Holding

Reservation benefits under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are unavailable to a forward‑caste person who merely marries into a backward class; eligibility requires birth‑based social and educational backwardness and the attendant handicaps.

Summary

The appellant, a Syrian Catholic (a forward caste) married a Latin Catholic fisherman (a backward class) and was appointed as a lecturer to a post reserved for Latin Catholics under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. The appointment was challenged on the ground that she was not entitled to reservation benefits. The Kerala High Court Division Bench and a Single Judge had held the appointment invalid, but a Full Bench reversed that decision, holding that marriage does not confer backward‑class status. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Full Bench, stating that reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is available only to persons who are socially and educationally backward by birth and who suffer the same handicaps as the class, not to those who acquire the status by marriage, adoption or conversion. The Court set aside the lower courts' orders and dismissed the appeal. The judgment reiterates the constitutional policy of affirmative action for genuine backward classes and rejects any ‘transplantation’ of forward‑caste individuals into reserved categories.

Issues considered

The applicability of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution to a person who acquires backward‑class status by marriage.
Whether recognition by the community after marriage confers eligibility for reservation.
Whether a forward‑caste individual can claim the social and educational disadvantages of a backward class merely by marital affiliation.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.15(1), s. Art.15(2), s. Art.15(3), s. Art.15(4), s. Art.16(1), s. Art.16(4), s. Art.17, s. Art.21, s. Art.335, s. Art.38, s. Art.39, s. Art.46
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993s. Sec.12, s. Sec.2(b)

Subjects

reservationbackward classArticles 15(4) and 16(4)inter‑caste marriageaffirmative actionsocial justicecasteequality before lawsecularismconstitutional law

Judgment

A MRS. VALSAMMAPAULETC.

COCHIN UNIVERSITY Af.:!D ORS. ETC.
()>
JANUARY 4, 1996

B [K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. I-IANSARJA, JJ.]

Constiturion of India, 1950 : Articles 15(4) and 16(4)

Reservation-Backward cll!ss-Syrian Catholic Lady o.f forward
class--/Vfarrying a Latin Catholic Backward class .fisher1nen-Her appoint-
c n1e11t against reserved post as lecturer--Held not valid-Held she was llOf
entitled to the bene.fit o_f reservation given to Latin Catholics o_f back\-vard
class-Her recognition as me1nber o_f Latin Ca1holics held not relevanl .for the
purposes o.f her entitle1nent to reservation.

Social lnteRration :
D
Inter-caste, /11ter-sect and Inter-religion marriages--/mportance o.f

The appellant, a syrian catholic by birth (a forward 'class) was
married to a person who was latin catholic (Backward class) fishermen).
She was a appointed as lecturer in the Law Department of Coch.in
E University against a post reserved for latin catholics (backward class
fishermen). Her appointment was challenged on the ground that she was
not entitled to the benefit of reservation under Article 16(4) of the Consti-
tution. A Single Judge of the High court held that the appellant's appoint-
ment was not valid. On appeal the appellant relied on the judgment of
F Single Judge in Dr. Kanjamma Alex v. Public Service Commission, (1980)
KLT 18; which later stood upheld in Public Service Commission v. Dr.
Kaniamma Alex, (1981) KLT 24. Doubting the correctness of the decision
of the Division Bench, the matter was referred to the Full Bench. The Full
Bench in its Judgment held that being a syrian Catholic by birth the
appellant cannot claim the status of a backward class by marriage. The
G Full Bench further held that the special provisious under Articles 15(4) and
16(4) of the Constitution intended for the advancement of socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens cannot be defeated by including
candidates by alliance or by any other mode of joining the community.
Accordingly, the Full Bench overruled the decision of the Division Bench
H and of the Single Judge.
128
V. PAUL (MRS.) '· COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. 129
In appeal to this Court it was contended for the appellant that : (i) A
she married a backward class and had entered into the marital home of
her husband and was received and recognised by the community as a
member of Latin Catholic. Due to her marriage, she has subjected herself
and suffered all the environmental disabilities to which her husband was
subjected and to which all other members of backward class in the region
B
are subjected to. She cannot, therefore, be discriminated by denying
equality given by Article 16(4) of the Constitution; (ii) birth by itself was
not a determinative factor for claiming Protective disc.rimination given to
the backward classes. Environmental and social disabilities are also
relevant factors.

·on behalf of the respondents it was contended that (1) Articles 16(4)
c
and 15(4) are intended to remove handicaps and disadvantages suffered by
backward class citizens due to social and educational backwardness like
the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, persons
who by birth belong to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward
Classes alone were entitled to the benefit of Articles 16(4) and 15(4). By D
marriage, adoption or any other device, viz., by procuring false social
• status certificates, they were not eligible to avail of protective discrimina~
tion for appointment to an office or to a post under the State or admission
in educational institution; (ii) mere recognition of and acceptance by the
community after her marriage is not relevant for the purpose of availing E
of the benefit of Articles 16(4) and 15(4).

Dismissing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1. The Full Bench had rightly concluded that the appellant
is not entitled to the benefit of reservation under Article 16(4) as a lecturer p
which post was reserved for the backward class Latin Catholic community.
The orders of the Division Bench and the Single Judge are set aside. The
Full Bench judgement stands confirmed. [154-C-D]

State of Kamataka v. Appa Bali lngale & Ors., AIR (1993) SC 1126;
C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajagopal & Ors., [1976] 1 SCC 863; Soosai v. Union G
of India, AIR (1986) SC 733; Prindpal, Guntar Medical College, Guntar v.
Y. Mohan Rao, [1976] 3 SCR 1046; N.E. Hero v. Jahan Ara Jai Pal Singh,
[1972] 3 SCR 361; Indra Sawlmey v. Union of India, [1992] Suppl. 3 SCC
217; Kai/ash Sonkar v. Smt. Maya Devi, AIR (1984) SC 600; Kumari
Madhuri Patil & Anr. v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development & H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.
A Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 241 and Director of Tribal Wel{l1re, Government of
Andhra Pradesh v. Laveti Giri & Anr., JT (1995) 3 SC 684; referred to. -..

Smt. D. Neelima v. The Dean of P.G. Studies, A.P. Agricultural
University, Hyderabad & Ors., AIR (1993) A.P. 229; Unnila Ginda v. Union
of India, 1975 Delhi 115; Mrs. Vaishali v. Union of India, (1978) 80 BLR
B 182; P. Malikarjunadev & Ors. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, (1989) 3 ALT
50; A. S. Sailaia v. Kumool Medical College, Kumool & Ors., AIR (1989)
AP 209; VB. Rao v. Priizcipal, Osmania Medical College, AIR (1986) AP
197; K. Shantha Kumar v. State of Mysore, (1971) 1 Mys. L.J. 21; Nataraja
v. Selection Committee, (1972) 1 Mys. L.J. 226 and R. Srinivasa v. Chair-
C man, Selection Committee, AIR (1981) Karnataka 86, approved.

Dr. Kaniamma Alex v. Public Service Commission, (1980) KLT 18;
Public Service Commission v. Dr. Kanjamma Alex, (1981) KLT 24; Khazan
Singh v. Union of India, AIR (1980) Delhi 60, overruled.

Pandaiya Ta/aver v. Puli Telaver (1) Mad. 478, cited.
D
2. The recognition of the appellant by the member of Latin Catholic
is not relevant for the purpose of her entitlement to the reservation under
Article 16(4) for the reason that she, as a member of the forward caste, had
advantageous start in life and after her completing education and
E becoming major married person of backward class; and so, she is not
entitled to the benefit of reservation given to the Latin Catholic, a
backward class. [153-H; 154-A]

3. The concepts of "equality before law" and "equal protection of the
law" guaranteed by Article 14 and its species Articles 15(4) and 16(4) aim
F at establishing social and economic justice in political democracy to all
sections of the society, to eliminate inequalities in status and to provide
facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst
groups of people belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
other Backward Classes of citizens to secure adequate means of livelihood
and to promote with spf!cial care the economic and educational interest of
G the weaker sections of the people, in particular, Dalits and Tribes so as to
protect them from social injustices and all forms of exploitation. Articles
15(4) and 16(4), therefore, intend to remove social and economic inequal-
ity to make equal opportunities available in reality. Social and economic
justice is a right enshrined for the protection of society. The right to social
H and economic justice envisaged in the preamble and elongated in the
V PAUL (MRS.) v. COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. 131
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of the Constitution, in par- A
ticular, Articles 14, 15, 16, 21, 38, 39 and 46 of the Constitution, is to make
the equality of the life of the poor, disadvantage and disabled citizens of
the society, meaningful. (136-F-H; 137-A; D·E]
4. The Dalits and Tribes suffered social and economic disabilities
recognised by Articles 17 and 15(2). Consequently they became socially, B
culturally and educationally backward; the OBCs also suffered social and
educational backwardness. The object of reservation is to remove these
handicaps, disadvantages, sufferings and restrictions to which the mem-
bers of the Dalits or Tribes or OBCs were subjected to and sought to bring
them in the mainstream of the nation's life by providing them opportuni- C
ties and facilities. (151-E-G]
5. Education, employment and economic empowerment are some of
the programmes, the State has evolved and also provided reservation in
admission into educational institutions, or in case of other economic
benefits under Articles 15(4) and 46, or in appointment to an office or a D
post under the State under Article 16(4). Therefore, when a member is
transplanted into the Dalits, Tribes and OBCs, he/she must of necessity also
undergo same handicaps, be subject to the same disabilities, disadvantages,
indignities or sufferings so as to entitle the candidate to avail the facility
or reservation. A candidate who had the advantageous start in life being
born in forward caste and had march of advantageous life but is trans- E
planted in backward caste by adoption or marriage or conversion, does
not become eligible to the benefit of reservation either under Article 15(4)
or 16(4), as the case may be. Acquisition of the status of Scheduled Caste
etc. by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the
Constitution, and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy under F
Articles 15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution. (151-H; 152-A-C]
Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu, JT (1995) 3 SC
563 and R. Chandevarappa v. State of Kamataka, JT (1995) 7 SC 93,
referred to.
G
6. The institution of marriage is one of the sound social institutions to
bring harmony and integration in Social fabric. The Shastric law among
Hindus has undergone change, in the rigidity of shastric prescriptions. In
relation to interest succession of property, marriage, adoption and mainte-
nance among Hindus, they are brought under statutory operation appro-
priately underpinning the rigid shastric prohibitions, restrictions to oper- H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.
A ate in harmony with Universal Dedaration of Human Rights and constitu-
tional rights. Inter-caste marriages and adoption are two important social
institutions through which secularism would find its fruitful and solid base
for an egalitarian social order under the Constitution. Therefore, due rec-
ognition should be accorded for social mobility and integration and ac-
cordingly its recognition must be upheld as valid law. [149-G-H; 150-A; F]
B
7. The approach in reconciling diverse practices, customs and tradi-
tions of the marriages as one of the means for social and national unity and
integrity and establishment of Indian culture for harmony, a;ruty and self
respect to the individuals, is the encou~agement to inter-caste, inter-sect,
inter-religion marriages from inter-region. The purposive interpretation
c would, therefore, pave way to establish secularism and secular State.

Usha M. Apte, "The Sacrament of Marriage in Hindu Society From
Vedic period to Dharmasastras" 19"18 Ed. P. 13; G. Banerjee, "Hindu Law
of Marriage and Stridhana" 2nd Ed. 1896, p.68-69; Dr. Paras Diwan, "Law
D of Marriage and Divorce", 2nd Edn. p. 75; Arnn Shouri, "Religion in
Politics" 1986 P. 332-333, referred to. [147-F] .>-

8. The Constitution seeks to establish secular socialist democratic
republic in which every citizen has equality of status and of opportunity,
to promote among the people dignity of the individual, unity and integrity
E of the nation transcending them from caste, sectional religious barriers
fostering fraternity among them in an integrated Bharat. The emphasis,
therefore, is on a citizen to improve excellence and equal status and
dignity of person. With the advancement of human rights and constitu-
tional philosophy of social and economic democracy in a democratic
polity to all the citizens on equal footing, secularism has been held to be
F one of the basic features of the Constitution, and egalitarian social order
is its foundation. Unless free mobility of the people is allowed transcending
sectional, caste~ religious or regional barriers, establishment of secU.lar
socialist order becomes difficult. [143-B-D]

S.R. Bommai v. Union ~(India, [1994] 3 SCC 1, referred to.
G
9. Pluralism is the keynote of Indian culture and religious tolerance
. is the bedrock of Indian secularism. It is based on the belief that all
religions are equally good and efficacious pathways to perfection or God-
realisation. It stands for a comple~ interpretive process in which there is
H a transcendence of religion and yet there is a unification of multiple
V PAUL (MRS.) '· COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. 133
religions. It is a bridge between religions in a multi-religious society to A
cross over the barriers of their diversity Secularism is the basic feature
of the Constitution as a guiding principle of State policy and action.
Secularism in the positive sense is the cornerstone of an egalitarian and
forward looking society which our Constitution endeavours to establish. It
is the only possible basis of a uniform and durable national identity in a B
multi-religious and socially disintegrated society . It is a fruitful means for
conflict-resolution and harmonious and peaceful living. It proVides a sense
of security to the followers of all religions and ensures full civil liberties,
constitutional rights and equal opportunities. [147-G-H; 148-A-B)

10. Human rights are derived from the dignity and worth inherent C
in the human person. Human rights and fundamental freedoms have been
reiterated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Democracy,
development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are
inter-dependent and have mutual reinforcement. The human rights for
women, including girl child are, therefore, inalienable, integral and indi- D
visible part of universal human rights. The full development of person-
ality and fundamental freedoms and equal participation by women in
political, social, economic and cultural life are concomitants for national
development, social and family stability and growth-culture, social and
economical. All forms of discrimination on grounds of gender is violative
of fundamental freedoms and human rights. [148-C-D] E

11. In the light of the ConstitutionaVphilosophy of social integrity
and national unity, right to equality assured by the human rights and the
Constitution of India, on marriage by man and woman, they become
members of the family and entitled to the social status as married couple, F
recognition per se is not a pre-condition but entitled to be considered, when
evidence is available. It is common knowledge that with education or
advance of economic status, young men and women marry against the
wishes of parents and in many a cas~ consent or recognition would
scarcely be given by either or both of the parties or parents of both
spouses. Recognition by family or community is not a pre-condition for
G
married status. [151-C-E)

Mussumat Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ramkishore Achari Chowdhary,
(1865) 10 MIA 279 and Lally Bhoy v. Cassibai, (1979-80) 7 IA 212,
referred to. H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.
A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3163-64 of
1995 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.1.95 of the Kerala High Court
in W.A. Nos. 416 & 187 of 1992.

B K.M.K. Nair and R. Satish for the Appellants.

S.A. Syed for State of Kerala, C. N. Sreekumar, G. Prakash and Navin
Prakash for the Cochin University for Intervenor.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c K. RAMASWAMY, J. C.A. Nos. 3163-64195. These appeals by special
leave arise from the judgment dated January 18, 1995 of the Full Bench of
the Kerala High Court in writ appeal Nos. 416 and 187 of 1992. The Division
Bench, doubting the correctness of the judgment in Public Service Commis-
sion v. Di: Kanjamma Alex, (1981) KLT 24, (subject matter of CA No. 1197/
D 81) had referred the question to the Full Bench. Facts lie in a short compass
and are stated as under :

Two posts of Lecturers in Law Department of Cochin University were
notified for recruitment, one of which was reserved for Latin Catholics
(Backward Class-Fishermen). The appellant, a Syrian Catholic (a forward
E class), having married a Latin Catholic, had applied for selection as a
reserved candidate. The University selected her on that basis and accordingly
appointed her against the reserved post. Her appointment was questioned by
one Rani George by filing a Writ Petition, viz., O.P. No. 9450/91 praying for
a direction to the University to appoint her in place of the appellant to the '-
F said post. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition of Rani George
and held that the appointment should be made strictly in accordance with
Rules 14 to 17 of the Kerala State Subordinate Service Rules. When appeals
were filed, the appellant cited the judgment a single Judge in Dr. Kaniamma
Alex v. Public Service Commission, (1980) KLT 18 which later stood upheld
in Public Service Commission v. Dr. Kan;ama Alex, ( 1980) KLT 24. As stated
G
earlier, doubting the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench in Dr.
Kanjamma Alex's case, the reference to the Full Bench had come to be made. 'Jr

The Full Bench in the impugned judgment held that though the
appellant was married according to the Canon Law, the appellant, being a
H Syrian Catholic by birth, by marriage with a Latin Catholic (Backward Class),
\\-.

V. PAUL (MRS.I" COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 135
is not a member of that class nor can she claim the status as a backward class A
by marriage. The special provisions under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the
Constitution intended for the advancement of socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens cannot be defeated by including candidates by
alliance or by any other mode of joining the community. It would tantamount

- to making a mockery of the constitutional exercise of identification of
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. Accordingly, the Full
Bench overruled the decision of the Division Bench and of the single Judge
B

referred to hereinbefore. The appeal challenging the Division Bench Judge-
ment in respect of Dr. Kanjamma Alex, (Civil Appeal No. 1197/81) is placed
before us alongwith these appeals.

The question is one of constitutional importance to harmonize the
c
personal law of the citizens and the constitutional goal, viz., to accord equal
opportunity to the disadvantaged social segments, envisaged in Articles
16(4) and 15(4) of the Constitution. Shri T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel
for the appellant, contended that though the appellant is a Syrian Catholic
(a forward class) by birth and had voluntarily married J. Yesudas, a Latin D
Catholic (Fishermen community), admittedly a backward class, she had
entered into the marital home of her husband in the year 1982 and was
received and recognised by the community as a member of the Latin
Catholic. Due Io her marriage, she has subjected herself and suffered all the
environmental disabilities to which her husband, J. Yesudas, was subjected E
and to which all other members of backward class in the region are subjected
to. She cannot,, therefore, be discriminated by denying equality given by
Article 16(4) of the Constitution. He elaborated the contention arguing that
birth by itself is not a determinative factor for claiming protective discrimi-
nation given to the backward classes. Environmental and social disabilities
are also relevant. factor to which the appellant had volunteered by subjecting F
herself to them and that, therefore, she is entitled to the same treatment as
is available to the Latin Catholics (Fishermen) to which she was transplanted
by marriage according to Canon Law. Therefore, the view of the Full Bench
is not correct in law. He placed strong reliance on the Judgment of this Court
in Principal, Guntur Medical College, Gwztur v. Y. Mohan Rao, [l 976] 3 G
SCR 1046 and N.E. Hero v. Jahan Ara Jai Pal Singh, (1972] 3 SCR 361.

Shri Nambiar, learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents,
contended that Articles 16(4) and 15(4) are intended to remove handicaps
and disadvantages suffered by backward class citizens due to social and
educational backwardness like the members of Scheduled Castes and H
(
_i

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.
A Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, persons who by birth belong to Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes alone arc entitled to the
benefit of Articles 16(4) and 15(4). By marriage, adoption or any other
device, viz., by procuring false social status certificates, they are not eligible
to avail of protective discrimination for appointment to any office or to a post
under the State or adn1ission in educational institution. What is relevant is
B
inadequacy of representation of that class into an offi~e or service under the
Stale. The members belonging to that particular group which is not ad-
equately represented alone are entitled to avail of the protective discrimi-
nation. The appellant, having had the advantage of starting life as Syrian
Catholic being born in forward, class, though she voluntarily married to a
c backward class citizen, cannot claim the status as a backward class to avail
of protective discrimination unless she further pleads and establishes that
candidates like her suffered all the handicaps and disadvantages having been
born as backward class citizens or Scheduled Castes or scheduled Tribes.
Mere recognition of and acceptance by the community, after her marriage is
not relevant for the purpose of availing of the benefit of Articles 16(4) and
D
15(4). Acceptance may be only for recognition as a legally wedded wife of
a backward class citizen and nothing more. He distinguished the ratio of
Mohan Rao's case (supra) contending that the parents of Mohan Rao initially
belonged to the Scheduled Castes but later they converted into Christianity.
On reconversion Mohan Rao was accepted to be a member of the Scheduled
E Castes and, therefore, his admission as a reserved candidates was upheld by
this Court. The ratio therein cannot be extended to all the situations and has
to be confined to special facts established in that case. As to Hero case, the
submission was that it is not relevant for our purpose.

The riv~l contentions give rise to the question of harmonising the
F conflict belween the personal law and the constitutional animation behind
Articles 16(4) and 15(4) of the Constitution. The concepts of "equality before
Jaw" and "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by Article 14 and its
species Articles 15(4) and 16(4) aim at establishing social and economic
justice in political democracy to all sections of the society, to eliminate
G inequalities in status and to provide facilities and opportunities not only
amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people belonging to
Scheduled Castes (for short 'Dalits'J, Scheduled Tribes (for short 'Tribes') and
Other backward Classes of citizens (for short OBCs) to secure adequate means
of livelihood and to promote with special care the economic and educational
interests of the weaker sections of the people, in particular, Dalits and Tribes
H
V PAUL (MRS.),_ COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY,!.] 137
so as to protect the1n fro1n social injustice and all forms of exploitation. By A
42nd Constitution (A1ncnd1nent) Act,. secularism and socialism were brought
in the Preamble of the Constitution to realise that in a democracy unless all
sections of the society are provided facilities and opportunities to participate
in political democracy irrespective of caste, religion, and sex, political
democracy would nol last long. Dr. Ambedkar in his closing speech on the
B
drati Constitution stated on November 25, 1949 that "what we must do is not
to be attained with 1nere political democracy; we must 1nake. our. political
den1ocracy a social democracy as well, Political de1nocracy cannot last unless
there lies on the base of it a social democracy". Social democracy means "a
way of life which recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as principles of
life". They are not separate items in a trinity but they form union of trinity. C
To diversify one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy.
Without equality, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the
many. Equality without liberty would kill individual initiative. Without
fraternity, liberty and equality could not become a nalural course of things.
Articles 15(4) 16(4), therefore, intend to remove social and economic D
inequality to make equal opportunities available in reality. Social" and
economic justice is a right enshrined for the protection of society. The right
to social and economic justice envisaged in the Preamble and elongated in
the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of the Constitution, in
particular, Articles 14, 15, 16, 21, 38, 39 and 46 of the Constitution, is to
make the quality of the life of the poor, disadvantaged and disabled citizens E
of the society, meaningful. Equal protection in Article 14 requires affirmaLive
action for those unequals by providing facilities and opportunities. While
Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex,
place of birth, Article 15(4) enjoins upon th~ State, despite the above
injunction and the one provided in Article 29(2), to make special provision F
for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of
citizens or for the Dalits and Tribes. Equally, while Article 16(1) guarantees
equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or
appointment to any office under the State, Article 16(4) enjoins upon the
Stale to make provision for reservation for these section& which in the
opinion of the State are not adequately represented in the services under the G
State. Article 335 of the Constitution mandates that claims of the members
of the Dalits and Tribes shall be taken into consideration m making
appointments to services and p9sts in connection with affairs of the Union
or of a State consistent with the malntenance.of efficiency of administration.
Therefore, this Court interpreted that equal protection guaranteed by Articles H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.
A 14, 15(1) and 16(1) is required to operate consistently with Articles 15(4),
16(4), 38, 39, 46 and 335 of the Constitution, vide per majority in Indra
Sawhney v. Union of India, [ 1992] Supp. 3 SCC 217 known as Manda/ case.
In other words, equal protection requires affinnative action for those unequals
handicapped due to historical facts of untouehability practiced for millennium
which is abolished by Article 17; for Tribes living away from our national
B
mainstream due to social and educational backwardness of OBCs.

In Kai/ash Sankar v. Smt. Maya Devi, AIR (1984) SC 600 a Bench of
three Judges of this Court, considering the historical perspective confronting
the framers of the Constitution in drafting fhe Constitution, stated that one
C of the important objectives to be translated into action was to take special
care of the backward classes and members of the Dalits and Tribes by
bringing them to the fore through pragmatic actions and providing adequate
opportunities for their amelioration and development, education, employ-
ment and the like. Hindu social structure was erected by impregnable walls
D of separation with graded inequalities between different sections amongst
Hindus. Caste became the result of birth and not of volition. No one wishes
to be born in a particular caste or religion. It is the result of biological act
of the parents. However, in Hindu social structure also, caste is the result of
birth and has become a bane for individual drive, thrive and improvement
of excellence, a fundamental duty under Article 5 IA(j). The practice of
E untouchability, which had grown for centuries, denuded social and economic
status and cultural life of the Dalits and the programmes evolved under
Articles 14, 15(2), 15(4) and 16(4) aimed to bring Dalits into national
mainstream by providing equalitarian facilities and opportunities. They are
designated as "Scheduled Castes" by definition under Article 366(24) and
F
"Scheduled Tribes" under Article 366(25) read with Articles 341 and 342
respectively. The constitutional philosophy, policy and goal are to remove
'
handicaps, disabilities, suffering restrictions or disadvantages to which Dalits/
Tribes are subjected, to bring them into the national mainstream by providing
facilities and opportunities for fhem. As to OBCs, fheir identification was
delegated to a Commission appointed under article 340.
G
In Manda/ case, identifying fhe backward classes of citizens, per 1
majority, this Court at page 714 para 779 had held that a caste is nothing
but a social class - "a social homogeneous class. It is also an occupational
grouping, with this difference that its membership is hereditary. One is born
into it. Its membership is involuntary. Even if one ceases to follow that
H
V. PAUL (MRS.)'· COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 139
occupation, still he remains and continues to be a member of that group. To A
repeat, it is a socially and occupationally homogeneous class. Endoga1ny is
its main characteristic. Its social status and standing depends upon the
natures of the occupation followed by it; lowlier the occupation lowlier the
social standing of the class in the graded hierarchy. In rural India, occupation-
castc nexus is true even today. A few members may have gone to cities or
B
even abroad but when they ~eturn, they do, -barring a few exceptions, go into
the same fold again. It does not matter if he bas earned money. 1;e may not
follow that particular occupation. Still, the label remains. His identity is not
changed. It is his social class, the caste, that is relevant."
• In para 784 at page 717, it was further held .that reservation under C
Article 16(4) is not made in favour of a 'caste' but a backward class. Once
a caste satisfies the criteria of backwardness, it becomes a backward class for
the purpose of Article 16(4). Even that is not eaough. It must further be found
that the backward class is not adequately represented in the services of the
State. It would, therefore, be for the authority constituted under Article 340
D
or the appropriate authority to identify the backward class eligible for
entitlement under Article 16(4). It would thus be seen that the D1lits, Tribes
and identified backward classes of citizens who are not adequately repre-
sented in a service or office under the State are eligible to be considered
under Article 16(1) read with Article 16 (4). Equally under Article 15(4) for
admission in educational institutions and in other programmes. E

The question, therefore, is : Whether a candidate, by marriage, adoption
or obtaining a false certificate of social status would be entitled to an
identification' as such member of the class for appointment to a post reserved
under Article 16(4) or for an admission in an educational institution under
F
Article 15(4)? In Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. v. Add/. Commissioner, Tribal
Development & Ors., [1994] SCC 241, the appellants were deughters of one
Laxman Patil who was a Hindu Koly (forward class). They obtained social
status certificates as Mahadeo !<.oli, Scheduled Tribe and were admitted into
Medical college. When it was found that they belonged to forward class, their
adntissions were cancelled and writ petitions were dismissed culminating in G
the aforesaid judgment. This Court had held that for the purpose of entitle-
ment to aamission under Article 15(4 ), the identification by the President as
a Scheduled Tribe under Article 342(1) subject to the law under Article
342(2) as amended by the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Amend-
ment) Act 1976, is conclusive. In other words, this Court had not accorded H
I
,_./

140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) l S.C.R.
A to a member of forward class, by obtaining a false certificate the status of a
Scheduled Tribe. Admission given on the basis of false certificate was
declared unconstitutional.

Director (If Tribunal Welfare, Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Laveti
Giri & Anr., JT ( 1995) 3 SC 684, is equally instructive. Therein, the father
B of the respondent who was a Government servant obtained false certificate
that his son was a Scheduled Tribe and got the respondent admitted in
Engineering College. Father was a Kapu (a forward class in Andhra Pradesh)
and certificate obtained was as Konda Kapu, Scheduled Tribe. It was held that
the false claim by fraud played by the guardian disentitled the candidate to •
c the social status as a Schedule Tribe.

In Telangana Region of Andhra Pradesh, Holva Community is a
backward class. They sought to obtain social status as Holuva, a Scheduled
,.
Tribe. The Collector issued memo to the Tahsildar not to issue certificate to
thent. When validity of the memo was questioned, A.P. High Court in Andhra
D Holwa Society v. Union o,f/ndia and Ors., in Writ Petition No. 17011 of 1984
dated 28.2.1986 held that the class exodus of one class of citizens as tribes
on names of synonimity is impermissible. Similarly, Jangama community/
backward class sought certificates as Scheduled Castes (Bcda or Budaga
Jangarna). The same .High Court in P. Hallikarjunadev & Ors. v. Govt., o,f
Andhra Pradesh, [1989) 3 A.LT. 50, held that they are not entitled to social
E
status certificates. It would thus be dear that there are attempts of transplan-
tation of forward classes to backward classes. Instead of integrated forward
march, it is a retrograde reverse march from forward to backward status to
claim reservations.

F In A.S. Sailaja v. Kurnool Medical College, Kurnool & Ors., AIR
(1986) A.P. 209, the petitioner, daughter of A.S. Radhakrishna, an advocate
of Cuddapah in Andhra Pradesh, had initially appeared for Common Entrance
Examination for 1984-85 for admission into medical College but failed. For
the Common Entrance Examination for 1985-86 she described herself to be
daughter of natural father Radhakrishna but in the application for admission
G made on July 13, 1985, she claimed that she was adopted by one B.
•
Sivararnaiah, (Shepard), a backward class in Andhra Pradesh and sought
admission on that basis. She secured 417 marks out of 600 and when she
claimed to be. O.B.C., but was not given admission, she filed a writ petition
in A.P. High Court for direction to the College to admit her as a backward
H class group-D. The High Court considered the inter-play of adoption under r

t
V PAUL (MRS.) v. COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY,!.] 141
the Hindu Adoption and maintenance Act, 1956 and the protective discrimi- A
).. nation under Article 15(4). It held that the native endowments of men are by
no means equal. The mind of children b~ought up in culturally, educationally
and economically advanced atmosphere, is accounted highly as they are
bound to start the race of life with advantages. It would apparently have its
inevitable profound effect on the quality of the child born in that atmosphere.
B
The children born amongst backward classes would not start the race of life
with the same quality of life. It would, therefore, be necessary to identify the
,. competing interests between diverse sections of the society and it is the duty
of the Court to strike a balance bet ween competing claims of different
' interests. Citizens belonging to a group of backward classes identified by the
appropriate authority or the commission, as a part of that class, fulfilling the c
traits of socially and educationally backwardness among that group, would
alone be eligible for admission as a backward class citizens under Article
15(4). In that event,. the Court declined to go into the question whether such
person is socially or educationally backward which is an exclusive function
of the commission/authority appointed under Article 340 of the Constitution. D
But any person who would attempt, by process of law and seeks to acquire
... the status of such a backward class should satisfy that he/she suffered the
same handicaps or disadvantages due to social, educational and cultural
backwardness. A person born in upper caste and having early advantages of
education is not entitled to the benefit of Article 15(4). In that context, it was
held that caste will be one of the considerations along with other factors E
applicable to homogeneous group of the people. A homogeneous group
;. together be_ing identifying as a class for the purpose of Article 15(4) or 16(4)
would become mockery. Therefore, it was held that the petitioner, though by
adoption became a member of the backward class, was not eligible for
admission into medical college under Article 15(4) since she did not undergo F
any sufferings or disadvantages, handicaps or ignominy to which the mem-
bera of the homogeneous backward class are subjected to.

It was further held that in interpreting the provisions of the Hindu
Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956, and the Constitution, the balance is
to be struck to maintain secularism and mobility of castes for national G
iritegration ensuring inter-caste marriages or adoption from one caste to
<
another, allowing enough lee way for free mobility and integration of all
sections of the society as homogeneous group. At the same time, the Court
required to construe the provisions of the Act and the. Constitution t~
reconcile the right of the individual and the society's right, namely, social
H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 1 S.C.R.
A justice. In writ petition No. 11914/85 (spouse of inter-caste marriage) and
Writ Petition No. 14875/85 (adoption of a backward class boy 10 a Scheduled
Tribe) disposed of on the same day, it was held in separate judgment that they
were not eligible for admission under Article 15(4). In V.B. Rao v. Principal,
Osmania Medical College, AIR (1986) A.P. 197, a Velama (forward caste) was
held not eligible for admission as Kappula Velama (O.B.C.). In K. Shantha
B Kumar v. State of Mysore, (1971) 1 Mys. L. J. 21; Nataraja v. Selection
Committee, (1972) 1 Mys. L. J. 226 and R. Srinivasa v. Chairman Selection
Committee, AIR ( 1981) Kamataka 86, the Kamataka High Court consistently
had held that on adoption a boy, belonging to a forward caste by a backward
class citizen, is not entitled to the benefit of reservation under Article 15(4).
c
In Smt. D. Neelima v. The Dean of P.G. Studies, A.P. Agricultural
University, Hyderabad & Ors., AIR 1993 A.P. 229, the appellant, a Reddy by
birth (Reddy caste is a forward caste in A.P.) married to Erukala boy (basket
weaving community, Scheduled Tribe in A.P.) was living in her marital home
since her marriage. She sought admission into M. Sc. (Home Science) in
D
Agricultural University as a Scheduled Tribe. She filed writ petition for
direction for admission. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition
holding that by "anuloma" marriage she was not entitled to the same status
as that of the tribe. In another writ petition No. 1313 of 1992, the petitioner
lady born in a Vysya community (Business community) was married to a
E Bestha (fishermen community - a backward class - A category). She applied
for admission into Post-Graduate Medical Course (D.C.H.) under the quota
reserved for Backward Class - A Group. Her writ petition was allowed by a
learned single Judge holding that a marriage was not an agreement. It is a
sacrament. After marriage she was no more a member of her parents' family
F but became a member of her husband's family. Therefore, she was entitled to
be a member of the backward class. The diverse views were challenged before
the Division Bench which had held that though on marriage the girls become
members of their husbands' families snapping all their ties from parental
homes and acquire the status as a Scheduled Tribe or backward class, they
are not entitled, by virtue of marriage, to the right to reservation envisaged
G under Article 15(4) of the Constitution. Similar view was taken in Urmila
~-·
Ginda v. Union of India, AIR (1975) Delhi ll5 and Mrs. Vaishali v. Union
of India, (1978) 80 BLR 182, wherein the Delhi and Bombay High Courts
respectively had held that ladies belonging to the upper caste married to the
Scheduled Caste.men were not entitled to the reservation under Article 16(4).
H In Khazan Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Delhi 60 a single Judge of the
\._
V PAUL (MRS.) v. COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.J 143
Delhi High Court had held that on adoption of a jat boy into Scheduled Caste A
family, he became entitled to the benefit of reservation under Section 16(4).
).
The Constitution seeks to establish secular socialist democratic repub-
lic in which every citizen has equality of status and of opportunity, to
promote among the people dignity of the individual, unity and integrity of
the nation transcending them from caste, sectional, religious barriers fostering B
fraternity among them in an integrated Bharat. The emphasis, therefore, is on
a citizen to improve excellence and equal status and dignity of person. With
the advancement of human rights and constitutional philosophy of social and
economic democracy in a democratic polity to all the citizens on equal

' footing, secularism has been held to be one of the basic features of the
Constitution (Vide : S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 and
C

egalitanan social order is its foundation. Unless free mobility of the people
is allo\ved transcending sectional, caste, religious or regional barriers, estab-
lishment of secular socialist order becomes difficult. In State of Kamataka
v. Appa Balu lngale & Ors., AIR (1993) SC 1126 this Court has held in
paragraph 34 that judiciary acts as a bastion of the freedom and of the rights D
of the people. The Judges are participants in the living stream 0f national life,
.., steering the Jaw bet ween the dangers of rigidity and formlessness in the
seemless web of life. Judge must be a jurist endowed with the legislator's
wisdom, historian's search for truth, prophet's vision, cJ.pacity to respond to
the needs of the present, resilience to cope with the demands of the future E
to decide objectively, disengaging himself/herself from every personal influ-
ence or predilections. The Judges should adapt purposive interpretation of
the dynamic concepts under the Constitution and the act with its interpretive
armoury to articulate the felt necessities of the time. Social legislation is not
a document for fastidious dialects but means of ordering the life of the
people. To construe law one must enter into its spirit, its setting and history.
F
Law should be capable to expand freedom of the people and the legal order
can weigh with utmost equal care to provide the underpinning of the highly
inequitable social order. Judicial review must be exercised with insight into
social values to supplement the changing social needs. The existing social
inequalities or imbalances are required to be removed re-adjusting the social G
order through rule of law. In that case, the need for protection of right to take
water, under the civil Rights Protection Act, and the necessity to uphold the
constitutional mandate of abolishing untouchability and its practice in any
form was emphasised.

Usha M. Apte in her "The Sacrament of Marriage in Hindu Society from H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R ..
A Vedic period to Dharmsastras" (1978 Ed.) stated at page 13 that inter-caste
marriages were prevalent in the period of Rig Veda. She quoted thus :

"Savasva, Kaksivat and Vimada all belonged to Brahmin families
but they married daughters of the kings i.e. Ksatriya girls. Even
Cyavana married a Ksatriya girl. On the other hand Sasvati i.e.
B daughter of the sage Angirasa, was married to king Asanga. The 'l
king Svanaya Bhavaya-vya i.e. brother-in-law of Kaksivat was mar-
ried to Brahmani wife of Angirasa (of VIII. 1.34). Even marriage of
Yayati and Devayani (X. 63. 1) is of the same type i.e. Ksatriya male
marrying a Brahinani."
c From the Brahmanas and the Upanishads, she also quoted at page 41 thus : '
"Mahidasa Aitareya was the seer of the Aitareya Brahmana. He was
the son of Itara i.e. a mother who was other than a Brahmani. The
word can be interpreted also as 'son of Itara', In this case he would
D be a child born of extra-marital connections."
,
At page 189 she stated that although the Sastrakaras accept the inter-
caste marriage of anuloma type, certainly they did not approve of it. To them
•.
such marriages led to inter-mixture of Varnas which could lead to social
chaos. She pleaded for simplification of the marriage rights and avoidance
E of waste of money and· material.

In "Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhana" by G. Banerjee, 2nd Edition
· 1896, it has been stated at pages 68-69 that by inter-caste marriages among _,
Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras, which were allowed in Vedic
F period, there arose a number of mixed classes, which have been treated in the
10th Chapter of Manu; and further, by a division of the Sudras according
to their occupations, there arose a numbe~ or sub-castes; such being the
nature ahd origin of caste, the prohibition of inter-marriage applies only with
reference to the four primary castes, and was inapplicable to sub-divisions of
the Sudra caste. Quoting from Pardaiya Telaver v. Puli Te/aver, I Mad. 478
G from the judgment of Scotland, CJ., it was concluded that the general law
applicable to all classes or tribes does not seem opposed to marriage between
individuals of different sects or divisions of the same class or tribe, and even \
as regards the marriage between individuals of a different class or tribe, the
law appears to be no more than directory. Although it recommends and
H inculcates a marriage with a woman of equal class as a preferable description,
V. PAUL (MRS.) v. COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 145
yet the marriage of a man with a woman of a lower class or tribe than himself A
appears not to be an invalid marriage, rendering the issue illegitimate.

Dr. Paras Diwan in his 2nd Edition of "Law of Marriage and Divorce"
stated at page 75 that in inter-caste and inter-sect marriages in anuloma form
a male of superior caste marries a female of inferior caste; and in pratiloma
marriage a male of inferior caste marries a female of superior caste. During B
British Raj, pratiloma marriage came to be considered as invalid and obsolete
but anuloma mariiage was held valid. Customary inter-caste marriages were
held valid. They were performed under Special Marriages Act, 1872. The
Arya Marriages Validation Act, 1937 permitted performance of both anuloma
' and pratiloma marriages under the auspices of the Arya Samaj. Inter-sub-caste
ma.rriages were validated under the Hindu Marriage (Removal of Disabilities)
c
Act, 1946. The Hindu Marriage Validity Act, 1949 permitted performance of
both forms of inter-caste marriages. Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
inter-caste marriages among all castes are valid as under the Act marriage
between any two Hindus is valid one. At page 76 he stated that under Muslim
law inter-sect marriages between Muslims belonging to different sects or D
schools are valid. The Christian Marriage Act permitted marriage between
Roman Catholics and Protestants. Among Parsis there are no sects or denomi-
nations. It would thus be clear that in Hindu social order, the prohibition of
inter-caste marriage and looking down upon the progeny born to such inter-
caste couple resulted in shunning the inter-caste marriages as a social E
mobility and resulted in rigidity in social structure. The Hindu Marriage Act
has done away with that rigidity and made valid the inter-caste marriages.
Section 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act introduced an amendment in the State
of Tamil Nadu providing that marriages made between any two Hindus in any
form solemnised in the presence of relatives, friends or other persons in a
simplified form are a valid marriage; and by statutory operation of sub- F
section (2), such marriages held earlier to the commencement of Hindu
Marriages Madras Amendment Act 1957 are to be regarded as good and valid
in law, doing away with any customary practice or usages to be mandatory.
The Tamil Nadu Act 21 of 1957 came into force with effect from January 20,
1968. G
The Constitution through its Preamble, Fundamental Rights and Direc-
tive Principles created secular State based on the principle of equality and
non-discrimination striking a balance between the rights of the individuals
and the duty and commitment of the State to establish an egalitarian social
order. Dr. K.M. Munshi contended on the floor of the Constituent Assembly H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 1 S.C.R.
A that "we want to divorce religion from personal law, from what may be called
social relations, or from the rights of parties as regards inheritance or
succession. What have thl'se things got to do with religion, I fail to
understand? We are in a stage where we must unify and consolidate the
nation by every means without interfering with Ieligious practices. If, how-
ever, in the past, religious practices have been so construed as to cov_er the
B
whole field of life, we have reached a point when we must put our foot down
and say that these matters are not religion, they are purely matters for secular
legislation. Religion must be reso"icted to spheres which legitimately apper-
tain to religion, and the rest of life must be regulated, unified and modified
in such a manner that we may evolve, as early as possible, a strong and t
C consolidated nation" (Vide : Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII 356-8).

In the onward march of establishing an egalitarian secular social order
based on equality and dignity of person, Article 15(1) prohibits discrimina-
tion on. grounds of religion or caste identities so as to foster national identity
which does not deny pluralism of Indian culture but rather to preserve it.
D Indian culture is a product or blend of several strains or ele1nents derived
from various sources, in spite of inconsequential variety of forms and types.
There is unity of spirit informing Indian culture throughout the ages. It is this ...
underlying unity which is one of the most remarkable everlasting and
enduring feature of Indian culture that fosters unity in diversity among
E different populace. This generates and fosters cordial spirit and toleration that
make possible the unity and continmty of Indian traditions. Therefore, it
would be the endeavour of everyone to develop several identities which
constantly interact and overlap, and prove a meeting point for all members ..,
of different religious communities, castes, sections, sub-sections and regions
to promote rational approach to life and society and would establish a
F
national composite and cosmopolitan culture and way of life.

Arnn Shourie in his "Religion in Politics'', 1986 stated thus at pages
332-33

"To fashion a fair and firm State; a State and society in which the
G individual is all, an individual1 with an inviolate sphere of autonon1y
that neither the State nor anyone acting in the name of religion nor
any other collectivity can b_reach; a State and society in which we
learn to look upon one another as human beings, in which the habit
of partitioning our fellow-men between 'them' and 'us' is gone; a
H State and society in which a man of God is known not by the
V. PAUL (MRS.) v. COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY, I.] 147

externals - by his appeaiance, by the rituals he observes, by the A
religious office he holds, - but by t~e service he renders to his
fellow-men; a State and society in which each of us recognises all
our traditions as the common heritage of us all; a State and society
in which we shed the dross in religion and perceive the unity and
truth to which the mystics of all traditicns have born testimony; a
B
state and society in which we learn, in which we examine, in which
we begin to think for ourselves - fashioning such a State and society
is a prograimne worthy of those who aspire to humanism and
secularism.

The sine qua non for such a programme is that all of us accept c
a limitation on means. We must accept the right of everyone to his
own opinion and belief as well as the right of everyone to influence
others to adopt his opinion and belief, but simultoneously each of
us must vow that he will influence others by persuasion alone or
not at ali.
D

- And the hallmaik of the humanist and the secularist in regaid
to the ideals he will pursue and the means by which he will pursue
them is not 'I will be secular, I will be a humanist, only when all the
'others' also conduct themselves as secularists and humanists.' Our
conduct must be principles, whatever the conduct of others. 'For', as E
Jesus said, 'if you love those who love yeu, what rewaid have you?'

The approacli in reconciling diverse practices, customs and traditions
of the mairiages as one of the means for social and national unity and
integrity and establishment of Indian culture for haimony, ainity and self-
respect to the individuals, is the encouragement to inter-caste, inter-sect, F
inter-religion mairiages from inter-region. The purposive interpretation would,
therefore, pave way to establish seculaiism and a seculai State.

At the cost of repetition, it is stated that pluralism is the keynote of
Indian culture and rehgio~s tolerance i.5 the bedrock of Indian secularism. It
is based on ,he belief that all religions aie equally good and efficacious G
pathways to perfection or God-realisation. It stands for a complex interpretive
process in which there is a transcendence of religion and yet there is a
unification of multiple religion,. It is a bridge between religions in a multi-
religious society to cross over the barriers of their diversity. Secularism is the
basic feature of the Constitution as a guiding principle of State policy and H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.
A action. Secularism in the positive sense is the cornerstone of an egalitarian
and forward - looking society which our Constitution endeavours to estab-
lish. It is the only possible basis of a uniform and durable national identity
in a multi - religious and socially disintegrated society. It is a fruitful means
for conflict-resolution and harmonious and peaceful living. It provides a
sense of security to the followers of all religions and ensures full civil
B
liberties, constitutional rights and equal opportunities.

Human rights are derived from the dignity and worth inherent in the
human person. Human rights and fundamental freedoms have been reiterated · •
in the Universal declaration of Human Rights. Democracy, development and
C respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are inter-dependent and
have mutual reinforcement. The human 1ights for women, including girl child
are, therefore, inalienable, integral and an indivisible part of universal human
rights. The full development of personality and fundamental freedoms and
equal participation, _by women in political, social, economic and cultural life
are concomitants for national development, social and family stability and
D growth-cultural, social and economical. All forms of discrimination on
grounds of gender is violative of fundamental freedoms and human rights.
Convention for Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(for short, "CEDAW") was ratified by the U.N.O. on December 18, 1979 and
the Government of India had ratified as an active participant on June 19,
E 1993 acceded to CEDAW and reiterated that discrimination against women
violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity and
it is an obstacle to the participation on equal terms with men in the political,
social, economic and cultural life of their country; it hampers the growth of
the personality from society and family, making more difficult for the full
development of potentialities of women in the service of the respective
F
countries and of humanity.

Establishment of a new international economic order based on equality
and justice will contribute significantly towards the promotion of equality
between men and women etc. Article 1 defines "discrimination against
women" to mean "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis
G
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognized enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on the basis of equality of men and women, all human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field." Article 2(b) enjoins upon the State parties, while condemning
H discrimination against women in all its forms, to pursue, by appropriate
\)-

V. PAUL (MRS.) v. COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 149
means, witl1out delay, elimination of discrimination against women by A
adopting "appropriate legislative and other measures including sanctions
where appropriate prohibiting all discrirninations against women; to take all
appropriate measures including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and prautices which constitute discrimination
against women. Clause C enjoins upon the State to ensure legal protection
of the rights of women on equal basis with men, through constituted national B
tribunals and other public institutions against any act of discrimination to
provide effective protection to women,. Article 3 enjoins upon the State
parties that it shall take, in all fields, in particular, in the political social ,
economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures including legislation
to ensure full development and advancement of women for the purpose of
guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and funda-
c
mental freedoms on the basis of equality with men. Article 13 states that "the
State parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure,
on a basis of equality of men and women".
D
The Parliament has enacted the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
Section 2(b) defines "human rights" to mean "the rights relating to life,
liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, embodied in the international conventions and enforceable by courts in
India". Thereby, the principles embodied in CEDAW and the concomitant
E
right to development became integral part of the Constitution of India and
the Human Rights Act and became enforceable. Section 12 ·of the Protection
of Human Rights Act charges the commission with duty for proper implemen-

.. tation as well as prevention of violation of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms .
F
Though the Government of India kept its reservations on Articles 5(e),
16(1), 16(2) and 29 of CIDAW, they bear little consequence in view of the
fundamental rights in Article 15 (I) and (3) and Article 21 and the directive
principles of the Constitution.

It would thus be seen that the institution of marriage is one of the G
sound social institutiOns to. bring harmony and integration is social fabric.
The Shastric law among Hindus has undergone sea change, in the rigidity of
Shastric prescriptions. In relation to intestate succession of property, mar-
riage, adoption and maintenance among Hindus, they are brought under
statutory operation appropriately underpinning the rigid shastric prohibi- H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.
A tions, restrictions to operate in harmony with Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and constitutional rights. The right to divorce which is unknown to
Hindu law is. made feasible and an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage
is m•de a ground so as to enable the couple to seek divorce by mutual
consent. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 and Special Marriage Act, 1954
B made the marriage between persons belonging to different castes and reli-
gions as valid marriage. Even local amendments in Section 7A to the Hindu
Marr-iage Act 1956 like in Tamil Nadu, removed the rigidity of celebrating
the marriages in accordance with shastric prescription like Kanyadan and
Saptapadhi being not mandatory, recognised social marriage as valid. Right
to maintenance from the divorced husband is provided under the Hindu
c Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 so long as she remains unmarried. Under Hindu
Minority and Maintenance Act, she is entitled to maintenance from father-
in-law. Similar gender equality is available to other citizens consistent with
Human Rights and under Article 15(3) of the constitution. The march of law
D lays emphasis on the rights of the individual for equality. The form of
marriages is relegated to backdoor as unessential. These are matters of belief •
and practice and not core content. Tying Tali is a must and without it ,,.
marriage is not complete in South India among all Hindus and in some parts
among Harijan Christians, while exchange of rings would do in North India.
E Ritualistic celebration of marriage would be considered by some as valid,
while most people in other sections think that factum of marriage is enough.
When in Tamil Nadu such marriage is statutorily, valid would it become
invalid in other parts of the country? The answer would, obviously and

F
emphatically be, "NO". Inter-caste marriages and adoption are two important
social institutions through which ~ecularism would find its fruitful and solid
base for an egalitarian social order under the Constitution. Therefore, due
..
recognition should be accorded for social mobility and integration and
accordingly its recognition must be upheld as valid Jaw.

It is well settled law from Mussumat Bhoobun Moyee Debia v.
G Ramkishore Achari Chowdhary, (1865) 10 MIA 279 that judiciary recognised
a century and half ago that a husband and wife are one under Hindu law, and
so long as the wife survives, she is half of the husband. She is 'Sapinda' of
her husband as held in Lallu Bhoy v. Cassibai, (1979-80) 7 IA 212. It would,
therefore, be clear that be it either under the Canon law or the Hindu law, on
H marriage wife becomes an integral part of husband's marital home entitled to
\)-..-

V PAUL (MRS.) "· COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 151
equal status of husband as a member of the family. Therefore, the lady, on A
marriage, becoines a inembcr of the family and thefeby she beco1nes a
member of the caste to which she 1noved. The caste rigidity breaks down and
would stand no impediment to her bcco1ning a me1nbcr of the fa1nily to which
the husband belongs and she gets herself transplanted.

The immediate question arises : Whether recognition of the community B
is a pre~con<lition? Though it was consistently held that recognition is a
circumstance to be taken irito consideration, marriage being personal right of
the spouses they are entitled to live, after marriage openly to the knowledge
of all the members of the community or locality in which they live and by
such living they acquire married status. In the light of the constitutional c
philosophy of social integrity and national unity, right to equality assured
by the human rights and the Constitution of India, on marriage of a man and
a woman, they become members of the family and are entitled to the social
status as married couple, recognition per se is not a pre-condition but entitled
to be considered, when evidence is available. It is common knowledge that
with education or advance of economic status, young men and women marry
D
against the wishes of parents and in many a case consent or recognition
would scarcely be given by either or both the parties or parents of both
spouses. Recognition by family or community is not a pre-Condition for
married status.
E
However, the question is : Whether a lady marrying a Scheduled Caste,
Scheduled Tribe or OBC citizen, or one transplanted by adoption or any
other voluntary act, ipso .facto, becomes entitled to claim reservation under
Article 15(4) or 16(4), as the case may be? It is seen that Dalits and Tribes
suffered social and economic disabilities recognised by Articles 17 and 15(2).
Consequently, they became socially, culturally and educationally backward; F
the OBCs also suffered social and educational backwardness. The object of
reservation is to remove these handicaps, disadvantages, sufferings and
restrictions to which the members of the Dalits or Tribes or OBCs were
subjected to and was sought to bring them in the mainstream of the nation's
life by providing them opportunities and facilities. G
~ In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu, IT (1995) 3 SC
563 and R. Chandevarappa v. State qf Kamataka, IT (1995) 7 SC 93, this
Court had held that economic empowerment is a fundamental right to the
poor and the State is enjoined under Articles 15(3), 46 and 39 to provide
them opportunities. Thus, education, employment and economic empower- H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] I S.C.R.
A ment are some of the programmes, the State has evoived and also provided
reservation in adrnission into educational institutions, or in case of other
economic benefits under Articles 15(4) and 46, or in appointment to an office
or a post under the State under Article 16(4). Therefore, when a member is
transplanted into the Dalits, Tribes and OBCs, he/she must of necessity also
undergo have had same the handicaps, and must have been subject to the
B
sa1nc disabililies, disadvantages, indignities or sufferings so as to entitle the
candidate to avail the facility of reservation. A candidate who had the
advantageous start in life being born in forward casle and had nlarch of
advantageous life but is transplanted in backward caste by adoption or
marriage or conversion, docs not become eligible to the benefit of reservation
c either under Article 15(4) or 16(4), as the case may be. Acquisition of the
Status of Scheduled Casce etc. by voluntary mobility into these categories
would play fraud on the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign
constitutional policy under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution.

Further question is : Whether recognition by the community, as is
D envisaged by law and expressly recognised by this Court in Mohan Rao'.1·
case would give the benefit of reservation? In that case, parents of Mohan
Rao originally belonged to a Scheduled Caste in A.P. Mohan Rao became
a Christian but· reconverted into Hinduism and claimed the status as a
Scheduled Caste. The Constitution Bench had. held that by reconversion, he
E could not become a Hindu but recognition by the community is a pre-
condition. In that case, it was found that caste/community had recognised
him after reconversion as a member of the Scheduled Caste. In Kai/ash
Sonkar's case (supra), this Court, in the context of election law, considered
the question of reconversion into Hindu fold. On conversion to a Christianity
or any other religion, the convertee would lose the said caste. Where a person
F belongin& to the Scheduled Caste is converted to Christianity or Islam, the
same involves loss of the caste. unless the religion to which he is converted
is liberal enough to permit .the convertee to retain his caste or the family law
by which he was originally governed. Where the new religion does not at all
accept or believe in the caste system, the loss of the caste would be final and
G complete. In South India, if a person converts from Hindu religion to other
religion, the original caste, without violating the tenants of the new order to
which he has gone, as a matter of common practice continues to exist from
times immemorial. If a person abjures his old religion and converts to a new
one, there is no loss of caste. However, where the convertee exhibits by his
actions and behaviour his clear intention of abjuring lhe new religion, on his
H
V. PAUL (MRS.) c. COCHIN UNIVERSITY & ORS. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 153
o\vn volition wilhout any persuasion and is not molivated by any benefits A
> or gain; the con1111unity of the old order to which the convcrtce originall~ 1
belonged, is gracious enough to admit him to the original caste either
expressly or by necessary intendment; and rules of the ne\V order pennit the
converlee to join the nev. caste, on reconversion his original caste revives
1

and he becomes a member of that caste. However, this Court had held that
B
"in our opinion the 1r.ain test should be a g~nuinc intention of the reconvc11
to abjure his new religion and completely dissociate hi1nsclf from it. We nJust
hasten to add here that this docs not mean that the reconvcrs_ion should be
only a ruse or a pretext or a cover to gain 1nundane worldly benefits so that
the reconversion becomes merely a show for achieving a particular purpose
whereas the real intention may be shrouded in mystery. The reconvert must C
exhibit a clear and genuine intention to go back to his old fold and adopt
the customs and practices of the said fold without any protest from members
of his erstwhile caste." In that case it was held from his conduct, the
respondent established that she by her conduct became a member of the
community entitled to contest the elections as a Scheduled Caste. In Mohan D
Rao 's case (supra), this court found as a fact that after conversion he was
accepted as a member of the Dalits by the eunununity. Similar are the facts
in Hero case (supra). Jn CM. Arumugam v. S. Rajagopal & Ors., [1976] l SCC
863, this Court did not accept reconversion, though Rajagopal proclaimed
by conduct of his becoming a member of Scheduled Caste and his relations
treated him as a member of Dalits. In Hero case also th~ respondent was E
recognised as a member of the Scheduled Tribe. Further in election law the
compulsion of political party nominating a candidate and voters' verdict may
be looked into. In Soosai v. Union of India, AIR (1986) SC 733, Bhagwati,
CJ. speaking for a three Judge Bench held that non-recognition of Scheduled
Caste Christians as Dalits was not violative of Article 14 as by reason of F
conversion they were not similarly handicapped as Dalits. In Madhuri's case
and Laveti Giri's case, this Court direCted procedure for issuance of social
status certificates. As a part of it, the officer concerned should also verify, as
a fact, whether a convert has totally abjured his old faith and adopted, as a
fact, the new faith; whether he suffered all the handicaps as a Dali! or tribe;
whether conversion is only a ruse to gain constitutional benefits under G
Article 15(4) or 16(4); and whether the community has in fact recognised his
conversion and treated him as a member of the community and then issue
such a certificate.

The recognition of the appellant as a member of the Latin Catholic
H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.
A would not, therefore, be relevant for the purpose of her entitlement to the
reservation under Article 16(4 ), for the reason that she, as a member of the
forward caste, had an advantageous start in life and after her completing
education and becon1ing n1ajor 1narried Yesudas; and so, she is not entitled
to the facility of reservation given to the Latin Catholic, a backward class.

B The learned single Judge and the Division Bench in Di: Ku11iamma's
case proceeded solely on basis of Canon Law, celebration of the marriage in
accordance with Latin Catholic rites and acceptance of her as member of that
community. Unfortunately they did not advert to the constitutional mandate
adverted to hereinbefore. Consequently, the learned single Judge and the
C Division Bench did not correctly decide the law. Equally, in Khazan Singh 's
case the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court too did not lay the law
correctly. The Full Bench, for the aforesaid reasons, had rightly concluded
that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of reservation under Article
16(4) as a lecturer which post was reserved for the backward class Latin
Catholic community.
D
The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The orders of the Division
Bench and the single Judge stand set aside. The Full Bench judgment stands
confirmed but, in the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own
costs throughout.

E C.A. No. J/97181

Consequent upon dismissal of C.A. Nos. 3163-64 of 1995 as above, )

this appeal is allowed.

T.N.A. Appeals dismissed.