OM PRAKASH AMBADKARversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

          [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1469 : 2025 INSC 139

                 Om Prakash Ambadkar
                            v.
             The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
               (Criminal Appeal No. 352 of 2020)
                         16 January 2025
        [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]


                     Issue for Consideration
Magistrate passed an order under Section 156(3), Code of the
Criminal Procedure, 1973 directing registration of FIR against the
appellant-accused for the offences punishable under Sections 323,
294, 500, 504 & 506, Penal Code, 1860. Whether the High Court
was justified in affirming the said order and rejecting the petition
filed by the appellant under Section 482, Cr.P.C.

                             Headnotes†
Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.156(3) – Scope –
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.323, 294, 500, 504, 506 – On facts,
whether a case is made out to put the appellant to trial for
the alleged offences:
Held: No – Whenever any application is filed by the complainant
before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation
u/s.156(3), Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply
his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations
levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not –
However, in the present case, the Magistrate passed the order
directing police investigation mechanically without ascertaining
whether the allegations levelled disclose commission of any
offence or not – On facts, none of the ingredients to constitute the
offences punishable u/ss.323, 294, 500, 504 & 506, IPC are borne
out – Order passed by the Magistrate directing police investigation
u/s.156(3), Cr.P.C, set aside – Impugned order passed by the High
Court affirming the said order also set aside. [Paras 11-13, 19, 37]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.294 – ‘Obscene act’:
Held: Obscene act for the purpose of s.294 has a particular
meaning – Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by
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    themselves are not sufficient to attract the offence u/s.294 – The
    act of a police officer assaulting the complainant within public view
    or public as alleged does not amount to an obscene act. [Para 15]
    Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.156(3) – ‘may’ – Remedy
    u/s.156(3) is discretionary – Prerequisites to be followed before
    approaching the Magistrate u/s.156(3) – Discussed. [Para 24]
    Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.156 – Bharatiya
    Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.175 – Changes brought by
    BNSS to the scheme of s.156, CrPC – Enumerated. [Paras 29-35]

                             Case Law Cited
    Madhanagopal and Another v. K. Lalitha [2022] 15 SCR 649 :
    (2022) 17 SCC 818; Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. State of
    Gujarat [2015] 5 SCR 283 : (2015) 6 SCC 439 – relied on.
    Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P [2015] 4 SCR 108 : (2015) 6
    SCC 287; Babu Venkatesh v. The State Of Karnataka (2022) 5
    SCC 639 – referred to.

                               List of Acts
    Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Bharatiya
    Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

                            List of Keywords
    Section 156(3) of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973; Police
    investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of the Criminal
    Procedure, 1973; Direction to register FIR; Cognizable offence;
    Judicial Magistrate; Order passed mechanically; Mechanical
    manner; Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, 506 of the Penal Code,
    1860; Quashing; Application of judicial mind; Application of mind
    by the Magistrate; Cognizance; Abuse of process of law; Simple
    hurt; Obscene act; Obscenity; Criminal Intimidation; Defamation.

                           Case Arising From
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
    352 of 2020
    From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.2019 of the High Court
    of Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur in CRLA (APL) No. 32 of 2012
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                         1471

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Kishor Lambat, Ms. Kashmira Lambat, Ms. Suja Joshi, Prem S
     Mankani, Digant Mishra, Kambli Anilkumar Laxman, Milind Vaishnav
     (for M/s. Lambat And Associates).
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Shantanu Phanse, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Order

1.   The Respondent No. 3 who is the original complainant, although
     served with the notice issued by this Court, has chosen not to
     remain present either in-person or through an advocate and oppose
     this appeal.
2.   This appeal arises from the impugned common Judgment and Order
     passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
     Nagpur dated 16.10.2019 in Criminal Application No. 33/2012 by
     which the High Court rejected the application filed by the appellant
     herein under Section 482 of Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973
     (hereinafter, referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) and thereby affirmed the
     order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Digras under
     Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. directing the police authorities to register
     the FIR against the appellant herein for the offence punishable under
     Sections 323, 294, 500, 504 & 506 respectively of the Indian Penal
     Code (for short, “the IPC”).
3.   It appears from the materials on record that the original complainant
     preferred an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. in the
     Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Digras praying that the
     police authorities be directed to register his FIR for the offences
     enumerated above. The averments made in the application filed by
     the complainant reads thus:-
           “IN THE COURT OF HON’BLE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
                       FIRST CLASS, DIGRAS
           APPLICANT: Adv. Nitin Devidas Kubade Aged about 32
                       yrs. Occu. Advocate r/o Shashtrinagar,
                       Digras Tq.Digras Dist. Yavatmal
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                                Versus
        Non-Application:
        APPLICATION U/S 156 (3) OF CR.P.C. FOR GIVING
        ORDER TO THE POLICE OF DIGRAS POLICE STATION
        TO REGISTERED THE OFFENCE AS PER THE
        COMPLAINT
        The above named applicant begs to submits as under:-
        1. That, the applicant is permanent residence of above
        address and practicing as an advocate at Digras. On
        31.12.2011 at about 11.30 to 11.40 pm. The accused who
        are the policemen humiliated the applicant therefore on
        03.01.2012 applicant want to lodged a report to the police
        station, Digras but the police did not accepted the same,
        therefore the applicant submitted his submission and
        requested the Bar Association, Digras about supported
        the applicant after considering the factual position.
        2. That, it is submitted that as per the resolution of the Bar
        council of Digras, applicant alongwith the other members
        of Bar association submitted the grievance before learned
        Superintendent of Police Yavatmal and submitted a report
        to him but though the applicant submitted the report to the
        superintendent of Police Yavatmal then also as the accused
        are policeman, the police are avoiding to registered the
        offence, against the accused.
        3. That, it is submitted that the applicant is filing the copy
        of report for kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court from which it
        reveals that the accused has committed an offence u/sec.
        323, 294, 504, 506, 500 of I.P.C. and therefore it is the
        boundant duty of the police to registered the offence but
        the police are avoiding the same therefore the applicant
        is filing this application before this Hon’ble Court to direct
        the police to registered the offence against the accused
        as per the report lodged before the Superintendant of
        Police Yavatmal.
        4. That, it is submitted that from simple perusal of report
        there is prima-facie allegations against the accused, but
        the police hectically avoiding to registered the offence,
        in such circumstances it is necessary in the interest of
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           1473

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


           justice to use the power as laid down u/sec.156 (3) of
           Cr.P.C. whereby the Hon’ble Court has a power to direct
           the police to registered the offence. The copy of the report
           is annexed for kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court.
           5. Prayer:- It is therefore most humbly prays that,
           (a) The Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the incharge
           Police officer of Digras Police Station to registered offence
           as per the report submitted before the Superintendant
           Police of Yavatmal.
           (b) Any other suitable relief be given to the application in
           the circumstances if required.

           Place: Digras                                     Signature

           Date: 06.01.2012”
4.   The Magistrate looked into the application filed by the complainant
     seeking police investigation and vide order dated 09.01.2012 passed
     an order directing the police authorities to register an FIR and
     undertake the necessary investigation.
5.   The order passed by the Magistrate referred to above reads thus:-
           “1. Heard counsel for the applicant, perused the application,
           report and affidavit.
           2. In short the story of the application is as under:
           That, the applicant is a practicing advocate and on
           31.12.2011 at about 11.30 to 11.40 p.m. the policeman
           (appellant) humiliated the applicant. Therefore, the
           applicant went to Police Station on 3/1/12 to lodged a
           report at Police Station, Digras. But police did not accept
           the same. Therefore, he submitted one application to the
           Bar Association Digras on 3/1/12 and thereafter, the Bar
           Association supported the applicant and thereafter, the
           grievances were raised before the Superintendent of Police
           at Yavatmal but the police authorities were avoiding to
           register the offence, though the offences are cognizable.
           Hence, he filed this application on 06.01.2012.
           3. Heard counsel for applicant Shri T.M. Malnas at length.,
           perused application, report and affidavit, after going
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        through the submissions and case paper, it appears
        that the complaint discloses the commission of offence
        under section 294 of IPC which is a cognizable offence.
        The Learned counsel for applicant relied on the ruling
        of Honourable Bombay High Court in 1) Bhavarabai
        W/o Parashramji Atal v. Sanjay Ramchandra Gundhewar,
        reported in 2011 Volume 4 Mh. L.J. (Crl.) Page No.283;
        and 2) Narayandas S/o Hirlalji Sarda and Ors v. State
        of Maharashtra reported in 2008 All MR (Cri). 2737.
        The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that
        the cognizable offence is made out from the allegations
        levelled by the applicant and therefore he submitted that
        the ratio laid down in the ruling is applicable. Considering
        the submissions and after going through the contents of
        the complaint, I agree that the ratio laid down in the above
        ruling is applicable as the offence under Section 294 IPC
        is cognizable and it appears from the complaint that the
        applicant has tried to lodged the report at PS Digas on
        3.1.2012 but police has not registered the offence. The
        counsel “for applicant further submitted that, there is no
        bar to register the offence against the police as under
        Section 197 of Cr.P.C. as the act of the policeman was
        not in discharge of his official duties. So he relied upon the
        ruling of Honourable Bombay High court 1) Nandkumar
        S. Kale v. Bhaurao Chandrabhanji Tidke, reported in 2007
        All MR (Cri), 2737, the ruling of Honourable Supreme
        Court 2) State of Maharashtra Vs. Devhari Devsingh Pawar
        and others, reported in 2008 AII MR (Cri) 518 (Supreme
        Court). After going through the allegations made by the
        applicant in the complaint it appears that, the police has
        abused him and threatened to kill him and also humiliated
        the complainant. With due respect to the ratio laid down in
        the above decisions, I am of the view that the alleged act
        of the police are not in discharge of official duty. Hence the
        previous sanction under Section 197 CrPC is not necessary.
        4. After going through the submissions and application,
        report, affidavit and the ruling cited by the applicant, it is
        a fit case to call the report of police under Section 156(3)
        of Cr.P.C. Hence, application is allowed and police Station
        office, Police Station, Digras is directed to register the
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                          1475

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


           offence and submit his report under Section 156(3) of
           CrPC within stipulated period.”
6.   We take notice of the fact that the complainant claims to be an
     advocate whereas the appellant herein is a police officer.
7.   We have heard Ms. Kashmira Lambat, the learned counsel appearing
     for the appellant and Mr. D. Kumanan, the learned counsel appearing
     for the respondent, that is, the State of Maharashtra.
8.   Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:-
           “156. Police Officer’s power to investigate cognizable case.
           (1) Any officer-in-charge of a police station may, without
           the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case
           which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within
           the limits of such station would have power to inquire into
           or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
           (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case
           shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that
           the case was one which such officer was not empowered
           under this section to investigate.
           (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may
           order such an investigation as above mentioned.”

9.   As we see it, the words are plain and the meaning is clear. It empowers
     any officer in-charge of a Police Station to investigate any cognizable
     offence without the order of a Magistrate.
10. Ordinarily, Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is invoked by the complainant
    when the police authorities decline to register a First Information
    Report. In such circumstances, a private complaint may be made in
    the court of the Judicial Magistrate and the complainant may pray that
    police investigation be ordered under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
    However, it is the discretion of the concerned Magistrate whether
    to order police investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. or take
    cognizance upon the complaint and issue process or dismiss the
    complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. Over a period of time and
    in view of many decisions of this Court, if the officer in-charge of
    the concerned Police Station for some reasons declines to register
    the FIR, then the law has left it open for the complainant to file an
    appropriate application before the Magistrate and pray for police
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     investigation. Once an order is passed for police investigation under
     Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., then it becomes a police case. At the
     end of the investigation the police may either file a charge-sheet or
     file an appropriate closure report.
11. However, what is important to observe is that whenever any
    application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial
    Magistrate seeking police investigation under Section 156(3) of the
    Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind
    for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in
    the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other
    words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain
    whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate
    is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation
    to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute
    the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint.
12. In the case on hand, it appears that the Magistrate passed an order
    directing police investigation mechanically and without ascertaining
    whether the allegations levelled disclose commission of any offence
    or not.
13. It is the case of the complainant that the appellant herein committed
    offence punishable under Section 294 of the IPC. The Magistrate very
    promptly accepted this contention without ascertaining if the necessary
    ingredients required to constitute the offence were disclosed in the
    complaint or not. In our view, even if all the allegations as levelled
    in the complaint are believed to be true, none of the ingredients to
    constitute the offence punishable under Section 294 of the IPC could
    be said to be borne out.
14. In so far as Section 294 of the IPC is concerned, this Court in N.S.
    Madhanagopal and Another v. K. Lalitha reported in (2022) 17
    SCC 818 has explained the true purport and scope of Section 294.
    We quote the relevant observations as under:-
          “6. Section 294(b) IPC talks about the obscene acts and
          songs. Section 294 IPC as a whole reads thus:
                “294. Obscene acts and songs.—Whoever, to the
                annoyance of others—
                (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
                (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs,
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           1477

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


                ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be
                punished with imprisonment of either description for
                a term which may extend to three months, or with
                fine, or with both.”
           7. It is to be noted that the test of obscenity under Section
           294(b)IPC is whether the tendency of the matter charged
           as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
           are open to such immoral influences. The following passage
           from the judgment authored by K.K. Mathew, J. (as his
           Lordship then was) reported in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan
           Chacko [P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko, 1967 SCC OnLine
           Ker 125 : 1967 KLT 799] explains as follows : (SCC OnLine
           Ker paras 5-6)
                 “5. The only point argued was that the 1st accused
                has not committed an offence punishable under
                Section 294(b)IPC, by uttering the words above-
                mentioned. The courts below have held that the
                words uttered were obscene and the utterance caused
                annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this
                view. In R. v. Hicklin [R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB
                360] , QB at p. 371 Cockburn, C.J. Laid down the
                test of “obscenity” in these words : (QB p. 371) ‘…
                the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of
                the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and
                corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
                influences.…’
                6. This test has been uniformly followed in India.
                The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of
                the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra
                [Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC
                OnLine SC 52 : AIR 1965 SC 881]. In Roth v. United
                States [Roth v. United States, 1957 SCC OnLine US
                SC 106 : 1 L Ed 2d 1498 : 354 US 476 (1957)], Chief
                Justice Warren said that the test of “obscenity” is the
                ‘substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful
                desires’. Mr Justice Harlan observed that in order
                to be “obscene” the matter must “tend to sexually
                impure thoughts”. I do not think that the words uttered
                in this case have such a tendency. It may be that
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               the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I
               do not think that the words are “obscene” and the
               utterance would constitute an offence punishable
               under Section 294(b)IPC.”
          8. It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence
          of words which will involve some lascivious elements
          arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract
          the offence under Section 294(b). None of the records
          disclose the alleged words used by the accused. It may
          not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases
          the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant
          case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere abusive,
          humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an
          offence under Section 294(b) IPC.
          9. To prove the offence under Section 294IPC mere
          utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there
          must be a further proof to establish that it was to the
          annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one
          has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed
          and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the
          words uttered by the appellant-accused annoyed others,
          it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under
          Section 294(b)IPC is made out.”
15. We fail to understand how the act of a police officer assaulting the
    complainant within public view or public as alleged would amount to
    an obscene act. Obscene act for the purpose of Section 294 has a
    particular meaning. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words
    by themselves are not sufficient to attract the offence under Section
    294 of the IPC.
16. Thus, in so far as Section 294 of the IPC is concerned, we are of the
    view that no case is made out to put the appellant/accused to trial.
17. We shall now deal with Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC respectively.
18. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through one of us, J.B.
    Pardiwala, Justice, in its decision in Mohammad Wajid & Anr. v.
    State of U.P. & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 2340/2023 decided on
    August 8, 2023) explained what constitutes an offence of criminal
    intimidation. We quote the relevant paragraphs from the said decision
    as under:-
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                            1479

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


           “23. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation,
           Insult and Annoyance.
           Section 503 reads thus:-
                “Section 503. Criminal intimidation. — Whoever
                threatens another with any injury to his person,
                reputation or property, or to the person or reputation
                of any one in whom that person is interested, with
                intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that
                person to do any act which he is not legally bound to
                do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally
                entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution
                of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
                Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any
                deceased person in whom the person threatened is
                interested, is within this section.
                Illustration
                A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from
                prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house.
                A is guilty of criminal intimidation.”
           Section 504 reads thus:—
                “Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke
                breach of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults,
                and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending
                or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will
                cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any
                other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment
                of either description for a term which may extend to
                two years, or with fine, or with both.”
           Section 506 reads thus:—
                “Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—
                Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation
                shall be punished with imprisonment of either
                description for a term which may extend to two years,
                or with fine, or with both;
                If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—
                And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt,
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        or to cause the destruction of any property by fire,
        or to cause an offence punishable with death or
        imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a
        term which may extend to seven years, or to impute
        unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with
        imprisonment of either description for a term which
        may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
        24. An offence under Section 503 has following
        essentials:—
        1) Threatening a person with any injury;
        (i) to his person, reputation or property; or
        (ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom
        that person is interested.
        2) The threat must be with intent;
        (i) to cause alarm to that person; or
        (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is
        not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the
        execution of such threat; or
        (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which
        that person is legally entitled to do as the means of
        avoiding the execution of such threat.
        25. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally
        insulting a person and thereby provoking such person
        insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting
        a person knowing it to be likely that the person
        insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach
        of the public peace or to commit any other offence.
        Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the
        section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case
        might amount to an intentional insult provoking the
        person insulted to commit a breach of the public
        peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive
        language is used intentionally and is of such a nature
        as would in the ordinary course of events lead the
        person insulted to break the peace or to commit an
        offence under the law, the case is not taken away
        from the purview of the Section merely because the
        insulted person did not actually break the peace or
        commit any offence having exercised self control or
        having been subjected to abject terror by the offender.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                               1481

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


                In judging whether particular abusive language is
                attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find
                out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be
                the effect of the abusive language used and not
                what the complainant actually did as a result of his
                peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense
                of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the
                abusive language that is the test for considering
                whether the abusive language is an intentional insult
                likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a
                breach of the peace and not the particular conduct
                or temperament of the complainant.
                26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence,
                may not amount to an intentional insult within the
                meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the
                necessary element of being likely to incite the person
                insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence
                and the other element of the accused intending to
                provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the
                peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to
                commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive
                language shall have to be decided in the light of
                the facts and circumstances of that case and there
                cannot be a general proposition that no one commits
                an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses
                abusive language against the complainant. In King
                Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom
                LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
                pointed out that:—
                     “To constitute an offence under Section 504,
                     I.P.C. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind
                     calculated to cause the other party to lose his
                     temper and say or do something violent. Public
                     peace can be broken by angry words as well
                     as deeds.”
                27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes
                it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation.
                Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made
                out, it must be established that the accused had an
                intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
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                28. In the facts and circumstances of the case and
                more particularly, considering the nature of the
                allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to
                constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of
                the IPC may probably could be said to have been
                disclosed but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The
                allegations with respect to the offence punishable
                under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at
                from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the
                first informant has stated is that abusive language
                was used by the accused persons. What exactly was
                uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR.
                One of the essential elements, as discussed above,
                constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC
                is that there should have been an act or conduct
                amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the
                use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what
                those words were in order to decide whether the use
                of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the
                absence of these words, it is not possible to decide
                whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.”
19. Applying the principles as explained aforesaid, we are of the view
    that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable
    under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC respectively are borne out.
20. We fail to understand how the Magistrate could have directed the
    police to investigate into the offence of defamation punishable under
    Section 500 of the IPC. We are at a loss to understand as to why
    this aspect was not looked into even by the High Court.
21. The aforesaid reflects the mechanical manner in which the order
    came to be passed for police investigation under Section 156(3) of
    the Cr.P.C. It was expected of the High Court to look into all these
    relevant aspects before rejecting the petition filed by the appellant
    herein under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
22. The allegations as regards simple hurt also do not inspire any
    confidence.
23. This Court in a plethora of its decisions, more particularly in the case
    of Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat reported in
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                              1483

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


     (2015) 6 SCC 439, has laid emphasis on the fact that the directions
     under Section 156(3) should be issued only after application of mind
     by the Magistrate. Paragraph 22 of the said decision reads thus:-
           “22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that the
           direction Under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after
           application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate
           does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to
           postpone issuance of process and finds a case made out
           to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is
           issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of
           information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is
           considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation,
           such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes
           cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases
           where the Magistrate has yet to determine “existence of
           sufficient ground to proceed”. Category of cases falling
           under Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra) may fall Under
           Section 202 Subject to these broad guidelines available
           from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by
           the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case
           to case.”
24. Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant
    before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the
    Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds
    with the word ‘may’. The Magistrate is required to exercise his
    mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied
    that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences
    and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging
    out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can
    be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not
    necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed
    under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the
    Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has
    also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the
    evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can
    be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the
    court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important
    at that stage and cannot be ignored.
1484                                                       [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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25. In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only
    where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the
    Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence
    of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to
    mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining
    whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation
    by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations
    made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway
    proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record
    evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the
    buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, if the
    allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated
    investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance
    and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate
    for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities.
    The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post
    Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an
    application seeking investigation by the Police.
26. The incident is of the year 2012. This Court while admitting this
    appeal had stayed the investigation.
27. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that no case is
    made out to put the appellant/accused to trial for the alleged offence.
    Continuance of the investigation by the police will be nothing short
    of abuse of the process of law.
28. However, before we part with the matter, we deem it necessary to
    discuss the changes brought to the scheme of Section 156 of the
    Cr.P.C. by the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
    2023 (for short, “the BNSS”).
29. Section 175 of the BNSS corresponds to Section 156 of the Cr.P.C.
    Sub-section (1) of Section 175 of the BNSS is in pari materia with sub-
    section 156(1) of the Cr.P.C. except for the proviso which empowers
    the Superintendent of Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of
    Police to investigate a case if the nature or gravity of the case so
    requires. Sub-section (2) of Section 175 the BNSS is identical to
    Section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C. Section 175(3) of the BNSS empowers
    any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance under Section
    210 to order investigation in accordance with Section 175(1) and to
    this extent is in pari materia with Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. However,
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                       1485

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


     unlike Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., any Magistrate, before ordering
     investigation under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, is required to:
     a.    Consider the application, supported by an affidavit, made by
           the complainant to the Superintendent of Police under Section
           173(4) of the BNSS;
     b.    Conduct such inquiry as he thinks necessary; and
     c.    Consider the submissions made by the police officer.
30. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS is a new addition to
    the scheme of investigation of cognizable cases when compared
    with the scheme previously existing in Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. It
    provides an additional safeguard to a public servant against whom an
    accusation of committing a cognizable offence arising in the course
    of discharge of his official duty is made. The provision stipulates that
    any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance under Section
    210 of the BNSS may order investigation against a public servant
    upon receiving a complaint arising in course of the discharge of his
    official duty, only after complying with the following procedure:
     a.    Receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the
           incident from the officer superior to the accused public servant;
           and
     b.    Considering the assertions made by the accused public servant
           as regards the situation that led to the occurrence of the alleged
           incident.
31. A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3)
    of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been
    introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
     a.    First, the requirement of making an application to the
           Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge
           of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory,
           and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3)
           is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the
           Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by
           an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate
           under Section 175(3).
     b.    Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct
           such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order
           directing registration of FIR.
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     c.   Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions
          of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the
          refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under
          Section 175(3).
32. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be attributed
    to the judicial evolution of Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. undertaken
    by a number of decisions of this Court. In the case of Priyanka
    Srivastava v. State of U.P. reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287, this
    Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate
    under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the applicant must necessarily
    make applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). It was further
    observed by the Court that applications made under Section 156(3)
    of the Cr.P.C. must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by
    the applicant. The reason given by the Court for introducing such a
    requirement was that applications under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
    were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases
    only with a view to cause harassment to the accused by registration
    of FIR. It was further observed that the requirement of supporting
    the complaint with an affidavit would ensure that the person making
    the application is conscious and also to see that no false affidavit
    is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would
    be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This would deter
    him from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate under
    Section 156(3). The relevant observations made by the Court are
    reproduced hereinbelow:
          “27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of
          law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate
          has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made
          and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions
          without proper application of mind. He has also to bear
          in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to
          justice and then he may pass the requisite order. The
          present is a case where the accused persons are serving
          in high positions in the Bank. We are absolutely conscious
          that the position does not matter, for nobody is above the
          law. But, the learned Magistrate should take note of the
          allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether
          any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is also to
          be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution
          covered under the Sarfaesi Act, invokes the jurisdiction
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                              1487

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


           under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and also there is a separate
           procedure under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
           Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care,
           caution and circumspection has to be adhered to.
           28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the application”
           to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in
           society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the
           learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and
           unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash
           Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to
           bring the financial institutions on their knees. As the factual
           exposition would reveal, Respondent 3 had prosecuted
           the earlier authorities and after the matter is dealt with by
           the High Court in a writ petition recording a settlement, he
           does not withdraw the criminal case and waits for some
           kind of situation where he can take vengeance as if he is
           the emperor of all he surveys. It is interesting to note that
           during the tenure of Appellant 1, who is presently occupying
           the position of Vice-President, neither was the loan taken,
           nor was the default made, nor was any action under the
           Sarfaesi Act taken. However, the action under the Sarfaesi
           Act was taken on the second time at the instance of the
           present Appellant 1. We are only stating about the devilish
           design of Respondent 3 to harass the appellants with the
           sole intent to avoid the payment of loan. When a citizen
           avails a loan from a financial institution, it is his obligation
           to pay back and not play truant or for that matter play
           possum. As we have noticed, he has been able to do such
           adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction that
           he will not be taken to task because an application under
           Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is a simple application to the court
           for issue of a direction to the investigating agency. We have
           been apprised that a carbon copy of a document is filed
           to show the compliance with Section 154(3), indicating it
           has been sent to the Superintendent of Police concerned.
           29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under
           Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A
           court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps
           at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his
           own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate.
1488                                                     [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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        A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands
        must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects
        the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route
        to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to
        scuttle and curb the same.
        30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this
        country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be
        supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who
        seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
        That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate
        would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify
        the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the
        applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so
        as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine
        manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only
        to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more
        disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people
        who are passing orders under a statutory provision which
        can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or
        under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot
        be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if
        somebody is determined to settle the scores.
        31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior
        applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing
        a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should
        be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary
        documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for
        giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3)
        be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making
        the application should be conscious and also endeavour
        to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once
        an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for
        prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him
        to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under
        Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the
        veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned
        Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations
        of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number
        of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/
        family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           1489

       Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.


           cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is
           abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as
           are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014)
           1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned
           Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging
           of the FIR.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

33. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Babu
    Venkatesh v. The State Of Karnataka reported in (2022) 5 SCC
    639, the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) were
    referred to and it was held as follows:
           “24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has come
           where applications under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C. are to be
           supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who
           seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
           25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case,
           the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the
           truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The
           Court has noted that, applications under Section 156(3)
           Cr.P.C. are filed in a routine manner without taking any
           responsibility only to harass certain persons.
           26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing of
           a petition under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C., there have to be
           applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3)Cr.P.C.. This
           Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so that
           the persons making the application should be conscious
           and not make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the
           persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority
           of the Magistrate, under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C.. Inasmuch
           as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be
           liable for prosecution in accordance with law.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

34. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3)
    of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above,
    it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of
    the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the
    procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced
1490                                                      [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports



     by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation
     of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving
     ulterior motives.
35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made
    by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions
    under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on
    the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section
    173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the
    concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies
    his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the
    submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement
    of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and
    comprehensive manner.
36. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
37. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The
    order passed by the Magistrate directing police investigation under
    Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is also set aside.
38. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey