NAGAMMA @ NAGARATHNA & ORS.versusTHE STATE OF KARNATAKA

                [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1239 : 2025 INSC 1135

                   Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors.
                                v.
                      The State of Karnataka
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 425 of 2014)
                             22 September 2025
           [K.V. Viswanathan and K. Vinod Chandran,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       In the instant case, whether the motive projected and the crime has
       been proved and whether the circumstances lead to the culpability
       of the accused.

                                  Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 –
       Allegation that a police man-A1 took loan from another police
       man-victim – The victim-deceased made persistent demands
       for repayment of the loan – This led to A2, the wife of A1,
       calling the victim to her home on the pretext of repaying the
       debt – At night, victim was made immobile by throwing chili
       powder on his face and hacked to death with two choppers
       wielded by the accused – A2 then, after sunrise, went directly
       to the police station and confessed to the SHO about the
       crime and apprised him of the presence of the dead body
       in her house – A police constable made enquiries and later
       an inquest was done, after which the body was taken to
       the hospital – Trial Court acquitted A-1 and A-2 to A-4 were
       convicted u/s. 302 – The High Court affirmed the findings of
       the Trial Court – Correctness:
       Held: 1. There is no cogent, credible evidence that the body was
       at the house of A-1 & 2 – The extra judicial confessions and the
       context in which they were made, within the police station cannot
       at all be relied upon – The extra judicial confessions, said to have
       been made by A2 in the present case, were all within the police
       station, where she is said to have voluntarily come, to confess
       about the murder – The other witnesses to whom the extra judicial
       confession was made, that too inside the police station, in any
       case turned hostile – As far as recovery of chopper MO-16 on the

* Author
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    confession statement is concerned, the I.O though has stated about
    the disclosure statement of both A3 and A4, he does not specify
    whether it is simultaneous or one after the other – It is also not
    clear; if the disclosure is at different points of time, in which event,
    who made the first disclosure – PW-2 and PW-3, the witnesses of
    recovery of MO16 turned hostile – Further, it also has to be noticed
    that but for the recovery there is nothing to indicate the culpability of
    A3 and A4 through forensic evidence to link the recovered weapon
    to the crime proper – The fact that confessions were made by both
    the accused and the recovery was made from one of the accused,
    A4, leading the police to the spot would restrain this Court from
    treating the recovery as an inculpating circumstance against A3 or
    A4, especially when the confession is taken simultaneously from
    both the accused – This Court is of the opinion that in the present
    case there can be no reliance placed on the recovery based on
    the sketchy evidence adduced – PW-20 and PW-22 eyewitnesses
    turned completely hostile – The prosecution case itself was that the
    deceased was summoned to the house of A-1 & 2, for which there
    is no evidence adduced nor does PW-18, the wife speaks of the
    deceased having left the house on receiving such a call – Further it
    is the case of the prosecution that the deceased reached the house
    of the accused at around 10 pm while the death was confirmed as
    having occurred at 2 pm – What happened in the interregnum is not
    clear, there is a suspicion as to the genesis and origin of the crime
    which compounds the reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution
    case – The motive projected and the crime itself has not at all been
    proved and there is no circumstance leading to the culpability of the
    accused – This Court is of considered opinion that the conviction
    cannot be sustained. [Paras 22, 23, 25, 28, 31, 34, 35]
    Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Disclosure statements taken from
    one or more persons in police custody – Recovery u/s. 27 –
    Fact discovered. [Paras 27-30]

    Evidence Act, 1872 – s.25 and s.26 – Confession to a Police
    Officer:
    Held: Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates that no confession
    made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused
    of any offence and Section 26 also restricts any confession by a
    person in the custody of a police officer from being proved against
    him unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
    [Para 24]
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       Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors. v. The State of Karnataka


                             Case Law Cited
     Santosh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023] 7 SCR 719 : (2023) 19
     SCC 321; State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [1961] 1 SCR 14 :
     1960 SCC OnLine SC 8 – relied on.
     State of West Bengal v. Vindu Lachmandas Sakhrani alias Deru,
     AIR 1994 SC 772; Suraj Pal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1995
     SC 419; Babu v. State of Kerala [2010] 9 SCR 1039 : (2010) 9
     SCC 189; Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra [2021]
     2 SCR 617 : (2021) 5 SCC 626; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot
     Sandhu @ Afsan Guru [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2005) 11 SCC
     600; Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra [2017] 1 SCR 330
     : (2017) 3 SCC 760; Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra
     [1976] 1 SCR 715 : (1976) 1 SCC 828; Manoj Kumar Soni v.
     State of M.P. [2023] 11 SCR 246 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984
     – referred to.

                               List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.

                            List of Keywords
     Extra judicial confessions; Cogent evidence; Credible evidence;
     Circumstantial evidence; Complete chain of circumstances;
     Culpability of accused; Motive projected; Section 27 of Evidence
     Act, 1872; Disclosure statements; Recovery of articles; Recovery
     under section 27 of Evidence Act, 1872; Recovered weapon.

                           Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     425 of 2014
     From the Judgment and Order dated 13.02.2013 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRA No. 50 of 2009

                        Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellants:
     C.B. Gururaj, Prakash Ranjan Nayak.
     Advs. for the Respondent:
     Nishanth Patil, A.A.G., Sanchit Garga, Arijit Dey, Awanish Gupta.
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                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     K. Vinod Chandran, J.

1.   The default in repayment of a loan led to a crime, most foul, of murder,
     is the prosecution case. The allegation was that a police man, the 1st
     accused, took a loan from another police man, the deceased, who
     was killed by the wife, brother and brother-in-law of the former; at his
     instigation. The deceased, the driver of a Superintendent of Police
     made persistent demands for repayment of the loan. This led to A2,
     the wife of A1, calling the deceased to her home on the pretext of
     repaying the debt, on the night of 10.03.2006. At around 2am on
     the next day the victim was made immobile by throwing chili powder
     on his face and hacked to death with two choppers wielded by the
     accused. A2 then, after sunrise, went directly to the police station
     and confessed to the SHO about the crime and apprised him of the
     presence of the dead body in her house. The SHO deputed a police
     constable to make enquiries and later an inquest was done by PW-24
     at the house of A2, after which the body was taken to the hospital.
2.   Before the trial court, the prosecution examined 24 witnesses and
     marked 33 documents as also 16 material objects. The first accused
     examined himself and during the examination of the prosecution
     witnesses marked Exs.D1 to D8. The trial court found, from the
     evidence of the prosecution witnesses, that the presence of the
     dead body in the house of A2 was proved, and the crime itself was
     confessed to by A2, who also pointed out the dead body which was
     lying in her house. A2 is said to have made extra judicial confessions
     to other persons, including the wife of the deceased.
3.   A recovery was made of a chopper, and one chopper (sickle) was
     seized from the scene of occurrence itself. A1, who was arrayed for
     instigation, had a perfect alibi insofar as the night duty undertaken
     in another police station, deposed to by PW-14, who was also on
     duty. There was nothing to indicate an instigation, which led to the
     acquittal of A1. A2 to A4 were convicted under Section 302 read
     with Section 34 and was sentenced to life. The High Court affirmed
     the findings of the Trial Court in an appeal by A2 to A4, finding
     established; the motive and the culpability of the accused based
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        Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors. v. The State of Karnataka


      on other circumstances, like extra judicial confessions, recovery of
      a chopper under Section 27, the crime scene being the house of
      A1&2 and the absence of explanation for the dead body being at
      the house of the accused, under Section 106.
4.    Mr.C.B. Gururaj, learned counsel for the appellants would argue that
      since Section 302 is charged against four accused read with Section
      34, when one of the accused is acquitted, it should inure to the benefit
      of the others also. Reliance was placed on State of West Bengal v.
      Vindu Lachmandas Sakhrani alias Deru1 and Suraj Pal v. State
      of Uttar Pradesh2. The depositions were read over to us and it was
      argued that the eye witnesses had turned hostile and there was no
      circumstance bringing out the culpability of the accused.
5.    Mr.Nishanth Patil, learned AAG, however, sought to uphold the
      conviction on the ground that the dead body was found in the house
      of A2, which was pointed out by her and there was no explanation
      even under Section 313 questioning. The motive was proved, and the
      extra judicial confessions further established the crime. The recovery
      as against A4 also provided a link in the chain of circumstances,
      which chain is complete.
6.    Undisputedly, this is a case of circumstantial evidence, especially
      since the eyewitnesses who were projected as tenants in the building
      in which the crime occurred, turned hostile. It is also pertinent that
      as per the allegation of the prosecution, a police man was killed
      by the wife of another police man, with the aid of her brother and
      brother-in-law. Upon the sad news being conveyed to the wife of the
      deceased, she allegedly went to the premises with her relatives and
      friends; the latter of whom were either police men or their spouses.
7.    On the question of whether the death was a homicide, there can
      be no dispute raised, unequivocally established by the evidence of
      PW-23, the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem. Almost 13 wounds
      were noticed which were lacerated and chop wounds. According to
      the Doctor, death was caused due to the injuries sustained to the
      head; all the internal and external injuries being ante-mortem in



1    AIR 1994 SC 772
2    AIR 1995 SC 419
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     nature. The chop wounds were found on the right side & middle of
     the forehead as also over the left parietal prominence and the eye,
     the nose and the lip on the left side. There were wounds on the
     right cheek, over the right ear lobe, incised wound extending from
     the occipital area to the left ear, with comminuted fracture on the
     occipital area, at the right temporal bone extending to lower of left
     temporal bone, with brain tissue exposed. There were other lacerated
     and chop wounds on the left leg exposing the libia and fibula and
     on the left wrist a joint fracture in the second metacarpal bone. The
     injuries bring forth a case of a brutal frontal attack, which is opined,
     by PW-23, to be possible by the chopper recovered from the scene
     of occurrence and that recovered at the instance of A4.
8.   The death, no doubt is homicidal in nature and now we turn to the
     culpability of the accused. The first argument of the learned counsel
     for the appellants, that, the appellants too have to be acquitted,
     considering their parity with A-1, cannot at all be countenanced. In
     Vindu Lachmandas Sakhrani alias Deru1 (supra), a husband and
     his wife were charged with the kidnapping and murder of a six-year-
     old child. While the husband was acquitted, the trial court convicted
     the wife, which conviction was overturned in appeal on the ground
     of parity. In that case, dependent solely on circumstantial evidence,
     it was held that the charge under Section 302 read with Section
     34 IPC, based on the common intention of both, falls flat with the
     acquittal of the husband, especially when there was no simpliciter
     charge under Section 302 against the wife.
9.   In Suraj Pal2 (supra), the charges were under Sections 147, 323, 307
     and 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC. There was no independent
     charge against the sole accused convicted for the offence under
     Sections 307 and 302 IPC. In that circumstance when all the others
     were acquitted, one of the accused who was arrested for shooting
     the deceased, could not have been convicted under Sections 307
     and 302 IPC, was the finding. In the present case, the charge against
     A1 was under Section 109, instigation, leading to a charge under
     Section 302 read with Section 34. The charge against the other
     accused was under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC; quite
     distinguishable. There was no evidence to substantiate instigation
     and an independent charge under Section 302 would not stand
     against A2 by reason of the air-tight alibi.
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10. The motive alleged is of a loan of Rs.1 lakh taken from the deceased
    having not been repaid giving rise to persistent demands, resulting
    in ill will between the deceased and the accused, leading to frequent
    quarrels. The trial court and the High Court placed reliance on the
    evidence of PW-18, 11 &12, the wife, mother and brother of the
    accused and PW-7, to find motive.
11. In chief examination, PW-18 deposed that it was A2 who revealed
    to her that she owed a sum of Rs.1 lakh to the deceased which A2
    had obtained at the time of construction of the house. The chief
    examination of PW-18 does not at all support the motive set up by the
    prosecution. In cross examination, it was categorically stated by PW-
    18 that in the domestic inquiry against A-1, she had appeared before
    the inquiry officer; Dy. S.P. Arasikare, and deposed that her husband
    and accused were in cordial terms and there were no transactions
    between them. Very strangely, after the cross examination by the
    accused, the Special Public Prosecutor sought to treat the witness
    as hostile and attempted a cross examination. She categorically
    asserted that the statement made before the inquiry officer was not
    under coercion.
12. Yet another witness proffered by the prosecution to prove the motive
    was PW-7, a police constable and a neighbour of the deceased. In
    his chief examination, it was deposed that while occupying the police
    quarters, the deceased and the accused were on friendly terms. He
    also deposed that he had no information regarding any loan taken
    by A-1 from the deceased. The witness was treated hostile and
    cross examined by the prosecution, when it was brought out that in
    the statement under Section 161, Cr. PC, the witness had spoken
    about the loan of Rs.1 lakh taken by A-1 from the deceased, which
    alone would not prove the motive since it was not deposed in his
    chief examination.
13. PW-11 and PW-12, the mother and brother of the deceased, however
    spoke of a loan having been taken by A-1 from the deceased. The
    reliability of the said witnesses has to be tested on the totality of the
    circumstances as deposed to by the witnesses. PW-18 deposed that
    PWs-11&12 were not on cordial terms with her husband; belying their
    knowledge of the loan availed, which even the wife of the deceased
    was not aware of. PW-18 asserted that she or her husband were not
    in the habit of discussing their problems with PWs-11&12 nor was
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     there even exchange of pleasantries. There are further reasons to
     disbelieve the testimony of PWs-11&12, which we shall deal with
     a little later.
14. Absence of motive is not an imperative circumstance to arrive at
    a conviction, in a case where there is ocular evidence. The role of
    motive is not very significant even when circumstances otherwise
    form an unbreakable chain. Motive only provides another link, and
    the absence of motive is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused
    as held in Babu v. State of Kerala3. We cannot find a motive in this
    case; of the financial transaction having led to the crime. Further,
    the prosecution case is that the deceased was summoned over
    telephone, to the house of A2, on the pretext of repaying the loan.
    But even PW-18 has no case that the deceased left the house
    on such a mission, after a telephone call. There is also no clear
    evidence as to whether the deceased returned to his home in the
    evening of that day.
15. Even according to the prosecution, the police came to know about the
    death from A2 who surrendered before the Police Station and made
    a voluntary statement before PW-15, the Station House Officer (SHO)
    in the presence of PW-17, a Sentry on duty at the Police Station.
    PW-15, immediately called PW-21, a constable and directed him to
    proceed to the house of A2 to verify the information given by A2.
    PW-22, with another constable, visited the house of A2 and having
    seen the dead body, intimated it to PW-15. PW-15 informed PW-18,
    who in turn informed her neighbours and her relatives.
16. The prosecution in addition to the official witnesses, sought to establish
    the presence of the dead body at the house of A1& A2, through
    the other witnesses including the wife, mother and brother of the
    deceased who were alleged to have come to the crime scene and
    witnessed the presence of the dead body thereat. PW-18, the wife
    of the deceased more than once deposed in her chief examination
    and cross examination, that she came to know of the death of her
    husband at ‘7 O’clock’ on the morning of 11.03.2006 when the police
    came to her house with the information of the crime. Though, she
    stated in her chief examination that she went to the house of A2
    and saw the dead body, before the inquiry officer, Dy. S.P. Arasikare,


3   (2010) 9 SCC 189
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        Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors. v. The State of Karnataka


     she had stated that she saw the dead body first at the hospital;
     admitted in her testimony before Court. In cross examination by
     the Prosecutor, after she was declared hostile, it was categorically
     stated by PW-18 that she did not see the dead body of her husband
     at the house of A-1&2.
17. PW-6 and PW-8, the wives of two police constables who resided near
    to the house of the deceased stated before police that they saw the
    dead body at the house of A-1&2, but resiled from their statement
    before Court and both of them were declared hostile. PW-7, in his
    chief examination stated that he too saw the dead body first at the
    hospital but, in cross examination by the prosecution, sought to assert
    that he had seen the body of the deceased at the house of A-1&2;
    which statement he had not made before the police.
18. The inquest report was drawn up by PW-24, allegedly at the house
    of A-1&2. PWs-1&4, the witnesses to the inquest report, did not
    corroborate and deposed that the report was drawn up and signed
    at the hospital. PW-11 and PW-12, the mother and brother of the
    deceased spoke of having seen the dead body at the alleged crime
    scene, the house of A-1&2. It is pertinent that according to PW-18,
    the relatives including her mother-in-law and brother-in-law came
    to the hospital. The presence of the said witnesses in the alleged
    scene of crime, after the crime proper, is suspect.
19. PW-11, the mother of the deceased stated in her cross examination
    that PW-18 called her over phone at 4 am to inform her about the
    crime committed. It is also stated that she was informed by PW-18
    through the phone of one Shankarappa, who was not examined
    before Court. PW-12, the brother of the accused stated in his cross
    examination that having been informed of the murder of his brother,
    by PW18, he came to Hassan at about 05:30 am in the morning.
    PW18 at the risk of repetition, asserted before Court more than
    once, that she was first informed about the death of her husband at
    7 am when the police came to her house with the said information.
20. Useful reference can be made to the decision of this Court in
    Santosh v. State (NCT of Delhi)4, wherein the dead body was
    recovered from an apartment occupied by the appellant/accused as



4   (2023) 19 SCC 321
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     a tenant. The Court categorically found that there was no serious
     dispute to the tenancy arrangement but even then, that was insufficient
     by itself, to hold the accused guilty. It was held:
            “… there is no general presumption against the owner/
            tenant of a property with regard to his/her guilt if a dead
            body with homicidal injuries is found in his/her property.
            No doubt if the prosecution succeeds in proving a chain
            of circumstances from which a reasonable inference can
            be drawn regarding one’s guilt then, in absence of proper
            explanation, the court can always draw an appropriate
            conclusion with respect to his/her guilt with the aid of
            Section 106 of Evidence Act, 1872. But, if the chain of
            circumstances is not established, mere failure of the
            accused to offer an explanation is not sufficient to hold
            him guilty.”
21. This Court also relied on Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of
    Maharashtra5 in which it was observed that Section 106 of Evidence
    Act 1872 does not directly operate against either the husband or the
    wife, staying under the same roof, even if he/she is the last person
    seen with the deceased. It does not absolve the prosecution of
    discharging its primary burden of proving a case beyond reasonable
    doubt. Unless there is evidence led to sustain a conviction or which
    makes out a prima facie case, the question does not arise of a
    burden of proof placed upon the accused to offer an explanation.
22. As we found, there is no cogent, credible evidence that the body
    was at the house of A-1&2. But, for the moment we will accept the
    said circumstance to have been proved on two grounds. One, PW-
    15, the SHO to whom A2 spoke of the crime, even if eschewed
    as a confession, recorded the statement, marked as Ext.P10(a) in
    the Station Diary produced as Ext.P10. PW-17 corroborated the
    statement, leading to the discovery of the body at the house of A2 by
    PW-21, the Constable deputed to verify. Even if these circumstances
    are accepted, going by the decisions cited, that alone cannot be
    conclusive proof to find A2 guilty, without other corroborating evidence.



5   (2021) 5 SCC 626
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       Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors. v. The State of Karnataka


23. One another circumstance, heavily relied upon by the trial court
    and the High Court are the extra judicial confessions made by
    A2 to various persons, but all inside the police station. The First
    Information Report was on the complaint made by PW-18, the wife
    of the deceased, though the information first supplied was by A2 in
    the morning, to PW-15, the SHO and PW-17, the Sentry. Both these
    extra judicial confessions have been made in the police station before
    the police officers, even according to the prosecution, on which no
    reliance can be placed. PW-18, the wife of the deceased deposed
    that it was A2 who revealed to her the murder of her husband, at
    the police station, which was the testimony of PW-7 also. The extra
    judicial confessions and the context in which they were made, within
    the police station cannot at all be relied upon.
24. Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates that no confession made to
    a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any
    offence and Section 26 also restricts any confession by a person in
    the custody of a police officer from being proved against him unless
    it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. In State of
    U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya6, this Court had considered the impact
    of Section 25 and 26, in paragraph 7, from which the relevant portion
    is extracted herein below:
            “… The expression, “accused person” in Section 24 and
            the expression “a person accused of any offence” have
            the same connotation, and describe the person against
            whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding.
            As observed in Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor by
            the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, “Section 25
            covers a confession made to a police officer before any
            investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of
            an investigation”. The adjectival clause “accused of any
            offence” “is therefore descriptive of the person against
            whom a confessional statement made by him is declared
            not provable, and does not predicate a condition of
            that person at the time of making the statement for the
            applicability of the ban. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence
            Act by its first paragraph provides. “No confession made


6   1960 SCC OnLine SC 8
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            by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police
            officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a
            Magistrate, shall be proved as against a person accused
            of any offence”. By this section, a confession made by a
            person who is in custody is declared not provable unless
            it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. …”
25. The extra judicial confessions, said to have been made by A2 in
    the present case, were all within the police station, where she is
    said to have voluntarily come, to confess about the murder. The
    confession made to the SHO, PW-15, overheard by PW-17, the
    Sentry of the police station, hence has to be completely eschewed
    under Section 25. The confession made to PW-18, the wife of the
    deceased and PW-7, though a police constable; who arrived at the
    police station in the status of the neighbour of the deceased, also
    has to be eschewed under Section 26. The other witnesses to whom
    the extra judicial confession was made, that too inside the police
    station, in any case turned hostile.
26. Yet another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the
    recovery of a chopper, MO-16 on the confession statement of A4
    under Section 27. In this context, we have to look at the evidence of
    PW-24, the investigating officer (I.O) who deposed that A3 and A4
    were taken into police custody on 15.03.2006 after their voluntary
    surrender before Court on 13.03.2006. It is the categoric statement of
    the I.O that both A3 and A4 confessed in their voluntary statements
    that they would point out the chopper used for commission of offence
    by leading the police to the spot where they concealed it. A4 alone
    was taken to the spot, leading to the recovery of MO-16, is the case
    of the prosecution.
27. Disclosure statements taken from one or more persons in police
    custody do not go out of the purview of Section 27 altogether, as
    held in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru7
    and reiterated in Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra8. While
    asserting that a joint or simultaneous disclosure would per se be
    not inadmissible under Section 27, it was observed that it is very
    difficult to place reliance on such an utterance in chorus; which


7   (2005) 11 SCC 600
8   (2017) 3 SCC 760
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     was also held to be, in fact, a myth. Recognising that there would
     be practical difficulty in placing reliance on such evidence, it was
     declared that it is for the Courts to decide, on a proper evaluation
     of evidence, whether and to what extent such a simultaneous
     disclosure could be relied upon. In Kishor Bhadke7, while affirming
     the above principles in Navjot Sandhu6, the facts revealed were
     noticed, wherein the information given by one, after the other, was
     without any break, almost simultaneously and such information was
     followed up by pointing out the material thing by both the accused,
     in which circumstance it was held that there is no reason to eschew
     such evidence.
28. With the above principles in mind when we look at the facts of the
    present case, the I.O though has stated about the disclosure statement
    of both A3 and A4, he does not specify whether it is simultaneous
    or one after the other. It is also not clear; if the disclosure is at
    different points of time, in which event, who made the first disclosure.
    Deposition of PW-24 though does not speak of the exact location as
    stated by the accused in the confession statement; PW-24 speaks
    of having taken A4 to the bush of Rose Trees at the Helipad near
    Udayagiri Layout from where the chopper was produced. PW-2 and
    PW-3, the witnesses of recovery of MO-16 turned hostile and they
    deposed that they affixed their signatures to the recovery mahazar
    at the police station. Further, it also has to be noticed that but for
    the recovery there is nothing to indicate the culpability of A3 and
    A4 through forensic evidence to link the recovered weapon to the
    crime proper.
29. Insofar as the recovery under Section 27, as has been reiterated
    in Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra9, the expression
    ‘fact discovered’ includes not only the physical object produced,
    but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of
    the accused about the concealment. In the cited decision, which
    considered the offence of theft, the accused had made a statement
    of the place where the stolen drums were kept by him. Finding the
    admissible portion of the statement to be only the location of the
    three drums, it was held that the information taken in conjunction
    with the facts discovered, was insufficient to draw the presumption


9   (1976) 1 SCC 828
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      that the accused was the thief or the receiver of the stolen property,
      with the knowledge that it was stolen. The drums in question were
      found in the compound or yard of a musafirkhana (rest place for
      travellers) and it was neither lying concealed nor was the compound
      under the lock and key of the accused. In the present case, the I.O,
      PW-24, categorically deposed before Court that after A3 and A4
      were taken into custody on 15.03.2006, pursuant to their surrender
      before Court on 13.03.2006, confessions were made by both the
      accused regarding the concealment of the chopper allegedly used for
      commission of offence; which statement of ‘use in the commission
      of offence’ has to be totally eschewed. The exact spot in which the
      concealment was made as stated in the disclosure statement has
      also not been deposed to by the I.O.
30. Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P.10 was a case in which all the
    accused persons made disclosure statements to the IO whereupon
    recovery of various articles were effected. It was held that even when
    disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in a
    case, it is not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and
    without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable
    doubt (sic, para 22).
31. The fact that confessions were made by both the accused and
    the recovery was made from one of the accused, A4, leading the
    police to the spot would restrain us from treating the recovery as
    an inculpating circumstance against A3 or A4, especially when the
    confession is taken simultaneously from both the accused. We are of
    the opinion that in the present case there can be no reliance placed
    on the recovery based on the sketchy evidence adduced.
32. Now, looking at the witness who supported the prosecution case,
    we find them to be totally unreliable. PW-7, whose evidence was
    relied upon for the purpose of motive and also the presence of
    the dead body at the house of A-1&2, we have already found, did
    not speak of either of these circumstances before the police under
    Section 161 or in the chief examination. As far as PW-11 and PW-12
    are concerned, their presence at the scene of occurrence itself is
    doubtful. The motive sought to be proved through PW-11&12 as also
    the presence of the dead body in the house of A-1&2, hence stands


10   2023 SCC OnLine SC 984
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                      1253

       Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors. v. The State of Karnataka


     totally discredited. It is also relevant that PW-16, the brother-in-law
     of the deceased, categorically stated that he saw the dead body at
     the hospital and not at the house of A-1&2.
33. As we noticed at the outset, PW-20 and PW-22 eyewitnesses turned
    completely hostile. We are at a loss to understand how the High
    Court and the trial court made an observation that though they were
    declared hostile, there was credible material in their evidence pointing
    to the culpability of the accused, which could be relied upon. We find
    no such material in the chief examination or the cross examination.
    PW-20 and PW-22, who as per the prosecution were brothers staying
    in the house of A1 and A2 on rent. The witnesses admitted that they
    were bothers but they denied that they were tenants of A1 and A2.
    After PW-20 was declared hostile, the prosecutor had put forth P-12
    to P-20 contradictions in the alleged statements under Section 161
    recorded by the police, which were all denied by the said witness.
    Likewise, PW-22 also did not subscribe to the prosecution case and
    there was nothing in his evidence to find culpability of the accused.
34. The prosecution case itself was that the deceased was summoned
    to the house of A-1&2, for which there is no evidence adduced nor
    does PW-18, the wife speaks of the deceased having left the house
    on receiving such a call. Further it is the case of the prosecution that
    the deceased reached the house of the accused at around 10 pm
    while the death was confirmed as having occurred at 2 pm. What
    happened in the interregnum is not clear and together with what
    we noticed above, there is a suspicion as to the genesis and origin
    of the crime which compounds the reasonable doubt regarding the
    prosecution case.
35. Undisputably, the case is one of circumstantial evidence which
    is treated as proved only when there is a complete chain of
    circumstances, comprising cogent and reliable material, providing
    an unbreakable link, leading only to the culpability of the accused
    and bringing forth the hypothesis only of guilt and not leading to any
    reasonable doubt as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. The
    motive projected and the crime itself has not at all been proved and
    there is no circumstance leading to the culpability of the accused.
    The presence of the dead body in the house of the accused is also
    under a cloud and in any event, that, with the absence of a proper
    explanation cannot by itself bring home a conviction.
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36. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the evidence led
    in the trial, we are of the considered opinion that the conviction
    cannot be sustained; which we set aside and acquit the accused. If
    the accused are in custody, they shall be released forthwith, if they
    are not wanted in any other case. However, if they are on bail, their
    bail bonds shall stand cancelled and revoked.
37. The criminal appeal stands allowed.
38. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan