Holding

Section 482 CrPC cannot be invoked to quash criminal defamation proceedings merely on the ground of alleged vicarious liability; the liability of a newspaper owner under Sections 500, 501 and 502 IPC must be determined at trial.

Summary

The respondent, owner of the Kannada daily "Jaya Kirana", was charged under Sections 500, 501 and 502 of the Indian Penal Code for publishing a news item that the appellant claimed was defamatory. The appellant filed a private complaint, which led to criminal proceedings; the respondent sought quash of the case under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the owner could not be vicariously liable for the alleged defamation. The Karnataka High Court dismissed the petition, holding that prosecution would cause a miscarriage of justice, without analysing the principles of vicarious liability. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, observing that the question of whether the owner is liable under the IPC offences and whether sufficient evidence exists is a matter for trial, not for a Section 482 proceeding. The Court further clarified that the owner, printer or seller can be liable under Sections 501 and 502 if the requisite mens rea is proved, and that Section 482 cannot be used casually to quash criminal defamation cases.

Issues considered

The scope of Section 482 CrPC in quashing criminal defamation proceedings against a newspaper owner.
Whether a newspaper owner can be held vicariously liable under Sections 500, 501 and 502 IPC for defamatory material printed and sold by his enterprise.
Whether the sufficiency of evidence to establish the offences is a matter for trial and not for a Section 482 application.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 499, s. 500, s. 501, s. 502
Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867s. 7

Subjects

defamationvicarious liabilitycriminal lawSection 482 CrPCnewspaper ownerIPC Sections 500-502quashing of criminal proceedingspress law

Judgment

[2017) 12 S.C.R. 9

MOHAMMED ABDULLA KHAN A
v.
PRAKASH K.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2059 of2017)
DECEMBER 04, 2017 B
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND S. ABLUL NAZEER, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 - Petition for
quashing of defamation proceedings - Respondent is the owner of
the newspaper which allegedly published defamatory material
against the appellant - Proceeding initiated against him under
c
s.500-502 /PC - High Court quashed the proceedings - On appeal,
held: The owner, the printer, or the person selling or offering to sell
defamatory material is liable for the offences under ss.501 or 502
JPC, (as the case may be) if the other elements indicated in those
sections are satisfied - Whether there is sufficient evidence to D
establish the guilt of the respondent for any one of these offences is
c1 matter that can be examined only cifter recording evidence at the
time of trial - That can never be a subject matter of a proceeding
under s.482 - High Court simply concluded that prosecution of
respondent would lead to miscarriage of justice without discussing
E
and without disclosing any principle which forms the basis of the
conclusion - The extent of the applicability of the principle of
vicC1rious liability in crimincil law pe1rticulC1rly in the context of the
offences relating to defamation are neither discussed by the High
Court in the judgment under appeal nor argued before Supreme
Court because the respondent neither appeared in person nor F
through any advocate - The question requires a serious
examination since the owner of a newspaper employs people to
print, publish and sell the newspaper to make a financial gain out
of the said activity - Each of these activities is carried oi1 by persons
employed by the owner - Where defamatory matter is printed (in a
G
newspaper or a book etc.) C1nd sold or offered for sale, whether the
owner thereof can be heard to say that he cannot be made vicariously
liable for the defamatory material carried by his newspaper etc.
requires a critical examination - Neither prosecutions nor the power
under s.482 can be either conducted or exercised casually m was
done in the case on hand - Impugned judgment set aside - Trial H
9
10 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A court to proceed _with the case in qc~ordance with law - Penal Code,
1860 - ss.499, ~00, 501, 502. .· . " .
Allowing '_the apP,e~,
. -· . -,the ~ou~t .· .·
.. ·.·. ., '
.,
HELD: 1.1 The essence of publication in the context of
Section 499 is communication of defamatory imputation to persons
B other than the persons ag~i'nsi whoin the imputation is made.
Committing any act' which· constitutes- defamation under. Section
499 IPC is punishable offence under Section 500 IPC. If the
content of any news item carrie<l in a newspaper is defamatory as
defined under Sectio~ 499. IP<;:, ih~ mere prlntingof su~h inaterial
c "knowing or having 'good rea~oit ~~ believ~ that such matter is
defamatory" itself. constitutes .a distinct offence under Secti01.1
501 IPC .. The sale or offering for. sale ot's~c]t printed ''substapce
containing defamatory m~tter" "knowing that it contains such
matter" is a distlrict offence under Section 502 IPC. In the context
of the facts of the present case, first· of all; it must be· established
D that the matter printed-and offered for sale is defamatory within
the meaning of the. e~pre~sio~. under .Section 49.9. IPC •. lf so
proved, the next 'step. woµld i)e.fo e~amine the question whether
the accused committed the ac.ts which constitute the offence of
which he is charged· witlt the 1~ectutSite 'lnterttion ot-knowledgc'
E etc. to make his acts culpable. [Paras 11-13 ainl 15] [15-A:-F] ·
Khima Ncmd v. Emperor (1937) 38 Cri ·LJ ·806 (All);
Amar Singh F. KS Badalia (1965) 2 Cri LJ 693 (Pat)
- ref~rred- to. ;_!·.;·. . ·:.:·-~· • ·

1.2 Whether the ~ontent of the appellant's complaint
F constitutes an 1>ffonce punishable under any one or all or some of
these .sections was.not examined by the High Court for quashing
the complaint against the respondent. Whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the respondent for any one of
the three offences is a matter that can be examined only after
0 recording evidence at the time of trial. That can never be a subject
matter of a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. From the
judgment under appeal, it appears that before the High Court it
was argued on behalf of the respondent that there is no vicarious
liability in criminal law and therefore the owner of a newspaper
cannot be prosecuted for the offences of defamation. The High
H Court concluded that prosecution of the respondent would lead
MOHAMMED ABDULLA KHAN v. PRAKASH K. 11

to miscarriage of justice; A conclusion without any discussion A
and without disclosing any principle which forms the basis of the
conclusion. [Paras 17-20] [16-C-H] ·
K.M. Mathew v. .K.A. Abraham (2002) 6 SCC 670 :
[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 662 - referred to.
2. Where defamatory matter is printed (in a newspaper or B
a book etc.) and sold or offered for sr.Ie·, whether the owner
thereof can be heard to say that he cannot be made vicariously
liable for the defamatory material carried by his newspaper etc.
requires ;t critical examination. Each case requires a careful
scrutiny of the various questions indicated above. Neither c
prosecutions nor the power under Section 482 CrPC can be either
conducted ur exercised casually as was done in the case on hand.
[Paras 25-27] [20-A-B]
Ramasami v. Lokanada (1886) ILR 9 Mad 692;
Emperor v. Bodi Narayana Rao and G Harisar11ot/1ama D
Rao (1909) ILR 32 Mad 338 - referred to.
The Queen v. Holbrook. L.R. 3 QBD 60 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 662 referred to Para7
E.
(1937) 38 Cri LJ 806 (All). referred to Para 11
(1965) 2 Cri LJ 693 (Pat) referred to Para 11
(1886) ILR 9 .Mad 692 referred to Para 24
(1909) ILR 32 .Mad 338 referred to Para 24 F

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 2059 of2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2016 of the High Court G
ofKarnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Petition No. 8679 of2015.
M. N. Rao, Sr. Adv (AC), for the Appellant.
Petitioner-in-person.

H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHELAMESWAR, J, 1. Leave granted.
2. The sole respondent is admittedly the owner of a Kannada
Daily Newspaper by name "Jaya Kirana" published from Mangalore,
Karnataka. On 16.12.2013, the said newspaper carried a news item
B containing certain allegations against the appellant herein. According to
the appellant, the allegations are highly defamatory in nature.
3. The appellant lodged a report with the Panambur Police,
Mangalore, Dakshina Kannada District on 17.12.2013 against the
respondent and another person who was editor of the abovementioned
c newspaper. Police did not take any action. Thereafter, the appellant
filed a private complaii:it against the respondent and the editor of the
abovementioned newspaper before the J.M.F.C.-II, Mangalore in PCR
No.24/2014 which eventually came to be numbered as CC No.1252 of
2014. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the matter on
D 15.04.2014 for the offences punishable under Section 500, 501 and 502
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
4. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.04.2014, the respondent carried
the matter in Revision Petition No.219 of2014 before the Sessions Judge,
Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore. By the order dated 06.11.2015, the
E respondent's revision was dismissed. Respondent further carried the
matter in Criminal Petition No.8679 of 2015 to the Karnataka High Court
invoking Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. By an
order dated 23.11.2016, the said petition was allowed and the proceedings
in CC No.1252 of 2014, insofar as they pertained to the respondent,
were quashed.
F
5. Both in his revision as well as the petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C., the respondent urged various grounds which according to him
render the order dated 15.04.2014 illegal. The details of those various
grounds are not necessary for our purpose.
G 6. The judgment under appeal is v~ry cryptic. The first three
paragraphs of the judgment under appeal (running into a short one and a
half page) purport to take note ofonly one submission of the respondent.
"Para 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would point out
that there can be no vicarious liability insofar as the criminal law
is concerned. The complainant's allegation of the defamatory
H
MOHAMMED ABDULLA KHAN v. PRAKASH K. 13
[CHELAMESWAR, J.]

·material published in the newspaper against him, even if it is A
established, can only be sustained against the editor of the
newspaper and not the owner of the newspaper. The petitioner
admittedly was the owner. The newspaper carries a legend that
the newspaper is edited and published on behalf of the petitioner
and there is no dispute in this regard."
B
7. It appears from the judgment .under appeal that the nppellant
herein argued that in view of the law laid down in K.M. Mathew v. K.A.
Abraham, (2002) 6 SCC 670 the respondent's objection could not be
sustained. High Court rejected the submission of the appellant.
"Para 3. Though the learned Counsel for the respondent would c
seek to contend that the question is no longer res integra and is
covered by a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.M.
Mathew vs. K.A. Abraham, AIR 2002 SC 2989, it is however
noticed thnt the said decision was in respect of a managing editor,
resident editor or a chief editor of respective newspaper
publications, who were parties therein." D
The learned Judge recorded that the judgment in KM Mathew's
case could be distinguished and, therefore, opined that the respondent's
petition is required to be allowed.
"Para 3. . .. Therefore, at the outset, it can be said that the said E
case could be distinguished from the case on hand, as, the petitioner
is not claiming as an editor, who had any role in the publication of
the newspaper. Therefore, it is a fit case where the petition should
be allowed."
It is unfortunate that the High Court did not choose to give any F
reason whatsoever for quashing the complaint except a grand declaration
that "it would le~d to a miscarriage of justice".
"Accordingly, though the criminal proceedings can go on against
the editor of the newspaper, the petitioner cannot be proceeded
with, as it would lead to a miscarriage of justice."
G
Hence, the appeal.
8. Before us the appellant appeared in person. Inspite of the
service of notice, the respondent neither chose to appear in person nor
through a counsel. In view of the fact that a substantial question of law
H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A is involved in the matter, we thought it appropriate to request Shri M.N.
Rao, learned Senior Advocate to assist the Court in this matter.
9. Heard Shri M.N. Rao, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant.

10. Section 499 IPC defines the offence of defamation. It contains
B 10 exceptions and 4 explanations . .The relevant portion reads;
"Section 499. Defamation.- Whoever, by words either spoken
or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations,
makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending
to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such
C imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except
in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person."
11. An analysis of the above reveals that to constitute an offence
of defamation it requires a person to make some imputation concerning
any other person;
D
(i) Such imputation must be made either
(a) With intention, or
(b) Knowledge, or
E (c) Having a reason to believe
that such an imputation will harm the reputation of the person
against whom the imputation is made.
(ii) Imputation could be, by
(a) Words, either spoken or written, or
F
(b) By making signs, or
(c) Visible representations
(iii) Imputation could be either made or published.
G. The difference between making of an imputation and publishing
.the s11me is:
If 'X' tells 'Y' that 'Y' is a criminal - 'X' makes an imputation.

If 'X' tells 'Z' that 'Y' is a criminal- 'X' publishes the imputation.
H
...
MOHAMMED ABDULLA KHAN v. PRAKASH K. 15
[CHELAMESWAR, J.]

The essence of publication in the context of Section 499 is the A
communication of defamatory imputation to persons other than the
persons against whom the imputation is made. 1 ·
12. Committing any act which constitutes defamation under Section
499 IPC is punishable offence under Section 500 IPC. Printing or
engraving any defamatory material is altogether a different offence under B
Section 501 IPC. Offering for sale or selling any sucp printed or engraved
defamatory material is yet another.distinct offence under Section 502
IPC. · . .
13. If the content of any news item carried in a newspaper is
defamatory as defined under Section 499 IPC, the mere printing of such C
material "knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is
defamatory" itself constitutes a distinct offence under Section 501 IPC.
The sale or offering for sale of such printed "substance containing
defamatory matter" "knowing that it contains such matter" is a distinct
offence under Section 502 IPC.
14. Whether an accused (such as the respondent) against whom D
a complaint is registered under vari.ous Sections of the IPC (Sections
500, 501 & 502 ~C) could be convicted for any of those offences depends
upon the evidence regardi"ng the existence of the facts relevant to
constitute those offences.
15. in the coritext of the facts of the present case, first of all, it E
must be established that the matter printed and offered for sale is
defamatory within the meaning of the expression under Section 499 IPC.
If so proved, the next step would be to examine the question ·whether
the accused committed the acts which constitute the offence of which
he is charged with the requisite intention or knowledge etc. to' make his F
acts culpable. . · ·
16. Answer to the ·question depends upon the facts. If the
respondent is the person who eithe-r made or published the defamatory
imputation, he would be liable for punishment under Section 500 IPC. If
he is the person who "printed" the matter within the meaning of the
expression under Section 501 IPC. Similarly to constitute an offence G
under Section 502 IPC,.it must be established that the respondent is not
only the owner of the newspaper but also sold or offered the newspaper
for sale.
'Khima Nand v. Emperor, (1937) 38 Cr! LJ 806 (All);Amar Sin.gh v. K)/,nadalia,
(1965) 2 Cri LJ 693 rn. " . . ·· "· H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A 17. We must make it clear that for the acts of printing or selling or
offering to sell need not only be the physical acts but include the legal
right to sell i.e. to transfer the title in the goods - the newspaper. Those
activities if carried on by people, who are employed either directly or
indirectly by the owner of the newspaper, perhaps render all of them
i.e., the owner, the printer, or the person selling or offering for sale liable
B
for the offences under Sections 501 or 502 IPC, (as the case· may be) if
the other elements indicated in those Sections are satisfied.
18. Whether the content of the appellant's complaint constitutes
an offence punishable under any one or all or some of the abovementioned
sections was not examined by the High Court for quashing the complaint
c against the respondent. So we need not trouble ourselves to deal with
that question. We presume for the purpose of this appeal that the
content of the appellant's complaint does disclose the facts necessary to
establish the commission of one or all of the offences mentioned above.
Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the respondent
D for any one of the abovementioned three offences is a matter that can
be examined only after recording evidence at the time of trial. That can
never be a subject matter of a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
19. From the judgment under appeal, it appears that before the
High Court it was argued on behalf of the respondent that there is no
E vicarious liability in criminal law and therefore the owner of a newspaper
cannot be prosecuted for the offences of defamation.
"2. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that
there can be no vicarious liability insofar as the criminal law is
concerned. The complainant's allegation of the defamatory
F material published in the newspaper against him, even if it is
established, can only be sustained ugainst the editor of the
newspaper and not the owner of the newspuper. The petitioner
admittedly was the owner. The newspaper carries a legend that
the newspaper is edited and published on behalf of the petitioner
and there is no dispute in this regard."
G
20. It appears from para 3 of the judgment that the appellant
herein submitted in response to the above extracted contention of the
respondent that the question is no longer res integra and is covered by
a judgment of this Court in K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham & Otlrers. 2
H (2002) 6 sec 670
2
MOHAMMED ABDULLA KHAN v. PRAKASH K. 17
[CHELAMESWAR, J.]

The High Court rejected the submission holding: A
" ....... it is however noticed that the said decision was in respect
of a managing editor, resident editor or a chief editor of respective
newspaper publications, who were parties therein. Therefore, at
the outset, it cun be said that the said case could be distinguished
from the case on hand, as, the petitioner is not claiming as an B
editor, who had any role in the publication of the newspaper..
Therefore, it is a fit case where the petition should be allowed."
The High Court concluded that prosecution of the respondent would
lead to miscarriage of justice. A conclusion without any discussion and
without disclosing any principle which forms the busis of the conclusion. c
fACIS. ISSUE & RATIO DECIDENDI OF K.M. MATHEW'S
~:

21. K.M. Mathew was the "Chief Editor" of a daily called
Malayalc1m Manorama. When he was sought to be prosecuted for the
offence of defamation, he approached the High Court under Section D
482 Cr.P.C. praying that the prosecution be quashed on the ground that
Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 only permits
the prosecution of the Editor but not the Chief Editor. The High Court
rejected the submission.
22. Even before this Court, the same submission was macle. 3 This E
Court rejected the submission holding:
"16. The contention of these appellants is not tenable. There is
no statutory immunity for the Chief Editor against any prosecution
for the alleged publication of any matter in the newspaper over
which these persons exercise control." F
It was further held that though the presumption under Section 7
of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 is not applicable to
somebody whose name is printed in the newspaper as the Chief Editor,
the complainant can still allege and prove that persons other than the
Editor, if they are responsible for the publication of the defamatory O
material.
'The contention of the appellants in these cases is that they had not been shown as
Editors in these publications and that their names were printed either as Chief Editor,
Managing Editor or Resident Editor and not us "Editor" and there cannot be any
criminal prosecution against them for the alleged libellous publication of any matter in
that newspaper. [Pura 15 of K.M. Mathew's case] H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A "20. The provisions contained in the Act clearly go to show that
there could be a presumption against the Editor whose name is
printed in the newspaper to the effect that he is the Editor of such
publication and that he is responsible for selecting the matter for
publication. Though, a similar presumption cannot be drawn against
the Chief Editor, Resident Editor or Managing Editor, nevertheless,
B
the complainant can still allege and prove that they had knowledge
and they. were responsible for the publication of the defamatory
news item. Even the presumption under Section 7 is a rebuttable
presumption and the same could be proved otherwise. That by
itself indicates that somebody other than editor can also be held
c responsible for selecting the matter for publication in a newspaper."
23. K.M. Mathew's case has nothing to do with the question of
vicarious liability. The argument in K.M. Mathew's case was that in
view of Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 only
the Editor of a newspaper could be prosecuted for defamation. Such a
D submission was rejected· holding that Section 7 does not create any
immunity in favour of persons other than the Editor of a newspaper. It
only creates a rebuttable presumption that the person whose name is
shown as the editor of the newspaper is responsi\>le for the choice and
publication of the material in the newspaper~ K.M. Mathew's case
made 'it cle<1r that if a c.omplaint contains allegations (which if proved
-E would constitute defamation), person other than the one who is.declared
to be t~e editor of the· newspapers can be prosecuted if they are alleged
to be res.pon·sible for the publication of such defamatory material.
The High Court, in our opinion, without examining the ratio of
K.M. Mathew's case chose to conclude that the dei;:ision is. distinguishable.
F The judgment of the High Court is absolutely unstructured leaving much
to be desired.
24. Vicarious liability for a crime is altogether a different matter.
In England, at one point of time, the owner of a newspaper was held to
be vicariously liable for an offence of defamation (libel). The history of
G law in this regard is succinctly stated by Lord Cockburn in The Queen
11. llolbrook. 4 Though there appears to be some modification of the law
subsequent to the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act i.e. the Libel Act
1843 (6&7 Viet C 96).
4 L.R. 3 QBD 60 ·
H
MOHAMMED ABDULLA KHAN v. PRAKASH K. 19
[CHELAMESWAR, J.]

Lord Campbell's Act did not apply to India. The Press and A
Registration of Books Act (Act XXV of 1867) is made applicable to
British India and continues to be in force by virtue of the declaration
under Article 372 of the Constitution of India. There are material
differences between the scheme and tenor of both the enactments. In
Ramasami v. Lokanada, (1886) ILR 9 Mad 692, it was held:
B
" ... But we cannot hold that the provisions of that Statute (Ed ..
Lord Campbell's Act) are applicable to this country, and we must
determine whether the accused is or is not guilty of defamation
with reference to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. We
consider that it would be a sufficient answer to the charge in this
country if the accused showed that he entrusted in good faith the C
temporary management of the newspaper to a competent person
during his absence, and that the libel was published without his
authority, knowledge or consent. As the Judge has, however,
misapprehended the effect of Act XXV of 1867, we shall set
aside the order of acquittal made by him and direct him to restore D
the appeal to his file,· to consider the evidence produced by the
accused and then to dispose of the appeal with reference to the
foregoing observations."
and reiterated in Emperor v. Bodi Narayana Rao and G.
Harisarvothama Rao, (1909) ILR 32 Mad 338: E
"Lord Campbell's Act, of course, is not in force in India, and the
Criminal Law of England is not necessarily the same as the
Criminal Law of India as contained in the Indian Penal Code ... "
25. The extent of the applicability of the principle of vicarious
liability in criminal law particularly in the context of the offences relating F
to defamation are neither discussed by the High Court in the judgment
under appeal nor argued before us because the respondent neither
appeared in person nor through any advocate. Therefore, we desist
from examining the question in detail. But we are of the opinion that the
question requires a serious examination in an appropriate case because G
the owner of a newspaper employs people to print, publish and sell the
newspaper to make a financial gain out of the said activity. Each of the
abovementioned activities is carried on by persons employed by the
owner.

H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A 26. Where defamatory matter is printed (in a newspaper or a
book etc.) and sold or offered for sale, whether the owner thereof can
be heard to say that he cannot be made vicariously liable for the
defamatory material carried by his newspaper etc. requires a critical
examination.
B 27. Each case requires a carefol scrutiny of the various questions
indicated above. Neither prosecutions nor the power under Section 482
CrPC can be either conducted or exercised casually as was done in the
case on hand.
28. The judgment underappeal cannot be sustuined for the reasons
c indicated above. The same is, therefore, set-aside and the appeal is
allowed. The trial court will now proceed with the case in accordance
with Jaw.

Devika Gujrnl Appeal allowed.