Supreme Court of India
NAGARAJAN & ANR.versusTHE STATE OF TAMIL NADU
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 703
- Decided
- 14 May 2025
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- DIPANKAR DATTA
Holding
The Court held that Section 20AA of the PoFA, read with the repeal and savings clause of the FSS Act, excludes the application of the Probation of Offenders Act and also precludes any mollification of the sentence, but partially allowed the appeals by converting imprisonment to fines based on factual discrepancies and equity.
Summary
The appellants were convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (PoFA) for selling adulterated curd and various food items, receiving six months' imprisonment and fines. They sought release on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, arguing that Section 20AA of PoFA, which excluded probation, violated constitutional rights and that the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act) allowed a reduced sentence. The Supreme Court examined the literal wording of Section 20AA, the repeal and savings clause in Section 97 of the FSS Act, and prior precedents on statutory interpretation and probation. It held that the benefit of probation cannot apply to offences committed between 1976 and 2006, and that the repeal and savings clause bars any mollification of the original penalty. However, relying on a discrepancy in laboratory reports and the decision in C. Mohammed, the Court partially allowed the lead appeal, converting imprisonment to a fine, and also partially allowed the connected appeal following the reasoning in A.K. Sarkar & Co. The orders were that the imprisonment sentences be replaced by fines, with a deadline for payment.
Issues considered
- Whether the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 can be granted to persons convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for offences committed between 1976 and 2006.
- Whether, in the absence of probation, the reduced sentence envisaged under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 can be imposed on the appellants.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 360
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 20
- Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006s. 97
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. 26, s. 6
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966s. Article 15
- Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954s. 16(1)(a)(i), s. 20AA, s. 2(ia)(a)(m), s. 7(1)
- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 can be granted to the appellants; if the answer to the aforesaid issue is in the negative, can the reduced sentence that the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 Act envisages be imposed on the Adulteration Act, 1954 – s.20AA – Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – s.97 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Offences under the PoFA Act took place in 2001 and 1985 – Appellants were convicted and sentenced – Mollification of sentence sought by the
Subjects
Food adulterationMollification of sentenceBenefit of probationRepeals and savings clauseRelease of offenders on probationSamples of curdSpiceChilli powderFlourCooking oilSaltFood InspectorRule of beneficial constructionRule of literal constructionCrime against public healthSafety of consumersSafety standards of foodPreventing adulterated foodInternational Covenant on Civil and Political RightsDiscrepancy in analysis reportsInterest of justiceEquityProprietyJudicial comity
Judgment
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 471 : 2025 INSC 703
Nagarajan & Anr.
v.
The State of Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Appeal No. 1390 of 2025)
15 May 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan , JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958 can be granted to the appellants; if the answer to the
aforesaid issue is in the negative, can the reduced sentence that
the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 Act envisages be imposed
on the appellants instead.
Headnotes†
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – s.20AA – Food
Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – s.97 – Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958 – Offences under the PoFA Act took place in 2001 and
1985 – Appellants were convicted and sentenced – Mollification
of sentence sought by the appellants:
Held: s.20AA, PoFA Act r/w s.97, FSS Act makes it clear that
the benefit under the Probation Act is inapplicable to an offence
committed under the PoFA Act, if the offence has been committed
between introduction of s.20AA in 1976 and its repeal in 2006 by
the FSS Act – However, in the facts and circumstances and the
discrepancy in the analysis reports of the seized curd, the lead
appeal is partly allowed following the decision in C. Mohammed –
The connected appeal is also partly allowed in the interest of
justice, equity, propriety and judicial comity on the basis of the
dictum in A.K. Sarkar & Co. – Sentences imposed converted to
fine. [Paras 47, 48]
Interpretation of Statutes – Rule of literal construction – Food
Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – s.97 – Repeal and savings –
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – s.20AA – Probation
of Offenders Act, 1958:
Held: A ‘repeals and savings’ clause in any statute is not mere
surplusage that the Courts may ignore in the interpretation of the
* Author
472 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
law – When a ‘repeal and savings’ clause specifically protects
a penalty provided for in the old enactment, the intention of the
legislature is clear – This Court cannot and should not provide a
benefit to the accused that is not permitted in law – Mollification
must only be provided in cases where a provision in relation to
‘repeal and savings’ is either not present or where the ‘repeal and
savings’ clause envisages such a possibility – This Court cannot
offend the express provisions present in any legislative instrument
merely to provide a benefit to an offender, not envisaged under
the law – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.6, 26 – Constitution of
India – Article 20. [Paras 41, 43]
Case Law Cited
T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe [1983] 1 SCR 905 : (1983) 1 SCC 177;
Paramjit Singh v. Municipal Corpn. (1982) 3 SCC 317; Santosh
Kumar v. Municipal Corpn. (2000) 9 SCC 151 – held inapplicable.
Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (1987) Supp. SCC 12; Basheer v.
State of Kerala [2004] 2 SCR 224 : (2004) 3 SCC 609;
C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala (2006) 13 SCC 290 – relied on.
A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of W.B. [2024] 3 SCR 356 : (2024) 10
SCC 727; Ishar Das v. State of Punjab [1972] 3 SCR 312 : (1973)
2 SCC 65; Jai Narain v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi [1973] 1 SCR
923 : (1972) 2 SCC 637; Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra
Dange [1974] 2 SCR 154 : (1974) 1 SCC 167; Prem Ballab v.
State (Delhi Admn.) [1977] 1 SCR 592 : (1977) 1 SCC 173; Nemi
Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 17 SCC 448; Rattan Lal v.
State of Punjab [1964] 7 SCR 676 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 40;
Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas [1974] 3 SCR 133 :
(1974) 4 SCC 222 – referred to.
List of Acts
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; Food Safety and
Standards Act, 2006; Probation of Offenders Act, 1958; Constitution
of India; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; General Clauses Act, 1897.
List of Keywords
Food adulteration; Mollification of sentence; Benefit of probation;
Repeals and savings clause; Release of offenders on probation;
Samples of curd; Spice; Chilli powder, Flour; Cooking oil; Salt;
Food Inspector; Rule of beneficial construction; Rule of statutory
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 473
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
interpretation; Rule of literal construction; Food adulteration; Crime
against public health; Safety of consumers; Safety standards of
food; Preventing adulterated food; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 1966; Discrepancy in the analysis reports;
Seized curd; Interest of justice; Equity; Propriety; Judicial comity.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1390 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.06.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRLRC (MD) No. 111 of 2010
With
Criminal Appeal No. 2054 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
S. Nandakumar, Sr. Adv., R. Satish Kumar, Ms. V. Susheatha,
Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Aakash Elango, Ms. Sandhya Dutt,
Mohit Kumar Gupta, P.V. Yogeswaran.
Adv. for the Respondent:
Sabarish Subramanian.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
The Appeals
1. The two criminal appeals before us, arising from different incidents of
crime, question the correctness of two decisions of the respective High
Courts involving the same question of law. We, therefore, propose
to decide the said two appeals by this common judgment and order.
2. In the lead appeal, the appellants - Nagarajan and Selvaraj - have
assailed the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras1
1 Madras High Court
474 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
dated 04th June, 2019 dismissing the criminal revision2 filed by them
on the grounds assigned therein.
3. In the connected appeal, the appellant - Naresh Chandra - has
assailed the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad3
dated 04th July, 2019. The criminal revision4 filed by the appellant
was dismissed thereby on similar grounds.
Factual Matrix
4. The case of the prosecution in the lead appeal is that a sample
of curd was taken from the shop of the appellants on 26th June,
2001 at about 14:30 hours and sent for analysis. The analysis
revealed that the standard, prescribed under the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 19545 and the relevant rules, was not fulfilled. A
complaint came to be registered followed by trial. Upon perusal of
the evidence, vide judgment and order dated 18th June, 2006, the
Trial Court convicted Nagarajan and Selvaraj under Sections 7(1) and
16(1)(a)(i) r/w Section 2(ia)(a)(m) of the PoFA Act and sentenced them
to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 (six) months each and to pay
a fine of Rs. 3000/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment
for 2 (two) months each.
5. Aggrieved, Nagarajan and Selvaraj filed an appeal 6 before the
concerned Appellate Court, which confirmed the conviction and
the sentence of the Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 18th
December, 2009.
6. Still aggrieved, Nagarajan and Selvaraj invoked the revisional
jurisdiction of the Madras High Court unsuccessfully.
7. The case of the prosecution in the connected appeal is that at about
10:45 hours on 20th March, 1985, in the area of Karkala Bazaar, the
concerned Food Inspector found Naresh Chandra selling spice, chilli
powder, flour, cooking oil, salt and other stuff. Upon suspicion, the
Food Inspector presented Form VI to Naresh Chandra who refused
to accept and sign it. The Food Inspector then called on witnesses
2 CRLRC (MD) No. 111/2010
3 Allahabad High Court
4 CRLR No. 1660/1998
5 PoFA Act
6 CA No. 183 of 2004
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 475
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
present there; however, no one agreed to take part except one
Radhey Lal (PW2). Thereupon, an attempt was made by the Food
Inspector to take a sample on his own. Naresh Chandra intimidated
the Food Inspector and refused to allow him to take a sample.
The complaint lodged by the Food Inspector eventually led to a
trial. The Trial Court vide order dated 25th August, 1987 convicted
Naresh Chandra u/s Section 7/10(1) r/w Section 16(1)(c)(d) of the
PoFA Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for
6 (six) months and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default to undergo simple
imprisonment for 2 (two) more months.
8. The conviction and sentence had been carried in appeal7 by Naresh
Chandra whereupon, the Appellate Court upheld the same and
dismissed the appeal vide order dated 16th November, 1988.
9. The appellate judgment and order having been subjected to challenge
before the Allahabad High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, vide the
impugned judgment, the court refused to interfere and dismissed
the revision.
Contentions
10. Mollification of sentence is sought on behalf of the two sets of
appellants by learned counsel appearing on their behalf on the
common following grounds:
a. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act effectively denies the benefit
of probation for first-time offenders, thereby violating Article 14
of the Constitution of India.
b. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act violates Article 21 of the
Constitution as denial of probation impacts the liberty of individuals
without due consideration of their circumstances considering that
the Probation of Offenders Act, 19588 is to rehabilitate offenders
and reduce the burden on the prison system.
c. That Section 20AA of the PoFA Act contradicts the reformative
justice approach enshrined in Section 360 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 19739 which encourages rehabilitation of
offenders.
7 Criminal Appeal No. 138 of 1987
8 Probation Act
9 Cr. PC
476 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
d. That the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006,10 which repealed
the PoFA Act, does not include a provision equivalent to
Section 20AA evincing the legislative intent to move towards
a reformatory framework.
11. However, learned counsel for the respondent in the lead appeal - State
of Tamil Nadu - has placed great reliance on the express words in
Section 20AA of the PoFA Act, prescribing a categorical and complete
exclusion of the applicability of the Probation Act and Section 360 of
the Cr. PC. Therefore, according to the State, the legislative intent
is clear that food adulteration is a crime against public health and
the perpetrators of such crimes must face consequences for their
acts of crimes. Furthermore, emphasis was laid on incorporation of
Section 20AA in the PoFA Act by way of amendment and reliance
was placed on the Statement of Object and Reasons for such
amendment highlighting the growing concern over the prevalence
of food adulteration and the inadequacy of existing provincial laws
to address the issue uniformly.
12. The State of Uttar Pradesh has not pressed any arguments before us.
The Legislative Framework
13. Section 20AA was introduced in the PoFA Act though an amendment
in 1976. It reads thus:
20AA. Application of the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958 and section 360 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.—Nothing contained in the Probation
of offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or section 360 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply
to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless
that person is under eighteen years of age.
14. The PoFA Act was repealed by the FSS Act. We may also refer to
Section 97 of the FSS Act, which deals with ‘repeal and savings’.
The proviso to Section 97 specifically saves certain aspects of the
PoFA Act. The relevant part is reproduced below:
10 FSS Act
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 477
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
97. Repeal and savings.–
…
Provided that such repeal shall not affect:—
(i) the previous operations of the enactment and Orders
under repeal or anything duly done or suffered there
under; or
(ii) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under any of the enactment or
Orders under repeal; or
(iii) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in
respect of any offences committed against the
enactment and Orders under repeal; or
(iv) any investigation or remedy in respect of any such
penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such
investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be
instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty,
forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if this
Act had not been passed.
…
15. The appellants have largely based their arguments on the basis of
Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which is as follows:
20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.—
(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for
violation of a law in force at the time of the commission
of the Act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a
penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted
under the law in force at the time of the commission of
the offence.
16. Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
1966, which was ratified by India in 1979, includes a provision similar
to Article 20(1) of the Constitution. It says:
Article 15. 1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international
law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
478 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at
the time when the criminal offence was committed. If,
subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision
is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby.
17. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 189711 notes the effect of a
repeal of any enactment:
6. Effect of repeal.—Where this Act, or any Central Act
or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act,
repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be
made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal
shall not—
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at
which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so
repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in
respect of any offence committed against any enactment
so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy
in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any
such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be
instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty,
forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing
Act or Regulation had not been passed.
18. Section 26 of the GC Act positing a situation of an offence being
punishable under two or more enactments, ordains that the offender
shall be liable to punishment only under one of those enactments
and not under both [quite falling in line with Article 20(2) of the
Constitution]. It reads thus:
11 GC Act, hereafter
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 479
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or
more enactments.—Where an act or omission constitutes
an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender
shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either
or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be
punished twice for the same offence
19. The relevant part of Section 16 of the PoFA Act stipulating penalties
reads as follows:
16. Penalties.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
(1A) if any person—
(a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his
behalf, imports into India or manufacturers for sale
or stores, sells or distributes any article of food—
(i) which is adulterated within the meaning of
sub-clause (m) of clause (ia) of section 2 or
misbranded within the meaning of clause (ix)
of that section or the sale of which is prohibited
under any provision of this Act or any rule made
thereunder or by an order of the Food (Health)
Authority;
(ii) Other than an article of food referred to
in sub-clause (I), in contravention of any of
the provision of this Act or of any rule made
thereunder, or
…
(c) prevents a food inspector from taking a sample
as authorised by this Act; or
(d) prevents a food inspector from exercising any
other power conferred on him by or under this Act;
…
he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be
liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
six months but which may extend to three years, and with
fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees:
…
480 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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Questions
20. Special Leave Petitions having been presented before this Court
by the two sets of appellants, separate coordinate Benches issued
notice, limited to the question of sentence.
21. Based on the rival contentions, two short but interesting inter-
connected questions of law arise for decision in the present appeals:
(i) whether the benefit of the provisions of the Probation Act can be
granted to the respective appellants? (ii) should the answer to the
above question be in the negative, can the reduced sentence that
the FSS Act envisages be imposed on the appellants instead?
Analysis
22. We now proceed with our analysis. The task ought to commence
with a study of judicial precedents.
Precedents
23. The parties before us have referred to a catena of decisions of this
Court in support of their contentions. A study of such decisions along
with a few other decisions would provide guidance for the ultimate
disposal of these appeals.
24. Prior to 1976, i.e., before Section 20AA was included in the PoFA
Act, there was no doubt that the Probation Act applied to the offences
committed under the PoFA Act. A profitable reference may be made
to the decision in Ishar Das v. State of Punjab,12 wherein Hon’ble
H.R. Khanna, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench
observed:
“9. The provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, in our
opinion, point to the conclusion that their operation is not
excluded in the case of persons found guilty of offences
under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Assuming
that there was reasonable doubt or ambiguity, the principle
to be applied in construing a penal act is that such doubt or
ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the person who
would be liable to the penalty (see Maxwell on Interpretation
of Statutes, p. 239, 12th Edn). It has also to be borne in mind
12 (1973) 2 SCC 65
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 481
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
that the Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958
subsequent to the enactment in 1954 of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act. As the legislature enacted the
Probation of Offenders Act despite the existence on the
statute book of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
the operation of the provisions of Probation of Offenders
Art cannot be whittled down or circumscribed because
of the provisions of the earlier enactment viz. Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act. Indeed, as mentioned earlier,
the non obstante clause in Section 4 of the Probation
of Offenders Act is a clear manifestation of the intention
of the legislature that the provisions of the Probation of
Offenders Act would have effect notwithstanding any other
law for the time being in force...”
However, Their Lordships rightly cautioned against resorting to the
provisions in the Probation Act in normal circumstances and instead
advocated adoption thereof on a case-to-case approach such that
the Court is convinced about the application of the Probation Act:
“10. Adulteration of food is a menace to public health. The
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted with
the aim of eradicating that anti-social evil and for ensuring
purity in the articles of food. In view of the above object
of the Act and the intention of the legislature as revealed
by the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for
a period of six months and a fine of rupees one thousand
has been prescribed. The courts should not lightly resort
to the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act in the
case of persons above 21 years of age found guilty of
offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act...”
(emphasis supplied)
25. Thereafter, a three-Judge Bench of this Court dealing with an offence
under the PoFA Act in Jai Narain v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi,13
while upholding the view expressed in Ishar Das (supra), held that
the conduct of the appellant therein being anti-social did not merit
the application of the Probation Act.
13 (1972) 2 SCC 637
482 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
26. Yet again, in the case of Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra
Dange,14 this Court, through Hon’ble V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., upheld
the view in Ishar Das (supra) and observed that the offence under
the PoFA Act is an economic offence and would therefore, not be
easily susceptible to the probationary process. We quote His Lordship
hereunder:
“28. The kindly application of the probation principles is
negatived by the imperatives of social defence and the
improbabilities of moral proselyti-sation. No chances can be
taken by society with a man whose anti-social operations,
disguised as a respectable trade, imperil numerous
innocents. He is a security risk. Secondly, these economic
offences committed by white-collar criminals are unlikely to
be dissuaded by the gentle probationary process. Neither
casual provocation nor motive against particular persons
but planned profit-making from numbers of consumers
furnishes the incentive — not easily humanised by
the therapeutic probationary measure. It is not without
significance that the recent report (47th report) of the Law
Commission of India has recommended the exclusion
of the Act to social and economic offences by suitable
amendments. It observed:
‘We appreciate that the suggested amendment
would be in apparent conflict with current trends
in sentencing. But ultimately, the justification of all
sentencing is the protection of society. There are
occasions when an offender is so anti-social that his
immediate and sometimes prolonged confinement
is the best assurance of society’s protection. The
consideration of rehabilitation has to give way,
because of the paramount need for the protection of
society. We are, therefore, recommending suitable
amendment in all the Acts, to exclude probation in
the above cases’.”
27. Shortly after the amendment in 1976, this Court speaking through
Hon’ble P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) in Prem Ballab v.
14 (1974) 1 SCC 167
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 483
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
State (Delhi Admn.),15 while deciding on a similar issue arising from
the unamended statute, observed that:
“7. …The imperatives of social defence must discourage
the applicability of the probation principle. No chances
can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social
activities, in the guise of a respectable trade, jeopardise
the health and well-being of numerous innocent consumers.
The adulterator is a social risk. It might be dangerous
to leave him free to carry on his nefarious activities by
applying the probation principle to him. Moreover, it must
be remembered that adulteration is an economic offence
prompted by profit motive and it is not likely to lend
itself easily to therapeutic treatment by the probationary
measure. It may be pointed out that the Law Commission
also in its Forty-seventh Report recommended the
exclusion of applicability of the probationary process in
case of social and economic offences and presumably
in response to this recommendation, the legislature has
recently amended the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act, 1954 by introducing Section 20AA providing that
nothing contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
or Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under the
Act unless that person is under eighteen years of age.
This amendment of course would not apply in the present
case but it shows the legislative trend which it would not
be right for the court to ignore. We cannot, therefore, give
the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to the
appellants and release them on probation.”
(emphasis supplied)
28. However, another three-Judge Bench of this Court in T. Barai v.
Henry Ah Hoe,16 was called upon to decide various issues including
the issue whether a convict is entitled to the mollified sentence on
account of the fact that the new Central enactment provided for a
15 (1977) 1 SCC 173
16 (1983) 1 SCC 177
484 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
lesser punishment for the same offence as compared with an older
State enactment under which the appellant was convicted. Hon’ble
A.P. Sen, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench
ruled that:
“11. It was not long before Parliament stepped in to meet the
growing menace of the anti-social offence of adulteration
of articles of food meant for human consumption which
was a threat to the national well-being and it was felt that
such offences must be ruthlessly dealt with. It was also
felt that there should be a summary trial of these offences.
The Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act,
1976 was accordingly brought into force with effect from
April 1, 1976. It not only created new offences but also
enhanced the punishment provided. But at the same time
it also provided for graded punishment for various types
of offences. Incidentally, it mollified the rigour of the law
by providing for a reduced punishment for an offence
punishable under Section 16(1)(a). We are however
not concerned with other types of offences except the
one punishable under Section 16(1)(a) and for this the
maximum punishment provided was for a term of three
years instead of six years…
…
22. It is only retroactive criminal legislation that is prohibited
under Article 20(1). The prohibition contained in Article
20(1) is that no person shall be convicted of any offence
except for violation of a law in force at the time of the
commission of the act charged as an offence prohibits
nor shall he be subjected to a penalty greater than that
which might have been inflicted under the law in force at
the time of the commission of the offence. It is quite clear
that insofar as the Central Amendment Act creates new
offences or enhances punishment for a particular type
of offence no person can be convicted by such ex post
facto law nor can the enhanced punishment prescribed by
the amendment be applicable. But insofar as the Central
Amendment Act reduces the punishment for an offence
punishable under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act, there is no
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 485
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
reason why the accused should not have the benefit of such
reduced punishment. The rule of beneficial construction
requires that even ex post facto law of such a type should
be applied to mitigate the rigour of the law. The principle
is based both on sound reason and common sense.
23. To illustrate, if Parliament were to reenact Section
302 of the Penal Code, 1860 and provide that the
punishment for an offence of murder shall be sentence
for imprisonment for life instead of the present sentence
of death or imprisonment for life, then it cannot be that
the courts would still award a sentence of death even in
pending cases.
…
25. It is settled both on authority and principle that when
a later statute again describes an offence created by an
earlier statute and imposes a different punishment, or
varies the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by
implication…The rule is however subject to the limitation
contained in Article 20(1) against ex post facto law providing
for a greater punishment and has also no application where
the offence described in the later Act is not the same as
in the earlier Act i.e. when the essential ingredients of the
two offences are different.
26. In the premises, the Central Amendment Act having
dealt with the same offence as the one punishable under
Section 16(1)(a) and provided for a reduced punishment,
the accused must have the benefit of the reduced
punishment. We wish to make it clear that anything that
we have said shall not be construed as giving to the
Central Amendment Act a retrospective operation insofar
as it creates new offences or provides for an enhanced
punishment.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. T. Barai (supra) is no doubt a leading decision on the aspect of the
principle of beneficial interpretation of penal statutes for the purposes
of sentencing. However, we are not convinced that the same is wholly
applicable in the instant case as (i) the dispute therein was between
486 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
a Central enactment and a State enactment pertaining to the same
offence, (ii) the case concerned punishment to be provided and was
not a decision related to release of an offender on probation and
(iii) in that case, there existed no such provision similar to either
Section 20AA of the PoFA Act or even Section 97 of the FSS Act
and obviously, was not a case dealing with repeal.
30. Shortly after the decision in T Barai (supra), this Court in the case
of Babu Ram v. State of Haryana,17 in no uncertain terms held that
the special provision made in the form of Section 20AA of the PoFA
Act, would override the provisions of the Probation Act.
“2. The appellant was convicted under Section 16(1)(a)
(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The facts
are not in dispute. The respondent has been sentenced
to 6 months’ rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Rs 1000. Notice was issued confined to the question of
sentence. The learned counsel argues that this is a fit case
where the appellant should be admitted to probation. On
the other hand, Mr Mahajan for the respondent points out
the provision in Section 20AA in support of his submission
that the Special Act excludes application of the Probation
of Offenders Act. We are inclined to agree with him that
the special provision made in the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act overrides the provision of the Probation
of Offenders Act and therefore the appellant will not be
entitled to the benefit thereof…”
(emphasis supplied)
31. In the case of Nemi Chand v. State of Rajasthan,18 this Court
applying the decision in T. Barai (supra) modified the sentence of
six months’ imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1000/- to Rs. 50,000 for
an offence committed under Sections 7/16 of the PoFA Act.
32. Recently, a co-ordinate bench of this Court in A.K. Sarkar & Co. v.
State of W.B.,19 placing reliance on T Barai (supra) held that:
17 (1987) Supp. SCC 12
18 (2018) 17 SCC 448
19 (2024) 10 SCC 727
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 487
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
“10. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was
repealed by the introduction of the Food Safety and
Standards Act, 2006 where Section 52 provides a maximum
penalty of Rs 3,00,000 for misbranded food. There is no
provision for imprisonment…
…
15. Considering all aspects, more particularly the nature of
offence, though we uphold the findings of the courts below
regarding the offence, but we hereby convert the sentence
of Appellant 2 from three months of simple imprisonment
along with fine of Rs 1000 to a fine of Rs 50,000 (Rupees
fifty thousand only). The sentence of Appellant 1 which
is for a fine of Rs 2000 is upheld. The amount shall be
deposited with the court concerned within a period of three
weeks from today. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed.”
33. Two more decisions have been cited before us, which we believe
are inapplicable to the present lis. The reasons are assigned below:
a. In Paramjit Singh v. Municipal Corpn.,20 the Court held
that since the offence pertained to November 1968 at which
point of time the Courts had the power to release the offender
on probation, the same should be done as the facts did not
necessitate the passing of a sentence of imprisonment upon the
appellant therein. This case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable
from the present matter.
b. The decision in Santosh Kumar v. Municipal Corpn.21 is
also not applicable to the facts at hand as that was a case of
commutation of sentence under Section 433(d), Cr. PC.
34. At this stage, we would also like to highlight a few other decisions
of this Court that would seem to be applicable for resolution of the
controversy.
35. In the case of Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab,22 Hon’ble K. Subba
Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the majority in a
3-Judge Bench decision held that:
20 (1982) 3 SCC 317
21 (2000) 9 SCC 151
22 1964 SCC OnLine SC 40
488 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“6. …Every ex post facto law is necessarily retrospective.
Under Article 20 of the Constitution, no person shall be
convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in
force at the time of the commission of that act charged as
an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that
which might have been inflicted under the law in force at
the time of the commission of the offence. But an ex post
facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law
does not fall within the said prohibition. If a particular law
makes a provision to that effect, though retrospective in
operation, it will be valid. The question whether such a law
is retrospective and, if so, to what extent depends upon
the interpretation of a particular statute, having regard to
the well-settled rules of construction. Maxwell in his book
On Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., at pp. 274-75,
summarizes the relevant rule of construction thus:
‘The tendency of, modern decisions, upon the whole,
is to narrow materially the difference between what
is called a strict and a beneficial construction. All
statutes are now construed with a more attentive
regard to the language, and criminal statutes with a
more rational regard to the aim and intention of the
legislature, then formerly. It is unquestionably right
that the distinction should not be altogether erased
from the judicial mind, for it is required by the spirit
of our free institutions that the interpretation of all
statutes should be favourable to personal liberty, and
this tendency is still evinced in a certain reluctance
to supply the defects of language, or to eke out
the meaning of an obscure passage by strained or
doubtful influences. The effect of the rule of strict
construction might almost be summed up in the
remark that, where an equivocal word or ambiguous
sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning
which the canons of interpretation fail to solve, the
benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject
and against the legislature which has failed to explain
itself. But it yields to the paramount rule that every
statute is to be expounded according to its expressed
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 489
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
or manifest intention and that all cases within the
mischiefs aimed at are, if the language permits, to
be held to fall within its remedial influence.’
7. Let us now proceed to consider the question raised in
the present case. This is not a case where an act, which
was not an offence before the Act, is made an offence
under the Act; nor this is a case where under the Act a
punishment higher than that obtaining for an offence before
the Act is imposed. This is an instance where neither the
ingredients of the offence nor the limits of the sentence are
disturbed, but a provision is made to help the reformation
of an accused through the agency of the court. Even so
the statute affects an offence committed before it was
extended to the area in question. It is, therefore, a post
facto law and has retrospective operation. In considering
the scope of such a provision we must adopt the rule of
beneficial construction as enunciated by the modern trend
of judicial opinion without doing violence to the provisions
of the relevant section. … As the Act does not change the
quantum of the sentence, but only introduces a provision to
reform the offender, there is no reason why the legislature
should have prohibited the exercise of such a power, even
if the case was pending against the accused at one stage
or other in the hierarchy of tribunals…”
36. In Basheer v. State of Kerala,23 a batch of appeals was heard on
the point of the constitutional validity of the proviso to Section 41(1)
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment)
Act, 2001. The unamended statute made no distinction between
“any quantity” and “small quantity”. In all the appeals before the
Court, the accused were convicted by the trial courts and had filed
appeals before the respective High Courts. Further, their appeals
were pending before the High Courts on 2nd October, 2001, when
the amending Act came into force. The accused were found guilty of
offences and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 10 years
and a fine of Rs one lakh each, which was the minimum punishment
prescribed under the unamended statute. The new Act, however,
23 (2004) 3 SCC 609
490 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
provided for graded punishment on the basis of the quantity of drugs
in the possession of the accused. This Court ruled that the concerned
rule of beneficial construction of a penal statute is limited to the
reduction of any sentence and the conviction remains under the old
Act. The amendment had in effect created a new set of offences, and
therefore, the benefit of graded punishment would not be available
to the appellants therein. Relevant passages read thus:
“13. Nothing much however, turns on this principle as far
as the appeals before us are concerned. Notwithstanding
the application of the mollifying provisions of the Act
retrospectively, by the proviso to Section 41(1), Parliament
has expressly declared that the benefit of the retrospective
mollificatory provisions would not be available to the
cases ‘pending in appeal’. What is crucial is whether
this segregation of ‘cases pending in appeal’ and their
exclusion from the application of the beneficial effects of
the amending Act infringes the equality right guaranteed
under Article 14 of the Constitution.
…
22. Inasmuch as Act 9 of 2001 introduced significant and
material changes in the parent Act, which would affect the
trial itself, application of the amended Act to cases where
the trials had concluded and appeals were pending on the
date of its commencement could possibly result in the trials
being vitiated, leading to retrials, thereby defeating at least
the first objective of avoiding delay in trials. The accused,
who had been tried and convicted before 2-10-2001 (i.e.
as per the unamended 1985 Act) could possibly urge in
the pending appeals, that as their trials were not held in
accordance with the amended provisions of the Act, their
trials must be held to be vitiated and that they should be
retried in accordance with the amended provisions of the
Act. This could be a direct and deleterious consequence
of applying the amended provisions of the Act to trials
which had concluded and in which appeals were filed prior
to the date of the amending Act coming into force. This
would certainly defeat the first objective of avoiding delay
in such trials. Hence, Parliament appears to have removed
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 491
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
this class of cases from the ambit of the amendments and
excluded them from the scope of the amending Act so that
the pending appeals could be disposed of expeditiously
by applying the unamended Act without the possibility of
reopening the concluded trials.
23. Thus, in our view, the Rubicon indicated by Parliament
is the conclusion of the trial and pendency of appeal. In the
cases of pending trials, and cases pending investigation,
the trial is yet to conclude; hence, the retrospective
mollification of the rigour of punishment has been made
applicable. In the cases where the trials are concluded
and appeals are pending, the application of the amended
Act appears to have been excluded so as to preclude
the possible contingency of reopening concluded trials.
In our judgment, the classification is very much rational
and based on clearly intelligible differentia, which has
rational nexus with one of the objectives to be achieved
by the classification. There is one exceptional situation,
however, which may produce an anomalous result. If the
trial had just concluded before 2-10-2001, but the appeal
is filed after 2-10-2001, it cannot be said that the appeal
was pending as on the date of the coming into force of the
amending Act, and the amendment would be applicable
even in such cases. The observations of this Court in
Nallamilli case [(2001) 7 SCC 708] would apply to such a
case. The possibility of such a fortuitous case would not
be a strong enough reason to attract the wrath of Article
14 and its constitutional consequences. Hence, we are
unable to accept the contention that the proviso to Section
41 of the amending Act is hit by Article 14.
…
28. In the result, we are of the view that the proviso to
Section 41(1) of the amending Act 9 of 2001 is constitutional
and is not hit by Article 14. Consequently, in all cases, in
which the trials had concluded and appeals were pending
on 2-10-2001, when amending Act 9 of 2001 came into
force, the amendments introduced by the amending Act 9
of 2001 would not be applicable and they would have to be
492 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
disposed of in accordance with the NDPS Act, 1985, as it
stood before 2-10-2001. Since there are other contentions
of law and fact raised in each of these cases, they would
have to be placed before the appropriate Benches for
decision and disposal in accordance with the law.”
37. Lastly, in the case of Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar
Biswas,24 Y.V. Chandrachud, J (as His Lordship then was) arising
from a conviction under the Customs Act, 1962 succinctly delineated
the purpose, purport and object of the Probation Act in the following
words:
“11. The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure
and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if spared
the indignity of incarceration, can be usefully rehabilitated in
society. A jail term should normally be enough to wipe out the
stain of guilt but the sentence which the society passes on
convicts is relentless. The ignominy commonly associated
with a jail term and the social stigma which attaches to
convicts often render the remedy worse than the disease
and the very purpose of punishment stands in the danger
of being frustrated. In recalcitrant cases, punishment has
to be deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn
themselves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But
the novice who strays into the path of crime ought, in the
interest of society, be treated as being socially sick. Crimes
are not always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin
may lie in psychological factors induced by hunger, want
and poverty. The Probation of Offenders Act recognises the
importance of environmental influence in the commission
of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender
can be reformed and rehabilitated in society. An attitude of
social defiance and recklessness which comes to a convict
who, after a jail term, is apt to think that he has no more to
lose or fear may breed a litter of crime. The object of the
Probation of Offenders Act is to nip that attitude in the bud.
Winifred A. Elkin describes probation as a system which
24 (1974) 4 SCC 222
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 493
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
provides a means of re-education without the necessity of
breaking up the offender›s normal life and removing him
from the natural surroundings of his home [ English Juvenile
Courts, (1938) p. 162] . Edwin H. Sutherland raises it to a
status convicted offender. [ Principles of Criminology 4th
Edn. (1947) p. 383]
…
13. There is no foundation for the fear that offenders
released on probation may hold the society to ransom
and the society may therefore look upon the release of
offenders on probation as the triumph of criminals over
the weaknesses of law. An offender released on probation
is convicted but not forthwith sentenced in the sense of
penal laws. Under the disposition made by the Court the
sentence is suspended during the period of probation.
Section 4(1) of the Act provides that instead of sentencing
the offender ‘at once’, the Court may direct his release on
his entering into a bond to ‘receive sentence when called
upon’ during the probationary period and in the meantime
to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Thus it is only
in a limited, though a socially significant, sense that the Act
constitutes an exception to the broad and general principle
of criminal law embodied, for example, in Sections 245(2),
258(2), 306(2) and Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, that a sentence shall follow on a conviction.”
38. We preface our observations that this Court has consistently held
that the safety of citizens is paramount. The safety of consumers was
the goal of the PoFA Act as safety standards of food is essential for
the health and well-being of its citizens. The PoFA Act, now repealed
by the FSS Act, was instrumental in preventing adulterated food in
the market by creating a framework wherein adulterated food could
not be sold as they would endanger the lives of consumers. Food,
as we all know, is essential for life and no leeway must be given in
such circumstances.
Application Of The Probation Of Offenders Act
39. A canonical rule of statutory interpretation, i.e, the rule of literal
construction, is that the words of a statute should be read as it is
494 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and should be understood in their natural and ordinary sense. A
reference to the rule of beneficial construction of a statute or any
other rule of statutory interpretation may be resorted to only if the
literal rule fails to provide suitable guidance or results in absurdity.
40. There can be no quarrel that Section 20AA, introduced by way of
amendment, is too clear admitting of no absurdity and seals this
question of law against the appellants. Nothing in these decisions have
shown us that the rule of beneficial construction can also be extended
to the release of offenders on probation, especially considering the
express provision present in Section 20AA of the PoFA Act.
41. This Court has often lamented the lack of sentencing guidelines
in this country, which we echo. That being said, we are of the firm
opinion that there exists a fundamental difference between reduction
or mollification of a sentence and releasing an offender on probation.
The probationary process envisages that first time offenders who
are capable of reformation can be provided a benefit such that they
can continue to a be a part of society as capable and law-abiding
citizens in the future. The thrust of penology in the past few decades
has been focused on the reformation of an individual. “Every saint
has a past, and every sinner has a future”. While there is no quarrel
with the probationary process, we ought to remain subservient to the
wisdom of the legislature in applying the benefit of probation. This
Court cannot offend the express provisions present in any legislative
instrument merely to provide a benefit to an offender, not envisaged
under the law. Section 20AA of the PoFA Act read with Section 97
of the FSS Act makes it clear that the benefit under the Probation
Act cannot be made applicable to an offence committed between
1976 (when Section 20AA was introduced) up to the repeal of the
statute in 2006 by the FSS Act in line with the decision rendered in
Babu Ram (supra).
42. Therefore, the first question is decided against the appellants.
Mollification Of Punishment
43. While deliberating on the second question, we have also considered
the claim that the sentence should at least be reduced as per the
FSS Act. Several decisions have been cited before us to contend that
mollification of a punishment on the ground that the new enactment
provides for a lesser punishment is permissible. We are, however, in
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 495
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
respectful disagreement with such proposition insofar as the instant
case is concerned. A ‘repeals and savings’ clause in any statute is
not mere surplusage that the Courts may ignore in the interpretation
of the law. When a ‘repeal and savings’ clause specifically protects
a penalty provided for in the old enactment, the intention of the
legislature is clear. This Court, in its enthusiasm, cannot and should
not provide a benefit to the accused that is not permitted in law.
Mollification must only be provided in cases where a provision in
relation to ‘repeal and savings’ is either not present or where the
‘repeal and savings’ clause envisages such a possibility. This is in
line with the decision rendered in Basheer (supra). Therefore, the
second question too is decided against the appellants.
44. At this stage, a plea to our conscience has been made that despite
the order issuing notice being limited to sentence, to look at the
grounds for conviction and to provide some relief in the lead appeal.
Considering the age of the appellants and the fact that the offences
took place in 2001 and 1985, we consider it appropriate to look
into the record to see whether we may interfere with the conviction
recorded against these appellants.
45. In the lead appeal, the cause for the offence is that the appellants
were selling curd that was found to have a fat content lower than the
standard prescribed for buffalo milk, leading to its classification as
adulterated. The record before us suggests that the Food Inspector
took 12 samples of curd, mixed them in a vessel and out of that
mixture took a sample and sent it for analysis. The Food Inspector
had not marked whether the milk was buffalo milk or cow milk, and the
standard for buffalo milk was taken for the purpose of analysis. The
public analyst recorded that there was 4.6% fat against a minimum
of 5% fat as required under the standard for buffalo milk. However,
the curd was also sent for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory,
Kolkata. It reported that the percentage of fat in the sample was 8.3%,
which is higher than the minimum percentage required. This apparent
discrepancy should be interpreted to the benefit of the accused.
46. In C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala,25 the sentence of imprisonment
was converted to a sentence of fine on the ground that there was a
discrepancy between the reports as to the percentage of adulteration:
25 (2006) 13 SCC 290
496 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“3. The appellant was found guilty of an offence punishable
under Sections 16(1)(a)(i) and (ii) read with Sections 7(1)
and (2)(ix)(d) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954. A sample of moong dal (black gram dal) was taken
from the shop of the appellant on 20-3-1989 and it was
sent for chemical analysis and it was found by the Regional
Analytical Laboratory at Calicut that it contained 0.28% of
talc as foreign matter. The appellant was not satisfied with
the report and sent the second sample to be examined
by the Central Food Laboratory and the Central Food
Laboratory issued a certificate dated 1-8-1989 wherein
the percentage of talc was described as 1.363% and
the learned Single Judge held the appellant guilty of the
offence punishable under the sections as aforesaid of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
4. Counsel for the appellant submits that talc is not an
inorganic foreign matter as it does not come within the
Explanation contained in clause A.18.06.11 (sic A.18.06.10)
of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 and
whereas the said contention was refuted by the counsel for
the State. Counsel for the appellant also contended that
this is not a harmful substance and the talc was added only
as preservative and to prevent the sticking of the grains
of dal and therefore, the sentence of imprisonment may
be converted to that of a sentence of fine.
5. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case that though the certificate issued by the Central
Food Laboratory supersedes the report of the Regional
Analytical Laboratory, it should be noticed that the first
report showed the percentage only at 0.28 which was
much below the prohibited percentage. In view of the
aforesaid circumstances, we hold that the sentence of
imprisonment be converted into a sentence of fine and
a sum of Rs 10,000 is imposed as fine. The appellant to
remit the fine so imposed within a period of two months
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 497
Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu
Therefore, the approach adopted in C. Mohammed (supra) can be
followed and the lead appeal calls for being allowed in part.
47. With reference to the connected appeal, we do not find any reason
to interfere with the conviction of the courts below. However, the
decision of the coordinate Bench in A.K. Sarkar & Co. (supra) weighs
on us heavily. Being a decision of a coordinate Bench, ordinarily we
ought to follow the same. However, we have our own reservations
on the reasoning that led to the conclusion in such decision. This is
primarily because the Bench had not been taken through the ‘repeal
and savings’ clause in the FSS Act, when it provided the benefit of
mollified sentence, and also because of reliance placed on T. Barai
(supra) which we, for reasons assigned above, have held not to
be applicable here. While the normal course of action calls for a
reference of the question of law to a larger Bench for an answer,
we believe that this will only lead to protracted litigation and would
leave the appellant - Naresh Chandra - at the mercy of the sword
of Damocles which has been looming over him for forty summers.
Therefore, notwithstanding that we are unable to be ad idem with the
dictum in A.K. Sarkar & Co. (supra) but, in the interest of justice,
equity, propriety and judicial comity, we propose to follow the same
and proceed to partly allow the connected appeal too.
Conclusions and Relief
48. Therefore, resting on our discussion aforesaid, we conclude that:
a. The benefit that the Probation Act envisages is inapplicable to
an offence committed under the PoFA Act, if the offence has
been committed between introduction of Section 20AA in 1976
and its repeal in 2006 by the FSS Act, in line with the decision
rendered in Babu Ram (supra);
b. The benefit of mollification of sentence cannot be given when
a ‘repeal and savings’ clause in the repealing statute expressly
saves a penalty incurred under the repealed statute;
c. As per the approach in C. Mohammed (supra), the lead appeal
has to be partly allowed considering the facts and circumstances
and the discrepancy in the analysis reports of the seized curd;
d. The connected appeal also needs to be partly allowed on the
basis of the dictum in A.K. Sarkar & Co. (supra).
498 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
49. For the aforesaid reasons, both the appeals are partly allowed.
50. Sentences of imprisonment for 6 (six) months imposed on Nagarajan
and Selvaraj stand converted to a fine of Rs. 30,000/- each, while in
case of Naresh Chandra, the sentence of imprisonment is converted
to that of fine of Rs.20,000/.
51. All three appellants are given time till end of June, 2025 to pay the
fine, failing which this order shall stand revoked and they shall expose
themselves to be taken in custody for serving the prison term of six
months, minus set-off for any period they were in custody earlier.
Result of the case: Appeals partly allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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