Holding

The writ petitions are maintainable but no relief is granted because the factual matrix does not show any violation of Article 21 and anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is not applicable.

Summary

The petitioners, directors of several finance companies accused of large‑scale cheating, filed writ petitions under Article 32 claiming that their personal liberty under Article 21 was violated because they were detained in various jails despite obtaining bail in some cases. The Court held that while a petition under Article 32 is maintainable, the factual record did not demonstrate any infraction of Article 21, as production warrants and custody were lawful procedures established by law. Consequently, the Court declined to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C., noting that the petitioners were already in custody and that a blanket bail order would prejudice investigation. Each deposit agreement was treated as a separate offence, precluding a “single‑offence” approach, and the Court refused directions for exemption from personal appearance or transfer of investigations to the CBI. The petitions were dismissed, with a suggestion that the petitioners seek consolidation of cases in the appropriate High Courts and that the Central Government devise a scheme to expedite such prosecutions.

Issues considered

Whether a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable when the petitioner alleges violation of Article 21 due to inability to obtain bail in multiple criminal cases.
Whether the denial of anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. amounts to an infraction of Article 21.
Whether the multiple cheating offences can be treated as a single offence for the purpose of granting anticipatory bail.
Whether the Supreme Court can direct exemption from personal appearance or transfer of investigations to the CBI.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 205, s. Section 438
Constitution of Indias. Article 21, s. Article 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 120B, s. Section 406, s. Section 409, s. Section 420, s. Section 467, s. Section 468, s. Section 471
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. Section 138
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. Section 5(2) r/w Section 5(d)

Subjects

Article 32Article 21anticipatory bailSection 438 Cr.P.C.personal libertynatural justicewhite‑collar crimemultiple FIRsconsolidation of criminal casesspeedy trialprocedural fairnessbail jurisprudence

Judgment

A NARINDERTIT SINGH SAHNI AND ANR.
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

B
OCTOBER 12, 2001

[G.B. PATTANAIK, UMESH C. BANERJEE AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.]
-
Constitution of India, 1950 :

Articles 32 and 21-Petition under Article 32-Maintainability.of-
C Infraction of Article 21-Accused involved in criminal cases all over the
country-Bail granted in some cases-However, detained in jail custody in
view of production warrants in other cases-Held, in such a case petition is
maintainable as opportunity of being heard of doctrine of natural justice
warrants fair opportunity-However, factual matrix does not show infraction
D of Article 21-Deprivation of personal liberty of the accused persons is in
accordance with law.

Article 32-Judicial Review-Power of-Implicit in the written
constitution-There is no fetter for such review-However, maintainability of
petition is an issue de hors the ultimate result in the petition.
E
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :

Section 438-Anticipatory bail-Grant of-Accused alleged to have
cheated millions of depositers-Criminal cases pending against them all over
the country-Bail granted in some cases but benefit not availed. on account
F of production warrants in other cases-Held, since no infraction of Article 21
is identified, petition for grant of anticipatory bail not sitstainable.

Section 205-Exemption from personal appearance-ls the prerogative
of Magistrate and thus cannot be sought from Supreme Court.
G Penal Code, 1860-Sections l 20B and 420-Cheating-Differentfinance
companies alleged to have cheated depositers and criminal cases filed all over
the country-Held, as parties are different, amount of deposit and also period
of deposit is d~fferent, each individual deposit agreement is to be treated as
separate and individual transaction brought by allurement offinance compaliy-
H Thus each constitutes separate o.ffence.
114
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. 115
Wonts and Phrases : A
Expression 'Personal liberty'-Meaning of in the context of Article ·21,
Constitution of India, 1950.

Petitioners are the finance investment companies; its directors and
employees. They accepted deposists from large number of people but failed B
to make repayment and numerous cases were filed against them under the
Penal Code and the negotiable Instruments Act which are pending in different
States. Petitioners got bail in one case but detained by reason of production
warrant in other cases and resultantly are languishing in jails, being deprived
of order of grant of bail. Thus the petitioners contended infraction of Article C
21 of the Constitution. Hence the present writ petitions •

.The issues involved in these appeals are whether writ petitions are
maintainable under Article 32 by reason of supposed infraction of Article 21
and whether order of anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. ought to be
made available to the petitioners by reason of the deprivation of the liberty D
without there being any sanction of law in line with blanket order.

Dismissing the petitions, the Court

HEl1D: 1.1. Any person complalning of infraction of any fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution is at liberty to move this Court but the
E
rights that could b~ invoked under Article 32 must ordinarily be the rights
of the petitioner himself who complains of the infraction of such rights and
approaches the Court for relief and the proper subject for investigation
would however be as to the nature of the rights that is stated to have been
infringed. [143-C-D] F

D.A. V. College, Bhatinda, etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1971] 2 SCC
262, followed.

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Guiab Khan & Ors.,
[1997) 11 sec121, relied on. G

1.2. Incidentally, power of judicial review being implicit in written
Constitution, question of there being any fetter for such review would not
arise and specially in the 21st century there ought not to be thwarting of such
a right nor even any hesitancy in that regard. Maintainability of the writ H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A petition is an issue de hors the ultimate result in the petition - presently the
/. justice oriented approach and set-up a standard in accordance therewith
ought to be the guiding factor so far as the law courts are concerned. Refusal
to entertain cannot be in tune with the present approach and rather acts
contra. The requirement is a prima f acie satisfaction on the basis of the
available pleadings as to whether the judicial re:view prayed for under Article
B ~\' t.
32 needs consideration, if it does, there cannot be any doubt as regards its
.
~aintafoability.. [143-H;
.
!44-A-CJ,

· i:3. In the instant case, the records depict that thousands of innocent
persons have fallen a prey in the methodology of working offinance companies
c and firms but that does not mean and imply a denial of an opportunity of
being heard or considered. Doctrine of natural justice warrants a fair
opportunity. The writ petitioners herein have come up with a petition on the
ground that th~y have not been able to obtain benefit of the justice delivery
syste~ and thereby ithas been alleged that Article 21 stands violated. Judicial
D re~iew or maintainability of the petition under Article 32 cannot possibly be
doubte~ in any way. [144-C-E]

1.4. Arti'cle 21 of the Constitution postulates that no per.;on shall be
deprived of his personal liberty except according to the procedure established
by law. The expression 'personal liberty' admittedly is of widest possible
E amplitude and cannot in any way whatsoever be, curbed or restricted without
·I .
offending the constitutional mandate. [123-F-G]

Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh and Ors., (1993] i
sec 645, relied on.
F
1.5. The protecti~n of personal liberty stands expanded to make the
right to life under Article 21 more meaningful, the language of the Article
itself records an exception indicating thereby that a person may be deprived
of his liberty in accordance with procedure established by law and it is in this
sphere the Courts will scrupulously observe as to whether the same stands
G
t
differently and contra as regards the procedure established by law and in
the event it is not so done, it would be a plain e]l:ercise of judicial power to
grant redress to the petitioner. (144-H; 145-A-B]

1.6. In the instant case, there is no difficulty in appreciating the
grievance and grant .of relief but facts are too insufficient to come to a
H
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. 117
conclusion as regards the infraction of Article 21. Production warrants have A
been spoken of without any details whatsoever therefor • the reason offered
is that the petitioners, in fact, are not in the know of things ~eing behind the
_..._ prison bar and it starts pouring in from all parts of the country and in the
... factual backdrop, it is a well-neigh impossibility to come to a finding as
regards the infraction of Article 21 and since in the factual matrix, no
infraction can be identified and thus question of sustaining the. plea· of a
infringement of Article 21 would not arise. In any event the liberty of the
petitioners cannot be said to have been trifled with the absence ofdue process
of law. Deprivation, if any cannot be claimed to be not in accordance ~th
due process of law. [145-B-D]
c
1.7. An accused being involved in large number of criminal cases in
different parts of the country, if is not able to be released from custody even
on getting bail orders in some cases, itself would not tantamount to violation
of the right ofa citizen under Article 21. The object of Article 21 is to prevent
encroachment cpon personal liberty by the executive save in accordance D
with law, and in conformity with the provisions thereof. n is, therefore,
imperative that before a person is deprived of his life or personal liberty, the
pro~edure established by law must strictly be follow~d and must not be
departed from, to the disadvantage of the person affected. Issuance of
production warrants by the Court and the production of accused in Court, E
in cases where he is involved is a procedure established by law and
consequently, the accused cannot be permitted to make a complaint of
infraction of his rights under Article 21. [147-D; E; H; 148-A]

1.8. while in the contextual facts, a petition under Article. 32 of t~e F
Constitution is maintainable but the petitioners are not entitled to any relief
by reason of insufficiency of available materials on record as regards the
issue of infraction of Article 21. (149-Gj

2.1. Even though the accused is able to get orders for bail ~rom differe.-it G
courts, where cases are pending but in view of the large number of cases
against the accused throughout the country, it has physically not become
possible to release the accused from the custody. If an accused facing a charge
under Sections 406, 409, 420 and 120-B is ordinarily not entitled to invoke
the provisions of Section 438 Cr.P.C. unless it is established that such criminal
H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A . accllSatiori is not a bona fide one, it is difficult to conceive that an accused
who is invoh·ed in thousands of cases in different ·parts of the country by
cheating millions of countrymen, can be given benefit of the privilege of
anticipatory bail as a matter ofroutine. In the case of JVG Group ofCompanies
and Kuber Group of Companies*, on the basis of which the present batch of
B cases have been filed, relief was granted that in the event of the arrest of the
petitioner in connection with any criminal case in his capacity as Managing
Director/Director of the G_roup of Companies, the Arresting Officer shall
release him on bail on his executing a bond to the satisfaction of the Arresting
officer which tantamounts to an order, invoking the provisions of Section
C 438 Cr.P.C. In the manner in which these white-collared crimes are committed
and the extent to which it has pervaded the society at large, cases decided by
this Court earlier would not be of universal application and cannot be used
as a precedent for availing of the privilege in the nature of an anticipatory
bail. It would be a misplaced sympathy of the Court on such white-collared
D accused person whose acts of commission and omission has ruined a vast
majority of poor citizens of this Country. Though in the instant case, Court
may·bejustifiedindirecting release of the accused, taking stock of the entire
situation in the case and also that the petitioners could maintain a petition
under Article 32, but it would riot be justified in directing the release of such
E accused under a blanket order since such a course of action would perpetrate
gross injustice. [146-H; 147-A-C; 148-A-C]

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1980) SC 1632, followed.

F 2.2. Grant of anticipatory bail, under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. is
made applicabie only in the event of there being an apprehension of arrest.
In the instant case petitioners are all inside the prison bars upon arrest
against all cognizable offences, therefore, question relieving the petitioners
from unnecessary disgrace and harassment would not arise. Also, the petition
G ·cannot be sustained as regards the issue of anticipatory bail under Section
438 ¢r. P.C. since no infraction can be identified. [145-E-F]

Kartar Sinf?h v. State of Pun.jab, [1994) 3 SCC 569 and Supreme Court
Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Un.ion of India &
H Ors., [1994) 6 sec 731, distinguished.
, N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. 119
Shaheen We(fare Association v. Union ofIndia & Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 616; A
R.D. Upadhyayv.StateofA.P. &Ors., [1996]3SCC422and "Common Cause"
A Registered Society. through its Director v. Union of India & Ors., [1996] 4
sec 33, refetred to•
.,..
3. Right of an accused to have speedy trial is now recognised as right
under Article 21. The procedural fairness required by Article 21, including B
the right to a speedy trial has to be observed throughout and to be borne in
mind. However, while no relief is granted to the accused persons Central
Government should evolve certain formula or procedure, so that the accused
will not complain of undue harassment on account of protraction of their
cases and the persons deceived who have filed complaints, will be satisfied c
with the early conclusions of the trial. [148-D; F]

Sheela Barse and Am: v. Union of India & Ors., AIR (1986) SC 1773,
referred to.

4. Direction of exemption from personal appearance cannot be had D.
from this Court since it is within the powers of the Magistrate and in his
judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused
and as such be it provided here that it would be open to the party to apply to
the concerned trial/sessions court for such exemption and in the event of
there being such an application, the same can be disposed of in accordance E
with law. [149-D]

Mis. Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Mis. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Lid. &
Ors., JT (2001) 7 SC 127, referred to.

5. Each individual deposit agreement shall have to be treated as separate F
and individual transaction brought about by the allurement of the financial
companies, since the parties are different, the amount of deposit is different
as also the period for which the deposit was effected. It has all the
characteristics of independent transactions and thus the contention of
petitioners as regards the issue of single offence cannot be concurred with. G
[149-B]

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos.
245-246 of 2000.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. .H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A WITH

W.P. (Cr!.) Nos. 249, 270, 405, 421, 433-435/2000, 57 and 63-64 of
2001. .
•·
K.N. Raval, Additional Solicitor General, Shanti Bhushan, D.D. Thakur,
B S.S. Javali, P.P. Malhotra, S. Balakrishnan, K.T.S. Tulsi, S. Markandeya, R.S.
Suri, Vikas Pahwa, Shally Bhasin Maheshwari, Rishi Maheshwari, S. Tabrez,
R.K. Maheshwari, Bahar U. Barqi, Amit Dhingra, M. Choudhary, P.H. Parekh,
Vipin Gogia, Jaspreet Gogia, T.S. Arora, D.K. Garg, N.P. Midha, Manjoor Ali,
Ms. Ritu Puri, V.R. Thangavelu, Rajiv Nanda, Sushma Suri, Ashok Bhan for
D.S. Mabra, Smt. Rev'athi Raghavan, Ms. Shweta Garg, Sunitha Choudhary,
-
c (Sunii Kr. Jain, V. Hansaria,) for Mis. Jai~ Hansaria & Co., Mahabir Singh,
D.N. Goburdhan, Ms. Suruchi Aggarwal, H. Wahi, Ms. Anu Sawhney, Smt.
C. Markandeya, Anupam 'Iyagi, Sunil Kumar Bharti, Atul Kumar, Ranbir
Yadav, .Anil Hooda, V.G. Pragasam, Jayshree Anand, Addi. Adv. General for
State of Punjab, G. Sivabalamurugan, Rajeev Sharma, S.S. Shinde, for S.V.
D D~shpan~e, Ranji Thqmas for Javed M. Rao, J.R Das, D.P. Mohimty, K.K.
Mahalik, Pramod. Swarup, Praveen ~warup, Ms. Pareena Swarup, Prashant
Choudhary, A.S. Pundi~, V Singh, Prakash Kumar Singh, V.K. Shukla, Anil
Shrivastav, T.C. Sharma, Ms. A. Subhashini, G. Prakash, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal,
Dr. Nafis A. Siddiqui, .Appli<.:;ant-in-Person, .B.B. Singh, V. Krishna Murthy,
E Ms.,, Vibha Dutta Makhija,
'
Alok Bhachawat, Uma .
Nath Singh, Sanjay R.
Hegde, S.M. Garg for the appearing parties .

. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BANERJEE, J. This batch of writ petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution by reason of supposed infraction of Article 21, were moved before
this ·cc>uri for the ·grant ·~f ari. order for bail .in the nature as prescribed under
Section 438 ·er. P. Code, andin line with the orders dated 28.3.2000 in W.P.
(Crl.) No. 256 of 1999 .and dated 5.5.2000 in W.P. (Crl.) Nos. 72-75 of 2000
pas~ed earlier by this C~urf. To crystalize the issue, the orders as passed earli~r
ought to b~ noti~ed af this juncture. The first of the two orders read as below
G
...
: (JVG'Grciup of Companies: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 256 of 1999)

"It is not possible for us to order that all his cases pending in different
st'ates should be consolidated into one and brought before one court.
That would impose unwarranted and unnecessary hardships on the
H witness and investigating agency spread over to those different States.
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 121
Nor are we inclined to order the Central Bureau of Investigation to A
take up the investigation in respect of all cases, and further that he
would make himself available on any date when his presence is
imperatively needed in that court.

- 3. We permit the petitioner to move the appropriate High Courts for
bringing all the cases pending in different courts within the territorial ·B
jurisdiction of that High Court to one single court or more than one
court (depending upon the number of cases or the width of the area
of the State is concerned).

4. This order will come into effect only if the petitioner would
surrender his passport in this court. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned
c
senior counsel expressed a doubt that petitioner would have already
surrendered his passport before another court pursuant to the order
passed. In that case he can satisfy the Registrar General of this Court
by an affidavit of the situation and the Registrar General can intimate
the jail authorities concerned of that position. t
5. We make it clear that it is open to the investigating agency in any
case to move for cancellation of bail if any such investigating agency
finds that petitioner is misusing the liberty granted by this order.

In view of the above order we direct the jail authorities of the jail E
in which he is presently kept to release him forthwith on Registrar
General of this Court intimating the jail authorities regarding the
surrender of his passport as indicated above.

It is needless to say that this order will not be treated as a precedent F
and is passed only on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly."

This Court also on a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in
Kuber Group of Companies (Writ Petition Nos. 72-75 of 2000 being the 2nd
order as noticed hereinbefore) also passed a similar order to the following G
effect:

"1. If the petitioner is arrested in connection with any criminal case
in his capacity as managing director/director of JVG Group of
companies the arresting officer shall release him on bail on his H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A executing a bond to the satisfaction of the arresting officer.

2. Such relief shall be made after getting an assurance from him
that he will be present in the court concerned on the days when
his case is posted. However, we make it clear that it is open to
the petitioner to apply to the court concerned for exempting him '
B from personal appearance on condition that a counsel on his
behalf would be present on such posting dates and he would
not dispute his identity as the particular accused in that case,
and further that he would niake himself available on any date
when his presence is imperatively/needed in that court.
c 3. We permit the petitioner to move the appropriate High Courts
for bringing all the casef: pending in different courts within the
territorial jurisdiction of that High Court to one single court or
more than one court (depending upon the number of cases or
...
the width of the area of the State is concerned).
D
4. This order will come into effect only if the petitioner would
surrender his passport in this Court. Shri Shanti Bhushan,
learned senior counsei expressed a doubt that petitioner would
have already surrendered his passport before another court
pursuant to the order passed. In t~at case he can satisfy the
E
Registrar General of this court by an affidavit of the situation
and the Registrar General can intimate the· jail ·authorities
concerned of that position.

5. We make it clear that it is open to the investigating agency in
F any case to move for cancellation of bail if any such investigating
agency find that petitioner is misusing the liberty granted by this
order.

AND THIS COURT has further ordered to the jail authorities of the
jail in which petitioner/detenues P.K. Sharma S/o. Deep Chand
G Sharma (In Judicial Custody since 4.6.1999), Mrs. Roweena Sharma
W/o. P.K. Sharma (In Judicial custody since 17.7.1999) and M.M.
Sharma, S/o. Deep Chand Sharma (In judicial custody since 6.7.1999)
confined in Central Jail No. 1, Tihar Jail, New Delhi, to release them
forthwith as the condition of surrender of passports have been fulfilled
H to the satisfaction of learned Registrar General of the Hon'ble court
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 123
who has perused the affidavit in this Registry to the above effect. AND A
THIS COURT has also observed that his order will not be treated as
precedent and is passed only on the peculiar facts and circumstances
of this case.

AND THIS COURT DOTH FURTHER ORDER THAT THIS ORDER
be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned." B

To put the records straight and complete, be it noted however that these
matters were placed before this Court for similar orders, but since the Division
Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of this Court delving into the matter, felt some
difficulty to lend concurrence to the orders as above, the Bench refen-ed the c
matter to the learned Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench and in
terms therewith, this Bench stands constituted for disposal of this batch of
petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Incidentally, several writ petitions have been filed invoking jurisdiction
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by reason of supposed infraction l.J
of Article 21 with several identical prayers - the main being grant of a writ
of mandamus or any other appropriate writ in the nature of an order under
Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing that in the event the
petitioner is arrested in connection with any criminal case, the arresting officer
shall release him on bail on his execution a bond to the satisfaction of the E
arresting officer. As regards the other prayers, we shall defer it presently since
the cardinal issue relates to the first prayer. As noticed above, supposed
infraction of Article 21 was taken recourse to substantiate the invocation of
Article 32.

Needless to record that Article 21 of the Constitution postulates that no F
person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to the
procedure established by law. The expression 'personal liberty'; admittedly is
of widest possible amplitude and cannot in any way whatsoever be, curbed
or restricted without offending the constitutional mandate. The decision of this
Court in Unni Krishna' case ( Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. v. State of Andhra G
Pradesh and Ors., [1993] 1 SCC 645) lends concurrence to the observations
as above.

We are not called upon to deal with the true scope or the total ambit
of Article 21: The petitioners have taken recourse to the Article stating therein
H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A that in the event they are not granted any relief as prayed for, the petitioners
resultantly would suffer the consequences which stand negated by the
constitutional mandate.

The relief spoken of however pertains to Section 438 of Criminal
Procedure Code. It is noteworthy that the 41st report of the Law Commission
B recommended for the first tin:ie inclusion of a provision of what is called
anticipatory bail (vide Section 438 Cr. P.C.). Section 438 contemplates an
applicatfon by a person on an apprehension 'of arrest in regard to the
commission of a non-bailable offence: the object being to relieve a person from
unnecessacy harassment or disgrace and it is granted when the Court is
c otherwise convined that there is no likehood of misuser of the liberty granted
since he would neither abscond nor take such step so as avoid due process
of law.

In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1980) SC 1632,
the Constitution bench of this Court very succint.:tly laid down the difference
D between right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the Police to
investigate into crimes. This Court in paragraph 37 observed that a blanket
order of anticipatory bail may cause some interferen9e in the matter of
investigation. This Court observed :

·: ... A Blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause serious
E interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter
of investigation because, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged
to have been committed by the applicant and when, an order of bail
which comprehends allegedly unlawful activity of any description
whatsoever, will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even
F if he commits, say, a murder in the presence of the public. Such an
order can then become ::i charter of lawlessness and a weapon to stiffle
prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be
predicated when the order was passed. Therefore, the court which
grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or
offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. The
G power should not be exercised in a vacuum."

Having however, discussed the outlying features of the grant of
anticipatory bail and upon due consideration of the caution exercised by this
Court in Gurbaksh Singh (supra), let us advert to the factual score presently
H before this Court.
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 125
0

The petitioners charged with offences under different provisions of law, A
are admittedly in custody: no complaint or grievance can be made against the
issuance of charge-sheet by reason of the contextual facts of the writ petition.
Facts relating to the charge-sheet as high lighted by both the parties during
the course of hearing would be adverted to shortly, suffice however to record
that the liability shall have to be adjudicated: The petitioner's culpability in
the offence if any, shall have to be deciphered and if this bC the foundation B
of launching of prosecution, the issue then as contended arises, viz., where
is the scope of invoking Article 21 of the Constitution - Has the Article been
incorporated in the Constitution to safeguard the offenders? These are few of
the issues raised by the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Rawal,
appearing for the Union of India. The answer obviously cannot be in the c
affirmative provided however, there is due sanction of law in the matter of
having the petitioners in the custody, but only upon scrutiny of facts. True,
Section 438 stands included in the Code, but its applicability would be rather
in rarity than generality.

It is at this juncture we feel it inclined to take recourse to a short tabular D
format (in W.P. (Crl.) Nos. 245-246 of 2000) depicting the factual score, rather
than a longish narration form for appreciating the contentions advanced in the
:;.
matter under consideration. The petition herein is involved as principal accused
person in:

(1) (2) (3) E
(FIR No.) Charge under Section Police Station

1006/98 U/s 420 IPC PS Tilak Nagar

149/98 U/s 420/406/409/120 IPC PS Prasad Nagar
F
257/98 U/s 420/406/409/120 IPC PS Karol Bagh

264/98 U/s 420/406/409/120 IPC PS Pras,id Nagar

209/98 U/s 420/406/120B IPC PS K. Gate
.G
407/98 U/s 420/406/409/120B IPC PS K. Gate
~

355/99 U/s 420/406/409/120B IPC PS K. Gate

16/2000 U/s 420/406/409/120B IPC PS K. Gate

H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A Apart from the above, there are 142 other complaints against the
petitioner filed under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. with
regard to which production warrants have been served in Tihar Jail. (Emphasised
to high-light the same)

There are further 10 FIRs pending investigation in Dehradun: Four
B matters are pendi11g before the Consumer Forum at Delhi and 9 others just
o~tside the Delhi Area: Apart therefrom compiaint cases. are pending in
Aligarh, Mainpuri, Bulandsahar, Alwar, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Ludhiana, Gurgaon;
Naham Dist. (H.P.) Dibrugarh (Assam), Fandabad, Jagadhari, PalwaL Besides
howe~er the FIRs mentioned above in Dehradun, there are 40 other compiaints
c in pehradun under section 138 of th~·Negotiable Instruments Act. There are
alsq innumerable production warrants_ that have been served on the supdt,
Tihar Jail, mainly under Section 138 of the Negotiable· Instruments act.
Ho~ever, it is stated that the petitioner being in custody, has not been able
to secure any information about the nature of cases• and is totally dependent
upon the authorities to produce him or not to produce him before a particular
D
cburt. But why these proceedings? Th·e answer however is not very far to seek.
It appears that the Petitioner No. 1 happens to be the Managing Director of .
Mis. Okara Agro Group of Companies. The records depict that the petitioner
No. 2.0kara Agro Industries Ltd., commenced its business w.e.f. 7.5.1993 upon
incorporation under the provisions of Companies Act 1956. The records further
E depict that on 18th Dec., 1997 the Securities & Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) issued a. notice in the daily newspaper stating that tht: Central
Government has decided an appropriate regulatory framework for regulating
the entities issuing instruments such as Agro bonds, plantation .bonds etc.
The notice also prohibited investment scheme including mutual funds
from· sponsoring schemes till the regulations are notified by SEBI. It was
F
provided further that till the regulations are notified, all collective schemes
which were operating should continue with their operation till the regulatic>ns
are notified.

On 25.3.1998, a FIR bearing No. 149/98 was registered at P.S. Prasad
G Nagar under sections 420/406/409/120-B IPC against the company and its
directors for accepting deposits from large number of people in different
schemes and for failure to make repayment inspite of requests - charge-sheet
was subsequently filed by the Crime Branch of Delhi Police in the Court of
Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari. Subsequentiy, on 28.4.98 a FIR being No.
H 264/98 was registered at P.S. Prasad Nagar on the complaint of one Om Prakash
N.S. SAHNI v. U.O.I. [BANERJEE, J.] 127
Mishra against the petitioner alleging that the latter had defrauded and cheated A
him and other members of his family in accepting money. in various schemes
of the company and when the complainant asked for the money, the post-dated
cheques issued by the company were dishonoured since accounts were closed.
It is in regard to the FIR 264/98 as noticed above that the petitioner No. 1
was arrested by the Crime Branch of Delhi Police on 29.6.1998.
B
The factual context further depict that in September, 1998, a Public
Interest Litigation being No. CWP No. 3352 of 1998 (S.D. Bhattacharya &
Ors. v. SERI & Ors.) was filed in the Delhi High Court against 700 planation
companies wherein the petitioner was added as party respondent as Respondent
No. 8. In the Writ Petition the High Court however, passed an order on c
7.10.1989 restraining the respondent companies from selling and disposing of
or alienating their immovable properties and the same was also made applicable
to the directors as well. The recorcis depict that the petitioner on 19.12.98 was
granted interim bail by the Additional Sessions Judge but the same stands
stayed by the order of Delhi High Court dated 8th March, 1999.
D
The High Court however, on· 26th May, 1999 during the course of
hearing of Criminal Misc. Petition No. 4730 of 1998 stated that the bail to
the petitioner could only be granted if sufficient money could be made
available for the purposes of making repayments to the investors and in that
context directed the petitioner to file a scheme for payment or proposal for E
payment and it is in that perspective that on 7th October, 1999, the petitioners
moved Misc. Application seeking permission to sell certain properties of the
petitioner to repay the amount to the investors. The Delhi High Court, however
subsequently while disposing of the Crl. Miscellaneous Application directed
the Commissioner Qf Police to hand over the investigation to a very senior
police officer assisted by a team of sufficiently large number of investigating F
officers to e:isure the conclusion of the investigation within 4 months. The
Crime Branch was also directed to file the list of 71 properties including the
properties of sister concerns and the financial stability and the liquid assets
of the company in the form of a report to the High Court within 6 weeks :
Factual score thus very candidly exposed the popular English saying-ingenious G
are the ways, where the genius works!

It is on these set of facts that Mr. Tulsi, the learned senior Advocate
appearing in support of some of these writ petitions contended that this long
incarceration of the petitioners in jail cannot but be ascribed to be a situation
H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A which runs counter to the mandate of the Constitution under Article 21. Mr.
Tulsi contended that the petitioner No. 1 being the Managing Director of
Mis: Okara Group of Companies is sought to be charged under Section 420
IPC with the aid of Section l20B without there being any material to indicate
that the petitioner had either the knowledge or the intention to assit the other
B accused in commission of the offence. In any- event, it is submitted that the
offence of conspiracy being in the nature of a continuing offence, its inclusion
would be sufficient to establish the connection of one offence with the other
for the purpose of converting all the offences into a single offence or in the
alternative, into the kind of offence which could only have been committed
in the course of the same transaction, within the meaning of section 220 of
c the·Code of Criminal Procedure - Admittedly a su~mission of some effect and
this is so irrespective of the factum of about 250 number of FIRs lodged
throughout the country. We are however not making any observation in regard
thereto presently. Incidentally, Mr. Shanti Bhushan appearing in support of
some of the other petitions also contended more or less in the similar vein
D as regards the· issue of single offence and we do deem it expedient to deal
with the same at a stage later in the judgment since we do deem it fit to note
some preliminary submissions, which are of some consequences as advanced.
by the Respondents at this juncture.

E Mr. D.N. Goburdhan, learned Advocate, appearing for the Investors'
Forum, attributed .the writ petition as a classic case of abuse of the process
of law~ since there is neither any violation of guaranteed right under Part III
of the Constitution nor a relief under Section 438 Cr.P.C. can however be
termed to be a guaranteed right. The writ petitioners' conduct as a matter of
fact, it has been contended, disentitles him for any discretionary relief from
F the Court. Mr. Goburdhan with his usual felicity of expression was rather
emphatic in contending that petition for bail under Sections 437 and 439
Cr.P.C. has been converted· into a petition under Article 32. ·It has been
contended that the petitioners' bail was rejected by the MC1.gistrate's Court and
the interim bail for 90 days granted by the learned Sessions Judge was also
G challenged in the High Court by the investors' forum and the same stands
suspended - Secondly Mr. Goburdhan contended that whilst the petition is .......I
pending before the High Court this writ petition was filed. According to Mr.
Goburdhan that the writ petitioner in connivance with his family who all were
Directors of the company have totally siphoned off the monies collected from
H the public. The intention to cheat and the actus rea of cheating is complete
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 129
in all force. All other Directors who are family members are absconding and A
have been declared as proclaimed offenders by the Court.

In any event, Mr. Goburdhan contended that Articles 21 and 438 Cr.P.C.
are not only mutually inconsistent with each other but cannot go hand in hand
with each other and the methodology adopted in the. garb of a petition under
Article 32 for infraction of Article 21, cannot but be a handy work and B
. ingenuity of the writ petitioners. The amount of money siphoned off from out
of the deposits of the public in general by the petitioners does not permit the
Court under Article 32 or under any other provision to grant any relief to the
petitioners herein.

Mr. Rawal, the learned Additional Solicitor General opened up a new
c
vesta in the matter and submitted that in an application for anticipatory bail
the gravity of the offences involved ought to be the prime consideration since
thousands of investors have lost their lives' savings, after being duped by the
petitioners - It is an "economic murder" of an entire community of people and
thus has necessarily to be dealt with utmost severity. The two earlier judgments D
of this Court spoken about cannot be the guiding feature, since the same were
pronounced in the facts and circumstances of each case: Secondly in both the
decisions this Court was cautious enough to record that the same would not
be treated as a judicial precedent in any way whatsoever and in view of such
express recording, question of the same or a similar order being passed in any E
other matter would not arise. Mr. Rawal contended that the gravity of massive
economic genocide c.,annot be belittled by terming it as a major offence of
cheating or depriving someone of his property. The victim is deprived of his
economic life. The crime is no less heinous than putting an end to the life
of a person. A large number of suicides which follow such white collared crime
is indicative of the magnitude of the crime involved. Therefore, the fact that
F
a maximum punishment of 7 years is prescribed for a single offence of cheating
cannot be pressed into service by the petitioners for seeking relief. The
activities of the concerned economic offenders are as a matter of fact spreading

• in several States. Very often after starting their operations in one State and
by luring investors of high returns, to finance those returns fresh funds are G
raised in some other State. To pay the promised high returns in tile second
State, funds are raised in a third State and so the channel continues. Each act
of cheating, therefore, constitutes a separate offence and the attempt to say
that it is only one advertisement which results in to multitude of consequential
deprivation of property is an endeavour to mis-lead this Court. Without H
•
•
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A however, expressing any opinion in the matter presently, neither we should
also, but the eloquence of Mr. Rawal seems to be of unmatched quality both
as regards the legal issues as also on the factual context.

As regards the issue of maintainabiHty of the writ petition under Article
32 of the Constitution by reason of infraction of Article 21, it has been the
B contention of Mr. Rawal that there has been no viol.ation of procedure
''
established by law arid thus taking recourse to die remedy of institution of the
present writ petition on this score is wholly purposive and with motive not
far to seek.\_ Article 21 prohibits denial of liberty except according to the ·
. procedure established by law - in the contextual facts Mr. Rawal submitted
C that there is no denial of liberty except in accordance· with the due process
of law and infringement of Article 21 as has been drawn, is a myth and ought
not to be countenanced by this Court in entertaining the petition under Article
32.. '

D Undoubtedly a situation which requires utmost consideration of
this Court : On the one hand the constitutional mandate under Article 21
and its broad and lofty ideals involved therein and on the other to quote Mr.
Rawal's language, there is existing an economic genocide - not only an issue
interesting but its importance in the jurisprudence of the country cannot be
lost sight of.
E
Before, however, we are caught on to the details of the white-coll.ared
crime and its effect on the society, we deem it expedient to advert to the more
•
or less similar fact-situations of other six matters placed before this Bench.

F Re: Writ Petition No. 249 of 2000

In the earlier writ petition Nos. 245-246 of 2000, we thought it expedient
to take refourse to a tabulated format and thus avoided a other dull longish
narration, but in the instant matter we do not think it proper to cut short the
longish narration since we have already on record a version of the petitioner·
G B.B. Sharma herein support of the writ petition as emphasised by Mr. Shanti
1
Bhush an, the learned Senior Advocate in support of the petition and the other
version available on record through the affidavit of one Raghuvir Singh and
other notings available on record ,- the facts are rather interesting as also
revealing and in that perspective the same shall have to be considered vis-a-
H vis the present petitions under Article 32: Needless to record that main trial
N.S. SAHNI v. U.O.l. [BANERJEE, J.]. 131
is yet to commence and as such our endeavour should and ought always be A
not to prejudice the trial in any way whatsoever. While it is true that detailed
submissions have been made by both the petitioners as also the respondents,
but we will in this judgment deal with only the basic facts as is required
presently and that too· without expression of any opinion thereon.

B
The instant petition under Article 32 has been at the instance of Shri
B.B. Sharma who happened to be the Chairman and Managing Director of
Hoffland group of Companies. The latter has been engaged in accepting
deposits and giving loans to public. The petitioner as appears has promoted
40 firms companies having 50 branches all over the country. Till 1997 the
petitioner company said to have made payment with interest on maturity but c
thereafter the company suffered huge losses because of downtrend in the
business of financial - service companies and added together is the termination
of registration as financial managers by SEBI - the problem according to the
petitioner has been by reason of subsequent closure of company's A/cs by main
banker viz., Oriental Bank of Commerce and post dated cheques of the D'
Company where returned unpaid and resultantly several FIRs were lodged. In
January, 1998 on the factual score, it appears that petitioner was arrested but
subsequently released on bail in the month of February itself. Diverse criminal
proceedings have started against the petitioner and the petitioner was behind
the bars several times though the petitioner was granted bail in some FIRs in
Delhi and also at Mumbai, Pune, Chandigarh, Udaipur, Gurgaon, Ghaziabad,
E
Ludhiana, D;:,!lradun and Ambala but could not avail such privilege to be
released on bail as he was in judicial custody in similar FIRs by other
depositors. The principal grievance of the petitioner being that though in
judicial custody for the last 21 months but the petitioner can never be released
as the situation presently stands by reason of several production warrants F
pending in different States like Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Kerala, Punjab and
Karnataka. It is petitioners definite case that imperative is the question of
release as then only he can look after the interest of investor by evolving a
scheme of revival. The petitioner as a matter of fact, it has been contended,
has to be shuttled from one place to another all over the country as presence G
of the petitioner suddenly becomes mandatory at every other place and on
every date of hearing. It is this state of affairs which Mr. Shanti Bhushan
appearing in support of the petitioner highlighted and contended that the same
is unjust and violative of the fundamental rights under Article 21 of the
Constitution.
H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A It has been contended in support of the petition that all these cases
initiated against the petitioner are basically under Section 420 read with Section
120 B of the IPC and such question is whether there are numerous cases of
cheating or there is only one offence and one case and it is in this context
reliance was placed ·upon Section s 2, 9, 34, 36 and 40 of the Indian Penal
Code and it was contended that an offence denotes a thing made punishable
B
by the Indian Penal Code and that an act or omission would constitute an
offence. In was emphasized that the singular includes plural and vice versa
and the language of Section 415 IPC was taicen' recourse to since the Section
provides whoever deceives or induces a person to do or omit to do anything
comrilits an offence. It was submitted that many persons may have been
c induced but since the act of deception was one and the act of deception being
issuance of advertisement by the petitioner and his group of companies and
there is only one act of deception even if several persons stand cheated. Diverse
other provisiOIJ.S of the Cr. P. Code were referred to and we shall presently
deal w.ith the same but before adverting thereto, the facts as submitted by the
D Investors' Association represented by Mr. Goburdhan as regards the issue of
exercise of jurisdiction by this court Article 32 of the Constitution ought to
be noticed at this juncture. Mr. Goburdhan contended that the present petitioner
is a habitual criminal offender and is repeatedly changing his name after
committing offences and after getting bail, unlike the other writ petitioners.
Significantly, the present petitioner is also having a cri.minal background. His
E
original name is B.B. Rai, and was working as Branch Manager with the
Syndicate Bank, Bisawar (Distt. Mathura, U.P.) wherein in the year 1986, he
had made an embezzlement of Rs. 20 lacs approximately. After making the
said embezzlement he was taken into custody and was dismissed from the
services and Sh. H.C. Bisht, Dy. S.P., CBI SPE Dehradun, had conducted the
F enquiry in regard to the said em.bezzlemerit, as the investigating officer and
·filed two FIRs being nos. RC-111987 & RC-2/1987 and the. said cases are
pending in the court of Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Dehradun.

Significantly, the FIRs, spoken of the RC-1/1987 is available on record
G and for convenience sake, the same reads as below:

"Delhi Special Police Establishment, Dehradun Branch

First Information Report

H (Recorded u/s 154 Cr.P.C.)
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 133
Crime No. RC-1/87 Date and time of Report 5 .1.87 A
16.30 Hrs.

Place of occurrence with State Bisav·ar, Distt. Mathura, (UP)

Date and Time of occurrence During 1986

Name of Complainant or Source B
Informant with address

Offence 120-B, 420 IPC and 5(2) r/w
5(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption
Act (Act-II of 1947)
c
Name and address of the : 1. Sh. B.B. Rai, Branch Manager
Accused Syndicate Bank, Bisavar,
Distt. Mathura (Group B)

2. (Unknown persons) ......................... .
D
3. ························································
Action taken RC Registered.

Investigating Officer Sh. H.C. Bisht, Dy. S.P. CBI SPE
Dehradun E
Information

Information has been received that during the year 1986, Sh. B.B. Rai,
while posted and functioning as Branch Manager, Syndicate Bank, Bisavar,
Distt. Mathura entered into a criminal conspiracy with some unknown persons F
with the object to cheat the Syndicate Bank. In Pursuance of the said criminal
conspiracy a Current Account No. 133 in the fake name of Sh. S.K. Verma
was got opened at the said bank on 5.6.86. Various clean over-drafts were
allowed by Sh. B.B. Rai,in this account on 7.6.86, 14.6.86, 17.6.86 and
21.6.86, thus there was adebit balance of Rs. 2,36,884 in this account on 8.7.86
when a cheque pertaining to Sh. Madan Lal having a Saving Bank Account G
with Oriental Bank of Commerce, Shahdara, Delhi amounting to Rs. 2,80,000
was purchased/discounted in the said bank at Bisavar and its proceeds were
credited to the fake current account of Sh. S.K. Verma and on this basis Sh.
B.B. Rai caused the closure of the said fake account. Actually the absence ih
of proper balances in the said account, the cheque mentioned above was H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A returned unpaid. The whole amount is since outstanding.

Thus Sh. B.B. Rai by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing
his position as a publiC servant in conspiracy with others caused heavy
pecuniary loss to the bank and corresponding pecuniary advantage to himself
or others. These facts constitute offences punishable u/s 120-B, 420 IPC and
B Sec. 5(2) r/w Sec. 5(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

A regular case is, therefore, registered and Sh. H.C. Bisht, Dy. S.P. is
deputed to investigate it.

Supdt. of Police
c CBI Spe Dehradun"

Whereas the period of offence pertaining to crime RC-1187 as noticed
in the FIR appears to be between 5th January. 1986 to 21st January, 1986 and
the period covered under RC-2/1987 stands between 8th July, 1986 to 13th
D September, 1986 wherein the Syndicate Bank has had to suffer a financial loss
to the extent of approximately Rs. 20 lacs_ as the records depict.

tit is after the above noted episode of the Bank and upon getting the bail,
the petitioner is said to have absconded from the jurisdiction of the court and
came to Delhi with a new name as B.B. Sharma and opened up Hoffland group
E of Companies and Mr. Goburdhan has been very emphatic that all the family
members of the petitioner are absconding and the address given in the petition
is also fake since nobody is living in the address noted. It has been further
contended that the petitioner has not been able to obtain bail from any court
except in 3 cases - one in the case of Gurgaon, Haryana due to non filing of
F challan under Section -167 Cr.P.C.: Another in the case of Ghaziabad wherein
the agent has made a complaint and in the third case he was given bail from
the High Court of Delhi by reason of wrong facts though however an appeal
is pending in the said matter in the High Court itself. Significantly, Mr.
Goburdha11 furthef' contended that the petitioner alias B.B. Rai after getting
bail from the Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad absconded froin the
G jurisdiction of the said court and went to Varanasi. It has been stated that the
petitioner this time changed his name to one Mr. B.B. Badal and lived in Surya
Hotel from where however he was arrested on 20th August, 1998 with the
help of one depositor viz., Mr. Raghubir Singh. Mr. Raghubir Singh's affidavit
is annexed in the papers filed before this Court, the extracts of which are set
H out hereinbelow :
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 135
"I. That I accompanied the Delhi Police team which went to Varanasi A
to arrest the petitioner alias B.B. Rai who was staying in 'Surya Hotel'
by changing his name as "B.B. Badal".

2. That I have identified the Petitioner on 20. 9 .1998 in the said Hotel.
I was accompanied by the officials of the team of 'Crime Branch -
Delhi Police' headed .by Shri Shyam Singh, the then Asstt. B
Commissioner of Police, Economic Offences Wing Crime Branch,
Delhi.

4. That I am one of the thousands of gullible investors and have lost
my hard earned retirement benefits to tune 3,20,000 (Rupees Three
· 1acs twenty thousand only) in the Hoffland Group and a such am well
c
conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case and hence
competent to swear this affidavit.

5. That I have lodged FIR No. 340/1998 with Prasad Nagar Police
Station and the trial in the said case is about to be completed in the D
Court of Tej Singh Kashyap the Learned Addi. Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi."

The submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan pertaining to. the charges in the
matters relate to Section 420 only - there seems however to be some amount
of confusion by reason of the factum of initiation of a proceeding under Section E
409 IPC in various cases in the court of New Delhi. The charge of Section
409 appears to have been framed by the learned Addi. Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Delhi together with Sections 420 and 120-B of the IPC by an o~der
dated 5th May, 2001.
F
Another redeeming feature as contended by Mr. Goburdhan was that the
petitioner has had no intention to bonour the commitment which he has
undertaken to different agencies. The Company Law Board passed an order
on 21st October, 1998 as regards the scheme for repayment but the petitioner
herein thought it fit not to comply with the same, question of the petitioner
being in jail or outside the bar can be of no consequences as regards the desire G
to make the payment. A scheme for repayment of the investors' money was
made available to the Company Law Board and the order was passed also
therein on the basis of such assurance which stands in non compliance rather
than compliance. Incidentally, the submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that
compliance of scheme cannot be had by reason of the petitioner being in the H·
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A jail but the factum of payment of a sum of Rs. 2 lacs in the court of
Metropolitan Magistrate Delhi through one of his nominee to a depositor viz.,
Major Gen. Ranjit Singh (Retd,) could easily be had, as such the plea of being
behind the bars was not a factor to be reckoned with. Mr. Goburdhan further
pointed out that question of clubbing of offence or consolidation of cases in
a single court is not feasible and as such, this Court will be pleased not to
B
pass such order as regards one charge and one offence. It has been contended
by both the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State and
Mr. Goburdhan that the question of one offence and one charge does not and
cannot arise. The representations were totally different in different States and
people. were cheated by adoptation of a different methodology in ·different
c States of the country, as such, question of the same being treated as one charge
oi one offence would not arise. This is apart from the factum, it has been
contended, that there are charges under Section 409 IPC which cannot thus
be ignored.

Investors' Forum have been rather vocal in the matter of even entertaining
D
petition under Article 32 as regards the writ petition herein and Mr. Goburdhan
contended that the writ jurisdiction of this court ought not to be meant to be
that easily available to a person of such a heinous character for the reasons
noticed above neither any bail or in the nature of anticipatory bail .can or could
be granted to the petit.ioner herein. The provisi_on of bail, it has been contended
E has been engrafted in the statute book and specific provisions are available
to th.e petitioner' if he is otherwise entitled to and selection of this Court for
projection of the so~called plight of the petitioner was utterly motivated, and
invocation of ~rticle 21 is wholly wrong and in any event an offender of the
nature of the petitioner herein cannot invoke such a plea as under Article 21.
The heinous nature of crime committed by the petitioner as it has been
submitted does not warrant this Court to exercise the jurisdiction under Article
32 by reason of the so-called infraction of Article 21 of the Constitution. The
petitioner richly deserves the treatn:ient meted out and no credence ought to
be placed on the submission of Mr. Shanti. BhusJ;ian since his client does not
deserve any sympathy from any quarters far less the Apex Court of the Country.
G
It is at this juncture the other writ petitions as filed before this Court
and included in this batch of petitions ought to be noticed.

(I) Writ Petition· No. 405 of 2000
(M. Lal. v. Union of India & Ors.)
H
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 137
The petitioner herein has been an employee of Hoffland Finance Ltd. A
and similar are the prayers in the writ petition to wit: consolidation of
proceedings and the grant of bail. The affidavit on behalf of Union of India
& Ors. undoubtedly impleads the petitioner herein in the matter of perpetration
of fraud and resultantly cheating the public to the tune of about I 00 crores
on the basis of false promises all over the country. An FIR No. 155/98 under
Sections 406, 420, 120-B IPC was registered and investigation was taken up
B
by the Crime Branch of Delhi Po,ice. The details of the alleged misdeeds of
the present petitioner has been noticed hereinbefore in the matter of Chairman-
cum-Managing Director more fully and as such we need not dilate thereon
excepting recording the submission of Mr. Rawal that the involvement of Shri
M. Lal in the entire conspjracy and siphoning of large amount of public money c
from Hoffland Investment cannot in any way be doubted. He has been a close
associate of Shri B.B. Sharma, and an instrument in the perpetration of fraud
contended Mr. Rawal. Significantly, the petitioner herein however did not feel
shy to record that Shrj B.B. Sharma has been bailed out in most of the cases,
the affidavit of the Union of India however records a contra state. For D
convenience sake, paragraph 7 (XXI) is set out herein below :

(x~i) That is incorrect to state that B.B. Sharma the Chairman cum
Managing Director of Hoffland Group of Companies has been
bailed out in most of the cases. That the fact is that Shri B.B.
Sharma was granted bail only in one matter case FIR No. 113/ E
98 by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi due to misrepresentation
of the facts and the state has gone in appeal against it in the
Hon'ble High Court Delhi which is pending before the Hon'ble
High Court and the next date is fixed for 16.1.2001. S/Sh.
Kishan Chand Aggarwal, K.S. Kardam and D.B. Sharma have p
been granted bail by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi because
of their individual special circumstances like ill health etc. And
the same can not be invoked as a general precedent as has been
rightly ruled by the Hon'ble High Court while refusing bail to
the acc;used petitioner vide order dated 31.1.2000.
G
The State of Rajasthan being a party in the proceeding has also filed
an affidavit but has recorded its inability to deal with the allegations in a
manner effective since no details have been furnished. We do feel it expedient
to record our concurrence therewith as more fully detailed herein below in
this judgment. H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A 2. ~·it Petition (Crl.) No. 270 of 2000
(Su.fyan Ahmad v. Union of India _& Ors.)

The petition~r herein claims some amount of indulgence b.eip.g an
engin~ering student at the undergraduate level. The petitioner claims that being

B the real brother of Shri Jawad Ahmad Siddiqui the Chairman of Al f.alah
· Grnup of Companies, he was made a Dormarit · Director in one. of the
Companies of the Group and his name has. been wrongly included in. the list
of offenders of any fraud perpetrated by the Company. It has beeQ the
contention of the petitioner that he is in judicial custody since 29th January,
2000 and as such invoked jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 for
c violation of his liberty as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. A
contra affidavit filed however depicts a contra picture and in. terms. of the
affidavit of Deputy Commissioner of Police Headquarter, Delhi, there are more
than 250 complaints alleging mis-appropriation of an ru:nount of more than Rs .
.. 7 crores. While making no comments on the plea of the peti6oner's as regards
D his status as a student but the affidavit is rather cap.did in recording that
sufficient evidence is available that the petitioner was a full fledged Director ·
of M/s. Al Falah Finlease Limited and was actively associated with its
functioning right from the very beginning. As a matter of fact, the inducement
to invest was effected by the petitioner only in different parts of the country
E and money siphoned off from the Accounts of the Company to his Personal
Account. As as matter of fact, the petitioner was arrested in FIR No. 43/2000
under Sections 406, 420, 409, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC and it is on this score
Mr. Rawal contended that question of non-involvement of the petitioner does
. not arise and seeking of sympathy of court by reason of his age and status
as a student runs contra to the factual state and thus totally unwarranted. The
F

-
First Information Report against petitioner being No. 43/2000 however, lends
concurrence to the submissions of Mr. Rawal. The State of U.P. in more or
less in similar vein contended that question of drawing sympathy as a student
. does not and cannot arise so far as the petitioner is. concerned.

G Incidentally, in this Writ Petition, there is an application for impleadment
by reason of failure to pay on the part of the Company and its Directors. We
do not'See any r~ason however to implead the applicanfherein at this stage
of the proceeding, as such we pass no order on the impleadment application
being Cr!. Misc. Petition No. 2618 of 2001 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 270
H of 2000.
-
N.S. SAHNI v. U.O.l. [BANERJEE, J.] 139

3. Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 433-435 of 2000 A
(Jawad Ahmad Siddiqui & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors,)

The factual situation are more or less the same as that of Sufyan Ahmad
in Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 270 of 2000 and hence we need not dilate on the
same. The prayers are also identical in nature: Incidentally, the High Court
of Delhi has appointed a Liquidator on 20th July, 2000 over the assets of Al B.
Falah Group of Companies. Be it further noted that the Company has been
a family concern and two of the Directors are absconding. The Depositors'
Forum of Al Falah Group of Companies also moved an application for
intervention, denouncing the effort to obtain the relief in the Writ Petition filed
under Article 32 for the supposed infraction of the rights guaranteed ·under c
Article 21 of the Constituti.on. We however do not see any reason to allow
the Intervention Application ai this stage of the proceedings and as such we
do not pass any order in. Cr!. M.P. No. 1223-25/2001 in W.P. (Cr!.) No. 4~3-
435 of 2000.

Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 421 of 2000
D
4.

- (Shri M.N. Badam v. Union of India & Ors.)

The petitioner herein has been a Director of Hoffland Finance Ltd. and
it is stated that he was designated as one of the Directors purely looking after
the formalities and to co-ordinate the official work with the Governmental E
agencies and as such was not involved with the day to day affairs of the
Company's management. Significantly however, the petitioner retired as the
Senior Superintendent of Police from the Intelligence Bureau on 30.4.1991 and
said to have been awarded various awards including the Indian Police Medal
in August, 1980. It has been the specific case of the petitioner that at least
F

-
36 commendation certificates were awarded to the petitioner and the petitioner
was awarded some medals also in the war of 1971 with Pakistan. The principal
submission on this factual score in support of the petition has been after serving
the country for more than 35 years and in order to get himself engaged joined
the ~offland Finance Ltd. and he has been a victim of circumstances. The
petitioner also prayed in the similar vein for consolidation of proceedings and G
the grant of bail. From the records however, it appears that there are altogether
31 proceedings against the petitioner herein including some under Sections
420, 406, 409, 120-B IPC and some under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act and one case under the Gangster Act (490/1999 under Section
3(2): Kotwali Dehradun, U.P.). The Senior Superintendent of Police Shri H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A Kuldeep Singh in the counter affidavit on behalf of the Respondent No. 4 has
stated that petitioner has been declared a proclaimed offender by the trial court
of Ludhiana and he is also wanted in case FIR No. 58 dated 3.3.1999 under
Sections 420 and 120-B IPC. It has been the contention of the respondent that
the indulgence sought for by reason of the past records in the Police force
ought not to permit the court to pass any orders since presently the petitioner
B
cannot be termed to be a better substitute than the worst offender.

5. Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 63-64 of 2001.
(P.C. Sharma & Am: v. Union of India and Ors.)

c The petitioner herein has been rather emphatic for enforcement of his
fundamental rights. On his own accord, several proceedings are pending in
the States of Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Delhi, Gujarat, Chandigarh, Madhya
Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and U.P. The petitioner herein also relied ·upon the
two of the orders noticed above, passed by this Court and prayed in the similar
vein for consolidation of proceedings and a separate application for the grant
D
of anticipatory bail.

Incidentally, the records depict that in a proceeding under Sections 120-
B, 420, 409, 467, 468 and 471 IPC, the petitioner herein moved an application
for bail before the 1st Additional Sessions _Judge, Kanpur Nagar (Bail
-
E Application No. 1928/1997: P.C.·Shanna v. State). The learned Sessions Judge
in his order dated 28th July, 1997 came to a definite conclusion that a clear
case of Sections 420, 468 and 471 has been made out so also the case also
under Section 409 IPC. The learned Sessions judge further observed that "the
conduct of the company shows that the accused be not released on bail. He
F has not only influenced the 1.0. when he was not in jail but has compelled
the complainant also for giving false affidavit. Thus no case for bail is made
out. The bail ·application, is, therefore; rejected." -
Subsequently, a Bail Petition was moved before the High Court at
Allahabad wherein by an order dated 14th August, 1997 the learned Single
G Judge of the High Court was pleased to allow the Bail Application. In Criminal
Misc. Application No. 5717 of 1997, a learned judge of the Allahabad High
Court allowed the application of the petitioner under Section 482 and
thereby released the latter on bail. While passing the order as noted lastly,
the. learned Judge observed: 'That an accused cannot be refused to be
H released on bail on the ground of requisition issued by other Criminal court
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 141
to produce the accused particularly when the date for producing the accused A
has already expired.

Significantly, an earlier Writ Petition filed before this Court in the name
of Ashima Finance & Investment Co. Lid. & Am: v. State of U.P. & Am: wherein
this Court has been pleased to observe :
B
"Having heard learned counsel, we are satisfied that the second
petitioner, using as a shield the order dated 14th May, 1998, went into
hiding to escape ,the processes of the law. His writ petition under
Article 32 is 31tfabuse of the process of this Court. Were it not for
the possible delay to the other matters in which the petitioners are C
involved. We would have contemplated taking action against the
second petitioner for contempt of Court.

The writ petition is dismissed. Consequent upon its dismissal, all those
who have a claim against the petitioners shall be free to prosecute
D
the same under the law. The Learned ASG submits that the police
of several States have warrants of arrest against the second petitioner
and that it would be in the interests of justice that the CBI should
be permitted to retain him under arrest for 48 hours, to be handed
over to such poli~e authority as may arrest him. We think this is
appropriate to secure the ends of justice in the circumstances and order E
accordingly. The CBI shall release the second petitioner into the
custody of such police authority as he has a warrant for his arrest as
soon as such arrest is made. If no arrest is made within 48 hours,
ending at 12 Noon on 25th November, 1998, the second petitioner
~~~~~~~ F

W.P. (Crl.) Nos. 149-155198, 124-131198, 117-123198

Having regard to the dismissal of W.P. (Crl.) No. 347-348/97, we are
not inclined to entertain these matters. The petitioners therein shall
be free to file the writ petitions in the High Courts concerned or pursue G

-- such other remedies as may be available to them under the law.

Obviously the present petition under Article 32 shall have to be decided
on the basis of the facts situation of the matter in issue.
H

..
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A 6. Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 57 of2001
(C. Natesan v. Union of India & Ors.)

Th~ petitioner was the Chairman and Managing Director_ of Anubhav
Plantations and Managing Partner .of the partnership firm Anµbhav Finance
and Investments. Anubhav Plantations has,been the flagship company of the .
B Anubhav Group of Companies which consists of 9 other companies and
. firms collected about 125 crores
financial firms. Admittediy,. these financial
from 40000 investors throughout the country and by reason of non payment
to the depositors, the case of the petitioner and the reason addressed is the
depressed market and allied problems of the company and the financial firms.
c petitioner's own showing depicts that there_ are about' 254 partnership firms
which form part of Anubhav Finance and Investments and Anubhav Dhana
Viruksha. The records depicts that the petitioner has been granted bail in
respect of cases pending at Chennai, Pune, Nagpur, Ahmedabad, Rajkot,
Baroda, Hyderabad, Visha~apainam and Jabalpur but the petitioner has not
been able _to avail all these bail orders and he is still in judicial custody in
D
respect of similar FIR registered elsewhere on si~lar complaints of depositors.
Petitioner fµrther reci~es in the Application for Bail being Crl. M.P. No. 1807
of 2001 in Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 57 of 2001 the cases more or less identically
situated and that of Col. (Retd.) T.S. Bhan and V.K. Sharma as also the other
two orders as noticed hereinbefore in detail in this judgment. In support of
E his contention as in the case of other writ petitioners that by reason of the
continued detention, the petitiOner's rights stand violated ·under Article 21 of
the Constitution and hence the petition under Article 32. The counter affidavits
filed in the matter by ~he different States reveal that various proceedings are
pending in various courts under Sections 407, 409, 420 and 120-B IPC against
F the petitioner. The methodology adopted have been stated in detail but we do
not feel it expedient to record the same at this juncture save and except
recording that the same depicts rather a dismal picture of the functioning of
the petitioner herein. The records, as a matter of fact, depict that both Anubhav
Plantation and Anubhav Finance & Investment firm have collected more than
Rs. 400 crores from ihe investors throughout the country and there are various
G production warrants from various courts from U.P., Bihar Madhya Pradesh and
other States, pending by reason wherefor and as noticed herein befo.:e, the
petitioner in spite of obtaining the bail has not been able to utilise the bail
order so obtained. As a matter of fact, the petitioner has not been able to even
specify the number of complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable
H Instrument Act.
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 143
The above noted are the writ petitions filed in this court invoking the A
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution and this Bench is confronted
with the twin issues for consideration - of the two issues mentioned, the 1st
issue pertains to the Maintainability of the petition under Article 32 and
se~oridly, an order in the nature of an anticipatory bail ought to be made
available to the petitioners herein by reason of the deprivation of the liberty
with.out there being any sanction of law.
B
---J.
' issue as regards the consolidation of proceeding though
The incidental
raised certain eye-brows from the depositors but the same would be dealt with
later in this judgment. Presently however, turning on lo the first of the twin
issues namely, maintainability of the petition, be it noticed that any person c
complaining of infraction of any fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution is at liberty to move this Court but the rights that could be invoked
under Article 32 must ordinarily_ be the rights of the petitioner himself who
complains of the infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief
and the proper subject for investigation would however be as to the nature
of the rights that is stated to have been infringed. This Court in Ahmedabad D
Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Guiab Khan & Ors., [1997] 11 SCC
121, reiterated the oft noted phraseology that judicial review is a basic structure
- of the Constitution and every citizen has a fundamental right to redress the
perceived legal injury through judicial process. This Court went on to record
: " ..... the Constitutional Court, therefore, has a constitutional duty as sentinal .E
on the qui vive to enforce the right of a citizen when he approaches the court
for perceived legal injury, provided he establishes that he has a right to

.. remedy..... "

The Constitution Bench decision of this Court in D.A. V. College,
Bhatinda, etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1971] 2 SCC 261, has the following F
to state as regards the maintainability of the petition under 32 Article of the
Constitution.

" ..... a petition under Article 32 in which petitioners make out a prima
.facie case that their fundamental right are either threatened or violated G
will be entertained by this Court and that it is not necessary for any
person who considers himself to be aggrieved to wait till the actual
threat has taken place ....... "

Incidentally, the power of judicial review being implicit in written
Constitution, question of there being any fetter for such review would not arise H

.,
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A and specially in the 21st century there ought not to be thwarting of such a
right nor even any hesitancy in that regard. Be it noticed herein that
maintainability of the writ petition is an issue de hors the ultimate result in
the petition - presently the justice oriented approach and set-up a standard in
accordance therewith ought to be the guiding factor so far as the law co~rts
B . are concerned. Refusal to entertain cannot be in tune with the present.approach
and rather acts contra. The requirement is a prima facie satisfaction on the
basis of the available pleadings as to whether the judicial review prayed for
under Article 32 needs consideration, if it does, there cannot be any doubt as
regards its maintainability.

c Let us, therefore, analyse the situation in totality and consider the plea
as emphasised by the petitioners herein. The records depict that thousands of
innocent persons have fallen a prey in the methodology of. working of finance
companies and firms but does that mean and imply a denial of an opportunity
of being heard or considered - the answer however, cannot possibly be in the
affirmative. Doctrine of natural justice warrants a fair opportunity - we do not
D
wish even to adumbrate the issue of natural justice here but the fact remains
the writ petitioners herein have come up with a petition on the ground that
they have not been able to obtain benefit of the justice delivery system, reasons
of which need not·be dealt with presently but the factum of not being able
to obtain the benefit and thereby it has been alleged that Article 21 stands
E violated : In our view, judicial review or in other words maintainability of the
petition under Article 32 cannot possibly be doubted in any way and as such
we are unable to record our concurrence with the submissions of the
respondents in the matter.

Let us however, try and analyse the grievance of the petitioners and
F
consider as to whether there is any substance in such a grievance. Shortly put
the petitioners' grievance, which stands identical in all the writ petitions, stand
out to be that though the petitioners were favoured with an order of bail in
one case but is being detained by reason of production warrant in another
matter and resultantly the petitioners are languishing in the jails being deprived
G of the order of grant of bail, - this aspect of the matter has been stated to be
violative of Article 21. In our view, however, the situation as noticed above
does to ipso facto render it violative of Article 21. Article 21 of the Constitution
postulates deprivation of life or personal liberty except according to the
procedure established by law. Admittedly, the protection of personal liberty
H stands expanded to make the right to life under Article 21 more meaningful,
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 145
the language of the Article itself records an exception indicating thereby that A
a person may be deprived of his liberty in accordance with procedure
established by law and it is in this sphere the courts will scrupulously observed
as to whether the same stands differently and contra as regards the procedure
established by law and in the event it is not so done, it would be aplain exercise
of judicial power to grant redress to the petitioner. While there is no difficulty
in appreciating the grievance and grant of relief in a given case but facts are
B
too insufficient however, to come to a conclusion as regards the infraction of
Article 21. Production warrants have been spoken of without any details
whatsoever therefor - the reason offered is that the petitioners, in fact, are not
in the know of things being behind the prison bars and it starts pouring in
from all parts of the country and in the factual backdrop, as noticed above c
it is a well nigh impossibility to come to a finding as regards the infraction
of Article 21 and since in the factual matrix, no infraction can be identified
and thus question of sustaining the plea of infringement of Article 21 would
not arise. In any event the liberty of the petitioners cannot said to have been
trifled Within the absence of due process of law. Deprivation, if any cannot D
claimed to be not in accordance with due process of law.

On the score of anticipatory bail, it is trite knowledge that Section 438
of the Crl. P. Code is made applicable only in the event of there being an
apprehension of arrest - The petitioners in the writ petitions herein are all inside
the prison bars upon arrest against all cognizable offences, and on the wake E
of the aforesaid question relieving the petitioners from unnecessary disgrace
and harassment would not arise.

In that view of the matter and since no infraction can be identified, the
petition also cannot be sustained as regards the issue of anticipatory bail under
F
Section -438.

A large number of decisions have been relied upon as regards this long
incarceration. We do however, feel it expedient to deal with some of them at
this juncture since more or less identical issues have been dealt with in those
judgments. The first in the line of decisions referred to is in regard to Kartar G
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994] 3 SCC 569 wherein this Court in paragraph
351 of the report stated :

"No doubt, liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by the
courts; nonetheless the courts while dispensing justice in cases like
H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A the one under theTADA act, should keep in mind not only the liberty
of the accused but also the interest of the victim and their near and
dear and above all the collective interest of the community and the
safety of the nation so that the public may not loose faith in the system
of judicial administration and indulge in private retribution."
B The fact situation of. the matter under consideration does not warrant
further discussion more so by reason of the fact that the collective interest of
the community is said to be affected. The decision thus does not lend any
assistance to the petitioners herein.

The decision of this Court in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee
c Represe1tting' Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India & Ors., (1994] 6 SCC
731 and the directions contained therein has no relevance in the instant case,
as such we need not· dilate on the issue or with the decision any further.

In Shaheen We(fare Association v. Union of India & Ors., [ 1996] 2 SCC
D 616; R.D. Upadhyay V. State ofA.P. & Ors., (1996] 3 sec 422 and in"'Common
Cause" A Registered Society through its Director v. Union of India & Ors.,;
(1996] 4 SCC 33 and the direction issued to the High Courts to deal with the
pending criminal proceedings regarding the offences involving corruption, ·
misappropriation of public funds, cheating etc. for disposal of the cases on
priority basis does not in fact have any impact in the present context - though,
E
however, we also deem it fit to issue similar directives in the matter under
consideration irrespective of the factum of our finding on infraction of Article
21 as also under Section 438 of the Code.

It is no doubt true that this Court earlier on two occasions in Writ Petition
F (Crl.) No. 256199 ·and Writ Petition (Cr!.) Nos. 72-75/2000, has granted the
relief that in the event of the arrest of the petitioner in connection with any
criminal case in his capacity as Managing Director/Director of the Group of
companies, the arresting officer shall release him on bail on his executing a
bond to the satisfaction of the arresting officer. This order obviously tantamounts
to an order, invoking the provisions of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal
G
Procedure. The Court adopted the af~resaid procedure to find out a solution
in the peculiar situation and being of the opinion that even though the accused
is able to get orders bail from different Courts, where cases are pending, but
in view of the large number of cases against the accused throughout .the
country, it has physically not become possible to release the accused from fhc
H custody. If an accused facing a charge under Sections 406, 409, 420 and 120-
N.S. SAHNI v. U.0.1. [BANERJEE, J.] 147
B is ordinarily not entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 438 of the A
Criminal Procedure Code unless it is established that such criminal accusation
is not a:·bonafide one, it is difficult to conceive that an accused who is involved
in thousands of cases in different parts of the country by cheating millions
of countrymen, can be given benefit of the privilege of anticipatory bail as
a matter of routine, as was done in the two cases, on the basis of which the
present batch of cases have been filed. In the manner in which these white- B
collared crimes are committed and the extent to which it has pervaded the
society at large, we are of the considered opinion that the two cases decided
by this Court earlier would not be of universal application and cannot be used
as a precedent for availing of the privilege in the nature of an anticipatory
bail. The Court itself was conscious of the peculiar situation and, therefore, c
noticed that the Court is exercising its discretion in the peculiar nature and
facts of the case. We do not agree with the proposition that an accused being
involved in large number of criminal cases in different parts of the country,
if is not able to be released from custody even on getting bail orders in some
cases, itself would tantamount to violation of the nght of a citizen under Article
21 of the Constitution. The object of Article 21 is to prevent encroachment
D
upon personal liberty by the Executive save in accordance with law, and in
conformity with the provisions thereof. It is, therefore, imperative that before
a person is deprived of his life or personal liberty, the procedure established
by law must strictly be followed and must not be departed from, to the
disadvantage of the person affected. In each case where a person complains E
of the deprivation of his life or personal liberty, the Court, in exercise of its
constitutional power of judicial review, has to decide whether there is a law
authorising such deprivation and whether in the given case, the procedure
prescribed by such law is reasonable, fair and just, and not arbitrary, whimsical
and fanciful. On account of liberal interpretation of the words 'life' and
F
'liberty' in Article 21, the said Article has now come to be invoked almost
as a residuary right, even to an extent which the founding fathers of the
Constitution never dreamt of. In a country like ours, if an accused is alleged
to have deceived millions of coumryn.en, who have invested their entire life's
saving in such fictitious and frivolous companies promoted by the accused and
when thousands of cases are pending against an accused in different parts of G
the country, can an accused at all complain of infraction of Article 21, on the
ground that he is not being able to be released out of jail custody in view of
different production warrants issued by different Courts. Issuance of production
warrants by the Court and the production of accused in Court, in cases where
he is involved is a procedure established.by law' and consequently, the accused H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A cannot be permitted to make a complain of infraction of his rights under Article
21. In our considered opinion, it would be a misplaced sympathy of the Court
on such while-collared accused persons whose acts of commission and
omission has ruined a vast majority of poor citizens of this country. Though
we agree that in a given case, Court may be justified in directing release of
the accused, taking a stock of the entire situation in the case. While,. therefore,
B
we agree with the submissions of the counsel for the petitioners-accused that
an accused could maintain a petition under Article 32, but the Court would
not be justified in directing the release of such accused under a blanket order
like the one, which hasbeen relied upon by the counsel for the accused persons
and such a course of action would perpetrate gross injustice.
c
We are, therefore, unable to agree with the method adopted by this Court
in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 256/99 and Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos. 72-75/2000
since in our opinion to adopt the ~ethod would be giving a premium to the
accused persons. Right of an. accused to have speedy trial is now recognised
D as a right under Article 21. Even it has been extended to investigation of
offences against child offenders in the case of Sheela Barse and Ant: v. Union
of India and Ors., AIR (1986) SC 1773. The procedural fairness required by
...
Article 21, including the right to a speedy trial, has, therefore to be observed
throughout and to be borne in mind. In course of hearing, we had requested
the learned Additional Solicitor General to evolve a scheme for expeditious·
E disposal of criminal cases of the nature with which we are concerned in the
· present batch of cases. But no concrete proposal came till the conclusion of
the hearing of these matters. While, therefore, we are not granting any relief
to the accused persons on the reasons already indicated, we would commend
upon the Central Government to evolve certain formula or procedure, so that
F the accused will not complain of undue harassment on account of protraction
of their cases and the persons deceived who have filed complaints, will be
satisfied with the early conclusions of the trial.

True, there are certain orders passed by this Court .wherein special
directions have been given but this Court while passing the orders have not
G
only been extremely careful but was cautious enough to record therein that
the order was passed on the special facts and the circumstances in the issue
and the same ought not to be treated as a precedent - on the wake of recording
of such a caution and the order being in the specific facts of the matter in
issue question of the same being treated as a judicial precedent would not arise,
H in any event in the view as noticed herein above, the said orders as a matter
N.S. SAHNI v. U.O.I. [BANERJEE, J.] 149
of fact have lost its significance. A
As regards the issue of a single-offence, we are afraid that the fact-
situation of the matters under consideration would not permit to lend any
credence to such as submission, Each individual deposit agreement shall have
to be treated a separate and individual transaction brought about by the
allurement of the financial companies, since the parties are different, the
B
amount of deposit is different as also the period for which the deposit was
effected. It has all the characteristics of independent transactions and we do
.not see any compelling reason to hold it otherwise. The plea as raised also
cannot have our concurrence.
c
In almost all the petitions there has been a prayer for exemption from
personal appearance - we are afraid that such a direction cannot be had from
this Court since it is within the powers of the Magistrate and in his judicial
discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused and as such
be it provided here that it would be open to the party to apply to the concerned D
trial/sessions court for such exemption and in the event of there being such
an application, the same be disposed of in accordance with the law. (see in
this context the decision of this Court in Mis. Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v.
Mis. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd. & Ors., IT (2001) 7 SC 127.

Another prayer which. has been made in almost all the petitioners is that
E
the investigations of all cases should be transferred to the CBI. Such a prayer
has been rejected in the earlier orders.as relied upon by the petitioners herein
and as such we do not feel it expedient to dilate on the issue excepting
recording out concurrence with the earlier view expressed and thereby
rejecting the same. F

In that view of the matter, we conclude that while in the contextual fact,
a petition under Article 32 is maintainable but the petitioners are not entitled
to any relief by reason of insufficiency of available materials on record as
regards the issue of infraction of Article 21. In regard to the prayer for G
consolidation the petitioner would be at liberty to approach the High Court
in accordance with law. Similar is the situation as regards the orders of the
Consumer Forum and the petitioner in the normal course of events would be
at liberty to ventilate the grievance if any, before the· Appellate Forum in
accordance with law.
H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A By reason of the above, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed
excepting to the extent as specifically noticed above.

Be it placed on record that observations made in this judgment and order
ought not to be treated as having any effect in the trial and each matter 'be
dealt with in accordance with law and uninfluenced by the factum of rejection
B of these writ petitions.

N.J. Petitions dismissed.