Holding

The life‑insurance amount received by the claimants is not deductible from the compensation computed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

Summary

The husband of Mrs. Helen C. Rebello died in a collision between a Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation bus and a Karnataka State Transport bus, the accident being caused by negligent driving. The legal heirs filed a claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and were awarded Rs.3,90,000 by the trial court, but the court deducted the life‑insurance proceeds (Rs.3,15,067.95) received by the heirs in accordance with a Bombay High Court decision. The High Court upheld the deduction and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the life‑insurance amount is not a “pecuniary advantage” within the meaning of Section 110‑B of the 1939 Act because it is not derived from the accidental death but from a contractual insurance policy. The Court emphasized that Section 110‑B uses the word “just”, giving the tribunal a wider discretion than the older Fatal Accidents Act, and that the Act is a beneficial legislation intended to provide maximum compensation for accidental death. Consequently, the deduction was set aside and the original compensation restored.

Issues considered

Whether the life‑insurance proceeds received by the legal heirs are to be deducted from the compensation payable under Section 110‑B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
How the term “pecuniary advantages” in Section 110‑B should be interpreted, particularly in relation to the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855.
Whether the word “just” in Section 110‑B expands the tribunal’s discretion to exclude such deductions.

Legislation cited

Fatal Accidents Act, 1855s. 1A
Insurance Act, 1938s. 7
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 110-B, s. 92-A, s. 92-B, s. 94, s. 95-AA, s. 95(proviso), s. 96, s. 97
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 168(1)

Subjects

Motor Vehicles Actcompensationlife insurancepecuniary advantageSection 110-Bdeductionaccidental deathbeneficial legislationinterpretationcommon law loss and gain

Judgment

A MRS. HELEN C. REBELLO AND ORS.
v.
MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT
CORPORATION AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1998
B
[K. VENKATASWAMI AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 :

C Sections 110-B, 95 proviso, 92-A and 92B---Compensation for death in
motor accidents-Computation of-Life insurance amount received by the
legal heirs-Common law p1inciple of adjusting the pecuniwy advantages
coming from whatever source by reason of death-Held, has to be i11te1preted
in such cases as refe11ing to pecwzimy advantages coming on account of
accidental death and not other fo11ns of death-Thus, provident fund, family
D pension, cash balance, shares, fixed deposits etc. ·cannot be tenned as
"pecuniary advantages" for the pwposes of Motor Vehicles Act-Distinction
between the language of Fatal Accidents Act, 1885 on the one ha11d and
Section 110-B and Section 168(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 011 the
other hand-Fatal Accidents Act, 1885, Section I-A-Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, Sections 168(1), 140 and 141.
E
Compensation "which appears to be just"-Meaning a11d scope
of~Held, scope of computing compensation under Section 110-B is wider
than under Fatal Accidellts Act, 1885 and English Fatal Accidellts Act, 1846.

Words and phrases :
F
"Pecuniwy advantdges''-Meani11g of-In the c6nto.t of Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939.

"Just''- Meaning of-In the context of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and
Fatal Accidents Act, 1885.
G
Interpretation of Statutes-Beneficial Statutes--Inte1pretation of-Inter-
pretation which subse1ves the object of legislation i.e. benefit to the subject
under such statutes should be accepted.

Practice and Procedure-Appeal before the Supreme Court-Appeal
H filed before the High Cowt was not pressed as it was covered by an earlier
684
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRASRTC AND ANR. 685

decision of the same High Cowt 011 that point-Objection raised before this A
Cowt that High Cowt dismissed the appeal being not pressed-Held, such
appeals are 111ai11tai11able--Co11stitution of Indilr-Alticle 136.

Husband of appellant No. 1 (father of appellants Nos. 2 to 6) was
travelling in a bus belonging to State Transport when it met with an
accident by a bus belonging to another State Transport (respondent No. B
2), due to negligent driving, resulting in his death. In an action for
compensation/damages brought by the appellants, the legal heirs of
deceased, Trial court allowed it. However, the Trial court deducted the
amount of life insurance received by the appellants in view of a Division
Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court. High Court rejected the cross. C
appeals. Hence this appeal.

It was contended by the appellants that the life insurance amount
received by them was not deductible from the compensation computed
under the Motor Vehicles Act.
D
HELD : 1.1. So far as the general principle of estimating damages
under the common law is concerned, the pecuniary loss can be ascertained
only by balancing on· one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future
pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death with
the "pecuniary advantage" which from whatever source comes to him by E
reason of the death. In other words; it is the balancing of loss and gain of
the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour to
the extent a statute intends to do. The compensation payable under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is on account of the pecuniary loss to the
claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms of death. F
Therefore, the application of the general principle under the common law
of loss and gain for the computation of compensation under this Act must
correlate to this type of injury or death, viz. accidental death. If the
"pecuniary advantage" resulting from death means pecuniary advantage
under all forms of death then it will include all the assets movable,
immovable, shares, bank accounts, cash and every amount receivable G
under any contract. This would obliterate all possible conferment of
economic security to the claimant by the deceased and the intention of the
legislature. Thus, under the present Act, whatever pecuniary advantage is
received by the claimant, from whatever source, would only mean that
which comes to the claimant on account of other forms of deaths. It would H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A not include that which the claimant receives on account of other forms of
death, which he would receive even apart from accidental death as such
pecuniary advantage would have no correlation to the accidental death for
which compensation is computed. However, where the employer insures his
employee, as against injury or death, arising out of an accident, any
amount received out of such insurance on the happening of such incident
B may be an amount liable for deduction. Legislature has taken note of such
contingency through the proviso to Section 95 of the Act. Under it the
liability of insurer is excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out of
and in the course of employment of an employee. [709·E·H; 710·A·B]

c 1.2. An employee contributing to a provident fund or his heirs are
entitled to the amount of the fund irrespective of the accidental death.
Similarly the heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the acciden·
tal death. There is no correlation between the two. Similarly, the amount
of life insurance policy is receivable by the claimant not on account of any
D accidental death but otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only a step
or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly,
any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits etc., though pecuniary
advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these
have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned
only on account of accidental death. Such an amount cannot come within
E the periphery of Motor Vehicles Act, to be termed as "pecuniary advantage"
liable for deduction. (711-G·H, 712-A·B]

1.3. The Act, in relation to payment of compensation to the claimant,
is a beneficial legislation. The intention of the legislature is made more
F clearly broughtout under Section 110-B of the 1939 Act. This is also visible
through the provision of Section 168(1) under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
and Section 92-A of the 1939 Act which fixes the liability on the owner of
the vehicle even on no fault. Section 92-B of the 1939 Act ensures that the
claim for compensation under Section 92-A is in addition to any other right
to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this
G Act or of any other law for the time being in force. This clearly indicates
the intention of the legislature which is conferring larger benefit on the
claimant. Interpretation of such beneficial legislation is also well settled.
whenever there are two possible interpretations in such statute, then the
one which subserves the object of legislation, viz., benefit to the subject
H should be accepted. In the present case, two interpretations have been
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTC AND ANR. 687

given evidenced by two distinct sets of decisions of the various High A
Courts. Therefore, the set of decisions which applied be principle of no
deduction of the life insurance amount, should be accepted and the other
set, which interpreted to deduct, is to be rejected. [712-E, F, G, H; 713-A-B]

1.4. Thus, the amount received by the claimant on the life insurance
of the deceased is not deductible from the compensation computed under B
the Motor Vehicles Act. [692-A]

Jaikwnar Chhaganlal Patni v. Mery Jerome D' Souza, AIR (1978) Born.
239, overruled.
c
2.1. The language of Section 110-B of the 1939 Act is different from
what is under Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1955, Section 1-A of
the 1955 Act entitles the party to recover damages, whenever dea~h is
occasioned by the wrongful act, negligence or default, which would have
entitled the party injured (if death had not resulted) to maintain au action D
to recover damages iu respect thereof. This provision was interpreted
within the limitation of the words used therein and in the absence of any
guiding words therein. The courts rightly drew the general principle of
common law of loss and gain. But Section 110-B of the 1939 Act empowers
the Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just.
Use of the w.vrds "which appears to it to be just" widens the scope of E
determination of compensation which is neither under the Indian Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855 nor under the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846. This
shows that the word "just" was deliberately brought in Section 1111-B of the
1939 Act to enlarge the consideration in computing the compensation
which, of course, would include the question of deductibility, if any. This F
leads one to an irresistible conclusion that the principle of computation
of the compensation both under the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 and
under the Indian Fatal Accidents Ad, 1855 to be restrictive in nature was
in the absence of any guiding words therein, hence the courts applied the
general principle at the common law of loss and gain but that would not
apply to the consideration under Section 110-B of the 1939 Act which G
:t. enlarges the discretion to deliver better justice to the claimant, in comput-
ing the compensation, to see what is just. The word 'just", as its nomencla-
ture denotes, means equitability, fairness and reasonableness having a
large peripheral field. The largeness is, of course, not arbitrary, it is
restricted by the conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable; if it H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A exceeds it is ternied as unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just. Thus,
this field of wider discretion of the Tribunal has to be within the said
limitations and the limitations under any provision of this Act or any other
provision having the force of law. [706-E to H; 707-A-D]

N. Sivammal v. Managing Director, Pa11dian Roadways Corporation,
B [1985] 1 sec 18, relied on.

Gobald Motor Se1vice Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami, [1962] 2 SCR 929
and Sheikhupura Tra11sp01t Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transpolt Insurance ~ ..
Co., AIR (1971) SC 1624, distinguished.
c
LIC of India v. Naranbhai Munjabhai Vadhia, (1973) ACJ 226 AIR =
(1973) Guj. 216; Sood and Co. v. Swjit Kaw; (1973) ACJ 414 (P&H); Bhag-
wanti Devi v. !sh Kumar, (1975) ACJ 56 (Delhi); Union of India v. Sup1iya
Ghosh, AIR (1973) Pat. 129; Sushi/a Devi v. Ibrahim, AIR (1974) MP 181;
Sabita Pati v. Rameshwar Singh, (1973) ACJ 319 (Orissa); Automobiles
D Transpon (Rajasthan) (P) Ltd. v. Dewala, AIR (1977) Raj. 121 and Orissa
Road Tra11sp01t Co. Ltd. v. Sibananda Pattanaik, (1976) ACJ 497 : AIR
(1976) Ori. 205, referred to.

Bradum v. Great Westem Rly. Co., [1874- 80] ALL ENGLAND LAW
REP.195; Pany v. Cleaver, [1969] l ALL ENGLAND LAW REP. 555; Dalby _,
E
v. India and Lo11don Life Insurance Co., (1854) 15 CB 365: (1843-60); The ~

Grand Tnmk Rly. Co. of Canada v. Jenni11gs, [1888] 13 AC 800; Davies v.
Powell Duffiy11 Associated Collielies Ltd., (1942) AC 601; Na11ce v. B1itish
Columbia Electlic railway Co. Ltd., [1951] AC 601 and Bregman v. Kress, 81
NYS 1072, referred to.
F
Fleming: Law of T01ts; T.P. Muklwjee : Law Lexicon, (5th Edn.),
referred to. ~

2.2. Thus, it has to be concluded that the Tribunal, while computing
the compensation under Section 110-8 of the 1939 Ad, has a wider discre-
G tion than what ithad under the 1855 Act. Various provisions of this Act like -#
Sections 94, 95, 95-AA, 96 and 97 indicate the legi~lature's intent conferring ·~

visible benefit on the claimant by securing compensation through casting
obligation on the tortfeasor and the insurer. All these and such other . -~

provisions are clearly beneficial legislation, hence should be interpreted in
H a manner which confers benefit and not that usurps its benefit. [708-B-D]
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTC AND ANR [MISRA, J.] 689

3. The contention of tl1e respondent that this appeal is not main- A
Jllf
. tainable as the High Court dismissed the appeal as not pressed, has no
merits. This only reveals that the question of deduction being covered by
the earlier decision of the High Court, the appellants could not press the
point in that appeal in foat court. It is for this reason the appellants
challenged this point before this Court for consideration. (691-8-F]
B
Jaikumar Chhaganlal Patni v. Mery Jerome D'Souza, AIR (1978) Born.
239, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1904 of
1989.
c
-·
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.9.85 of the Bombay High
Court in F.A. No. 1209 of 1981.

Gopal Jain, (Ms. Nandini Gore) for Ms. M. Karanjawala for the
Appellants. D
K.R. Nagaraja, K.K. Tyagi, M. Sharda, (R.S. Hegde) for S.K. Ag-
nihotri for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
MISRA, J. The question raised in this appeal is of great importance
on which the High Courts in India are divided. Importance of this question
is underlined and revealing since 19th century where there is full debate in
the English Courts having divergent views leading to legislation and amend-
ments to set at rest this controversy. So far as our country is concerned, as
aforesaid, we have divergent views of the various High Courts, but so far F
this Court, it has not dwelled this question in depth, except passmg
references in a few cases to which we shall be referring later.

The question is, whether the life insurance money of the deceased is
to be deducted from the claimants' compensation receivable under the G
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939? The minimum matrix of the facts to appreciate
the controversy is stated hereunder :

'j The husband of appellant No. 1, father of appellants Nos. 2 to 6, was
travelling in the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation bus from
Rathare Badruk to Pune on 12th April, 1973 at about 4.00 P.M. when this H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. l S.C.R.

A bus passed the village Umbraj and came near village Kotri near milestone
No. 89/4, Karnataka State Transport bus was seen coming from the op-
posite direction, i.e., from Satara side towards Kolhapur. The drivers of the
two buses were not able to control their buses resulting into collision
between the two, seriously injuring the deceased Clement Rebello and Mr.
B Viney John Pereira, in which Mr. Rebello received multiple fractures and
died on the spot. The appellants filed a Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 1975
against the aforesaid two State Road Transport Corporations. It was
avered in the plaint that the deceased was aged about 40 years and was the
sole bread winner of the family. He was a well known boat builder and
businessman of the Bassein. He was doing business in partnership under
C the name and style of Marine Engineering Works. He was a person of great
skill and hard worK'er. He was a person of robust health and sober habits.
His income from the business and other activities was about Rs. 40,000 per
annum. He was assessed for an income of about Rs. 43,000 by the Income
Tax Authorities for the Assessment Year 1971-72. Being the sole bread
D winner, he used to provide the family with the support of Rs. 25,000 per
year. The claim made by the appellants for damages/compensation under
the various admissible heads of damages was for Rs. 4 lacs. The claim of
the appellants was allowed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara,
holding that the death was caused due to rash and negligent driving on the
part of the driver of respondent No. 2, namely, Karnataka Road Transport
E Corporation. It was also held that the deceased had supported his family
with an amount of Rs. 25,000 per annum. It was found that as the deceased
was of 40 years old at the time of his death and his father had lived upto
the age of 85 years, the normal longevity of his life would have been 25
years from the date of death, but since the claimants had claimed a
F compensation only taking a period of 20 years, the Trial court held that
the appellants were entitled lo a compensation of Rs. 3,80,000 by way of
pecuniary loss and Rs. 10,000 on account of pain and suffering, in total Rs.
3,90,000. However, in view of the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay
Court inlaikwnar Chhaganlal Patni and Others v. Mmy Jerome D'souza and
Others, AIR (1978) Bombay 239, the Trial court deducted the amount of
G life insurance received by the appellants to the tune of Rs. 3,15,067.95p
from the aforesaid compensation calculated and held that only the balance
amount of Rs. 74,939 .05p with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum
is payable by the respondent No. 2 to the claimants.
I
H Throu.gh the witness Shashikant Dattatraya Kale, Exhibit 67, who was
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTCAND ANR [MISRA, J.] 691

serving in LIC at Bombay, it was elicited that the deceased Clement had A
insured his life under the said policy. The claimants were enti~led to get an
amount of Rs. 4,40,193.65p, out of which an amount of Rs. l,25,125.70p
was deducted by way of estate duty and the remaining amount of Rs.
3,15,067.95p was paid to the aforesaid heirs. It is this amount, as aforesaid,
which was deducted in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court
referred to above. On appeal, preferred both by the appellants and also
B
the respondents, the High Court rejected the cross appeal of respondent
No. 2, namely, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. However, the
appeal (No. 209/81) of the appellants was dismissed as it could not be
pressed in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court, as aforesaid. It
is against this judgment, this appeal has been preferrc:d by the appellants. c
At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the respondents made
a preliminary objection that this appeal is not maintainable since the appeal
in the High Court was dismissed as not pressed. We have no difficulty in
holding that this preliminary objection of the respondents has no merit. We
find that the High Court had rejected the appeal with the following D
observation :

"As regards the other appeal bearing No. 209 of 1981, Mr.
Chaphkar, the learned counsel for the appellants, has urged that
in view of (Full Bench) decision of this Court, he does not press E
the appeal as the same does not survive."

(Full Bench was wrongly recorded for
the Division Bench)

This only reveals that since the question of deduction as aforesaid F
being covered by the earlier decision of the same court, he could not press
the point in that appeal in that court. It is for this reason the appellants
challenge this point before us for our consideration.

In this case, we are not concerned with the question of compensation G
assessed under the Motor Vehicles Act as the same is not under challenge
before us. This became final, as the cross objections filed by respondent
No. 2 were dismissed by the High Court which challenged the fixation of
the quantum of compensation against which no appeal was preferred by
the respondents. This leaves us to the only question for adjudication, as
aforesaid, whether out pf the compensation amount payable to the appel- H

_,
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A !ants under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, the money received by the
appellants on account of life insurance policy of the deceased, is deductible
or not which has been done in the present case through the impugned
order?

Adverting to the said Bombay High Court decision in the case of
B Jaikumar (supra), we find that it refers to the two sets of decisions of the
various High Courts in India. One set, holding that life insurance money
received by the heirs ought to be deducted and the other set, holding not
to deduct from the compensation payable under the aforesaid Act. The
case of Jaikumar (supra), which is the foundation of the present appellants
C being deprived of the total compensation, the contention therein was,
amount received towards life insurance policy is the pecuniary advantage
received by the claimants by the reason of the death hence liable to be
deducted in terms of the ratio in the case of Gobald Motor case AIR (1962)
S.C. 1. Jaikumar (supra) holds :

D
"....Judicial opinion is also sharply divided on the question
whether life policy amount can be said to have come to the
claimants by reason of the death of the deceased to justify its ·
deduction from the amount of compensation payable to the
claimants towards their pecuniary loss. Our attention was drawn
E by Mr. Zaveri the learned advocate for the respondents, to a few
judgments of the High Court of Gujarat in LIC of India v.
Naranbhai Munjabhai, (1973) ACC CJ 226 : AIR (1973) Guj. 216,
High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Sood and Company v. Surjit
Kaur, (1973) ACC CJ 414, as also Delhi High Court in Bhagwanti
F Devi v. !sh Kumm; (1975) ACC CJ 56 and several other judgments
of same High Courts, which do support his contention that
amounts so received are not liable to be deducted as the same
cannot be said to have come to the claimants by reason of the
·death of the deceased. Mr. Dwivedee, on the other hand, drew our
attention to the judgments reported in Union of India v. S. Ghosh,
G AIR (1973) Pat. 129; Sushi/a Devi v. Ibrahim, AIR (1974) Madh
Pra 181; Sabita Pati v. Rameshwar Singh, (1973) ACC CJ 319
(Orissa High Court) and Automobiles Transport v. Dewalal, AIR
(
(1977) Raj. 121 and a few other judgments of the same courts
taking the contrary view. We may at once observe that Patna High '.
H Court supports deduction only of such policy amounts as are
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTCAND ANR. [MISRA, J.] 693

subscribed to meet accident contingency and not other policy A
amounts. It rather supports Mr. Zaveri's contention and not that
of Mr. Dwivedee, Mr. Zaveri also drew our attention to some other
judgments of Delhi High Court, including in the case of Orissa
Road Transport Co. Ltd. v. Sibananda Pattanaik, (1976) ACC 0
497 : AIR (1976) Orissa W5 which justify deduction only of a
portion and not of the entire policy amounts."
B

After recording the divergent opinions by the various High Co.urts in
India, the said decision itself records the state of uncertainty in the follow-
ing terms :
c
"The answer turns really on whether such policy amount can
be said to be 'pecuniary advantage' that come to the claimants 'by
reason of the death of the deceased'? That such amounts amount
to pecuniary advantage admits of little doubt. Controversy really D
centres round if it comes to the' dependants 'by reason of death'.
Reading of the decided cases only go to show how this very
question can arise under variety of circumstances, giving rise to
different considerations, pregnant with equally different legal im-
plication, and it is by no means easy to lay down any inflexible rule
as to which pecuniary benefit can be said to have been received E
'by reason of the death.' It is pertinent to note that in the absence
of any provision t.o the contrary such policy amount form part of
the estate of the deceased and come to his heirs or dependants by
way of inheritance, it is sought to be disposed of by deceased
otherwise. Nominee mentioned therein is not necessarily the F
beneficiary but invariable happens to be merely an authorised
collector thereof for the benefit of all heirs. We are unable to see
ariy ~ifference between this amount, and any other income yieldi~g
estate. That comes to the dependants either by way of inheritance - !
or pursuant to any will or settlement. The causal connection G
'r between receipt of such amounts, and death is too apparent and
both really stand on the same footing legally. Donations by the
charitable trusts, or provisions for such dependants by some public
spirite.d institutions, or gifts or contributions by relatives or sym-
pathisers, of course stand on different foo.ting and are clearly H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A distinguishable and can never be treated as advantages or benefits
or having received by reason of the death of the bread winner,
though the death may furnish an occasion for such receipts. We
are ourselves unable to see how and why the policy amount or
other amounts from income yielding assets, such as bank balances
B or interests thereon, or on fixed deposits, or dividends from shares
and securities, left or settled by the deceased on the dependants,
cannot be said to have come to the claimants by 'reason of the
death' of the deceased and why it should not be balanced against
the pecuniary losses caused by the death of the bread winner in
terms of Gobald Motor's case (AIR 1962) SC 1 (supra). The
c Supreme Court has been at pains in the above quoted passage to
indicate how source of such pecuniary advantage is irrelevant by
words 'from whatever sources'. It should not be forgotten that these
essentially are compensatory and not punitive· damages."

D It records from the decided cases that there may arise variety of
circumstances giving rise to different consideration and it is by no means
easy to lay down any inflexible rule. In fact, answer to the question raised
in this appeal would mainly depend on defining this 'pecuniary benefit' in
the context of the law under the Motor Vehicles Act with its preceding
E historical facts. The state of fluidity shows writ at large when the court
records while considering the 'pecuniary benefit' by further circumscribing
its periphery which is evident from the follmving :

".... It is nobody's case that it was an accident policy entitling
the claimants to such amount, on the death of the deceased only
F
in such an accident, and the amount could not have been received
by them, had the death been due to otherwise than such an
accident. We express no opinion if this could have made any
difference as there is no unanimity in the decided cases as to the
liability of even such amounts to deduction from compensation."
G
Leaving this state of affairs so far as Indian courts are concerned, ·f
we may now advert to the courts in England, right from the 19th century
on this issue. It seems that they have also been oscillating with different
interpretations under various facts and circumstances. T~e uncertainty
H went for a long time which was ultimately resolved by making legislation
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTCAND ANR. (MISRA, J.) 695

and the statutory amendments to set at rest this question. Now, this A
question is no more res integra there and is settled that life insurance policy
amount is not deductible from the compensation assessed on account of
the death of the deceased. As aforesaid, before this, even in England, this
question, as in Indian courts, varied its interpretation depending on the
facts of each case, one set by strict interpretation deciding against the B
claimant while other based on equity, justice, reasonableness and public.
policy deciding in favour of claimant. In England, the insurance policy ·
amount was initially considered to be such pecuniary advantage, coming to
the dependants on the deceased death, which was held deductible under
the common law from the amount of compensation payable under the Fatal
Accidents Act, 1846. This situation was reversed by the Fatal Accidents C
(Damages) Act of 1908 which was further rendered advantageous to the
claimants by Law Reforms (Personal Injuries) Act of 1948 and finally
altered drastically by the Fatal Accidents Act of 1959 ensuring various
kinds of insurance and pensionary benefits not to be excluded from the
compensation payable by the tortfeasors. In India, first such legislation was D
the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 analogous to English, Fatal Accident Act,
1846. In fact, the interpretation given by the Bombay High Court in
Jaikwnar (supra), which is also the submission by the learned counsel for
the respondents that principle of deduction with reference to the Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855 has to be the same as in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846.
Thus, Jai Kumar (supra) concludes, it is difficult to find any basis or trace E
for any rationale not to deduct such life policy amounts when on the face
of it, this amounts to the pecuniary advantages and are received by the
heirs by reason of the death of the bread winner. The question that arises,
firstly, whether language of the provisions under 1855 Act and 1846 Act
are the same and even if same, whether language of 1939 Act is similar to F
1855 Act? So far as the first question is concerned, though something may
be said but since the present case is only under 1939 Act, it is not necessary
to go into this question. In this case, we would be examining, whether
there is difference of language between 1855 Act and 1939 Act or not,
if yes, what difference it would make. Now, we refer to the relevant
provisions both of 1855 Act and 1939 Act. Relevant section of the Fatal G
Accidents Act, 1855 is quoted hereunder :

"(lA) Suit for compensation to the family of a person for loss
occasioned to it by his death by actionable wrong. Whenever the
death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death
had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an
action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who
would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to
an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
-~
person injured, and although the death shall have been caused
B under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or other
crune.

And in every such action, the court may give such damages as
c it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to
the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such
action shall be brought, and the amount so recovered, after deduct-
ing all costs and expenses, including the costs not recovered from
the defendants, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned
D parties, or any of them, in such shares as the court by its judgment
or decree shall direct."

Similarly Section 110-B of the aforesaid 1939 Act is quoted
hereunder.

E 110-B Award of the claims Tribunal - On receipt of an applica-
tion for compensation made under Section 110-A the Claims
Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being
heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award
determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be
just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation
F
shall be paid; and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall
specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer (or owner
or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of
them, as the case may be}."

G (Emphasis supplied)
•f
Prima f acie we find that the language of the aforesaid two enactments
are not similar, the later clearly enlarges the scope of computing the
compensatio~ about which we shall be considering later.

H Returning to the English decision :
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTC AND ANR. [ MISRA, J.] 697

In Bradum v. Great Westem Rail Co., (1874-80) All England Law A
Reports 195, it held :

"Where a plaintiff suffers personal injuries through the
negligence of the defendant, the damages awarded are not to be
reduced because the plaintiff has insured himself against accidental
injury. In such a case the plaintiff is entitled to receive the amount B
payable by the insurer in addition to the damages recoverable from
the defendant." ·

In this case, the plaintiff got himself insured against accident by
railway in the railway accident insurance office and on account of the injury c
received, he received for his treatment from insurance a sum of 31 pounds.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed the total damage
sustained on account of the accident at 217 pounds, out of which an amount
of 31 pounds was deducted, thus making.the payment of 186 pounds. But
the Court on these facts held :
D
"Because he has sustained these damages somebody else gave
him 31 pounds, and therefore, it is said he has not been damaged
to the amount of 217 pounds. It is because he has been damaged
to the amount of 217 pounds that he got the 31 pounds; and really
it would be the most unreasonable think in the world if he were E
not to be allowed to get it, because a man pays his premiums on
these insurances against accidents with the intention and object of
getting them back again, if he should have the misfortune to meet
with an accident and be injured." ·
F
In this decision, another earlier decision is also referred, which may

- have some relevance, is quoted hereunder :

"It is not worth while to go into it, but the subject of insurances
will be found to have been thoroughly discussed a few years ago
in Dalby v. India and London Life Assurance Co., (1854) 15 C.B. G
365 in the Court of Common Pleas. A man pays the premiums
upon these accident policies upon this kind of footing, namely, that
his right to an indemnity in case of an accident shall be an·
equivalent for the mischief or injury that happens to him. He gets
more, no doubt, if the mischief happens than all the premiums H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A which he h.as paid would amount to, but he mns the chance that
he will not get anything at all, and therefore it is, I say, that he
ought to have this sum in addition to the damages that he may
have sustained at the hands of the defendants by reason of the
accident itself, for otherwise he would be a loser by insuring against
accidents in a case where the railway company was in the wrong.
B
I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the verdict stands at present
for the right amount."

The Grand Tmnk Railway of Canada v. Jennings, (1888) 13 A.C. 800,
held that the Common law, pecuniary benefits from insurance policies,
C whatever the source, and pension schemes whether contributory or non-
contributory, were deducted. The various English Courts' decisions reveal
the unsettled state of adjudication regarding the deductions from the
compensation payable under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846. Various diver-
gent opinions were expressed, some favourable to the claimant to exclude
D any sum payable on life insurance or pensions from deduction out of the
compensation payable to the claimant and other not to deduct till, as
aforesaid, the matter was set at rest by various legislations culminating into
the Fatal Accidents Act, 1959. Till before this, within the limitation of the
restrictive language of the Act and in the absence of any motivating and
E guiding words under the statute the general principles under the common
law was applied to ascertain the pecuniary loss and gain. Thus, the
'pecuniary advantage' from whatever source comes to the claimant by
reason of the death, was interpreted giving its widest meaning. This
amplitude of large sphere has been the cause of concern of the Courts,
Legislative and the Jurists with reference to the insurance, pension, gratuity
F etc. whether it is a pecuniary gain deductible, if it is, whether one's
conscience, equity and fairness are eroded, specially if it is applied with
reference to the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act? To salvage from this
onslaught, some decisions declined to interpret for deduction and some
-
other, even after holding deductible, expressed their conscience in favour
G of the sufferer. This we find both in the English decisions and the Indian
decisions.

In Parry v. Cleaver, (1969) Vol. 1 All England Law Reports p. 555
records uncertainty in England, which is evident from the following
H words:
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASITTRA SRTC AND ANR [MISRA, J.] 699
~

"My Lords, the facts of this case are of a pattern becoming A
increasingly common. The appellant was in pensionable employ-
ment. By the, negligent driving of the respondent he was disabled
from continuing in that employment. So he received a disablement
pension. How are damages for his financial loss to be assessed?
In particular how is the disablement pension to be dealt with? The
authorities are not consistent with each other, so I find it necessary
B
to begin by considering general principles."

Two questions were raised for the adjudication, first what did the
appellant lose as a result of the accident? What are the sums which he or
his dependants would have received but for the accident but which, by C
reason of the accident, he or his dependants can no longer get? And
second, what :ire the sums which he or his dependants did in fact receive
as a result of the accident but which he or his dependants would not have
received if there had been no accident?
D
The Court while dealing with the second point also felt the same
difficulty, to which we are in, which is recorded hereunder ;-

"None of the noble and learned Lords who took part gave it
more than a passing reference, and I am satisfie,9 that none of
them intended to go out of their way to pronounce on it. Before E
Gourley's case (1955) 3 All E.R. 796 it was well established that
there was no universal rule with regard to sums which came to the
plaintiff as a result of the accident but which would not have come
to him but for the accident. In two large classes of case such sums
were disregarded - the proceeds of insurance and sums coming to F
him by reason of benevolence. In Gourley's case (i.e. The Fatal
Accidents Act, 1846) had any bearing on this matter it must have
impinged on these classes. But no one suggest that it had any effect
as regards sums coming to the plaintiff by reason of benevolence,
and I see no reason why it should have made any difference as
regards insurance." · G

It further records ;

"The common law has treated this matter as one depending on
justice, reasonableness and public policy. H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A xxx xxx xxx

As regards moneys comings to the plaintiff under a contract of
insurance, I think that the real and substantial reason for disregard-
ing them is that the plaintiff has bought them and that it would be
unjust and unreasonable to hold that the money which he prudently
B spent on premiums and the benefits from it should enure to the
benefit of the tortfeasor. Here again I think that the explanation
that this is too remote is artificial and unreal. Why should the
plaintiff be left worse off than if he had never insured? In that case
he would have got the benefit of the premium money, if he had
c not spent it he would have had it in his possession at the time of
the accident grossed up at compound interest."

It is true that the aforesaid two English decisions were cases of
injuries, but the principle as spelt out is equally applicable in cases of
D death. The EJiglish Court held that for any money coming under the
contract of insurance, it would be unjust and unreasonable to hold that the
money which he prudently spent on premiums, the benefit from it should
enure to the benefit of the tortfeasor. To this, we fully endorse. Under the
life insurance, in case one lives upto the time of maturity, after paying full
premium he receives the assured money back, based on the terms of the
E contract. In fact, he receives less than the total premium paid. It is for this
gain to the insurer it is obliged to pay to the extent the sum assured, to the
claimant in case of injury or death under the contract. In other words,
payable only on the contingency as referred, if the contingency of injury or
death does not happen, the insurer is the gainer as it receives more under
F premium than to pay on maturity of the policy, and in case contingency

-
occurs the claimant is the gainer as he receives the amount even before
paying the full prel)liums and the gain is to the proportion of the balance
unpaid premium, whether it is injury or death. A Large number of persons,
under the policy may live upto the maturity of policy by paying full
premium and the contingency of injury or death may not happen. On each
G of such matured policies, Life Insurance Corporation having its gain in
mind enters into its business, to offer to the policy holders in terms in case
of happening of the said contingency to pay the full amount assured, if it
takes place earlier, without paying the full premium. It is this game of gain
or loss the Life Insurance Corporation enters into the contract. This fact
H is revealed by the Preamble of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTC AND ANR. [ MISRA, J.] 701

(Act, No. 31 of 1956), quoted hereunder : A
"An Act to provide for the Nationalisation of life insurance busi-
ness in India by transferring all such business to a Corporation
established for the purpose and to provide for the regulation and
control of the business of the Corporation and for matters con-
nected therewith or incidental thereto." B

Many invest through this policy for variety of reasons, maybe, to
secure the sum for himself as forced saving, maybe, as in India, for
deduction towards his income-tax liability, to secure loan by himself in case
needed on a meagre interest for building his residence or to secure sum in C
case of happening of the said contingencies etc. He enters into this contract
with an open eye, as an act of wisdom, of course, not towards the gain to
the tortfeasor. The English Court expressing concern on this aspect in the
aforesaid decision recorded : "why should the plaintiff be left worse off
than if he had never insured". Thus, the interpretation of deduction of life D
insurance would result into the gain to the wrong doer in proportion to the
higher scale of premium paid by the insured for no contribution of his and
loss to the claimant in proportion to the higher scale of premium paid, as
he would have received the compensation amount without payment of any
premium. Before we proceed to decide the question raised, it is necessary
to refer to the decision of this Court in Gobald Motor case (supra) which E
is the foundation of the decision in Jaikumar (supra). The passage relied
upon is quoted hereunder :

"Only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of
the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary ad- F /

vantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of
the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by
the death must be ascertained."

This was a case under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 as it stood
before its amendment by the Act (3 of 1951). This Court, in this case, was G
not called upon to consider regarding any deduction out of the compensa-
tion payable as assessed, either under the aforesaid Act or under the Motor
Vehicles Act. The question of life insurance deduction, which is in issue
here or the deduction of pension, gratuity or any other pecuniary advantage
received by the claimant was neither raised, considered or adjudicated. The H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A passage quoted above only referred to the general principle under the
common law with reference to the decisions of the English Courts made
under the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846. In that case the Gobald Motor
Service Ltd. (Company) was engaged in the business of transporting pas-
sengers by bus, when one of its buses met with an accident causing death
to some of the passengers in which one Rajaratnam died. The Claimants,
B the.heirs of Rajaratnam, filed a suit against this company, claiming com-
pensation under Section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 for the loss of
pecuniary benefit sustained by them personally and under Section 2 for the
loss sustained by the estate on account of the death of Rajaratnam. The
court awarded damages to the claimants. On appeal to the High Court, it
C confirmed the compensation awarded with some modification in the quan-
tum of compensation. In this background, this Court was called upon to
decide the limited question raised by the counsel for the appellant, which
is evident from the following :

"Learned counsel for the appellants raised before us the following
D points : (1) The finding of the High Court that the bus was driven
at an excessive speed at the place where the accident occurred,
based on probabilities, was erroneous. (2) The concurrent finding
of the two courts that respondents 2 to 7 would be entitled to
damages in a sum of Rs. 25,200 for the loss of pecuniary advantage
E to them was not based upon any acceptable evidence but only on
surmises. (3) The High Court went wrong in awarding damages f

separately for loss of expectation of life under S. 2 of the Act, as
damages under that head had already been taken into considera-
tion in giving compensation to respondents 2 to 7 for the pecuniary
F loss sustained by them by the death of Rajaratnam. "

These questions, raised itself, reveal that the Court was adjudicating
limited issue raised. It is true, in adjudicating the said questions that the
Court did scn:tinise two English decisions based on its Section 9 under the
G Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 as that Act was similar to Section 1 of our Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855. The relevant paragraph quoted in Jaikumar (supra)
was in fact the quotations out of the two English decisions where the
general rule under the common law was enunciated, viz., loss and gain
theory. The Court referred two cases, one of them was the case of Davies
H v. Powell Dufflyn Associated Collieries Ltd., (1942) AC 601.
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTC AND ANR. [MISRA, .1. J 703

"The general rule which has always prevailed in regard to the A
assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts is well
settled, namely, that any benefit accruing to a dependent by reason
of the relevant death must be taken into account. Under those Acts
the balance of loss and gain to a dependent by the death must be
ascertained, the position of each dependent being considered
B
separately".

Lord Write elaborated the theme further thus at p. 611 :

"The damages are to be based on the reasonable expectation
of pecuniary benefit or benefit reducible to money value. In as- C
sessing the damages all circumstances which may be legitimately
pleaded in diminution of the damages must be considered ...... The
actual pecuniary loss of each individual entitled to sue can only be
ascertained by balancing, on the one hand, the loss to him of the
future pecuniary benefit, and on the other any pecuniary advantage
which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death". D
The second decision was of the Viscount Simon in Nance v. British
Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd., (1951) AC 601. Here the Lords were
considering the analogous provisions of the British Columbia legislation.
Viscount Simon laid down the mode of estimate of the damages. This
authority spelt out the method of calculating damages and thus held : E
".. .It would be seen from the said mode of estimation that many
imponderables enter into the calculation. Therefore, the actual
extent of the pecuniary loss to the respondents may depend upon
data which cannot be ascertained accurately, but must necessarily
be an estimate, or even partly a conjecture. Shortly stated, the
F
general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only
by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future
pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which
from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that
is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependent by the death must G
be ascertained."

(Emphasis supplied)

This Court in Gobald Motor Service (supra) considering the quantum
of damages under Sections 1 and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A referred to the said principle as enunciated in the English decisions, since
our provisions under the Act in consideration, was similar to Section 9 of
the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846. This Court was neither called upon
to consider computing damages under the Motor Vehicle Act nor "to
consider any form of deductions, whether justified under the Motor
Vehicles Act.
B
We have already referred to above the Section (lA) of the Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855 and Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
under which compensation is payable to the claimant. Section 1 of 1855
Act was renumbered as Section 1A through the amending Act No. 3 of
C 1951. We find that the language of Section 110-B of the 1939 Enactment
is different than what is under Section lA of the 1855 Act. Section lA of
1855 Act provides that whenever death occurs on account of wrongful act
or neglect, entitles the party injured to maintain a suit to recover damages
from the party, who caused the injury or the death. This entitles the party
D to recover damages, whenever death is occasioned by the wrongful act,
negligence or default, which would have entitled the party injured (if death
had not resulted) to maintain an action to recover damages in respect
thereof. This provision was interpreted within the limitation of the words
used therein and in the absence of any guiding words therein. The Courts
rightly drew the general principle of common law of loss and gain. But
E Section 110-B of 1939 Act empowers the Tribunal to determine the com-
pensation which appears to it to be just. The words used in Section 110-B
are : "which appears to it to be just". Use of these words, widen the scope
of determination of compensation which is neither under the India Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855 nor under the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846. So
far, as observed above, apart from the conflicting decisions of the Indian
F High Courts, no decision has been placed before us of this Court, deter-
mining any principle of deductibility of any amount, like, life insurance,
gratuity, pension etc. from the amount payable under the Motor Vehicles
Act. In Mis. Sheikhupura Transport Company Ltd. v. N01them India
Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR (1971) SC 1624 this Court did con-
sider the case of compensation under Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles
G Act, 1939 and did refer to the decision in Gobald Motor Service (supra),
in case the compensation is to be computed under 1855 Act. This inference
was drawn by assuming if 1855 Act is applicable, however, it further holds
that language used in the 1939 Act, is wider. This apart, again in this case
neither any question was raised nor facts were pleaded and adjudicated
H regarding the deduction of life insurance, gratuity, pension etc. The
MRS. HELEN 1' ND ORS. v. MAHARASHIRA SRTC AND ANR [ MISRA, J.) 705

relevant portion is quoted herein-under : A
"Under Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the
tribunal is required to fix such compensation which appears to it to
be just. The power given to the tribunal in the matter of fixing
compensation under that provision is wide. Even if we assume (we
do not propc.se to decide that question in this case) that compen- B
sation under that provision has to be fixed on the same basis as is
required to be done under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (Act 13 of
1855), the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved partly would depend
upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must neces-
sarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. The general c
principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by
balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future
pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary a<lvantage which
from whatever sources come to them by reason of the death, that
is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must
be ascertained - See Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K Velus- D
wami, (1962) 1 SCR 929 = AIR (1962) SC 1)."

(Emphasis supplied)

This Court, in this case did observe, though did not decide, to which E
we refer that the use of the words, "which appears to it to be just" under
Section 110-B gives wider power to the Tribunal in the matter of deter-
mination of compensation under 1939 Act. There is another case of this
Court in which there is passing reference to the deduction out of the
compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act. In N. Sivammal & F
Ors. v. Managing Director, Pandian Roadways Corporation & Anr., (1985] 1
SCC 18, this Court held that Rs. 10,000 receivable as monetary benefit to
the widow of the pension amount, the deduction of which is not justified.
So, though deduction of widow's pension was not accepted but for this, no
principle was discussed therein. However having given our full considera-
tion, we find there is deliberate change in the language in the later Act, G
revealing the intent of the Legislature viz., to confer wider discretion to the
Tribunal which is not to be found in the earlier Act. Thus, any decision
based on the principle applicable to the earlier Act, would not be ap-
plicable while adjudicating the compensation payable to the claimant in the
later Act. H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Fleming, in his classic work on the Law of Torts, has summed up the
law on the subject in these words. This is also referred to in Sushi/a Devi
and Ors. v. Ibrahim and Anr., AIR (1974) MP 181 :

"The pecuniary loss of such dependant can only be ascertained

B
by balancing, on the one hand, the loss to him of future pecuniary .,. ....
benefit, and, on the other, any pecuniary advantage which, from
whatever source, comes to him by reason of the death ... ".

"... .There is a vital distinction between the receipt of moneys
under accident insurance and life insurance policies. In the case
c of accident policies, the full value is deductible on the ground that
there was no certainty, or even a reasonable probability, that the
insured would ever suffer an accident. But since man is certain to
die, it would not be justifiable to set off the whole proceeds from
a life insurance policy, since it is legitimate to assume that the
D widow would have received some benefit, if her husband had
pre-deceased her during the currency of the policy or if the policy
had matured during their joint lives. The exact extent to permis-
sible reduction, however, is still a matter of uncertainty."

Fleming has also expressed that the deduction or set off of the life
E
insurance could not be justifiable. When he uses the words 'not be
justifiable' he refers to one's conscience, fairness and contrary to what is
just. In this context, the use of the word 'just', which was neither in the
English 1846 Act nor in the Indian 1855 Act, now brought in under 1939
Act, gains importance. This shows that the word 'just' was deliberately
F brought in 110-B of the 1939 Act to enlarge the consideration in computing
the compensation which, of course, would include the question of deduc-
tibility, if any. This leads us to an irresistible conclusion that principle of ·
compensation of the compensation both under the English Fatal Accidents
Act, 1846 and under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 by the earlier
G decision, were restrictive in nature in the absence of any guiding words
therein, hence the courts applied the general principle at the common law -r-
of loss and gain but that would not apply to the considerations under
Section 110-B of 1939 Act which enlarges the discretion to deliver better
justice to the claimant, in computing the compensation, to see what is just.
H Thus, we find that all the decisions of the High Courts which based its
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTC AND ANR [MISRA, J.] 707

interpretation on the principles of these two Acts, viz., English 1846 Act A
and Indian 1855 Act to hold deductions, were valid cannot be upheld. As
we have observed above, the decision even with reference to the decision
of this Court in Gobald Motor Service (supra), where the question was
neither raised nor adjudicated and that case also, being under the 1855
Act, cannot be pressed into service. Thus, these Courts by giving restrictive B
interpretation in computation of compensation based on the limitation of
the language of the Fatal Accidents Act, fell into an error, as it did not
take into account the change of language in the 1939 Act and did not
consider the widening of the discretion of the Tribunal under Section
110-B. The word 'just', as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness
and reasonableness having large peripheral field. The largeness is, of c
course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience which is fair,
reasonable and equitable, if it exc~eds; it is termed as unfair, unreasonable,
unequitable, not just. Thus, this field of wider discretion of the Tribunal
has to be within the said limitations and the limitations under any provision
of this Act or any other provision having force of law. In Law Lexicon, 5th D
Edn., by T.P. Mukherjee "Just" is described :

"The term "just" is derived from the Latin word Justus. It has
various meanings and its meaning is often governed by the context.
'Just' may apply in nearly all of its senses, either to ethics or law, E
denoting something which is morally right and fair and sometimes
that which is right and fair according to positive law. It connotes
reasonableness and something conforming to rectitude and justice,
something equitable, fair (vide page 1100 of volume 50, Corpus
Juris Secundum). At page 438 of Words and Phrases, edited by
West Publishing Co., Vol. 23 the true meaning of the word "Just"
F
is in these terms :

"The word "Just" is derived from the Latin justus, which i,s from
the Latin jus, which means a right and more technically a legal
right-a-law. Thus 'jus dicere' was to pronounce the judgment; G
to give the legal decision. The word 'Just' is defined by the
Century Standard Dictionary as right in law or ethics and in
Standard Dictionary as conforming to the requirements of right
or of positive law, in Anderson's Law Dictionary as probable,
reasonable, Kinney's Law Dictionary defines 'Just' as fair, ade- H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A quate, reasonable, probable; and justa cause as a just cause, a
lawful ground. Vide Bregman v. Kress, 81 N.Y.S. 1072, 1073, 83
App. Div. I"

Thus, we have no hesitation in concluding that the Tribunal while
computing the compensation under Section 110-B of the 1939 Act, has a
B wider discretion, than what it had under the 1855 Act. Various provisions
of this .Act indicate legislature's intend conferring visible benefit to the
claimant by securing compensation through casting obligation on the
tortfeasor and the insurer. Section 94 makes it obligatory to insure a vehicle
against third party risk before putting on the road. Statutory obligation and
C the limit of the insurer is provided under Section 95. Under Section 95-AA
in addition to the deposits under Sec. 7 of the Insurance Act, 1938, the
insurer has to deposit with the Reserve Bank of India or State Bank of
India a security of thirty thousand for discharging any liability covered by
the insurance policy. Then, Section 96 casts obligation on the insurers to
D satisfy judgments in respect of third party risks. No settlement between
insurer and insured in respect of any claim to which the third party is
entitled, is valid unless third party is a party to such settlement under
Section 97. All these and such other provisions are clearly beneficial
legislation, hence should be interpreted in a manner which confers benefit
and not which usurp its benefit.
E
<
This being so, we finally revert to the question, which is in issue for
consideration, whether the compensation computed under 1939 Act, the
life insurance amount received by the claimants occasioned by the death
of the deceased, is deductible from it or not?
F
Submission by the learned counsel for the appellants is, the insurance
money is by virtue of a contractual relationship between the deceased and
the Insurance Company and is payable to the legal heirs of the deceased
in terms of the contract. Such money cannot be said to have been received
by the heirs only on account of the death of the deceased, but truly it is a
G fruit of the premium paid by the deceased during his life time. The
deceased bought this insurance policy as an act of his prudence, to confer '«Iii,
benefit either to himself or to his heirs in case of death. This amount is
receivable by the claimant irrespective of the accidental death, even if he
would have died the natural death. He further submits that the interpreta-
H tion given by the High Court confers benefit to the tortfeasor for his
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASIITRA SRTC AND ANR. [ MISRA, J.] 709

negligence and wrong to the untimely death without any contribution by A
him. It permits him to escape from the liability cast by the statute. Thus,
his submission is, any amount payable under any contract of social as-
surance or any insurance, ought not to be deducted as the same is payable
to the heirs because of the contract and not on account of the death of the
insured person. Referring on the dictionary meaning of the word
'compensation', he submits it would mean anything given to make things
B
equal in value. He submits that in this case the death of the deceased-hus-
band of the claimant was due to the negligence of the respondent has to
be offset by a just equivalent, where claimants are put back in position
where they would have been but for such death. On this, he draws the
conclusion, the benefits of insurance policy cannot be deducted while c
awarding the compensation. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
respondents restricted the argument as was advanced before the High
Court and submitted, the High Court, after considering all aspects includ-
ing English decisions and the decisions of this Court, rightly concluded to
deduct the life insurance money out of the. compensation payable to the D
claimant.

So far as the general principle of estimating damages under the
common law is concerned, it is settled that the pecuniary loss can be
ascertained only by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the
future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death E
with the "pecuniary advantage" which from whatever source comes to him
by reason of the death. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and gain
of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour
to the extent a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in the
light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is very clear, to F
which there could be no doubt that this Act delivers compensation to the
claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of
any other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this Act
has to be deciphered, co-relating with the accidental death. The compen-
sation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the
pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not other G
forms of death. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness,
including even death by accident, through train, air flight not involving
motor vehicle, would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus,
the application of general principle under the common law of loss and gain
for the computation of compensation under this Act must co-relate to this H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A type of injury or deaths, viz., accidental. If the words 'pecuniary advantage'
'from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death
under this Act it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the
claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. If the 'pecuniary
advantage' resulting from death means pecuniary advantage coming under
B all forms of death then it will include all the assets movable, immovable, ~ _
shares, bank accounts, cash and every amount receivable under any con-
tract. In other words, all heritable assets including what is willed by the
deceased etc. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of
economic security to the claimant by the deceased and the intentions of
the legislature. By such an interpretation the tortfeasor in spite of his
C wrongful act or negligence, which contributes to the death, would have in
many cases no liability or meagre liability. In our considered opinion, the
general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain
has to be interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and the
loss on account of the accidental death. Thus, under the present Act
D whatever pecuniary advantage is received by the claimant, form whatever
source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on account of the
accidental death and not other form of death. The constitution of the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal itself under Section 110 is, as the Section
states;

E "...for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensa-
tion in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury
to, ..... "

Thus, it would not include that which claimant receives on account
F of other form of deaths, which he would have received even apart from
accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have no corelation
to the accidental death for which compensation is computed. Any amount
received or receivable not only on account of the accidental death but that
would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed
to be the 'pecuniary advantage', liable for deduction. However, where the
G employer insures his employee, as against injury or death arising out of an
accident, any amount received out of such insurance on the happening of
such incidence may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our
legislature has taken note of such contingency, through the proviso of
Section 95. Under it, the liability of the insurer is excluded in respect of
H injury or death, arising out of, in the course of employment of an employee.
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTCAND ANR. [MISRA, J.] 711

This is based on the principle that the claim:mt for the happening of A
the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is
excluded' thus, either through the wisdom of legislature or through the
principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant
twice arising from the same transaction, viz., same accident. It is significant
to record here in both the sources, viz., either under the Motor Vehicles
Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is
B
either statutory or through the security of the employer securing for his
employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribu-
tion. How thus an amount earned out of one's labour or contribution
towards one's wealth, savings, etc. either for himself or for his family,
which such person knows, under the law, has to go to his heirs after his c
death either by succession or under a will could be said to be the
'pecuniary gain only on account of one's accidental death. This, of
course, is a pecuniary gain but how this is equitable or could be
balanced out of the amount to be received as compensation under the
Motor Vehicle Act. There is no co-relation between the two amounts. D
Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract
could be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract.
Similarly, how an amount receivable under a statute has any co-relation
with an amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to
be on the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the
contract to the contrary or any provisions of law. E
,• .~

Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is
a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during
the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive
this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, F
is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act
is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event, viz.,
accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also
earned by. an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his
contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by G
the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise
> than the accidental death. No co-relation between the two. Similarly, life
insurance policy is received either by the insured, or the heirs of the
insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which insured .
contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured, if
he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums, in the case of death H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the
contracts for the premium paid. Again', this amount is receivable by the
claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on insured's
death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to
receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits,
etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account
B of one's death but all these have no co-relation with the amount receivable
under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could
such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to
be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction. When we seek the
principle of loss and gain, it has to be on similar and same plane having
C nexus inter se between them and not to which, there is no semblance of any
co-relation. The insured (deceased) contributes his own money for which
he receives the amount has no co-relation to the compensation computed
as against tortfeasor for his negligence on account of accident. As
aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on
account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it,
D then how can fruits of an amount received through contributions of the
insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor
Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act, he receives without any contribu-
tion. As we have said the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles
Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy
is contractual.
E
As we have observed the whole scheme of the Act, in relation to the ' '
payment of compensation to the claimant, is a beneficial legislation, the
intention of the legislature is made more clear by the change of language
from what was in Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and what is brought under
p Section 110-B of 1939 Act. This is also visible through the provision of
Section 168(1) under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 92-A of
1939 Act which fixes the liability on the owner of the vehicle even on no
fault. It provides where the death or permanent disablement of any person
has resulted from an accident in spite of no fault uf the owner of the
vehicle, an amount of compensation fixed therein is payable to claimant by
G such owner of the vehicle. Section 92-B ensures that the claim for compen-
sation under Section 92-A is in addition to any other right to claim <
compensation in respect whereof under any other provision of this Act or
of any other law for the time being in force. This clearly indicates the
intention ·of the legislature which is conferring larger benefit to the
H claimant. Interpretation of such beneficial legislation is also well settled.
MRS. HELEN AND ORS. v. MAHARASHTRA SRTCAND ANR [MISRA, J.] 713

Whenever there be two possible interpretations in such statute then the A
one which subserves the object of legislation, viz., benefit to the subject
should be accepted. In the present case, two interpretations have given of
this statute, evidenced by two distinct sets of decisions of the various high
courts. We have no hesitation to conclude that the set of decisions, which
applied the principle of no deduction of the life insurance amount, should
be accepted and the other set, which interpreted to deduct, is to be B
rejected. For all these considerations, we have no hesitation to hold that
such High Courts were wrong in deducting the amount paid or payable
under the life insurance by giving restricted meaning to the provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act basing mostly on the language of English statutes
and not taking into consideration the changed language and intends of the c
legislature under various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 9th Septem-
ber, 1985 and restore the judgment of the tribunal dated 29th September,
1980 and hold tha( the amount received by the claimant on the life
insurance of the deceased is not deductible from the compensation com- D
puted under the Motor Vehicles Act. The concerned respondent shall
make the payment accordingly, if not already paid in terms thereof.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, Cost on parties.

R.K.S. Appeal allowed. E
""

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