MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIARversusTHAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE REP BY ITS PROCURATOR DEVSSIA’S SON REV. FATHER JOSEPH KAPPIL

                         [2022] 5 S.C.R. 579



                   MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIAR
                                  v.
THAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE REP BY ITS
  PROCURATOR DEVSSIA’S SON REV. FATHER JOSEPH
                   KAPPIL
                   (Civil Appeal No. 2592 of 2022)
                          APRIL 01, 2022
  [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
       Transfer of Property Act, 1882: ss. 41, 3 – Power of Attorney
– Alienation of Property – In the instant case the appellant executed
a general Power of Attorney in favour of her sister – After sometime
the said power of attorney was cancelled by the appellant – But in
the meantime the appellant’s sister executed four different documents
in favour of third parties, assigning/releasing some properties –
Thereafter the appellant filed suit against the assignees/releasees
and the same was decreed but later the appellant came to know that
the latter had sold the property to the respondent – Appellant filed
another suit seeking partition and separate possession of her share
in the suit property and the same was decreed – The respondent
preferred appeal against the decision before the High Court and
the same was allowed on the ground that the appellant failed to
seek relief of setting aside the document of tranfer even though the
appellant has constructive notice of such alienation u/s 3 of the Act
and therefore the appellant was not entitled to a decree of partition
and the fact that the transferee cannot be held to have excercised
‘reasonable care’ as required by the Proviso to s. 41 of the Act is of
no help as the appellant has acquiescenced to such alienation by
not seeking the relief of setting aside the document of transfer –
Hence instant appeal – Held: It is a fundamental principle of law
of transfer of property that ‘no one can confer a better title than
what he himself has’ (Nemo dat quod non habet) – There was
concurrent finding of both the trial court and the High Court that
the respondent did not excercise reasonable care as required by the
Proviso to s. 41, which if they had excercised they could have easily
found out that there was no power of sale with the holder of the
power of attorney – Since the drafting of power of attorney was
plain and simple by which the holder was empowered to lease out
                                 579
580            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     the property, power to execute document offering property as security
      for any borrowal and there was no mention of any express power to
      sell and therefore the alienation made the appellant’s sister (Holder
      of Power of Attorney) was illegal and as the vendors of the
      respondent did not have any title they had nothing to convey –
      High Court order is set aside and order of trial court is restored.
B
             Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s. 3, Explanation I and II –
      Interpreatation Clause – Constructive Notice – Legal Position –
      Two things are important for the interpretation clause to come into
      effect so far as ‘constructive notice’ is concerned (i) wilful abstention
      from an enquiry or search; and (ii) gross negligence – Explanation
C     I and Explanation II under the interpretation clause are applicable
      to the person acquiring an immovable property, the transaction
      relating to which is required by law to be effected by a registered
      instrument.
            Suit of Partition – Cancellation of alienation – When
D     necessary – Legal Position – It is not always necessary for a plaintiff
      in a suit for partition to seek the cancellation of the alienations –
      There are several reasons behind this principle – One is that the
      alienees as well as the co- sharer are still entitled to sustain the
      alienation to the extent of the share of the co-sharer – It may also
E     be open to the alienee, in the final decree proceedings, to seek the
      allotment of the transferred property, to the share of the transferor,
      so that equities are worked out in a fair manner.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1. The deed of general Power of Attorney executed
F     by the appellant in favour of her sister on 21.07.1971, did not
      specifically contain any power of sale. Therefore, the trial Court
      as well as the High Court held in no uncertain terms that the
      appellant’s sister was not competent to sell the property to the
      predecessor-in-interest of the respondent. It remains a plain and
G     simple fact that the deed of Power of Attorney executed on
      21.07.1971 contained provisions empowering the agent: (i) to
      grant leases under Clause 15; (ii) to make borrowals if and when
      necessary with or without security, and to execute and if
      necessary, register all documents in connection therewith, under

H
  MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIAR v. THAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC                    581
   DIOCESE REP BY ITS PROCURATOR DEVSSIA’S SON REV. FATHER
                        JOSEPH KAPPIL

Clause 20; and (iii) to sign in her own name, documents for and          A
on behalf of the appellant and present them for registration, under
Clause 22. But there was no clause in the deed authorizing and
empowering the agent to sell the property. The argument that
the deed was drafted by a doyen of the Bar, is an argument not in
favour of the respondent. This is for the reason that the draftsman
                                                                         B
has chosen to include, (i) an express power to lease out the
property; and (ii) an express power to execute any document
offering the property as security for any borrowal, but not an
express power to sell the property. Therefore, the draftsman
appears to have had clear instructions and he carried out those
instructions faithfully. The power to sell is not to be inferred from    C
a document of Power of Attorney. The trial Court as well as the
High Court were ad idem on the finding that the document did
not confer any power of sale. [Paras 8, 9][585-E-F, H; 586-A-D]
       2. Unfortunately after finding (i) that the Power of Attorney
did not contain authorization to sell; and (ii) that the respondent      D
cannot claim the benefit of Section 41 of the Act, the High Court
fell into an error in attributing constructive notice to the appellant
in terms of Section 3 of the Act. Two things are important for the
interpretation clause to come into effect. They are: (i) wilful
abstention from an enquiry or search; and (ii) gross negligence.
Explanation I and Explanation II under the above interpretation          E
clause are applicable to the person acquiring an immovable
property, the transaction relating to which is required by law to
be effected by a registered instrument. The High Court has turned
the above interpretation clause upside down and held the Principal
in relation to a deed of Power of Attorney, to have had constructive     F
notice in terms of Section 3, of a sale effected by the agent.
[Paras 12, 13][586-H; 587-A; 588-C-D]
      3. It is not always necessary for a plaintiff in a suit for
partition to seek the cancellation of the alienations. There are
several reasons behind this principle. One is that the alienees as       G
well as the co-sharer are still entitled to sustain the alienation to
the extent of the share of the co-sharer. It may also be open to
the alienee, in the final decree proceedings, to seek the allotment


                                                                         H
582            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     of the transferred property, to the share of the transferor, so that
      equities are worked out in a fair manner. Therefore, the High
      Court was wrong in putting against the appellant, her failure to
      challenge the alienations. [Para 15][588-F-G]
             4. As a matter of plain and simple fact, deed of Power of
B     Attorney did not contain a clause authorizing the agent to sell
      the property though it contained two express provisions, one for
      leasing out the property and another for executing necessary
      documents if a security had to be offered for any borrowal made
      by the agent. Therefore, by convoluted logic, punctuation marks
      cannot be made to convey a power of sale. Even the very decision
C     relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, makes it
      clear that ordinarily a Power of Attorney is to be construed strictly
      by the Court. [Para 17][589-B-C]
            Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish
            (1973) 2 SCC 825 : [1974] 1 SCR 535; Syed Abdul
D           Khader v. Rami Reddy and Others (1979) 2 SCC 601 :
            [1979] 2 SCR 424 – held inapplicable.
             5. It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of
      property that “no one can confer a better title than what he himself
      has” (Nemo dat quod non habet). The appellant’s sister did not
E     have the power to sell the property to the vendors of the
      respondent. Therefore, the vendors of the respondent could
      not have derived any valid title to the property. If the vendors
      of the respondent themselves did not have any title, they had
      nothing to convey to the respondent, except perhaps the
F     litigation. [Para 19][589-E-F]
            Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational
            Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust
            (2012) 8 SCC 706 : [2012] 6 SCR 404 – relied on.
                             Case Law Reference
G
      [1974] 1 SCR 535               held inapplicable        Para 16
      [1979] 2 SCR 424               held inapplicable        Para 16
      [2012] 6 SCR 404               relied on                Para 18

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   MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIAR v. THAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC                       583
    DIOCESE REP BY ITS PROCURATOR DEVSSIA’S SON REV. FATHER
                         JOSEPH KAPPIL

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2592                    A
of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2016 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in Appeal Suit No.464 of 1997.
      Dushyant A. Dave, Sr. Adv., Harish Beeran, Mushtaq Salim,              B
Usman Ghani Khan, Azhar Assess, Sayid Marzook Bafaki, Advs. for
the Appellant.
     Thomas P. Joseph, Ramesh Babu M. R., Advs. for the
Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                             C

      V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
      1. Their suit for partition having been decreed by the trial Court
but reversed by the High Court in a regular first appeal, the plaintiffs
have come up with the above appeal.                                          D
       2. We have heard Shri Dushyant A. Dave, learned senior counsel
for the appellant and Shri Thomas P. Joseph, learned counsel for the
respondent.
       3. The suit schedule property originally belonged to one
Ullattukandiyil Sankunni. After his death, the property devolved upon his    E
two daughters, one of whom is the appellant herein. The appellant herein
executed a general Power of Attorney on 21.07.1971, registered as
Document No.35 of 1971, in favour of her sister Smt. Ranee Sidhan.
However, the said power was cancelled on 31.01.1985. But in the
meantime, the appellant’s sister was found to have executed four different   F
documents in favour of certain third parties, assigning/releasing some
properties. Therefore, the appellant first filed a suit in O.S.No.16 of
1986 followed by another suit in O.S.No.27 of 1988 against the assignees/
releasees. Though a preliminary decree was passed in the second suit
on 7.01.1989, the appellant came to know later that the assignees/
                                                                             G
releasees had sold the property to the respondent herein.
       4. Therefore, the appellant filed yet another suit in O.S No.130 of
1989, seeking partition and separate possession of her half share in the
suit property. The trial Court granted a preliminary decree in favour of
the appellant. However, the regular appeal filed by the respondent herein
                                                                             H
584             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court by the judgment and
      decree impugned in this appeal. Therefore, the appellant has come up
      with the above appeal.
             5. At the outset, it should be stated that the respondent herein did
      not dispute the fact that the suit schedule property originally belonged to
B     the father of the appellant and her sister and that the appellant and her
      sister were entitled to equal shares in the property. But the respondent
      contested the suit on the grounds inter alia (i) that in view of two prior
      suits for partition, namely, O.S. No.16 of 1986 and O.S.No.27 of 1988,
      the suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 of CPC; (ii) that the general
      Power of Attorney executed by the appellant in favour of her sister,
C
      authorized the agent to sign all documents and present them for
      registration; (iii) that by virtue of the said power, the appellant’s sister
      transferred the suit schedule properly to four persons, for the purpose of
      discharging the debts incurred in the family business; (iv)that those
      transferees, in turn, sold the property to the respondent herein for a
D     valuable consideration; (v) that though the appellant was earlier residing
      in England, she came back to India and was staying in a house just 1 km.
      away from the plaint schedule property; (vi) that the appellant was
      therefore aware of all the transfers including the transfer in favour of
      the respondent and the development made by the respondent over the
      suit property; (vii) that, therefore, the appellant is guilty of acquiescence;
E
      and (viii) that the respondent has actually developed a commercial
      complex on the suit property and hence entitled at least to the value of
      improvements, in the event of a decree being passed.
             6. The trial Court framed as many as 23 issues for consideration
      in the suit. The objection on the basis of Order II Rule 2 of CPC was
F
      rejected by the trial Court on the ground that the appellant’s sister had
      committed a fraud and that the cause of action for the present suit was
      different from the cause of action for the previous suits. The contention
      that the appellant was guilty of acquiescence was rejected by the trial
      Court on a factual finding that the appellant was not aware of the transfer.
G     On an examination of the recitals contained in the Power of Attorney, the
      trial Court came to the conclusion that the document did not confer any
      power to sell the property and that, therefore, the appellant’s sister was
      not entitled to alienate the property. Since the original alienations made in
      1981 and 1982 by the appellant’s sister were null and void on account of
      lack of express power to sell, the subsequent sale made by those alienees
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   MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIAR v. THAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC                          585
    DIOCESE REP BY ITS PROCURATOR DEVSSIA’S SON REV. FATHER
            JOSEPH KAPPIL [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

in favour of the respondent herein was also held to be invalid. On the          A
basis of these findings, the trial Court decreed the suit, as prayed for.
       7. While reversing Judgment and decree of the trial Court, the
High Court held: (i) that the failure of the appellant to seek the relief of
setting aside the documents of transfer and/or recovery of possession of
the property was fatal to her case; (ii) that though the principle behind       B
Order II Rule 2 CPC may not be applicable to suits for partition, the
appellant must be held to have had constructive notice of the alienations
made by her sister, in view of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”); (iii) that once constructive
notice is attributed to the appellant, any relief for cancellation of the
                                                                                C
documents of alienation would have already become time barred, by the
time the Power of Attorney was cancelled; (iv) that since the deed of
general Power of Attorney filed as Exhibit A-1 did not contain any express
power to sell the suit property, the transferee cannot be held to have
exercised ‘reasonable care’ as required by the proviso to Section 41 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; and (v) that despite this fact, the         D
appellant was not entitled to a decree for partition, in view of her failure
to seek the cancellation of the alienations, in spite of having constructive
notice of the alienations.
       8. As could be seen from the judgments of the trial Court and the
High Court, the deed of general Power of Attorney executed by the               E
appellant in favour of her sister on 21.07.1971, did not specifically contain
any power of sale. Therefore, the trial Court as well as the High Court
held in no uncertain terms that the appellant’s sister was not competent
to sell the property to the predecessor-in- interest of the respondent.
However, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent argued, (i)           F
that while construing a document, all punctuation marks should be given
due weightage; (ii) that the deed of Power of Attorney was drafted by
a doyen of the Bar; (iii) that Clause 22 of the deed of Power of Attorney
conferred upon the agent, the power to execute and register all documents;
(iv) that the power to execute a document and present the same for
registration, should be understood to mean the power to execute                 G
documents requiring registration in the light of Section 49 of the
Registration Act, 1908; and (v) that, therefore, a bonafide purchaser
like the respondent should not be made to suffer.
     9. But we do not agree with the above submissions of the learned
counsel for the respondent. It remains a plain and simple fact that the         H
586             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     deed of Power of Attorney executed by the appellant on 21.07.1971 in
      favour of her sister contained provisions empowering the agent: (i) to
      grant leases under Clause 15; (ii) to make borrowals if and when
      necessary with or without security, and to execute and if necessary,
      register all documents in connection therewith, under Clause 20; and
B     (iii) to sign in her own name, documents for and on behalf of the appellant
      and present them for registration, under Clause 22. But there was no
      clause in the deed authorizing and empowering the agent to sell the
      property. The argument that the deed was drafted by a doyen of the
      Bar, is an argument not in favour of the respondent. This is for the
      reason that the draftsman has chosen to include, (i) an express power to
C     lease out the property; and (ii) an express power to execute any document
      offering the property as security for any borrowal, but not an express
      power to sell the property. Therefore, the draftsman appears to have
      had clear instructions and he carried out those instructions faithfully.
      The power to sell is not to be inferred from a document of Power of
D     Attorney. The trial Court as well as the High Court were ad idem on the
      finding that the document did not confer any power of sale.
            10. In fact the High Court rejected even the refuge sought by the
      respondent under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act which
      reads as follows:
E           “Transfer by ostensible owner.- Where, with the consent,
            express or implied, of the persons interested in immoveable
            property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property
            and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall
            not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not
F           authorised to make it:
                  Provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable
            care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the
            transfer, has acted in good faith.”
            11. The High Court has held and in our view rightly so, that if the
G     respondent had exercised reasonable care as required by the proviso to
      Section 41, they could have easily found out that there was no power of
      sale.
            12. Unfortunately after finding (i) that the Power of Attorney did
      not contain authorization to sell; and (ii) that the respondent cannot claim
H     the benefit of Section 41 of the Act, the High Court fell into an error in
   MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIAR v. THAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC                        587
    DIOCESE REP BY ITS PROCURATOR DEVSSIA’S SON REV. FATHER
            JOSEPH KAPPIL [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

attributing constructive notice to the appellant in terms of Section 3 of     A
the Act. The relevant interpretation clause in Section 3 of the Act reads
as follows:
      “Interpretation Clause-
      xxxx                           xxx                         xxxx
      “a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually            B
      knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry
      or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he
      would have known it.
             Explanation I-Where any transaction relating to
      immoveable property is required by law to be and has been               C
      effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such
      property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall
      be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of
      registration or, where the property is not all situated in one
      sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered    D
      under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act,
      1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any
      memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any
      Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property
      which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or
      interest is being acquired, is situated:                                E
      Provided that--
             (1)   the instrument has been registered and its registration
                   completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian
                   Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) and the rules
                   made thereunder,                                           F
             (2)   the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered
                   or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under
                   section 51 of that Act, and
             (3)   the particulars regarding the transaction to which the
                   instrument relates have been correctly entered in the      G
                   indexes kept under section 55 of that Act.
             Explanation II.--Any person acquiring any immoveable
      property or any share or interest in any such property shall be
      deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for
      the time being in actual possession thereof.                            H
588               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A                     Explanation III.--A person shall be deemed to have had
               notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting
               on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material:
                      Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact,
               the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against
B              any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the
               fraud.”
            13. Two things are important for the above interpretation clause
      to come into effect. They are: (i) wilful abstention from an enquiry or
      search; and (ii) gross negligence. Explanation I and Explanation II
C     under the above interpretation clause are applicable to the person
      acquiring an immovable property, the transaction relating to which is
      required by law to be effected by a registered instrument. The High
      Court has turned the above interpretation clause upside down and held
      the Principal in relation to a deed of Power of Attorney, to have had
      constructive notice in terms of Section 3, of a sale effected by the agent.
D
             14. The reasoning given by the High Court for holding that the
      appellant ought to have challenged the alienations, is that the appellant
      was out of possession. Here again, the High Court failed to appreciate
      that the possession of an agent under a deed of Power of Attorney is
      also the possession of the Principal and that any unauthorized sale made
E     by the agent will not tantamount to the Principal parting with possession.
              15. It is not always necessary for a plaintiff in a suit for partition
      to seek the cancellation of the alienations. There are several reasons
      behind this principle. One is that the alienees as well as the co- sharer
      are still entitled to sustain the alienation to the extent of the share of the
F     co-sharer. It may also be open to the alienee, in the final decree
      proceedings, to seek the allotment of the transferred property, to the
      share of the transferor, so that equities are worked out in a fair manner.
      Therefore, the High Court was wrong in putting against the appellant,
      her failure to challenge the alienations.
G           16. The learned counsel for respondent relied upon the decision
      of this Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Durga Chand
      Kaushish1, in support of his argument about the rule of interpretation to
      be adopted while construing Exhibit A-1, the deed of general Power of

      1
H         (1973) 2 SCC 825
      MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIAR v. THAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC                        589
       DIOCESE REP BY ITS PROCURATOR DEVSSIA’S SON REV. FATHER
               JOSEPH KAPPIL [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

Attorney. He also relied upon the Judgment of this Court in Syed Abdul           A
Khader vs. Rami Reddy and Others2 for driving home the question as
to how the deed of Power of Attorney should be construed.
       17. We do not know how the ratio laid down in the aforesaid
decisions could be applied to the advantage of the respondent. As a
matter of plain and simple fact, Exhibit A-1, deed of Power of Attorney          B
did not contain a clause authorizing the agent to sell the property though
it contained two express provisions, one for leasing out the property and
another for executing necessary documents if a security had to be offered
for any borrowal made by the agent. Therefore, by convoluted logic,
punctuation marks cannot be made to convey a power of sale. Even the
very decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent,             C
makes it clear that ordinarily a Power of Attorney is to be construed
strictly by the Court. Neither Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon nor
Section 49 of the Registration Act can amplify or magnify the clauses
contained in the deed of Power of Attorney.
       18. As held by this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust            D
and Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational
Trust3 the document should expressly authorize the agent, (i) to execute
a sale deed; (ii) to present it for registration; and (iii) to admit execution
before the Registering Authority.
        19. It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of property     E
that “no one can confer a better title than what he himself has”
(Nemo dat quod non habet). The appellant’s sister did not have the
power to sell the property to the vendors of the respondent. Therefore,
the vendors of the respondent could not have derived any valid title to
the property. If the vendors of the respondent themselves did not have           F
any title, they had nothing to convey to the respondent, except perhaps
the litigation.
      20. Therefore, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of
the High Court is set aside and the Judgment and preliminary decree
passed by the trial Court are restored. There will be no order as to costs.      G

Devika Gujral                                                  Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

2
    (1979) 2 SCC 601
3
    (2012) 8 SCC 706                                                             H