NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. & ORS.versusANANTA KISHORE ROUT & ORS.

                          [2014) 7 S.C.R. 406


A             NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. & ORS.
                                   v.
                 ANANTA KISHORE ROUT & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 5989 of 2008)
                             MAY 8, 2014
B
        [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.]

         SERVICE LAW:

c        Employer-employee relationship - In order to determine
    the existence of employer-employee relationship, the
    determining factor is whether there is complete control and
    supervision by the employer - In the instant case, claim was
    made by the employees of the schools that they be treated
    at par with the employees of appellant company as the
0
    schools were established by the appellant for the wards of its
    employees - Records proved that the schools have their own
    independent Managing Committees and the day to day
    control over the staff was with the Managing Committees -
    Mere fact that schools were set up by the appellant or they
E had agreed to take care of financial deficits for the running of
   schools is not conclusive factor - Moreover, the employees
   of appellant were discharging altogether different kinds of
   duties - Therefore, principles of 'equal pay for equal work' is
  ·not attracted at all - There was no parity in the nature of work,
F mode of appointment, experience, education qualification
   between the appellant employees and employees of schools
   - Moreover, the salaries and other perks which school
   employees were getting were better than their counter parts
   in Government Schools or aided/unaided recognized schools
G in State of Orissa.

      The appellant is a public sector undertaking. In the
  year 1984, it established two schools for the benefit of the
  wards of its employees. The appellant provided
H                             406
    NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA               407
            KISHORE ROUT & ORS.
necessary infrastructure, such as land, building, furniture, A
library and other assets. In/ 1985, the appellar)t entered
into agreements with CCM Trust (CCMT) whereunder the
appellant entrusted the management of the schools on
a contract basis to CCMT. In terms of these agreements,
the appellant agreed to pay Rs. 10,000 p.a. to CCMT as B
donation towards supervision charges for each school.
These agreements also provided that the powers to
establish, maintain and manage the schools would veEt
in the Managing Committee consisting of seven
members. Out of these seven members, four were the c
nominees of CCMT and three persons were nominated
by the appellant. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
Secretary-cum-correspondent were to be the nominees
of CCMT. Apart from constructing the building and
 providing requisite furniture and fittings, the appellant
                                                                0
was .also to provide quarters at its own cost for teachers
 and staff members of the schools. The employees of the
 schools were treated at par with the appellant company
 employees so far as the medical, consumer co-operative,
 club and similar facilities were concerned. These
 agreements came to an end by efflux of time in the year E
 1990. Thereafter, SVS agreed to manage both the
 schools. Accordingly agreement was entered into by the
 appellant with SVS. As per this agreement, the appellant
 agreed to pay to SVS certain amount towards its
 supervision charges. Even as per this Agreement, the F
 Executive Authority of these two schools vested in the
 Managing Committee to be constituted separately for
 each of the schools. The employees of both schools filed
 writ petitions for claiming parity of pay with the
 employees of the appellant on the ground that real G
 control and supervision of the schools, including the staff
 was that of the appellant which has the final say in all vital
 matters. The High Court allowed the writ petitions. The
 instant appeals were filed challenging the decision of the
 High court.                                                    H
    408      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A         Allowing the appeals, the Court

        HELD: 1. No doubt, th~ school was established by
  the appellant. The appellant was providing necessary
  infrastructure and adequate financial support inasmuch
  as deficit, after meeting the expenses from the tuition fee
8
  and other incomes received by the schools, was met by
  the appellant. The appellant has also placed staff quarters
  at the disposal of the schools which were allotted to the
  employees of the schools. Employees of the school were
  also accorded some other benefits like recreation club
C facilities etc. [Para 21] [425-E-F]

       2. In order to determine the existence of employer-
  employee relationship, the correct approach would be to
  consider as to whether there was complete control and
D supervision of the appellant. The relationship of master
  and servant is a question of fact and that depends upon
  the existence of power in the employer, not only to direct
  what work the servant is to do but also the manner in
  which the work is to be done. It has been established
E from the documents on record that both the schools have
  their own independent Managing Committees. These
  Managing Committees were registered under the
  Societies Registration Act. It was these Managing
  Committees who not only recruited teaching and other
F staff and appointed them, but all other decisions in
  respect of their service conditions were also taken by the
  Managing Committees. These ranged from pay fixation,
  seniority, grant of leave, promotion, disciplinary action,
  retirement, termination etc. In fact, even Service Rules
G were framed which contained the provisions; d.elineating
  all necessary service conditions. Various documents
  were produced to show that appointment letters were
  issued by the Managing Committees, disciplinary action
  was taken by the Managing Committees, pay fixation and
  promotion orders were passed by the Managing
H
     NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                 409
             KISHORE ROUT & ORS.
  Committees and even orders of superannuation and                A
· termination of the staff were issued by the Managing
  Committees. It, thus, became clear that day to day control
  over the staff was that of the Managing Committees.
  These Managing Committees were having statutory
  status as they were registered under the Societies              B
  Registration Act. Managing Committees thus had their
  own independent legal entities. However, merely because
  the schools were set up by the appellant or they had
  agreed to take care of the financial deficits for the running
  of the schools were not the conclusive factors. [Paras 22       c
  to 24] [425-G, H; 426-A-B, E-F; 427-A, B]

      3. In the instant case, the day to day supervision and
  control vested with the Managing Committee, from the
  appointment till cessation/termination. The exercise .
  which was undertaken by the High Court was in the 0
  nature of piercing the veil and commenting that real
. control vested with the appellant. Whether the
  arrangement/contract was sham or camouflage is a
  disputed question of fact. No doubt, there may be some
  element of control of the appellant because of the reason E
  that its officials were nominated to the Managing
  Committees of the schools. Such provisions were made
  to ensure that schools ran smoothly and properly by the
  society. It also became necessary to ensure that the
  money was appropriately spent. However, this kind of F
  'remote control' would not make the appella'nt as the
  employer of these workers. This only showed that since
  the appellant was shouldering and meeting the financial
  deficits, it wanted to ,ensure that money was spent for
  rightful purposes. [Paras 26 and 30] [428-F-H; 431-F, G] G
     4. The argument was raised that the Managing
 Committee cannot be the employer as it would lose its
 identity on the termination of agreement between the
 appellant and SVS. However, even that by itself cannot           H
    410    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A be the determinative factor. When the agreement was
   earlier entered into between the appellant and CCMT, and
   staff was appointed in the school by CCMT, appellant
   ensured that such staff is taken over by SVS. For this
   purpose a specific clause was provided in agreement
B between the appellant and SVS. Only because SVS
  agreed to take over the employees, would not mean that
  the appellant becomes the employer. On the contrary, this
  clause suggested that but for the intervention of the
  appellant, the school staff that was engaged by CCMT
c would have been dealt with by CCMT. It is a matter of
  record that CCMT ran other schools as well. In that
  -eventuality, it would have taken these employees with
  themselves or retrenched these employees in accordance
  with law. Same was the position of SVS who have other
  schools also. However, this kind of situation would not
0
  arise in the instant case as assurance was ·given by the
  appellant that the teaching and other staff of the two
  schools would not lose their jobs even if present
  agreement of the appellant with SVS comes to an end
E and the management is taken over by some other agency
  for running the· schools. The appellant shall stand
  committed by this assurance and would adhere to the
  same for all times to come. The position which emerged,
  in view of the assurance, is. that the service tenure of
  these employees is protected. [Paras 31 and 32) [431-H;
F 432-A, B, D, HJ

         5. The salaries and other perks which the
    respondents were getting were better than their counter
    parts in Government schools or aided un-aided
G recognised schools in the State of Orissa. In a situation
    like this even if, it is presumed that the appellant is the
    employer of these employees, they would not be entitled
    to the pay scales which were given to other employees
    of the appellant as there cannot be any comparison
1-1 between the two. The principle of 'equal pay for equal
    NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA               411
            KISHORE ROUT & ORS.
work' is not attracted at all. Those employees directly A
employed by the appellant were discharging altogether
different kinds of duties. Main activity of the appellant was
the manufacture and production of alumina and
aluminium for which it had its manufacturing units. The
process and method of recruitment of those employees, B
their eligibility conditions for appointment, nature of job
done by those employees etc. was entirely different from
the employees of these schools. There was no parity in
the nature of work, mode of appointment, experience,
educational qualifications between the appellant c
employees and the employees of the two schools. In fact,
such a comparison can be made with their counter parts
in the Government schools and/or aided or unaided
schools. On that parameter, there cannot be any
grievance of the staff which is getting better emoluments 0
and enjoying far superior service conditions. [Paras 33
and 34] [433-A-D; 436-D-E]
     SC Chandra & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand and Ors. 2007
(8) SCC 279: 2007 (9) SCR 130 - relied on.
                                                               E
    A.K. Bindal & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2003) 5 SCC
163: 2003 (3) SCR 928; State of West Bengal & Anr. v. West
Bengal Registration Copywriters Association and Anr. (2009)
14 SCC 132: 2009 (8) SCR 334; Nihal Singh & Ors. v. State
of Punjab & Ors (2013) 10 Scale 162 - referred to.             F
                    Case Law Reference :
    2003 (3) SCR928          Referred to          Para 17
    2009 (8) SCR334          Referred to          Para 17
                                                               G
    (2013) 1O Scale 162      Referred to          Para 17
    2007 (9) SCR 130         Relied on            Para 28
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5989 of 2008.                                                  H
    412      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               · [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A       From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.2006 of the
    High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in OJC. No. 11761 of 2001. ·

                                   WITH

    C.A. Nos. 5992 and 5993 of 2008.
B
        P.P. Rao, Ashok Gopta, K.K. Venugopal, Jaideep Gupta
 · Manu Nair, Anuj Berry, Tanuj Bhushan (for Suresh A. Shroff &
   Co,), K.L. Janjani, Dip_ak Kumar Jena, Minakshi Ghosh Jena,
   Harish Shukla, Tarun Kumar, Shivnath Mahanta, Anurag
c Pandey for the appearing parties.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. The Appellant herein, National Aluminium
  Company Limited (NALCO) has established two schools for the
D benefit of the wards of its-employees. These schools are known
  as Saraswati Vidaya Mandir (SVM) and located at NALCO
  Nagar in Angul district and at Damandjodi in Koraput district,
  Orissa. Management of these schools is presently in the hand
  of Saraswati Vidya Mandir (SVS) which is affiliated to Vidya
E Bharati Akhila Bharatiya Sikhya Sansthan.

        2. Two Writ Petitions were filed by the employees of each
  of school in the Orissa High Court, Cuttack for a declaration
  that they are the employees of NALCO and be treated as such,
F with consequential prayer that these employees be also
  accorded suitable pay scales as admissible to the employees
  of NALCO. Having regard to the commonality of fact, situation
  under which these writ petitions were filed, as· well as
  singularity of the issue.rnvolved, both these writ petitions were
G heard together by the High Court, the outcome of which is the
  judgment dated 21st December, 2006. The High Court has
  accepted the case of these employees of SVM holding them
  to be the employees of the NALCO. As a sequittor, direction
  is issued to the NALCO to make available the benefits, which
  are enjoyed by other employees of the NALCO. Presen
H
     NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                   413
       KISHORE ROUT & ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
appeals, filed by NALCO, question the validity of the aforesaid      A
judgment of the High Court.

    3. We may first take note of those facts which ~re not in
dispute. These are as follows:

     NALCO is a Public Sector Enterprise under the                   8
Government of India. It is Company incorporated under the
Indian Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at
Bhubaneswar, Orissa. NALCO is engaged in manufacture and
production of Alumina and Aluminium. It has its manufacturing
units: one at NALCO Nagar, Angul and at Damanjodi in                 C
Koraput district.

      4. In the year 1984, NALCO established two schools in the
townships set up by it for its employees working in its
manufacturing units at NALCO Nagar, Angul and at Damanjodi,          o
with a view to provide educational facility mainly to the children
of its employees from primary to +2 level though the children
from neighbouring area are also given admissions. It also
provided necessary infrastructure, such as land, building,
furniture, library, laboratory equipments and other assets. The      E
said schools admittedly are unaid~d private schools. On 15th
May, 1985, NALCO entered into two separate but identical
agreements for the aforesaid schools with the Central Chinmoy
Mission Trust, Bombay (in short, CCMT) whereunder the
NALCO entrusted the management of the schools on contract
basis to CCMT and the schools were called Chinmay                    F
Vidyalayas. According to the these agreements, NALCO
agreed to pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- per annum to CCMT
as donation towards the supervision charges for each school.
     5. These Agreements acknowledged the fact that the two          G
schools have been established by the NALCO and to start and
run those schools, it had approached CCMT. The Agreements
further stipulated terms and conditions on which CCMT was to
run and manage these schools. It is a common case of the
parties that the schools have been recognized by the State           H
    414      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014) 7 S.C.R. .

A Government (Education Department) and also affiliated to the
    Orissa Board of Secondary Education. As per the requirements
    of the Statute governing school education, every school is
    required to constitute a Managing Committee. Accordingly,
    these Agreements also provided that the powers to establish,
B maintain and manage the schools shall vest in the Managing
    Committee consisting of seven members. Out of these seven
    members, four were the nominees of CCMT and three persons
    were nominated by the NALCO. Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
    Se,cretary-cum-correspondent were to be the nominees of
c CCMT. Though the admission in the schools is open to all
    children irrespective of caste, creed and community, preference
  . is to be given to the children of the employees of the NALCO.
    Apart from constructing the building and providing requisite
    furniture and fittings, NALCO was also to provide quarters at
    its own cost for teachers and staff members of the schools.
0
    NALCO also agreed to provide residential accommodation to
    every employee in due course. Significantly, the employees of
    the schools were to be treated at par with NALCO employees
    so far as the medical, consumer co-operative, club and similar
    facilities are concerned. NALCO also agreed to meet the
E revenue deficit as per Clause 15 of the said Agreement which
   reads as under:
          "15. That NALCO shall meet the revenue defit of Chinmaya
          Vidyalaya, Damanjodi on the actual basis. Since NALCO
F         shall be meeting the capital expenditure and the revenue
          deficit, NALCO shall have the right to fix the tuition fees
          and other charges from time to time for children of NALCO
          employees and others."
G        6. These agreements were terminable at the instance of
    the parties by giving six months prior notice in writing to the other
    party. In the event of termination the agreements, the services
    of the staff employed by the school were liable to be terminated
    in accordance with the terms of their appointment iri these
    schools.
H
     NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD .. v. ANANTA              415
       KISHORE ROUT & ORS .. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
       7. These agreen:ients came to an end by efflux of time in A
1the year 1998. It appears that CCMT was not interested in
 continuing with the aforesaid arrangement. This led NALCO to
 find another organizatjon for running and managing the schools.
 It is how SVS came into the picture which agreed tG manage
 both the schools. Accordingly Agreement dated 18th May, 1990 B
 was entered into by NALCO with SVS. As per the Agreement,
 name of the school was changed from Chinmaya Vidyalaya
 Damahjodi to Sa~aswati Vidya Mandiar (SVM). As per this
  agreement NALCO agreed to pay Rs.i,OOO/- per month to the
 SVS towards its supervision charges wh.ich was enhanced from C
 time to time and this figure was Rs.50,000/- per annum at the
 time of the filing of the writ petitions in the High Court. Even as
 per this Agreement, the Executive Authority of these two schools
 vests in the Managing Committee to be constituted separately
  for each of the..schools. This Managing Committee is constituted D
  with the following members:

     "(a) The respective unit heads of Damanjodi/Angul or its
     nominee shall be the ex-officio president;

     (b) A nominee of the Finance department of the respective    E
     units of NALCO;

     (c) A nominee of the Personnel Admn. Department of the
     respective units of NALCO;

     (d) A representative of the parents/guardians who hsall be   F
     an employee of NALCO to be co-opted by the Managing
     Committee respectively for each school at the units;

     (e) 4 members to be nominated by the Samiti;
                                                                  G
     (f) The headmaster of the school;

     (g) A representative of the teachers;
     (h) A part-time representative of the Samiti who shall act
                                                                  H
    416       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014) 7 S.C.R.

A         as the ex-officio member-secretary of the Managing
          Committees."

         The aforesaid clause in the Agreement is with a proviso
    that the relevant provisions of the Orissa Education Act and
    Rules shall be kept in view while making aforesaid nominations.
8
          8. Accordingly, two Managing Committees were
  constituted; one for each school and both have been registered
  under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. As per the
  provision contained in clause 4 of the aforesaid Agreement,
C other clauses relating to placing at the exclusive disposal of the
  SVS, the two school premises along with requisite furniture/
  fittings, library, laboratory games equipments, audio-visual, etc.
  remain as it is. Likewise provision for providing deficit funds,
  after accounting for the fee and other amounts received from
D the students, by NALCO is also maintained. Other functions
  which are specifically assigned to the Managing Committee,
  as per this Agreement, are as follow:

          "(a) Audit of the schools accounts by the Auditors
          appointed by the Managing Committee.
E
          (b) Managing Committee to raise funds- by way of donation
          and voluntary contribution including power to borrow funds
          or raise loans for the purpose of the schools after getting
          prior approval of the Samiti, without any liability to
F         NALCO."

       9. It is also significant to note that apart from providing usual
  termination clause, as per this Agreement, the Samiti agreed
  to retain the services of the existing teachers and staff in both
G the schools as provided in clause 25 thereof, which is to the
  following effect:

          "25. It has been agreed by the Samiti to retain the services
          of the existing teachers and staffs in both the schools on
          their existing terms and conditions of service and the
H
         NATIONALALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                    417
           KISHORE ROUT & ORS)A.t<. SIKRI, J.]
        Managing Committee in due c.ourse may review the                 A
        position."
         10. Since the teaching and non-teaching staff working in
    the aforesaid schools had no service conditions, there was
    discontentment among the employees. Therefore, it was thought 8
0   proper to frame rules regulating conditions of service for such
    employees. A joint meeting was convened for this purpose
    wherein certain modalities were worked out to frame rules
    regarding recruitment and conditions of services of the ,
    employees of the schools and a committee for this purpose · C
    was constituted comprising of the authorities of both the schools
    at Angul and Damanjodi, the Manager (Personnel) of NALCO
    and the Secretary of SVS. A set of draft rules was framed
    under the name and style 'Saraswati Vidyamandir Employees'
     Recruitment ~nd Conditions of Service Rules, 1995' (Rules'
     hereinafter). The Rules so framed were approved by the D
    Corporate office of NALCO.

         11. These Rules provide for the scales of pay of different
    categories of employees, the modalities for recruitment of
    Principal, teachers and other non-teaching staff and                 E
    determination of seniority of the employees besides fixing the
    age of superannuation etc.

          12. It cannot be disputed that as per these Rules, it is the
    Managing Committee's of the schools, which are registered as
                                                                         F
    societies under the Societies Registration Act, undertake the
    recruitment of the teaching and other staff, issue appointment
    letters and take all other decisions in respect of the services
    of teaching and other staff incJuding promotion, pay fixation,
    seniority, grant of leave, disciplinary action, retirement,
    termination etc. This has been so demonstrated by NALCO by           G
    producing copies of the orders issued by the MCs relating to
    each of the aforesaid aspects. Not only this, it has been so
    provided under the Rules as well. Rule 4 prescribes the method
    of recruitment; Rule 2(a) defines the appointing as MC; Rule
    4(11} deals with the cadre of posts; Rule 20 touches the aspect      H
    418     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014) 7 S.C.R.

A   of termination of service; and Rule 24 deals with the discipline
    and disciplinary action.

        13. From these facts, narrated above, one can easily find
  out as to what are the respective cases of both the parties. The
  employees of both schools filed the writ petitions to lay the
8
  claim that they are the employees of the NALCO on the ground
  that real control and supervision of the schools, including the
  staff is that of NALCO which has the final say in all vital matters.
  It was their argument that though the appointments are made
  by the Managing Committees of the schools, it is on the
C recommendation of the Selection Committee of which the
  authorities of NALCO are the members. Further, since
  inception of the school, an officer in the rank of General
  Manager of NALCO has been functioning as the President of
  the Managing Committee, and an officer in the rank of Chief
D Manager/DGM (Personal Admn.), and the DGM (Finance) are
  the other two members. That apart, the building furniture/fittings
  and all necessary paraphernalia for running of the schools is
  provided by and is the responsibility of NALCO. Even the
  finances are provided by NALCO the financial budget is
E approved by the Board of Director of the NALCO. NALCO even
  fixes the tuition fee. No transaction of the schools can be made
  without the approval of DGM (Finance), NALCO which includes
  the expenditure with regard to the salary component, provident
  fund, medical reimbursement, leave travel concession, festival
F advance, increments, etc. Teaching and non-teaching staff of
  the schools are allotted with residential quarters by the NALCO.
  It was thus argued that NALCO plays a decisive role in the
  matter of appointment of the employees as well as in the
  management of the schools.
G
        14. On the other hand, the case of the NALCO was that
  Managing Committees are the societies registered under
  Societies Registration Act having independent legal status; it
  is these MCs which are not only the appointing authorities but
  disciplinary authorities with all controlling power over these
H
    NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                  419
      KISHORE ~OUT & ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
employees and therefore NALCO cannot be treated as the            A
employer of the staff of the schools.

     15. The High Court after considering the respective
submissions and perusing the material on record came to the
conclusion that real control and supervision over these           8
employees and even over the schools, was that of NALCO.
Some of the relevant discussion in the impugned judgment is
extracted below:

     "A bare look at the basic document, i.e. agreement dated
     15th May, 1985 entered into between the NALCO and C
     CCMl\ Clause 20 of it, as indicated above, would show
     that on termination of the agreement, only the name of the
     Chinmaya Vidyalaya cannot be used by NALCO and
     subsequently, the place of CCMT has been taken over by
     SVS. From the voluminous documents as referred to D .
     above, there can be no second opinion in regard to the
     fact that the schools were established by the NALCO,
     funded by NALCO authorities and it has dee·p and
      pervasive control over the schools. It is the NALCO, which
      pays the salary, Provident fund, and makes the medical E
      reimbursement, the SVS as stated in its affidavit, only
      looked to the discipline, curriculum and management of the
      schools. In this regard, we may refer to a decision
      rendered by this Court in OJC No.4581985 (Duryodhan
      Swain & Ors. vs. Fertiliser Corporation of India and F
      others) on 22.11.1990, wherein a similar question arose .
   . Twenty-one petitioners serving in the Fertilizer Higher
      Secondary school in different capacities had filed the said
      writ petition. The said school was imparting teaching in +
      2· course and on account of the welfare need of its G
    · employees, the school was given grant and was converted
      into a High.er Secondary School. Even though a managing
      committee was constituted for the said school,
       representatives of trade unions and of guardians and
       parents as well a~ the officials of the corporation were also H
         420       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014) 7 S.C.R.


    .A         included. The financial· control of the school rested in a
               larger measure with the corporation and it was fully
               financed by the corporation. In those prevailing facts and
               circumstances, this court held that the corporation had
               deep and pervasive control over the working of the school
    s          and ultimately, directed the corporation to accept the
               petitioners to be its employees.

               Now in the instant case, at the cost of repetition, we may
               say that the agreement dated 18.05.1990 entered into
               between the NALCO and the SVS (Annexure 1) and the
    c          agreement dated 15.05.1985 entered into between the
               NALCO and CCMT (Annexure 19) as indicated above,
               would amply prove the control of NALCO over the schools
               in finance, payment, discipline and administration. This fact
               is further corroborated and strengthened by the submission
    D          of the learned counsel for the SVS that it only carries on
               the activities of providing better educational aid and that :
                                                                             1
'              it is not an educational agency.
               It is a peculiar case, where there is no denial that all the '
    E          employees are getting much higher scale of pay than that
               of the employees of the aided and unaided schools under
               the state and their pay structure is totally different and even
               much better than the employees of all the Government
               educational institutions functioning of the state. It has
    F          become possible only due to the reason that the entire
               finance is being paid by NALCO and if NALCO withdraws
               itself from the schools, neither SVS and SVM would be
               able to meet the expenses of the schools.
               The agreement dated 15.05.1985 as well as the conduct i
    G          of the parties and the transactions that are carried on from ~
               1985 till today, would indicate that NALCO has deep and .. ·
               pervasive control over the management of the schools and
               it is NALCO, which is the educational agency in
               establishing the schools. The argument advanced by Mr:
    H          R.K. Rath, learned coun.sel for NALCO, and Mr. B.N. Rath,
     NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                  421
       KISHORE ROUT & ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
    ·learned counsel appearing for SVS in both the Writ             A
     Petitions do not detract from the position that the schools
     are being managed and financed by the NALCO and from
     the documents. It is crystal clear that the ownership and
     overall management of the schools are retained by the
     NALCO while CCMT and SVM or SVS as the case may                B
     be, have taken up the responsibility of running the schools
     at different point of time because they have expertise and
     experience in the field of teaching."

       16. Before us arguments of both the parties remain the C
 same. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
 Appellant in one appeal and Mr. Ashok Gupta, Senior
 Advocate appearing in the other appeal of NALCO challenged
 the aforesaid line of thinking of the High Court. It was argued
 by Mr. Rao that the High Court took into consideration those
 facts which were irrelevant and not germane to decide the D
  controversy viz. over the whether NALCO had any deep and
  comprehensive control and supervision over the teaching and
  other staff of the school. His submission was that establishment
  of the school with necessary infrastructure was not at all relevant
  factor. The schools were set up by NALCO acknowledging its E
  responsibility as a model employer which can be termed as a
  step towards "Corporate Social Responsibility". /1..s a "Jelfare
  measure, NALCO wanted to provide this facility in the 'wo
  NALCO campuses. However, by providing land, bu1!d'ng and
  infrastructure and setting up of the school, all of it has been F
  handed over to the outside agency to run these schools. For
  running these schools, it is that outside agency which had to
' employ the staff and settle their service conditions. In so far as
  provision of providing financial assistance is concerned, it was
  only to the extent of meeting shortfall, again, keeping in mind · G
  good corporate governance. He argued that the real test in such
  a case was to examine as to which authority was the appointin•
  authority of the employees, and was fixing terms and conditions
  of the employment, including fixing their service conditions I'
   pay fixation, seniority, grant of leave, promotion etc. When       H
      '
     .422      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                {2014] 7 S.C.R.


A these powers were with the Managing Committee or the SVS
 .. which was so specifically provided in the service rules as well,
  · duly approved by the Director of Education, by no stretch of
    imagination these employees could be called as the employees
    of NALCO.
B
         17. Another submission of Mr. Rao was that even the High
   Court has accepted, in the impugned judgment, that the
   employees of these schools are enjoying much higher scales
   of pay than that of the employees of aided and unaided schools
C. under the State of Orissa and their pay structure is much better
   than the employees of even the Government educational
   institutions functioning in the State. He, thus, argued tha~ when
   it is established as an admitted fact that the salaries and
   services conditions of the employees of these schools are far
   superior than their counter parts in working in aided, unaided
D and government schools, there was no reason for these
   employees to file these petitions. Elaborating this proposition,
   the submission of Mr. Rao was that even if it is assumed that
   they are the employees of NALCO, no direction could have
   been given to give them the pay scales which are enjoyed by
~ the employees of NALCO, in the absence of any parity
   inasmuch as principle of equal pay for equal work has no
   application in a case like this as the duties, functions, job
   requirements and even the eligibility conditions for appointment
   of such staff were materially different from the employees of the
F NALCO. Therefore, the High Court could not give any direction
   to NALCO to make available the benefits which are being
   enjoyed by other employees of NALCO to the employees of
   these schools. To buttress this argument he referred to the
   following judgments:
:G          (i) AK. Bindal & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.; (2003) 5
            sec 163;
            (ii) State of West Bengal & Anr. v. West Bengal
            Registration Copywriters Association and Anr.; (2009) 14
            sec 132,
    NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                  423
      KISHORE ~OUT & ORS. [AK. SIKRI, J.]
    (iii) Nihal Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors; (2013)      A
    10 Scale 162

     18. Mr. Ashok Gupta, in addition, argued that the impugned
direction to treat the employees of the school as that of
NALCO, amended to giving them the status of public
                                                                   8
employment which was impermissible inasmuch as the
procedure for recruitment by NALCO for its own staff was
entirely different. Further, whether the agreement entered into
with SVS is a camouflage an aspect which could not have been
gone into in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution. He also argued that impugned direction of the High   C
Court would discourage the corporate sector, private or public,
to take up welfare measures for its employees and would be
counter productive to the principle of corporate good
governance, which is now mandatorily provided under new
Companies Act, enacted by the Parliament in the year 2013.         D

       19. Mr. Venugopal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the employees of the schools defended the judgment of the
High Court and the directions contained therein. He referred
to all those documents and provisions as per which NALCO           E
had been exercising effective control in functioning of these
schools. These features have already been mentioned above.
Thrust of his submission was that even when there was cloak
of Managing Committee, apparently running the show, it was
only a subterfuge, when examined in the light of the aforesaid     F
documents reflecting that the real control was that of NALCO
which was pulling the strings. Apart from highlighting that the
schools were established by NALCO which remain the property
of NALCO, it is even providing entire infrastructure as wel~ as
full financial support on continuous basis. Further the schools    G
were established for the benefit of the children of NALCO's
employees. He also referred to various documents, which are
taken note of by the High Court as well, to buttress his
 submission that the actual decision making authority from the
 stage of recruitment process to that of termination of these      H
    424       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 7 S.C.R.


.A employees, is NALCO. From these documents, he drew the
   attention of the Court to the following aspects:

          "(i) Though the appointments are made by the Managing
          Committees of the School, selection process of
          appointment is controlled by NALCO which has financial
B
          say in the matter.                                •

          (ii) Appointments are made on the recommendation of the
          Selection Committee of which authorities of NALCO are
          the members.
c
          (iii) President of the Managing Committee is the General
          Manager of NALCO. Likewise Chief Manager/DGM
          (Personnel Administration) is member of the Managing
          Committee who takes care of personnel managing of the
D         Managing Committee. Financial affairs of the Schools are
          controlled by DGM (Finance) of NALCO as a member of
          the Managing Committees. In this way administrative and
          financial control is exercised by NALCO.
        (iv) Entire expenses incurred for running of the school are
E       borne by NALCO and no transaction can be made without
      . the approval of DGM (Finance), NALCO including the
        expenses with regard to the salary, Provident Fund,
        medical reimbursement, Leave Travel Concession, festival
        advance, increments etc.
F                               ~                         .
       (v) Teaching and non-teaching staff of the schools also
       enjoyed the facilities of Consumer Cooperative Society by
       NALCO as well as NALCO Hospital, like any other
       employees of NALCO.
G      (vi) Budgetary provisions for the school are made by the
       NALCO authorities every year. NALCO appoints auditors
       to audit the accounts of the schools. NALCO has provided
       residential quarters to the teaching and non-teaching staff
       of the school in the NALCO Township at par of the
H      employees of the NALCO.
     NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                   425
       KISHORE ROUT & ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
     (vii) Documents show that day to day grievances of the          A
     staff of different schools and other issues are addressed
     by NALCO Authorities."

       20. Mr. Venugopal submitted that in a matter like this,
 where one has to examine as to who may be the employer of           8
 the employees of the school, there were three possibilities
 namely NALCO, Siksha Samiti or Managing Committee. He
 argued that so far as the Managing Committee is concerned,
 it is not having any legal entity of its own. Moreover as soon as
 the agreement between NALCO and SVS comes to an end,                C
 these Managing Committees would disappear. Therefore, such
 a body cannot be the employer. Likewise, in so far as the SVS
 is concerned, it was only an agency for running the school and
 would go away after the expiry or termination of the agreement.
 Therefore, it would follow that NALCO is t.he real employer which   D
Ifact stands established from the manner in which NALCO is
 exercising deep and pervasive control.

     .21. We have considered the aforesaid submissions with
 reference to the record of this case. No doubt, the school is
 established by NALCO. NALCO. is also providing necessary            E
 infrastructure. It has also given adequate financial support
 inasmuch as deficit, after meeting the expenses from the tuition
 fee and other incomes received by the schools, is met by
 NALCO. NALCO has also placed staff quarters at the disposal
 of the schools which are allotted to the employees of the           F
 schools. Employees of the. school are also accorded some
 other benefits like recreation club facilities etc. However, the
 poser is as to whether these features are sufficient to make the
 staff of the schools as employees of NALCO.

     22. In order to determine the existence of employer -           G
 employee relationship, the correct approach would be to
 consider as to whether there is complete control and
 supervision of the NALCO. It was so held by this Court in
 Chemical Works Limited (supra) way back in the year 1957.
 The court emphasised that the relationship of master and            H
     426       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A    servant is a question of fact and that depends upon the
     existence of power in the employer, not only to direct what work
     the servant is to do but also the manner in which the work is to       1

     be done. This was so explained by formulating the following ;
     principle:-
6
           '~The principle which emerges from these authorities is that
           the prima facie test for the determination of the relationship
           between master and servant is the existence of the right
           in the master to supervise and control the work done by
           the servant not only in the matter of directing what work the
,c         servant is to do but also the manner in which he shall do
           his work, or to borrow the words of Lord Uthwatt at Page
           23 in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins &
           Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd., and Another, "The proper test is
           whether or not the hirer had authority to control the manner
·o         of execution of the act in question."

        23. It has been established from the documents on record
  that both the schools have their own independent Managing
  Committees. These Managing Committees are registered
E under the Societies Registration Act. It is these Managing
  Committees who not only recruit teaching and other staff and •
  appoint them, but all other decisions in respect of their service
  conditions are also taken by the Managing Committees. These
  range from pay fixation, seniority, grant of leave, promotion,
F disciplinary action, retirement, termination etc. In fact, even           1



  Service Rules, 1995 have been framed which contain the
  provisions; delineating all necessary service conditions.
  Various documents are produced to show that appointment
  letters are issued by the Managing Committees, disciplinary
G action is taken by the Managing Committees, pay fixation and
  promotion orders are passed by the Managing Committees
  and even orders of superannuation and termination of the staff
  are issued by the Managing Committees. It, thus, becomes
  clear that day to day control over the staff is that of the
  Managing Committees. These Managing Committees are
H
     NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA               427
       KISHORE ROUT & ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
having statutory status as they are registered under the        A
Societies Registration Act. Therefore .. Mr. Venugopal is not
right in his submission that Managing Committees do not have
their own independent legal entities.

     24: Merely because the schools are set up by NALCO or 8
they have agreed to take care of the financial deficits for the
running of the schools, according to us, are not the conclusive
factors. Such aspects have been considered by this Court in
various cases. In the case of RBI (Supra), question was as to
whether workers of the canteens which were established and
even financed by the RBI, were the workers of RBI. Various C
canteens were ~et up by the RBI which were being run through
a Cooperative Society. They were established in the Bank's
premises for the benefit of its employees. The Bank was
reimbursing the charges incurred in getting various statutory
licenses. Even prior permission of the RBI was required to D
increase the strength of the employees. Holding that these
canteen workers were not the employees of RBI, the court
observed:

     "10. The Bank does not supervise or control the working E
     of the canteens or the supply of eatables to employees.
     The employees are not under an obligation to purchase
     eatables from the canteen. There is no relationship of
     master and servant between the Bank and the various
     persons employed in tne canteens aforesaid. The Bank F
     does not carry any trade or business in the canteens. The
     staff canteens are established only as a welfare measure.
     Similar demands made by the staff canteen employees
     and the request made to the Central Government to refer
     the dispute for adjudication was rejected by the Central G
     Government and the c~hllnge against the same before
     the Calcutta High Court wa unsuccessful. According to the
     Bank, it has no statute or other obligation to run the
     canteens and it has no, airect control or supervision over
     the employees engaged in the canteens. It has not right H
    428       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A         to take any disciplinary action or to direct any canteen
          employee to do a particular work. The disciplinary control
          over the persons employed in the canteens does not vest
          in the Bank nor has the Bank any say or control regarding
          the allocation or work or the way in which the work is
B         carried out by the said employees. Sanctioning of leave,
          distribution of work, maintenance of the Attendance
          Register are all done either by the Implementation
          Committee (Canteen Committtee) or by the Cooperative
          Society or by th'~ contractor."
c      25. The court noticed that the Implementation Committee
  (Canteen Committee) which was running the canteen consisted
  of certain members, three out of which were nominated by the
  Bank. This was held to be a non-determinative factor. Following
  discussion on this aspect is also material and, therefore we
D extract the same hereunder:

          "Moreover, there is no right in the Bank to supervise and
          control the work done by the persons employed in the
          Committee nor has the Bank any right to direct the manner
E         in which the work shall be done by various persons. The
          Bank has absolutely no right to_ take any disciplinary action
          or to direct any canteen employee to do a particular work.
          Even according to the Tribunal, the Bank exercises only a
          'remote control'."
F       26. In the present case, as pointed out above, the day to
  day supervision and control vests with the Managing
  Committee, from the appointment till cessation/termination. The
  exercise which is undertaken by the High Court is in the nature
  of piercing the veil and commenting that real control vests with
G NALCO. Though we would come to this aspect a little later, it
  is necessary to point out at this stage that whether the
  arrangemenU contract is sham or camouflage is a disputed
  question of fact. In the present case writ petitions were filed and
  it is not a case where industrial disputes were raised by these
H employees.
      NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                     429     -
        KISHORE ROUT.& ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
    27. In the case of Workmen of Nilgiri Cooperative                   A
Marketing Societies Ltd. (Supra) the entire law was re-visited.
The Court emphasised that no hard and fast rule can be laid
down nor it is possible to do so. Likewise no single test - be
it control test, be it orga.nisational or any other test - has been
held to be the determinative factor for determining the jural           B
relationship of employer and employee. The Court enumerated
the relevant factors; which are to be examined in such cases,
in Paras 37 and 38-Which reads as under:-

 c:) "37. The control test and the organisation test, therefore,        C
     are not the only factors which can be said to be decisive.
     With a view to elicit the answer, the court is required to
     consider several factors which would have a bearing on
     the result: (a) who is the appointing authority; (b) who is
     the paymaster; (c) who can dis.miss (d) how long alternative
     service lasts; (e) the extent of control and supervision; (f)      D
     the nature of the job e.g. whether it is professional or skilled
     work; (g) nature of establishment; (h) the right to reject.
     38. With a view to find out reasonable solution in a
     problemati.c case of this nature! what is rieeded is an            E
     integrated approach meaning thereby integration of the
     relevant tests wherefor it may be necessary to examine as
     to whether the workman concerned was fully integrated
     int9 the employer's concern 'meaning thereby independent
     of the concern although attached therewith to some extent."        F _

     In the facts of that case, where the court found that the
     portress and gridders who were claiming themselves to be
     the employees of Nilgiri Cooperative Marketing Society,
     were not its employees as the said society was neither
     maintaining any attendance register or wage register or            G
     fixing working hours or had issued appointment letters to
     them."
    28. More significant case, having close proximity with the
present one is the judgment in SC Chandra & Ors. v. State of            H
    430      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 7 S.C.R.

A Jharkhand and Ors. 2007 (8) sec 279. In that case Hindustan
  Copper Limited (HCL), the Government of India enterprise, had
  established a school. Employees of that school claimed that
  their real employer was HCL. Admitted facts were that school
  was established by tho HCL with the object of benefiting
B children of the workers of the HCL. Even the financial assistance
  was provided to the schools. The Court however, came to the
  conclusion that only by giving financial assistance the HCL did
  not become the employer of teachers and staff working in the
  school. They were held to be the employees of the Managing
c Committee of the school. That apart of the discussion which
  has direct bearing on the present case runs as follows:-

          "8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
          perused the records. The basic question before us is
          whether a writ of mandamus could be issued against the
D         management of HCL. The learned Single Judge relying on
          the Division Bench in an identical matter pertaining to ,
          Bharat Cooking Coal Limited dismissed the writ petition
          of the appellants. This issue was examined in an analogous ·
          writ petition and in the aforesaid case, this issue Was I
E         extensively considered as to whether the management of ·.
          the school is the direct responsibility of HCL or not. After
          considering the matter in detail, the learned Single Judge
          relying on the aforesaid judgment found that there is no
          relationship of master and servant with that of the teachers
F         and other staff of the school with HCL as the management ·
          of the school was done by the Managing Committee
          though liberal financial grant was being made by the
          Corporation. By that there was no direct connection of the
          management of HCL with that of the management of the
G          school. Though through various communication an
           impression was sought to be given that the school is being
           run by HCL but in substance HCL only used to provide
          financial assistance to the school but the management of
           the school was entirely different than the management of
H          HCL. Giving financial assistance does not necessarily
    NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                  · 431
      KISHORE ROUT & ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
    mean that all the teachers and staff who are working in the     A
    school have become the employees of HCL. Therefore, we
    are of the view that the view taken by the learned Single
    Judge appears to be correct that there was no relationship
    of the management of HCL with that of the management
                                                         •
    of the school though most of the employees of HCL were          B
    in the Managing Committee of the school. But by that no
    inference can be drawn that the school had bee n
    established by HCL. The children of workers of HCL were
    being benefited by the education imparted by this school.
    l:herefore the management of HCL was giving financial           c
    aid but by that it cannot be construed that the school was
    run by the management of HCL. Therefore, under these
    circumstances, we are of opinion that the view taken by
    the learned Single Judge appears to be correct."

     29. From the reading of Para 20 in that judgment it cari       D
be discerned that the Managing Committee which was
managing the school was treated as an independent body. This
case is relevant on the second aspect as well viz. the claim of
school employees predicate upon the financial burden that is
assured by NALCO. To that aspect we shall advert to little later    E
in some detail.

   . 30. No doubt, there may be some element of control of
NALCO because of the reason that its officials are nominated
to the Managing Committees of the schools. Such provisions          F
are made to ensure that schools runs smoothly and properly
by the society. It also· becomes necessary to ensure that the
money is appropriately spent. However, this kind of 'remote
control' would not make NALCO as·the employer ·Of these
workers. This only shows that since NALCO is shouldering and        G
meeting the ·financial deficits, it wants to ensure that money is
spent for rightful purp9ses.

     31. It was argued .that the Managing Committee cannot be
the employer as it would lose its identity on the termination of
agreement between NALCO and SVS. However, even that by              H
    432       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 7 S.C.R.
                                              \
A itself cannot be the determinative factor. When the agreement
  · was earlier entered into between NALCO and CCMT, and staff
    was appointed in the school by CCMT, NALCO ensured that
  · such staff is taken over by SVS. For this purpose a specific
    clause is provided in agreement between NALCO and SVS
s which reads as under:
          "That if any of the parties hereto at any time wishes to
          terminate this arrangement, it may do so on giving of least
          six months priornotice in writing to the other party, of such
          an intention, provided that such termination shall' be
c         effective only at the close of the academic session.
          Provided further that in the event of such termination, the
          services of the staff employed by the school shall, subject
          to any agreement to the contrary between the two parties
          hereto, be terminated in accordance with the terms of their
D         appointment in the Chinmaya Vidyalaya, Damanjodi."
        32. Only because SVS agreed to take over the employees,
  .would not mean that NALCO becomes the employer. On the
   contrary, this clause suggests that but for the intervention of
E NALCO, the school staff that was engaged by CCMT would
  have been dealt with by CCMT. It is a matter of record that
   CCMT runs other schools as well. In that eventuality it would
  .have taken these employees with themselves or retrench these
  ·employees in accordance with law. Same is the position of SVS
F who have other schools als•o. However, this kind of situation is
   not going to arise in the present case. We place on record the
   ~ssurance given by the learned Senior Counsels appearing for
   NALCO that the teaching and other staff of the two schools
   would not lose their jobs even if present agreement of NALCO
   With SVS comes to an end and the management is taken over
G by some other agency for running the schools. We direct that.
   NALCO shall stand committed by this assurance and would
   adhere to the same for all times to come. The position which
   emerges, in view of the aforesaid assurance, is that the service
   tenure of these employees is protected.
H   ,
      NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                 433
        KISHORE ROUT & ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

       33. In so far as their service conditions are concerned, as A
  already conceded by even the respondents themselves, their
  salaries and other perks which they are getting are better than
  their counter parts in Government schools or aided/ un-aided
  recognised schools in the State of Orissa. In a situation like this
  even if, for the sake of.argument, it is presumed that NALCO· B
  is the employer of these employees, they would not be entitled
  to the pay ~cales which ar~ given to other employees of
  NALCO as there cannot be any comparison between the two.
  The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not attracted at
  all. Those employees directly employed by NALCO are .            c
  discharging altogether different kinds of duties. Main activify of·
  NALCO is the manufacture and production of alumina and
  aluminium for which it has its manufacturing units. The process
  and method of recruitment of those employees, their elig"ibility
  conditions for appointment, nature of job done by those 0
  employees etc. is entirely different from the employees of these
 ·schools. This aspect is squarely dealt with in the case of SC
/ Chandra & Ors. (supra) where the plea for parity in employment
  w~s rejected thereby refusing to give parity in salary claim by
  school teachers with cl.ass working under Government of E
  Jharkhand and BCCL. The discussion which ensued, while .
  rejecting such a claim, is recapitulated hereunder in the majority
  opinion authored by A.K. Mathur, J.:

      "20. After going through the order of the Division Bench
      we are of opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench F
      of the High Court is correct. Firstly, the school is not being
      managed by BCCL as from the facts it is more than clear
      that BCCL was only extending financial assistance from ·
      time to time. By that it cannot be saddled with the liability
      to pay these teachers of the school as being paid to the G
      clerks working with BCCL or in the Government of
      Jharkhand. It is essentially a school managed by a body
      independent of the management of BCCL. Therefore,
      BCCL cannot be saddled with the responsibilities of
                                                                   H
    434      SU.PREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A         granting the teachers the salaries equated to that of the
          clerks working in BCCL.

        21. Learned counsel for the appellants have relied on
        Article.39(d) of the Constitution. Article 39(d) does not
8       mean that all the teachers working in the school should be
        equated with the clerks in BCCL or the Government of
        Jharkhand for application of the principle of equal pay for
        equal work. There should be total identity between both
        groups i.e. the teachers of the school on the one hand and
        the clerks in BCCL, and as such the teachers cannot be
c       educated with the clerks of the State Government or of
        BCCL. The question of application of Article 39(d) of the
        Constitution has recently been interpreted by this Court in
        State ·of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh wherein Their
        Lordships have put the entire controversy to rest and held
D       that the principle, 'equal pay for equal work' must satisfy
        the test that the incumbents are performing equal a_      nd
        identical work as discharged by employees against whom
        the equal pay is claimed. Their Lordships have reviewed
        all the cases bearing on the subject and after a detailed
E       discussion have finally put the controversy to rest that the
        persons who claimed the parity should satisfy the court that
        the conditions are identical and equal and same duties are
         being discharged by them. Though a number of cases
      . were cited for our consideration but no useful purpose will
F        be served as in Charanjit Singh all these cases have been
      . reviewed by this Court. More so, when we have already
         held that the appellants are not the employees of BCCL,
         there is no question seeking any parity of the pay with that
         of the clerks of BCCL."
G
        Markandey Katju, J in his concurring and supplementing
    judgment dwelt on this very aspect in the following manner:-

           "24. The principle of equal pay for equal work was
           propounded by this Court in certain decisions in the 1980s
H         ,e.g. Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P., Surinder Singh v.
 NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. v. ANANTA                    435
   KISHORE ROUT & ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
  Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD, Randhir Singh" v. Union of India, A
  etc. This was done by applying Articles 14 and 39(d) of
. the Constitution. Thus, in Dhirendra Chamofi case this ,
  Court granted to the casual, daily rated employees the
  same pay scale as regular employees.
 '                                                                B·
 25.' ft appears that subsequently it was realised that the
 application of the principle of equal pay for equal work was
 creating havoc. All over India different groups were
 claiming parity in pay with other groups e.g. Government
 employees of one State were claiming parity with                 C
 Government employees of another State.

 26. ·Fixation of pay scale is a delicate mechanism which
 requires various considerations including financial
 capacity, responsibility, educational qualification, mode of
 appointment, etc. and it has a cascading effect. Hence, in       D
 subsequent decisions of this Court the principle of equal
 pay for equal work has been considerably watered down,
 and it has hardly ever been applied by this court in recent
 years.
                                                                  E
  27. Thus, in State of Haryanan v. Tilak Raj it was held that
 ·the principle can only apply if there is complete and
  wholesale identity between the two groups.' Even if the
  employees in the two groups are doing identical work they
  cannot be granted equal pay if there is no complete and
  wholesale identity e.g. a daily rated employee may be           F
  doing the same work as a regular employee, yet he cannot
  be granted the same pay scale. Similarly, two groups of
  employees may be doing the same work, yet they may be
  given different pay scales if the educational qualifications
  are different. Also, pay scale can be different if the nature   G
  of jobs, responsibilities, experience, method of recruitment,
  etc. are different.

     28. In State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh discussing a ·
     large number of earlier decisions it was held by a three H
     436       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014) 7 S.C.R.


A          Judge Bench of this Court that the principle of equal pay
           for equal work cannot apply unless there is complete and
           wholesale identity between the two groups. Moreover,
           even for finding out whether there is complete and
           wholesale identity, the proper forum is an expert body and
B          not the writ court, as this requires extensive evidence. A
           mechanical interpretation of the principle of equal pay for,
           equal work creates great practical difficulties. Hence in
           recent decisions the Supreme Court has considerably
           watered down the principle of equal pay for equal work and
c·         this principle has hardly been ever applied in recent
           decisions."

       34. We say at the cost of repetition that there is no parity .
  in the nature of work, mode of appointment, experience,
  educational.qualifications between the NALCO employees and
D the employees of the two schools. In fact, such a comparison
  can be made with their counter parts in the Government schools
  and/or aided or unaided schools. On that parameter, there
  cannot be any grievance of the staff which is getting better
  emoluments and enjoying far superior service conditions.
E
       35. We thus, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment
  of the J-ligh Court is un-sustainable. Allowing these appeals, the
  judgment of the High Court is hereby set aside. There shall,
  however, be no order as to costs.
F    Devika Gujral                                     Appeals allowed.