operation which does not
clearly come within the scope of the language used.
21. When it is said that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly,
it only means that the Court must see that the thing charged is an offence
within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words.
22. In the circumstances referred to above, we have reached the
conclusion that Section 395 of the IPC is not applicable to the case on hand.
SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC
23. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult
and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:-
“Section 503. Criminal intimidation. — Whoever threatens another
with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person
or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent
to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act
which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that
person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution
of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person
in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.
Illustration
A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit,
threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.”
Section 504 reads thus:-
“Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach
of the peace.— Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 339
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that
such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to
commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.”
Section 506 reads thus:-
“Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. — Whoever
commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— And if the
threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction
of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
24. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:-
1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person
is interested.
2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally
bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that
person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding
the execution of such threat.
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
25. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a
person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace
or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person
insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace
or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the
purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case
might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to
commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If
abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would
in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the
peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away
from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did
not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised
self control or having been subjected to abject terror by the off ender. In
judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504,
IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would
be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant
actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament
or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive
language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language
is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit
a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of
the complainant.
26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not
amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC
if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the
person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the
other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted
to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is
likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language
shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of
that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits
an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language
against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai,
(1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
pointed out that:-
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 341
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
“To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if
the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his
temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken
by angry words as well as deeds.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of
it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation
is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause
alarm to the complainant.
28. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly,
considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie
case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may
probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504
of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under
Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective.
In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language
was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of
abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed
above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there
should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where
that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those
words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to
intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide
whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.
29. However, as observed earlier, the entire case put up by the first
informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this
stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for quashing
of an FIR in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). The parameters are:-
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance
of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal grudge.”
In our opinion, the present case falls within the parameters Nos. 1, 5
and 7 resply referred to above.
30. At this stage, we would like to observe something important.
Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the
FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that
such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with
the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 343
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.
We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the
accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then
he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the
necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made
in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the
Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings,
the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if
need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines.
The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or
Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a
case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading
to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected
in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple
FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of
such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance,
thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal
grudge as alleged.
31. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004)
6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of
materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine
distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence
and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails
to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR.
The Court held:-
“5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and
if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce
injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an
abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of
court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends
of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what
the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out
even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ
1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power
can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint
taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute
the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal
evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails
to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind
the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence
or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which,
on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence
in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation
of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the
trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument
of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect
and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant
facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 345
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time
the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-
circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death…..”
(Emphasis supplied)
DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR
32. The alleged incident is said to have occurred sometime in the year
2021. There is no reference to any date or time of the incident in the FIR.
The allegations are too vague and general. Had it been the case of prompt
registration of the FIR, probably the police might have been able to recover
Rs. 2 Lakh from the possession of the accused persons alleged to have been
forcibly taken away from the pocket of the first informant. The FIR also
talks about a document on which the first informant and his brother were
forced to put their signatures. We wonder, whether the investigating agency
was in a position to collect or recover any such document from the accused
persons containing their signatures in the course of the investigation,
more particularly when the State says that the investigation is over and
the charge sheet is also ready. In the absence of all this material, how is
the State going to prove its case against the accused persons. The FIR in a
criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the
purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The object
of insisting upon lodging of the FIR to the police in respect of commission
of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances
in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and
the part played by them as well as names of the eye witnesses present at
the scene of occurrence.
33. In the aforesaid context, we may clarify that delay in the registration
of the FIR, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing of the FIR. However,
delay with other attending circumstances emerging from the record of
the case rendering the entire case put up by the prosecution inherently
improbable, may at times become a good ground to quash the FIR and
consequential proceedings. If the FIR, like the one in the case on hand, is
lodged after a period of more than one year without disclosing the date and
time of the alleged incident and further without any plausible and convincing
explanation for such delay, then how is the accused expected to defend
himself in the trial. It is altogether different to say that in a given case, in
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
the course of investigation the investigating agency may be able to ascertain
the date and time of the incident, etc. The recovery of few incriminating
articles may also at times lend credence to the allegations levelled in the
FIR. However, in the absence of all such materials merely on the basis of
vague and general allegations levelled in the FIR, the accused cannot be
put to trial.
34. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State
vehemently submitted that considering the gross criminal antecedents of
the appellants before us, the criminal proceedings may not be quashed.
The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State in her
written submissions has furnished details in regard to the antecedents of the
appellants. A bare look at the chart may give an impression that the appellants
are history sheeters and hardened criminals. However, when it comes to
quashing of the FIR or criminal proceedings, the criminal antecedents of the
accused cannot be the sole consideration to decline to quash the criminal
proceedings. An accused has a legitimate right to say before the Court that
howsoever bad his antecedents may be, still if the FIR fails to disclose
commission of any offence or his case falls within one of the parameters as
laid down by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), then the Court
should not decline to quash the criminal case only on the ground that the
accused is a history sheeter. Initiation of prosecution has adverse and harsh
consequences for the persons named as accused. In Directorate of Revenue
and another v. Mohammed Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370, this Court
explicitly recognises the right to not to be disturbed without sufficient
grounds as one of the underlying mandates of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Thus, the requirement and need to balance the law enforcement power and
protection of citizens from injustice and harassment must be maintained. It
goes without saying that the State owes a duty to ensure that no crime goes
unpunished but at the same time it also owes a duty to ensure that none of
its subjects are unnecessarily harassed.
35. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the
continuation of the criminal case arising from the FIR No. 224 of 2022
registered at Mirzapur Police Station, Saharanpur will be nothing but abuse
of the process of the law. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case,
we are inclined to accept the case put up on behalf of the appellants herein.
MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 347
AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
36. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The
impugned order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is
hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 224 of
2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur,
State of U.P. are hereby quashed.
37. It is needless to clarify that the observations made in this judgment
are relevant only for the purpose of the FIR in question and the consequential
criminal proceedings. None of the observations shall have any bearing on
any of the pending criminal prosecutions or any other proceedings.
Headnotes prepared by: Appeal allowed.
Nidhi Jain
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