Holding

The High Court's award of Rs.48,00,000 with interest at 7.5% per annum constitutes just compensation, and no deduction of the ex‑gratia amount or alteration of the award is warranted.

Summary

An oil tanker collided with a car driven by Rajpal Singh Johal, killing him and injuring his family. The claimants (his parents, wife, and children) sought compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, while the insurer challenged the quantum of award and the interest rate. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal initially awarded Rs.37.71 lakh with 12% interest, which the High Court enhanced to Rs.48 lakh with 7.5% interest, applying the principles from Pranay Sethi and Sarla Verma. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's assessment of the multiplicand, future prospects, deductions, and interest complied with the statutory requirement of "just" compensation and whether the ex‑gratia amount paid by the employer should be deducted. It held that the High Court's award conforms to the established principles, that the ex‑gratia payment is not deductible, and that the interest rate of 7.5% is appropriate. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The adequacy of the High Court's enhanced compensation award as "just compensation" under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Whether the ex‑gratia amount received from the deceased's employer should be deducted from the compensation.
The appropriate rate of interest to be awarded on the compensation sum.
The correctness of the assessment methodology for multiplicand, future prospects, personal expense deductions, and multiplier in line with Pranay Sethi and Sarla Verma principles.

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 168

Subjects

Motor Vehicles Actcompensationpecuniary lossex gratiainterest ratefuture prospectsmultiplierjust compensationinsurance claimvehicular accident

Judgment

[2019] 6 S.C.R. 683 683

NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. A
v.
MANNAT JOHAL & ORS. ETC. ETC.
(Civil Appeal Nos.. 4079-4081 of 2019)
APRIL 23, 2019 B
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND
DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Offending vehicle, an oil tanker
rammed into the car driven by one ‘RSJ’, with his wife and children C
also in it, while coming from the opposite direction – ‘RSJ’ died –
Claims filed by the parents of the deceased and wife and minor
children of the deceased stating that the he was 38 yrs of age,
working as General Manager (Marketing) with a Company, was
drawing gross annual salary of Rs. 3,21,801.60 with perks just
D
prior to the accident; and was due to be promoted as the Associate
Vice President – Tribunal awarded Rs.37,71,000/- as compensation
to the claimants inter alia with interest @ 12% p.a. – High Court
enhanced the compensation to Rs.47,95,000/- and rounded it up to
Rs. 48,00,000/- with interest @7.5% p.a. – On appeal, held: Award
made by the Tribunal suffered from few fundamental errors and E
shortcomings as regards the assessment of multiplicand – Tribunal,
instead of taking the last drawn emoluments of the deceased, chose
to proceed on his enhanced projected emoluments after the expected
promotion and pay revision but, did not provide for further future
prospects – Assessment made by the Tribunal not in conformity with
F
the principles in Pranay Sethi case – Assessment made by the High
Court stands more or less in conformity with the principles
enunciated in Pranay Sethi case – Only doubtful area is that the
High Court enhanced future prospects only at 40% on the last drawn
emoluments of the deceased and not at 50% though he was shown
to be in a settled employment with future chances of promotion as G
also pay revision – However, on facts no modification made in the
amount awarded by the High Court – Pecuniary loss assessed by
the High Court is reasonable and does not call for any interference
– High Court modified the interest component at reasonable rate of
7.5% p.a. – No reason to allow the interest at any rate higher than
H
683
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A that – Amount ultimately receivable by the claimants in terms of the
judgment of the High Court remains that of just compensation – No
case for interference made out.
Compensation – Ex-gratia amount received by the claimants
from employer of the deceased – If to be deducted from the
B compensation received by claimants – Plea of insurer relying on
Shashi Sharma case that the said ex-gratia amount so received by the
claimants be deducted from the compensation granted by the High
Court – Held: Decision in Shashi Sharma would not apply to the
facts of the present case – No deduction in the amount awarded by
the High Court.
C
Compensation – Vehicular accident – Assessment of
compensation – Factors for – Discussed.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The modified award made by the High Court in
D this case remains that of just compensation and no case for
interference is made out in either of these appeals. While dealing
with the question of quantification in a claim for compensation
under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the endeavor has to
be to ensure awarding of just compensation to the claimant/s.
E [Paras 7, 8][692-C-D]
1.2 In a case like the present one, relating to the death of
the vehicular accident victim, any process of awarding “just”
compensation involves assessment of such amount of pecuniary
loss which could be reasonably taken as the loss of dependency
F suffered by the claimants due to the demise of the victim. In other
words, such a process, by its very nature, involves the assessment
of monetary contribution that the claimants were likely to receive
from the deceased had he not met with the untimely end due to
the accident. For the purpose of such an assessment, while some
of the basic facts, like the age, job and income of the deceased
G and the number of dependents with extent of their dependency,
could be reasonably ascertained from the evidence on record,
yet, several uncertain factors also, per force, come into play, like
the future prospects of the deceased coupled with various
imponderables related with a human life. As the process, by its
H
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL 685

very nature, involves a substantial deal of guess-work, this Court, A
over the years, has evolved and applied several principles so as
to ensure that as far as possible, the methods for assessment
remain uniform, curbing against disparity in the amount of
compensation to be awarded in similarly circumstanced cases.
[Para 9][693-B-E]
B
1.3 The award made by the Tribunal suffered from a few
fundamental errors and shortcomings as regards the assessment
of multiplicand. The Tribunal, instead of taking the last drawn
emoluments of the deceased, chose to proceed on his enhanced
projected emoluments after the expected promotion and pay
revision. However, thereafter, the Tribunal did not provide for C
any further future prospects. The Tribunal also did not make any
deduction towards the tax component. Moreover, the Tribunal
deducted one-third towards personal expenses of the deceased
though he had had five dependents. Then, the Tribunal applied
the multiplier of 16. Apparently, the assessment made by the D
Tribunal could not have been countenanced, for being not in
conformity with the principles in Pranay Sethi case. The High
Court, on the other hand, took the figure of the last drawn
emoluments of the deceased and made the deduction towards
income-tax. Thereafter, the High Court provided for future
prospects at 40% and made the deduction of one-fourth towards E
personal expenses. In this manner, the High Court arrived at
the figure of multiplicand at Rs. 3,15,000/-. On this multiplicand,
the High Court applied the multiplier of 15 in view of the age of
deceased at 38 years and hence, worked out the pecuniary loss
at Rs. 47,25,000/-. The High Court further awarded Rs. 40,000/- F
towards loss of consortium, Rs. 15,000/- towards funeral
expenses, and Rs. 15,000/- towards loss to estate; and finally
assessed the total compensation at Rs, 47,95,000/-, rounded up
to Rs. 48,00,000/-. [Paras 10, 11][695-H; 696-A-E]
1.4 The assessment so made by the High Court stands G
more or less in conformity with the principles enunciated in
Pranay Sethi. The only doubtful area is that the High Court
provided for enhancement towards future prospects only at 40%
on the last drawn emoluments of the deceased and not at 50%
though he was shown to be in a settled employment with future
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686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A chances of promotion as also pay revision. However, on the facts
and in the circumstances of the present case, any modification in
the amount awarded by the High Court is not considered for a
variety of factors. [Para 11.1][696-F-G]
1.5 An amount of Rs.3,21,801/- was paid by the employer
B to the claimants, being one year’s gross salary of the deceased.
In Shashi Sharma’s case, a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court
was dealing with the payment received by the legal heirs of the
deceased in terms of Rule 5 of the Haryana Compassionate
Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government
Employees Rules, 2006 (‘Rules of 2006’) whereunder, on the
C death of a government employee, the family would continue to
receive as financial assistance a sum equal to the pay and other
allowances that was last drawn by the deceased employee for
periods specified in the Rules and after the said period, the family
would be entitled to receive family pension. The family would
D also be entitled to retain the government accommodation for a
period of one year in addition to payment of Rs. 25,000/- as ex
gratia. Decision in Shashi Sharma has been explained and
distinguished by another three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court
in Sebastiani Lakra. [Paras 12, 12.1][696-G-H; 697-A-D]
E 1.6 In the present case too, it has not been shown if the ex
gratia amount received by the claimants had been under any Rules
of service and would be of continuous assistance,as had been the
case in Shashi Sharma. No deduction in the amount awarded by
the High Court appears necessary. The Tribunal had awarded
interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a
F rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters.
The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the
award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable
rate of 7.5% p.a. and no reason is found to allow the interest in
this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court.
G The amount ultimately receivable by the claimants in terms of
the judgment of the High Court remains that of just compensation
and no case for interference is made out. [Paras 12.2, 13 &14]
[699-C-D; F-H; 700-A]

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NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL 687

National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & A
Ors. 2017 ACJ 2700 (SC) - followed.
Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shashi
Sharma & Ors. 2016 ACJ 2723 (SC) – held inapplicable.
Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation
and Anr. 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC) ; Sebastiani Lakra & B
Ors. v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. 2019
ACJ 34 (SC) – referred to.
Case Law Reference
2017 ACJ 2700 (SC) followed Para 3 C
2009 ACJ 1298 (SC) referred to Para 3
2016 ACJ 2723 (SC) held inapplicable Para 6
2019 ACJ 34 (SC) referred to Para 6
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4079- D
4081 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.07.2018 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in FAO Nos. 1136, 1434
and 1435 of 2000.
With E

Civil Appeal Nos. 4082-4083 of 2019.
Abhishek Kumar, Sudhir Naagar, Arun Nagar, Ms. Tanuj Bagga,
Advs. for the appearing parties..
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
1. The application for substitution of legal representatives in the
petition filed on behalf of the claimants is allowed; the named legal
representative shall stand substituted in the both the petitions. Delay
condoned in the petition filed on behalf of the claimants. G

1.1. Leave granted in the both the petitions.
2. These cross-appeals relating to the vehicular accident
compensation claims, respectively by the insurer of the offending vehicle
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688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A and by the claimants, are directed against the common judgment and
order dated 06.07.2018, as passed in FAO No. 1136 of 2000 (O & M)
and connected matters, whereby the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
has allowed the appeal for enhancement of compensation filed by the
claimants and has modified the common award dated 27.01.2000 as
made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh in MACT
B
Case Nos. 80 of 1996 and 84 of 1996 that were filed respectively by the
parents and by the wife and children of the deceased Shri Rajpal Singh
Johal.
3. In the impugned judgment and order dated 06.07.2018, the High
Court has made upward revision of the amount of compensation awarded
C by the Tribunal and, in place of the amount of Rs. 37,71,000/- together
with interest @ 12% p.a. as awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court
has awarded a sum of Rs. 48,00,000/- together with interest @ 7.5%
p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of realisation.
The High Court has allowed this enhancement essentially with reference
D to the principles enunciated by this Court in National Insurance
Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors.: 2017 ACJ 2700 (SC) and in
Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.:
2009 ACJ 1298 (SC).
4. In these appeals, on one hand, the insurer of the offending
E vehicle has questioned the quantum of compensation so awarded,
basically on the ground that while making assessment of pecuniary loss,
the ex gratia amount received by the claimants from the employer of the
deceased deserves to be deducted while, on the other hand, the claimants
have questioned the reduction of the rate of interest by the High Court.

F 4.1. Therefore, the basic question for consideration in these appeals
is as to whether the amount of compensation as awarded by the High
Court is that of just compensation or the same calls for any modification?
5. The background aspects of the matter, so far relevant for the
question at hand, may be noticed, in brief, as follows:
G 5.1. The vehicular accident in question occurred on 30.12.1995,
at about 1 p.m., near the police out post Bagari (Assam), when the
deceased Shri Rajpal Singh Johal was driving a car, taking his wife and
children along, from Kaziranga to Guwahati. The offending vehicle, being
an oil tanker bearing registration No. AS-01-9526, rammed into the car
driven by the deceased while coming from the opposite direction. The
H
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL 689
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

deceased succumbed to the injuries sustained in this accident while his A
wife was also injured and their two children suffered severe shock.
5.2. On account of demise of the victim Shri Rajpal Singh Johal
due to the injuries sustained in the accident aforesaid, two claim
applications came to be made before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Chandigarh: one on 14.05.1996 by the parents of deceased, being MACT B
Case No. 80 of 1996; and another on 22.05.1996 by the wife and minor
children of the deceased, being MACT Case No. 84 of 1996. The sum
and substance of the allegations in claim applications had been that the
deceased met with his untimely end for the accident in question that
occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the oil tanker in question. It
was asserted that the deceased was 38 years of age; was working as C
General Manager (Marketing) with Punjab Wireless System Limited,
Mohali; was drawing gross annual salary of Rs. 3,21,801.60 with perks
just prior to the accident; and he was due to be promoted as the Associate
Vice President in January 1996 whereby, his annual salary would have
been enhanced to Rs. 3,50,000/-. While asserting their dependency on D
the deceased, the claimants i.e., the parents, wife and children of the
deceased claimed compensation against the driver, owner and insurer of
the offending vehicle. The cause of action being the same, these two
claim petitions were consolidated, and were tried and decided together
by way of the common award dated 27.01.2000.
E
5.3. Before the Tribunal, driver of the offending vehicle remained
ex parte while its owner denied any negligence on part of the driver and
rather alleged that the accident occured due to rash and negligent driving
by the deceased. On the other hand, insurer of the offending vehicle
denied the factum of the accident and also alleged that the driver of the
offending vehicle did not possess a valid driving license. F

5.4. On the pleadings, the Tribunal framed as many as 9 issues.
After taking evidence, the Tribunal proceeded to determine the relevant
issues in its impugned award dated 27.01.2000. The Tribunal decided
the basic issues relating to the factum of accident and the responsibility
for the same against the non-applicants while holding that the accident G
in question occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending
oil tanker. The Tribunal also held that the wife and children of the deceased
were dependent on him and further that the parents were marginally
dependent on him.
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690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 5.5. On the question of quantification of compensation, the Tribunal
took note of the evidence led by the claimants as regards emoluments of
the deceased as on 01.12.1995; the fact that his colleagues were promoted
as Associate Vice President in the year 1995; that he too had the
prospects of such promotion; and that emoluments of the Associate Vice
President were revised with effect from the month of December 1996.
B
Therefore, the Tribunal considered it just and reasonable to assess the
income of the deceased at Rs. 3,51,000/- p.a., as per the revised
emoluments for the post of Associate Vice President in the employer
company. Then, the Tribunal proceeded to deduct one-third towards
personal expenses of the deceased and in this manner, took the annual
C loss of dependency at Rs. 2,34,000/- and, after applying the multiplier of
16, assessed the pecuniary loss of the claimants at Rs. 37,44,000/-. The
Tribunal further awarded Rs. 25,000/- towards transportation of dead-
body and Rs. 2,000/- towards other expenses and thus, finally awarded
a sum of Rs. 37,71,000/- to the claimants. The Tribunal also allowed
interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of filing of claim application
D
No. 80 of 1996. The Tribunal allowed a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- each to
the mother and father of the deceased while observing that they were
in the age group of 78 years and were only marginally dependent on the
deceased; and apportioned the remaining amount amongst the wife and
children of the deceased.
E 5.6. Against the award so made by the Tribunal, the claimants in
MACT Case No. 84 of 1996 preferred an appeal before the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana, seeking enhancement of the amount of
compensation, while the insurance company preferred two separate
appeals questioning the findings in the award and seeking reduction of
F the amount of compensation.
5.7. The High Court, in its impugned judgment dated 06.07.2018,
in the first place rejected the contentions urged on behalf of the insurer
as regards the factum and cause of accident and affirmed the findings
of the Tribunal. As regards quantum of compensation, the High Court
G proceeded to make enhancement over the amount awarded by the
Tribunal with reference to the decisions in Pranay Sethi and Sarla
Verma (supra). The High Court did not accept the basis of assessment
of loss of income with reference to the likely enhanced emoluments of
deceased on his expected promotion and subsequent revision of pay-
scale in the year 1996. The High Court, therefore, took the base annual
H
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL 691
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

emoluments at Rs. 3,21,801.60 and, while deducting Rs. 20,000/- towards A
income-tax, rounded off the figure to Rs. 3,00,000/-. The High Court,
thereafter, provided for enhancement of 40% towards future prospects
and then, looking to five number of dependents, deducted one-fourth
towards personal expenses of the deceased. In this manner, the High
Court arrived at the multiplicand of Rs. 3,15,000/- and, while applying
B
the multiplier of 15 in view of the age of the deceased at 38 years,
worked out the pecuniary loss at Rs. 47,25,000/-. The High Court further
awarded Rs. 40,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs. 15,000/- towards
funeral expenses and Rs. 15,000/- towards loss to estate. Accordingly,
the High Court assessed the total compensation at Rs, 47,95,000/- and
rounded it up to Rs. 48,00,000/-. The High Court, however, allowed C
interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a., while holding that the respondents related
with the offending vehicle were liable to make payment of compensation.
As regards apportionment, the High Court allowed a sum of Rs.
26,00,000/- to the wife of the deceased; Rs. 8,00,000/- to the son of the
deceased; Rs. 10,00,000/- to the daughter of the deceased; and Rs.
D
2,00,000/- each to the mother and father of the deceased.
6. Assailing the impugned judgment of the High Court, learned
counsel for the insurer has strenuously argued that the High Court has
erred in not considering and applying the principles enunciated in Reliance
General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma & Ors.: 2016
ACJ 2723 (SC) and in not deducting the ex gratia amount received by E
the claimants from the employer of the deceased. Learned counsel has
also attempted to argue that the High Court has taken into consideration
certain payments like conveyance allowance, performance linked special
pay and company lease accommodation while making the calculation of
total annual gross salary, though such allowances ought to have been F
deducted. Per contra, learned counsel for the claimants would submit
that a clear case for enhancement over the modified award of the High
Court is made out, particularly when the High Court reduced the annual
income figure of the deceased from Rs. 3,51,000/- to Rs. 3,21,801.60
and further slashed it to Rs. 3,00,000/- and then, reduced the rate of
interest at 7.5% p.a. as against the rate allowed by the Tribunal at 12% G
p.a. According to the learned counsel, the rate of interest as allowed by
the Tribunal was in conformity with the lending rates at the time of
accident in the year 1995 and should not have been reduced. The learned
counsel has also argued that a few components of allowances and benefits
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692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A as taken into consideration for assessment of the annual income had
been the part of composite pay packet of the deceased and the claimants
were also the beneficiaries of such allowances while being dependent
on the deceased. The learned counsel for the claimant has also countered
the submissions as regards the ex gratia payment made by the employer
with the contentions that such an amount is not required to be deducted
B
from the total compensation, while relying on the decision in Sebastiani
Lakra & Ors. v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. : 2019
ACJ 34 (SC).
7. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions
and having examined the record, we are clearly of the view that the
C modified award made by the High Court in this case remains that of just
compensation and no case for interference is made out in either of these
appeals.
8. It remains trite, and need not be over-emphasised, that while
dealing with the question of quantification in a claim for compensation
D under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘the Act of 1988’), the endeavor
has to be to ensure awarding of just compensation to the claimant/s. In
Shashi Sharma (supra), this Court reiterated on the basics regarding
meaning of the expression “just” in the context of the Act of 1988 in the
following:-
E “17. ........ the term “compensation” has not been defined in
the 1988 Act. By interpretative process, it has been understood
to mean to recompense the claimants for the possible loss
suffered or likely to be suffered due to sudden and untimely
death of their family member as a result of motor accident.
F Two cardinal principles run through the provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 in the matter of determination of
compensation. Firstly, the measure of compensation must be
just and adequate; and secondly, no double benefit should
be passed on to the claimants in the matter of award of
compensation. Section 168 of the 1988 Act makes the first
G principle explicit. Sub-section (1) of that provision makes it
clear that the amount of compensation must be just. The word
“just” means—fair, adequate, and reasonable. It has been
derived from the Latin word “justus”, connoting right and
fair. In para 7 of State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, it has been
H held that the expression “just” denotes that the amount must
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL 693
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

be equitable, fair, reasonable and not arbitrary. In para 16 A
of Sarla Verma v. DTC, this Court has observed that the
compensation “is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or
source of profit”. That, however, may depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case, as to what amount would be
a just compensation.”
B
9. In a case like the present one, relating to the death of the
vehicular accident victim, any process of awarding “just” compensation
involves assessment of such amount of pecuniary loss which could be
reasonably taken as the loss of dependency suffered by the claimants
due to the demise of the victim. In other words, such a process, by its
very nature, involves the assessment of monetary contribution that the C
claimants were likely to receive from the deceased had he not met with
the untimely end due to the accident. For the purpose of such an
assessment, while some of the basic facts, like the age, job and income
of the deceased and the number of dependents with extent of their
dependency, could be reasonably ascertained from the evidence on D
record, yet, several uncertain factors also, per force, come into play,
like the future prospects of the deceased coupled with various
imponderables related with a human life. As the process, by its very
nature, involves a substantial deal of guess-work, this Court, over the
years, has evolved and applied several principles so as to ensure that as
far as possible, the methods for assessment remain uniform, curbing E
against disparity in the amount of compensation to be awarded in similarly
circumstanced cases. It is not necessary for the present purpose to
traverse through the large number of past decisions, particularly for the
reason that the basic parameters stand explained and standardised with
the larger Bench decision in Pranay Sethi (supra), wherein this Court F
has partly modulated the parameters enunciated in the two-Judge Bench
decision in Sarla Verma (supra), and has laid down the principles as
follows:-
“59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50%
of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future G
prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was
below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition
should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to
50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to
60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should
be read as actual salary less tax. H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed
salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should
be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40
years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between
the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was
between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the
B
necessary method of computation. The established income
means the income minus the tax component.
59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction
for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts
shall be guided by paras 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma which we
C have reproduced hereinbefore.
59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in
the Table in Sarla Verma read with para 42 of that judgment.
59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for
D applying the multiplier.
59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely,
loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should
be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The
aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in
E every three years.”
9.1. For completion of the principles above-quoted, appropriate
would it to be to take note of paragraphs 30 to 32 as also paragraph 42
in Sarla Verma (supra) which read as under:-
“30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made
F towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the
basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, the general practice
is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered
several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view
that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards
personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-
G
third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members
is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent
family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the
number of dependent family members exceeds six.

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NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL 695
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants A
are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle.
In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal
and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor
would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is
also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in
B
which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is
likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the
contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will
not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will
be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as C
dependants, because they will either be independent and
earning, or married, or be dependent on the father.
32. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and
siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a
dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and D
living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution
to the family. However, where the family of the bachelor is
large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in a
case where he has a widowed mother and large number of
younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and
living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution E
to the family will be taken as two-third.
***** ***** *****
42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should
be as mentioned in Column (4) of the Table, which starts with F
an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20
and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years,
that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-
15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for
46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years,
that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 G
for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”
10. Applying the principles aforesaid to the present case, we find
that the award made by the Tribunal suffered from a few fundamental

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696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A errors and shortcomings as regards the assessment of multiplicand. The
Tribunal, instead of taking the last drawn emoluments of the deceased,
chose to proceed on his enhanced projected emoluments after the
expected promotion and pay revision. However, thereafter, the Tribunal
did not provide for any further future prospects. The Tribunal also did
not make any deduction towards the tax component. Moreover, the
B
Tribunal deducted one-third towards personal expenses of the deceased
though he had had five dependents. Then, the Tribunal applied the
multiplier of 16. Apparently, the assessment made by the Tribunal could
not have been countenanced, for being not in conformity with the principles
in Pranay Sethi (supra).
C 11. The High Court, on the other hand, took the figure of the last
drawn emoluments of the deceased and made the deduction towards
income-tax. Thereafter, the High Court provided for future prospects at
40% and made the deduction of one-fourth towards personal expenses.
In this manner, the High Court arrived at the figure of multiplicand at Rs.
D 3,15,000/-. On this multiplicand, the High Court applied the multiplier of
15 in view of the age of deceased at 38 years and hence, worked out the
pecuniary loss at Rs. 47,25,000/-. As noticed, the High Court further
awarded Rs. 40,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs. 15,000/- towards
funeral expenses, and Rs. 15,000/- towards loss to estate; and finally
assessed the total compensation at Rs, 47,95,000/-, rounded up to Rs.
E 48,00,000/-.
11.1. The assessment so made by the High Court stands more or
less in conformity with the principles enunciated in Pranay Sethi (supra).
The only doubtful area is that the High Court provided for enhancement
towards future prospects only at 40% on the last drawn emoluments of
F the deceased and not at 50% though he was shown to be in a settled
employment with future chances of promotion as also pay revision.
However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, we
are not considering any modification in the amount awarded by the High
Court for a variety of factors, as indicated infra.
G 12. Taking up the question of ex gratia payment received by the
claimants from the employer of the deceased, it is noticed that an amount
of Rs. 3,21,801/- was paid by the employer to the claimants, being one
year’s gross salary of the deceased. While relying on the decision in
Shashi Sharma, it is contended on behalf of the insurer that the ex
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NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL 697
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

gratia amount so received by the claimants is required to be deducted. A
Noticeable it is that in Shashi Sharma’s case, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court was dealing with the payment received by the legal heirs of
the deceased in terms of Rule 5 of the Haryana Compassionate
Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employees
Rules, 2006 (‘Rules of 2006’) whereunder, on the death of a government
B
employee, the family would continue to receive as financial assistance a
sum equal to the pay and other allowances that was last drawn by the
deceased employee for periods specified in the Rules and after the said
period, the family would be entitled to receive family pension. The family
would also be entitled to retain the government accommodation for a
period of one year in addition to payment of Rs. 25,000/- as ex gratia1. C
12.1. The aforesaid decision in Shashi Sharma has been explained
and distinguished by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Sebastiani Lakra (supra) in the following:-
“10. In Shashi Sharma’s case, 2016 ACJ 2723 (SC), this
court was dealing with the payments made to the legal heirs D
1
Rule 5 of the Rules of 2006 taken into consideration in Shashi Sharma’s case had been
as under:
“5. Criteria for financial assistance.—(1) On the death of any government employee,
the family of the employee would continue to receive as financial assistance a sum equal
to the pay and other allowances that was last drawn by the deceased employee in the
normal course without raising a specific claim— E
(a) for a period of fifteen years from the date of death of the employee, if the employee
at the time of his death had not attained the age of thirty-five years;
(b) for a period of twelve years or till the date the employee would have retired from
government service on attaining the age of superannuation, whichever is less, if the
employee at the time of his death had attained the age of thirty-five years but had not
attained the age of forty-eight years;
(c) for a period of seven years or till the date the employee would have retired from
F
government service on attaining the age of superannuation, whichever is less, if the
employee had attained the age of forty-eight years.
(2) The family shall be eligible to receive family pension as per the normal rules only
after the period during which he receives the financial assistance as above is completed.
(3) The family of a deceased government employee who was in occupation of a
government residence would continue to retain the residence on payment of normal G
rent/licence fee for a period of one year from the date of death of the employee.
(4) Within fifteen days from the date of death of a government employee, an ex gratia
assistance of twenty-five thousand rupees shall be provided to the family of the deceased
employee to meet the immediate needs on the loss of the bread earner.
(5) House rent allowance shall not be a part of allowance for the purposes of
calculation of assistance.”
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698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A of the deceased in terms of rule 5(1) of the Haryana
Compassionate Assistance to the Dependants of Deceased
Government Employees Rules, 2006 (for short ‘the said
Rules’). Under rule 5 of the said Rules on the death of a
government employee, the family would continue to receive
as financial assistance a sum equal to the pay and other
B
allowances that was last drawn by the deceased employee
for periods set out in the Rules and after the said period the
family was entitled to receive family pension. The family was
also entitled to retain the Government accommodation for a
period of one year in addition to payment of Rs. 25,000 as ex
C gratia. In this case, the three-Judge Bench adverted to the
principles laid down in Helen C. Rebello’s case 1999 ACJ 10
(SC), followed in Patricia Jean Mahajan’s case 2002 ACJ
1441 (SC), and came to the conclusion that the decision in
Vimal Kanwar’s case 2013 ACJ 1441 (SC), did not take a
view contrary to Helen C. Rebello or Patricia Jean Mahajan
D
cases (supra). The following observations are relevant:
“(12) The principle expounded in this decision in Helen
C. Rebello’s case that the application of general principles
under the common law to estimate damages cannot be
invoked for computing compensation under the Motor
E Vehicles Act. Further, the ‘pecuniary advantage’ from
whatever source must correlate to the injury or death
caused on account of motor accident. The view so taken
is the correct analysis and interpretation of the relevant
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, and must
F apply proprio vigore to the corresponding provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This principle has been re-
stated in the subsequent decision of the two-Judge Bench
in Patricia Jean Mahajan’s case, 2002 ACJ 1441 (SC), to
reject the argument of the insurance company to deduct
the amount receivable by the dependants of the deceased
G by way of ‘social security compensation’ and ‘life
insurance policy’.”
However, while dealing with the scheme the court held that
applying a harmonious approach and to determine a just

H
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL 699
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act it would A
be appropriate to exclude the amount received under the said
Rules under the head of ‘pay and other allowances’ last drawn
by the employee. We may note that on principle this court
has not disagreed with the proposition laid down in Helen C.
Rebello or in Patricia Jean Mahajan (supra), but while
B
arriving at a just compensation, it had ordered the deduction
of the salary received under the statutory Rules.”
12.2. In the present case too, it has not been shown if the ex
gratia amount received by the claimants had been under any Rules of
service and would be of continuous assistance, as had been the case in
Shashi Sharma (supra) as per the Rules of 2006 considered therein. In C
an overall analysis and with reference to the decision in Sebastiani
Lakra (supra), we are clearly of the view that the decision in Shashi
Sharma would not apply to the facts of the present case and no deduction
in the amount awarded by the High Court appears necessary.
12.3. Apart from the above, as noticed, the High Court has even D
otherwise provided for enhancement towards future prospects only at
40% though the deceased was in a settled job and was not self-employed
or on fixed salary. If at all an assertion is made that the assistance
received by the claimants or a part of allowances received by the deceased
need to be taken into consideration for making certain deductions, the E
enhancement by way of future prospects at 50% would be effectively
setting off any such proposed deduction. In other words, in the ultimate
analysis, the amount of pecuniary loss as assessed by the High Court
remains reasonable and cannot be said to be either exorbitant or too low
so as to call for any interference.
F
13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged
on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal
had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too
high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters.
The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award
amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% G
p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate
higher than that allowed by High Court.

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700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 6 S.C.R.

A 14. The upshot of the discussion aforesaid is that in our view, the
amount ultimately receivable by the claimants in terms of the judgment
of the High Court remains that of just compensation and no case for
interference is made out.
15. Accordingly, both these appeals fail, and are dismissed.
B
Divya Pandey Appeals dismissed.

C

D

E

F

G

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