MUNNAversusSTATE OF M.P.

                        [2014] 7 S.C.R. 822


A                             MUN NA
                                 v.
                          STATE OF M.P.
               (Criminal Appeal No. 2358 OF 2010)

                      SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
B
                   [V. GOPALA GOWDA AND
                  ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]

        Penal Code, 1860: s. 376 - Rape - Allegation of rape
C committed on knife point - Conviction u/s.376 - Held: The
  testimony of prosecutrix is almost at par with an injured
  witness and can be acted upon without corroboration -
  However, if the testimony has inherent infirmities creating
  doubt about its veracity, the same may not be acted upon -
D In the instant case, the circumstances taken as a whole
  created doubt about the correctness of the prosecution
  version, therefore, appellant held entitled to benefit of doubt
  and acquitted of charge of rape - Evidence Act - s. 114A.

E      The prosecution case was that on the fateful day, the
  prosecutrix was sleeping in her house when the
  appellant along with co-accused entered her house and
  committed rape on her on knife point. The trial court
  convicted the appellant and acquitted the co-accused.
  The conviction of the appellant was based on the
F testimony of PW-2 and PW-3, Kotwar of the village. The
  High Court confirmed the conviction. Hence the appeal.
        Allowing the appeal, the Court

G       HELD: 1. The testimony of the prosecutrix is almost
    at par with an injured witness and can be acted upon
    without corroboration. [Para 6] [826-C]

        Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat

H                               822
              MUNNA v. STATE OF M.P.                       823


(1983) 3 SCC217: 1983 (3) SCR ~80; State of Maharashtra            A
vs. ChandraprakashKewalchand Jain (1990) 1 SCC 550:
1990 (1) SCR 115; State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh (1S96)
2 sec 384: 1996 (1) SCR 532 - relied on.

     2. While absence. of injuries or absence of raising 8
alarm or delay in FIR may not by itself be enough to
disbelieve the version of prosecutrix in view of the
statutory presumption under Section 114A of the
Evidence Act but if such statement has inherent
infirmities, creating doubt about its ~era«?ity, the same C
may not be acted upon. The heino~s offence under
Section 376, IPC has to be treated with sensitivity but .in
the present case the circumstances taken as a whole
created doubt about the correctness of the prosecution
version. A case is made out for giving benefit of doubt
to the accused. The conviction of the appellant is set D
aside and he is..acquitted of charge. [Para 7) [833-E-H]
    Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat
(1983) 3 SCC217: 1983 (3) SCR 280; State of Maharashtra
vs. ChandraprakashKewalchand Jain (1990) 1 SCC 550:                E
1990 (1) SCR 115; State ofPunjab vs. Gurm it Singh (1996)
2 sec 384: 1996 (1) SCR 532 - relied on.

                      Case Law Reference:
     1983 (3) SCR 280          Relied on             Para 6        F
     1990 (1) SCR 115          Relied on             Para 6
     1996 (1) SCR 532          Relied on             Para 6
      CRIMINNAL APPELLATE .JURISDICTION : Criminal                 G
,'Appeal No. 2358 of 201 O

     From the Judgement and Order deted 03.07.2008 of the
 High Court of Judicature of M.P. at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal
 No.369 of 1994.
                                                                   H
    824      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2014] 7 S.C.R.

A         Pragati Neekhra for the Appellant.

        Mishra Saurabh, Vanshaja Shukly, Ankit Kumar Lal for the
    Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
8
         ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. This appeal has been
    preferred against the conviction and sentence of the appellant
    for offences under Sections 450 and 376 of the Indian Penal
    Code (IPC) for which the appella.nt stands sentenced to
c   undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years under both
    heads but the sentences are to run concurrently, apart from
    being sentenced to pay fine.

       2. Case of the prosecution as per FIR is that on 19th April,
   1993, when the prosecutrix (PW 1) was sleeping in her house
D at 1.00 A.M., the appellant along with co-accused Sahab Singh
  @ Mutta entered the house of the prosecutrix and both of them
  committed rape on the prosecutrix and then fled away. They
  were carrying knife which was shown to the prosecutrix to
  threaten her if she raised alarm. The prosecutrix narrated the
E incident to her husband and lodged First Information Report at
  the Police Station on the next day. After investigation both the ·
  accused were sent up for trial. The prosecutrix did not support
  the version against co-accused Sahab Singh @ Mutta.:
  Accordingly, he was acquitted by the trial Court. Relying upon
F her version supported by her husband Balkishan (PW 2) and
  Kotwar of the village Manaklal (PW 3), the trial Court convicted
  and sentenced the appellant which has been confirmed by the
  High Court.

G       3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

       4. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that
  there are major discrepancies in the version of the prosecution ;
  which create doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case
  against the appellant. The discrepancies pointed out are as 1
H follows:                                                        i
            MUNNA v. STATE OF M.P.                           825
           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
(i)      Though initially, two per~ons were named and it             A
         was alleged that both threatened the prosecutrix
         with a knife, version at the trial was different and only
         the appellant has been named.                     '

(ii)     The prosecutrix gave affidavit dated 23th April,            8
         1993 three days after the lodging of the FIR,
         disowning the version and exonerating the
         appellant. The said affidavit was duly acted upon
         by the trial Court, as the prosecutrix appeared in
         Court and supported the contents of the affidavit,          C
         for granting the accused anticipatory bail. vide
         Order dated 29th April, 1993. The order of
         anticipatorY bail reads as under:

''Affidavit of the complainant perused. According to which
Village Patel Shiv Kumar had put pressure upon the                   D
complainant and got a false report registered. Additional
Public Prosecutor has not of)jected the bail application.

Bail of accused Mutta is already granted on this ground
hence this accused is also being granted benefit of bail             E
and it is ordered that if in this case applicant is arrested
then he should be released on bail bond of Rs.5,0001-
and surety. "

 (iii)   PW 3 has admitted that husband of the prosecutrix
         had enmity with the appellar.it. The medical report         F
         inter alia read as follows :

" ........... No signs of injury anywhere .......... One cream
color petticoat on which there no stains of looking like
Semenal stains present.. .......;                                    G

 (iv)    The statement of the prosecutrix has also
         contradictions, as at one place she states that she
         had seen the accused only when he was escaping
         and not before, while at the other place she gave a
                                                                     H
    826       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 7 S.C.R. ·

A                different statement. Similarly her husband PW 2
                 has contradicted the prosecutrix about the
                 presence of the accused when PW 2 arrived.
                 According to PW 2, accused was still at the house~
                 and ran away only when he opened the door while
B                according to prosecutrix the accused had ran away
                 before arrival of her husband.

         5. We find that the above discrepancies are supported by
    the record.
c        6. We are conscious that testimony of the prosecutrix is
    almost at par with an injured witness and can be acted upon
    without corroboration as held in various decisions of this Court.
    Reference may be made to some of the leading judgments.

D         In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat1'•
    ,this Court held as under :

          "9. In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony
        of 8 victim of sexual assault in the absence of
        corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why
E       should the evidence of the girl or the woman who
        complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with
        the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt,
        disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge
        of male chauvinism in a male dominated society: We
F       must analyze the argument in support of the need for
        corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless
        cross-examination. And we must do so with a logical, and
        not an opinionated, eye in the light of probabilities with
        our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our
G       eyes focussed on the Indian horizon. We must not be
        swept off the feet by the approach made in the western
        world which has its own social milieu, its own social mores,
        its own permissive values, and its own code of life.

H 1. (1983) .3 sec 211.
          MUNNA v. STATE OF M~P.                          827
         [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
Corroboration may be considered essential to establish            A
a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology
of the western world. It is wholly unnecessary to import the
said concept on a turnkey basis and to transplant it on
the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different
atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian             B
society, and its profile. The identities of the two Wf>rlds are
different. The solution of problems cannot therefore ·be
identical.

10. Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or
of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a C
girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual
assault . . . . . .. . The statement is generally true in the
context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by and
large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so
sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. 9nly very D
rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or
two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites.
Because (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition-bound non-
permissive society of lndi~ would be extremely reluctant
even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect E
on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be
conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the
society or being looked down by the society including by
her own family members, relatives, friends, and
neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. F
(4) She would face fhe risk of losing the love and respect
of her own husband and near relatives, and of her
matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If
she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be
difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from G
a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost
inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture ·
and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by
others will always haunt her. (8) She would fee! extremely
embarassed in. relating the incident to otHers being H
    828       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2014) 7 S.C.R.

A         overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the
          upbringing in a tradition-bound society where by and
          large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be
          to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family
          name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10)
B         The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband
          and members of the husband's family of a married
          woman, would also more often than not, want to avoid
          publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the
          family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the
c         victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in
          some way responsible for the incident regardless of her
          innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by
          the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the
          cross-examination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk
          of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent."
D
        In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand
          2
    Jain , this Court held as under :
          "15. It is necessary at the outset to state what the
          approach of the court should be while evaluating the
E
          prosecution evidence, particularly the evidence of the
          prosecutrix, in sex offences. Is it essential that the
          evidence of the proseculrix should be corroborated in
          material particulars before the court bases a conviction
          on her testimony ? Does the rule of prudence demand
F         that in all cases save the rarest of rare the court should
          look for corroboration before acting on the evidence of
          the prosecutrix ? Let us see if the Evidence Act provides
          the clue. Under the said statute 'Evidence' means and
          includes all statements which the court permits or
G         requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to
          the matters of fact under inquiry. Under Section 59 all
          facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved
          by oral evidence. Section 118 then tells us who may give

H 2. (1990) 1 sec 550.
          MUNNA v. STATE OF M.P.                       829
         [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
 oral evidence. According to that section all persons are A
 competent to testify unless the court considers that they
·are prevented from understanding the questions put to ·
 them, or from giving rational answers to those questions,
 by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of
 body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. Even B
  in the case of an accomplice Section 133 provides that
  he shall be a competent witness against an accused
 person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it
 proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an
  accomplice. However, illustration (b) to Section 114, which c
  lays down a rule of practice, says that the court 'may'
,presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless
  he is corroborated in material particulars. Thus under
   Section 133, which lays down a rule of law, an accomplice
  is a competent witness and a conviction based solely on 0
   his uncorroborated evidence is not illegal although in
   view of Section 114, illustration (b), courts do not as a
   matter of practice do so and look for corroboration in
   material particulars. This is the conjoint effect of Sections
   133 and 1-14, illustration (b).
                                                              E
16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par
with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime.
The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot
be accepted unless it is corroborated in material
particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness F
under Section 118 and fyer evidence must receive the
same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of
physical violence. The same degree of care and caution
must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the
case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. G
What is necessary is that the court must be alive to. and
conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence
of a person who is interested in the outcome of the
charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and
feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the
prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated H
    830       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A       in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section
        114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some
        reason the court is hesitant to place implicit ·reliance on
        the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence
        which may lend assurance ·to her testimony short of
8       corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The
        nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the
        testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on
        the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a
        prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court
c       is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless
        the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the
        totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of
        the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a
        strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the
        court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting
D
      · her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds
        that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not
        lack understanding must be accepted. The degree of
        proof required must not be higher than is expected of an
        injured witness. For the above reasons we think that
E       exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the
        High Court as is reflected in the following passage:
          "It is only in the rarest of rare cases if the court finds that
          the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy, truthful
F         and reliable that other corroboration may not be
          necessary."
          With respect, the law is not correc.tly stated. If we may say
          so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily the evidence of a
          prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to
G         an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there
          are special circumstances which. call for greater caution,
          in which casE1 it would be safe to act on her testimony if
          there is independent evidence lending assurance to her
          accusation.
H
                  MUNNA v. STATE OF M.P.                      831
                [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
      17. We think it proper, having regard to the increase in A
      the number of sex violation cases in the recent past,
      particularly cases of molestation and rape in custody, to
      remove the notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a
      woman who is a victim of sexual violence must ordinarily
      be corroborated in material particulars except in the B
      rarest of rare cases. To insist on corroboration except in
      the rarest of rare cases is to equate a woman who is a
      victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime .
      and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult
      to injury to tell a woman that her story of woe will not be c
      believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars
      as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a
      conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour.
       Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the
       western and European countries. Our standard of
                                                                      0
       decency and morality in public life is not the same as in
       those countries. It is, however, unfortunate that respect for
       womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases
       of molestation and rape are steadily growing. An Indian
       woman is now required to suffer indignities in different E
       forms, from lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from ·
       molestation to rape. Decency and morality in public life
       can be promoted and protected only if we deal strictly with
       those who violate the societal norms. The standard of
       proof to be expected by the court in such cases must take
       into account the fact that such crimes are generally F
       committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of
       a person other than the prosecutrix is available. Courts
       must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a
       young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false
       charge concerning her chastity."                               G

     Similar observations were made in State of Punjab vs.
· Gurmit Singh 3 , as under :

 3.   (1996) 2 sec 384.                                              H
1
    832       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A          " ............... The courts must, while evaluating evidence, '
          remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self- ·
          respecting woman would come forward in a court just to
          make a humiliating statement against her honour such '
          as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases
8         involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations
          which have no material effect on the veracity of the
          prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement
          of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies
          are such which are offatal nature, be allowed to throw out
c         an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent
          bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal
          outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts
          should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such
          cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons
          which necessitate looking for corroboration of her
D
          statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on
          the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict
          an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and
          is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her
          statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in
E         such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why
          should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains
          of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt,
          disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the
          evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance
F         of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since
          she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the
          charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law
          to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base
          conviction of an accused. The evidence of Cl victim of
G         sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence.
          of an injured witness and to an extent is even more
          reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury
          in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted,
          is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he
H         is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a
                 MUNNA v. STATE OF M P                      833
                [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL. J ]

     victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, A
     absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative
     evidence is not an imperative component of judicial
     credence in every case of rape Corroboration as a
     condit/6n for judicial reliance on the testimony of the
     prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of B
     prudence under given circumstances. It must not be
     overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual
     assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim
     of another person's lust and it is improper and
     undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount         c
     of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice.
     Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and
     circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead
     uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of
     law is introduce,d through a new form of testimonial 0
     tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to
     a fossil formula ancf insist upon corroboration even if,
     taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex
     crime strikes the judicial mind as probable."

     7. Thus, while absence of injuries or absence of raising       E
alarm or delay in FIR may not by itself be enough to disbelieve
the version of prosecutrix in view of the statutory presumption
under Section 114A of the Evidence Act but if such statement
has inherent infirmities, creating doubt about its veracity, the
same may not be acted upon. We are conscious of the                 F
sensitivity with which heinous offence under Section 376, IPC
has to be treated but in the present case the circumstances
taken as a whole create doubt about the correctness of the
prosecution version. We are, thus, of the opinion that a case
is made out for giving benefit of doubt to the accused.             G

    8. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the
conviction of the appellant and acquit him of the charge.

Devika Gujraf                                     Appeal allowed.
                                                                    H.