P. CHIDAMBARAMversusDIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

450                      [2019]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    14 S.C.R. 450              [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A                             P. CHIDAMBARAM
                                        v.
                     DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 1831 of 2019)
B                            DECEMBER 04, 2019
                  [R. BANUMATHI, A. S. BOPANNA AND
                         HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.439 – Bail – Grant of,
      in economic offence – In the instant case, CBI registered a case of
C
      corruption against some known and unknown suspects including
      the son of the appellant – Appellant was the then Union Finance
      Minister – He was however not named in the said FIR – Based on
      the said FIR, respondent directorate registered ECIR case for money
      laundering against the accused named in the FIR – Allegations in
D     the said ECIR case were the same as those in the FIR – Appellant
      was not named in this case as well – Apprehending his arrest,
      appellant applied for anticipatory bail which was rejected –
      Appellant was arrested in CBI case and since then he had been in
      custody – In ECIR case, appellant was arrested on the grounds that
      payment of Rs.3 crores was made at the appellant’s instance to the
E
      companies controlled by his son on account of FIPB work done for
      INX Group and that due to non-co-operation of appellant,
      investigation was not fruitful and certain relevant information which
      was within his exclusive knowledge was withheld by him and thus
      his custodial investigation was necessary – After his arrest, appellant
F     moved a regular bail application before High Court – By impugned
      order, High Court held test of flight risk, tampering of evidence
      and influencing of the witnesses in favour of appellant, however
      declined the bail on the ground that prima facie the allegations
      were serious in nature and the appellant played key and active role
      in the case – On appeal, held: Appellant was declined anticipatory
G
      bail earlier and was available for custodial interrogation for more
      than 45 days – In addition to the custodial interrogation, in case
      further investigation is made, the appellant would be bound to
      participate in such investigation as is required by the respondent –
      Further one of the co-accused has been granted bail by the High
H
                                       450
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                451


Court while the other co-accused is enjoying interim protection from          A
arrest – Appellant is aged about 74 years and as noted by the High
Court itself in its order, the appellant has already suffered two bouts
of illness during incarceration and was put on antibiotics and
advised to take steroids of maximum strength – In that circumstance,
the availability of the appellant for further investigation,
                                                                              B
interrogation and facing trial is not jeopardized – In view of all
facts and circumstances, the appellant is granted bail.
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.439 – Bail –
Consideration of bail application in economic offence – Held: Even
economic offences fall under the category of “grave offence”, in
view of the consequences that would befall on the society in cases            C
of financial irregularities, and in such circumstance while
considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court has
to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation
made against the accused – One of the circumstances to consider
the gravity of the offence is the term of sentence that is prescribed         D
for the offence the accused is alleged to have committed – Such
consideration with regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which
is in addition to the triple test or the tripod test that would be normally
applied – However, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in
every case of economic offence since there is no such bar created
in the relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the              E
bail jurisprudence provides so – The consideration will have to be
on case to case basis on the facts involved therein and securing the
presence of the accused to stand trial.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                              F
       HELD: 1. Perusal of the order dated 15.11.2019 impugned
indicates that the Single Judge having taken note of the rival
contentions in so far as the triple test or the tripod test to be
applied while considering an application for grant of regular bail
under Sec. 439 Cr.PC, has answered the same in paragraphs 50
to 53 of the order, in favour of the appellant. The Solicitor General,        G
however, contended that the finding on likelihood of tampering
and influencing witness has not been considered in its correct
perspective. The finding in that regard has not been assailed and
in such event, the appellant cannot be taken by surprise. Even
                                                                              H
452            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     otherwise as rightly observed by the Single Judge, the evidence
      and material stated to have been collected is already available
      with the Investigating agency. In the present situation, the
      appellant is not in political power nor is he holding any post in
      the Government of the day so as to be in a position to interfere.
      In that view, such allegation cannot be accepted on its face value.
B
      With regard to the witness having written that he is not prepared
      to be confronted as he is from the same State, the appellant cannot
      be held responsible for the same when there is no material to
      indicate that the appellant or anyone on his behalf had restrained
      or threatened the concerned witness who refused to be
C     confronted with the appellant in custody. [Para 16][465-B-F]
             2. The basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same
      inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception
      so as to ensure that the accused has the opportunity of securing
      fair trial. However, while considering the same, the gravity of the
D     offence is an aspect which is required to be kept in view by the
      Court. The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered
      from the facts and circumstances arising in each case. Keeping
      in view the consequences that would befall on the society in cases
      of financial irregularities, even economic offences would fall under
      the category of “grave offence” and in such circumstance while
E     considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court
      will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of
      allegation made against the accused. One of the circumstances
      to consider the gravity of the offence is also the term of sentence
      that is prescribed for the offence the accused is alleged to have
F     committed. Such consideration with regard to the gravity of
      offence is a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the
      tripod test that would be normally applied. In that regard, what is
      also to be kept in perspective is that even if the allegation is one
      of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be
      denied in every case since there is no such bar created in the
G     relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the bail
      jurisprudence provides so. Therefore, the underlining conclusion
      is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the
      precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for either
      grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle.
H
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                           453


But ultimately the consideration will have to be on case to case         A
basis on the facts involved therein and securing the presence of
the accused to stand trial. In the circumstance, it would be clear
that even after concluding the triple test in favour of the appellant,
the Judge of the High Court was certainly justified in adverting
to the issue relating to the gravity of the offence. However, the
                                                                         B
manner in which the conclusions are recorded in paragraphs 57
to 62 are disapproved wherein the observations are reflected to
be in the nature of finding relating to the alleged offence.
[Paras 21, 22][468-E-H; 469-A-D]
      Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab, (1980)
      2 SCC 565 : [1980] 3 SCR 383 – followed.                           C

      State of Bihar & Anr. v. Amit Kumar (2017) 13 SCC
      751 : [2017] 4 SCR 503; Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI
      (2013) 7 SCC 466; CBI v. Ramendu Chattopadhyay,
      Crl Appeal.No. 1711 of 2019; Seniors Fraud
      Investigation Office v. Nittin Johari & Anr. (2019) 9              D
      SCC 165; Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI (2013) 7
      SCC 439; State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal
      (1987) 2 SCC 364 : [1987] 2 SCR 677 – relied on
       3. The question as to whether the Court could look into
the documents while considering an application for bail had arisen       E
for consideration in the very case between the parties in Criminal
Appeal No.130/2019 wherein through the judgment dated
05.09.2019 while considering the matter relating to the order
dated 20.08.2019 whereby the High Court had rejected the bail,
this Court had held that it would be open for the Court to receive
the materials/documents collected during the investigation and           F
peruse the same to satisfy its conscience that the investigation
is proceeding in the right lines and for the purpose of
consideration of grant of bail/anticipatory bail etc. At the same
time, this Court, had disapproved the manner in which the Judge
of the High Court in the said case had verbatim quoted a note
produced by the respondent. If that be the position, in the instant      G
case, the Judge while adverting to the materials, ought not have
recorded a finding based on the materials produced before him.
While the Judge was empowered to look at the materials
produced in a sealed cover to satisfy his judicial conscience, the
                                                                         H
454            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     Judge ought not to have recorded finding based on the materials
      produced in a sealed cover. Further while deciding the same case
      of the appellant in Crl. Appeal No.1340 of 2019, after holding so,
      this Court had consciously refrained from opening the sealed
      cover and perusing the documents lest some observations are
      made thereon after perusal of the same, which would prejudice
B     the accused pre-trial. In that circumstance though it is held that
      it would be open for the Court to peruse the documents, it would
      be against the concept of fair trial if in every case the prosecution
      presents documents in sealed cover and the findings on the same
      are recorded as if the offence is committed and the same is treated
      as having a bearing for denial or grant of bail. However, since
C     the Single Judge of the High Court had perused the documents
      in sealed cover and arrived at certain conclusion and since that
      order is under challenge, it had become imperative for this Court
      to also open the sealed cover and peruse the contents so as to
      satisfy ourselves to that extent. A perusal showed that the
      statements of persons concerned have been recorded and the
D     details collected have been collated. The recording of statements
      and the collation of material is in the nature of allegation against
      one of the co-accused son of appellant of opening shell companies
      and also purchasing benami properties in the name of relatives
      at various places in different countries. Except for recording
      the same, documents are not adverted to any further since
E
      ultimately, these allegations would have to be established in the
      trial wherein the accused/co-accused would have the opportunity
      of putting forth their case, if any, and an ultimate conclusion would
      be reached. Hence, the finding recorded by the Judge of the High
      Court based on the material in sealed cover is not justified. [Paras
F     23, 24][469-F-H; 470-A-H]
            4. The appellant has not been named as one of the accused
      in the ECIR but the allegation while being made against the co-
      accused, it was indicated the appellant who was the Finance
      Minister at that point, has aided the illegal transactions since
      one of the co-accused is the son of the appellant. In this context,
G     even if the statements on record and materials gathered are taken
      note, the complicity of the appellant will have to be established
      in the trial and if convicted, the appellant will undergo sentence.
      As taken note the anticipatory bail had been declined earlier and
      the appellant was available for custodial interrogation for more
      than 45 days. In addition to the custodial interrogation, if further
H     investigation is to be made, the appellant would be bound to
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                             455


participate in such investigation as is required by the respondent.        A
Further, one of the co-accused has been granted bail by the High
Court while the other co-accused is enjoying interim protection
from arrest. The appellant is aged about 74 years and as noted by
the High Court itself in its order, the appellant has already suffered
two bouts of illness during incarceration and was put on antibiotics
and has been advised to take steroids of maximum strength. In              B
that circumstance, the availability of the appellant for further
investigation, interrogation and facing trial is not jeopardized and
he is already held to be not a ‘flight risk’ and there is no possibility
of tampering the evidence or influencing/intimidating the
witnesses. Taking these and all other facts and circumstances
including the duration of custody into consideration the appellant         C
is entitled to be granted bail. [Para 25] [471-C-G]
      Rohit Tandon vs. Directorate of Enforcement (2018) 11
      SCC 46; P. Chidambaram v. CBI (Crl. Appeal No.
      1603/2019); Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40:
      [2011] 13 SCR 309; Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1                   D
      SCC 40 : [2011] 13 SCR 309 – referred to.
                           Case Law Reference
(2018) 11 SCC 46                 referred to              Para 11
[2011] 13 SCR 309                referred to              Para 11
                                                                           E
[2017] 4 SCR 503                 relied on                Para 18
(2013) 7 SCC 466                 relied on                Para 18
(2019) 9 SCC 165                 relied on                Para 18
(2013) 7 SCC 439                 relied on                Para 18
                                                                           F
[1987] 2 SCR 677                 relied on                Para 18
[1980] 3 SCR 383                 followed                 Para 19
[2011] 13 SCR 309                referred to              Para 20
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1831 of 2019.                                                              G
      From the Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2019 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Bail Application No. 2718 of 2019.
      Kapil Sibal, Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Advs., Arshdeep Singh
Khurana, Kunal Vajani, Amit Bhandari, Hitesh Rai, Akshat Gupta, Ayush
Agarwal, Aman Brar, Savya Baweja, Jayant Mohan, Advs. for the              H
Appellant.
456            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A           Tushar Mehta, SG, K.M. Nataraj, ASG, Ms. Sonia Mathur,
      Sr. Adv., Amit Mahajan, Rajat Nair, Kanu Agrawal, Shantanu Sharma,
      Bhuvan Kapoor, Sushil Kumar Dubey, Ms. Divya Nair, Puneet Pathak,
      Anuj Aggarwal, B. Krishna Prasad, Advs. for the Respondent.
            The Judgment and Order of the Court were delivered/passed by
B           A. S. BOPANNA, J.
            1. Leave granted.
             2. The instant appeal has been filed by the appellant assailing the
      final order dated 15.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New
C     Delhi in Bail Application No. 2718 of 2019 whereby the High Court
      declined to grant regular bail to the appellant.
             3. The genesis of the case in question lies in FIR No. RC2202017-
      E0011 dated 15.5.2017, registered by the CBI under section 120-B r/w
      420 IPC and sections 8 and 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of PC Act against some
D     known and unknown suspects with allegations that M/s INX Media
      Private Limited (accused no. 1 in the FIR) sought approval of Foreign
      Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) for permission to issue by way of
      preferential allotment, certain equity and convertible, non-cumulative,
      redeemable preference shares for engaging in the business of creating,
      operating, managing and broadcasting of bouquet of television channels.
E     The company had also sought approval to make a downstream financial
      investment to the extent of 26% of the issued and outstanding equity
      share capital of M/s INX News Private Limited (accused no. 2). The
      FIPB Board recommended the proposal of INX Media for consideration
      and approval of the Finance Minister. However, the Board did not approve
F     the downstream investment by INX Media (P) Ltd. in INX News (P)
      Ltd. Further, in the press release dated 30.5.2007 issued by the FIPB
      Unit indicating details of proposals approved in the FIPB meeting, quantum
      of FDI/NRI inflow against M/s INX media was shown as Rs. 4.62
      crores. Contrary to the approval of FIPB, M/s INX Media Pvt. Ltd.
      deliberately and in violation of conditions of approval, made a downstream
G     investment to the extent of 26% capital of INX News and also generated
      more than Rs. 305 crores FDI in INX Media (P) Ltd. against the approved
      foreign inflow of Rs. 4.62 crores is the allegation. A complaint is stated
      to have been received by the investigation wing of the Income Tax
      department which sought clarifications from the FIPB Unit of Ministry
      of Finance. The FIPB Unit vide letter dated 26.5.2008, sought
H
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                               457
                [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]

clarifications from M/s INX Media Limited. It was further alleged in the     A
FIR that upon receipt of this letter, M/s INX Media in order to avoid
punitive action entered into criminal conspiracy with Mr. Karti
Chidambaram (accused no. 3 in the FIR who is the son of the appellant).
Mr. Karti Chidambaram is alleged to have exercised his influence over
the officials of FIPB unit which led to the said officials showing undue
                                                                             B
favour to M/s INX News (P) Ltd. Thereafter by deliberately concealing
the investment received in INX Media (P) Ltd., M/s INX News (P)
Ltd. again approached the FIPB Unit and sought permission for the
downstream investment. This proposal was favourably considered by
the officials of ministry of finance and approved by the then Finance
Minister. It was also stated in the FIR that Mr. Karti Chidambaram, in       C
lieu of services rendered to M/s INX Group, received consideration in
the form of payments. Information disclosed that invoices for
approximately Rs. 3.5 crores were got raised in favour of M/s INX
Group in the name of companies in which Mr. Karti Chidambaram was
having sustainable interests either directly or indirectly. The appellant
                                                                             D
herein, who was the then Union Finance Minister, was not however
named in the said FIR.
      4. On the basis of the aforementioned FIR, the Respondent
Directorate of Enforcement registered a case ECIR/07/HIU/2017
(hereinafter referred to as ECIR case) under section 3 of Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter PMLA), punishable under              E
section 4 of the said Act against the accused mentioned in the FIR. The
allegations in the said ECIR case were the same as those in the
aforementioned FIR. The appellant was not named an accused in this
case as well.
      5. On 23.7.2018, apprehending his arrest by the Respondent, the        F
appellant filed an application before the High Court of Delhi seeking
grant of anticipatory bail in the aforementioned ECIR case. The High
Court extended interim protection to the appellant until 20.8.2019, when
the appellant’s application seeking anticipatory bail was dismissed.
       6. The appellant then approached this court by filing Criminal        G
Appeal No. 1340 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7523 of 2019)
wherein while dismissing the appeal of the appellant, the court concluded
that in the instant case, grant of anticipatory bail to the appellant will
hamper the investigation and that this is not a fit case for exercise of
discretion to grant anticipatory bail. This court applied the following      H
458             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     rationale for coming to the said conclusion: there are sufficient safeguards
      enshrined in the PMLA to ensure proper exercise of power of arrest;
      grant of anticipatory bail is not to be done as a matter of rule, especially
      in matters of economic offences which constitute a class apart. Regard
      must be had to the fact that grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of
      investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the
B
      accused and in collecting useful information and also materials which
      might have been concealed.
             7. In the meanwhile, on 21.8.2019, the appellant was arrested in
      the CBI case (arising out of the above-mentioned FIR). Since then he
      has been in custody. In the ECIR case, he was arrested on 16.10.2019
C     on the grounds that payment of approx. Rs. 3 crores was made at the
      appellant’s instance to the companies controlled by his son on account
      of FIPB work done for INX Group. Further it was stated in the grounds
      of arrest that the investigation is not fruitful due to the appellant’s non-
      cooperation; the appellant has withheld relevant information which is
D     within his exclusive knowledge and thus his custodial interrogation is
      necessary.
             8. After dismissal of his application seeking anticipatory bail by
      this court, the appellant moved an application dated 5.9.2019 praying to
      surrender before the Trial Court (Court of Special Judge (PC Act), CBI)
E     in the ECIR case. This application was rejected on 13.9.2019 in view of
      the submission on behalf of the respondent Directorate that it was not
      willing to arrest the appellant at that particular stage since it was
      completing investigation pertaining to some aspect of the money laundering
      and only on this background investigation was completed, the interrogation
      of the appellant would be meaningful. Thereafter, on 11.10.2019, the
F     Respondent Directorate moved an application u/s 267 CrPC seeking
      issuance of production warrant against the appellant for the purpose of
      arrest and remand. The allegations which were levelled against the
      appellant in this application are that in lieu of granting FIPB approval to
      INX Media Pvt. Ltd., he and his son received a sum of approx. Rs. 3
G     crores through companies controlled by the son of the Appellant/accused
      Karti P. Chidambaram. Though INX media in its application did not
      mention the total amount of FDI inflow which they intended to bring, the
      appellant without ascertaining their competency, granted approval. Further
      the appellant became fully aware about the violations made by INX
      Group when the matter was highlighted by the Income Tax Department
H
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                  459
                [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]

and a complaint was also received by him regarding the investment by            A
M/s INX Media into M/s INX News without due approval. Despite this
knowledge, the appellant again approved the downstream proposal of
INX Group treating it as a fresh approval. Further investigation has
revealed that there were at least 17 overseas bank accounts opened by
the appellant and co-conspirators. In this regard, summons was issued
                                                                                B
to 11 persons and statements of some of these persons revealed that the
overseas assets were acquired in the name of various shell companies
on the instructions of appellant’s son. Thus, it was stated that a need
arises to confront the appellant with the material gathered. This
application was allowed by the Trial Court vide order dated 11.10.2019.
Thereafter on 14.10.2019, the Respondent inter alia moved an application        C
seeking permission to arrest the appellant. The Trial Court treated this
application as an application for interrogation of the appellant and allowed
it. Subsequently, on 16.10.2019, the appellant was arrested for the grounds
stated supra. Vide order dated 17.10.2019, the Trial Court remanded the
appellant to the custody of the Respondent for a period of 7 days.
                                                                                D
       9. After his arrest, on 23.10.2019, the appellant moved a regular
bail application (Bail Application No. 2718 of 2019) before the High
Court u/s 439 of CrPC averring that he is a law abiding citizen having
deep roots in the society; he is not a flight risk and is willing to abide by
all conditions as may be imposed by the court while granting bail. It was
also submitted that the instant case is a documentary case and being a          E
respectable citizen and former Union Minister, he cannot and will not
tamper with the documentary record of the instant case which is currently
in the safe and secure possession of the incumbent government or the
Trial Court. On merits, it was stated by the Appellant that he merely
accorded approval to the unanimous recommendation made by the FIPB              F
which was chaired by the Secretary, Economic Affairs and included 5
other secretaries who were all among the senior most IAS officers (one
among them was a senior IFS officer) and had a long and distinguished
record of service. Anyone familiar with the working of the FIPB would
know that no single officer can take a decision on any proposal.
Therefore, it is preposterous to allege that any person could have              G
influenced any official of FIPB, including all 6 senior secretaries to the
Government of India. Moreover, the ECIR case is a verbatim copy of
the FIR dated 15.5.2017 and allegations registered therein and thus the
Special Judge erred in granting remand of the appellant in the ECIR
case since the offences allegedly committed in both the cases arise out         H
460             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     of the same occurrence and have been committed in the course of the
      same transaction. Further the Special Court committed an error in not
      accepting the surrender application of the appellant which was an
      application limited to surrendering before the Trial Court. The Special
      Court proceeded on an erroneous basis that the desire of an accused is
      contingent upon the desire of the investigating agency to arrest the
B
      accused and that arrest is a condition precedent for surrendering before
      the Court.
             10. Vide the impugned order, the High Court observed that it has
      not even been alleged by the Respondent Enforcement Directorate in its
      counter affidavit that the appellant is a flight risk. Regarding tampering
C     of evidence also the court observed that it is neither argued nor any
      material is available on record in this regard. Moreover, there is no chance
      to tamper the material on record as the same is with the investigating
      agencies, central government or courts. Regarding influencing of
      witnesses, the court noted that three witnesses have stated in their
D     statements that the appellant and his family members have pressurised
      them and asked them not to appear before the Enforcement Directorate.
      However, since their statements have already been recorded, at this
      stage when the complaint is almost ready to be filed, the Court held that
      there is no chance to influence any witness. The High Court also took
      notice of the fact that co-accused have been granted bail. The Court
E     was cognizant of the fact that the appellant has been suffering from
      illness but the Court opined that the Court has already issued directions
      to the Jail Superintendent in this regard and therefore this ground is no
      longer available to the appellant at this stage. The Court noted that during
      investigation, it has been revealed that there has been layering of proceeds
F     of crime by use of shell companies, most of which are only on paper, and
      opined that there is cogent evidence collected so far that these shell
      companies are incorporated by persons who can be shown to be close
      and connected with the appellant. Next, the Court held that the material
      in the present case is completely distinct, different and independent from
      the material which was collected by the CBI in the predicate offence.
G     Even the witnesses in the PMLA investigation are different from the
      investigation conducted by the CBI. The High Court concluded that prima
      facie, allegations are serious in nature and the appellant has played key
      and active role in the present case. On the basis of all these observations,
      the High Court dismissed the bail application.
H
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                    461
                [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]

       11. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel Shri Kapil          A
Sibal and Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi on behalf of the appellant before
us that the High Court ought to have granted regular bail to the appellant
after holding the triple test of flight risk, tampering with evidence and
influencing of witnesses in favour of the appellant. The Impugned Order
deserves to be set aside only on the ground that the allegations of a             B
completely unrelated case (Rohit Tandon vs. Directorate of
Enforcement (2018) 11 SCC 46) have been considered by the High
Court as allegations relating to the instant case and findings on merits
against the appellant have been rendered based on such unrelated
allegations. Next, it has been contended by the appellant that the High
Court erred in law in going into and rendering findings on merits of the          C
case in order to deny bail to the appellant despite the settled position of
law that merits of a case ought not to be gone into at the time of adjudication
of a bail application. This Court in the appellant’s own case seeking
regular bail in the case registered by CBI against him titled
P. Chidambaram vs. CBI (Crl. Appeal No. 1603/2019) has held that                  D
“at the stage of granting bail, an elaborate examination of evidence and
detailed reasons touching upon the merit of the case, which may prejudice
the accused, should be avoided.” It has also been contended on behalf
of the appellant that the High Court erred in accepting at face value the
allegations made on merits of the case in the counter affidavit filed by
                                                                                  E
the respondent and converting such allegations verbatim into findings by
the Court and declining to grant bail to the appellant solely on the basis
of said findings. On merits, the appellant has submitted that he is neither
a shareholder nor director of any allegedly connected company nor does
he have any connection with any of these companies. No material linking
the appellant directly or indirectly with the alleged offence of money            F
laundering has either been put to the appellant so far or been placed on
record before the High Court. Further, the 12 officers who signed the
file pertaining to the approval of the FDI proposal of INX Media were
not even arrested. Only the appellant, who was the 13th signatory has
been arrested and denied bail. Moreover, all the other co-accused in the          G
instant ECIR case have also been granted bail or have not been arrested.
The High Court also failed to appreciate that the appellant has already
been granted regular bail by this Court in the predicate offence FIR vide
its order dated 22.10.2019. The High Court erred in denying bail to the
appellant on the specious ground that allegations are of a serious nature.
                                                                                  H
462             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     It is the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that
      the gravity of an offence is to be determined from the severity of the
      prescribed punishment. In the instant case, the alleged offence of money
      laundering is punishable by imprisonment for a term which shall not
      exceed 7 years. Thus, the offence is not ‘grave’ or ‘serious’ in terms of
B     the judgment of this Court in Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC
      40. The High Court should also have considered that the appellant is a
      74 year old person whose health is fragile and while being lodged in
      judicial custody of the Respondent Enforcement Directorate between
      16.10.2019 and 30.10.2019 and thereafter being lodged in judicial custody
      between 30.10.2019 till date, the appellant has suffered multiple bouts of
C     chronic and persistent pain in his abdomen, for which he was taken to
      AIIMS and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital on various occasions (viz.
      On 23.10.2019, 26.10.2019, 28.10.2019, 30.10.2019 and 1.11.2019) for
      consultation, diagnosis and tests. The appellant’s health continues to
      deteriorate and with the onset of the cold weather, the appellant will
D     become more vulnerable.
              12. Between 05.09.2019 and 16.10.2019 though the appellant was
      available in custody the respondent did not choose to interrogate but
      remand period was sought on 17.10.2019 and 24.10.2019, while the third
      remand sought was rejected and accordingly the remand period expired
E     on 30.10.2019. No witness was confronted despite seeking remand for
      that purpose. It is contended that the very manner in which the whole
      process is being conducted is only to see that the appellant remains in
      custody. It is contended that the liberty of the appellant cannot be denied
      in such manner by adopting an unfair procedure. Though much is sought
      to be made out as if the offence committed is grave there is absolutely
F
      no material to indicate that the appellant is involved and even otherwise
      it is a matter of trial wherein the charge is to be established. The gravity
      can only beget the length of sentence provided in law and by asserting
      that the offence is grave, the grant of bail cannot be thwarted. The
      respondent cannot contend as if the appellant should remain in custody
G     till the trial is over.
             13. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General while seeking to
      oppose the petition has made reference to the counter affidavit filed on
      behalf of the respondent. It is contended that though the High Court has
      held that there is no possibility of tampering the evidence and has not
H     influenced any witnesses and has ultimately denied the bail, such
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                  463
                [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]

conclusion is not justified. It is contended that the appellant having held     A
a very high position and also due to his status is likely to influence the
witnesses and one of the witness had already indicated that he hails
from the same State to which the appellant belongs and is not in a position
to appear for the purpose of being confronted. Hence even in that regard
it should be held against the appellant. It is further contended that even      B
otherwise despite holding the triple test in favour of the appellant the
gravity of the offence can be considered as a stand-alone aspect as the
gravity of the offence in a particular case is also important while
considering bail. In that circumstance, the three aspects to be taken note
is the manner in which the offence has taken place, gravity of the offence
and also the contemporaneous documents to show that the accused either          C
in custody or otherwise, wields influence over the witnesses. Hence, he
contends that the finding of the High Court insofar as saying that the
appellant has not tampered is factually incorrect. The learned Solicitor
General further contends that the economic offences are graver offences
which affect the society and the community suffers. The common man              D
loses confidence in the establishment. It is contended that the Investigating
Agency has collected documentary evidence such as emails exchanged
between the co-conspirators on behalf of the appellant and documents
to indicate investment of laundered money in benami properties whose
beneficial owners can be traced to the appellant and his family members.
                                                                                E
The respondent has also recorded the statement of material witnesses
who are the part of process of money laundering. It is his contention that
the appellant has knowledge of all these aspects and the material will
show the share holding pattern of the 16 companies. It is further
contended that the learned Judge of the High Court has referred to the
documents produced in a sealed cover and in that light has arrived at the       F
conclusion to deny bail. The High Court has, however, not properly
considered while recording that a complaint is ready to be filed and
therefore, he would not influence the witnesses. Even if the complaint/
charge sheet is filed in 60 days it is only to avoid default and the
investigation which is not complete would continue. In that light it is         G
contended that when economic offences are premeditated it would require
detailed investigation to unearth material and, in such circumstances, if
bail is granted it would defeat the case of the prosecution. The learned
Solicitor General has also referred to the decisions which would be taken
note at the appropriate stage.
                                                                                H
464             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A             14. The learned senior counsel for the appellant in reply to the
      submissions contended that not a single document is available to indicate
      that the appellant is involved in the offence. The allegation of the appellant
      tampering the evidence or influencing the witnesses as sought to be
      made out on behalf of the respondent cannot be accepted for the reason
      that the alleged offence is of the year 2007-08 and though the proceedings
B
      were initiated in the year 2017, the appellant was arrested only in the
      year 2019. In such event when the appellant has not influenced any
      person while he was at large, the allegation of tempering while in custody
      is not acceptable. The statement of the alleged witnesses is stated to
      have been recorded in the year 2018 and the case of the respondent that
C     they are seeking to confront the witnesses is being put forth at this stage
      only to indicate as if the custody of the appellant is still required by them.
      When there is no document to indicate that the appellant is involved, the
      mere allegation against the alleged co-conspirators cannot be the basis
      to indicate that an economic offence has been committed by the appellant.
      In that light it is contended that the prayer made in the petition be accepted.
D
              15. Though we have heard the matter elaborately and also have
      narrated the contention of both sides in great detail including those which
      were urged on the merits of the matter we are conscious of the fact that
      in the instant appeal the consideration is limited to the aspect of regular
      bail sought by the appellant under Section 439 of Cr.PC. While stating
E     so, in order to put the matter in perspective it would be appropriate to
      take note of the observation made by us in the case of this very appellant
      vs. CBI, in Criminal Appeal No. 1603/2019 which reads as hereunder;
             “The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of
             the well-settled principles having regard to the facts and
F            circumstances of each case. The following factors are to be taken
             into consideration while considering an application for bail:- (i) the
             nature of accusation and the severity of the punishment in the
             case of conviction and the nature of materials relied upon by the
             prosecution; (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the
G            witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the
             witnesses; (iii) reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
             the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence;
             (iv) character behaviour and standing of the accused and the
             circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; (v) larger interest
             of the public or the State and similar other considerations (vide
H
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                     465
                [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]

       Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi and another (2001) 4 SCC                  A
       280. There is no hard and fast rule regarding grant or refusal to
       grant bail. Each case has to be considered on the facts and
       circumstances of each case and on its own merits. The discretion
       of the court has to be exercised judiciously and not in an arbitrary
       manner.”
                                                                                   B
       16. In the above background, perusal of the order dated 15.11.2019
impugned herein indicates that the learned Single Judge having taken
note of the rival contentions in so far as the triple test or the tripod test to
be applied while considering an application for grant of regular bail under
Sec. 439 Cr.PC, has answered the same in paragraphs 50 to 53 of the
order, in favour of the appellant herein. The learned Solicitor General            C
has however sought to contend that though there is not much grievance
with regard to the conclusion on ‘flight risk’, the finding on likelihood of
tampering and influencing witness has not been considered in its correct
perspective. The finding in that regard has not been assailed and in such
event, the appellant in our opinion cannot be taken by surprise. Even              D
otherwise as rightly observed by the learned Single Judge the evidence
and material stated to have been collected is already available with the
Investigating agency. Learned Solicitor General would however contend
that still further materials are to be collected and letter rogatory has
been issued and as such tampering cannot be ruled out. In the present
situation the appellant is not in political power nor is he holding any post       E
in the Government of the day so as to be in a position to interfere. In that
view such allegation cannot be accepted on its face value. With regard
to the witness having written that he is not prepared to be confronted as
he is from the same state, the appellant cannot be held responsible for
the same when there is no material to indicate that the appellant or               F
anyone on his behalf had restrained or threatened the concerned witness
who refused to be confronted with the appellant in custody.
        17. The only other aspect therefore for consideration is as to
whether the further consideration made by the learned Judge of the
High Court, despite holding the triple test in appellant’s favour was justified    G
and if consideration is permissible, whether the learned Judge was justified
in his conclusion.
      18. While opposing the contention put forth by the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant that the learned Judge of the High Court ought
not to have travelled beyond the consideration on the triple test and              H
466             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     holding it in favour of the appellant, the learned Solicitor General would
      contend that the gravity of the offence and the role played by the accused
      should also be a part of consideration in the matter of bail. It is contended
      by the learned Solicitor General that the economic offences is a class
      apart and the gravity is an extremely relevant factor while considering
      bail. In order to contend that this aspect has been judicially recognised,
B
      the decisions in the case of State of Bihar & Anr. vs. Amit Kumar,
      (2017) 13 SCC 751; Nimmagadda Prasad vs. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC
      466; CBI vs. Ramendu Chattopadhyay, Crl Appeal.No.1711 of 2019;
      Seniors Fraud Investigation Office vs. Nittin Johari & Anr.; (2019)
      9 SCC 165; Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy vs. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439;
C     State of Gujarat vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal, (1987) 2 SCC 364
      are relied upon. Perusal of the cited decisions would indicate that this
      Court has held that economic offences are also of grave nature, being a
      class apart which arises out of deep-rooted conspiracies and effect on
      the community as a whole is also to be kept in view, while consideration
      for bail is made.
D
            19. On the consideration as made in the above noted cases and
      the enunciation in that regard having been noted, the decisions relied
      upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant and the principles
      laid down for consideration of application for bail will require our
      consideration. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has relied
E     upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
      Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565
      with reference to paragraph 27 which reads as hereunder:
            “ It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right
            to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel
F           to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as
            long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in
            Nagendra v. King-Emperor [AIR 1924 Cal 476, 479, 480 : 25
            Cri LJ 732] that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of
            the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the
G           solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused
            is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial
            and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a
            punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the
            ‘Meerut Conspiracy cases’ observations are to be found regarding
            the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar
H
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                 467
                [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]

      v. Emperor [AIR 1931 All 504 : 33 Cri LJ 94] it was observed,            A
      while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present
      Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge
      or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not
      handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which
      corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the
                                                                               B
      court that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle
      governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498
      and that the only principle which was established was that the
      discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor v.
      Hutchinson [AIR 1931 All 356, 358 : 32 Cri LJ 1271] it was said
      that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any               C
      particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to
      the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court
      unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that
      may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is
      dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say
                                                                               D
      that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other
      classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the
      various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant
      of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person
      who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his
      case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody.          E
      As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to
      freedom and every opportunity look after his own case. A
      presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him
      to establish his innocence.”
       We have taken note of the said decision since even though the           F
consideration therein was made in the situation where an application for
anticipatory bail under Section 438 was considered, the entire conspectus
of the matter relating to bail has been noted by the Constitution Bench.
       20. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has also placed
reliance on the decision on the decision in the case of Sanjay Chandra         G
vs. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 with specific reference to paragraph 39 which
reads as hereunder:
      “ Coming back to the facts of the present case, both the courts
      have refused the request for grant of bail on two grounds: the
      primary ground is that the offence alleged against the accused           H
468             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A           persons is very serious involving deep-rooted planning in which,
            huge financial loss is caused to the State exchequer; the secondary
            ground is that of the possibility of the accused persons tampering
            with the witnesses. In the present case, the charge is that of
            cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property and forgery
            for the purpose of cheating using as genuine a forged document.
B
            The punishment for the offence is imprisonment for a term which
            may extend to seven years. It is, no doubt, true that the nature of
            the charge may be relevant, but at the same time, the punishment
            to which the party may be liable, if convicted, also bears upon the
            issue. Therefore, in determining whether to grant bail, both the
C           seriousness of the charge and the severity of the punishment should
            be taken into consideration.”
             The said case was a case of financial irregularities and in the said
      circumstance this Court in addition to taking note of the deep-rooted
      planning in causing huge financial loss, the scope of consideration relating
D     to bail has been taken into consideration in the background of the term
      of sentence being seven years if convicted and in that regard it has been
      held that in determining the grant or otherwise of bail, the seriousness of
      the charge and severity of the punishment should be taken into
      consideration.
E             21. Thus from cumulative perusal of the judgments cited on either
      side including the one rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court,
      it could be deduced that the basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains
      the same inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the
      exception so as to ensure that the accused has the opportunity of securing
      fair trial. However, while considering the same the gravity of the offence
F     is an aspect which is required to be kept in view by the Court. The
      gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered from the facts and
      circumstances arising in each case. Keeping in view the consequences
      that would befall on the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has
      been held that even economic offences would fall under the category of
G     “grave offence” and in such circumstance while considering the
      application for bail in such matters, the Court will have to deal with the
      same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the accused.
      One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of the offence is also
      the term of sentence that is prescribed for the offence the accused is
      alleged to have committed. Such consideration with regard to the gravity
H
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                 469
                [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]

of offence is a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the tripod   A
test that would be normally applied. In that regard what is also to be kept
in perspective is that even if the allegation is one of grave economic
offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case since
there is no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by the
legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence provides so. Therefore, the
                                                                               B
underlining conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of
charge, the precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for
either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle.
But ultimately the consideration will have to be on case to case basis on
the facts involved therein and securing the presence of the accused to
stand trial.                                                                   C
         22. In the above circumstance it would be clear that even after
concluding the triple test in favour of the appellant the learned Judge of
the High Court was certainly justified in adverting to the issue relating to
the gravity of the offence. However, we disapprove the manner in which
the conclusions are recorded in paragraphs 57 to 62 wherein the                D
observations are reflected to be in the nature of finding relating to the
alleged offence. The learned senior counsel for the appellant with specific
reference to certain observations contained in the above noted paragraphs
has pointed out that the very contentions to that effect as contained in
paragraphs 17, 20 and 24 of the counter affidavit has been incorporated
as if, it is the findings of the Court. The learned Solicitor General while    E
seeking to controvert such contention would however contend that in
addition to the counter affidavit the respondent had also furnished the
documents in a sealed cover which was taken note by the learned Judge
and conclusion has been reached.
       23. The question as to whether the Court could look into the            F
documents while considering an application for bail had arisen for
consideration in the very case between the parties herein in Criminal
Appeal No.130/2019 wherein through the judgment dated 05.09.2019
while considering the matter relating to the order dated 20.08.2019
whereby the High Court had rejected the bail, this Court had held that it      G
would be open for the Court to receive the materials/documents collected
during the investigation and peruse the same to satisfy its conscience
that the investigation is proceeding in the right lines and for the purpose
of consideration of grant of bail/anticipatory bail etc. At the same time,
this Court, had disapproved the manner in which the learned Judge of
                                                                               H
470             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     the High Court in the said case had verbatim quoted a note produced by
      the respondent. If that be the position, in the instant case, the learned
      Judge while adverting to the materials, ought not have recorded a finding
      based on the materials produced before him. While the learned Judge
      was empowered to look at the materials produced in a sealed cover to
B     satisfy his judicial conscience, the learned Judge ought not to have
      recorded finding based on the materials produced in a sealed cover.
      Further while deciding the same case of the appellant in Crl. Appeal
      No.1340 of 2019, after holding so, this Court had consciously refrained
      from opening the sealed cover and perusing the documents lest some
      observations are made thereon after perusal of the same, which would
C     prejudice the accused pre-trial. In that circumstance though it is held
      that it would be open for the Court to peruse the documents, it would be
      against the concept of fair trial if in every case the prosecution presents
      documents in sealed cover and the findings on the same are recorded as
      if the offence is committed and the same is treated as having a bearing
D     for denial or grant of bail.
             24. Having said so, in present circumstance we were not very
      much inclined to open the sealed cover although the materials in sealed
      cover was received from the respondent. However, since the learned
      Single Judge of the High Court had perused the documents in sealed
E     cover and arrived at certain conclusion and since that order is under
      challenge, it had become imperative for us to also open the sealed cover
      and peruse the contents so as to satisfy ourselves to that extent. On
      perusal we have taken note that the statements of persons concerned
      have been recorded and the details collected have been collated. The
      recording of statements and the collation of material is in the nature of
F
      allegation against one of the co-accused Karti Chidambaram- son of
      appellant of opening shell companies and also purchasing benami
      properties in the name of relatives at various places in different countries.
      Except for recording the same, we do not wish to advert to the documents
      any further since ultimately, these are allegations which would have to
G     be established in the trial wherein the accused/co-accused would have
      the opportunity of putting forth their case, if any, and an ultimate conclusion
      would be reached. Hence in our opinion, the finding recorded by the
      learned Judge of the High Court based on the material in sealed cover is
      not justified.
H
  P. CHIDAMBARAM v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                    471
                [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]

        25. Therefore, at this stage while considering the bail application       A
of the appellant herein what is to be taken note is that, at a stage when
the appellant was before this Court in an application seeking for interim
protection/anticipatory bail, this Court while considering the matter in
Criminal Appeal No.1340/2019 had in that regard held that in a matter of
present nature wherein grave economic offence is alleged, custodial
interrogation as contended would be necessary and in that circumstance            B
the anticipatory bail was rejected. Subsequently the appellant has been
taken into custody and has been interrogated and for the said purpose
the appellant was available in custody in this case from 16.10.2019
onwards. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that the
witnesses will have to be confronted and as such custody is required for          C
that purpose. As noted, the appellant has not been named as one of the
accused in the ECIR but the allegation while being made against the co-
accused it is indicated the appellant who was the Finance Minister at
that point, has aided the illegal transactions since one of the co-accused
is the son of the appellant. In this context even if the statements on
record and materials gathered are taken note, the complicity of the               D
appellant will have to be established in the trial and if convicted, the
appellant will undergo sentence. For the present, as taken note the
anticipatory bail had been declined earlier and the appellant was available
for custodial interrogation for more than 45 days. In addition to the
custodial interrogation if further investigation is to be made, the appellant
would be bound to participate in such investigation as is required by the         E
respondent. Further it is noticed that one of the co-accused has been
granted bail by the High Court while the other co-accused is enjoying
interim protection from arrest. The appellant is aged about 74 years and
as noted by the High Court itself in its order, the appellant has already
suffered two bouts of illness during incarceration and was put on                 F
antibiotics and has been advised to take steroids of maximum strength.
In that circumstance, the availability of the appellant for further
investigation, interrogation and facing trial is not jeopardized and he is
already held to be not a ‘flight risk’ and there is no possibility of tampering
the evidence or influencing\intimidating the witnesses. Taking these and
all other facts and circumstances including the duration of custody into          G
consideration the appellant in our considered view is entitled to be granted
bail. It is made clear that the observations contained touching upon the
merits either in the order of the High Court or in this order shall not be
construed as an opinion expressed on merits and all contentions are left
open to be considered during the course of trial.
                                                                                  H
472              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A            26. For the reasons stated above, we pass the following order:
            i) The instant appeal is allowed and the judgment dated 15.11.2019
      passed by the High Court of Delhi in Bail Application No.2718 of 2019
      impugned herein is set aside;
             ii) The appellant is ordered to be released on bail if he is not
B     required in any other case, subject to executing bail bonds for a sum of
      Rs.2 lakhs with two sureties of the like sum produced to the satisfaction
      of the learned Special Judge;
             iii) The passport ordered to be deposited by this Court in the CBI
      case shall remain in deposit and the appellant shall not leave the country
C     without specific orders to be passed by the learned Special Judge.
             iv) The appellant shall make himself available for interrogation in
      the course of further investigation as and when required by the respondent.
            v) The appellant shall not tamper with the evidence or attempt to
D     intimidate or influence the witnesses;
            vi) The appellant shall not give any press interviews nor make
      any public comment in connection with this case qua him or other co-
      accused.
             vii) There shall be no order as to costs.
E                                    ORDER
             After pronouncement of the Judgment in the above mentioned
      matter, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing for the
      respondent-Directorate of Enforcement, has submitted that the findings
      in the Judgment may not have a bearing qua the other accused.
F
             Considering the above submission, we make it clear that the findings
      in the Judgment, as above, shall not have any bearing qua the other
      accused in the case and the same shall be considered independently on
      its own merits.

G
      Devika Gujral                                                Appeal allowed.




H