Supreme Court of India
MURARI AND ORS.versusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1996 INSC 1266
- Decided
- 1 November 1996
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- KULDIP SINGH
Holding
The Court upheld the validity of the acquisition proceedings, rejected the appellants' contentions on delay, multiple declarations, and Article 31‑A, and affirmed that compensation is to be determined as per Section 23 with reference to the market value on the date of the Section 4 notification.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined the acquisition of several thousand acres of land for the planned development of Delhi under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where notifications under Section 4 were issued between 1959 and 1965 and declarations under Section 6 between 1966 and 1969, but awards were delayed until 1979‑83. The appellants challenged the proceedings on grounds of inordinate delay, vagueness of public purpose, multiple declarations under Section 6, applicability of the Delhi Development Act, and the relevance of Article 31‑A concerning compensation for land under personal cultivation. The Court held that the delay, partly caused by the land owners’ objections and stays, does not invalidate the acquisition, and that the 1967 amendment validating multiple declarations is lawful. It affirmed that compensation must be fixed as per Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act with reference to the market value on the date of the Section 4 notification, and that the Delhi Development Act does not preclude acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. The Court also ruled that the release of part of the land does not nullify the entire notification and dismissed the appeals, ordering additional compensation at 12% per annum from the date of the Ajlatoon judgment.
Issues considered
- The effect of the delay in making the award and taking possession on the validity of the acquisition proceedings.
- Whether more than one declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act can be made for land covered by a single Section 4 notification.
- The applicability of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and its Section 55 provisions to the acquisition for planned development of Delhi.
- The relevance of the second proviso to Article 31‑A of the Constitution in determining compensation for land under personal cultivation and within ceiling limits.
- Whether the release of certain parcels of land from acquisition invalidates the entire Section 4 notification.
- The proper basis for fixing compensation – market value on the date of notification versus date of award or possession.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 31, s. 31(2), s. 31(5), s. 31-A
- Delhi Development Act, 1957s. 15(1), s. 55
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 10, s. 11, s. 11-A, s. 23, s. 4, s. 48, s. 5-A, s. 6, s. 9
Subjects
Land acquisitionDelay in awardCompensation valuationSection 4 notificationSection 6 declarationDelhi Development ActArticle 31-APublic purposeRelease of landAmendment Validation Act
Judgment
MURARI AND ORS. A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
NOVEMBER I, 1996
[KULDIP SINGH AND FAIZAN UDDIN, JJ.] B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894--Sections 4 and 6-Acquisition of land
for planned development of Delhi-Delay in making of award and taking
over possession of /and-Whether acquisition proceedings can be quashed
Held no.
c
Sections 4 and 6-Sing/e notification under Section 4-Severa/
declarations under Section 6 relating to land notified under Section 4-
Permissibility of
Sections 11 (I) and 23 (])-Acquisition of land for planned D
development of Delhi-Land within ceiling limit and in personal
cultivation-Whether second proviso to Article 31-A applicable-
Constitution of India-Second proviso to Article ) 1-A.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 4-Acquisition of land for
planned development of Delhi-Whether the acquisition can be presumed E
to be under Delhi Development Act-Delhi Development Act, 1957-
Sections 55 and 15(1).
Land Acquisition Act, 1894--Section 4-Notification for acquisition
of several thousand acres of land-Some lands released from notification F
subsequently-Whether notification in respect of other lands also invalid-
Constitution of India-Article 14.
Interpretation ofStatute-Relevance ofreport ofthe Public Accounts
Committee-Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4 and 6. G
For the planned development of Delhi, several thousand acres
ofland was sought to be acquired and various notifications were issued
between 1959 and 1969 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
for the said purpose. Declarations under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act were made between 1966 and 1969. H
313
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A In 1957, Delhi Development Act was enacted which, inter alia,
under Section 55 provided for compulsory acquisition of land. Under
the Delhi Development Act, acquisitions could be made only in
accordance with the master plan and the zonal plan framed under
the Act. In 1962, a master plan of Delhi was brought into force.
B The acquisition proceedings were challenged by several persons
on the grounds of delay in issuance of declaration under Section 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act, vaguencess of the public purpose specified
in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and so on. The
matter came up before this Court and a Constitution Bench of this
Court dismissed the appeals of the landlords and upheld the
C acquisition proceedings. The judgment has been reported in Ajlatoon
and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, [197511 SCR 802.
The judgment in Aflatoon was pronounced on August 23, 1974.
However, the awards were not made till 1980-81 and in some cases till
D 1983. In Ram Chand v. Union of India reported in [1994) I SCC 44 this
court, while declining to quash the acquisition proceedings having
regard to larger public interest, held that there was no justification
for the delay in acquirng the land after the pronouncement of the
judgment in Ajlatoon and directed payment of additional amount of
compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum
E after the expiry of two years from the date of judgment in Aflatoon
till the date of making of the award by the Collector to be calculated
with reference to the market value of the land on the date of
notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
F The appellants challenged the acquisition proceedings by way
of several Writ Petitions before the High Court, some of which were
dismissed by the High Court. Against the orders of dismissal, appeals
were tiled before this Court. This Court also transferred all other
Writ Petitions pending before the High Court to this Court.
G The following contentions were raised by the appellants before
this Court.
I. The inordinate delay in completing the acquisition proceedings
and taking over possession of the land deprived the landlords of
H reasonable and real price of land as the land prices had gone up
MURARl v. U.O.l. 315
many times from the date of the notification under Section 4 of the A
Land Acquisition Act to the date of making of award and taking
possession of the properties. The purpose for which the land was sought
to be acquired, that is, for the planned development of Delhi, has lost
its value due to delay as the life span of the master plan for Delhi
itself was 20 years only.
B
The appellants relied upon the report of Public Accounts
Committee which stated that the Delhi Development Authority
acquired land from the land owners at a very low rate and sold
them at exorbitant rates thereby earning huge profits. It was also
contended that the judgment of the Court in Ram Chand's case had
internal inconsistency and cannot be taken as authority in all C
situations.
2. In State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, AIR (1966) SC 1593,
it was observed by this Court that even in a case of an emergency
there can at the most be only two notifications under Section 6
following one notification under Section 4 (1). Therefore, the D
Government could not issue more than one declaration under Section
6 of the Land Acquisition Act with regard to land comprised within
one notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act treating
Section 4 notification as a reservoir to make more than one
declarations under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. E
3. The land which is in the personal cultivation of land owners
and is within the ceiling limit could not be acquired without payment
of full market value in view of the second proviso of Article 31 A of
the Constitution of India and the decision of this Court in D.G.
Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1977) SC 915. F
4. Since the land was acquired for planned development of Delhi,
the provisions of Delhi Development Act, 1957 became applicable and
it should be presumed that lands covered by the notification issued
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were land designated for G
compulsory acquisition under Section 55(1) of the Delhi Development
Act, 1957. But as the lands were not acquired within six months of
the date of service of notice under Section 53(2) of the Delhi
Development Act, the lands would be released from acquisition after
the expiry of the period of 10 years of the coming into force of the
master plan. H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A 5. The Government had itself chosen to withdraw its notification
nnder Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of certain
lands. Therefore, not releasing the other lands from acquisition would
violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
6. II was not clear as to what public purpose lands marked in
B green in the Master Plan had been acquired.
7. Various super structures such as factories, sports complex etc.
had been constructed on the lands and demolition thereof will be a
national waste.
C Dismissing the appeals and the transfer petitions, this Court.
HELD: Re: Contention No. I
I. 1. There is no inconsistency in the decision of this Court in
D Ram Chand v. Union of India. After issuance of the notifications and
notices under Sections 9 and I 0 of the Land Acquisition Act, large
number of objections and Writ Petition were filed by the land owners
whose land was sought to be acquired challenging the validity of the
notification under Section 4 as well as the declaration· under Section
6 of the Land Acquisition Act in which interim orders of stay were
E passed by the High Court which resulted into considerable delay.
Thus the authorities alone were not responsible for the delay but the
land owners were equally responsible for the same. (326-F, 325-G)
1.2. The principle laid down in Ram Chand v. Union ofIndia has to
be applied even in those cases in which the possession is not taken. There
F is no reason to distinguish such cases from the application of the
principles laid down in Ram Chandv. Union ofIndia merely on the ground
that possession is not taken from some of the land owners. [326-G)
Ram Chand v. Union of India, [1994) 1 SCC 44, relied on.
G
Bihar State Housing Board v. Ram Behari Mahato, AIR (1988) SC
2134 and Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumat Johri, [1992] 1 SCC
329, cited.
1.3. The city of Delhi is confronted with serious housing problems
H due to enormous growth and ever expa.nding population. Consequently
MURAR!v. U.0.1. 317
Delhi development is a continuous and unending pro~ess for which A
no terminal point for the completion can be visualised. In these facts
and circumstances simply because there is a delay which in the facts
and circumstances of the present case was bound to occur, it cannot
be justifiably contended that the notifications issued were rendered
· ineffective. (334-D]
B
1.4. The report of the Public Accounts Committee is nothing
but recommendations for the necessary amendment in the Act. The
recommendations of any authority howsoever high it may be cannot
be enforced unless the same take the shape of law. [325-E]
2. In order to meet the situation created by the judgment in the C
case of State of MP. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma the President of India
promulgated the Land Acquisition (Amendment Validation) Act No.
13 of 1967 which permitted more than one award in respect of the
land which had been notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act. The validity of the aforesaid Amending Act has been upheld by
this Court in the case of Uday Ram Sharma v. Union of India, [1968] 3 D
SCR 41 which has been further reaffirmed by this Court in the case
of Ajlatoon. Therefore, the submission of the appellants could not be
accepted in vitw of the decision of this Court upholding the validity
of the said Amending Act. [327-E, H, 328-A-B].
E
Ajlatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Govern<>r of Delhi, [1975] 1 SCR 802;
Uday Ram Sharma v. Union of India, [1968] 3 SCR 41 and State of MP.
v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, AIR (1966) SC 1593, referred to.
3.1. Article 31-A of the Constitution of India has got nothing to
do with acquisition of land for building of a capital of a State. The F
land in the present case is not said to. be acquired for purposes of any
agrarian reforms and development but for the planned development
of Delhi. [331-B]
3.2. The Land Acquisition Act provides for payment of G
compensation in respect of acquisitions made, at the market value of
the land, and as such it is consistent with the second proviso to Article
31-A of the Constitution of India. In view of sub-section (1) of Section
II and sub-section (I) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, the
market value of such land is to be fixed with reference to the date of
the publication of notification under Sectior 4 (I) of the Land H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl 996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A Acquisition Act, irrespective of the dates on which declaration under
Section 6 or award under Section II of the Land Acquisition Act are
made or possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act. [331-F,GJ
D. G. Mahajan v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR (l 977) SC 915, referred
to.
B
Ajlatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, [1975] l SCR 802; P. V
Mudaliar v. Deputy Collector, [1965) l SCR 614; Nagpur Improvement
Trustv, Vithal Rao, [1973[ 1 SCC 500 and Vajravalu v. Sp/. Dy. Collector,
AIR (1965) SC 1017, relied on.
c 4.1. Neither Section 55 nor any other provisions of the Delhi
Development Act contain any inhibition of acquisition of the land for
the public purposes of planned development of Delhi under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 15(1) was enacted in
the Delhi Development Act which provides inter alia that if in the
D opinion of the Central Government, any land is required for the
purpose of development, or for any other purpose, under the Delhi
Development Act, the Central Government may acquire such land
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. [333-A,D]
4.2. The notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
E Act were issued between the period from 1959 to 1965 as a result of
which the application of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act was
locked up by virtue of acquisition process under the Land Acquisition
Act. This apart the land cannot be acquired within the period of six
months as contemplated in Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act
unless an agreement under Section II (2) of the Land Acquisition Act
F has reached because if the objections are filed under Section 5-A of
the Land Acquisition Act or in response to notice under Sections 9
and 10 the proceedings are bound to consume considerable time
beyond the prescribed period of six months contained in Section 55
of the Delhi Development Act. [333-B-CJ
G
4.3. For acquisition under the Delhi Development Act, it must
be shown that the particular land is designated in the master plan or
the zonal development plan which is the subject matter of acquisition.
In the present case, no zonal development plan were prepared with
regard to the lands. In the master plan there is no particularisation
H of any land which can be said to be required for compulsory
MURARI v. U.0.1. 319
acquisition under the Delhi Development Act. [332-H, 333-A) A
5. Assuming that there was release of certain lands from the
acquisition proceedings, the entire notification could not be rendered
invalid. The release of land from acq11isition proceedings being a
separate and subsequent act of the Collector, could not invalidate the
entire notification but would only invalidate the portion released, B
with the result that the original notification would be restored to its
position as it stood on the date of its notification. (336-E-F)
Chandra Bansi Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1984] 4
SCC 316; State of Maharashtra v. Uma Shankar Rajabhau & Ors. JT
(1995) 8 SC 508 and U.P. Jal Nigam v. Mis Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., C
relied on.
6. In the master Plan the land indicated in green colour is reserved
for recreational facilities. The recreational facilities are also part of
the planned development of Delhi and it cannot be disputed that
recreational amenities are also part of the life of the people and an D
important feature of a developed society. Therefore, no legitimate
objection can be made in the acquisition of such land which are shown
in green colour. (337-G]
7. There is no material to show that the structures and
constructions made on the land were made before the issuance of E
notification under Section 4 of the Act. It is also not clear whether such
constructions were raised with or without necessary sanction/approval
of the competent authority. No grievance therefore, can legitimately
be raised in that behalf as the same would be regarded as unauthorised
and made at the risk of the land owners.(337-H, 338-A] F
State of UP. v. Pista Devi, AIR (1986) SC 2025, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Transferred case Nos. 20-
3lof1995
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.3.95 of the Delhi High Court
in C.W.P. Nos. 2179.2178, 2140, 2139, 2197, 2084, 2138/83, 812/84,
2144, 2199/83, 810 and 81 l of 1984.
K.K. Venugopal, G.L. Sanghi, H.N. Salve, Soli J. Sorabjee, H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.Rt
A Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Kapil Sibal, P.N. Lekhi, Keshav Dayal, S.L. Watel,
N.N. Goswamy, Arun Jaitley, Ravinder Sethi, Sr. Advs., S.K. Mehta, Dhruv
Mehta, Fazlin Anam, Pramod Kumar, Gopal Singh, P.R. Seetaraman, K.V.
Mohan, B.S. Mor, Ms. Kusum Singh, M.S. Dahiya, K.B. Rohtagi, Ms.
Apama Rohtagi, Subash Mittal, M.K. Garg, Shri Narain, Sandeep Narain,
Yashwant Mathur, N.S. Vasisht, Pradeep Misra, Shiva Punjan Singh, B.B.
B Singh, Maninder Singh, Mrs. Pratibha Singh, Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal,
M.Malhotra,Devender Verma, Ms. Maldeep Sidhu, Ms. Naresh Bakshi,
B.S. Mann, M.A. Chinnaswamy, Atul Sharma, Vishnu Mehra, K.M.K.
Nair, Nidhesh Gupta, Ms. S. Janani, S.N. Mehta, S.C. Dhamija, H.S.
Tale, Pradeep Misra, A.K. Sikri, Ms. Madhu Sikri, S.M. Ashri, C.S. Ashri,
Dr. K.S. Sidhu, T.V.S.N. Chari, Nikki! Nayyar, R.K. Watel, Mukul Mudgal,
C Ms. Anu Mohla, Ms. Lalita Kaushik, Pramod Swamp, S.N. Sikka, Arvind
Minocha, Ms. Meenakshi Arora and Mukesh K. Giri, D.V. Padma Priya,
T.C. Sharma, Hemani Sharma, B.K. Prasad, V.B. Saharya, Vibha Makhija,
P.' Parmeswaran and Ms. A. Subhashini for the appearing parties.
The judgement of the Court was delivered by
D
FAIZAN UDDIN, J. Leave granted.
1. The appellants .in the appeals enumerated herein above had
challenged the acquisition proceedings in respect of their respective lands
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for purposes of Planned
E development of Delhi by filing various writ petitions before the High
Court of Delhi. The said writ petitions were dismissed by a full Bench of
the Delhi High Court by judgment dated December 14, 1995 against which
these appeals have been preferred by special leave. Various notifications
were issued from time to time under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 for acquisition of Land for the public purpose of planned
F development of Delhi. The said notification covered the land belonging to
the transfer petitioners, appellants and some other persons. The transfer
petitioners like others had also filed writ petitions in the High Court of
Delhi being writ petitions No. 2179, 2178, 2140, 2139, 2197, 2083, 2138,
2144, 2199/1983 and civil writ petitions no. 810-81211984 challenging
G the acquisition of their respective lands on various grounds. These writ '
petitions were pending in the High Court. However, during the course of
hearing of writ petition (c) No. 4677/1985 pending before this Court it
was felt necessary to transfer all the aforesaid writ petitions from Delhi
High Court to this Court. Consequently on the basis of Interlocutory
Applications No. 20 and 21of1995 in W.P. (c) No. 4677/1985 this Court
H by order dated December 14, 1994 directed that all the aforementioned
MURARI v. U.0.1. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.) 321
writ petitions be transferred to this court. This is how those writ petitions A
stand transferred to this court which have been registered as transfer cases
nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of 1995. As said earlier
besides the aforementioned transfer cases large number of writ petitions
filed by various persons were already pending before the High Court of
Delhi challenging the acquisition of their respective lands for the public
purpose of planned development of Delhi which were dismissed by a Full B
Bench of the High Court of Delhi by the impugned common judgment
dated December 14, 1995 against which the appeals referred to above
have been filed by special leave. Since the common question of law and
facts arise in all these transfer cases and appeals and therefore, they were
clubbed together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
c
2. The facts in brief leading to the transfer cases and the appeals may
be narrated thus:-
Various notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
(hereinafter referred to as the Act.) were issued from time to time between
1959 and 1965 for the acquisition of several thousand acres ofland for the D
common public project, namely, planned development of Delhi.
Declarations under Section 6 of the Act were also made between the years
1966 and 1969, while the making of the awards was deferred till the year
1979-80. The master plan of Delhi was brought into force in September
1962 giving the details of the facts and circumstances under which it became
imperative to have a development plan of the city of Delhi. It is common E
knowledge that after the partition of the country there was an enormous
and huge migration of population into India, mainly at Delhi which resulted
into a phenomenal growth of population of the settlers in Delhi besides
considerable growth of industrial and commercial activities, which gave
rise to various residential and occupational problems as a result of which F
various substandard structures, complexes and colonies came into being
without p1oper layouts and other essentials of life. No land was available
at reasonable price and within the reach of common man. It was in these
circumstances and with a view to give a proper shape to the city of Delhi,
the capital oflndia, the Central Government had set up a Delhi Development
Authority in 1955 and later in December 19"55 a Town Planning G
Organisation was set up under the administrative control of Delhi
Improvement Trust to monitor the planning development in the National
Capital Territory of Delhi. It was in this background that planned
development of Delhi was conceived of and to achieve that objective
various notifications under Section 4 of the Act were issued from time to
time between the period from 13.11.1959 and 21.1.1965 whereby large H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A chunks of land were sought to be acquired. After issuance of notices under
Section 9 and IO of the Act a spate of writ petitions were filed challenging
the acquisition proceedings on various grounds whose lands were sought
to be acquired, most of which were dismissed including the letters Patent
Appeal by the High Court by an earlier judgment dated April 29, '1972
vide l.L.R. 1971 (2) Delhi 31 i Aj/atoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi.
B
3. The said judgment was challenged in appeal before this Court
which was also dismissed by judgment dated August 23, 1974 by a
Constitution Bench of this Couri which is reported in [1975] (!) SCR
802= AIR (1974) SC 2077 Aj/atoon & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi in
which amongst others the contentions before this Court were raised that
C (I) the public purpose specified in the notification under Section 4 of the
Act was vague as neither master plan nor zonal plan was in existence on
the date of notification; (2) that there was inordinate delay in finalising
the acquisition proceedings by reason of which the land owners were
deprived of the benefits of the appreciation of price between the date of
notification under Section 4 and the date of taking possession of the
D property; (3) !hat provisions of Section 23 of the Act laying down that the
compensation should be determined with reference to the market value of
the land as on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act was
unreasonable restriction and affecting the fundamental rights of the land
owners. But this Court repelled all the contentions and dismissed the appeals
and the writ petitions by maintaining the validity of notices issued under
E Section 4 of the Act laying down that in the case of an acquisition oflarge
areas of land belonging to different persons, the specification of public
purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area for
it may be difficult to specify the particular purpose for which each and
every item of land comprised in the area is needed but unlike the case of
F an acquisition of a small area. The said Constitution Bench of this Court
dispelled the challenge of the acquisition proceedings on the ground of
deley by holding that the appellants of that case did not move the Court in
the matter even after the declaration under Section 6 was published in the
year 1966 but they preferred to approach the Court with their writ petitions
only in 1970 when notices under Section 9 were issued. This Court further
G took the view the the appellants of that case allowed the Government to
complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis of the notifications under
Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act which were available
to them at the time when the notifications were published and if their
objection is allowed to stand it would amount to putting a premium n
dilatory tactics adopted by them. On the question of delay in competing
H the acquisition proceedings the Constitution Bench in the aforementioned
MURARI v. U.0.1. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 323
case observed that about 600 objections were filed under Section 5-A of A
the Act and civil writ petitions were also filed challenging the validity of
the acquisition proceedings. Consequently the Government unnecessarily
had to wait for disposal of those objections and petitions before proceeding
further in the matter and, therefore, it was bound to result in delay. It was
further held that the Land Acquisition Act being a pre constitution Act its
provisions are not liable to be challenged on the ground that they are not B
in conformity with the requirement of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution.
The land owners, therefore, could not complain about the payment of
compensation computing with reference to the market value of the land as
on the date of notification under section 5 and Section 23 of the Act could
not be held to be bad, as such a challenge is precluded in view of Article
31 (5) of the Constitution. This Court further held that it is true that there C
could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the
provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force but
there was no inhibition in the acquisition ofland for planned development
of Delhi under the Act before the master plan was ready.
4. Before the High Court a number of controversies and objections D
were raised and the acquisition proceedings were sought to be challenged
on various grounds including challenge to the validity of the declarations
made from time to time under Section 6 of the Act using the notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act as the reservoir and that more than one
declarations under Section 6 of the Act were issued which according to the
transfer petitioners and the appellants were not permissible. A plea was E
raised that after the lapse ofa long period and inordinate delay in completing
the proceedings, the proceedings must result in the abandonment of the
acquisitions proceedings and no award on the basis of such proceedings
can validly be made. It was also contended that more than one award is
not contemplated by law in respect of the land, which was the subject F
matter of one declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. A further
contention raised before the High Court was with regard to the interpretation
of Section 55 of Delhi Development Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as
the Delhi Act). It was contended that some of the land owners had issued
notice to the Central Government under sub-section (I) of Section 55 of
the Delhi Act with regard to the requirement of the designated land under G
the master plan or a zonal development plan but the Central Government
failed to acquire the i?nd within a period of 6 months from the date of
receipt of the said notice as required by sub-section (2) of Section 55 and,
therefore, the said omission on the part of the authorities to complete the
acquisition proceedings within the stipulated time would result in
abandonment of the acquisition proceedings completely in respect of such H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A land to which Section 55 of Delhi Act was applicable. It was also contended
before the High Court by some of the transfer petitioners and appellants
that according to Article 31 A of the Constitution the appropriate value of
the land forming part of an estate which is sought lo be acquired would be
the market value prevailing at the time of award and not the value prevailing
on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act as contemplated is
B Section 23 thereof. The appellants of the civil writ petition no. 325/1982
(Ram Phal v. Union of India) before the High Court took the plea that the
Central Government had issued an order under Section 48 of the Land
Acquisition Act withdrawing the acquisition proceedings in respect of their
land and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the said land
be quashed. The High Court repelled all the aforementioned contentions
C as well as some other grounds on the basis of which the acquisition
proceedings were sought to be quashed and dismissed the writ petitions by
the common judgment as said earlier against which these appeals have
been preferred. To some extent same grounds are advanced by the learned
counsel appearing for the land owners in the transfer cases.
D 5. The main attack by learned counsel appearing for all the appellants
and those representing the transfer petitioners was advanced for quashing
the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay in completing the
acquisition proceedings. Mis Soli Sorabjee, Venugopal, P.N. Lekhi, Kapil
Sibal, Rajiv Dhavan, H.N. Salve, G.L. Sanghi learned senior counsel and
host of other advocates appearing for the appellants made a concerted
E effort to show that there was unreasonable' delay of about 15 to 20 years in
completing the acquisition proceedings by the respondents by reason of
which the land owners were deprived of the reasonable and real price of
their properties who have been offered only a pittance of compensation
after a long lapse of time while the prices have gone up many times high
in between the period from the date of notification under Section 4 to the
F date of making in the award and taking possession of the properties. It was
submitted that the main purpose in issuing the notifications under Section
4 of the Act during the period from 1959-1965 was to freeze the price of
the land causing great loss to the land owners. The decision rendered in
the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India, [1994) 1 SCC 44 was sought to
G be distinguished by contending that the same cannot stand as a bar in cases
for the reason that though the award had been made in the year 1980 but
no possession was taken from the land owners and, therefore, Ram ch and' s
case has no application to the facts of the present case. Shri Soli Sorabjee
further added that there is internal inconsistency in the decision of Ram
chand's case and the same cannot b~ taken to be an authority on the
H proposition in all situations but different principles have to be applied on
MURARI v. U.0.1. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.) 325
circumstances of each case when the fact situations is different. It was A
vehemently urged by all the learned advocates that the award of interest at
the rate of 12 per cent after the expiry of two years from August I 974 in
respect of the awards made prior to the amendment of Section 23 of the
Act would not mitigate the loss suffered by the land owners. The 18th
report of the public Accounts Committee of the 7the Lok Sabha on the
working of the Delhi Development Authority was also south to be pressed B
in service to support the aforementioned submissions in addition to various
decisions of this Court. It was stated that the Public Accounts Committee
in its report dated 26.4.1981 at page IOI stated in para 5.29 that it is well
known fact that the D.D.A. acquires land from the land owners at a very
low rate and after development sells it at exorbitant rates thereby earning
huge profits. It was stated that even where land is acquired for a public C
purpose, a reasonable compensation has to be paid but in cases where land
is acquired and later sold by auction or for commercial purposes, as has
happened in most cases, the Committee feels the land owners/ farmers
should not be compelled to part with their holdings at throw away price,
the Committee therefore recommended that the Land Acquisition Act may
be suitably amended so that the interest of the farmers are properly D
safeguarded.
6. After giving our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made
above, it may be stated that the report of the Public Accounts Committee
referred to above and on which great emphasis was laid is nothing but
recommendations for the necessary amendment in the Act. The E
recommendations of any authority howsoever high it may cannot be
enforced unless the same take the shape of law. The provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act as they stand today have to be interpreted and applied
in accordance with existing position of law and in its true sense of
perspective in respect of which this Court has made authoritative
pronouncements on the points raised and contended by the learned counsel. F
In the present case as stated earlier 11fter issuance of the notifications and
notices under Section 9 and 10 of the Act not only large number of
objections were filed by the land owners whose land was sought to be
acquired but a number of writ petitions were filed in the Delhi High Court
challenging the validity of the notification under Section 4 as well as the G
declaration under Section 6 in which interim orders of stay were passed
by the High Court which resulted into considerable delay. Thus the
authorities alone were not responsible for the delay but the land owners
were equally responsible for the same. In such circumstances and on
consideration of several decisions of this Court including those rendered
in the case of Bihar State Housing Board v. Ram Behari Mahato, AIR H
326 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A (1989) SC 2134; and Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v.Raj KumarJohri, [1992]
I SSC 329 this Court in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India, [I 994]
1 SCC 44 took the view that in any case there was no justification for the
authorities to make the award in 1980/1981/I 983 when the declaratior.
under Section 6 was made in 1966-69, but at the same time, in view of the
facts of delay caused by land owners themselves in approaching the Courts
B and the developments already made on the land• for public use, quashing
of acquisition proceedings would not be appropriate. But at the same time
in the said decision this Court also took the view that the land owners
alone were not responsible for the entire delay that was caused in
completing the acquisition ]Jroceedings. This Court in the said decision
pointed out that all those writ petitions were dismissed by this Court on
C August 23, 1974 in the case of Ajlatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi yet no
effective steps were taken by the respondents till 1980-81 and in some
cases even till 1983 for which the respondents could give no justification
for that delay on their part in completing the acquisition proceedings even
after the judgment of this Court in Aflatoon's case. This court having
regard to the fact that the Delhi Administration and Delhi Development
D Authority after taking possession of the lands various developments have
been made and third party interest have also been created and, therefore,
having regard to the larger public interest declined to quash the acquisition
proceedings on the ground of delay but at the same time having regard to
the interest of the land owners who were likely to suffer loss in rating the
E price of the land with reference to the date of notification under Section 4,
directed payment of an additional amount of compensation to be calculated
at the rate of 12 percent per annum after expire of two years from August
23, I 974, the date of judgment of this Court in Ajlatoon 's case (supra) till
the date of the making of the awards by the Collector to be calculated with
reference to the market value of the lands in question on the date of
F notification under Section 4 (I) of the Act. We do not find any inconsistency
in the said decision, (Ram Chand's case) and find ourselves in respectful
agreement to the view taken by this Court in the case of Rum Chand
(supra). The same principle has to be applied in those cases in which the
possession is not taken and there is no reason to distinguish such cases
G from the application of the principles laid down in Ram Chand's case
merely on the ground that possession is not taken from some of the land
owners. Jn this connection the fact could not be lost sight of that the land
owners have enjoyed possession all these years and have taken the benefit
of the usfruct and other advantages out of the said land and, therefore,
they stand even in an advantageous position than those land owners from
H whom the possession was taken earlier.
MURARI v. U.O.l. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 327
7. It was then contended that it was not open to the Government to A
issue more than one declaration under Section 6 of the Act with regard to
the land comprised within one notification under Section 4 of the Act. In
other words it was submitted that the notification under Section 4 cannot
be treated as reservoir from which land could be taken from time to time
and declaration one after the other may be made under Section 6 of the
Act which is not permissible under the Act and, therefore, the acquisition B
proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground. In this connection
we feel it necessary to mention some of the facts and circumstances which
are relevant to the submissions made abov~ and to see whether the
submissions have any merit or not to the facts and circumstances of the
present case. It may be stated that similar question was raised before this
Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, AIR (1966) C
SC 1593 decided by a Bench comprised of three learned Judges of this
Court. The majority view taken was that the provisions in Section 17 (4)
of the Act do not lead to the conclusion that Section 6 of the Act
contemplates successive notification following the notifications made under
Section 4 of the Act. It was held that the intention of Section 4, 5-A and 6
of the Act was not to have successive declarations under Section 6. It was D
observed that even in a case of emergency there can at the most be only
two notifications under Section 6 following one notification under Section
4(1), one relating to the land which is covered by S. 17(1), and the other
relating to the land which is not covered by Section 17(1), provided both
kinds of land are notified by one notification under Section 4(1) of the
Act. In order to meet the situation created by the judgment in the case of E
Vishnu Prasad Sharma (supra) the President of India promulgated the
Land Acquisition (Amendment Validation) Act No. 13of1967, Section 2
of which purported to amend Section 5-A of the Principal Act permitting
more than one award in respect of the land which had been notified under
Section 4 of the Act; Section 3 of the said amendment Act purported to
amend Section 6 of the Principal Act by empowering different declaration F
to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels ofland covered
by the same notification made under Section 4 (1) irrespective of whether
one report or the different reports had been made under sub-Section 2 of
Section 5-A of the Principal Act. Further Section 4 of the Amendment
Xct, 1967 purported to Validate all acquisitions ofland made or purported G
to have been made under the Principal Act before the commencement of
the ordinance dated January 20, 1967, notwithstanding that more than one
declaration under Section 6 had been made in pursuance of the same
notification under Section 4(1) and notwithstanding the judgment decree
or order ofany Court to the contrary. The validity of the aforesaid Amending
Act has been upheld by this Court in the case of Uday Ram Sharma v. H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP.8 S.C.R.
A Union of India, [1968] 3 SCR 41 = AIR (1968) SC .1138 which has been
further reaffirmed by this Court in the case of Aflatoon (supra) Some of
the learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the
aforementioned Amending Act was promulgated with a view to over reach
the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Vishnu Prasad Sharma
but such a submission could not be accepted in view of the decision of this
B Court referred to above upholding the validity of the said Amending Act.
8. Dr. Siddhu learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the
civil appeal arising out of SLP (c) No. 2669/1978 as well as some other
counsel contended that the land in village Masodpur sought to be acquired
is in personal cultivation of the land owner which is a small area and by
C virtue of the provisions contained in the second proviso of Article 31-A of
the Constitution it will not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion
of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to the land owner
under any law for the ·time being in force. It was also asserted that the
market price of the land prevailing on the data of taking over the possession
of the land should be ascertained and paid to the land owner and not.the
D price prevailing on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act.
Reliance was placed on the decision rendered by this Court in the case of
D.G. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1977) SC 915 wherein it
has been observed that the second proviso of Article 31-A confers a right
and this right is higher than the one under clause (2) of Articles 31 on a
person in respect of such portion of land under his personal cultivation as
E is within the ceiling limit applicable to him and if the Act by creating an
artificial concept of a family unit and fixing ceiling on holding of
agricultural land by such family unit, enables land within the ceiling limit
to be acquired without payment of full market value, it would be taking
away or abridging the right conferred by the second proviso. Thus even
F according to this decision the land within the ceiling limit may be acquired
but on payment of the full market value. The question, therefore, arises
whether the market value prevailing on the date of the award or taking of
possession of the land or the one with reference to the date of notification
made under Section 4(1) of the Act is payable as the just and proper
compensation.
G
9. In the present case it may be noted that the provisions of sub-
section (1) of Section 23 of the Act provide the payment of the
compensation of such land, building or structure prevailing on the date of
publication of the notification under sub-Section (I) of Section 4, the
validity of which was upheld by this Court in the case of Aflatoon (supra)
H wherein it was observed at page 809-F.G. of the report as under:
. MURARI v. U.O.l. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 329
"The Land Acquisition Act is a pre-Constitution Act. Its A
provisions are not, therefore, liable to be challenged on the
ground that they are not in conformity with the requirement
of article 31 (2). What the appellants and writ petitioners
complain is that their properties were acquired by paying
them compensation computed with reference to the market
value of the land as on the date of the notification under S. 4 B
and that S. 23 is, therefore, bad. This, in substance, is nothing
but a challenge to the adequacy of compensation. Such a
challenge is precluded by reason of Article 31 (5). In other
words, the appellants and the writ petitioners cannot challenge
the validity ofS. 23-on the ground that compensation payable
under its provisions is in any way inadequate, because, such C
a challenge would fly in the face of Article 31 (5)."
That being so, the argument advanced by the learned counsel could
~ot be accepted. Here a reference may also be made to the decision in the
case of P. V. Mudaliar v. Deputy Collector, [1965] 1 SCR 614 (621-H) in D
which it has been observed as under:
"Under Article 31(2) and (2A) of the Constitution a State is
prohibited from making a law for acquiring land unless it is
for a public purpose and unless it fixes the amount of
compensation or specifies the principles for determining the E
amount of compensation. But Article 3 I-A lifts the ban to
enable the State to implement the pressing agrarian reforms.
The said object of the Constitution is implicit in Article 31-
A. If the argument of the respondents be accepted, it would
enable the State to acquire the lands of citizens without
reference to any agrarian reform in derogation of their F
fundamental rights without payment of compensation and
thus deprive Article (31 (2) practically of its content. If the
intention of the Parliament was to make Article 31 (2) a
dead letter it would have clearly expressed it intention. This
Court cannot by interpretation enlarge the scope of Article G
31-A. On the other hand the Article, as pointed out by us
earlier, by necessary implication, is confined only to agrarian
reforms. Therefore, we held that Article 31-A would apply
only to a law made for acquisition by the State ofany "estate"
or any rights therein or for extinquishment or modification of
such rights ifsuch acquisition, extinguishment or modification H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A is connected with agrarian reform. "
(Emphasis supplied)
In the same report it has been further observed it page 631-D as
under:
B
"One of the elements that should properly be taken into
account in fixing the compensation is omitted: it results in
the inadequacy of the compensation but that in itself does
not constitute fraud on power, as we have explained earlier.
We, therefore, hold that the Amending Act does not offend
c Article 31 (2) of the Constitution."
A reference may also be made to the decision n the case of Nagpur
Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, [1973) 1 SCC page 500 para 35 which
reads as under :
D "The learned counsel was not able to satisfy us that the above
case was distinguishable. We are of the opinion that the case
was rightly decided and must govern this case. In this view
of the matter, it is not necessary to refer to all the cases
referred to us at the Bar. We may mention that Mr. Tarkunde
also placed reliance on Article 3l(A) (1) (a) of the
E constitution. It is now well settled that Article 3l(a) (!)(a)
has relevance to agrarian reforms and development. It has
nothing to do with acquisition ofland for building ofa capital
of a state."
F 10. Further, a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Vajrava/u
v. Sp. Dy. Collector, -AIR (1965) SC 1017 observed in para 14 page 1023
Col. II as under :
•
"A scrutiny of the amended Article discloses that it accepted
the meaning of the expressions "compensation" and
G "principles" as defined by this Court in Mrs. Bela Banerjee 's
case, [1954) SCR 558=AIR(l954) SC 170. It may be recalled
that this. Court in the said expressions and then stated whether
the principles laid down take into account all the elements
which make up the true value of the properly appropriated
and exclude matters which are to be neglected, is a justiciable
H issue to be adjudicated by the Court. Under the amended
MURARI v. U.O.l. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 331
Article, the law fixing the amount of compensation or laying A
down the principles governing the said fixation cannot be
questioned in any court on the ground th~t the compensation
provided by that law was inadequate."
10. It is thus clear from these decisions that Article 3 IA has got
nothing to do with acquisition of land for building of a capital of a State. B
In the present case before us also the land is not said to be acquired for
purposes of any agrarian reforms and development but for the planned
development of Delhi and that being so the argument advanced by the
learned counsel in this behalf that the land belonging to a small agriculturist
within ceiling limit cannot be acquired or the value of the land of the
agriculturists sought to be acquired should be determined on the price C
value prevailing on the date of award or taking of possession and not on
the value prevailing on the date of notification under Section 4(1) cannot
be accepted. In the case of Ram Chand (supra) also in para 4 of the report
this Court while dealing with Article 31-A took the view that the
Constitution ensures under the second proviso to Article 31-A that where
any law makes provision for the acquisition by the State, of land held by D
a person, under his personal cultivation, within the ceiling limit, it shall
not be lawful for the state to acquire any portion of such land "unless the
law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure provides
for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the"
market value thereof'. It has been further observed in the same para that
by Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, clause (f) of Article E
19 and Article 31 have been deleted and, as such, to hold property is no
more a fundamental right. But still the mandate under second proviso to
Article 31-A continues regarding payment of market value in respect of
the land, the subject matter of acquisition, and that the Act provides for
payment of compensation in respect of the acquisition made, at the market
value of the land, as such it is consistent with the second proviso to Article F
31-A. But in view of sub-section (l) ofSection.11 and sub-section (1) of
Section 23 the market value of such land is to be fixed with reference to
the date of the publication of notification under Section 4, sub-section
(I), irrespective of the dates on which declaration under Section 6 or
award under Section 11 are made or possession is taken under Section 16 G
of the Act. In this view of the matter the contentions raised with regard to
Article 31-A could not be accepted and are accordingly rejected. The
acquisition proceedings, therefore, could not be quashed on the account
also.
11. Dr. Siddhu learned counsel appearing for the appellants in appeal H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A arising out of SLP (C) No. 2669/1996 further submitted that Khasra No.
364/21 was not notified under Section 6 of the Act as the land to be
acquired yet an award has been made in respect thereto also which deserves
to be quashed to the extent of the land of the said Khasra No. He submitted
that forgery was committed by changing the Khasra No. 264/21 into Khasra
No. 364/21 as in the gazette notification the land notified was khasra no.
B 264/21 and not khasra no. 364/21. This contention of the learned counsel
may be disposed of without going into the merits of the submissions in
view of the fact that the learned counsel himself admitted that a review
against the Said mistake is pending into the High Court itself.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants as well as the counsel appearing
C of the transfer petitioners also strenuously urged with great force that the
land was sought to be acquired for the planned development of Delhi and,
therefore, the provisions of Delhi Development Act, 1957 became applicable
to such acquisition ofland and the acquisition of land can be made only in
accordance with master plan and zonal plans to be framed under the Delhi
Development Act. It was contended that on the issuance of the notification
D under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of the land for planned
development of Delhi it has to be inferred that the land which was notified
under Section 4 of the Act for planned development of Delhi is the land
designated for compulsor acquisition within the meaning of sub-Section
(I) of Section 55 of the Delhi Act but as the land sought to be acquired
was not so acquired within the period of six months from the date of
E service of notice under sub-section (2) of Section 55 of the said Act by the
land owners, therefore, after the expiry of the period of 10 years of the
coming into force of the master plan, the land sought to be acquired went
out of the compulsory acquisition and the same would be deemed to have
been released from acquisition. It was submitted that sub-section (2) of
Section 55 provides that the owner of the land may serve on the Central
F Government a notice requiring his interest in the land to be acquired and
ifthe Central Government fails to acquire the land within the period of six .
months the same shall have the effect as ifthe land were not required to be
kept as an open space or unbuilt or were not designated as subject to
compulsory acquisition. It was asserted that since some of the land owners
G whose land was sought to be acquired had given such notice to the Central
Government but the Central Government did not acquire the land with the
specified period and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings must be quashed
on that account. After a careful consideration of the submissions made
above, we are of the view that there is absolutely no merit in this contention.
It must be shown that the particular land is designated in the master plan
H or zonal development plan which is the subject matter of acquisition.
MURARI v. U.0.1. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 333
13. It may be pointed out that in the present case before us no zonal A
development plans were prepared with regard to the said land. In the
master plan there is no particularisation of any land which can be said to
be required for compulsory acquisition under the Delhi Act. Neither Section
55 nor any other provisions of the Delhi Act contain any inhibition for
acquisition of the land for the public purposes of planned development of
Delhi under the provisions of the land Acquisition Act. As said earlier, the B
notifications under Section 4 of the Act were already issued between the
period from 1959 to 1965 as a result of which the appjication of Section
55 of the Delhi Act was locked up by virtue of acquisition process under
the Land Acquisition Act. This apart the land cannot be acquired within
the period of six months as contemplated in Section 55 of the Delhi Act
unless an agreement under Section 11 (2) of the Act has reached because if C
the objections are filed under Section 5-A or in response to notice under
·section 9 and I 0 the proceedings are bound to consume considerable time
beyond the prescribed limit of six months contained in Section 55 of the
Delhi Act. It is for these reasons that Section 15(1) was enacted in the
Delhi Act which provides interalia that if in the opinion of the Central
Government, any land is required for the purpose of development, or for D
any other purpose, under the said Act, (Delhi Act) the Central Government
may acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. It is thus distinctly clear that despite the enforcement of the Delhi
Development Act, 1957 Section 15( I) thereof lays down that the land for
the purposes of development may be acquired under the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act. This contention was also advanced before the High E
Court. The Full Bench of the High Court after considering the Arguments
at length and taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into
consideration recorded the following conclusion :
"Assuming thatthe argument advanced by Mr. Lekhi is correct
that once the land is notified for compulsory acquisition in F
Section 4 and _6 of the Land Acquisition Act, it would be
deemed to have been so designated in the master plan, even
then the provisions of Section 55 would not come into force
till the zonal development plan is also prepared and thereafter
I 0 years period had elapsed and the land so designated is not G
acquired within the stipulated period after service of notice,
only in that situation, it may be possible to say that the land
has gone out of the expression of compulsory acquisition
used in Section 55 of the Act. It is not possible to agree with
the contentions that the land is deemed to be designated for
the purpose of master plan, it would not be deemed to be H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A designated by same inference for the purpose of zonal
development plan."
We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High
Court referred to above. Thus the Argument based on the provision of
Section 55 (1) and (2) of the Delhi Act have not merit and, therefore, the
B same cannot be sustained.
14. A halfhearted argument was also advanced to the effect that the
life span of the master plan was 20 years but the acquisition proceedings
are not yet complete and, therefore the notifications issued for acquisition
of the land for planned development of Delhi have lost their value and the
C acquisition proceedings should be quashed. This argument is also without
any merit for the simple reason that Delhi is the capital of the largest
democratic country of the world. There is inflow of more than a lacs of
people every year to this city. It is ever expanding cosmopolitan
commercial and industrial city with multifarious national and international
D activities. The city of Delhi is confronted with serious housing problems
due to enormous growth and ever expanding population. Consequently
Delhi Development is a continuous unending proce~s for which no terminal
point for the completion of such process can be visualised. In these facts
and circumstances simply because there is a delay which in the facts and
circumstances of the present case was bound to occur, it cannot justifiably
E contended that the notifications issued were rendered ineffective. As pointed
out by the High Court and in our opinion rightly so that large tracks of
land was sought to be acquired for purpose of constructing huge residential
colonies and commercial areas and, therefore, the delay was bound to
occur in completing the acquisition proceedings. However the legislature
appears to have taken notice of such delays and it was for these reasons
F that it came to the rescue ofland owners by amending the Land Acquisition
Act by introducing Section 11-A in the Act providing the completion of
the acquisition proceedings within the time frame stipulated therein in
order to save the land owners from undue loss with regard to the price of
land sought to be acquired compulsorily.
G
15. Shri P.N. Lekhi, Shri Rajiv Dhavan and various other counsel
appearing for the appellants contended that the Government by its order
dated August 4, 1995 had withdrawn its notification issued under Section
4 of the Act involving certain areas ofland sought to be acquired in exercise
of its power under Section 48 of the Act and therefore, it was submitted
H that if one part of the land is released for the public purpose the whole
MURARI v. U.0.1. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 335
land covered under the notification will stand released as the Government A
cannot give a differential treatment which will be hit by the principles
enunciated in Article 14 of the Constitution. As against this the learned
counsel for the respondents refuted the allegation with regard to the
withdrawal of certain land from the acquisition for the planned development
of the city of Delhi. Alternatively it was submitted that the withdrawal of
certain land included in the notification under Section 4 could be effected B
only by denotifying the release and since there is no such notification
denotifying the release it could not be regarded as a release within the
meaning of Section 48 of the Act. In other words Section 48 of the Act
may be applied only when the release is published in the official gazette in
the same manner as the notification under Section 4 and declaration under
Section 6 of the Act are published in view of the provisions contained in C
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and since no such notifcations was
published in the official gazette mere infonnation given with regard to the
withdrawal from acquisi.tion will be of no consequence. Various decisions
were cited for and against by the parties at the Bar but we do not propose
to burden this judgment by citing them all except those which are most
relevant on the point in controversy. D
16. It may be noticed that sub-Section(!) of Section 48 of the Act
contemplates that except in the case provided for in Section 36, the
Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any
land of which possession has not been taken. This Section thus confers
power on the Government to withdraw any land from the acquisition but E
such power can be exercised only before taking the possession of the land
sought to be acquired. In this connection before we proceed to examine
the relevant decisions it would be appropriate to refer to the observations
made by the Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment with
regard to this controversy. The original record in which the Minister F
concerned is said to have passed the order for withdrawal was produced
before the High Court which was perused by the Full Bench. The photostat
copies of the notings were also placed on record of the High Court and
after the perusal of the original record the Full Bench found that in fact no
order has been made by the Minister concerned which may be said to be
an order for withdrawal of acquisition. The High Court observed that G
mere communication of the misconstrued orders by the officials would
not have the effect of an order of the Government withdrawing from
acquisition. The High Court on a careful perusal of the original file and
the noting contained therein and approved by the Minister came to the
definite conclusion that the Minister had directed that the matter be taken
up with the N.C.T. Delhi for denotifying and for release of the land H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A immediately which was indicative of the fact that the Minister had not
himself passed the order for releasing the land from acquisition and the
release from acquisition was left to the decision ofN.C.T. Delhi and since
N.C.T. Delhi did not give its consent the release of the said land was not
denotified. The High Court, therefore, took the view that the
communication sent to the appellants concerned purporting to be an order
B under Section 48 of the Act is invalid and the land acquisition proceedings
cannot be quashed on the basis of such invalid communication. In our
opinion the view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be erroneous
calling for any interference by this Court.
17. Here it would be relevant to refer to some of the decisions of this
C Court on the question of release of the land under Section 48 and its
validity under the law. In the case of Chandra Bansi Singh & Ors. v. State
of Bihar & Ors., [1984] 4 SCC page 316 this Court observed that perhaps
the appellants wanted to persuade this Court to strike down the entire
notification so that when a fresh notification is issued they may be able to
get a higher compensation in view of sudden spurt and rise in the price of
D land and other commodities in between the period when the acquisition
was made and when the actual possession was taken. This Court took the
view that it was not acceptable to uphold the aforesaid process ofreasoning.
The release was declared to be bad as a result of which the entire notification
-
issued under Section 4 would be deemed to be valid and the land specially
belonging to the land owner would form part of the acquisition. It has
E been further held that the release being a separate and subsequent act of
the Collector, could not invalidate the entire notification but would only
invalidate the portion released, with the result that the original notification
would be restored to its position as it stood on the date of its notification.
Assuming therefore, that there was release of certain areas ofland belonging
to certain land owners, the entire notification could not be rendered invalid.
F Further this Court in recent decision rendered in State of Maharashtra v.
Uma Shankar Rajabhau & Ors., JT (1995) 8 SC 508 took the view in
para 3 of the report as follows :
"It is brought to our notice that after the notification was
G quashed by the High Court, no further steps were taken by
the Government . It is not necessary since it is being
challenged in the appeal in respect of these three plots. A
submission was made that the Corporation does not need
these three plots of land for the employees. So long as there
is no notification published under Section 48 (I) of the Act
H withdrawing from the acquisition, the Court cannot take notice
MURARI v. U.0.1. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.] 337
of any subsequent disinclination on the part of the A
beneficiary."
18. The same view was expressed by this Court in yet another decision
in the case of UP. Jal Nigam v. Mis. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. In this
view of the matter even if we assume that there was an order for release of
certain land from the acquisition the same could not be given effect to in B
the absence of a notification denotifying the acquisition of land.
19. Some of the learned counsel for the appellants also submitted
that even the land shown in the green colour in the master plan which has
been sought to be acquired but it is not understood as to for what purpose
the said land is being acquired. It was also submitted that there are large C
number of structures and complexes raised on the land sought to be acquired
in which schools, sports and other recreational activities are going on.
Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil
Appeal arising out ofSLP (c) No. 5771/1996 and Civil Appeal arising out
of SLP (C) NO. 740/1996 as well as other advocates appearing for some
other appellants submitted that there exist factories, workshops, godowns D
and MCD School besides residential houses and quarters over the land
belonging to the appellant Partap Singh situated at Roshanara Road, Subzi
Mandi, Delhi which has been acquired and that there exist modern and
well developed farm house with modern facilities in the land belonging to
the appellant Rohsanara Begum, where there are a good number of other
structures and fruit bearing trees. Consequently these areas do not require E
further development as they are already developed and, therefore, the said
land should be released from acquisition. Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel
appearing for some of the appellants urged that the concerned appellant
had developed a sports complex providing modern amenities therein and
if the same is demolished there would be great national waste. It was, F
therefore, urged that such Complexes and built up areas should be deleted
from the acquisition. It may be pointed out that in the ml!Ster plan the land
indicated in green colour is reserved for recreational facilities. The
recreational facilities are also part of the planned development of Delhi
and it cannot be disputed that recreational amenities are also part of the
life of the people and an important feature of a developed society. Therefore, G
no legitimate objection can be made in the acquisition of such land which
are shown in green colour. So far as the structures and constructions made
on the land are concerned there is no material to show that they were made
before the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. It is also not
clear whetlier such constructions were raised with or without necessary
sanction/approval of the competent authority. No grievance therefore can H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A legitimately be raised in that behalf as the same would be regarded as
unauthorised and made at the risk of the land owners. Here a reference of
a decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Pista Devi, AIR
( 1986) SC 2025 may be made with advantage, para 7 of which reads as
under:-
B "It was next contended that in the large extent of land
acquired which was about 412 acres there were some buildings
here and there and so the acquisition of these parts of the
land on which buildings were situated was unjustified since
these portions were not either waste to or arable lands which
could be dealt with under S. 17(1) of he Act. This contention
c has not been considered by the High Court. We do not,
however, find any substance in it. The Government was not
acquiring any property which was substantially covered by
buildings. It acquired about 412 acres of land on the outskirts
of Meerut city which was described as arable land by the
Collector. It may be true that here and there there were a few
D superstructures. In a case of this nature where a large extent
of land is being acquired for planned development of the
urban area it would not be proper to leave the small portions
over which some superstructures have been constructed out
of the development scheme. In such a situations where there
is real urgency it would be difficult to apply S. 5-A of the
E Act in the case of few bits of land on which some structures
are standing and to exempt the rest of the property from its
application.
Jn the present case also a large extent of land measuring thousands
F of acres has been acquired and, therefore, it would not be proper to leave
out some small portions here and there over which some structures are
said to be constructed out of the planned development of Delhi. We may,
however add here that during the cause of the arguments Shri Goswami
learned counsel appearing for the respondents-State made a statement that
the Government will consider each of the structures and take a decision in
G that respect. We, therefore, leave this issue to the discretion of the
respondent.
20. After overall consideration of the issues involved in these transfer
cases and the appeals we find no ground to take a different view then the
one taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Consequently,
H the acquisition proceedings could not be quashed on any grounds. We also
MURARlv. U.O.i.[FAIZANUDDIN,J.] 339
find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court A
in the case of Ram Chand (supra). Consequently, the appeals fail and are
hereby dismissed. The transfer cases are allowed in terms of the order
made in the case of Ram Chand (supra) directing that the tranfer petitioners
and the appellants shall be paid an additional amount of compensation to
be calculated at the rate of 12 percent per annum, after the expiry of two
years from the date of decision of Aj/atoon 's case i.e. August 23, 1974 till B
the date of making of the awards by the Collector, to be calculated with
reference to the market value of the land in question on the date of
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances
of the case we make no order as to costs.
B.K.M. Appeal petition dismissed. C
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