Holding

A confessional FIR is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and in the absence of other admissible proof the appellant must be acquitted; the High Court’s alteration of the conviction was erroneous.

Summary

The appellant, Narayan Yadav, lodged a First Information Report (FIR) in which he confessed to killing Ram Babu Sharma during a drunken quarrel. The trial court convicted him of murder under Section 302 IPC, a conviction later altered by the High Court to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, invoking Exception 4 to Section 300. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the confessional FIR could be used as evidence, the admissibility of the post‑mortem expert testimony, the relevance of the appellant's conduct under Sections 27 and 8 of the Evidence Act, and the correctness of applying Exception 4. The Court held that a confessional FIR is barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act, that expert medical evidence alone cannot sustain a murder conviction, and that the conditions for Exception 4 were not met. Consequently, the High Court’s alteration of the conviction was erroneous and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.

Issues considered

Whether a confessional FIR lodged by the accused is admissible as evidence under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Whether the post‑mortem expert testimony can, by itself, establish the offence of murder.
Whether the appellant's conduct is admissible under Sections 27 and 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Whether Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC can be invoked to reduce murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Whether the High Court erred in altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC.

Legislation cited

Evidence Act, 1872s. 21, s. 24, s. 25, s. 26, s. 27, s. 30, s. 8
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 300, s. 300 Exception 4, s. 302, s. 304 Part I

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred in passing the impugned judgment relying on the confessional FIR filed by the appellant-accused himself and the medical evidence to uphold his conviction, however, altering it from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I. Headnotes† Evidence Act, 1872 ss.302, 304 Part I – Confessional FIR, not admissible in evidence – Appellant-accused himself lodged FIR confessing the murder of the deceased in a drunken quarrel after the deceased allegedly made an obscene remark about the appellant’s girlfriend – Convicted u/s.302, IPC

Subjects

Confessional FIRConfessional FIR not admissible in evidenceConviction altered from Section 302, Penal Code, 1860 to Section 304 Part IConfession before a police officerFIR of confessional nature made by accusedContents of the FIR hit by Section 25, Evidence Act, 1872MurderObscene remark about girlfriendSection 27, Evidence Act, 1872Section 8, Evidence Act, 1872Corroboration of medical evidence with the confessional part of the FIRDoctor not a witness of factExpert WitnessIncorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300, Penal Code, 1860Panch witnesses turned hostileNon-confessional FIR admissible against the accused

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 568 : 2025 INSC 927

Narayan Yadav
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 3343 of 2025)
05 August 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in passing the impugned judgment
relying on the confessional FIR filed by the appellant-accused
himself and the medical evidence to uphold his conviction, however,
altering it from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I.

Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.25 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 304
Part I – Confessional FIR, not admissible in evidence –
Appellant-accused himself lodged FIR confessing the murder
of the deceased in a drunken quarrel after the deceased
allegedly made an obscene remark about the appellant’s
girlfriend – Convicted u/s.302, IPC – High Court relied on the
confessional FIR and medical evidence to uphold conviction,
however, it was altered from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I, giving
benefit of Exception 4 to s.300 – Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – Confessional FIR is not admissible in
evidence – Contents of the FIR are hit by s.25, Evidence Act, being
a confession before a police officer – An FIR of a confessional nature
made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against
him, except to the extent that it shows he made a statement soon
after the offence, thereby identifying him as the maker of the report,
which is admissible as evidence of his conduct u/s.8, Evidence Act –
High Court erred in reading the contents of the FIR lodged by the
appellant into evidence – There was no question at all for the High
Court to seek corroboration of the medical evidence on record with
the confessional part of the FIR lodged by the appellant – Further,
the High Court should have been mindful of the fact that a doctor is
not a witness of fact – Evidence of such an expert is of an advisory
character – An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder
solely on the basis of medical evidence on record – Furthermore, the
depositions of the panch witnesses do not inspire any confidence –
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 569

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

Most of them turned hostile – No discovery of fact at the instance
of the appellant, relevant and admissible u/s.27, Evidence Act, was
established – Also, the High Court erred in invoking Exception 4 to
s.300, IPC – Appellant acquitted. [Paras 24, 25, 28, 29, 52]
Penal Code, 1860 – Exception 4 to s.300 – When cannot be
invoked – Discussed. [Paras 40-43, 48-50]
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.27, 8 – Implication of – Conditions
necessary for the applicability of s.27 – Discussed. [Paras 33, 36]

Evidence – Of expert witness – Nature – Advisory:
Held: An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because
of his specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge
may not be fully equipped to assess – The evidence of such an
expert is of an advisory character – The credibility of the expert
witness depends on the reasons provided in support of his
conclusions, as well as the data and material forming the basis
of those conclusions. [Para 28]

Case Law Cited
Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [1957] 1 SCR 657 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC
42; Faddi v. State of M.P. [1964] 6 SCR 312 : 1964 SCC OnLine
SC 123; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar [1966] 1 SCR 134 :
1965 SCC OnLine SC 109; Murli v. State of Rajasthan [2009] 13
SCR 378 : (2009) 9 SCC 417; A. N. Venkatesh & Anr. v. State
of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714; State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr. [1977] 1 SCR 601 : (1976) 4 SCC
382; Budhi Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2012] 11 SCR
848 : (2012) 13 SCC 663; Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1993]
3 SCR 696 : (1993) 4 SCC 238; Surain Singh v. State of Punjab
[2017] 2 SCR 824 : (2017) 5 SCC 796 – relied on.

List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Confessional FIR; Confessional FIR not admissible in evidence;
Conviction altered from Section 302, Penal Code, 1860 to Section
304 Part I; Confession before a police officer; FIR of confessional
nature made by accused; Confession made by accused before the
police; Contents of the FIR hit by Section 25, Evidence Act, 1872;
570 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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Murder; Obscene remark about girlfriend; Section 27, Evidence
Act, 1872; Section 8, Evidence Act, 1872; Corroboration of medical
evidence with the confessional part of the FIR; Doctor not a witness
of fact; Expert Witness; Incorrect application of Exception 4 to
Section 300, Penal Code, 1860; Panch witnesses turned hostile;
Non-confessional FIR admissible against the accused.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3343 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.01.2025 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 1538 of 2021

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
A Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Vishek Vats,
Ms. Shaik Soni Ahamed, Ms. Kiran Bala Agarwal.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Ms. Sugandha Jain, Prabodh Kumar.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ........................................................................ 2
B. ANAYLYSIS ................................................................................... 6
a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence .................... 7
b. Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in Nature .... 20
c. Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Act of 1872 ............ 22
d. Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC... 25
C. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 34

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 571

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 dated
16.01.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”)
by which the appeal preferred by the appellant herein against the
judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court came
to be partly allowed by altering the conviction of the appellant
herein from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short,
“the IPC”) to Section 304 Part I of the IPC.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The appellant (original accused) himself lodged a First Information
Report (FIR) dated 27.09.2019 with Korba Kotwali Police Station,
District Korba, which came to be registered for the offence punishable
under Section 302 of the IPC. The FIR reads thus:
“On 27.09.2019 I came to the P.S. Kotwali on the orders
of Chowki Incharge for getting the Nalsi number in Crime
No. 0/19 for the offence under Sections 302 and 380 IPC
respectively. Nalsi number detailed that I am residing in
the house of my relative Rajnath Yadav situated near
the Pump House, Korba. I earn my livelihood as a milk
supplier. I started work with Ram Babu Sharma, Thekedar
past 15-20 days. Ram Babu Sharma used to call me for
having drink at his house. Ram Baby invited me at his
place on 24.09.2019. I went to his house at about 9.30
PM situated at Parshuram Nagar. We both sat and drank.
Meanwhile I showed my girlfriend’s pic from my mobile.
Then he said that get your girlfriend at my place and leave
her with me for one night. Hearing this quarrel started
between us and we started to fight. Then I picked up a
knife kept in his house for cutting vegetables and inflicted
blows on his neck and stomach in anger and killed him by
hitting a log of wood on his head, legs and private part.
Thereafter I dragged his dead body near the bedside and
covered it with a cloth that I took out from an almirah. Then
I ransacked his room and took away his purse containing
Rs. 7000 and keys of the Bolero car. I locked the room
from outside and got the Bolero outside and locked the
main door and ran towards Bilaspur in Bolero. I met with
572 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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an accident at Raipur Road, ahead of Bilaspur. When
I regained consciousness in morning I found myself in
Saragaon Hospital where my mother and Yuvraj Yadu both
were present. Today morning I came to Korba after getting
discharged from the hospital. I informed about the incident
to my mausa Rajnath Yadav, Rahul Chaudhari and Anuj
Yadav and also informed the CSEB Chowki. Then I went
to Ram Babu’s house with police people and pointed out
the dead body. My vehicle is at the place of accident. I
am filing the report. Investigation to be done.”
4. Upon registration of the FIR, lodged by the appellant himself, at
the concerned Police Station referred to above, the investigation
commenced. It appears that the investigating officer, after arresting
the appellant, took him to the house of the deceased. After breaking
open the house, the dead body of the deceased was found lying in
a pool of blood inside his residence. A panchnama of the scene of
offence was prepared in the presence of panch witnesses. The knife
allegedly used by the appellant to inflict injuries on the deceased was
recovered from the place of occurrence, i.e., the deceased’s house.
The clothes and other articles were also collected in presence of the
panch witnesses by preparing a panchnama, and were sent to the
Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis. The clothes of
the appellant were discovered at his instance from the residence of
his uncle, Rajnath Yadav, by drawing a panchnama.
5. The inquest panchnama of the dead body of the deceased was drawn
in the presence of the panch witnesses. The body of the deceased
was then sent for post-mortem examination. The post-mortem report
Exhibit-PW 34 recorded the following injuries found on the body of
the deceased:
“1. An incised wound was present on the right Side of
his forehead measuring 6 X 2 cm, deep to the bone, in
a vertical position.
2. An incised wound was present on the left side of his
forehead, the size of which was 3 X 1 cm, deep to the
bone, in a vertical position.
3. An incised wound was present on the skin of the right
parietal bone of the head, which was 4 X 2 cm, deep to
the bone, in a vertical position.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 573

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

4. An incised lesion was present on the skin of the left
parietal bone, which was 5 X 2 cm in size, deep to the
bone, in a vertical position, which was on the middle part
of parietal bone.
5. An incised wound was present on the anterior part of
the abdomen at the iliac fossa part which was 4 X 2 X 2
cm in size.
6. An incised wound was present on the upper right side
of the chest, below the clavicle bone, the size of which
was 4 X 2 deep to the upper part of the lung.”
6. The cause of death, as stated in the post-mortem report and duly
proved by Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), was shock resulting from excessive
bleeding from the right side of the chest and injury to the upper lobe
of the right lung.
7. Upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet came to be filed by
the investigating officer, and the filing of chargesheet for the offence
enumerated above culminated in the Sessions Case No. 9 of 2020.
8. The Sessions Judge, Korba, proceeded to frame charge against the
appellant for the offences mentioned above. The appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. In the course of trial,
the prosecution examined the following witnesses:
i. PW-1, Rahul Kumar Chaudhari, panch witness (turned hostile);
ii. PW-2 Kamlesh Kumar, son of the deceased;
iii. PW-3 Ravishanker Sriniwas, panch witness;
iv. PW-4 Rampradeep Sharma, panch witness;
v. PW-5 Ramniwas Sharma, panch witness;
vi. PW-6 Jalashwar Sakar, panch witness;
vii. PW-7 B.R. Chaudhary, Police witness
viii. PW-8 Sudama Prasad, Police witness
ix. PW-9 Ashok Pandey, Police witness
x. PW-10 Dr. R.K. Divya, Medical Officer who performed post-
mortem
xi. PW-11 Hemant Patle, Police witness
574 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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9. The prosecution also adduced a few documentary evidence.
10. Upon completion of the recording of the oral evidence, further
statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In his statement, the appellant
claimed that he had been falsely implicated in the alleged crime and
asserted his complete innocence.
11. The Trial Court, upon overall appreciation of both oral as well as
the documentary evidence on record, reached the conclusion that
the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and
accordingly, it held the appellant guilty of the offence of murder and
sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
12. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court, preferred an appeal before
the High Court. The High Court partly allowed the appeal and
altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 of the IPC
to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, giving benefit of Exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC
13. In such circumstances referred to above the appellant is before this
Court with the present appeal.

B. ANAYLYSIS
14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the Impugned Judgment.
15. The entire judgment of the High Court could be termed as erroneous
on several grounds, there are errors apparent on the face of the
Impugned Judgment. The first misstep was that the High Court
examined the medical evidence on record in detail and then
proceeded to directly corroborate it with the contents of the FIR
lodged by the appellant himself. In doing so, the High Court fully
convinced itself that the appellant’s statements in the form of a
confession, as contained in the FIR, were entirely corroborated by
the medical evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that the
appellant had committed the alleged crime. In arriving at such a
conclusion, the High Court overlooked some fundamental principles
of criminal jurisprudence.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 575

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence
16. The FIR was exhibited in evidence (Exhibit P-14) through the oral
evidence of the investigating officer PW-9, Ashok Pandey. PW-9
proved his signature on the FIR and also identified the signature
of the first informant i.e., the appellant-herein. However, the other
contents of the FIR could not have been proved through the testimony
of the investigating officer. A plain reading of the FIR indicates that it
contains a confession by its maker i.e., the appellant-herein, regarding
the commission of the alleged offence.
17. A statement in an FIR can normally be used only to contradict
its maker as provided in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (for short, “the Act of 1872”), or to corroborate his evidence
as envisaged in Section 157 of the Act of 1872. In a criminal trial,
however, neither of these is possible as long as the maker of the
statement is an accused in the case, unless he offers himself to be
examined as a witness [See: Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., 1957 SCC
OnLine SC 42]. J.L. Kapur, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench
in that decision has observed:
“A first information report is not a substantive piece
of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the
statement of the maker under Section 157, Evidence
Act, or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act. It
cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial
if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or
contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is
not evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

18. The High Court failed to take into consideration two landmark
decisions of this Court – one in Faddi v. State of M.P., 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 123, and the other in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of
Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 109.
19. In Faddi (supra), this Court stated that:
“If the FIR given by the accused contains any admission
as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act there is no
bar in using such an admission against the maker thereof
as permitted under Section 21 of the Act, provided such
576 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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admission is not inculpatory in character. In the judgment
their Lordships distinguished Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC
366] in the following lines:
“But it appears to us that in the context in which the
observation is made and in the circumstances, which
we have verified from the record of that case, that the
Sessions Judge had definitely held the first information
report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted
to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High
Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this
observation really refers to a first information report
which is in the nature of a confession by the maker
thereof. Of course, a confessional first information
report cannot be used against the maker when he be
an accused and necessarily cannot be used against
a co-accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)

20. In Aghnoo Nagesia (supra), this Court sounded a note of caution
that when the statement in the FIR given by an accused contains
incriminating materials and it is difficult to sift the exculpatory portion
therefrom, the whole of it must be excluded from evidence.
21. In Faddi (supra), the issue before this Court was whether the FIR
lodged by the accused himself therein was admissible in evidence.
In the facts of the said case, this Court held that the objection to the
admissibility of the FIR lodged by the appellant was not sound, as the
FIR only contained a few admissions, and those admissions did not
amount to a confession so as to render the entire FIR inadmissible
in evidence. We quote the relevant observations made by this Court
in Faddi (supra) as under:
“14. It is contended for the appellant that the first information
report was inadmissible in evidence and should not have
been therefore taken on the record. In support, reliance
is placed on the case reported as Nisar Ali v. State of U.P
[AIR 1957 SC 366]. We have considered this contention
and do not see any force in it.
15. The report is not a confession of the appellant. It
is not a statement made to a police officer during the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 577

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act
and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do
not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission by
the accused of certain facts which have a bearing on
the question to be determined by the Court viz. how
and by whom the murder of Gulab was committed, or
whether the appellant's statement in Court denying the
correctness of certain statements' of the prosecution
witnesses is correct or not. Admissions are admissible in
evidence under Section 21 of the Act. Section 17 defines
an admission to be a statement, oral or documentary,
which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or
relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons,
and under the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in
the Act. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant
and may be proved as against a person who makes
them. Illustrations (c), (d) and (e) to Section 21 are of
the circumstances in which an accused could prove his
own admissions which go in his favour in view of the
exceptions mentioned in Section 21 to the provision
that admissions could not be proved by the person who
makes them. It is therefore clear that admissions of an
accused can be proved against him.
16. The Privy Council, in very similar circumstances, held
long ago in Dal Singh v. King Emperor [LR 44 IA 137] such
first information reports to be admissible in evidence. It
was said in that case at p. 142:
“It is important to compare the story told by Dal
Singh when making his statement at the trial with
that what he said in the report he made to the police
in the document which he signed, a document which
is sufficiently authenticated. The report is clearly
admissible. It was in no sense a confession. As
appears from its terms, it was rather in the nature
of an information or charge laid against Mohan and
Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have
been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to
Jubbulpur. As such the statement is proper evidence
against him….
578 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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It will be observed that this statement is at several
points at complete variance with what Dal Singh
afterwards stated in Court. The Sessions Judge
regarded the document as discrediting his defence.
He had to decide between the story for the prosecution
and that told for Dal Singh.”
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the facts
of that case were distinguishable in some respects from
the facts of this case. Such a distinction, if any, has no
bearing on the question of the admissibility of the report.
The report was held admissible because it was not a
confession and it was helpful in determining the matter
before the Court.
17. In Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC 366] Kapur, J. who
spoke for the Court said, after narrating the facts:
“An objection has been taken to the admissibility
of this report as it was made by a person who was
a co-accused. A first information report is not a
substantive piece of evidence and can only be used
to corroborate the statement of the maker under
Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under
Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence
against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes
an accused, not to corroborate or contradict other
witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is not evidence.”
It is on these observations that it has been contended for
the appellant that his report was inadmissible in evidence.
Ostensibly, the expression ‘it cannot be used as evidence
against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an
accused’ supports the appellant’s contention. But it appears
to us that in the context in which the observation is made
and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the
record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely
held the first information report lodged by the co-accused
who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and
that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment,
this observation really refers to a first information report
which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 579

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

Of course a confessional first information report cannot
be used against the maker when he be an accused and
necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused. Further,
the last sentence of the above-quoted observation is
significant and indicates what the Court meant was that
the first information report lodged by Qudratullah, the co-
accused, was not evidence against Nisar Ali. This Court
did not mean — as it had not to determine in that case —
that a first information report which is not a confession
cannot be used as an admission under Section 21 of the
Evidence Act or as a relevant statement under any other
provisions of that Act. We find also that this observation
has been understood in this way by the Rajasthan High
Court in State v. Balchand [AIR 1960 Raj 101] and in State
of Rajasthan v. Shiv Singh [AIR 1962 Raj 3] and by the
Allahabad High Court in Allahdia v. State [1959 All LJ 340] .
18. We therefore hold that the objection to the admissibility
of the first information report lodged by the appellant is not
sound and that the Courts below have rightly admitted it
in evidence and have made proper use of it.”
(Emphasis supplied)

22. We now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in Aghnoo
Nagesia (supra). The following observations of this Court at
paragraphs 9 to 18 are relevant and are quoted below:-
“9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions
of law dealing with confessions made by an accused.
The law relating to confessions is to be found generally
in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to
31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading
“Admissions”. Confession is a species of admission,
and is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an
admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its
admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section
24 excludes confession caused by certain inducements,
threats and promises. Section 25 provides: “No confession
made to a police officer shall be proved as against a
580 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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person accused of an offence”. The terms of S. 25 are
imperative. A confession made to a police officer under
any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against
the accused. It covers a confession made when he was
free and not in police custody, as also a confession made
before any investigation has begun. The expression
“accused of any offence” covers a person accused of
an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of
the offence when he made the confession. Section 26
prohibits proof against any person of a confession made
by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made
in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial
ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession made to
a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not
qualify the absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession
made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a
proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24,
25 and 26.It provides that when any fact is deposed to
as discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of
a police officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to
the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162
of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any
statement made by any person to a police officer in the
course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry
or trial in respect of the offence under investigation, save
as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under
sub-s. (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it
shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the
Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to
include a confession made to a police officer in the course
of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the
course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate
under S. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject
to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except
as provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession
by an accused to a police officer is absolutely protected
under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 581

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

course of an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to
any other person made by him while in the custody of a
police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in
the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions
seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by
an accused to a police officer or made by him while he
is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted,
and should not be used in evidence against him. They are
based upon grounds of public policy and the fullest effect
should be given to them.
10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
for the recording of the first information. The information
report as such is not substantive evidence. It may be used
to corroborate the informant under S. 157 of the Evidence
Act or to contradict him under S. 145 of the Act, if the
informant is called as a witness. If the first information is
given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the
information is admissible against him as evidence of his
conduct under S. 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information
is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the
accused as an admission under S. 21 of the Evidence Act
and is relevant, see Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Cri.
Appeal No. 210 of 1963, dated 24-1-1964: (AIR 1964 SC
1850), explaining Nisar Ali v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957
SC 366 and Dal Singh v. King Emperor, 44 Ind App 137:
(AIR 1917 PC 25). But a confessional first information report
to a police Officer cannot be used against the accused in
view of S. 25 of the Evidence Act.
11. The Indian Evidence Act does not define “confession”.
For a long time, the Courts in India adopted the definition
of “confession” given in Art. 22 of Stephen’s Digest of the
Law of Evidence. According to that definition a confession
is an admission made at any time by a person charged
with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he
committed that crime. This definition was discarded by the
Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor,
66 Ind App 66 at p. 81: (AIR 1939 PC 47 at p. 52). Lord
Atkin observed:
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“.......no statement that contains self exculpatory
matter can amount to confession, if the exculpatory
statement is of some fact which if true would negative
the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a
confession must either admit in terms the offence, or
at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute
the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating
fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not
of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the
accused is the owner of and was in recent possession
of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no
explanation of any other man’s possession.” These
observations received the approval of this Court in
Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (1), 1953 SCR 94
at p. 104; (AIR 1952 SC 354 at p. 357). In State of
U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 at p.
21: (AIR 1960 SC 1125 at pp. 1128-1129). Shah, J.,
referred to a confession as a statement made by a
person stating or suggesting the inference that he
has committed a crime.
12. Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an
admission of the offence by a person charged with the
offence. A statement which contains self-exculpatory
matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory
statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative
the offence alleged to be confessed. If an admission of an
accused is to be used against him, the whole of it should
be tendered in evidence and if part of the admission is
exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is not
at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part only.
See Hanumant Govind v. State of M. P. 1952 SCR 1091
at p. 1111: (AIR 1952 SC 343 at p. 350) and 1953 SCR
94 : (AIR 1952 SC 354). The accused is entitled to insist
that the entire admission including the exculpatory part
must be tendered in evidence. But this principle is of no
assistance to the accused where no part of his statement
is self-exculpatory; and the prosecution intends to use the
whole of the statement against the accused.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 583

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

13. Now, a confession may consist of several parts and
may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime
but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity,
the provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the
concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of
the accused. If the confession is tainted the taint attaches
to each part of it. It is not permissible in law to separate
one part and to admit it in evidence as a non-confessional
statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact,
i.e., some fact which by itself or along with other admitted
or proved facts suggests the inference that the accused
committed the crime, and though each part taken singly
may not amount to a confession, each of them being part
of a confessional statement partakes of the character
of a confession. If a statement contains an admission
of an offence, not only that admission but also every
other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the
statement is part of the confession.
14. If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision
of law such as S.24, S. 25 and S. 26 of the Evidence Act,
the entire confessional statement in all its parts including
the admissions of minor incriminating facts must also be
excluded, unless proof of it is permitted by some other
section under as S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Little substance
and content would be left in Ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of
admission of incriminating facts in a confessional statement
is permitted.
15. Sometimes, a single sentence in a statement may not
amount to a confession at all. Take a case of a person
charged under S. 301-A of the Indian Penal Code and
a statement made by him to a police officer that “I was
drunk: I was driving a car at a speed of 80 miles per
hour. I could see A on the road at a distance of 80 yards;
I did not blow the horn: I made no attempt to stop the
car; the car knocked down A”. No single sentence in this
statement amounts to a confession; but the statement
read as a whole amounts to a confession of an offence
under S. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, and it would
not be permissible to admit in evidence each sentence
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separately as a nonconfessional statement. Again, take a
case where a single sentence in a statement amounts to
an admission of an offence. ‘A’ states “I struck ‘B’ with a
tangi and hurt him”. In consequence of the injury ‘B’ died.
‘A’ committed an offence and is chargeable under various
sections of the Indian Penal Code. Unless he brings his
case within one of the recognised exceptions, his statement
amounts to an admission of an offence, but the other parts
of the statement such as the motive, the preparation, the
absence of provocation, concealment of the weapon and
the subsequent conduct, all throw light upon the gravity of
the offence and the intention and knowledge of the accused,
and negatives the right of private defence, accident and
other possible defences. Each and every admission of an
incriminating fact contained in the confessional statement
is part of the confession.
16. If the confession is caused by an inducement, threat
or promise as contemplated by S. 24 of the Evidence
Act, the whole of the confession is excluded by S. 24.
Proof of not only the admission of the offence but also
the admission of every other incriminating fact such as
the motive, the preparation and the subsequent conduct is
excluded by S. 24. To hold that the proof of the admission
of other incriminating facts is not barred by S. 24 is to rob
the section of its practical utility and content. It may be
suggested that the bar of S. 24 does not apply to the other
admissions, but though receivable in evidence, they are of
no weight, as they were caused by inducement, threat or
promise. According to this suggestion, the other admissions
are relevant but are of no value. But we think that on a
plain construction of S. 24, proof of all the admissions of
incriminating facts contained in a confessional statement
is excluded by the section. Similarly, Ss. 25 and 26 bar not
only proof of admission of an offence by an accused to a
police officer or made by him while in the custody of a police
officer but also admissions contained in the confessional
statement of all incriminating facts related to the offence.
17. A little reflection will show that the expression
“confession” in Ss. 24 to 30 refers to the confessional
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 585

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

statement as a whole including not only the admissions of
the offence but also all other admissions of incriminating
facts related to the offence. Section 27 partially lifts the
ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26 in respect of so much
of the information whether it amounts to a confession
or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered in
consequence of the information, if the other conditions of
the section are satisfied. Section 27 distinctly contemplates
that an information leading to a discovery may be a part
of the confession of the accused and thus fall within the
purview of Ss. 24, 25 and 26. Section 27 thus shows that
a confessional statement admitting the offence may contain
additional information as part of the confession. Again, S.
30 permits the Court to take into consideration against a
co-accused a confession of another accused affecting not
only himself but the other co-accused. Section 30 thus
shows that matters affecting other persons may form part
of the confession.
18. If the first information report is given by the accused to
a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement,
proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25. The
confession includes not only the admission of the offence
but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the
offence contained in the confessional statement. No part
of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence
except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 is lifted by S. 27.”
(Emphasis supplied)

23. The legal position, therefore, is this – a statement contained in the FIR
furnished by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any manner,
be used against another accused. Even as against the accused who
made it, the statement cannot be used if it is inculpatory in nature
nor can it be used for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction
unless its maker offers himself as a witness in the trial. The very
limited use of it is, as an admission under Section 21 of the Act of
1872, against its maker alone, and only if the admission does not
amount to a confession.
24. To put the aforesaid in simpler terms, an FIR of a confessional nature
made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against him,
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except to the extent that it shows he made a statement soon after the
offence, thereby identifying him as the maker of the report, which is
admissible as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Act of
1872. Additionally, any information furnished by him that leads to the
discovery of a fact is admissible under Section 27 of the Act of 1872.
However, a non-confessional FIR is admissible against the accused
as an admission under Section 21 of the Act of 1872 and is relevant.
25. Thus, the first error that the High Court committed was to read the
contents of the FIR lodged by the appellant into evidence. As observed
earlier, the FIR lodged by the appellant amounts to a confession,
and any confession made by an accused before the police is hit by
Section 25 of the Act of 1872. There was no question at all for the
High Court to seek corroboration of the medical evidence on record
with the confessional part of the FIR lodged by the appellant.
26. Once we say that the contents of the FIR are hit by Section 25 of
the Act of 1872, being a confession before a police officer, the only
remaining evidence on record is the medical evidence and the oral
evidence of the panch witnesses.

b. Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in Nature
27. At this stage, we may look into some curious findings recorded by
the High Court in its Impugned Judgement. We quote the relevant
paragraphs as under:
“16. Now, the next question for consideration would be
whether the accused/appellant herein is the perpetrator
of the crime in question, which the learned trial Court has
recorded in affirmative by relying upon the testimony of
Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), who conducted post-mortem had
opined that the cause of death is shock due to right side
of haemothorax due to laceration of apex lobe of right lung
secondary to incised wound over upper part of right side
of front of chest. The Doctor ultimately opined through his
report the nature of death to be homicidal. Thus, on the
basis of testimony of Dr R.K. Divya (PW-10), it is clear that
it is the appellant herein who on the fateful date and time
has caused grievous injuries to the deceased, due to which
he died. As such, the learned trial Court has rightly held
that it is the appellant/accused who has caused injuries
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 587

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

over the body of the deceased and caused his death.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.
26. Conviction of the appellant is based on the evidence of
Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), who has conducted postmortem on
the body of deceased, vide Ex.P/34 and he found following
injuries on the dead body of the deceased.
27. According to Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10). the cause of death
of deceased is shock due to right side of haemothorax
due to laceration of apex lobe of right lung secondary
to incised wound over upper part of right side of front of
chest and nature of death was homicidal. It has been also
opined by the concerned Doctor that the injury caused to
the deceased has been by the sharp edged weapon and
the same may be caused by knife.
28. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light
of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court in the above stated judgments, it is
quite vivid that the appellant himself has lodged a First
Information Report alleging that, on the date of incident,
some quarrel took place between the appellant and the
deceased on the ground of showing the photograph of his
girlfriend to the deceased and the deceased stated to bring
his girlfriend and left her with him for one night, then out of
anger and on sudden quarrel, the appellant assaulted the
deceased with a knife on his chest, by which, he received
grievous injury and died on the same day of the incident on
account of excessive bleeding due to injury on his chest. It
further appears from the fact on record that appellant after
committing the crime in question, has lodged the report
and upon his memorandum some incriminating articles
have been recovered from his instance and upon further
investigation, second memorandum has been recorded, by
which, his clothes were recorded. It is apparent that though
there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to
cause death of deceased, but he had given false version.”
28. The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that a doctor
is not a witness of fact. A doctor is examined by the prosecution
as a medical expert for the purpose of proving the contents of the
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post-mortem report and the medical certificates on record, if any.
An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because of his
specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge may not
be fully equipped to assess. The evidence of such an expert is of an
advisory character. The credibility of the expert witness depends on
the reasons provided in support of his conclusions, as well as the
data and material forming the basis of those conclusions. An accused
cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder solely on the basis
of medical evidence on record. So far as the panch witnesses are
concerned their depositions do not inspire any confidence.
29. Most of the panch witnesses turned hostile. If at all, the public
prosecutor wanted to prove the contents of the panchnamas after the
panch witnesses turned hostile, he could have done so through the
evidence of the investigating officer. However, the investigating officer
also failed to prove the contents of the panchnamas in accordance
with law. Thus, there is nothing on record by way of evidence relating
to any discovery of fact is concerned. In other words, no discovery of
fact at the instance of the appellant, relevant and admissible under
Section 27 of the Act of 1872, has been established.

c. Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Act of 1872
30. The learned counsel appearing for the State, strenuously urged
before us to take into consideration the conduct of the appellant
which, according to him, is relevant under Section 8 of the Act of
1872. He led stress on the following circumstances:
i. The appellant himself went to police station and lodged the FIR;
ii. While, at the scene of offence panchnama was being drawn,
appellant pointed out that the body of the deceased was lying
in between the two walls inside the house of the deceased;
iii. The appellant led the Investigating Officer and the panchnama
witnesses to the house of his uncle, Rajnath Yadav, and pointed
out the place where he had kept his clothes worn at the time
of the incident.
iv. A bloodstain was also found on the shirt of the appellant,
however, the learned counsel fairly conceded that there is
nothing to indicate that the bloodstain matched with the blood
group of the deceased.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 589

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

31. The first and most fundamental flaw in the testimony of all the
aforementioned prosecution witnesses is that none of them have
specifically deposed to the exact statement allegedly made by the
appellant, which purportedly led to the discovery of a fact relevant
under Section 27 of the Act of 1872.
32. Section 27 of the Act of 1872 reads thus:
“27. How much of information received from accused may
be proved.––Provided that, when any fact is deposed to
as discovered inconsequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of
a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”
33. The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 of the
Act of 1872 are:
i. That consequent to the information given by the accused, it led
to the discovery of some fact;
ii. The fact discovered must be one which was not within the
knowledge of the police and the knowledge of the fact for the
first time was derived from the information given by the accused;
iii. The discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such
information;
iv. Only such portion of the information as connected with the said
discovery is admissible;
v. The discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of
some offence.
34. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon the decision
of this Court in Murli v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2009) 9
SCC 417, which held that the contents of the panchnama are not
the substantive piece of evidence. It reads thus;
“34. The contents of the panchnama are not the substantive
evidence. The law is settled on that issue. What is
substantive evidence is what has been stated by the
panchas or the person concerned in the witness box.[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)
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35. In the aforesaid context, our attention was drawn to a decision of this
Court in the case of A. N. Venkatesh & Anr. v. State of Karnataka,
reported in (2005) 7 SCC 714, which states thus:
“9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct
of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct
influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant
fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that
the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place
where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found
and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would
be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective
of the fact whether the statement made by the accused
contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct
falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this
Court in Prakash Chand v. State (UT of Delhi) [Prakash
Chand v. State (UT of Delhi), (1979) 3 SCC 90 : 1979 SCC
(Cri) 656] . Even if we hold that the disclosure statement
made by the appellant-accused (Exts. P-15 and P-16) is
not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still
it is relevant under Section 8.”
(Emphasis supplied)

36. In this context, we deem it necessary to sound a note of caution.
While the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact under Section
8 of the Act of 1872, it cannot, by itself, serve as the sole basis for
conviction, especially in a grave charge such as murder. Like any other
piece of evidence, the conduct of the accused is merely one of the
circumstances the court may consider, in conjunction with other direct
or circumstantial evidence on record. To put it succinctly, although
relevant, the accused’s conduct alone cannot justify a conviction in
the absence of cogent and credible supporting evidence.

d. Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC
37. We could have concluded the judgment at this stage by allowing the
appeal and thereby acquitting the appellant of all the charges against
him. However, we consider it necessary to make certain observations
regarding Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. We wish to explain
why the High Court could not have invoked Exception 4 to Section
300 of the IPC and altered the conviction from Section 302 to 304
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 591

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

Part I of the IPC. Had there been any other oral or documentary
evidence on record connecting the appellant herein with the alleged
crime, we would have dismissed his appeal. Even while dismissing
his appeal and holding him guilty of the offence of murder, we would
not have been in a position to interfere with the erroneous application
of Exception 4, as there is no appeal at the instance of the State
challenging the acquittal under Section 302 of the IPC. Nevertheless,
it is necessary to explain why the High Court committed an error
in bringing the case within Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC.
38. Section 299 of the IPC explains culpable homicide as, causing death
by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention
of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the
knowledge that the act complained of is likely to cause death. The first
two categories require the intention to cause death, or the likelihood of
causing death. While, the third category confines itself to the knowledge
that the act complained of is likely to cause death. On the facts of this
case, the offence of culpable homicide is clearly made out.
39. Section 300 of the IPC explains murder and it provides that culpable
homicide is murder if, the act by which the death is caused is done
with the intention of causing death, or the act complained of is so
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death,
or “such bodily injury as is likely to cause death”. There are some
exceptions when culpable homicide is not murder and we are
concerned with Exception 4 which reads:
“Exception 4. - Culpable homicide is not murder if it is
committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the
heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the
offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel
or unusual manner.” Explanation. - It is immaterial in such
cases which party offers the provocation or commits the
first assault.”
40. Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC applies in the absence of
any premeditation. This is very clear from the words used in the
provision itself. It contemplates that the sudden fight must occur in
the heat of passion, or upon a sudden quarrel. The Exception deals
with a case of provocation not covered by Exception 1, although it
would have been more appropriately placed after that exception. It
is founded upon the same principle, as both involve the absence of
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premeditation. However, while Exception 1 involves total deprivation
of self-control, Exception 4 refers to that heat of passion which clouds
a person’s sober reason and urges them to commit acts they would
not otherwise commit. There is provocation in Exception 4, as there
is in Exception 1, but the injury caused is not the direct consequence
of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 addresses cases where,
notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck or provocation
given at the outset of the dispute, regardless of how the quarrel
originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties’ places them
on an equal footing with respect to guilt.
41. A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and the exchange of
blows on both sides. In such cases, the homicide committed is
clearly not attributable to unilateral provocation, nor can the entire
blame be placed on one side. If it were, Exception 1 would be the
more appropriate provision. There is no prior deliberation or intention
to fight; the fight breaks out suddenly, and both parties are more
or less to blame. One party may have initiated it, but had the other
not aggravated the situation by their own conduct, it may not have
escalated to such a serious level. In such scenarios, there is mutual
provocation and aggravation, making it difficult to determine the
precise share of blame attributable to each participant. The protection
of Exception 4 may be invoked if death is caused: (a) without
premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender having
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner;
and (d) the fight must have been with the deceased.
42. To bring a case within Exception 4, all the ingredients mentioned
therein must be satisfied. It is important to note that the term “fight”
occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is not defined
in the IPC. A fight necessarily involves two parties – it takes two to
make a fight. The heat of passion requires that there must be no
time for the passions to cool, and in such case, the parties may have
worked themselves into a fury due to a prior verbal altercation. A
fight is a combat between two and more persons, whether with or
without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as
to what constitutes a “sudden quarrel”. This is a question of fact, and
whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon
the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4,
it is not enough to show that there was a sudden quarrel and no
premeditation. It must also be shown that the offender did not take
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 593

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression
“undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.
43. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is
confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder” or
“culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, it will be convenient
to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be
considered at the first stage is, whether the accused committed an
act which caused the death of another person. Proof of a causal
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting death
leads to the second stage, for considering whether that act of the
accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299
of the IPC. If the answer to this question is, prima facie, found in
the affirmative, the next stage involves considering the application
of Section 300 of the IPC. At this stage, the court must determine
whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within
the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder”
contained in Section 300. If the answer to this is in the negative,
the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”,
punishable under either the first or the second part of Section 304,
depending respectively on whether the second or the third clause of
Section 299 is applicable. However, if the answer is in the positive,
but the case falls within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section
300, the offence would still be “culpable homicide not amounting
to murder”, punishable under the Part I of Section 304 of the IPC.
44. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr.,
reported in (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court, while drawing a distinction
between Section 302 and Section 304, held as under:-
“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable homicide”
is genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder” is “culpable
homicide” but not vice- versa. Speaking generally, “culpable
homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder”, is
“culpable homicide not amounting to murder”. For the
purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity
of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises
three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what
may be called, “culpable homicide of the first degree”.
This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is
defined in Section 300 as “murder”. The second may be
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termed as “culpable homicide of the second degree”. This
is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then,
there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is
the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment
provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments
provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this
degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.”
(Emphasis supplied)

45. In Budhi Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in (2012)
13 SCC 663, this Court has held as under:-
“18. The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is
incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating any
principle of universal application. This will always have to
depend on the facts of a given case. While applying this
principle, the primary obligation of the court is to examine
from the point of view of a person of reasonable prudence
if there was such grave and sudden provocation so as to
reasonably conclude that it was possible to commit the
offence of culpable homicide, and as per the facts, was
not a culpable homicide amounting to murder. An offence
resulting from grave and sudden provocation would
normally mean that a person placed in such circumstances
could lose selfcontrol but only temporarily and that too,
in proximity to the time of provocation. The provocation
could be an act or series of acts done by the deceased
to the accused resulting in inflicting of injury. Another test
that is applied more often than not is that the behaviour
of the assailant was that of a reasonable person. A fine
distinction has to be kept in mind between sudden and
grave provocation resulting in sudden and temporary
loss of selfcontrol and the one which inspires an actual
intention to kill. Such act should have been done during
the continuation of the state of mind and the time for such
person to kill and reasons to regain the dominion over the
mind. Once there is premeditated act with the intention
to kill, it will obviously fall beyond the scope of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.....”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 595

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

46. In the case of Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1993)
4 SCC 238, this Court held as under:-
“8. The counsel attempted to bring the case within Exception
4. For its application all the conditions enumerated therein
must be satisfied. The act must be committed without
premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion; (2)
upon a sudden quarrel; (3) without the offender’s having
taken undue advantage; (4) and the accused had not acted
in a cruel or unusual manner. Therefore, there must be a
mutual combat or exchanging blows on each other. And
however slight the first blow, or provocation, every fresh
blow becomes a fresh provocation. The blood is already
heated or warms up at every subsequent stroke. The
voice of reason is heard on neither side in the heat of
passion. Therefore, it is difficult to apportion between them
respective degrees of blame with reference to the state of
things at the commencement of the fray but it must occur
as a consequence of a sudden fight i.e. mutual combat
and not one side track. It matters not what the cause of
the quarrel is, whether real or imaginary, or who draws
or strikes first. The strike of the blow must be without any
intention to kill or seriously injure the other. If two men start
fighting and one of them is unarmed while the other uses a
deadly weapon, the one who uses such weapon must be
held to have taken an undue advantage denying him the
entitlement to Exception 4. True the number of wounds is
not the criterion, but the position of the accused and the
deceased with regard to their arms used, the manner of
combat must be kept in mind when applying Exception 4.
When the deceased was not armed but the accused was
and caused injuries to the deceased with fatal results,
the Exception 4 engrafted to Section 300 is excepted
and the offences committed would be one of murder. 9.
The occasion for sudden quarrel must not only be sudden
but the party assaulted must be on an equal footing in
point of defence, at least at the onset. This is specially
so where the attack is made with dangerous weapons.
Where the deceased was unarmed and did not cause
any injury to the accused even following a sudden quarrel
596 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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if the accused has inflicted fatal blows on the deceased,
Exception 4 is not attracted and commission must be
one of murder punishable under Section 302. Equally for
attracting Exception 4 it is necessary that blows should be
exchanged even if they do not all find their target. Even if
the fight is unpremeditated and sudden, yet if the instrument
or manner of retaliation be greatly disproportionate to the
offence given, and cruel and dangerous in its nature, the
accused cannot be protected under Exception 4....”
(Emphasis supplied)

47. This Court, in the case of Surain Singh v. State of Punjab, reported
in (2017) 5 SCC 796 has observed that:
“The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused
(a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without
the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been
with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4
all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to
be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section
300, IPC is not defined in IPC......... A fight is a combat
between two and more persons whether with or without
weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule
as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is
a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not
must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each
case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient
to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no
premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender
has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as
used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.”
(Emphasis supplied)

48. Section 304 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. Part I of this Section provides
that if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention
of causing death, or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, then the punishment may extend up to imprisonment for life.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 597

Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

On the other hand, Part II of Section 304 provides that if the offend-
ing act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death,
but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, then the punishment may extend
to imprisonment for 10 years.
49. The High Court considered only the first part of Exception 4 to Section
300 of the IPC. This part refers to the absence of premeditation in
a sudden fight arising from a sudden quarrel in a heat of passion.
However, it does not end there. The exception further requires that
the offender must not have taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner. Having regard to the manner in which the
assault was carried out, could it not be said that the offender i.e.,
the appellant-herein took undue advantage and also could be said
to have acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The deceased was
unarmed, it was not mutual fight between two individuals that would
bring the case within the ambit of Exception 4. The deceased was
absolutely harmless when the appellant inflicted injuries all over his
body indiscriminately.
50. Therefore, if at all the High Court intended to extend the benefit of
any of the Exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, it ought to have
considered Exception 1 of Section 300 of the IPC. However, it is not
necessary for us to delve into Exception 1 i.e., grave and sudden
provocation since, we have already reached the conclusion that
the case in hand is, one of no legal evidence and therefore, the
appellant deserves to be acquitted. We refer to Exception 1 merely
to illustrate that, if at all, it was this exception that could have been
examined. It is alleged that while the appellant and the deceased
were consuming alcohol at the deceased’s residence, the appellant
showed the deceased a photograph of his girlfriend. The deceased
allegedly made an obscene remark, “get your girlfriend to my place
and leave her with me for one night.” Such a statement might have
provoked the appellant, who then picked up a vegetable-cutting
knife lying in one corner of the house and inflicted injuries upon the
deceased. This aspect could have been considered in that context.

C. CONCLUSION
51. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the Impugned
Judgement passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 dated 16.01.2025 is not sustainable in law.
598 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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52. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
53. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges, and he be set free
forthwith if not required in any other case. The bail bonds stand
discharged, if any.
54. The Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all
the High Courts.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey