Supreme Court of India
NYADAR SINGH & ANR.versusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.
- Citation
- 1988 INSC 236
- Decided
- 23 August 1988
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- RANGANATH MISRA
Holding
Reduction in rank cannot be imposed on a directly recruited government servant to a post lower than his original recruitment unless the lower post is in the line of promotion, and the penalties were set aside.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined two appeals by government servants, Nyadar Singh and M.J. Ninama, who had been punished with "reduction in rank" under Rule 11(vi) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, to posts lower than those to which they were directly recruited. The appellants contended that such a reduction violated the rule and Article 311(2) of the Constitution, which protects against arbitrary reduction in rank. The Court held that "reduction in rank" refers to a demotion within the hierarchical structure and cannot be imposed to a post that the servant has never held unless the lower post is in the line of promotion (a feeder service). It further ruled that the statutory language must be read in harmony with service‑law principles and that allowing unrestricted demotion would create anomalous and unreasonable situations. Consequently, the penalties were set aside, the appellants were restored to their original posts, and no salary difference was payable for the period spent in the reduced posts. The appeals were disposed of in favour of the appellants.
Issues considered
- Whether Rule 11(vi) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 permits a disciplinary authority to reduce a directly recruited government servant to a post lower than the one to which he was initially recruited.
- Whether such a reduction, if permissible, must be limited to a post that is in the line of promotion (a feeder service).
- Interpretation of the expression "reduction in rank" under Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
Legislation cited
- Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965s. Rule 11(vi)
- Constitution of Indias. Article 311(2)
Subjects
reduction in rankdisciplinary actionservice lawArticle 311statutory interpretationdirect recruitmentpenaltycivil service
Judgment
(
'
A NYADAR SINGH & ANR.
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
AUGUST 23, 1988
B [RANGANATH MISRA AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.)
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1966: Rule ll(vi)-Government servant-Directly recruited to a par-
ticular post-Whether can be reduced to a post lower in rank to the one
that he was directly recruited.
c
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 311(2)-'Reduction in
rank'-Whether a government servant by way of punishment/penalty
can be reduced in rank to a post lower than that to which he was
recruited directly-All reversions from higher post are not necessarily
reduction in rank. . · ·
0
Statutory Interpretation: Consequences do not alter statutory
language-They only help to fix its meaning.
Pursuant to separate discipliuary proceedings the penalty of
R 'reduction in rank' was imposed on the appellants, Nyadar Singh and
M.J. Ninama, reducing each of them to a post lower than the one to
which they were directly recruited.
The Central Administrative Tribunals rejected the appellants'
challenge to the orders imposing the penalty.
Before this Court, the appellants' contention was that as a result
of the imposition of the penalty, they were reduced in rank to posts
lower than the one to which they were initially recruited, which on a
proper construction of Rule 11 of the Central Civil Services (Classilica-
tion, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 was not permissible.
The Additional Solicitor General, on the other hand, contended
that this limirotion which might be appropriate in the case of a 'rever-
sion', was inappropriate in a case of 'reduCtion in rank' imposed as a
penalty. The argument was that 'reduction ill rank' had a wider import
than 'reversion' and there was no reason why the power to impose this
· H penalty which was permissible on the plain language of the· Rule, be
whittled d~wn by any other consideration.
54il
NYADAR SINGH v. U.0.1. 547
Disposing of the appeals, it was,
A
HELD: (1) The meaning to be given to a particular statutory
language depends on the evaluation of a number of interpretative-
criteria. Shorn of the context, the words by. themselves are 'slippery
customers'. The general presumption is that these criteria do not
detract or stand apart from, but are to be harmonised with, the well B
accepted legal principles. Considerations relevant to interpretation are
not whether a differently conceived or worded statute would have
_yielded results more consonant with fairness and reasonableness. Con-
sequences do not alter the statutory language, but might only help to fix
its meaning. [555H; 556A-B, G-H]
(2) The expression 'rank', in 'reduction in rank' has, for pur- c
poses of Article 311(2), an obvious'referen~e to the stratification of the
posts or grades or categories in the official hierarchy. It does not refer
to the mere seniority of the Government Servant in the same class or
grade or category. [552B-C] ·
D
. (3) The penalty of 'reduction in rank' of a Gbvernment servant
initially recruited to a higher time-scale, grade, service or post to a
lower time-scale, grade, service or post virtually amounted to his
removal from the higher post and the substitution of his recruitment to
lower post, affecting the policy of recruitment itself. In conceivable
cases, the Government servant might not have the qualification requi- E
site for the post which might require and involve different, though not
necessarily higher, skills and attainment. [551B-C, 557G] ·
[Worthington v. Robin, [1896] 75 Law Times Reports 446, refer-
red to.]
F
(4) Rule 11 must he read in consonance with general principles
and so construed the expression 'reduction' in it would not admit of a
wider meaning. [557H; 558A]
\
Babaji Charan Rout v. State of Orissa, [1982] 1 SLJ 496;
Shivalingaswamy v. State of Karna/aka, [1985] ILR ·Kar. ,1453; G
_.approved.
Gopal Rao V• C.J. T., [1976] 2 MLJ 508; Mahendra Kumar v.
Union of India, [1984] l All India Ser. Law Journal 34; (1985) 1 SLR 1
161; S.N. Dey v. Union of India, [1983] 2 SLJ All. 114; C.S.
Balakumar v. The Inspecting Asst/. Commissioner of Income Tax, H
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A [ 1987] l All India SLJ 18, over-ruled.
P. V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller & Auditor General of India,
[1979] 3 SLR 509 and Hussain Sasan Saheb Kaldgi v. State of
Maharashtra, [1987] AIR SC 1627, referred to.
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3003
of 1988.
From. the Judgment and Order dated 8/9th April, 1986 of the
Central Al:iministrative Tribunal, New Delhi in R.A. No. 2 of 1986 in
TA No. T-564 of 1985.
a
AND
Civil Appeal No. 889 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.86 and 5.11.1986 in
0 the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad in O.A. No. 103 of
1986.
J.S. Bali and L.R. Singh for the Appellant in C.A. No. 3003 of
1988.
K.M.K. Nair for the Appellant in C.A. No. 889 of 1988.
Kuldi.p Singh, Additional Solicitor General, A. Subba Rao,
C.V .S. Rao and Heman! Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATACHALIAH, J. The special leave petition and the
appeal-by two Central-Government-servants-raise an interesting
point of construction of a service Rule whether a Disciplinary Autho-
rity can, under Sub-Rule (vi) of Rule 11 of the Central Civil Service
(} (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, (Rules for short),
impose the penalty of reduction on a Government Servant, recruited
directly to a particular post, to a post lower than that to which he was
so recruited; and if such a reduction is permissible, whether the reduc-
tion could only be to a post from which under the relevant Recruit-
ment Rules promotion to the one to which the Government servant
~ , was directly recruited.
NYADAR SINGH v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.l 549
The petition and appeal are directed against the orders dated·
8/9-4-1986 of the Cential Administrative Tribunal, Delhi, and the A
order dated 29.10.1986 of the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Gujarat, respectively, ~ffirming the orders of the Disciplinary
Authorities imposing on the petitioner and the appellant the penalty of
reduction .in rank to post lower than the one to which both of them
were initially recruited. B
There is a divergence of judicial opm1on amongst the High
Courts on the point: The Division Benches of the Orissa and
Karnataka High Courts have held that such a reduction in rank is not
possible at all. [See: Babaji Charan Rout v. State of Orissa and Ors.,
[1982] 1 SU 496; Shivalingaswamy v. State of Karnataka, [1985] ILR
Kar. 1453]. c
However, the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Allahabad High
Courts have held that there is no limitation on the power to impose
such a penalty. [See: Copa/ Rao v. C.I.T., [1976] 2 MU 508;
Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India, [1984] 1 All India Ser. Law Jour. D
34; S.N. Dey v. Union of India & Ors., [1983] 2 SU All. 1141. The
Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, in C.S. Balakumar v. The
Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1987] 1 All India SU
18 has also subscribed to this view.
There is yet a third view, as typified in P. V. Srinivasa Sastry v. E
Comptroller&.Auditor General of India, [1979] 3 SLR 509 and the one
taken by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the case from which
the Special Leave Petition arises, that such a reduction in rank is
permissible provided that promotion from the post to which th~ Gov-
_ernment servant is reduced to the post from which he was so reduced is
permissible, or, as it has been put, the post to which the Government F
servant· is reduced is "in the line of pro!llotion" and is a "feeder-
service".
Special leave is granted in SLP (C) 9509 of 1986. Both the cases
are taken up for final hearing, heard and disposed of by this common
Judgment. G
2. A brief advertailce to the facts of the cases is necessary.
SLP (C) 9506 of 1986 is by a certain Nyadar Singh, the unsuccess-
ful petitioner before the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi,
and is directed against that the Tribun_al's order No. T-564/85 (SBCWP H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A N0.· 1747/80) dated 28th February, 1986, rejecting his challenge to the
order dated 4th Sept., 1976, of the disciplinary authority imposing a
penalty of 'reduction in rank' reducing the petitioner from the post of
Assistant Locust Warning Officer to which he was recruited directly on
31.10.1960 and confirmed on 27.12.1971 to that of Junior Technical
Assistant pursuant to certain disciplinary proceedings held against
B him. In 1974, he was working as an Assistant Locust Warning Officer
at Nohar. On 4.11.1975 in respect of certain acts alleged to constitute
misconduct on his part certain disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against him which culminated in the order dated 4.9.1976 imposing the
aforesaid penalty. The statutory appeal before the appellate authority
was, dismissed on 24.4.1979. Thereafter he filed a writ petition before
the Delhi High Court which, after the coming into force of the Central
C Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, stood transferred t6 and was dis-
posed of by the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi, by its
order dated 28.2.1986, now under appeal. It is relevant to mention
that in the year 1981, after the period of penalty of five years had spent
itself out, the appellant was re-promoted to the post of Assistant
D Locust Warning Officer.
Civil Appeal No. 88\1 of 1988 is by M.J. Ninama, an Upper
Division Clerk in the Post & Telegraph Circle Office, Ahmedabad,
preferred against the order No. OA 103 of 1986 dated 29.10.1986 of
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad, rejecting appel-
B !ant's challenge to the legality and correctness of the order dated
15.5.1988 of the Post Master General who in modification of the
earlier orders imposing a penalty of compulsory retirement on him,
substituted in its place the order imposing the penalty of 'reduction in
rank' to the post of Lower Division Clerk pursuant to the findings
recorded against the appellant on the charge of accepting illegal
F gratification. Appellant had been directly recruited as an Upper Divi-
sion Clerk 'in the Office of the Post Master General, Gujarat Circle;
Ahmedabad. He was reduced to the lower post of Lower Division
Clerk until he was found fit after a period of five years from 15.5.1986.
However, the appellant's seniority on re-promotion was directed to be
fixed at what it·would have been, without the reduction.
G
4. We have heard Shri J.S. Bali, learned counsel for the
appellant-Nyadar Singh and Shri K.M.K. Nair, learned counsel for the
appellant-Ninama; and Shri I\:,uldip Singh, learned Additional
Solicitor General for the respondents in both the appeals.
hi 5. Rule 11 of the 'Rules' enumerates the penalties which may for
NYADAR SINGH v. U.0.1. IVENKATACHALIAH, J.] 551
good and sufficient. reasons be imposed on a Government servant.
A
Sub-rule (vi) of Rule 11 provides:
"11. The following penalties may, for good and suffi-
cient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a
Government servant namely:
B
Minor penalties: Omitted as irrelevant here.
Major penalties:
(v) ......... .
(vi) reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, c
post or Service which shall ordinarily be a bar tolthe pro-
motion of the Government servant to the time-scale of pay,
grade, post or Service from which he was reduced, with or
without further directions regarding conditions of the
restoration to that grade, or post or Service from which the D
Government servant was reduced and his seniority and pay .
on such restora~ion to that grade, post or Service;"
According to the contention of the appellants' learned counsel,
the appellants were, as a result of the imposition of the penalty,
reduced in 'rank to a post lower than the one to which they were E
initially recruited, which on a proper construction of the Rule, is not
permissible. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in
Hussain Sasan Sahed Kaldgi v. State of-Maharashtra, [1987) AIR SC
1627.
Shri Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, however, con- F
.tended that this llln.itation which may be appropriate in the case of a
'rev.ersion' which, as the very concept implies, could not be to a post
which the Government servant did not earlier hold, is inappropriate in
..a case of reduction in rank imposed as a penalty. Reduction in rank,
according to learned Additional Solicitor General, has a wider import
than 'reversion' and there is no reason why the power to impose. this G
penalty which is permissible on the plain language of the Rule be
whittled down by any other consideration. The learned Additional
.... Solicitor General sought to rely upon certain pronouncements of the
High Courts.
6. The import of the expression 'Reducton in rank' has been J:!
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A examined in the context of the constitutional protection afforded to
Government servants under Article 311(2) in relation to the three
major penalties of 'dismissal', 'removal' and 'reduction in rank' and
the constitutional safeguards to be satisfied before the imposition of
these three major penalties. In Article 311(2) the penalty of "reduc-
tion in rank" is classed along with 'dismissal' and 'removal' for the
B
reason that the penalty of reduction in rank has the effect of removing
a Government servant from a class or grade or category of post to a
lessor class or grade or category. Though the Government servant is
retained in service, however, as a result of the penalty he is removed
from the post held by him either temporarily or permanently and
retained in service in a lesser post. The expression 'rank', in 'reduction
in rank' has, for purposes of Article 311(2), an obvious reference to
the stratification of the posts or grades or categories in the official
hierarchy. lt does not refer to the mere seniority of the Government
Servant in the same class or grade or category. Though reduction in
rank, in one sense, might connote the idea of reversion from a higher
post to a lower post, all reversions from a higher post are not necessa-
D rily reductions in rank. A person working in a higher post, not substan-
tively, but purely on an officiating basis may, for valid reasons, be
Teverted to his substantive post. That would not, by itself, be reduction
in rank unless circumstances of the reversion disclose a punitive-
element.
R The submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General in
substance, is that while 'reversion' envisages that the lower post to
which the Government servant is reverted should necessarily be
amongst those earlier held by him and from which he had come up on
promotion, the idea of reversion being a mere antonym of promo-
tion-the importing· of such a limitation into a case of "reduction in
F
rank" imposed as a penalty would be doing violence of the express
statutory language and an unwarranted fettering of the power of the
disciplinary authority. The idea of reduction in rank, says the learned
Additional Solicitor General, is much wider than the idea of reversion
and there is no justification to whittle down the ambit of this expres-
sion consciously employed by the rule-making-authority. Such a con-
struction would create more difficulties than it might appear to solve
and become counter-productive in the sense that even where the
disciplinary-authority desires to retain a Government servant in
service, though not in the same post but in a lower one, the Authority "'·
would be rendered helpless by such a construction being placed in the
H R:ule.
NYADAR SINGH v. U.0.1. [VENKATACH.ALIAH, J.] 553
The argument in favour of this construction of the Rule is stated
A
by a learned Single Judge in Copa/ Rao's case (supra) thus: . .
•
." ..... In effect, what the learned counsel says is that
there is no difference between the order of reversion and
an order of reduction in rank, that it is well established that
reversion can be only to a .post which a person held earlier B
and that reduction alsn can only be to a post or class of
service which 'the person ~ccupied at any time before
'•
In .my view, the expression "reduction in
rank" covers a wider field than reversion to.a lower post. It
is true, the word "reversion" always connotes "a return to C
the original post or place." But the word "reduction" has
no such limitation and therefore, reduction in rank extends
even to a rank which the officer concerned never held
D
Similar view has been. iaken by a learned Single JUdge of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court ih Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India
and Anr., [ 1985) 1SLR 181:
.. . . . . . The Central Civil Service (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules provide for several penalties E
which can be imposed for good and sufficient reasons. One
of the major penalties contemplated by Rule 11 is "reduc-
tion to a lower ..... grade, post or service ..... ", and I
see no reason why this penalty cannot be imposed upon a
person who, on ihe date of imposition of penalty, is con-
'· tinuing in the same post to which he was appointed by F
direct recruitment. This is not a case of reyersion of a
Government servant to his substantive post for want of
vacancy or otherwise, but this is a case of reduction by way
Of punishment. I am unable to read any limitation upon the
power of the disciplinary authority to impose this punish-
ment on the petitioner, as suggested. No decision has also G.
been brought to my notice· supporting-this contention
,,
It must, however, be observed that in the above case the Hlgh
Court ,upheld the chiillenge of the ap_pellant that ihere was no miscon-
duct at all. The other observations as to the scope of the Rule were, H
•
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A therefore, unnecessary for the decision of the case.
7. The opposite view is taken by the Orissa High Court in Babaji
Charan Rout v. State of Orissa and Ors., [198l] ! All India SLJ 496 and
by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Shivalingaswamy
v: State of Karnataka, 11985] ILR Kar. 1453. In the first case, there is
ij no discussion of the matter as the Division Bench merely followed an
earlier unreported decision of another Division Bench of the same
High Court. In the Karnataka case, a person who had be.en directly
recruited as "Village-Accountant" had been reduced by the Discip-
linary Authority to the post of "daftarband". The Division Bench
interpreting an analogous rule in the State's Service Rules, held the
C reduction impermissible, observing:
" . . . . . Rule 8( v) of the Karnataka Civil Services
(Classification,· Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, as
amended, in our opinion, does not justify such an action. It
will lead to most unreasonable results if a person directly
II> recruited to a post is reduced to a post which he never came
to hold in service. That is not the scheme of the CCA Rules
and therefore we nave no hesitation in holding that the
Deputy Commissioner had no competence to impose the
penalty of reducing the appellant to the post of Daftar-
band-Attender when in fact he entered service only as Vil-
lage Accountant. If the disciplinary authority felt that the
gravity of the charges proved warrants that the appellant
should be removed from service it was open to the
authorities to make an order either dismissing or removing
him from service ..... "
f 8. The third view of the matter which while holding such a
reduction is permissible, but subject to the post to which the Govern-
ment servant is reduced being one from which promotion to the post
from which reduction is effected is permissible, is to be found in
Srinivasa Sastry's, case (supra) where Rama Jois, J. of the Karnatak'a
lligh Court held:
" . . . . . It is no doubt true that normally penalty of
•reduction in rank' is imposed only so as to bring down a
civil servant to a lower time scale, grade, service or post,
held earlier by' him before promotion and not below the
post, grade, service, or time-scale to which a civil servant
was directly recruited, and it appears, that it is also reason-
•
NYADAR SINGH v. U.0.1: (VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 555
able to do so. The learned counsel, however, could not
substantiate "the-point-with reference to the rule which
empowered the disciplinary authority to impose the pen-
alty of reduction in rank as it does not make any such
differentiation ..... "
[See 1979 3 SLR 509 at 515, para 9].
B
This is also the view taken by the Tribunal in the first of the
appeals now before us. The Tribunal held:
"12. In the light of the aforesaid discussion we find
that rule ll(vi) of the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, on its true construction C
permits reduction in rank in the case of a direct recruit if
the post to which he is reduced is in the line of promotion
i.e. is a feeder service ..... "
But as against this judicial-opinion in Srinivasa Sastry's case, tlie
learned Judge, as auther, [See 'Services under the State': Indian Law D
Institute, page 220] expressed the view:
"Therefore, it is reasonable to take the view that a
civil servant earns promotion by exhibiting· his merit and
ability and suffers reduction in rank instead 'of removal or
dismissal for misconduct or inefficiency during his service E
in the higher post unless he is unworthy of being retained in
the service and that the word 'reduction in rank' is used in
Article 311 in this sense. It appears that the punishment by
way of reduction in rank can be inflicted only against a civil
servant who held a lower post and who has been promoted
to.the higher post; ..... " F
9. The contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General
that when a legislative-authohty _uses the expression "reduction in .
rank" without imposing any limitations there is no justification to
fetter or otherwise limit the plenitude of the idea of 'reduction', looks,
at the first blush, seemingly plausible and even somewhat attractive. G
The view has commended itself for acceptance to some of the High
Courts and Tribunals. -
The meaning to be given to a partil:ular statutory language
depends on the evaluation of a number of interpretative-criteria.
1
Shorn of the context, the words by themselves are "slippery custo- H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
mers". The general presumption is that these criteria do not detract or
A
stand apart from, but are to be·harmonised with, the well accepted
legal-principles. hi a difficult case, the number of relevant interpre-
tative-criteria may be so high that the task of the court in assessing
their effect is, correspondingly, difficult. Even the statutory-language
apparently free from the sins of semantic ambiguity might not, in the
context of the purpose, connote or convey its lexicographic thrust; but
would acquire a different shade or colour imparted to it by the varia-
tions of the interpretation-criteria. The ambiguity need not necessarily
be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of appropriateness of the mean-
ing in a particular context. Francis Bennion in his "Statutory Interpre-
tation" refers to the nature of the task in weighing the factors: 1
c " ..... it is necessary for the interpreter to assess
the respective weights of the relevant interpretative factors
and determine which of the opposing constructions they
favour on balance ..... "
D "We may speak of the factors tending in .a::g:rtain
direction as a bundle of factors. This is figurative, but then
so is the idea of factors being 'weighed'. The court is
unlikely even to consider the factors one by one, and cer-
tainly will not proceed in any mechanistic way ..... "
"We find that one bundle of factors favours one of
the opposing constructions of the enactment, while the
other bundle favours the other construction. [As to oppos-
ing constructions sees. 84 of this Code.].
There may be factors drawn from .a single interpretative
F criterion in both bundles ..... "
[See 'Statutory Interpretatio_n' by Francis Bennion,
1984 Edn.-page 390]
It is true that where statutory language should be given its most 1.
<iJ obvious meaning- 'to accord with how a man in the street might
answer the problems posed by the words'-the Statute must be taken
as one finds it. Consideration relevant to interpretation are not
whether a differently conceived or worded statute would have yielded
results more consonant with fairness and reasonableness. Conse-
quences do not alter the statutory language, but may only help to fix its
.H meaning. ·
'_,...
NYADAR"SINGH v. U.O.L IVENK:'\TACHALlAH, J.J 557
10. As to whether a per5on initially recruited to a higher time- A
scale, grade or service or post can be reduced by way of punishment, to
a ·post in a lower time-scale, _grade, service or post which he :never
heJd beforeJ the _statutory-language authorises the imposition of pen-
alty does not, it is true, by itself impose any limitations. The question
is whether the interpretative-factors, relevant to the provision, impart
any such limitation. On a consideration of the relevant factors to which B
we will presently refer we musPllold that they do.
Though the idea of reduction may not be fully equivalent with
'reversion', there are certain assumptions basic to service law which
bring in the limitations of the latter on the former. The penalty of
reduction in rank of a Government servant initially recruited to a
'higher time-scale, grade, service or post to a lower time-scale, grade,
service or post virtually amounts to his removal from the higher post
and the substitution of his recruitment to lower post, affecting the
policy of recruitment itself.
In Worthington v. Robin, [1896] 75 Law Tinies Reports 446 D
where a supervisor of Inland Revenue was reduced in rank by statu-
tory authority, referring to the effect of reduction in ra'nk, though in a
different context, brought about by the order of the statutory autho-
rity, the Court of appeals understood the process 'as a dismissal from
the higher post' and reappointment to the lower post. Rigby, LJ
observed: E
" ..... I treat what has happened as a dismissal, be-
cause, though in effect he has been reduced to a lower
position, his new appointment is in fact a re-appointment.
If we could see any point in this action upon which there
might be a possibility of his succeeding, we should· be f
·most anxious-to give him the opportunity ..... "
But action was dismissed because the civil servant was holding
the office at the pleasure of the Commissioners under the Inland
Revenue Regulation Act governing the situation.
G
· There are, therefore, cerfain considerations of policy that might
militate against such a wide meaning to be given to the power. In
conceivable cases, the Government servant may not have the qualifi-
cations requisitefor the post which may require and involve different,
though not necessarily higher, skills and attainments. Here enter con-
siderations 'of the recruitment'policy. The rule must be read 'in con- H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ll988l Supp. 2 S.C.R.
sonance with the generai principles and so construed the expression
A
'.reduction' in it would not admit of a wider connotation. The power
should, of course, be available to reduce a civil servant to any lower
time-scale, grade, service or post from which he had subsequently
earned his promotion.
11. The Second, and perhaps equally relevant, consideration, is
the anomaly that a pushing to its logical limits of such power might
produce. In Sr{nivasa Sastry's case, (supra), the learned Judge of the
Karnataka High Court visualised these anomalies thus.
" ..... Acceptance of the contentions urged for the
respondents would lead to incongruous and absurd results.
c To illustrate, could a Doctor be reduced in rank to the post
of a Compounder, or an Engineer to the post of a Fitter, or
a Teacher in a High School to the post of a Peon, or a
Scientific Officer to the post of a ministerial officer, in the
absence of any provision in the rules for the consideration
Ii) of the case of the. civil servant concerned, for promotion
from the latter category to the former category? It appears
to me that on a fair and proper construction of rule l l(vi)
of the Rules, the condition precedent for the exercise of
power under that rule by way of imposing penalty of reduc-
tion in rank to a lower post is, that the higher post from
which the concerned-civil servant is sought to be reduced
must be a promotional post in relation to the lower post to
which he is sought to be reduced ..... [See 1979 3 SLR 509
at 516]."
The argument that the rule enables a reduction in rank to a post
F lower than the one to which the civil servant was initially recruited for
a specified-period and also enables restoration of the Government
servant to the original post, with the restoration of seniority as well,
and that, therefore, there is nothing anomalous about the matter, does
not, in our opinion, wholly answer the problem. It is at best one of the
criteria supporting a plausible view of the matter. The rule also
G enables an order without the stipulation of such restoration. The other
implications of the effect of the reduction as a fresh induction into a
lower grade, service or post not at any time earlier held by the Govern-
ment servant remain unanswered. Then-again, there is an inherent
anomaly of a person recruited to the higher grade or class of post being
asked to work in a lower grade which in certain conceivable cases
Hf might require different qualifications. It might be contended that these
NYADAR ·SINGH v. U.OJ. (VENKATACHAUAH, J.I SS9
anomalies could well be avoided by a judicious-choice of the penalty.In A
a given fact-situation and that these considerations are more matters to
be taken into account in tailoring-out the penalty than those limiting
the scope of the punitive power itself. But, an over-all view of the
balance of the relevant-criteria indicates that it is reasonable, to assume
that the rule-making-authority did not intend to chothe the dis-
ciplinary-authority with the power which would produce such anoma- B
lous and unreasonable situations. The contrary view taken by the High
Courts in the several decisions referred to earlier cannot be taken to
have laid down the principle correctly.
The pronouncement of this Court in Hussain Sasan Saheb Kaldgi
v. State of Maharashtra, !1987] AIR (SC) 1627 relied upon by the
appellant is one which deals w.ith a case of 'reversion'. Appellant in C
that case who, while working a~ a primary-teacher in the services of
the District Local Board, offered himself for and was selected by direct
recruitment to the post of the Asst. Deputy Educational Inspector.
But after four years he was sought to be reverted to the post of
primary-teacher. His suit for the declaration that the purported rever- D
sjon was illegal and void was decreed by the trial court, but was dismis-
sed by the High.Court in appeal. This court restored the decree of the
trial court. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor
General, the case dealt with the scope and limitations of the process of
'reversion· and is of no assistance in deciding the point under consi-
deration. But this does not m·ake any difference to the conclusion we · E
have reached.
13. The point now is as to what orders are to be made in these
·· appeals. Appellants in the two appeals have been reduced to posts
lower than these to which they were initially directly recruited. As
these penalties cannot be sustained in the view we take of the rule, in F
the normal course the penalties imposed would require to be set aside
and the disciplinary authority directed to re-consider which other pen- ·'
alty which it would now choose to impose. But, we are of the opinion
that it would be somewhat unfair that at this distance of time the
matters are re-opened. We think, having regard to all the circums-
tances of the cases the orders that commend themselves appropriate in G
the two cases are in terms following:
(i) In the first of the appeals, appellant-Nya!lar Singh, has, after
the period of the reduction in rank has spent itself out, been
restored to the original position. It would, therefore, be suffi-
cient to set aside the penalty imposed on him and direct that the H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A. period of service in the reduced post be treated as service in the
post held by him prior to imposition of the penalty, subject to the
condition, however, that the appellant shall not be entitled to
'any difference of salary for and during the period of reduction.
In view of this, we think ihat the proceedings taken against him
should come to an end and there is no need to remit the matter
B to the Disciplinary-Authority for selection and imposition of a
fres!) penalty.
(ii) In the case of M.J. Ninama the penalty of reduction i.n
rank is set aside and he shall be restored to the post which he'
held before the imposition of the penalty. However, for the
c period, if any, served by him in the lower post pursuant to the
penalty imposed on him, he shall not be entitled to the difference
of salary. It will also not be necessary to remit his case for fresh
consideration of the choice of the penalty having regard to the
lapse of time.
It is ordered and the appeals disposed of accordingly. No
costs.
R.S.S. Appeals disposed of.
'.
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