Holding

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt due to material contradictions, lack of forensic evidence, and unreliable dying declarations, leading to the acquittal of the accused.

Summary

In 1979, the principal of a college, Iqbal Bahadur Saxena, was allegedly shot by three accused while seated with his physician. The FIR, recorded at the police station, and a later statement made in hospital were treated as two dying declarations. The trial court convicted the accused under Sections 302, 307 and 34 of the IPC, a decision upheld by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined contradictions in eyewitness testimonies, the unnatural conduct of key witnesses, the absence of any forensic material such as blood stains, cartridges or weapons, and the inconsistencies between the two dying declarations, concluding that the prosecution had not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions and acquitted the accused.

Issues considered

Whether the FIR recorded by the deceased can be treated as a dying declaration for the purpose of conviction
Whether contradictions in eyewitness testimony and lack of forensic evidence defeat the prosecution's case
Whether inconsistencies between two dying declarations preclude reliance on either
Whether Section 34 (common intention) can be invoked when evidence against individual accused is unreliable
Whether the prosecution has discharged the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307, s. 34

Subjects

murderIPC 302IPC 307Section 34dying declarationforensic evidenceeyewitness testimonyreasonable doubtacquittalcriminal appeal

Judgment

86 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 12 S.C.R. 86 [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A MUNUWA @ SATISH ETC.
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 2224-2225 of 2010)
B AUGUST 26, 2022
[B. R. GAVAI AND
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: ss. 34, 302, 307 – Murder – On the fateful
day, while the victim-principal of the College was sitting with his
C family physician and private practitioner-PW-6 outside his office
of the college campus, three persons, A-1, A-2, and A-3, allegedly
entered the verandah and fired gunshots at the principal as well as
at PW-6, and fled – First aid given to the principal and thereafter
taken to Police Station on bullock cart – FIR lodged by the victim,
thereafter sent to hospital where he died of shock and hemorrhage
D
due to injuries caused by several gun shots – Trial court convicted
the accused persons u/s 302, 307 r/w s.34 – High Court upheld the
order – Meanwhile A-2 passed away – As regards A-1 and A-3 held
: There are certain glaring contractions in the evidences produced
– Failure of prosecution to recover blood-stained materials from
E the place of occurrence, empty cartridges, pellets, or any other
weapon used for commission of the crime, coupled with the
contradictions and unnatural conduct of the eye witnesses, and the
inconsistencies in the two dying declarations – Prosecution has not
proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt – Thus, the accused
entitled to benefit of doubt, and acquitted from all charges.
F
Meghraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 :
[1994] 3 SCR 592; Ram Sewak and Ors. v. State of
M.P. [(2004) 11 SCC 259 : 2004 (1) Suppl. JT 217;
Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf v. State of Karnataka
(2007) 13 SCC 112 : [2007] 8 SCR 713 - referred to.
G
Case Law Reference
[1994] 3 SCR 592 referred to Para 21
[2007] 8 SCR 713 referred to Para 28
[2010] 5 SCR 137 referred to Para 23
H
86
MUNUWA @ SATISH ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 87
PRADESH

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal A
Nos. 2224-2225 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Orders dated 10.02.2010 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal Nos.290 & 587 of
1981.
R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Venkita Subramoniam T.R., Likhi Chand B
Bonsle, Rahat Bansal, Advs. for the Appellants.
Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Prabhat Kumar Rai, Ajay Kumar Pandey,
Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.
1. These appeals challenge the judgment of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 290 and 587 of 1981
dated 10.02.2010, confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the
Sessions Judge, Bareilly in S.T. No. 402 of 1979 dated 31.01.1981. By D
the said judgment, the Sessions Judge, Bareilly convicted all the accused
under Section 302 and Section 307, each read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced them to life imprisonment and
rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years, respectively.
2. The Prosecution Case: The case of the prosecution is that, on E
24.08.1979, around 6:30 p.m., Shri Iqbal Bahadur Saxena, Principal of
the Chandra Shekhar Azad Inter-College, Giani, Uttar Pradesh 1, since
deceased was sitting with his family physician and private practitioner
Dr. Asghar Ali2 in the verandah outside his office, situated in the college
campus. He sent his security guard Fazal Maseeh3 to fetch an empty
F
bottle of medicines from his residence, also within the college campus.
As PW-1 was returning with the bottle, the three accused, Gullu @
Rajesh (A-1), Vimal Kumar @ Chunnoo (A-2), and Munuwa @ Satish
(A-3), are alleged to have entered the verandah from the south, fired
gunshots at the Deceased as well as at PW-6, and fled towards the
north of the building. PW-6 went to his dispensary located nearby and G
sought the help of Mahendra Kumar, a compounder at his dispensary, to
bring the Deceased who had become unconscious, to the dispensary on
1
hereinafter referred to as the ‘Deceased’.
2
hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-6’.
3
hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-1’. H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A a cot for administering first-aid. After that, the Deceased was put on a
bullock cart along with the cot to proceed to Police Station Aliganj.
PW-6 is supposed to have followed on another bullock cart.
3. Upon reaching the Police Station, the Deceased lodged an FIR
at 8:30 p.m. for offence under Section 307 of the IPC, a translated
B version of which reads as follows: -
“I, Iqbal Bahadur Saxena S/o Pyare Lal Saxena (?) am the
resident of Village Sarai Jatar, Ugait, District- Badaun. I am
the Principal at Gaini Inter College. I was sitting in front of
Giani School. Fazal and Asghar were sitting. At around 6.30
C P.M. Gullu S/o Mukat, Vimal Kumar S/o Dataram, Munua
S/o Chandra Sen of Gaini arrived and fired shots with the
country made pistol for killing me. Asghar and I have been
hit by the bullets. (I am?) witness in the case of Vimal Kumar,
therefore it has been done.”
D 4. The statement was entered into the General Diary by the Head
Constable Raghunandan Lal4, and after recording the statement, PW-4
sent the Deceased to Visharatganj Railway Station on a bullock cart for
boarding the train to Bareilly for treatment at the Bareilly General Hospital.
Constable Sohan Lal5 is said to have accompanied him. As per the
statement of PW-8, the Deceased reached the railway station by 9:15
E p.m. to board the train and finally reached the Bareilly General Hospital
by 11:00 p.m., where Dr. J.N. Bhargava6 examined him at 11:15 p.m.
On the other hand, PW-6’s bullock cart reached the railway station around
10:00 p.m., by which time the train carrying the Deceased had already
left. Accordingly, PW-6 boarded the 12:00 a.m. train and reached the
F hospital by 2:00 a.m. on the next date, i.e., 25.08.1979.
5. At the hospital, the statement of the Deceased was recorded
by the Tehsildar and Executive Magistrate Shri Subhash C. Rastogi7,
between 11:10 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. on 25.08.1979 after getting a certificate
of medical fitness from Dr. P.K. Bass8. In this statement, the Deceased
G recounted events leading to the attack on him, with crucial differences
in motive, place of occurrence, and the presence of other persons at
4
hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-4’.
5
hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-8’.
6
hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-11’.
7
hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-5’.
H 8
hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-9’.
MUNUWA @ SATISH ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 89
PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

such site, among others. On 27.08.1979 at 2:35 a.m. the Deceased passed A
away, and the post-mortem which was conducted on the same day
recorded seven gunshot wounds, stitched wounds and abrasions, and
noted that shock and hemorrhage due to injuries were the cause of death.
6. After the investigation and the arrest of the accused, the
prosecution filed the charge-sheet against the accused, and the Sessions B
Judge framed charges under Sections 302 and 307, each read with Section
34, of the IPC. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses being PW-1 to
PW-11, and marked around 28 documents.
7. Trial Court: The Trial Court, by its judgment dated 31.01.1981,
considered and rejected the appellants’ contention that the prosecution C
case was false. It accepted that the FIR was genuine and not ante-
dated, recorded after the dictation of the Deceased at around 8:30 p.m.
upon reaching the police station. The FIR was treated as the Deceased’s
first dying declaration. The Trial Court accepted that the place of
occurrence was the passage in front of the verandah of Deceased’s
office and observed that the accused could not suggest or prove an D
alternative place of occurrence of the crime. The submission concerning
the lack of motive was rejected on the basis of the FIR being treated as
the first dying declaration, in which the Deceased stated that as he was
a witness in a case against A-2, and hence motive was adequately proved
against A-2. However, the same conclusion could not be drawn against E
A-1 and A-3. The Trial Court further discarded the contradictions that
surfaced by the improvements in the statements of eye-witnesses
PW-1 and PW-6 during cross-examination, noting that they were a result
of intimidation by the accused persons who were on bail at the time of
recording of evidence. It held that these improvements did not vitiate the
story of the prosecution. The Trial Court disbelieved the statement of F
the Deceased recorded by PW-5 on 25.08.1979, also referred to as the
second dying declaration, as it was recorded more than 16 hours after
the incident, and was possibly a result of prior consultation and
deliberation. As indicated, the Trial Court finally convicted all the accused
under Sections 302 and 307, each read with Section 34 of the IPC. The G
accused persons were sentenced to life imprisonment for offences under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, and for offences under Section
307 read with Section 34 IPC, to rigorous imprisonment for four years.
8. High Court: In the criminal appeals filed by the accused, the
High Court affirmed the convictions and the sentences without any H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A variation. It noted that the motive against A-1 and A-3 pivoted on their
association with A-2, whose motive for committing the crime was
adequately proved. On the question of contradictions in the testimonies
of the eye-witnesses PW-1 and PW-6, the High Court noted that despite
the inconsistencies, both witnesses were consistent about specific facts,
such as the number of accused persons present at the site of the crime,
B
firing of gunshots, and the murder weapon. The Court concluded that
the contradictions resulted from apprehension of consequences, as the
eye-witnesses resided in the same locality as the accused. Further, the
High Court also disbelieved the statement of the Deceased recorded as
the second dying declaration, apart from noticing that the dying declaration
C recorded prior in point of time must be given preference, and its
corroboration by the subsequent such declaration is only a rule of prudence,
which does not vitiate the contents of the first dying declaration. We
may note here that during the pendency of the appeal before the High
Court, A-2 had passed away, and accordingly the present appeals only
concern the conviction and sentences against A-1 and A-3.
D
9. Submissions at the bar: We heard Shri Venkita Subramoniam
T.R, AOR at length, and his submissions were later supplemented by
Shri R Basant, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Shri Likhi Chand Bonsle and
Shri Rahat Bansal, Advocates. We also heard, Shri Sanjay Kumar Tyagi,
AOR on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh assisted by Shri Prabhat
E Kumar Rai and Shri Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocates.
10. At the outset, Shri Venkita Subramoniam T.R has submitted
that the FIR itself is false and fabricated and that the subsequent events
concerning the delay of the FIR in reaching the Court also casts grave
doubts about the occurrence of the incident. They further submitted that
F there is doubt as to the place of occurrence, and contradictions surface
in the testimonies of the eye-witnesses PW-1 and PW-6. He submits
that the conduct of PW-1 and PW-6 is rather suspicious and very unnatural.
If these eye-witnesses are discarded, there are no independent witnesses
to support the story of the prosecution, particularly when there are no
G recoveries of weapons in the case. On the other hand, Sh. Sanjay Kumar
Tyagi, has submitted that the findings of the Trail Court as well as the
High Court are based on credible and reliable evidence, particularly from
eye-witnesses who had no interest in securing the conviction and arrest
of the accused. He further submitted that the Trial Court examined the
entire evidence and has given good and valid reasons for coming to its
H
MUNUWA @ SATISH ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 91
PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

conclusions, and therefore, the High Court was right in upholding the A
decision of the Trial Court.
11. Analysis: Having heard the arguments, we notice some glaring
inconsistencies in the evidence put forth by the prosecution. We will
take note of some such crucial lapses.
12. At the outset, we are not impressed by the submission of Shri B
Venkita Subramoniam T.R that the FIR was signed by the Deceased
vertically, in different ink in the FIR, while the contents of the FIR itself
were written horizontally, thereby giving an impression that FIR was
written after the signature which was obtained at a prior point of time.
However, there are certain glaring contradictions that cannot be ignored. C
First, there is doubt as to whether the Deceased authored the FIR and
handed it over to the police, as stated in the cross-examination of PW-1,
or it was orally dictated by the Deceased and scribed by PW-4, as stated
by PW-6 in his chief-examination. The other connected fact casting
doubt on the way FIR was registered, is the delay caused in its receipt in
the Court. An endorsement contained in the original FIR states that it D
reached the concerned Court on 27.08.1979, i.e., three days after the
date of the registration of the FIR. This endorsement is evident from the
original FIR document and reads “Sambandith Nyayalay Beja.”
13. Re: ocular witnesses: There are doubts about the conduct
and testimony of the eye-witnesses. The first such contradiction in the E
testimony of PW-1 fundamentally challenges the premise that PW-1
was an eye-witness. In his testimony, PW-1 initially denied being a
witness to the actual commission of the crime, stating that:
“The shot was fired, when I had gone inside. When I brought
an empty bottle, I saw accused Vimal Kumar, Munua and Gullu F
fleeing. These persons were fleeing southwards. When I saw
accused persons fleeing, I had reached in verandah of the
office.”
14. Later, in his cross-examination, PW-1 stated that: -
G
“It is not so that as soon as I reached near stairs of the
verandah carrying an empty bottle, the accused persons fired
shots. And after firing shots in my presence, the accused
persons fled northwards”

H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 15. The aforementioned contradictions in the evidence of PW-1
and significant improvements in the testimony, cast doubts about his
presence at the alleged place of occurrence of the crime. At least one
thing is clear, he has not witnessed the accused firing at the Deceased.
16. The other concern relates to his presence at the police station.
B PW-1 deposed that his thumb impression was taken on the FIR. However,
there is no such thumb impression at all on the document. In addressing
this contradiction, the Trial Court concluded that,
“The statements referred to above were made with a view to
support the defence and I am unable to place any reliance on
C the same.”
17. Another observation made on perusal of the evidence is that
PW-1 stated that he reached the Aliganj police station on foot, remained
there for about 25-30 minutes, and after that returned to the village Giani
by 8-9 p.m. This statement is curious, as the FIR itself was registered at
D 8:30 p.m. It is surprising then that PW-1, who walked the distance of 3
km to the police station, reached there well in time and observed the
Deceased write the FIR, allegedly signed it himself, had his statement
recorded by the S.I., and after that, concluded the return journey as
well, all by 8-9 p.m. It is also curious that he did not accompany the
Deceased to the railway station and eventually the hospital when he
E was in a critical condition, given that he resided with the Deceased within
the campus and had been working there for 10-12 years.
18. Cumulatively, the abovementioned contradictions give rise to
suspicions about the eye-witness testimony of PW-1. Whether he was
present at the place of occurrence or accompanied the Deceased to the
F police station at all, are in doubt as his statements relating to the
circumstances surrounding the place of occurrence and the recording of
the FIR have been found to be untrue, and his conduct unnatural.
19. In similar vein, we notice unnatural conduct on part of the
eye-witness PW-6. PW-11 who examined PW-6 at the General Hospital
G Bareilly, stated that the injuries on PW-6 were simple in nature. Despite
this, immediately after the incident, PW-6, a doctor who admittedly
maintained close relations with the Deceased, instead of being with the
Deceased, went to his own house and rested. Later, he accompanied
the Deceased to the police station to report the crime instead of escorting
the Deceased to a hospital to administer proper treatment, even when it
H
MUNUWA @ SATISH ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 93
PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

has been admitted that the Deceased was in a very serious condition, A
having suffered seven gunshot injuries and oozing blood.
20. Re: place of occurrence: There is a great amount of
uncertainty about the place of occurrence of the crime. As per the FIR,
as well as the evidence of PW-1 and PW-6, the incident took place in
the passage in front of the verandah where the Deceased and PW-6 B
were sitting in two chairs facing each other. It is at this place that the
accused are alleged to have fired at the Deceased causing as many as
seven gunshot injuries on his body. Inspector Chob Singh (PW-7) who
was cross-examined about the place of occurrence has stated that he
has not found blood spots on the chair or the floor around the chair. This
contrasts with the testimony of PW-1, who, in his cross-examination, C
stated that when the Deceased was lying on the bullock cart in a cot,
blood was oozing out from him, which is relatable to the injuries sustained
at the place of occurrence.
21. It is unnatural that not even single drop of blood could be
traced or recovered from the chair or the floor where the Deceased and D
PW-6 were sitting, casting a serious doubt about the veracity of the
prosecution’s story regarding the place of the incident. It is common
knowledge that a place where a severe bodily injury occurs, it naturally
leaves a trail of the incident9. It is also common for the prosecution to
collect proof of blood-stained earth, clothes, or other materials, from E
where the incident would have occurred.
9
In Meghraj Singh v. State of U.P. [(1994) 5 SCC 188], this Court held, “13....The
absence of any blood in the field of Kirpal Singh as also the absence of blood trail from
the field of Kirpal Singh to the place where the dead body was found, as admitted by
PW 8, also suggests that the occurrence did not take place in the manner suggested by
the prosecution and that the genesis of the fight has been suppressed from the F
court...’’.
A similar view was taken in the case of Ram Sewak and Ors. v. State of M.P. [(2004) 11
SCC 259], wherein it was held, “14...We also notice that there is considerable doubt in
regard to the place of incident also. From the medical evidence we notice that the
deceased suffered 3 major incised wounds leading to the severance of the blood vessels
and amputation of his hand near the wrist and the body in question was lying at the
spot till the police came which was nearly 4 to 5 hours later but still the investigating
G
agency was unable to find any blood on the spot. Of course, the prosecution has given
an explanation that after the incident in question it had rained but even then it is
difficult to believe that even traces of blood could not have been found on the soil in
spite of the rain. The absence of any such material also supports the prosecution case
that the incident in question might not have happened at the place of incident...’’
(emphasis supplied) H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 22. On this aspect there is only a tangential observation in evidence
of PW-6, who stated that the Deceased’s “injured body part had been
wrapped with tehmand”. This statement fails to explain the lack of any
blood stains at the crime scene. This does not explain why the said cloth,
tehmand, was not produced by the prosecution. Accordingly, we find
that the prosecution’s failure to explain recovery of blood on the chair or
B
the place where the Deceased was sitting when he was fired at seven
times is fatal. The non-production of blood-stained clothes is equally
fatal.
23. Re: lack of material recoveries: In the present case, the
accused are alleged to have attacked the Deceased with the aid of
C firearms, and the Deceased is supposed to have seven gunshot wounds,
yet the prosecution has failed to make material recoveries from the place
of the occurrence of the crime. The prosecution has neither produced
the empty cartridges from the scene of the crime, nor the pellets from
the Deceased’s body. The prosecution has not been able to recover any
D weapons alleged to have been used in the incident. Further, it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to examine the ballistic experts to prove
whether the gunshots came from one or different guns. The prosecution
however, failed to examine ballistic experts or even produce the empty
cartridges. Perhaps it is in the circumstance of lack of any recovery of
empty cartridges that the prosecution found it convenient not to examine
E a ballistic expert. Lack of such material recoveries compounds doubts
about the story of the prosecution in the manner that they have set out.
24. Re: inconsistencies in the two dying declarations: Finally,
as noted above, there are inconsistencies in the two dying declarations
of the Deceased, as to the motive of the crime, the place of the incident,
F and the presence of other persons at such place. The first dying
declaration, the FIR, was recorded by the Deceased at the police station
on 24.08.1979. It states that at 6:30 p.m., the three accused came and
fired at him and PW-6 with a pistol because he was a witness in a case
against A-2. The second dying declaration, recorded by PW-5 after
G medical certification from PW-9 on 25.08.1979, states that the incident
took place in front of the gate of his quarters, in front of which, A-3’s
flour mill is located. The three accused came from the flour mill, and A-
1 and A-2 fired a shot with a revolver while A-3 held him fastened. It
also states that, at the relevant time and place, his peon Sakhar Ali Beg
and 5-6 other persons were also present. Notably, he stated that he had
H
MUNUWA @ SATISH ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 95
PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

rusticated A-2 from college after he failed in the 11th standard, and this A
motivated the crime.
25. The Trial Court rejected the statement made on 27.08.1979
as a dying declaration, noting that:
“The new facts introduced by Iqbal Bahadur Saxena create
a suspicion that this dying declaration was a result of B
consultation and as such I do not consider it safe to place
reliance on it.”
26. Without reversing this finding about the later dying declaration,
the High Court proceeded on the premise that in the event of two dying
declarations, the court may accept the one which is recorded prior in C
point of time, and the corroboration of the first dying declaration by the
later declaration is only a rule of prudence.
27. In our opinion, the second dying declaration comprising far
too many additions and improvements, was correctly rejected by the
Trial and the High Court. The first declaration was recorded in the police D
station, right before the Deceased left for the hospital in a critical condition,
without any certification of whether the Deceased was medically fit to
make a dying declaration. In fact, this is corroborated by the testimony
of PW-8 who stated that the Deceased was in a semi-conscious condition
on his way to the hospital. Further, PW-11 who examined the Deceased E
also stated that his condition was serious. The dubitable circumstances
in which the FIR was recorded, sought to be treated as the first dying
declaration, have already been considered by us in the initial part of our
analysis. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that it is not safe to
consider the FIR as a dying declaration as well.
F
28. In Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf v. State of Karnataka10,
this Court had similarly refrained from accepting any of the multiple
dying declarations in light of their manifest inconsistencies:
“7. Conviction can indisputably be based on a dying
declaration. But, before it can be acted upon, the same must
G
be held to have been rendered voluntarily and truthfully.
Consistency in the dying declaration is the relevant factor
for placing full reliance thereupon. In this case, the deceased
herself had taken contradictory and inconsistent stand in

10
(2007) 13 SCC 112. H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A different dying declarations. They, therefore, should not be
accepted on their face value. Caution, in this behalf, is
required to be applied.”
29. Conclusions: Having considered the matter in detail, and
having noted that the prosecution failed to recover blood-stained materials
B from the place of occurrence, empty cartridges, pellets, or any other
weapon used for commission of the crime, coupled with the contradictions
and unnatural conduct of the eye witnesses PW-1 and PW-6, and the
inconsistencies in the two dying declarations, we believe that the
prosecution has not proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
accused are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt.
C
30. Accordingly, in the event of failure of the prosecution to prove
the case against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt, the accused
will be entitled to be acquitted from all the charges. In the result, we
pass the following order: -
D i. Criminal Appeal Nos. 2224-2225 of 2010 is allowed.
ii. The judgment passed by the High Court of judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 290 and 587 of 1981 dated
10.02.2010 and the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Bareilly
in Sessions Trial No. 420 of 1979 dated 31.01.1981 are quashed
E and set aside.
iii. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges, and their bail
bonds stand discharged. Pending interlocutory applications, if
any, stand disposed of in terms of the above.

F Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

G

H