Holding

Clause 13 is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) and does not violate Article 14, whereas Clause 4(bb) is inconsistent with Section 9(1) proviso and is invalid; the right to contract with the State on statutory terms is not a separate fundamental right.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973, which created a state monopoly over the sale of Kendu leaves for bidi manufacturing. The petitioners, traders in Kendu leaves, challenged Clause 13 (a minimum royalty of 75% of the estimated yield) and Clause 4(bb) (purchasers could not object to quality or shortage) as unreasonable restrictions on their right to trade under Article 19(1)(g) and as violative of Article 14. The Court held that Clause 13 is a reasonable restriction within the first limb of Article 19(6) and does not breach Article 14, while Clause 4(bb) conflicts with the built‑in warranty in Section 9(1) of the Act and is therefore invalid. The right to contract with the State on statutory terms is not a separate fundamental right beyond the statutory scheme. All writ petitions were dismissed, except that Clause 4(bb) was struck down, and the related criminal appeal was also dismissed.

Issues considered

The validity of Clause 13 of the Tender Notice and statutory Agreement under Article 19(6) – whether it falls within the protection of sub‑clause (ii) and, if not, whether it is a reasonable restriction under the first limb of Article 19(6).
The validity of Clause 4(bb) which bars purchasers from raising objections to quality or shortage, in view of Section 9(1) proviso of the Act.
Whether the impugned provisions violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the right to enter into a contract with the State on statutory terms is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g).
The effect of the judgment on the criminal appeal under Sections 379, 409 of the Indian Penal Code and related provisions.

Legislation cited

Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973s. Section 20, s. Section 4, s. Section 9(1)
Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Rules, 1972/1973s. Rule 13 (Clause 13), s. Rule 4(bb), s. Rule 9
Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.19(1)(g), s. Art.19(6)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 379, s. Section 409

Subjects

State monopolyKendu leavesArticle 19(1)(g)Article 19(6)Article 14reasonable restrictionstatutory contractroyaltytenderpublic interestestoppelwaiver

Judgment

• 417

NEW BIHAR BIRI LEAVES CO. & ORS.
v.
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
lam/pry 6, 1981

[R. s. SARKARIA AND R. s. PATHAK, JJ.] 1J I
Constitution of India 1950, Articles 19(6) clauses (i) & (ii)-Clauses
whether distinct and separate-Law covered by the clauses whether to satisfy
I
- ~
the test of reasonableness.

Article 19(1) (g)-Citizen's right to enter into contract with State-Whether
fundamental right can be enforced though contractual. C
Bihar Ke11du Leaves (Control of Trade) Act 1973 & Bihar Ken.du Leaves
(Control of Trade) Rules, 1973-Clause 13 and Clause 4(bb) of agreement
• prescribed by rules-Whether unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 19.

Kendu leaves used in the manufacture of bidis are grown oo forest produce
in several States. On March 10, 1972 the State of Bihar issued the Bihar D
Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972, which was replaced by
the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973. The purpose was to
create a State monopoly in the matter of sale of Kendu leaves to the manu-
facturers· of bidis to regulate the trade in relation to the grower of Kendu
plants and their collection and sale through the agency of the State to the
registered manufacturers of bidis. Section 4, empowered the State Government
for the purpose of purchase and sale of Kendu leaves on its behalf, to appoint E
agents in respect of different units. Section 9 provided that the authorised
aSents will be bound to accept delivery of all those Kendu leaves which are
fit for the purpose of mannfacture of bidis.

In exercise of its ru.Ie-.making powers the State Government notified the
Bihar Kendu LeavOB (Control of Trade) Rules, 1972, which was continued
by Section 23 of the Act even after the repeal of the Ordinance. Provisions
regarding the disposal of Kendu leaves were made in Rule 9. Sub-rule (I)
F
~ -provided that Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected shall be sold
r- or otherwise disposed of by tender on terms and conditions spocified in the

- •
Tender Notice. The Tender was required by sub-rule (2) to be advertised
in newspapers. Sub-role (9) provided that the successful tenderer or success-
ful bidder shall be appointed as purchaser and the entire quantity of Kendu
leaves collected or likely to be collected or such lesser quantity out of it as
may be offered to him by the State shall be purchased by him on terms and
conditions in the agreement to be executed by the purchaser. Sub-rule (10)
G

required the purchaser to execute an Agreement in Form 'M' within 15 days
of the receipt of the order o:E appointment.

By a Notification dated January 16, 1974 the Rules were amended and
sub-clause (bb) after clause 4(b) was added in Form 'M' of the Agreement
which provided that the purchaser shall not raise any objection against the B
quality of Kendu leaves or shortage of leaves. Condition 13 of the Tender
Notice was a1so incorporated in the statutory Agreement, Form 'M' providing
•
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 2 S.C.R.

A that for every unit a minimum royalty will be 'payable by the purchaser,' and
that this amount shall be payable by the tenderer even if by the end of the
season, the price of Kendu leaves at the offered rate, collected und delivered
to the purchaser, fell short of this amount, the amount being payable before
the leaves are utilized or taken out and if not paid, realisable as arrears of
land revenue.

B In their writ petitions the petitioners who were carrying on trade in ~en~u
leaves, assailed the Rules framed under the Act and clause ,13 and clause 4(bb)
of the Tender Notice and the Statutory Agreement and the notices of demand

•" issued demanding royalty in respect of the undelivered quantity of Kendu:
leaves.

It was contended that : (i) the provisions and conditions contained in clause
..
c 4(bb) and clause 13 amount to an unreasonable restriction on freedom to •
carry on trade or business in Kendu leaves guaranteed under Article 19 (I) {g)
of the Constitution and that they are not within the protection of sub-clause
(ii) i)l the second part of clause (6) of Article 19; (ii) that the provisions in {

their immediate operation and effect, are harsh, unconscionable, arbitrary,
unfair and oppressive, thereby violating Article 14, (ill) the foreclosure of the
right of the purchaser to refuse delivery Oil the ground of the \eaves offered,
D not being of requisite quality, is inconsistent and ultra vires of the proviso to
Section 9(1) of the Act and (iv) that the auctions are held in January, while
the Agents are not appointed till March or April, the plucking season, and
consequently, no reasonable estimate of the expected yield is possible.

The respondents argued that (i) there is a paucity of skilled people who
could be employed as Agents and the prevailing practice is that the persons
E appointed as Agents, are sponsored by the purchasers and that the terms of'
the Agreement, taken as a whole are not one-sided, (il) if a person voluntarily
takes upon himself under the terms of a contract, such risks and chances of
benefit, he has no right in the, event of suffering a loss to be compensated for
it even under the ordinary law in a suit, much less the Court of writ jurisdic-
tion can grant any such relief, ,(iii) the right to enter into a contract on parti·
cular terms with the State is not a fundamental right, (iv) as the petitioners
F bad not paid amounts required to be adjusted against the remunera lion of the
Agents they are not entitled to relief under Article 32, and (v) the provisions l('
are directly and essentially related to the operation of monopoly and, as such
are wtihin the protection of sub-cloose (ii) of claus (6) of Art 19.

Dismissing the petitions and appeal
G HFLD: !. The condition in 4(bb) in the Tender Notices and the statutory
agreement is couched in peremptory, drastic and absolute language, not qua1i-
fied by any words showing that the bar envisaged in it will be attracted only
in cases where the purchaser bas had an earlier_ opportunity to raise his objec·
tion but failed to do so, or, where he had on an earlier occasion raised such
an objection which was heard and overruled by the competent Forest Officer.

H
Condition 4(bb) therefore is inconsistent with and repugnant to Section 9(1), •
proviso of the Act which contains a built-in-warranty, that the Kendu leaves
offered would be fit for manufacture of bidis; that is to say, the leaves would
be of merchantable quality and as such, invalid. [4420-H]
•
BIR! LEAYES V. BIHAR 419

2. The scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules and Forms including that A
of the impugned condition 13 was designed remove the deficiencies, infirmi-
• ties and vices pointed out in Rashbihari's Panda v. State of Orissa [1969]
3 S.C..R. 374. The impugned condition 13 satisfied the test of reasonableness
under the first part of Articles 19 ( 6). The contention, that in actual operation, the
impugned provision (clause 13) creates a n1onopoly in favour of a class of
middlemen consisting of 'Agents' and purchasers, and enables them to earn un-
duly large profits at the cost of the public or pluckers and growers is not accept- B
able. [4390-H, 440A-B]
3. (i). Clause (6) of Article 19 falls into two parts, indicating that the two
parts of the clause are intended to be distinct and separate. The words
"reasonable restrictions" which find pivotal mention in the first part, have not
been repeated in the second part which omission makes. it clear that a law
covered by sub-clause (ii) is not required to satisfy the test of reasonableness
under the first part of the clause and no objection to have validity of such a c
law is tenable on the ground that it infringes the right guaranteed under Article
l9(l)(g). Sub-clause (ii) is thus an exception to the main substantive provi-
sion in clause (1) of the Article. (4310-H, 432A-BJ
3(ii). The basic and essential features which are directly and immediately
connected with the creation of the State monopoly are found in the body of
the Act itself. The provisions incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice D
and Agreement are merely subsidiary or incidental prov1s1ons, therefore, do
not fall within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of Article
19(6). [432E-F]
• 3(iii). \Vhere the business to be carried on by a citizen is in a commodity,
the sale of which is a State monopoly,- conditioned by some statutory terms,
(analogous to the impugned conditions) which in operation, have a direct and
immediate impact on the fundamental freedom of the citizen guaranteed under E
Article 19(1) (g), the citizen cannot enter into a contract with the Government
for purchase of such a commodity except on the statutory terms laid down
by the seller-State. The Tender Notice and the Agreement \Vhich the purchasers
enter into with the Government, although couched in statutorv Forms, are
therefore, not bereft of their contractual character. [432G-H, 433A & C]
4. The minimum royalty or price payable being fixed on the basis of 75
~r cent of the estimated annual yield in standard bags from the unit multiplied
F
"9' ~Y the rates offered and accepted. Such an estimate, is made on the basis of
the average actual yield from that unit for the preceding three years. Such

-• an estimated yield is notified and published in the Tender Notices every year.
Purchasers in the trade, know beforehand as to what they are bidding for, and
they are generally persons who have been in the trade for several years and,
as such have a special knowledge of forming their own estimate-s of the expect·
ted yield and the chances of profit and loss from that particular nnit in a
G
particular year. [433F-OJ
5. As the chances of profit and risks of loss are evenly divided between the
seller-state and the purchasersi it cannot be said that the impugned condition
in clause 13 of the Tender Notice and the Agreement is manifestly nnreasona-
ble. The impugned condition 13 is a restriction imposed in the general public H
interest. [434B-C]
6. Although the Act alld the Rules contemplate that the Agents appointed
by the qovernment will be under its foll control and liable to compensate
•
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A the Government for any shortage, damage or loss caused in collection or deli-
very or any defect in the quality of the leaves collected, to the Government,
yet, in actual practice, the real position is that the Agents are generally persons
•
sponsored by and otherwise, deeply interested in the purchasers. [435B-C]
7. The agents are to be appointed every year at short notice when the
plucking season is at hand and as there is a dearth of suitable· persons having
adequate experience. and skill of work as efficient agents, the Government is
B dril'en into a situation in which they have to appoint persons sponsored by the
j
purchasers as Agents. The rules framed under the Act envisage a strict and
! exclusive control of the Government over the Agents and iheir activities, and
i provide for their liability to compensate the Government for the loss occa-
sioned by their misconduct or neglect. The condition in condition 13 far from I •
t creating a monopoly in the trade in favour of middlemen, operates as an -'1
~
c ironclad safeguard against leakage of the public revenue by assuring a mini-
mum return to the public exchequer from the sale of Kendu leaves. The. pro-
•
vision is aimed to secure the full benefit from the trade to the State leaving
chances of making reasonable, marginal profit to the purchasers.
[435C-D. 439B-E] '
8. It is a fundamental principle of general application th.1t if a person
of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out the con-
D tract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of the: terms of
the contract which proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other terms
of the same contract which might be disadvantageous to him. The maxim
is qui approbat non reprobat. A party to an instrument or transaction cannot
take advantage of one part of a document or transaction and reject the resL
[441E·Hl
Verschures Crean1eries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. [1921]
E 2 K. B.. 608 and Douglas Menzies v. Umphelby [1908] A.C. 224 at p. 232 refer-
red to.
In the instant case the petitioners had by offering highest bids at public
auctions or by Tenders, accepted and Vlo'orked out the contracts in; the past but
are now resisting the demands or other action, arising out of the impugned
condition 13 on the ground that this condition is violative of Articles 19(1){g)
and 14 of the Constitution. The impugned conditions though bearing a statu-
tory complexion, retain their basic contractual character. Though a person
coo.not be debarred from enforcing his fundamental rights on the ground of
estoppel or waiver, the principle which prohibits a party to a transaction from
approbating a part of its conditions and reprobating the rest, is different from
the doctrine of estoppel or waiver. [442A-C]
...•
G ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 2222-2252/77 &
121 to 125/79, 405 & 441174, 46 & 47 /75. ~
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 300 OF 1974.
•
H Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
14-2-1974 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction
No. 68/73.
BIRl LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, !.) 421
•
F. S. Nlitiman, Anil B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, l. ,S. A
Sinha and Tarini Prasad for the Petitioners in WPs. Nos. 121-125/1
79, 2222-2252/77 & 46-47175.
Y. S. Chitale, K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Petitioners in
W.P. Nos. 405 & 441/74 and Cr!. A. No. 300/74.
Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Balak Mahto, B
and U. P. Singh for the Respondents Nos. 1-2 in all W.Ps. and Appeal.
Miss A .. Subhashini for Respondent No, 3 in WP Nos. 2222-2252/
17.
The Jlldgme'.nt of the Court was delivered by
SARKAJUA, J.-The common question that has been seriously c
• pressed itito argument in this batch of writ petitions and criminal
appeal mentioned in the title, relates to the constitutiopal validity of
certain Rules framed under the State of Bihar under the Bihar Kendu
• Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
'Act') p:irticularly clause 13, clause 4 (bb) of the Tender Notice and
of the sµtutory Agreement notified by the Bihar Government in the D
Bihar Government Gazette,. and the notices of demand issued under
the impugned provisions demanding "royalty" from tl1e petitioners in
respect pf the undelivered quantity of Kendu leaves.
All these writ petitions will be disposed of by this common judg-
ment. The basic question being common, it will suffice to state E
the facfs giving rise to Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, filed by
the NejV Bihar Bidi Leaves Co.
The petitioners in all these writ petitions are either firms or indi-
viduals: carrying on trade in Kendu leaves in the State of Bihar. How-
ever, Retitioner No. 31 is an association of traders in Kendu leaves,
of which the other petitioners are members.
K~ndu leaves are grown as forest produce in several States,
including the States of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh. Under the old
system in Bihar, the right to pluck and extract Kendu leaves from a
forest: coupe carved out by the Forest Department, was auctioned by G
the S~ate Government.
dn March 10, 1972, while the State of Bihar was under the
Presitlent's rule, the Governor of Bihar issued the Bihar Kendu
Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972. The provisions of this
Ordlimnce were continued under successive Ordinances and ultimately
repl~ced by the aforesaid Act of 1973. This Act created State mono- II
poly: in the matter of sale of Kendu leaves to the manufacturers of
11-~7 SCI/ SJ
•
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.
•
A bidis. Its purpose is to regulate this trade in relation to the grower :if
Kendu plants and the collection and sale of the same through the
agency of the State to the registered manufacturers of bidis. Under its
scheme, a specified area of Kendu leaves is divided into units. The
'grower' is defined as 'a grower who holds lands on which Kenda
!' plants grow or who is in possession of such lands under a lease or
B otherwise, and includes the State Government.' Under Section 3, the
State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
declare any area to be a specified area for the purposes of the Act
and divid_e every such specified area into such number of units as it
may deem fit. 'Unit' means a sub-division of a specified area consti-
c tuted under Section 3. Under Section 4, the State Government may, -1 •
for the purpose of purchase and sale of Kendu leaves on its behalf,
appoint agents in respect of different units and any such agent may
•
be appointed in respect of more than, any one unit but not more than
three units. The terms, conditions and the procedure ior appointment
of agents have been prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act,
•
which we sh•ll presently notice. Section 5 places restriction on pur-
D
chase or transport of Kendu leaves. Section 8 mandates the Forest_ ~-
Officer incharge of a Division to set up in each unit a number of
depots. Section 9 is important and its material part runs as under:
"(I) The State Government or its authorised officer or
agent shall purchase Kendu leaves offered for sale and
E deliver at the depot during the bus_iness hours at the rates
fixed under Section 7:
Provided that it shall be open to the State Government or its
authorised officer or agent, for reasons to be communicated
in writing, to refuse to purchase or accept delivery of any
F Kendu leaves which, in their opinion, are not fit for the
purpose of manufacture of bidis.''

It will be seen that the proviso to sub-section ( 1) contains a built-in -~
warranty inasmuch as it says that the authorised agents will be bound
to accept delivery of all those Kendu leaves which, in their opinion, ~
G are fit for the purpose! of manufacture of bidis. In other words, the
Kendu leaves to be purchased by the authorised agents of thel
Government must be of merchantable quality. •
The next relevant provision is to be found in Section 11 which is
as follows
H "(1) Every manufacturer of bidis within the State shall •
get himself registered within such period on payment of such
fee and in such manner as may be prescribed.
,. BIRI LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, !.) 423

(2) Every manufacturer of bidis within the State A
• registered under sub-section (I) shall furnish a declaration
in snch form by such date and in such manner as may be
prnscribed."
Section 12 provides that Kendu leaves purchased by the State Gov-
ernment or by its authorised officer or agent, shall be disposed of in B
such manner as the State Government may direct. Section 20 of the
Act gives the State Government the power to make rules subject to
the conditions of previous publication, to carry out all or any of the
purposes of this Act. Sub-section (2) of that Section provides that
-"Such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters,
{
· namely:- C
" (a) procedure to be followed in making appointment of
a~nts;
• (b) to (d) ............ ,
(e) the manner of registration under Section 1O;
D
{f) the manner of registration, the period within which
such registration shall be made and the fee payable
thereof under sub-section (1) of Section 11 ;
(g) form of declaration, authority to whom, date by
which and the manner in which the .ckclaration shall
be furnished under sub-section (2) of Section 11; E
(h) "
In exercise of its powers under the then extent Ordinance
analogous to those under Section 20, the State Government of Bihar
notified the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Rules, 1972 (for
short the 'Rules'). These rules were, as already noticed, continued by F
~lion 23 of the Act, event after the repeal of the Ordinance con-

-. ' cemed.
Rule 2(8) defines 'Purchaser' to mean a person to whom Kendu
leaves have been sold by the State Government under Section 12
Under clause (1) of the same Rule, 'Standard bag' means a bag G
• conlaining 1000 standard gaddis of Kendu leaves and where the
standard gaddis are not bagged, reference to standard bag . shall be
construed as a reference to 1000 standard gaddis or 50,000 leaves.
Under clause ( 11) , "Standard gaddi" -means a bundle containing 50
• Kendn leaves .
H
Rule 3 provides the manner of appointing agents. The applica-
- tion for agency is to be submitted in ·Form "A". This Fonn requires
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198!] 2 S.C.R.

A the applicant for appointment as Agent to make a Declaration.. inter
aNa, to this effect:
•
"I/We ........ hereby declare that I/We have read
and understood all the provisions of the Bihar Kendu
Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972 and the rules
made thereunder and the conditions of agency mentioned
B
in the notice issued under rule 3 (1) and I/we agree to
abide by the same. , I/we have personally inspected the
unit No..... if I/we am/are appointed as an agent for the
unit mentioned above, I/we undertake lo purchase from
growers and collect from land of State Government and ___,
c deliver a quantity of Kendu leaves on both counts, which
shall not be less than . . . . . . Standard bags as mentioned
•
in the notice. I/we shall execute the agreement witlt the State
Government in Form 'C' within 15 days.
<
Witness:

0 1.
2. Signature of the applicant."
Under sub-rule (7) of Rule 3, if, in the opinion of the State
Government, it is not possible to select a suitable agent for the pur-
pose out of the persons who had applied for appointment as agent,
or where any agency is terminated and there is not sufficient time for
calling fresh applications, the State Government may appoint any
person as agent who in their opinion is suitable for the work. Such a
person to be appointed as Agent is required to furnish a declaration
in Form 'B'. Sub-rule (9) requires that on appointment as an agent,
the person so appointed shall execute an agreement in Form 'C'
within fifteen days of the receipt of the order of appointment, failing
which the appointment shall be liable to be cancelled and upon such
cancellation, the security· deposit shall be forfeited; and the age~t";
shall be liable to pay the loss, if any, incurred by the State Government
as a result of such cancellation of the appointment. Then, a formula
has been provided as to how such loss on cancellation of the appoint-
ment shall be calculated. The loss so determined shall be recoverable
from the agent or surety as arrears of land revenue. Sub-rule (10)
requires the agent so appointed for a particular unit to deposit •
security before signing the Agreement. Jt also provides how the
amount to be deposited shOllld be calculated. Sub-rule ( 11) provides
that the agent shall purchase Kendu leaves from growers and from
H such labourers who pluck Kendu leaves from the Government forests
and other lands at the depot opened by him or ordered to be opened
by the Divisional Forest Officer. Clause (ii) of sub-rule (11) lays
..
BIR! LEAVES v. BUIAR ( Sarkaria' I.) 425

down that unless ordered by the Divisional Forest Officer or an officer
authorised by him in writing, the agent shall not slacken or stop the
purchase or collection in any depot within the unit. Sub-rule (12)
requires the agent to deliver immediately the Kendu leaves purchased
or collected by him to the purchaser appointed for the unit. Sub-rule
(13) provides :
B
"The agent shall maintain such account and submit such
periodical returns to thei Divisional Forest Officer or to any
other officer authorised by him as may be directed by the
Divisional Forest Officer."
Sub-rule (14) requires the agent to furnish a list of persons employed
by him with the unit, immediately to the Divisional Forest Officer, c
and he is bound to remove any such person whose employment is
objected to by the Divisional Forest Officer. Sub-rule (15) is material
and reads as under :
"If the agent during the period of agency has duly
observed and performed all the terms and conditions of the I)
agency to the satisfaction of the State Government and if the
State Government is satisfied that he has done his best to
collect maximum quantity of leaves from the unit, it may
grant to the agent yearly renewal of agency for a period to
be fixed by the State Government on such terms and condi-
tions as may be decided upon for each year."
Sub-rule (16) provides that the agent shall be advanced such
money for the performance of agency as may be directed by the State
Government from time to time.
Rule 6(7) Jays down the procedure of enquiry about rejected
,~du leaves. According to this procedure, on receipt of a complaint F
(under sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Act, the officer shall hold
the enquiry after the necessary notice to the person concerned and

- pass such orders in terms of sub-section (3) or (4) of Section 9 as
he deems fit.
Rule 9 makes provision regarding the disposal of Kendu leaves. G
• Under sub-rule ( 1), Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected
by the State Government or by its authorised officer shall ordinarily
be sold or otherwise disposed of by tender on such terms. and
conditions as are specified in the Tender Notice and Tender Form
issued by .the State Government or by an officer authorised by the
State Government in this behalf. The Tender Notice is required by H
sub-rule ( 2) to be advertised in newspapers and in such other
'
• manner as the State Government may deem-fit. Sub-rule (8)
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A provides : "Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing pro-
visions, the State Government may sell or otherwise dispose of Kendu
leaves collected or likely to be collected by it or by its officers or
agents by auction on such terms and conditions as may be decided by
it." Sub-rule (9) reads as under :

B "The successful tenderer or successful bidder, as the
case may be, shall be appointed as purchaser for the parti-
cular unit, and the entire quantity of Kendu leaves collected
or likely to be collected from such unit or such lesser
quantity out of it may be offered to him by the State, its
officer or agent in such unit, shall be purchased by him in
c such manner and on such terms and conditions as may be
specified in the agreement to be executed by such purchaser
under sub-rule (10)."

Sub-rule ( 10) requires the purchaser to execute an Agreement
in Form 'M' within 15 days of the receipt of the order of appoint-
» ment. Sub-rule (11) requires such purchaser before signing the
agreement to deposit the security calculated as, provided in that sub-
rule. Sub-rule (13) provides that the purchaser, if he desires to con-
sume the leaves within the unit or to remove the leaves delivered to
him outside the unit immediately or at any time before the 30th June,
shall pay the purchase price in full for the quantity of leaves delivered
E to him calculated at the rate specified in the purchaser's agreement.
If the purchaser agrees in writing to keep the delivered leaves within
the unit under his supervision and risk and under insurance against
theft, fire and wastage at his expense but under the custody and con-
trol of the Divisional Forest Officer he may at the time of delivery of
leaves pay only such part of the purchase price of the delivered leaves,
F as may be specified in the purchaser's agreement. The balance of tl:i!!,.r
purchase price may be paid in instalments on the dates specified in 1
the purchaser's agreement or on any earlier date before the leaves are
removed outside the unit or are delivered for consumption within the
unit. In no case the purchaser shall be allowed to remove all the
G leaves unless full price has been paid.
•
By NotiJicati()n, dated January 16, 1974, published in the Extra-
ordinary Gazette of Bihar Governrnen\ of the same date, the Rules
were amended, and sub-clause (bb) after clause 4(b) was added in
Form 'M' of the Agreement. This sub-clause (bb) reads as under :
•
H "The purchaser shall not raise any objection against the
quality of Kendu leaves or shortage of leaves in the ,
standard gaddis."
BIR! LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, l.). 427

This is one of the impugned provisions. The other impugned provi- A
-sion is to be found in condition (13) of the Tender Notices published
in the Bihar Government Gazette, every year inviting tenders for the
puchase of Ken du leaves. This condition ( 13) which is also incor-
porated in the statutory Agreement (Fonn-M), runs as follows :
"For every unit a minimum royalty will be payable by B
the purchaser. The amount of minimum royalty will be
75% of the amount arrived at by multiplyihg the notified
yield in standard bags by the offer made by the purchaser
per standard bag. This amount shall be payable by the
tenderer even if by the end of the season, the _ price of
Kendu leave« at the offered rate, collected and delivered to c
the purchaser, fell short of this amount. This whole amount
will be payable before the leaves are utilized or taken out
and, if not paid, will be realised as arrears of land revenue."
The first proposition ca:nvas&ed by Mr. Nariman appearing for the
petitioners in Writ Petitions 405 and 441 of 1974, is the Petitioner• D
argued that the aforesaid impugned provisions/conditions comprised
in the aforesaid clause 4(bb) and clause (13) amount to alli unreason-
able restriction on the petitioners' fundamental freedom to carry on
trade or business in Kendu leaves; guaranteed under Article
19(l)(g) of the Constitution; that the impugned provisions are not
within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of claus~ E
( 6) of Article 19 because the impugned provisions are not "integrally
and essentially connected" with the creation of the monopoly in favour
-Of the State, but are only incidental or subsidiary to the operation of
the monopoly.
In support of this proposition, learned counsel has referred to the F
decisions of this Court in Akadesi Padhan v. State of Orissa(') and
Rashbihari Panda etc. v. State of Orissa. (')
The second proposition propounded by Mr. Nariman is that the
impugmd provisions violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners'
1lUaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution, becausei in their im-
mediate operation and effect, they are harsh, unco'nscionab]e, arbitrary G
11'nfair and oppressive; that even where the quantity offered to the
vurchaser is far less than 75% of the notified estimated yield, or the
leaves offered are not of merchantable quality, the impugned provisions
unreasonably obligate the purchaser to pay royalty for 75 per cent of
• the estimated yield irresp;:ctive of whether the shortfall in the quantity

... •
(l) [1%3] Supp, 2 S.C.R. 691
(2) (1969] 3 S.C.R. 374
H
•
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A offered/delivered or the unmercha'n(l!ble quality of the leaves offered
is due to the fraud or negligence of the Agent who, under the Rules,
iS supposed to be independent of the purchaser and under the exclu-
sive control of the Government; that the impugned provisions operate
irrationally and unfairly as they make no discerning distinction between
honest purchasers who are not blamable for the shortfall and dishonest
B
purchasers who through their fraud or collusion with the agent or
officers of the Government contribute to the sh01;tfa:I1. Thus, the im-
pugned provisions tar honest and dishonest purchasers with one and
the same brush which results in procrustean cruelty. .__.,, ·. -
Third, the impugned provision which forecloses the right of the
c purchaser to refuse delivery on the ground of the leaves offered, not
being of requisite quality, is incqnsistent with and ultra vire.• of the
Proviso to Section 9 ( l) of the Act which contains a built-in warranty <
that the leaves offered or delivered shall be fit for the purpose of
manufacture of bidis.
D
-
Dr. Chitale, appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions 121 to
125 of 1979, has by and large adopted the argnments of Mr. Nariman.
He has drawn our attention to Annexure 'C' to Writ Petition 47 of
1975, wherein quite a large number of instanc~s are given to show
that the shortfall in the actual delivery of the Kendu leaves to the
purchasers as against the estimated yield is considerable. Learned
E counsel has emphasised that the auctions are held in January, while the
Agents are not appointed till March or April, which is the plucking
season, and i'n January, no reasonable estimate of the expected yield
is possible. It is maintained that the allegations in the counter-
affidavit filed on behalf of the State to the effect, that the purchasers
inspect the nnits and make their own estimates of the expected yield
... is factually incorrect because in Jauuary no such estimate is possible.
Dr. Dewan, who has appeared for some of the petitioners, cited
Maneka Gandhi's case(') in support of his contention, that the im-
pugned provisions in their direct and inevitable effect, impinge upon
the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14
G and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Learned counsel contrasted the
impugned provisions with the Rules in vogue in the State of Andh.ra
Pradesh, which, according to him, have a reasonable basis.

Mr. K. S. Sinha, appearing for the appellant i'l1 Criminal Appeal
300 of 1974, submitted that the validity of the impugned provisions •
H was indirectly involved in this appeal, though in a different context.
It is pointed out that the permit to remove the leaves was refused to
(I) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621 -
BIR! LEAVES v. B111AR (Sarkaria, !.) 429

' the appellant on the ground thait he had taken away the leaves with- · A-
out paying 75 per cent of the royalty and had contravened Rule 16.
The point sought to be made out is that if the impugned Rules are
not held to be valid, this app~ mus!, in consequence, succeed.

On the other hand, Mr. L. N. Sinha, learned Attorney-General
submits on behalf of the respondents that there is a paucity of skilled R:
people who could ~ employed as Agents; that in actual practice the
persons appointed as Agents are sponsored by the purchasers.

,.._,_ (i) It is submitted that the terms of the Agreement, taken as a
' whole, are not one-sided. Whereas under the conditions of the
Tender Notice and the Agreement the purchasers voluntarily binc\ c
themselves to pay the full price of the unit which is fixed according
• to the Rules, irrespective of any shortfall in the quantity offered and
delivered, they, under the terms of the same Agreement get the bene-
fit of purchasing Kendu leaves offered in excess of 75 per cent of the
estimated yield at the concessional rate of 55 per cent only of the
purchase price. It is argued that if the conditions of the Tender Notice

- and the statutory Agreement are considered as a whole, it is evident
that the risks of loss and chances of benefit are equally divided bet-
ween the purchasers and the State.
(ii) It is stressed that what is sold at the time of auction is the
estimated produce from a unit, as such, and the highest bidder or E
tenderer gets the contract to purchase that unit al' a price the mini-
mum of which is fixed at 75% of the amount arrived at by multiply-
ing the notified estimated yield in terms of standard bags from that
unit. It is urged that (if a person volnntarily takes upon himself
under the tcnns of a contract, such risks and chances of be'nefi.t, he
'?"- - has no right in the event of suffering a loss to be compensated for it F
< even under the ordinary law in a suit, much less the Court of writ
jurisdiction can grant him any such relief). It is pointed out that
actually, in llO out of 1000 units, that yield exceeded in the notified
estimates, ami as a result, the purchasers reaped full benefit of the
~xcess supply at concessional rates.
G
(iii) (a) It is emphasised that the liability of the petitioners to
pay the whole price for the unit arises from the contract and, as such,
it cannot be considered to have a direct impact on the fundamental
right of the petitioners to carry on their trade or business; that the
• right to enter into a contract on particular terms with the State is not
a fundamental right. Even this Court-proceeds the argument-cannot II
reCQnstruct the terms and conditions voluntarily agreed between the
• petitioners and the State.
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 2 S.C.R.

A (iii) (b) It is argued that it is not a. fit case to be decided under
Article 32 of the Constitution, because in several of these petitions
'
the purchasers (petitioners) were in default, inasmuch as they did
not pay the amounts required to be adjusted against the remuneration
of the Agents; that in most of the cases the purchasers reaped that full
benefits of the contract and only in stray cases, they suffered loss;
B
that since they had availed of the chance of reaping and advantage,
they could not turn round and attack the validity of the terms and
conditions of the contract which they had voluntarily made and work-
ed out. ·
(iv) Another point sought to he made out is that the impugned •
provisions are directly and essentially related to the operation of the
monopoly and, as such, fall within the protedion of sub-clause (ii)
of clause (6) of Art. 19. •
(v) In the alternative, it is submitted that the impugned provisions
satisfy the test of reasonableness under the fir>t part of clause (6) of
n- the said Article~ and in applying that test the voluntary nature of thco
contract and the oblig2tions willingly undertaken by the purchaser with
all the risks of loss and chances of gain should not be lost sight of;
that a purchaser who acts on a -~ntract voluntarily entered into by him
is precluded from repudiating some of its conditions which involve risk
of loss and to accept those which are advantageous to him .
.E
In support of the proposition that one who has received the bene-
fits of statute is precluded from attacking the constitutionality of a
condition attached by the statute, the learned Attorney-G.cneral has
referred to these decisions of the Supreme Court of United States :
Berth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission of the Stale of Wis-
F conian('); St. Louis Casting Co. v. Consrmc1ion Co.('); and United
Food Fuel Gas Co. v. Rail Road Commission.(")
Jn reply, Mr. Nariman submits that writ petitions have been filed
from 1973 onwards by various purchasers to challeniic the validity
of the impugned provisions, as notified every yeat for inviting tenders,
in the High Court or in this Court, and from time to time interim ordeT'
staying the operation of the impugned provisions have been issued •
either by the High Court or this Court; that in \iew of this, it cannot
be said that the petitioners are precluded from challenging the validity
of the impugned provisions on the ground of acquiescence. waiver or
estoppel. It is maintained that fundamental rights cannot be waived, •
,ff ------
(!) 71 L.Ed, 908
(2) 1923us 469
(3) 102us 415
•
• BIR! LEAVES v. B!HAR (Sarkaria, l.) 431

particularly those under Article 14 of the Constitution and the prin- A
• ciple of estoppel enunciated in the American decisions is not appli-
cable in India. In support of this argument, reference has been
made to the decision of this Court in Basheshar Nath v. The Commis-
sioner of Income-tax, Delhi & fuliasthan & Anr. (')
TI1e learned Attqrney-General further submitted that his argu- B
ment was not to the effect that the petitioners were incompetent to
enforce their fundamental right on the ground of waiver or estoppel;
but that a person who voluntarily enters into a contract cannof retain
the benefit accrued to him thereunder and repudiate the other part of
' the contract which might have occasioned loss to him; that this prin-
-ciple is different from that of waiver or estop~l. C
The first question for consideration is, whether the impugned
• provisions fall within the protection of sub-Clause (ii) of Article 19(6)
and therefore, it is not necessary for those provisions to satisfy the
test of rcasonablene$S under the first p~i:t of clause (6) of the
Article. D
The relevant part of clause ( 6) reads thus :
"(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said crause shall
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law impos-
ing, in the interests of the general public, r~ason~ble restric- E
tions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-
clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause
shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating
to,-
F
(i) .......................... .
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation
owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, busi-
ness, industry or service, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise."
G
It will be seen that clause ( 6) falls into two parts. The first part
commences with the phrase : "Nothing in' sub-clause (g) of the said
clause (1) of the Article". Phmse to the same effect, with the addi-
tion of pre-fixed words "and, in particular" are repeated at the
• commencement of the second part, also. This indicates that the two
parts of the clause are intended to be distinct atid separate. Further, H
the words "reoasonablc restrictions" which find pivotal mention in the
• (l) [1959] Suppl, I S.C.R. ;2s
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A first part, have not been repeated in the second part, which ommission
makes it clear that a law covered by sub-clause (ii) is_ not required
•
to satisfy the test of reasonableness under the first part of the clause
and no objection to the validity of such a law is tenable on the ground
that it infringeS the right guaranteed under Article 19 ( 1)(g). Sub-
clause (ii) is thus in the nature of an exception to the main substan-
B
tive provision in clause ( 1) of the Article. Its! language therefore,
which is explicitly restrictive, has to be strictly construed. The pro-
tection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part is, in terms, available te>
the law only "in so far as it relates to" the carrying on by the State,
or by a Corporation owned or controlled by !he State, of any trade,
c business, industry, or service to the exclusion, complete or partial •
of the citizens or otherwise. The ambit of the words "in so far as it
relates to" in the context of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of
,
clause ( 6), came up for consideration before this Court in A kadasi
Padha11's case (ibid). Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, speaking
for the Court, held that only !hose provisions of the law which are
o "integrally and essentially" connected with the creation of the mono-
poly are protected under the second part of clause (6), but those
provisions which are not absolutely essential for creating the mono-
poly, but are merely incidental, subsidiary or helpful to the operation
of the monopoly do not fall under the second part of clause ( 6) and
-
their validity must be judged, under the first part of Article 19 ( 6).
E
Now, let us apply this test to the provisions which are impugned
in the instant case. These provisions are incorporated in the Forms
of Tender Notice and the Agreement by Rules framed under \he Act.
The basic and essential features which arc directly and immodiately
connected with the creation of the State monopoly are to be found
F in the body of the Act, itself. In any case, the impugned provisions
are merely subsidiary or incidental provisions relating to the operation
of the monopoly. The impugned provisions, therefore, do not fall
within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part ol Article
19(6).
The question, however, still remiiins whether the right to enter
G into a contract with the State on particular terms is a fundamental
right falling within the purview of Article 19 ( 1)( g) . The learned
•
Attorney-General maintains that it is not.
Whatever may be the position with regard to contracts relating
<
to other matters, where the business to be carried on by a citizen is in
II a commodity, the sale of which is a State monopoly, conditioned ·by
some statutory terms, analogous to the impugned conditions, which,
in operation, have a direct and immediate impact on the fundamental •
BllU LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, I.) 433
•
freedom of the citizen guaranteed under Article 19 ( 1) (g), the citizen A
eannot enter into a contract with the Government for pnrchase of
such a commodily except on the statutory terms laid down by the
seller-State. Sale of Kendu leaves for manufacture of bidis being a
State monopoly, the petitioners-purchasers could, if they so desired,
purchase the Kcndu leaves only in the manner prescribed by the
statutory rules on terms and conditions notified in the Tender Notices. B
Even so, these conditions leave sufficient room to the free volition of
the intending purchasers, particularly in the matter of fixing the rates
and the minimum price payable for the estimated yield from a parti-
cular unit in terms of standard bags. The Tender Notice and the
-Agreement which the purchasers enter into with the Government,
although couched in statutory Forms, are not bereft of their contrac-
c
tual character, either.

Since the impugned provisions do not, as already noticed, fall
withi11 the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of clause
( 6), they must satisfy the test of being a reasonable restriction under D
the first part of that clause.
The first point in this connection to be determined is, what actually
is sold to the purclrasers under the terms of the Tender Notice and
the statutory Agreement? Is it an estimated yield of a unit in terms
of standard bags which is sold or the actual yield in terms of standard
E
bags offered or delivered? From the scheme of the Rules, parti-
cularly Rule 9(9) extracted in a foregoing part of this judgment, it is
cle-ar that what is sold to the successful bidder at the annual auction
is the entire quantity of Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collec-
ted from a particular unit or such lesser quantity out of that unit as
may be offered to him by the State or its agent or officer for a parti- F
cular year at a price m!led 'roy!llty'. The minimum royalty or price
payable being fixed on the basis of 75 per cent of the estimated annual
yield in standard bags from the unit multiplied by the rates offered
and accepted. Such an estimate, as it appears from the counter-affi-
davit is made on the basis of the average actual yield from that unit
for the preceding three years. Such an estimated yield is notified and G
published in the Tender Notices every year. Purchasers in the trade,
therefore, know before-hand as to what they are bidding for. Purchasers
are generally pttsons who have been in the trade for several years and
as such, have a specraI knowledge of forming their own estimates of
the expegted yield and the chances of profit and loss from that parti-
cular unit in a particular year. While it is true that the bidders have H
to enter into Agreement on the terms and conditions notified by the
Government, yet it cannot be lost sight of !hut in spite of the fact that
•
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A the impugned provisions in Condition 13 of the Agreement and the
Tender Notice in 1973 and the impugned Condition 4(bb) has been
notified annually since the amendment of the statutory Forms in Jan-
uary 1974, the petitioners and their fellowmen in the trade hav~ been
offering rates of bids and entering into agreement on the notified terms
and conditions, including the impugned provisions. Only a few writ-
B petitions have been filed now and then by certain purchasers who suf-
fered loss, to challenge these impugned provisions sit1ce 1973. In
view of the fact that the chances of profit and risks of loss are evenly
divided between the seller-State and the purchasers and in the light
of the aforesaid historical background, it cannot be said that the im- .
c pugned condition in clause 13 of the Tender Notice and the Agreement
is manifestly unreasonable. The impugned Condition 13 is a restric-
tion imposed in the general public interest. Fixation of a minimum
price on the basis of estimated yield from a particular unit in a parti-
cular year operates as an insurance against loss or leakage of public •
Revenue due to connivance or collusion between purchasers on the
D one hand, and the servants and agents of the seller-State on the other.
This method also assures a minimum wage to the pluckcrs of the
Kendu leaves who, as has been affirmed in the counter-affidavit of the
respondent-State, are generally Adivasis or persons belonging to
economically backward classes.

E We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioners, that the impugned provisions are harsh and unreason-
able inasmuch as they obligate the purchasers to pay for the undeliver-
ed shortfall of Kendu leaves even where such shortfall is due to
the negligence or fraud of the Agent of the Government. The real
position has been explained in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of
F the State in Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, thus :
"Technically speaking the Agents were appointed by the
State Government but the persons so appointed were actually

G
sponsored by the respective purchasers. The Agents were
the persons of the purchasers and were loyal to their old
masters. This is an incontrovertible fact. In most of the
-
cases the agents got the full amount of their commission
and handling charges adjusted towards the purchase price of •
the units at the end of collection season. Specific instances
are on record that in many cases the Agents were close rela-
tives such as father, sons, brothers of the purchasers. In the
H case of firms, the Agents were partners in the same firm. In
some cases the purchasers and the Agents interchanged their
positions. Purchasers became Agents while the latter
•
BIR! LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, J.) 435
•
became purchasers. This was a common trick of the trade A
which is still in vogue.
•
Some of the instances showing the relationship between the peti-
tioners/purchasers and the Agents are tabulated in Annexure 'A'
hereto."
Although the Act and the Rules noticed earlier contemplate that n·
the Agents appointed by the Government will be under its full control
and liable to compensate the Government for any shortage, damage
or loss caused in collection or delivery or any defect in the quality of
the leaves collected, to the Government, yet, in actual practice, the
,___ real position is that the Agents are generally persons sponsored hy and
otherwise, deeply interested in the purchasers. In their counter-
c
'
affidavit, the Government has explained that there is a dearth of suit-
able persons having adequate experience and skill of work as efficient
• Agents. The Agents are to be appointed every year at short notice
when the plucking season is at hand. Circumstances being what they
are, the Government is driven into a situation in which they have to
appoint persons sponsored by the purchasers as Agents. From this
real factual position, viz., the close bond and rapport between the
purchasers and the agents, two inferences arise. First, that at the time
of auction, the intending purchasers are in a position to form a reason-
'able estimate of the return which they are likely to have for the year
concerned from that particular unit or units for which they offered E
the rates. Second, that if the purchase price wore to be fixed not on
the basis of any estimated annual yield from a particular unit but on
the basis of the quantity actually delivered, the risk of loss or leakage
of public revenue by reason of fraud and collusion between the pur-
chasers and the agents will manifestly increase. Looked at from this
angle also, against the real factual background, the impugned Condition
13 cannot be said to be unreasonable.
"t'-- Mr. Nariman contended that if the factual position, ~s stated in the
counter-affidavit filed on behall of the State, is correct, then the im-
pugned condition 13 will be hit by the ratio of this Court's decisions
in Rashbihari Panda etc. v. State of Orissa (ibid) and Akadasi
Padhan's case (ibid), bec:iuse in that situation the conclusion would
be ineluctable that the monopoly is being worked by the State not for
• its exclusive benefit or in the public interest but to benefit a class of
profiteers comprised of the purchasers al]d their agents, thereby creat-
ing a monopoly within a monopoly.
In ord~r to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to notice H
Rashbihari Panda's case. To regulate trade in Kendu leaves and pre-
vent exploitation of growers and pluckers, the State of Orissa enacted
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 s.c.R.

A
•
the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act. 1961. By Section
3 of that Act, which is analogous to Section 3 of the Bihar Act, no
person other than the Government, an authorised officer of the
•
Government, or an agent appointed by the Government, is entitled to
purchase or transport Kendu leaves; and under Section 4 of that Act,
8 the Government is authorised to fix the price at which the leaves shall
be purchased from the growers by the officer or agent of the Govern-
ment. Section 10 of that Act provided that the Kelldu leaves pur-
chased shall be sold or disposed of in such manner as the Government
may direct, and under Section 11, at least one-half of the net profits
derived by the G~vernment is to ~ ~aid to Samitis and Gram Pancha- __. <
c yats. In Akadas1 Padhan's case (1b1d), a grower of Kendu leaves '
challenged Sections 3 and 4 and Rule 7 ( 5) made under that Act on
•
the ground that it contravened his fnndamental right under Articles
14 and 19 (1 )(a) and ( g) in this Court. It was heW that Sections 3
and 4 did not infringe Article 19(6) (ii), but the State Government
was incompetent to implement the provisions of the Act and give effect
D
to its monopoly, because the agents appointed were not really agents
pf the Government but were authorised to carry on trade in the leaves
purchased not on behalf of the Government but on their own account,
and that it thus gave rise to a monopoly in favour of the agents which
was not protected by Article 19(6)(ii) since the Jaw cannot be used
by tffe State for the private benefit of agents. After the decision in
A k"'lasi Padhan' s case, the Orissa State made some changes in the
implementation of its monopoly. fn 1966, it invited tenders from
persons desirous of purchasing Kendu leaves purchased by the officers
and agents of the Government. During the years 1966 and 1967, the
prices of Kendu leaves ruled very high and when sales were effected
F by public auction, prices considerably in excess of those at which
tenders were accepted were realised. Early in 1968, the State evolved
another scheme under which, it offered to renew the licences of those .
trad•ors who in the State's view had worked satisfactorily in the pre- "i
vioys year and had paid the amounts due from them regularly. The
scheme was objected to, and realising that, the scheme arbitrarily ex-
G cluded many persons interested in the trade, a'nd hence was objection- '
able, the Government decided to invite offers for advance purchases
of Kendu leaves but restricted the invitation to those individuals who
had carried out the contracts in the previous year without default and
•
to the satisfaction of the Government that is, the existing contractors
w;ore given the exclusive right to make offers to purchase Kendu leaves.
H This new method of offering to enter into agreements for advance
purchases of Kendu leaves by private offers in preference to open
competition, was challenged by writ petitions ill the High Court as
) BIRI, LEAVES v, BIHAR (Sarkaria, J,) 437

violative of the petitioner's fund:i,rnental rights under Articles 14 and A
19(1 )(g).

Reversing the decision of the High Court, this Court, in appeal,
held,
The validity of a law by which the Stats- assumed the
monopoly to trade in a giwn commodity has to be judged by B
lhe test whether the entire benefit arising therefrom is to
cnure to the State, and the monopoly is not used as a cloak
for conferring private benefit upon a limited class of persons.
~··
The monopoly of purchasing Kendu leaves under Section 3
may be held to be valid .if, it be administered only for the
• benefit of the State. Similarly, the right to sell or dispose of
c
Kcndu leaves by the State under Section 10, in such ma·n-
ner as the Government may direct, would be valid if it be
exercised in public interest and not to s~rve the private in-
terest' and not to serve the private interests of any person or
class of persons. The profit resulting from the sale must be
D
for the public benefit and not for private gain. Section 11
also emphasises the concept that the machinery of sale or
disposal of the leaves must also be geared to serve the public
interest. If the scheme of disposal creates a class of middle-
men who could purchase from the Government at con-
cessioruil rates and earn large profits disproportionate to the E
nature of the service rendered or duty performed by them,
it cannot claim the prot~ti{)n of Article 19(6)(ii) as it is
not open to the Government to create a monopoly in favour
of third parties from its own monopoly.
(Head-note.of the Official Report)
F
)I . .:it was further held ·
"The right to make offers bei11g open to a limited class
of persons the schemes effectively shut out all other persons
carrying on trade in Kendu leaves as well as new entrants
into the trade. Both the schemes, evolved by the Govern- G
4 ment, namely, the one of offering to entt~r into contracts with
certain named licencees, and the other of inviting tenders
from licencees who had in the previous year carried out their
contracts satisfactorily gave rise to a monopoly in the trade
in the leaves to certain traders and singled out other traders
for discriminating treatment. Therefore, they were violative II
of the fundamental right of the Jl'"titioners under Articles 14
and 19 (1 )(g) and as the schemes were not 'integrally and
• 12-51 SCI/81
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.
'
A essentially' conp.ected wi!h the creation of the monopoly,
they were not protected by Article 19(6)(ii).
It was further observed that if the only anxiety of the Government
was to ensiire due performance by those who submitted tenders, Gov-,
ernment could devise adequate safeguards. But the classification
B based on the circumstance that certrun existing contractors had carried
out their obligation in the previous year regularly and to the satisfac-
tion of the Government, is not based on any real and substantial dis-
tinction bearing w just and reasonable relation to the objects sought to
be achieved namely, the effective execution of the monopoly in public
interest, the prevention of exploitation of pluckers and growers of ~
C Kendu leaves, or the securing of the fuJJ benefit from the trade, to the
State.
•
On the basis of this reasoning, it was finally held that the scheme
could not be supported on the ground that it imposed reasonable restric- •
lions, within the meaning of Article 19 ( 6), on the fu.ndamental rights
D of traders to carry on business in Kendu leaves. Hence, the plea that
the action of the Government was bona fide could not be an effective
answer to that challenge.
It may be noted that the decision of this Court in Rashbihari's case
(ibid) was announced on January 16, 1969. The Bihar Act, with
which we are concerned, was passed in 1_973. The Bihar Legislature,
E therefore could not but be aware of the unconstitutional features point-
ed out by this Court in the schemes of the Orissa Act and the Rules
framed thereunder. Care has been taken by the Bihar Legislature, and
the Government to exercise the scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules
and Forms framed or prescribed thereunder, of the vices from which
F the schemes of Orissa Legisl,ation suffered. This will be clear from a '
cCllD.parative study of the Orissa schemes and the Bihar scheme. Firstly,
under the Orissa schemes, the monopoly was not being worked for the "\
entire benefit of the State or in the general public interest, but was being
used as a cloak for conferring private benefit upon a limited class of
persons. The offers for purchasing Kendu leaves were restricted to a
G particular class of contractors and were not open to the general public.
This vice does not exist in the Bihar scheme including the scheme of
the impugned provisions. The notified estimate annual yield for a
unit or units is sold either by inviting tenders from the public by publish-
ing a Tender Notice or by public auction after a similar notice. Any

H
person .who wants to carry on the business of purchasing Kendu leaves
for the purpose or manufacture of Bidis is entitled to submit his offer
.
in the prescribed Tender Form in response to the public notice inviting
tenders, or offer his bid at the auction, if the disposal is by public
BIR! LEAVES v. BJJfAR (Sarkaria, J.) 439

auction. Secondly, the scheme of disposal envisaged by the impugned A
provisions of the Orissa Act and the Orissa rules created a class of
middlemen who could purchase from the Government at concessional
rates and earn large profits disproportionate to the service rendered
or duty perfomI_ed by them. In contrast with t)lis, the Bihar scheme
in question does not operate to cre'!lte any monopoly in favour of any
particular class of purchasers. Nor does the Bihar scheme enable the B
purchasers to make unduly large profits at the cost of the public revenue
or others. Even if the agents, in actual practice, are persons sponsored
by the purchasers, then also, the rules_ framed under the Bihar Act
envisage a strict and exclusive control of the Government over the
Agents and their activities, and provide for their liability to compensate c
• the Government for the loss occasioned by their mlsconduct or neglect.
Under the impugned Condition 13, the minimum price payable for
the unit or units concerned by a purchaser is 75 per cent <JI the notifi-
• ed estimated yield from that Ul)jt or units, in terms of standard bags
multiplied by the rates or bid offered by the purchaser and accepted
by the Government, even if the actual yield from that unit or units falls D
short of 75 per cent of the estimated yield. This condition far from
creating a monopoly in the trade in favour of middlemen, operates as
an ironclad safeguard against leakage of the public revenue by assur-
ing a minimum return to the public exchequer from the sale of Kcndu
leaves. The provision is aimed to secure the full benefit from the trade
to the State leaving chances of making reasonable, marginal profit lo the E
purchasers.

It was observed in Rashbihari's case, that it would be in the interest
of Stale to invite tenders in the open market from all persons irrespec-
tive of their having taken contracts in the previous year. This sugges-
tion has been adopted by the scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules
3ud the Forms of Tender Notice and Agreement prescribed thereunder.
)t Some other defects pointed out by this Court in the operation of the
< Orissa schemes, were that the Government had not estimated the crop
and the prevailing prices of Kendu leaves about the time when offers
were made, nor the conditions in the market, nor offers of higher prices
and. the likelihood of offerors of higher prices carrying out their obli- G
. gations. The scheme of the Bihar Act and .the Rules, and Forms in-
ducting that of the impugned condition 13 is designed to remove the
deficiencies, infirmities and vices pointed out by this Court in Rash~
bihari's case. · ··

For these reasons, we are unable to accept the contention, that in -it
actual operation, the impugned provision (clause 13) creates a moiio-
poly in favour of a class of midd/emeh consisting of 'Agents' and pur-
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981) 2 S.C.R.
'
A cbase£S, and enables them to earn unduly l'Jrge profits at the cost of
the public or pluckers and growers. •

The impugned Condition 13 satisfies the test of reasonableness
under the first part of Article 19(6). We, therefore, repel the challenge
·to the validity of that condition on the ground of Article 19 ( 6).
B
The next question is whether the impugned provisions arc violati"'
of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 14 of tht:
Constitution. The argument is that these provisions treat unequal·;
as equals, even where crying dissimilarities exist and thus their opera-
tion results in Procrustean cruelty. ~
c
The point sought to be made out is that even if the shortfall in the
quantity supplied or the substandard nature of the quality offered to
the purchaser is solely due to the fraud, negligence or misconduct of
the Agent or sefV'ant of the Government, the Joss due to such shortfall
•
or deficiency in quality must fall on the purchaser, notwithstanding the
D fact that he {purchaser) was in no way privy or contributory to that
fraud, negligence or misconduct of the Agent or Government servant
and thus the impugned provisions do not make any discerning distinc-
tion between honest purchasers and dishonest purchoasers, but tar those
dissimilarly situated classes with one and the same brush. The argu-
ment though attractive, does not stand a close examination.
-
At the time of inviting Tenders in the prescribed Form or inviting:
purchasers to bid at the publication, all tendercrs or bidders are treated
equally in the sense that they can offer their rates or bids subject to the
statutory conditions including the impugned provisions. While accept-
ing the highest Tender of rates per standard bag or the highest bid, it
is not possible to classify the purchasers whose offers/bids have been
accepted into 'honest' purchasers and 'dishonest' purchasers. Every- "'-,
body whose offer or hid is accepted, is assumed to be honest.

Secondly, in entering into a contract of purchase of the notified
G estimated yield in terms of standard bags, the discretion and volition
of the tenderer or bidder, also, plays an important part in calculating
the minimum price payable for the estimated yield from the particular
unit. According to the impµgned Condition 13 of the Tender Notice.
which also forms a part of the prcstribed Form in which tenders are
invited, the successful tenderer or bidder whose tender or bid is
H ~ccepted by the Department, has to pay a minimum royalty. also
described as 'revenue' or price, which will be 75 per cent of the notified
!estimated yield iri terms of stanpard bag by the tenderer or bidder .

•
BIR! LEAVES v. BllIAR (Sarkaria, I.) 441

Thus, the volition of the purchaser lllso plays a prominent part in A
lilting the rate or price payable by him. By means of his offer in the
Ten<Jer Form p'r by bidding at the auction, the purchaser binds him-
self to pay this minimum royalty even if by the _end' of the year, the
number of bags collected is less than the notified estimated yield, Tli.c'
pui:chasers form their own estimates of the expected yield from a!.
pw:ticular unit for a particular year and then make their offers· of' Ii
rates in the prescribed Tender Forrn, or when the dis¢sal is by public
auction, the purchasers make their bids stlbjeCt to the terms publisJied

- iu the· Tender or Auction Notices. H, according to the estim_ate of an·
f intending purchaser, the unit concerned· is not likely to yield th'e'
qlllllltity notified, it is open to him' eitliet not to submit any tehder or
ofl'er or rates at all, or not to offer a· bid- or an amount higher' than· c
that which, according to his own estimate or calculaJion, wpuld be
• a reas-onabfo price of the bargain. Iti oilier words, if a person with
his' eyes open tenders the highest riltes per standard bag or offers tlie'
highest bid at public auction, as the case may be, of his owti accilril,
it will be assumed that he did so because· in his own estimation' the D
acceptance of the contract at those rates and S'Ubject to the notified

- terms and condition would afford him a reasonable scppe for making.
profit. Furthermore, under the schenie of. the Bihar Act and. RultlB',
the sale is not restricted to any particular class of persons as in Rash-
bihari's case. Anyone who wants to do busi!!ess of purchase of Kendu
leaves can submit h'R tender of rates in the prescribed Form, or offer E
his bid at the auction, as the case may be, subject to the notified con"
ditions of th~ Tender Notice/Auction Notice.

If is a fundamental principle of general application that if a pel'Son
of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out
• the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of F'
~me terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and'
! rtjindiale the other terms of the same contract which might be dis-
adv~ntagcous to him. The maxim is qui approbat non reprobat,
-• (due who approbates cannot reprobate). this principle, though
originally borrowed from Scots Law, is now firmly embodied in
English Common L1W. According !o it, Ii party to an instfument or
• transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or trans·
acti'on and reject the rest. That is to say, no party can accept and
G

reject the S11me instrument or transaction (Per Scrufton L,J. Verschu-
res Creameries, Lid. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co.('}; See
Douglas Menzies v. Umphelhy('); See also &roud's Judicial Dictionary,
Vol. I, page 169, 3rd Edn.).
(I) [192112KB.608.
• (2) [1908] A.C. 224 at r. 2n.
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A The aforesaid inhibitory principle squarely applies to the cases of
those petitioners who had by offering highest bids at public auctions· •
or by Tenders, accepted and worked out the contracts in the past but
are now resisting the demands or other action, arising out of the im- ·
pugned Condition 13 on the ground that this condition is violative of
Articles 19 (1 )(g) and 14 of the Constitution. In this connection, it
B will bear repetition, here, that the impugned conditions though bear a ·
statutory complexion, retain $eir basic contractual characte& also. It
is true that a person cannoJ be debarred from enforcing his fnnda-·
menal rights on the gronnd of estoppel or waiver. But the aforesaid
principle which prohibits a party to a transaction from approbating, a: ~
part of its conditions and rep~o'bating the rest, is different from the
c doctrine of estoppel or waiver) .

. For the foregoing reasons, the challege to the impugned Condi-
ti&n No. 13, ou the ·ground of Article 14, also, is unsustainable and
is rejected .

D . Now, we take up the impugned Condition 4 (bb). It provides
that no objection from the purcha5er with regard to the quantity or
quality of the leave in the gaddis (bundles) offered would be tenable.
This condition is couched in peremptory, drastic and absolute langu~ ·
age. It is not qualified by any words showing that the bar envisaged
in· it will be attracted only in cases where the purchaser has had an
-
E earlier opportunity to raise thi5 objection but failed to do so, or,
where he had on an earlier occasion raised such an objection which ·
was heard and overruled by the competent Forest Officer. We have
already noticed that Section 9 ( 1 ) , proviso, of the Act contains a
bnilt-in-warranty, that the Kendu leaves offered would be fit for
manufacture of bldis; that is to say, the leaves would be of mercruint~
F able quality. Condition 4(bb) therefore, is inconsistent with and ' ·
repugnant to Section 9(1), proviso of the Act and, as such, invalid'.
It is, therefore, not necessary to test its validity on the ground· of
Articles 19 and 14 of the Constitution.
•
In the light of the above discussion, we would dismiss all the Writ
G petitions, namely, Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, Writ Peti-
tions 121 to 125 of 1979, Writ Petitions 405 and 441 of 1974, Writ
Pe1itions 46 and 47 of 1975, excepting to this extent that the aforesaid
clause 4(bb) in the Tender Notices and the statutory Agreement in
question. being inconsistent with the proviso to Section 9 (I) of the
Act, is declared to be invalid.
H
In Criminal Appeal 300 of 1974, the prose<:ution of the appellants
for an offence under Section 3 79, Penal Code has already been quash- •
BIRI LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, !.) 443

ed by the High Court by its judgment dated February 14, 1974; but A
• the Ord~r dated September 11, 1973 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Saheb Ganj, taking cognizance of a case instituted by the Divisional
Forest Officer, Dumka, for offences under Section 409, Penal Code
and Section 5(2) read with Section 16 of the Bihar Kendu Leaves
(Control of Trade) Ordinance ( 46 of 1973) was not quashed.
B
The main co'ntention of appellant 1, Shankar Prasad Bhagat, was
that he received only 650 standard bags as against the notified esti-
mated 1500 bags, and the Condition 13 of the statutory Agreement
- under which he was required to pay for the undelivere_d or unoflered
quantity of the leaves was unconstitutional .
• c
Since we have held that the aforesaid Condition 13 is valid, this
contention must fail. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. The case
shall now go back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for disposal in
accordance with law. We advisedly abstain from making any obser·
vation with regard to the merits of the case.

- N.K.A. Petitions and Appeal dismissed.

•

"

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