MOHAN BIR SINGH CHAWLAversusPANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH AND ANR.
- Citation
- 1996 INSC 1468
- Decided
- 11 December 1996
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B P JEEVAN REDDY
Holding
University‑wise preference is constitutionally permissible if reasonable, but a ten‑percent weightage is excessive; the rule is not void per se but should be limited to a lower percentage.
Summary
Mohan Bir Singh Chawla challenged Punjab University’s rule that added a ten‑percent weightage to the qualifying‑exam marks of candidates who had passed the exam from the same university for admission to its LL.B. programme. The Supreme Court examined whether such university‑wise preference violated Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution and whether the 10 % figure was reasonable, especially since admissions were based on qualifying‑exam marks and not a common entrance test. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that university‑wise preference is permissible if it is relevant and reasonable, but a ten‑percent addition is excessive; a five‑percent ceiling would be more appropriate. However, because the admissions in question pertained to the 1993‑94 academic year, the Court could not grant any relief and dismissed the appeal, urging the university to amend the rule for future years.
Issues considered
- Does the rule granting a ten‑percent weightage to candidates from the same university for LL.B. admission violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution?
- Is university‑wise preference permissible where admission is based on qualifying‑exam marks rather than a common entrance test?
- Is the extent of the weightage (ten percent) reasonable and within constitutional limits?
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 15
Subjects
Judgment
• MOHAN BIR SINGH CHAWLA A
v.
PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH AND ANR.
DECEMBER 11, 1996
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.] B
University :
Constitution of India, !950 : Articles 14 and 15.
Weightage-Grant of-To students of same university-Validity of-Ad- c
mission to LL.B.-Based on marks secured in qualifying examination-Rule
presclibed by University-Provided for weightage of 10% of the marks ob-
tained in qualifying examination to be added in case of candidates who
passed the qualifying examination from the same university-Held: Weightage
of 10% was on higher side-It should not exceed So/er-Since admission D
pertained to 1993-94 not possible to give any relief-But it must be taken into
consideration for future admissions.
The rule governing admission to LL.B. course among other courses
prescribed by the respondent-University provided that while admission
shall be made on the basis of merit, ten percent of the marks obtained in the E
qualifying examination shall be added in the case of candidates who had
passed the qualifying examination from the respondent-University. The
impugned rule read: "(vi) Admission shall be made on merit which shall be
determined after giving weightage as under:
(a) 10% marks obtained in the aggregate marks of the qualifying F
examination passed from Panjab University."
The appellant filed writ petition before the High Court challenging
the validity of the aforesaid rule on the ground that the said rule violated
the eqnality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The
G
·- High Court dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved the appellant
preferred the present appeal.
The question before this Court was whether weightage of ten percent
marks given to students of the same university in the matter of admission
to different courses in its constituent or affiliated colleges was permissible H
949
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A where the admission was not based upon a common admission test.
Disposing of the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1. From the decided cases, following principles emerge.:
B (a) College-wise preference is not permissible in any event..
(b) University-wise preference is permissible provided it is relevant
and reasonable. Seventy to eighty percent reservation has been sustained,
even where students from different universities appear at a common
entrance test. The trend, however, is towards reducing the reservations and
C providing greater weight to merit. The practice all over the country today,
as a result of the decisions of this Court, is to make iifteen percent of the
seats in M.B.B.S. course and twenty five per~ent of the seats in post-
graduate medical courses in all the Government medical colleges in the
country (except Andhra Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir) available on the
D basis of merit alone. Students from anywhere in the country can compete for
these seats which are allotted on the basis of an All-India test conducted by
the designated authority.
(c) The rule of preference on the basis of domicile/requirement of
residence is not bad provided it is within reasonable limits, i.e., it does not
E result in reserving more than eighty five percent seats in graduate courses
and more than seventy five percent seats in post-graduate courses. But
district-wise reservations are an anathema.
(d) Where the students from different universities appear at a com-
mon entrance test/examination (on the basis on which admissions are
F made) the rule of university-wise preference too must shed some of its
relevance. The explanation of difference in evaluation, standards of educa-
tion and syllabus lose much of their significance when admission is based
upon a common entrance test. At the same time, the right of the State
Governments (which have established and maintained these institutions) to
G regulate the process of admission and their desire to provide for their own
students shonld also be accorded due deference.
(e) The fair and proper rule is; the higher you go, in any discipline, lesser
should be the reservations - of whatever kind. It is for this reason that it was
said in Dr. Pradeep jain that there should be no reservations in the matter of
H admission to snper-specialities, though in the recent decision in Rajiv
=
.. M.B.S. CHAWIA v. PB. UNNERSITY 951
Gopinath Bhatt, a different view appears to have been taken while affirming the A
principle of merit, at the same time. In the larger interest of the nation, it is
dan'gerous to depreciate merit and excellence in any field. [959-C-H; 960-A-BJ
D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore,[1971) Sopp. SCR 608; Jagdish
Saran v. Union ofIndia, [1980) 2 SCR831; Dr. Pradeep!ain v. Union of India,
[1984) 3 SCC 654; State of Rajasthan v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Gupta, [1989) l B
SCC 93; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Tllukral Anjali Dev
Kumar, [1989] 2 SCC 249; P.K. Goyal v. U.P. Medical College, (1992) 3 SCC
232;Anant Madaan v. Slate of Haryana, [1995) 2 SCC 135; D.P. Joshi v. State
of Madhya Bharat, [1955] 1 SCR 1215; Sanjay Ah/awat v. Maharishi
Dayanand University, Rohtak, [1995] 2 SCC 762; Dr. Dinesh Kumar v. C
Motila/ Nehru College, [1986] 3 SCC 727 and Gujarat University v. Rajiv
Gopinath Bhatt, [1996] 4 SCC 60, referred to.
2. In the present case, the reservation being university-wise, it cannot
be said to be bad. Having regard to the fact that the case is one of admission
to LL.B. course and also having regard to the fact that the admissions are D
not made on the basis of marks in an entrance test - but on the basis of
marks obtained in the qualifying examination • addition of ten percent of
marks is yet on the higher side. The representation of students from other
universities appears to be coming down steadily. In the present competitive
age, ten percent of marks will make a substantial difference. May be, the E
addition, if any, should not exceed five percent. [960-C-EJ
3. Inasmuch as the admissions concerned in the present case pertain
to the year 1993-94, it is not possible to give any relief to the appellant.
However, it is hoped that the university will take into consideration the
observations made herein and modify the rule accordingly so as to avoid any F
avoidable litigation and complications for the next academic year. [960-E-F)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15704 of
1996.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.1.94 of the Punjab & G
.,. - Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 8593 of 1993.
Neeraj Jain for Ms. Abba R. Sharma for the Appellant.
Dhruv Mehta, Fazlin Anam and Ms. Monika Mehta for S.K Mehta
for the Respondents. H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. The rule governing admission to LL.R
course among other courses prescribed by the Panjab University provided
that while admission shall be made on the basis of merit, ten percent of
the marks obtained in the qualifying examination shall be added in the
B case of candidates who have passed the qualifying examination from the
Panjab University. The impugned rule reads :
"(vi) Admission shall be made on merit which shall be determined
after giving weightage as under :
c (a) 10% marks obtained in the aggregate marks of the qualifying
examination passed from Panjab University."
A number of writ petitions were filed in the Panjab and Haryana
High Court by students, who have passed the qualifying examination from
D universities other than Panjab University, questioning the validity of the
said weightage rule. According to them, the rule violates the equality clause
enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution and ought to be struck
down. The writ petitions have been dismissed by the High Court. Only one
of the writ petitioners has approached this Court by way of this Special
E Leave Petition.
Leave granted. Heard the counsel for the appellant and the Panjab
University.
There is little doubt that addition of ten percent of marks to can-
F didates who have passed their qualifying examination from Panjab Univer-
sity confers a substantial advantage to the candidates from the university
over the candidates who have passed the qualifying examination from other
universities. The result of the operation of the said rule is stated in the
judgment of the High Court on the basis of the information furnished by
the counsel for the univers:ty. In the academic year 1991-92, out of 360
G students admitted into the LL.B. course, 74 students were from other
universities. For the academic year 1992-93, the non-Panjab University
students were 57 out of 300. Jn the academic year 1993-94, their strength
came down to 47 out of a total admission of 300 students. The question is
- is this rule valid? In other words, the issue is whether the weightage of
H ten percent marks given to students of one's own university in the matter
M.B.S. CI-IAWIA v. PB. UNIVERSITY [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 953
of admission to different courses in its constituent or affiliated colleges is A
permissible where the admission is not based upon a common entrance
test? Inasmuch as a certain dissonance is found in the decisions on the
subject, we have heard the counsel at some length. Sri Dhruv Mehta,
learned counsel for the Punjab University, has brought to our notice the
several decisions on the subject to which a brief reference would be in
B
order.
In D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore, [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 608, a
three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the validity of Rule 9(1) of the
Mysore Medical Colleges (Selection for Admission) Rules, 1970 relating
to admission to M.B.B.S. course. Rule 9(1) provided that the seats in the C
general pool shall be distributed university-wise, i.e., seats in colleges
affiliated to the Karnataka University shall be allotted to persons passing
from colleges affiliated to that university and seats in colleges affiliated to
Bangalore and Mysore Universities shall respectively be allotted to persons
passing from colleges affiliated to each such university provided that not D
more than twenty percent of the seats in the colleges affiliated to any
university may, in the discretion of selection committee, be allotted to
students passing from colleges affiliated to any other university in the State
or elsewhere in India. The validity of the rule was questioned on the ground
that it brings about an unreasonable classification which is neither intel-
ligible nor has a rational nexus with the object of the rule. It was submitted E
that when there is one selection committee for all the government medical
colleges in all the three universities and 59 private colleges affiliated to them,
the reservation of eighty percent of seats in favour of students of the same
university is neither reasonable nor valid. The challenge to the validity was
repelled holding that "there is nothing undesirable in ensuring that those F
attached to such universities have their ambitions to have training in
specialized subjects like medicine satisfied through colleges affiliated to
their own universities .... The fact that a candidate having lesser marks might
obtain admission at the cost of another having higher marks from other
university does not necessarily mean that a less meritorious candidate gets G
advantage over a more meritorious one. As is well-known, different
universities have different standards in the examination held by them. A
preference to one attached to one university in its own institutions for
post-graduate or technical training is not uncommon.... Further, the
Government which bears the financial burden of running the Government
colleges is entitled to lay down criteria for admission in its own colleges H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 s:c.R.
A and to decide the sources from which admission would be made, provided,
of course, such classification is not arbitrary and has a rational basis and
a reasonable connection with the object of the rules." The argument of
excessive reservation in favour of same university candidates was also
repelled.
B In!agdish Saran v. Union of India, (1980] 2 S.C.R. 831, the adrnjssion
rules prescribed by the Delhi University provided that seventy percent of
the seats at the post-graduate level in the medical courses shall be reserved
for students who have obtained their M.B.B.S. degree from the same
university. The remaining thirty percent seats were open to all, including
C the graduates of Delhi. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the three-Judge
Bench, reviewed all the decisions rendered till then on the subject including
D.N. Chanchala. From the last mentioned decision, the learned Judge
drew the conclusion that "University-wise prefrential treatment may still be
consistent with the rule of equality of opportunity where it is to correct an
D imbalance or handicap and permit equality in the larger sense ... If univer-
sity-wise classification for post-graduate medical education is shown to be
relevant and reasonable and the differential has a nexus to the larger goal
of equalisation of educational opportunities, the vice of discrimination may
not invalidate the rule." The learned Judge rejected the argument that since
every university is providing similar reservation, the reservation cannot be
E said to be unreasonable. The reasonableness of any such rule has to be
examined on a totality of the facts and cannot be justified, the learned
Judge said, merely because other universities have provided a similar rule.
The learned Judge pointed out that the admissions to post-graduate medi-
cal courses are determined on the basis of a common entrance test. Inas-
F much as the students of Delhi University are drawn from all over India and
are not confined to the Delhi region, the learned Judge held, the rule is
"not that invidious". The learned Judge also recognised the desire of the
students for institutional continuity in education and recognised it as one
of the ground justifying the reservation. The argument of excessive reser-
vation was rejected on the ground that the material placed before the Court
G was imperfect and inadequate to form a basis for invalidating the rule.
In Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984] 3 S.C.C. 654, the Court
opined that wholesale reservation made by some of the State Governments
on the basis of domicile or requirement of residence within the State or on
H the basis of institutional preference for students who have passed the
M.B.S.CHAWLA v. PB. UNIVERSITY[B.P.JEEVANREDDY,J.) 955
qualifying examination held by the university or the State and excluding all A
students not satisfying the said requirement, regardless of merit, is uncon-
stitutional being violative of Article 14. Affirming that anyone from
anywhere in the country, irrespective of his language, religion, place of
birth or residence, is entitled to be afforded equal chance of admission to
any secular educational course anywhere in the country, but, at the same B
time, recogoising the de facto inequalities existing in the society and the
need for affirmative action on that account, the Court directed that thirty
percent of the seats in the M.B.B.S. course and fifty percent of the seats
in the post-graduate medical courses in all the government colleges in the
country should be set apart for being filled purely on the basis of merit.
Students from all over the country were held entitled to compete for these C
seats and the admission was directed to be based upon merit and merit
alone. [The above percentage was brought down to fifteen percent and
twenty five percent respectively in the subsequent decision in Dr. Dinesh
Kumar v. Motilal Nehru College (1986] 3 S.C.C. 727. The discussion in Para
19 of the judgment is relevant since it refers to the various contending D
factors, the earlier decisions of this Court and the direction in which the
court ought to proceed. The court also held that so far as super-specialities
are concerned, there should be no reservation either on the basis of
institutional preference or otherwise and that admissions should be granted
purely on merit· determined on All-fndia basis.
E
In State of Rajasthan v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Gupta, (1989] 1 S.C.C. 93,
the Rajasthan University provided that admission to post-graduate medical
courses in the colleges affiliated to the said university shall be based·upon
the merit determined at the competitive examination called "PG". The PG
competitive examination was common to al the jive medical colleges in the F
State. The rule, however, provided further that "(d) the .total marks so
obtained (at the PG competitive examination) shall be converted into
percentage. The percentage so obtained shall be increased as follows : (i)
by five if the applicant passed the final MBBS examination from the
Rajasthan University; (ii) by another five if the applicant passed the final G
MBBS examination from the same institution from which selections are
being made." The validity of sub-clause (ii) of clause ( d) alone was chal-
lenged as violative of Article 14. The Court noticed that all the five medical
colleges in the State (located at Jaipur, Bikaner, Udaipur, Jodhpur and
Ajmer) were not similarly situated in the sense that Jaipur Medical College
was generally considered to be the best - also because it offered many more H
956 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996)SUPP. 9S.C.R.
A PG courses than other colleges. The Court held that addition of five
percent marks to the. marks obtained by students who have passed their
examination from, say, Jaipur Medical College, in the matter of admission
to post-graduate medical courses in that medical college, brings about an
extremely unfair and unjust result. In the case of admission to post-
B graduate medical courses where each mark counts, addition of five percent
marks on the ground of institutional [same college] preference was held to
be excessive and unreasonable and, therefore, void. It was pointed out that
by virtue of the said rule of preference, students with far less marks would
steal a march over a student securing higher marks only because he has
passed his M.B.B.S. examination from the same college .
. c
In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Thukral Anjali Dev
Kumar [1989) 2 S.C.C. 249, the admission rules provided a preference in
favour of "candidates applying for admission at the parent institution". The
note appended to the rule defined the expression "parent institution' to
D mean "the medical college at which the candidate has passed his qualifying
examination". The matter again related to admission to post-graduate
medical courses. The rule was struck down by this Court holding that it
practices a patent discrimination and that there is no intelligible differentia
to justify the said classification, viz., college-wise preference. The Bench
comprising M.M. Dutt and T.K. Thommen, JJ. followed the decision in Dr.
E Ashok Kumar Gupta and held that college-based institutional preference is
impermissible. The unfairness of the rule was held to be demonstrable and
patent. The Court also rejected the contention that because the standard
of examination and evaluation of the merit of the students in practical
examinations differ from college to college, the college-wise preference was
F not invalid.
In P.K Goyal v. Uttar Pradesh Medical Counci~ [1992) 3 S.C.C. 232,
the relevant rule provided that "based on the marks obtained at the
competitive entrance examination and the candidate's choice of the course,
a merit list shall be prepared for each college out of the institutional can-
G didates of that college." To wit, while the admission to post- graduate medical
courses in Uttar Pradesh was determined on the basis of marks obtained
at the combined entrance examination conducted by the government, the·
rules provided at the same time that admission shall be institution-wise,
i.e., from among the students who have passed M.B.B.S. course from that
H particular college. This was held to be violative of Article 14 following the
M.B.S. CHAWLA v. PB. UNIVERSITY[B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,J.] 957
•'. decisions in Dr. Ashok Kumar Gupta and Thukral A11jali Dev Kumar. A
In Ana11t Madaan v. State of Haryana, [1995] 2 S.C.C. 135, decided
by a Bench of two Judges including, one of us [B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.] the
challenge was to a rule made by the Government of Haryana providing that
in the matter of admission to M.B.B.S./B.D.S. courses, eighty five percent B
of the seats shall be reserved for candidates who have studied 10th, 11th
and 12th standards as regular candidates in recognised institutions in the
State of Haryana. The challenge to the validity of the said rule was levelled
by students who had passed their 10th, 11th and 12th examinations from
schools/colleges outside the State of Haryana but whose parents were
either residing in or domiciled in the State of Haryana. The challenge to C
the rule was repelled following the decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1215,
and the decisions in Jagdish Saran, Dr. Pradeep Jain and Dinesh Kumar.
The impugned rule was, however, treated as a rule providing preference
on the ground of domicile/residence.
D
Sanjay Ahlawat v. Maharishi Daya11and University, Rohtak, [1995] 2
S.C.C. 762, was again a case from the State of Haryana. The decision was
rendered by a Bench of two Judges, including one of us [B.P. Jeevan
Reddy, J.]. The challenge was to the rule providing that in the matter of
admission to post-graduate medical courses, preference be given to local E
candidates by adding ten extra marks, i.e., to students passing the M.B.B.S.
examination from the Rohtak Medical College. The rule further provided
that students who are residents or domiciled in the State of Haryana but
who have passed their M.B.B.S. examination from a medical college out-
side the State of Haryana shall be added five marks. The validity of the F
rule was sustained observing that it was not a case of college-wise, or for
that matter university-wise, reservation but it is a rule providing for
preference on the basis of domicile. It was held on the basis of facts and
figures furnished by the state that the said rule did not have the effect of
shutting the doors of admission to students passing their M.B.B.S. course G
from other medical colleges than the Rohtak Medical College, which was
said to be the only medical college in the State of Haryana. It was shown
to the Court that outside students also got admission in reasonable num-
bers. The Court accepted the explanation furnished by the state that extra
marks were awarded to graduates of the Rohtak College to ensure that
medical facilities in the State are not impaired because of dearth of H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A doctors. The Court accepted the explanation that residents of Haryana will,
,,
by and large, remain in Haryana after obtaining medical degrees and that
their services will be available to the people of the State. In view of these
circumstances, the rule was held to be not violative of Articles 14 and 15
of the Constitution.
B Lastly, we may refer to a three-Judge Bench decision in Gujarat
University v. Rajiv Gopinath Bhatt, [1996] 4 S.C.C. 60. The Gujarat Univer-
sity invited applications for admission to two super-speciality courses, D.M.
and M.C.H., the admission whereto was to be made based upon the marks
obtained at the entrance examination conducted by the university. Because
C of the small number of seats available in the said courses, the rule provided
that "first preference will be given to candidates from Gujarat University.
Second preference will be given to candidates from other universities of
Gujarat State. Any vacancy remaining after this shall remain unfilled". By
the time, the appeal came up for hearing before this Court, the appeal had
D become infructuous as noticed Para 4 of the judgment, inasmuch as the
respondent was allowed to join the course and had also completed the
course by that date. In that view of the matter, the Court was of the opinion
that it is not actually required to examine the grievance made on behalf of
the appellant-university against the judgment of the High Court which had
struck down the rule. Even so, at the instance of the counsel for the
E university, the court examined the validity of the rule. The High Court had
relied upon the decisions of this Court in Jagdish Saran and Dr. Pradeep
Jain for invalidating the rule. This Court, however, sustained the rule,
except the last sentence therein, on the following reasoning :
F "Without examining that question in detail, it may be pointed out
that the aforesaid judgments (Jagdish Saran and Pradeep Jain) were
not in connection with the admission in super-speciality course. At
the same time, we reiterate that object of any institution while
selecting applicants for admission is to select the best amongst the
applicants, regional and other considerations which do not satisfy
G the test of Art. 14 of the Constitution should not affect the merit
criteria But from time to time, this Court taking into consideration
the local and regional compulsions have been making efforts to
strike a balance so that the students who have pursued the studies
in a particular State and have been admitted in the medical colleges·
H of that State are not suddenly thrown on the street when question
M.B.$.CHAWLA v. PB. UNIVERSITY[B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,J.) 959
•" of their admission in super-speciality courses arises in which the A
seats are limited in number."
After referring to certain observations in Dr. Pradeep Jain and An ant
Madaan, the Court observed, "(T)herefore if a rule has been framed that
out of the merit list prepared, preference is to be given for admission in
the super speciality courses to the students of the University in question, B
per se it cannot be held to be arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of Article
14 of the Constitution."
From the decided cases, following principles emerge :·
(a) College-wise preference is not permissible in any event.
c
(b) University-wise preference is permissible provided it is relevant
and reasonable. Seventy to eighty percent reservation has been sustained,
even where students from different universities appear at a common
entrance test. The trend, however, is towards reducing the reservations and D
providing greater weight to merit. The practice all over the country today,
as a result of the decisions of this Court, is to make fifteen percent of the
seats in M.B.B.S. course and twenty five percent of the seats in post-
graduate medical courses in all the Government medical colleges in the
country [eiicept Andhra Pradesh and J ammu & Kashmir] available on the E
basis of merit alone. Students from anywhere in the country can compete
for these seats which are allotted on the basis of an All-India test con-
ducted by the designated authority.
(c) The rule of preference on the basis of domicile/requirement of
residence is not bad provided it is within reasonable limits, i.e., it does not F
result in reserving more than eighty five percent seats in graduate courses
and more than seventy five percent seats in post-graduate courses. But
district-wise reservations are an anathema.
(d) Where the students from different universities appear at a com-
mon entrance test/examination [on the basis of which admissions are made] G
the rule of university-wise preference too must shed some of its relevance.
The explanation of difference in evaluation, standards of education and
syllabus lose much of their significance when admission is based upon a
common entrance test. At the same time, the right of the State governments
[which have established and maintained these institutions] to regulate the H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A process of admission and their desire to provide for their own students
should also be accorded due deference.
(e) The fair and proper rule is : the higher you go, in any discipline,
lesser should be the reservations - of whatever kind. It is for this reason
that it was said in Dr. Pradeep Jain that there should be no reservations in
B the matter of admission to super-specialities, though in the recent decision
in Rajiv Gopinath Bhatt, a different view appears to have been taken while
affirming the principle of merit, at the same time. In the larger interest of
the nation, it is dangerous to depreciate merit and excellence in any field.
Now let us examine the facts of the case before us from the
c standpoint of above principles. The reservation being university-wise, it
cannot be said to be bad. Having regard to the fact that the case is one of
admission to LL.B. course and also having regard to the fact that admis-
sions are made on the basis of marks in the entrance test -but on the basis
of marks obtained in the qualifying examination - we are inclined to think
D that addition of ten percent of marks is yet on the higher side. The result
of the rule is evident in the figures mentioned hereinbefore. The repre-
sentation of students from other universities appears to be coming down
steadily. In the present competitive age, ten percent of marks will make a
substantial difference. May be, the addition, if any, should not exceed five
E percent.
Inasmuch as the admission concerned herein pertain to the year
1993-94, it is not possible to give any relief to the appellant herein. We do,
however, hope and •rust that the university will take into consideration the
observations made herein and modify the rule accordingly so as to avoid
F any avoidable litigation and complications for the next academic year.
The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs.
v.s.s. Appeal disposed of.
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