NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS.versusSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

                        [2017] 4 S.C.R. 881


              NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS.                             A
                                 v.
                    STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
                 (Civil Appeal No. 11974 of 2016)
                         MARCH 21, 2017                               B

          [DIPAK MISRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.]
       Education - Medical stream - Post Graduate Courses -
Admission - Appellants cleared State Medical Entrance Examination
but did not make it to first round of counselling - Writ petition by C
appellants contending that in terms of the Information Brochure
there ought to be minimum three rounds of counselling and then a
mop-up round of counselling also ought to be held if sufficient
number of seats were left unallotted, and since the same were not
conducted, number of seats were lying vacant leading to waste of
government resources - Writ petition dismissed - Held: In the instant D
case, admission to post graduate courses for the academic session
2016-17 in the State of U.P stood concluded as per the decision by
Supreme Court in Dinesh Singh Chauhan on 16.08.2016 - However,
the appellants approached High Court only on 01.09.2016 - They
did not choose to move Supreme Court when the said case was
                                                                        E
pending despite being aware that such a litigation was pending - It
was only after certain orders were passed by Supreme Court in
Dinesh Singh Chauhan's case, that the appellants got the wake up
 call to agitate their grievance - Law does not assist the non-vigilant
- It is well settled that no one should suffer any prejudice because
 of the act of the Court- Howeve1; the maxim 'actus curiae neminem F
 gravabit' cannot operate in vacuum and has to get sustenance from
 the facts - Said maxim is not applicable in the facts of the present
 case - impugned judgment not interfered with - Maxims - 'Actus
 curiae neminem gravabit'.
       Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                G
      HELD: 1.1 Admission to post graduate courses for the
 academic session 2016-2017 in the State of Uttar Pradesh stood
 concluded by this Court as per the decision in State of Uttar
 Pradesh vs. Dinesh Singh Chauhan, as finally decided on 16.8.16.
 However, the appellants in the instant case approached the High       H
                               881
882            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017) 4 S.C.R.


A     Court only on 01.09.2016. They did not choose to move this
      Court when the case of Dinesh Singh Chauhan was pending. They
      were aware that such a litigation was pending before this Court.
      Despite the same, they chose to maintain a sphinx like silence.
      Had the grievance been raised before this Court at the time when
B     the special leave petitions were filed in respect of the seats lying
      vacant, the matter could possibly have been differently perceived.
      [Paras 10, 22) [888-A; 895-C-E)
        1.2 It is manifest that effective and complete counselling
  was held in the case of Uttar Pradesh on the basis of the verdict
  rendered by this Court in Dinesh Singh Chauhan and the
C appellants, after certain orders were passed by this Court, felt to
  have got the wake up call to agitate their grievance. [Para 23]
  [895-G)
         1.3 It is well settled in law that no one should suffer any
  prejudice because of the act of the court. The legal maxim that
D has been taken recourse to cannot operate in a vacuum .. It has
  to get the sustenance from the facts. As is manifest, after the
  admissions were over as per the direction of this Court, the
  appellants, who seemed to have resigned to their fate, woke up
  to have control over the events forgetting that the law does not
E assist the non-vigilant. One cannot indulge in luxury of lethargy,
  possibly nurturing the feeling that forgetting is a virtue, and
  thereafter, when the time has slipped through, for it waits for
  none, wake up and take shelter under the maxim "actus curiae
  neminem gravabit". It is completely unacceptable. [Para 311 [899-
  E-G]
F
          Jang Singh v. Brij Lal and others AIR 1966 SC 1631:
          [1964] SCR 145; Jagannath Singh and others v. Dr.
         Ram Naresh Singh (1970) 1 SCC 573; Atma Ram Mittal
         v. lshwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284 : [1988) 2
          Suppl. SCR 528; Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald
G        Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181 : [2001) 2 SCR
         207; Assam Tea Corpn. Ltd. v. Narayan Singh AIR 1981
         Gau 41; L. Janakirama Iyer v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer AIR
         1962 SC 633 : [1962) Suppl. SCR 206; Bhikhi Lal v.
         Tribeni AIR 1965 SC 1935; Master Construction Co.
         (P) Ltd. v.. State of Orissa and another AIR 1966 SC
H
NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND            883
                    ORS.

  1047 : (19661 SCR 99; Dwaraka Das v. State of MP          A
  and another (1999) 3 SCC 500 : [1999) 1 SCR 524;
  Thirugnanavalli Ammal v. P Venugopala Pillai AIR 1940
  Mad 29; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemani Vimalnath
  Narichania and others (2010) 9 SCC 437 : [2010)
  10 SCR 971; Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio
                                                            B
  Vascular Diseases and others (2014) 2 SCC 62 : (2013]
  12 SCR 674 - distinguished.
  State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dinesh Singh
  Chauhan (2016) 9 SCC 749 : [20161 6 SCR 571;
  Mridul Dhar (Minor) and another v. Union of India
  and others (2005) 2 SCC 65 : [2005] 1 SCR 380; Priya      c
  Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and others (2012) 7 SCC
  433 : [2012) 5 SCR 768; D1'. Surya Kant Ojha and
  others v. State of U.P. and others 2016 SCC OnLine
  All 622; Sudhir N. and others v. State of Kera/a and
  others (2015) 6 SCC 685 : [2015) 1 SCR 884; AIIMS         D
  Students' Union v. AJJMS and others (2002) 1 SCC 428:
   [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 79; State of M.P. and others v.
  Gopal D. Tirthani and others (2003) 7 SCC 83: [2003]
  1 Suppl. SCR 797; Satyabrata Sahoo and others v.
  State of Orissa and others (2012) 8 SCC 203 : [20121
   10 SCR 204; Supreet Batra and others v. Union of         E
  India and others (2003) 3 SCC 370 : [2003] 1 SCR
  586 - referred to.
                   Case Law Reference
   [2016] 6 SCR 571             referred to       Para3
                                                            F
   [2005) 1 SCR 380             referred to       Para4
   [2012] 5 SCR 768             referred to       Para4
   [2015) 1 SCR 884             referred to       Para8
   [2001) 2 Suppl. SCR 79       referred to       Para 10   G
   [2003) 1 Suppl. SCR 797      referred to       Para 10
   [2012] 10 SCR 204            referred to       Para 10
   (2003] 1 SCR 586             referred to       Para 18
   (1964] SCR 145               distinguished     Para 24   H
884            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A     (1970) 1 sec 573                     dis.tinguished       Para 26
      (1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 528              distinguished        Para 27
      [2001] 2 SCR 207                     distinguished        Para 28
      AIR 1981 Gau 41                      distinguished        Para 28
      [1962] Suppl. SCR 206                distinguished        Para 28
B
      AIR 1965 SC 1935                     distinguished        Para 28
      (1966] SCR 99                        distinguished        Para 28
      (1999] 1 SCR 524                     distinguished        Para 28
      AIR 1940 Mad 29                      distinguished        Para 28
c     (2010] 10 SCR 971                    distinguished        Para 29
      [2013] 12 SCR 674                    distinguished        Para 30
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11974
      of 2016.
        · From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2016 of the High Court
D of Judicature for Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Writ
  Petition No. 21038 (M.S.) of 2016.
           Yatindra Singh, Sr. Adv., A. S. Pundir, D. V. Singh, Arijeet Singh,
      Bhupendra Kumar Bhardwaj, Advs. for the Appellants.
E           Ms. lndu Malhotra, Sr. Adv., Irshad Ahmad, AA G, Ab his th Kumar,
      Gaurav Sharma, Ms. Amandeep Kaur, Prateek Bhatia, Dhawal Mohan,
      Ms. Vara Gaur, Vriti Jindal, Viresh Kumar Yadav, Yadav Narender Singh,
      Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F          DIPAK MISRA, J. I. The appellants invoked the jurisdiction of
  the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow
  in Writ Petition No. 21038 of 2016 for issue a writ of mandamus
  commanding the opposite parties, namely, State of Uttar Pradesh, King
  George's Medical University, Coordinator, U.P. Post Graduate Medical
G Entrance Examination, 2016 (UPPGMEE, 2016) and Medical Council
  of India (MCI) to complete the process of counselling by holding the
  second, third and mop-up round of counselling as prescribed in the
  Information Brochure issued for the UPPGMEE, 2016 and to ensure
  that no seats in any of the courses advertised in the Information Brochure
  ar1:: allowed to go vacant for the academic year 2016-2017.
H
  NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND                            885
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

        2. The facts which are requisite to be stated are that the appellants A
had appeared in the written test of UPPGMEE-20 I 6 and after being
declared successful, they participated in the first round of counselling
which was held from 04.04.2016 to 08.04.2016. The candidates who got
selected in the said counselling joined their respective seats allotted to
them. The case of the appellants before the High Court was that as per B
the Information Brochure, minimum three round of counsellings are to
be held and in case sufficient number of seats are left unallotted at the
end of third round of counselling, then a mop-up round of allotment is
required to be organized on the notified date after giving due publicity by
the Director General of Medical Education and Training, U.P. to ensure
that there is no loss of PG seats in the academic year 2016-2017. It was C
urged before the High Court that terms and conditions for participating
in the mop-up round of counselling are that (i) candidates who are
admitted/allotted but not joined/resigned in any seat in Uttar Pradesh
 will not be eligible for participation; (ii) any candidate who had taken
 admission in any PG course in any medical college in India also will not
 be eligible for participation; (iii) the candidate must present himself/herself
                                                                                 D
 with all original documents, and (iv) no request for re-allotment of seats
 already allotted in the first and second round will be entertained.
       3. It was the stand of the appellants before the High Court that it
is obligatory on the part of the respondents to give effect to the postulates
contained in the Information Brochure and hence, the authorities were E
under obligation to hold the second and third round of counselling as well
as the mop-up round of counselling, but they had failed to do so by their
erroneous understanding of the judgment and order dated 16.08.2016 in
the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dinesh Singh
 Chauhan 1. It was further contended that there was infringement of F
valuable 1ights of writ petitioners as they had been denied admission to
the institution of their choice in accordance with merit. It was canvassed
 with vigour that such an unacceptable situation had occurred, for despite
 the seats being lying vacant in several medical colleges no steps were
 being taken to fill them up. Citing an example, it was put forth that for
 the academic session 2013-2014 the counselling was done in the month G
 of August and the admissions were given to the meritbrious candidates
 and, therefore, it was necessary to issue appropriate directions to fill up
 the unfilled seats.
  1
      c2016) 9 sec 749
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886            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A        4. The stand of the appellants before the High Court was resisted
  by the respondent No. 2 therein - Director General of Medical Education
  and Training, Uttar Pradesh, contending, inter alia, that seats had
  remained vacant because of the directions of the Supreme Court in Mridul
  Dhar (Minor) and another v. Union of India and others2 wherein
  stress was laid for adherence to the time schedule and the categorical
B
  command that there should not be midstream admissions. It was further
  held that carrying forward unfilled seats of one academic year to another
  academic year was not permissible. Reliance was also placed on the
  authority in Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and others3 wherein
  it was directed that the concerned authority was bound to fill up the
C seats in accord with the time schedule stricto sensu and any violation
  thereof is to be seriously viewed.
         5. It was also highlighted by the contesting respondent that after
  the interim order passed by this Court on 12.05.2016 the merit list was
  drawn and counselling was carried out by 30.05.2016 as it was the last
D date fixed by the MCI for completion of admission process. It was
  highlighted that certain seats are lying vacant on ground of non-joining
  of the candidates and no further steps could be taken. Similar arguments
  were canvassed by the State ofUttar Pradesh and the Medical Council
  oflndia.
E        6. The High Court adverted to the factual backgrmmd which was
  to the effect that a policy decision was taken by the State of Uttar
  Pradesh on 16.01.2014 whereby 30% of postgraduate seats had been
  reserved for those candidates who had completed three years service in
  the rural areas and in pursuance of the same, the Government Order
  dated 28.02.2014 was issued to engage Provincial Medical Health
F Services Cadre members to go for higher education. In the said order, it
  was also provided that those members of Provincial Services who had
  served in far remote backward areas in respective Community Health
  Centre/Primary Health Centre would get the benefit. After the said
  policy decision, the Examining Body issued advertisement and therein
G the eligibility for admission had been provided for and as per the same
  only those incumbents were eligible to apply who had served for a period
  of three years in remote areas.
            7. The said order was challenged in Writ-C No. 1380 of 2015
      2
        (2005) 2 sec 65
H     '(2012) 7 sec 433
     NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND                      887
                 ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

titled Dr. Surya Kant Ojha and others v. State of U.P. and others4 A
before the High Court along with connected matters. The High Court
vide order dated 07.04.2016 quashed the Government Order dated
28.02.2014 with a direction that admissions in postgraduate degree
courses be made strictly on the basis of merit from amongst the
candidates who had obtained requisite minimum marks in the examination B
in question so prescribed by the MCI.
       8. As the factual matrix would uncurtain, the matter travelled to
this Court in Dinesh Singh Chauhan (supra) wherein this Court took
note of the authority in Sudhir N. and others v. State of Kerala and
others-', referred to Regulation 9 of the Medical Council of India
Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 which deals with          C
the method of selection of candidates for admission to postgraduate
courses and also noted the insertions made in Regulation 9( 1)(b) and
Regulation 9(2)(d). The proviso added after Regulation 9(2)( d) in terms
of Gazette Notification published onl 7.11.2009 reads as follows:-
        "Further provided that in determining the merit and the entrance D
        test for postgraduate admission weightage in the marks may be
        given as an incentive @ 10% of the marks obtained for each year
        in service in remote or difficult areas up to the maximum of 30%
        of the marks obtained."
      9. The Court noted the submissions of the learned counsel            E
appearing for the parties and directed as follows:-
        "In the circumstances, we direct that the State Government shall
        as expeditiously as possible revise and redraw the merit list of the
        candidates keeping in view Regulation 9 of the Medical Council
        of India Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 and F
        giving to the eligible candidates such weightage as may be due to
        them for rendering service in notified rural and/or difficult areas
        and to grant admission to the candidates found suitable for the
        same on the basis of such redrawn merit list. This exercise shall
        be completed before 30-5-2016, the last date fixed for granting of G
        admission. The entire exercise so conducted shall, however, remain
        subject to the outcome of these proceedings".


 4
   2016 SCC OnLine All 622
 '(2015) 6 sec 685
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888            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A        10. The matter was finally decided on 16.08.2016. The three-
  Judge Bench inDinesh Singh Chauhan (supra) referred to the decisions
  in A/IMS Students' Union v. AIIMS and others6, State of M.P. and
  others v. Gopal D. Tirthani and others 7, Satyabrata Sahoo and others
  v. State of Orissa and others 8 and Sudhir N. (supra) and ruled that
B Regulation 9 per se makes no distinction between Government and non-
  Government colleges for allocation ofweightage of marks to in-service
  candidates. Instead, it mandates preparation of one merit list for the
  State on the basis of results in NEET and further, regarding in-service
  candidates, all it provides is that the candidate must have been in-service
  of a Government/public Authority and served in remote and difficult
C areas notified by the State Government and the Competent Authority
  from time to time. The Court further held that the authorities are obliged
  to continue with the admission process strictly in conformity with
  Regulation 9. Elucidating the proposition, the Court expressed thus:-
            "The fact that most of the direct candidates who have secured
D           higher marks in the NEET than the in-service candidates, may
            not be in a position to get a subject or college of their choice, and
            are likely to secure a subject or college not acceptable to them,
            cannot be the basis to question the validity of proviso to Clause
            IV of Regulation 9. The purpose behind proviso is to encourage
            graduates to join as medical officers and serve in notified remote
E           and difficult areas of the State. The fact that for quite some time
            no such appointments have been made by the State Government
            also cannot be a basis to disregard the mandate of proviso to
            Clause IV-of giving weightage of marks to the in-service
            candidates who have served for a specified period in notified
 F          remote and difficult areas of the State."
      Thereafter, the three-Judge Bench opined:-
            "The provision in the form of granting weightage of marks,
            therefore, was to give incentive to the in-service candidates and
            to attract more graduates to join as Medical Officers in the State
G           Health Care Sector. The provision was first inserted in 2012. To
            determine the academic merit of candidates, merely securing high
            marks in the NEET is not enough. The academic merit of the
      • c2002J 1 sec 428
      1
        c2003 J 1 sec 83
H     ' (2012) s sec 203
  NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND                             889
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      candidate must also reckon the services rendered for the common          A
      or public good. Having served in rural and difficult areas of the
      State for one year or above, the incumbent having sacrificed his
      career by rendering services for providing health care facilities in
      rural areas, deserve incentive marks to be reckoned for
      determining merit. Notably, the State Government is posited with         B
      the discretion to notify areas in the given State to be remote, tribal
      or difficult areas. That declaration is made on the basis of decision
      taken at the highest level; and is applicable for all the beneficial
      schemes of the State for such areas and not limited to the matter
      of admissions to Post Graduate Medical Courses. Not even one
      instance has been brought to our notice to show that some areas          C
      which are not remote or difficult areas has been so notified. Suffice
      it to observe that the mere hypothesis that the State Government
      may take an improper decision whilst notifying the area as remote
      and difficult, cannot be the basis to hold that Regulation 9 and in
      particular proviso to Clause IV is unreasonable. Considering the         D
      above, the inescapable conclusion is that the procedure evolved
      in Regulation 9 in general and the proviso to Clause (IV) in
      particular is just, proper and reasonable and also fulfill the test of
      Article 14 of the Constitution, being in larger public interest."
       11. Lastly, the Court posed the question whether the arrangement
directed in terms of order dated 12.05.2016 by the Court should have E
prospective effect or also apply to admissions for academic year 2015-
2016, for the subject matter of challenge before the High Court pertained
to the academic year 2015-2016, the dispensation directed in terms of
Order dated l 2'h May 2016 should apply thereto. However, considering
the fact that the said admission process had been completed and all F
concerned had acted upon on that basis and that the candidates admitted
to the respective Post Graduate Degree Courses in the concerned
colleges had also commenced their studies, the Court held that it would
not be appropriate to unsettle that position given the fact that neither the
direct candidates nor the eligible in-service candidates who had worked
in remote and/or difficult areas in the State had approached the Court G
for such relief. The Court further held that it was only the in-service
 candidates who had not worked in remote and/or difficult areas in the
 State approached the Court for equating them with their counterparts
 who had worked in remote and/or difficult areas in the matter of
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890           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A reservation of seats for in-service candidates. The Court was of the
  view that if at that distance of time, the settled admissions were to be
  disturbed by quashing the entire admission process for academic year
  2015-2016, it would inevitably result in all the seats in the State almost
  over 500 in number remaining unfilled for one academic year; and that
B the candidates to be admitted on the basis of fresh list for academic year
  2015-2016 will have to take fresh admission coinciding with the admissions
  for academic year 2016-2017 which would necessitate doubling the
  strength of seats in the respective colleges for the current academic
  year to accommodate all those students, which may not be feasible and
  is avoidable. In the peculiar facts of the case, the Court moulded the
C relief in the appeals by directing all concerned to follow the admission
  process for academic year 2016-2017 and onwards strictly in conformity
  with the Regulations in force, governing the procedure for selection of
  candidates for Post Graduate Medical Degree Courses including
  determination of relative merit of the candidates who had appeared in
D NEET by giving weightage of incentive marks to eligible in-service
  candidates. The Court ruled that the High Court was justified in quashing
  the Government Order providing for reservation to in-service candidates,
  being violative of Regulation 9 as in force. It modified the operative
  direction given by the High Court and instead directed that admission
  process for Academic Year 2016-2017 onwards to the Post Graduate
E Degree Course in the State should proceed as per Regulation 9 including
  by giving incentive marks to eligible in-service candidates in terms of
  proviso to Clause IV of Regulation 9 (equivalent to third proviso to
  Regulation 9(2) of the Old Regulations reproduced in the interim order
  dated 12'h May 2016). The Court thereafter directed:-
F         "We, accordingly, mould the operative order of the High Court to
          bring it in conformity with the direction contained in the interim
          order dated 12'11 May,2016 but to be made applicable to Academic
          Year 2016-17 onwards on the basis of Regulation 9 as in force.
          We are conscious of the fact that this arrangement is likely to
          affect some of the direct candidates, if not a large number of
G         candidates whose applications were already proi;essed by the
          competent Authority for concerned Post Graduate Degree Course
          for Academic Year 2016-17. However, their admissions cannot
          be validated in breach of or disregarding the mandate of Regulation
          9, as in force. The appeals against the judgment of the High Court
H
  NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND                          891
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      of Judicature at Allahabad dated 7'h April, 2016 are disposed of A
      accordingly."
       12. After so stating, this Court adverted to the second set of appeals
arising from the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow
Bench dated 27.03.16 wherein it had taken the view that the direction to
prepare a fresh merit list vide interiffi order dated 12.05.16 was in respect B
of only such eligible and in service candidates as had submitted
applications for admission to post-graduate courses for relevant academic
year within the stipulated time and the direction was not to consider all
similarly placed persons (eligible in-service candidates) irrespective
whether they had made applications for admission to post-graduate degree
courses or otherwise. Concurring with the view of the High Court, the C
appeals were dismissed. Eventually, the Court clarified the position:-
      "We make it clear that we have not examined the correctness of
      the fresh merit list prepared by the concerned Authority in terms
      of interim order dated 12.05.2016. If any candidate is aggrieved
      on account of wrong placement in the fresh merit list or being in D
      violation of this decision, will be free to question the same by way
      of appropriate proceedings. That challenge can be considered on
      its own merit."
        13. The appellants, as the facts would unroll, filed writ petition
before the High Court seeking writ of mandamus for holding the second, E
third and mop-up round of counselling as prescribed in the information
brochure and to ensure that no seats in any of the courses advertised in
the brochure is allowed to go vacant in the academic session 2016-2017.
The appellants contended before the High Court that the respondents
were bound to give effect to the prescription contained in the information F
brochure which is mandatory and, therefore, the authorities are under
obligation to hold second and third round of counselling and that they had
misread and misapplied the judgment dated 16.08.2016; that there was
infringement of their rights as they had been denied admission in the
institution of their choice in accordance with merit that too when number
of seats were lying vacant in several medical colleges; that in the previous G
academic session 2013-2014, the counselling was done after the cut-off
date and the admissions were given to the candidates and hence, it would
be in the interest of the students to issue directions for filling up iinfilled
 seats.
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892            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A        14. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, opposing the relief sought
  by the appellant, submitted before the High Court that this Court in Mridul
  Dltar (Minor) (supra) has held that time schedule in respect of admission
  in postgraduate courses and super speciality courses should be strictly
  adhered to wherever provided; that there should not be midstream
  admissions; that admissions should not be in excess of sanctioned intake
B
  capacity or quota and carrying forward of unfilled seats of one academic
  year to another is not permissible. Reliance was also placed on the
  authority in Priya Gupta (supra), wherein it was directed that if anyone
  who fails to comply with the directions stricto sensu shall be liable for
  action under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. It was further
C contended before the High Court by the respondent No.2 that in terms
  of the interim order of this Court, all the seats were allotted to the
  respective candidates and the admission process stood completed by
  30.05.2016 and as regards unfilled seats, only 11 seats were lying vacant
  on account of non-joining of the candidates and no further steps could
D be taken on account of embargo put by the MCI with regard to the last
  date for completion and the time frame could only be altered or modified
  by this Court.
             15. Considering the rival submissions, the High Court accepted
      the submissions of the respondent and dismissed the writ petition. Hence,
      the present appeal.
 E
            16. We have heard Mr. Yatindra Singh, learned senior counsel
      along with Mr. A.S. Pundir, learned counsel for the petitioners and Ms.
      Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel, Mr. lrshad Ahmad, AAG and
      Mr. Gaurav Sharma learned counsel for the respondents.
 F         17. Learned senior counsel for the appellants would submit that
   the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit or "an act of the court shall
   prejudice no man" is a settled principle of law and applicable in the
   present case. It is further contended that the delay in holding counselling
   was due to the orders passed by or delay in this Court which should not
   prejudice the appellants; that there was no delay on the part of the
 G appellants but on account of orders passed by this Court or delay was
   caused in the proceedings or time taken by the State or by the MCI to
   file reply; that the Information Brochure of the examination body provided
   for holding three round of counselling and then mop-up round and under
   the latest amendments of the regulations, only two rounds of counselling
 H was permitted and in the case of the appellants only one round of
  NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND                          893
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

counselling had taken place and the second round was yet to take place; A
that the brochure as well as regulations provide counselling to be held
first in which all can participate and thereafter the mop-up round to be
conducted; that in the instant case, second round of counselling had not
taken place and it should be held first and then, ifthe need be, the mop-
up round should be held; that 71 seats are lying vacant in the State B
Government Colleges and non-filling of these seats will lead to waste of
government investment, its resources and their full potential will not be
utilized; that it is in public interest that further counselling should be held
as has been held for University of Delhi and the States ofTelangana and
Andhra Pradesh.
        18. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted that the C
legal position with regard to vacant seats after the cut-off date and extra
round of counselling is settled in the decision of this Court in Supreet
Batra and others v. Union of India and others9, wherein it has been
held that after the expiry of cut-off date, the seats lying vacant cannot
be filled up by way of conducting extra round of counselling. He further D
submitted that pursuant to the order of the High Court quashing the
policy decision of the State Government wherein provisions were made
for giving reservation in post graduate courses for the doctors of Provincial
Medical Services, who had worked continuously for three years in notified
backward areas within the State, State of U.P. had preferred special
leave petition wherein this Court vide order dated 12.05.2016 directed E
the State Government to revise and redraw the merit list and in pursuance
of that order, State Government had redrawn the merit list and fresh
counselling was held on 27.05.2016 and all the seats were filled up,
except 71 seats which remained vacant due to non-availability of the
candidates for the said courses. Therefore, in such circumstances no F
further counselling was required. It is further submitted by the learned
counsel for the State that the seats became vacant after the cut-off date
in different Government Medical Colleges because after taking admission
some of the candidates had either resigned from the allotted seats or not
joined the courses after admission.
                                                                             G
       19. Be it noted that IA No.3 of2016 was filed by the applicants
seeking "mop-up" round of counselling for filling up the vacant seats
which arose due to non-joining or resignation after de nova counselling
on the basis of clause 15 of the Information Brochure for the UPPGMEE,
'(2003) 3 sec 370
                                                                             H
894           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A 2016. Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel submits that in the
  present case only one round of counselling took place as the criteria for
  preparing the merit list was changed vide order of this Court. It is further
  submitted by her that after de novo round of counselling held on
  30.05.2016, large number ofcandidates did not join the allotted seats as
B a result of which almost 100 seats in various Government medical colleges
  have fallen vacant. To substantiate her claim, she relied on the order
  dated 01.09.2016 and 08.09.2016 passed by this Court in S.L.P. (Civil)
  No. 19633 of2016 wherein this Court directed the University of Delhi to
  conduct one more round of counselling for vacant seats within a period
  of two weeks and the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana to
C conduct one more round of counselling to fill up all the vacant seats. In
  effect, the submission of the learned senior counsel is that the appellants
  and applicants are similarly situated and by redrawing the merit list, the
  right of the applicants to appear in the second and third counselling is
  denied.
 D        20. The submission of Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel is
   fundamentally entrenched on the principle actus curiae neminem
   gravabit. The said submission is structured on the factual score that
   the time schedule could not be followed because of the directions of this
   Court issued vide order dated 12.05.2016 and eventually it became final
   on 16.08.2016 for which no fault can be found with the appellants. The
 E prayer of the appellants to hold further counselling in respect of71 seats
   was done in promptitude and, therefore, the High Court would have
   been well advised to direct for holding counselling or mop-up counselling
   so that the seats would not remain vacant and the procedure would have
   been duly complied with. Reliance has been placed on certain orders
 F passed by this Court in respect of the University of Delhi and the States
   of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.
          21. As far as States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh is
   concerned, it is necessary to note that the High Court had issued certain
   directions for filling up the seats. The same was challenged by the
 G Medical Council of India. Taking note of the peculiar facts and
   circumstances of the newly born States, the Court had passed the following
   order:-
            "We take note of the fact that 86 seats in the State of Andhra
            Pradesh and 32 seats in the State of Telagnana are available in
 H          the Government colleges in both the States. Having regard to the
  NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND                            895
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the                 A
      University(s) that conducted the last counseling shall conduct a
      counseling within two weeks hence after giving due publicity. A
      student who has already taken admission will not be eligible to
      participate in this counseling. Needless to say, the University shall
      follow the procedure as provided in the admission brochure/             B
      prospectus. We further say that the vacant seats are meant only
      for Government colleges and Universities. We repeat at the cost
      ofrepetition that we have passed this order in the special features
      of the case."
        22. The situation in the case of the said two States is totally
different than the present one. In the instant case, the appellants           C
approached the High Court only on 01.09.2016. They did not choose to
move this Court when the case of Dinesh Singh Chauhan (supra) was
pending. They were aware that such a litigation was pending before
this Court. Despite the same, they chose to maintain a sphinx like silence.
It is beyond any trace of doubt that admission to post graduate courses       D
for the academic session 2016-2017 in the State of Uttar Pradesh stood
concluded by this Court as per the decision in Dinesh Singh Chauhan
(supra). Had the grievance been raised before this Court at the time
when the special leave petitions were filed in respect of the seats lying
vacant, the matter could possibly have been differently perceived. Mr.
Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the MCI would submit             E
that the appellants only woke up from .the slumber after this Court, in
exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution, permitted the
States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana to hold counselling concurring
with the view of the High Court and also directed University of Delhi to
conduct an extra round of counselling beyond the cut-off date regard          F
being had to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. It is
urged by him that in such a situation, the appellants cannot be permitted
to advance the stand that nobody should suffer for the fault of the court.
       23. It is manifest that effective and complete counselling was
held in the case ofUttar Pradesh on the basis of the verdict rendered by      G
this Court in Dinesh Singh Chauhan (supra) and the appellants, after
certain orders were passed oy this Court, felt to have got the wake up
call to agitate their grievance.
      24. The seminal question that is required to be posed is whether
the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit would be applicable to such           H
896              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A a case. In Jang Singh v, Brij Lal and others10 , a three-Judge Bench
  noted that there was error on the part of the court and the officers of the
  court had contributed to the said occur. Appreciating the fact situation,
  the Court held:-
              " ...... It is no doubt true that a litigant must be vigilant and take
B             care but where a litigant goes to Court and asks fot the assistance
              of the Court so that his obligations under a decree might be fulfilled
              by him strictly, it is incumbent on the Court, if it does not leave the
              litigant to his own devices, to ensure that the correct information
              is furnished. If the Court in supplying the information makes a
              mistake the responsibility ofthe litigant, though it does not altogether
 c            cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the litigant acts on the
              faith of that information the Courts cannot hold him responsible
              for a mistake which it itself caused. There is no higher principle
              for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Courts
              should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see
 D            that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be
              restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake.
              This is aptly summed up in the maxim: "Actus curiae neminem
              gravabit "."
             25. Noting that there was mistake by the concerned district court,
 E    relief was granted by stating so:-
              " ......... In view of the mistake of the Court which needs to be
              righted the parties are relegated to the position they occupied on
              January 6, 1958, when the error was committed by the Court
              which error is being rectified by us nunc pro tune. "
 F           26. Another three-Judge Bench in Jagannath Singh and others
      v. Dr. Ram Naresh Sing/tu, took note of the fact that the judgment by
   the High Court had been rendered ex-parte, and the application for recall
   did not impress the High Court. Appreciating the factual matrix that
   there was an error in the cause list and accepting that there was an
 G omission to mention the case correctly in the cause list and treating it as
   a a mistake of the court, the Court held that though there was some
   negligence on the part of the counsel or of his clerk but it was not so
   grave as to disentitle the party to be heard, and in any event, the alleged
      10   AIR 1966 SC 1631
      11
           (1970) 1 sec 573
 H
  NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND                               897
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J .]

contemnors could not be punished for a mistake on the part of their              A
counsel or the counsel's clerk.   ·
        Being of this view, this Court set aside the order with costs.
       27. In Atma Ram Mittal v. Js/iwar Singh Punia 12 , this Court, in
the context of interpretation of Section 13( I) in juxtaposition with Section
1(3) of t!1e Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973,             B
adopting the purposive interpretation ruled:-
       "It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the fault
       of the court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim
       "actus curiae neminem gravabit" - an act of court shall
       prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the time normally           C
       consumed for adjudication, the ten years' exemption or holiday
       from the application of the Rent Act would become illusory, ifthe
       suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is
       common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the
       date ofletting it would never be disposed of within ten years and         D
       even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That will
       make the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide
       no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem
       of shortages of houses. The purpose oflegislation would thus be
       defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration
       legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else."              E

       28. The aforesaid authorities deal with three different situations.
There cannot be an iota of doubt that no prejudice shall be caused to
anyone due to the fault of the court, but it is to be seen in what situations
the court can invoke the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit". In
this regard, reference to the authority in Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald          F
Joseph Coellw 13 would be apt. In the said case, the Principal Judge,
Family Court, Bombay had modified the earlier decree. The same was
challenged in the writ petition which was dismissed. The Division Bench
confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge, which compelled the
appellant to approach this Court. Dealing with the principle of rectification    G
of decree under Section 152 CPC, the Court opined that there can be
hardly any doubt that any error occurred in the decree on account of
arithmetical or clerical error or accidental slip may be rectified by the
court. It has been further observed that the basis of the said provision is
12
   (1988) 4 sec 284
"(2001) 4 sec 181                                                                H
898           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A founded on the maxim that an act of court will prejudice no man. The
  Court referred to the authorities in Assam Tea Corpn. Ltd. v. Narayan
  Singh 14 , L. Janakirama Iyer v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer 15, Bhikhi Lal v.
  Tribeni 16 , Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa and
  another 17 , Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. and another 18 and
  Thirugnanavalli Ammal v. P. Venugopala Pillai 19 and, eventually
B
  analysing the facts, opined that rectification of the decree was totally
  misconceived.
         29. In this regard, we may usefully refer to a passage from
   Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemani Vimalnath Narichania and
   others20 , wherein it has been ruled that the maxim actus curiae neminem
 C gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one,
   becomes applicable when a situation is projected where the court is
   under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the
   court. In a case; where any undeserved or unfair advantage has been
   gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court, and the same
 D requires to be neutralized, the said maxim is to be made applicable.
             30. In this regard, reference to the Constitution Bench decision in
    Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases and othersu
    would be seemly. In the said case, the question for consideration was
    whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under
 E Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint
     or the date ofinstitution of the prosecution or whether the relevant date
     is the date on which a Magistrate takes.cognizance of the offence.
     Answering the issue, the Court held that for that purpose computing the
   . period oflimitation under Sec.tion 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date
     of filing of the complaint orthe date ofinstitution of prosecution and not
 F the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. In the course of
     deliberation, the larger Bench observed:-
            " ... The object of the criminal law is to punish perpetrators of
            crime. This is in tune with the well-known legal maxim nullum
      14
        AIR 1981 Gau 41
 G   "AIR 1962 SC 633
     16
        AIR 1965 SC 1935
     17
   •    AIR 1966 SC 1047
     " (I 999) 3 sec soo
     19
        AiR I 940 Mad 29
     20
        (2010) 9 sec 437
 H
     21
        (2014) 2 sec 62
  NEERAJ KUMAR SAINY AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. AND                          899
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] .

      tempus aut locus occurrit regi, which means that a crime never        A
      dies. At the same time, it is also the policy of law to assist the
      vigilant and not the sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin maxim
     ·vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Chapter
      XXXVI CrPC which provides limitation period for certain types
      of offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws suµport B
      from this maxim. But, even certain offences such as Section 384
      or 465 !PC, which have lesser punishment may have serious social
      consequences. The provision is, therefore, m~e for condonation
      of delay. Treating date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of
      proceedings as the relevant date for computing limitation under
      Section 468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim actus C
      curiae neminem gravabit which means that the act of court shall
      prejudice no man. It bears repetition to state that the court's
      inaction in taking cognizance i.e. court's inaction in applying mind
      to the suspected offence should not be allowed to cause prejudice
      to a diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus presents the D
      interplay of these three legal maxims. The provisions of this
      Chapter, however, are not interpreted solely on the basis of these
      maxims. They only serve as guiding principles."
       31. It is noticeable from the aforesaid passage that the
interpretation was made in accordance with the Code and the legal maxim
was taken as a guiding principle. Needless to say, it is well settled in law E
that no one should suffer any prejudice because of the act of the court.
The authorities that we have referred to dealt with the different factual
expositions. The legal maxim that has been taken recourse to cannot
operate in a vacuum. It has to get the sustenance from the facts. As is
manifest, after the admissions were over as per the direction of this F
Court, the appellants, who seemed to have resigned to their fate, woke
up to have control over the events forgetting that the law does not assist
the non-vigilant. One cannot indulge in luxury of lethargy, possibly
nurturing the feeling that forgetting is a virtue, and thereafter, when the
time has slipped through, for it waits for none, wake up and take shelter
under the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit ". It is completely G
unacceptable.
      32. Considering the precedents where the legal maxim actus
curiae neminem gravabit has been applied, we are compelled to form
the opinion that the said maxim is not applicable to the factual score of
                                                                            H
900             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A the present case. Once the said principle is not applicable, the rest of the
  submissions pertaining to seats going waste or the State lcsing its
  invesfment or the suffering of the students or claim of parity with other
  students have no legs to stand upon. It is because to give indulgence to
  the appellants or the interfering with the impugned order would only give
B rise to chaos; and it is an accepted norm that law does not countenance
  any chaos and abhors anarchy.
            33. Consequently, the appeal, being sans substance, stands
      dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.


      Divya i'andey                                            Appeal dismissed.