Holding

A conviction for abetment under Section 109 IPC cannot be sustained where the prosecution fails to produce positive evidence that the accused knowingly participated in the illegal acquisition of assets.

Summary

The case concerns P. Nallammal, wife of a former MLA and minister, who was convicted under Section 109 IPC in conjunction with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for allegedly abetting her husband in acquiring assets disproportionate to his known income. The trial court and the Madras High Court upheld her conviction and a one‑year rigorous imprisonment, also modifying an attachment order on her assets. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the principal issue was whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that Nallammal knowingly aided the illegal accumulation of wealth, satisfying the requirements of abetment under Section 107 IPC. A majority of the Court held that mere name‑lending and registration of properties in her name, without positive evidence of her knowledge of the illicit source of funds, did not constitute abetment, and therefore set aside her conviction. A dissenting judge argued that the surrounding circumstances and repeated transactions demonstrated her participation. The Court allowed the appeal challenging the conviction, dismissed the appeals concerning the attachment and administrative orders, and directed the matter to the Chief Justice of India for further directions.

Issues considered

The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knowingly aided or conspired with her husband in acquiring disproportionate assets, satisfying the elements of abetment under Section 107 IPC.
Whether the attachment order on the appellant's assets should be altered in light of her acquittal.
Whether the administrative order directing fresh hearing of the criminal appeal by the Chief Justice of the High Court is valid.

Legislation cited

Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance Act, 1944s. 3, s. 4
Evidence Act, 1872s. 106
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 109
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(e), s. 13(2)

Headnote

1854 : 2025 INSC 643 P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal No. 2489 of 2025) With (Criminal Appeal No. 2490 of 2025) Tmt. P. Nallammal & Ors. A1: Tmt. P. Nallammal A2: Thiru A. M. Paramasivam (Died) Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to appeal challenging the conviction and sentence of the appellant u/s.109 IPC r/w ss.13(1)(e) and 13(2) of PC

Subjects

Public ServantRelative of public servantCorruptionDisproportionate assetsCheck periodAbetmentAttachment OrderAdministrative OrderChief Justice of the High Court listed the criminal appeals for fresh hearingRegistry to place the papers of the appeal before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate directionsOffences abettable by a non-public servantMLAAccumulation of disproportionate assetsBonafide beliefPresumption in lawIllegal acquisitionsPresumption of innocenceCriminal jurisprudenceAbetment by close relative in corruption mattersDifference of opinion

Judgment

[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1854 : 2025 INSC 643

P. Nallammal
v.
State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anti-Corruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Appeal No. 2489 of 2025)
With
(Criminal Appeal No. 2490 of 2025)
Tmt. P. Nallammal & Ors.
A1: Tmt. P. Nallammal
A2: Thiru A. M. Paramasivam (Died) Through Lrs.
A2.1: P. Rajakumar Pandian
A2.2: P. Selvakumar Pandiyan
A2.3: Selvi Suriyakala @ Sudarsena
v.
State of Tamil Nadu, Represented By Inspector of Police
With
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 2491-2492 of 2025)
Thiru A. M. Paramasivam (Died) Through Lrs. & Ors.
A1.1: Tmt. P. Nallammal
A1.2: P. Rajakumar Pandian
A1.3: P. Selvakumar Pandiyan
A1.4: Selvi Suriyakala @ Sudarsena
v.
State of Tamil Nadu, Represented By Inspector of Police
07 May 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to appeal challenging the conviction and sentence
of the appellant u/s.109 IPC r/w ss.13(1)(e) and 13(2) of PC Act;
appeal challenging the attachment Order as modified by the High
Court; and the appeal challenging the Administrative Order passed

* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1855

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

by the Chief Justice of the High Court by which criminal appeals
were listed for fresh hearing.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – s.109 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 –
ss.13(2), 13(1)(e) – Offences under, abettable by a non-public
servant – Appellant accused of abetting her husband, an MLA-
accused no. 1, in the accumulation of disproportionate assets –
Trial court convicted accused no. 1 u/ss.13(2) and 13(1)(e) of
the PC Act, whereas the appellant-accused no.2 u/ss.13(2) and
13(1)(e) of the PC Act r/w s.109 IPC, and sentenced accordingly –
Attachment Order passed attaching the disproportionate assets
belonging to the accused no. 1 and the appellant – Appeal
thereagainst dismissed by the High Court, however, the
High Court modified the attachment order by reducing the
quantum of the disproportionate assets calculated by the trial
court – Appeal before this Court challenging the impugned
order upholding the appellant’s conviction and sentence; the
attachment Order as modified by the impugned order; and the
Administrative Order by which the Chief Justice of the High
Court had listed the criminal appeals for fresh hearing:
Held: Per Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J: It is for the prosecution
to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and a solitary
circumstance of name-lending, such as the one at present, cannot
lead to draw and sustain an inference which unerringly points to
the guilt of the appellant – There has to be something more in
the form of positive evidence to satisfy the essential requirements
for the offence of abetment – Life and liberty are not things to be
trifled with on the basis of conjectures and surmises – Presumption
of innocence is a basic tenet of criminal jurisprudence and it gets
dislodged only by presenting cogent and reliable evidence – No
evidence on record, much less any evidence to satisfy the standard
of proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish that the appellant
conspired/colluded with or intentionally aided the 1st Accused in
committing offences u/ss.13(2) r/w.13(1)(e) – Thus, the acts of
the appellant do not fall within the ambit of s.107 and in such
circumstances, it would be unsafe to sustain her conviction with
the aid of s.109 IPC – Impugned Order set aside to the extent
of conviction of the appellant and she stands discharged of the
liability of her bail bonds and sureties – Since the appellant is
acquitted, the attachment order does not require any interference
as it attaches the assets standing in her name beyond the value
1856 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

which has been explained by the appellant and accepted by the
courts below – Impugned Administrative Order, having worked
itself out, does not call for any interference – As evincible from the
impugned Administrative Order, there did not exist any ‘Judgment’,
the then Chief Justice of the High Court, thus, cannot be faulted
for restoring the criminal appeal for fresh hearing. [Paras 36-40]
Per Sudhanshu Dhulia, J (Partly dissenting): Where there is
abetment by a close relative in corruption matters, such as the
spouse in the present case, the culpability of such a relative
has to be tested by the surrounding circumstances and his/her
overall conduct because in such cases, there would rarely be
direct evidence of abetment – Appellant was an accomplice in the
commission of the crime when she allowed accused no.1 to register
the properties in her name – Appellant actively participated in the
purchase of various movable and immovable properties in her
name – It has come in unrebuttable evidence of the prosecution
that the appellant had visited the office of the concerned Registrar
for getting the sale deeds registered, and this had happened on
more than one occasion for different sale deeds – Trial court and the
High Court rightly accepted the prosecution’s case that the appellant
knowingly allowed her husband to accumulate illegal wealth in her
name and thus, committed an offence u/s.109 IPC r/w s.13(1)(e)
and s.13(2), thus, no reason to interfere with the impugned order
passed by the High Court – No fault in the administrative order
passed by the High Court. [Paras 15-19, 20, 21, 26, 27]
Per curiam: In view of difference of opinion pertaining to the
impugned order upholding the appellant’s conviction and sentence,
the Registry to place the papers of the appeal before the Chief
Justice of India for appropriate directions. [Paras 1, 3]

Case Law Cited
In the Judgment of Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State [1999] Supp. 1 SCR 135 : (1999) 6
SCC 559 – relied on.
K. Ponnuswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 97 :
(2001) 6 SCC 674; State v. Uttamchand Bohra [2021] 9 SCR 821 :
(2022) 16 SCC 663 – distinguished.
State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu [2022] 7 SCR 630 : (2023) 6
SCC 768 – referred to.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1857

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

In the Judgment of Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State [1999] Supp. 1 SCR 135 : (1999) 6
SCC 559; K. Ponnuswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [2001] Supp. 1
SCR 97 : (2001) 6 SCC 674; State v. Uttamchand Bohra [2021]
9 SCR 821 : (2022) 16 SCC 663; Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v.
State of Maharashtra [2023] 11 SCR 1135 : 2023 SCC OnLine
1038– relied on.
DSP v. K Inbasagaran (2006) 1 SCC 420; Kartarey v State of Uttar
Pradesh [1976] 2 SCR 199 : AIR 1976 SC 76; Reena Hazarika v.
State of Assam [2018] 13 SCR 1108 : (2019) 13 SCC 289; State
of Karnataka v. J Jayalalithaa [2017] 5 SCR 525 : (2017) 6 SCC
263; Kedari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2015) 14 SCC 505;
State of Tamil Nadu v. R Soundirarasu (2023) 6 SCC 768; Kishori
Lal v State of Madhya Pradesh [2007] 7 SCR 1051 : (2007) 10
SCC 797; State through Inspector of Police CBI Chennai v. Naresh
Prasad Agarwal (2024) 3 SCC 515; State through the Inspector
of Police CBI, ACB, Chennai v. S Murali Mohan, Criminal Appeal
No. 4166/2024 – referred to.

List of Acts
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860; Criminal
Law (Amendment) Ordinance Act, 1944.

List of Keywords
Public Servant; Relative of public servant; Corruption;
Disproportionate assets; Check period; Abetment; Attachment
Order; Administrative Order; Chief Justice of the High Court
listed the criminal appeals for fresh hearing; Registry to place
the papers of the appeal before the Chief Justice of India for
appropriate directions; Offences abettable by a non-public servant;
MLA; Accumulation of disproportionate assets; Bonafide belief;
Presumption in law; Illegal acquisitions; Presumption of innocence;
Criminal jurisprudence; Abetment by close relative in corruption
matters; Difference of opinion.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2489 of 2025
1858 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.11.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 1170 of 2000
With
Criminal Appeal No(s). 2490 and 2491-2492 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., M. P. Parthiban, R. Sudhakaran, Shreyas
Kaushal, Bilal Mansoor, S. Geyolin Selvam, Alagiri K
Advs. for the Respondent:
D. Kumanan, Ms. Deepa S, Sheikh F Kalia, Veshal Tyagi, Chinmay
Anand Panigrahi.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

1. I had the benefit of going through the Judgment authored by my
learned brother Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. where the Accused No.2
(P. Nallammal) has been acquitted for the offence under Section 109
of IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PC Act’). Though
I agree with some of the observations made by my brother Judge,
yet I am unable to accept the conclusion and findings of acquittal
as regards Accused No.2, who was the wife of the public servant
Accused No.1. Consequently, I have found it necessary to pen down
my reasons for doing so.
2. I would, first of all, make it clear that the delivery of this order has
taken more time than usual. But then I was only handed over his
opinion by my learned Brother a fortnight back and it has taken this
much of time further for me to give my reasons.
3. Leave granted.
4. There are four appeals before us:
a. Appeal arising from SLP (Crl) No.2127/2024 filed by the Accused
No.2 (P. Nallammal) challenging the impugned order dated
20.11.2023 by which appellant’s conviction and sentence of
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1859

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

one year R.I for offence under Section 109 of IPC read with
Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of PC Act by the Trial Court,
has been affirmed.
b. Appeal arising from SLP (Crl) No.2288/2024 filed by Accused
No.2 and Legal Heirs of the Accused No.1 (children of the
Accused No.1 and Accused No.2), challenging the attachment
Order as modified by the impugned order dated 20.11.2023.
c. Appeals arising from SLP (Crl) No.5196-5197/2024 filed by
the Legal Heirs of the Accused No.1 (children of the Accused
No.1 and Accused No.2), challenging the Administrative Order
dated 03.03.2022 by which the Chief Justice of the High Court
had listed the criminal appeals for fresh hearing which finally
resulted in the common impugned order dated 20.11.2023 by
which order of Accused No.2’s conviction and sentence as well
as the order of the attachment, with modification, were affirmed.
5. For the sake of convenience, the facts of the case are being taken
from the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 2127 of 2024.
However, the facts are not being reproduced in detail.
6. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to take note of the following
details of this case:
a. Accused no.1 (husband of the appellant) who was a Member
of the Legislative Assembly and a Minister, was accused of
acquiring disproportionate assets while holding public office as
a public servant. The properties were also accumulated in the
name of the present appellant i.e. Accused no.2 and their minor
children. The present appellant was thus accused of abetting
the accumulation of disproportionate assets.
b. The Trial Court convicted Accused No.1 under sections 13(2) and
13(1)(e) of the PC Act, whereas the appellant (Accused No.2)
was convicted under sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act
read with section 109 of the IPC. Accused No.1 and appellant
(Accused No.2) were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of
two years and one year, respectively.
c. An attachment order dated 03.01.2001 was passed under
sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance,
1944 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ordinance’), whereby the
disproportionate assets belonging to Accused No.1 and the
appellant were attached.
1860 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

d. Against both these orders (of conviction and sentence, and
attachment, respectively), the accused filed appeals before the
High Court. The High Court dismissed the criminal appeals by
the impugned judgment dated 20.11.2023. However, the High
Court modified the attachment order by reducing the quantum
of disproportionate assets calculated by the Trial Court.
e. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court,
Accused No.1 (husband of the appellant) has passed away. Now,
we have only Accused No.2 i.e. P. Nallammal, wife of the main
accused (A.M Paramasivam) who is now deceased, before us.
7. The challenge before us is to a judgment delivered by the Madras
High Court on 20.11.2023, whereby the conviction of the appellant
under sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act read with section
109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’)
and consequent sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year
imposed by the Trial Court was upheld.
8. At the outset, I must note that there are concurrent findings against
the accused in this case, holding her guilty of abetment in amassing
disproportionate assets during Accused No.1’s tenure in public office
i.e. between 16.06.1991 and 09.05.1996 (hereinafter ‘check period’).
9. The prosecution case was that the accused had amassed
disproportionate assets, since there was a vast difference between
the assets in their name at the beginning of the check period i.e.,
between 16.06.1991 and 09.05.1996. The prosecution case against
the present appellant was that although she had no independent
income as such, she abetted her husband in acquisition of these
assets in her name and in the name of her children as their
representative and natural guardian.
10. On the other hand, defence would argue that the figure of
disproportionate assets arrived at by the prosecution was grossly
exaggerated and based on arbitrary calculations. They had also
challenged the inclusion of many immovable properties by the
prosecution, arguing that these were acquired before the check
period. It was also the contention that their assets were traceable to
legitimate sources of income, such as income from agriculture, gifts
etc. and this was forthcoming from the Income Tax returns submitted
by them. Moreover, the counsel for the appellant would also argue
that the present appellant, in any case, is not a public servant and
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1861

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

thus, she has no obligation to explain her sources of income and
further, she cannot be convicted under Section 109 of IPC read with
Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2).
11. We have heard both sides and perused the record.
12. The Trial Court undertook a thorough examination of the oral and
documentary evidence on record, as well as the arguments made
by both sides, to arrive at the conclusion that the prosecution had
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the Accused
No.1 was guilty of misusing his public office in order to accumulate
disproportionate assets, which constituted ‘criminal misconduct’ under
section 13 of the Act. Further, the present appellant, i.e. Accused
no.2, was held guilty of abetment of the offence of Section 13(1)
(e) of the PC Act. It was specifically held that the accused had
failed to establish that the assets treated as disproportionate by the
prosecution were traceable to legitimate sources of income, since
the evidence brought on record by the accused to prove the same
was not satisfactory. These findings of the Trial Court were affirmed
by the High Court by the impugned judgment.
13. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant also tried to argue
that many of the assets considered by the Courts as ‘disproportionate
assets’, were actually gifted by the father of the appellant at the time
of her marriage to accused No.1. Further, a substantial portion of the
immovable properties sought to be included in the ‘disproportionate
assets’ by the prosecution were, in fact, purchased long before the
check period. These arguments have rightly been disbelieved as
the Trial Court arrived at a specific finding on these on examination
of documents and witnesses which show that the properties were
purchased only between March and May 1996, which falls within
the check period.
14. The story of defence that some portion of land, included in
‘disproportionate assets’, was purchased by Accused No.1 from his
brother in the year 1988 (i.e. before the check period), but for which
the sale deed was executed in favour of the children of the Accused
No.1 and appellant only in the year 1994, is very difficult to believe,
and the High Court and the Trial Court rightly rejected this line of
reasoning.
15. The efforts to prove that the income alleged to be ‘disproportionate
assets’ by the prosecution is from legitimate sources failed as the
1862 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

evidence presented by the defence was not only vague but lacked
credibility as well.
16. We must also keep in mind that insofar as corruption cases under
section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act are concerned, the burden of proof is
reversed, and it becomes the responsibility of the accused to dislodge
the presumption against him. This position has been reiterated by
this Court in State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu (2023) 6 SCC 768:
“83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure
from the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden
will always lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients
of the offences charged and never shifts on the accused to
disprove the charge framed against him. The legal effect
of Section 13(1)(e) is that it is for the prosecution
to establish that the accused was in possession of
properties disproportionate to his known sources
of income but the term “known sources of income”
would mean the sources known to the prosecution
and not the sources known to the accused and within
the knowledge of the accused. It is for the accused
to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his
hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to
give satisfactory explanation… ”
In the present case, the prosecution succeeded in establishing that
the accused were in possession of assets hugely disproportionate
to their known sources of income. The prosecution had successfully
discharged its initial burden. Thereafter, it was for the accused to satisfy
the Court, through cogent evidence, that the assets are from legitimate
sources. Upon perusal of the material on record and considering the
concurrent findings of the Courts below, I am of the opinion that the
accused miserably failed to discharge this burden of satisfactorily
explaining the source of income behind the ‘disproportionate assets’.
17. In fact, as far as the evaluation of disproportionate assets is
concerned, I and my learned brother (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.),
both agree that the High Court has rightly evaluated the assets, after
considering the material on record. The only point of our disagreement
is the question of the culpability of the appellant (P. Nallammal). In
the opinion of my learned brother Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J., it was
the appellant’s husband (Accused No.1) who had accumulated assets
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1863

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

disproportionate to his known sources of income and the prosecution
could not prove that the appellant was aware that the money from
which assets were being purchased or bought in her name, were
from unlawful sources. It is this finding that I disagree with.
18. There is no doubt that mere registration of disproportionate assets in
the name of a public servant’s relative or friend does not make that
person guilty of abetment of the offence of Section 13(1)(e) of the
PC Act. All the same, it is also a settled position of law that a person
who is not a public servant still can commit an offence under Section
13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the PC Act read with Section 109 of
the IPC. I am of the opinion that the appellant was an accomplice
in the commission of the crime when she allowed Accused No.1 to
register the properties in her name. Where there is abetment by
a close relative in corruption matters, such as the spouse in the
present case, the culpability of such a relative has to be tested by
the surrounding circumstances and his/her overall conduct. This is
because, in such cases, there would rarely be direct evidence of
abetment. This factor has to be kept in mind.
19. The appellant married Accused No.1 in the year 1983 and she was
a housewife without any independent source of income. After going
through the records, the High Court notes that from the year of
marriage (i.e.1983) till 1991, there is no acquisition of immovable
property either in the name of the appellant or Accused No.1. Accused
No.1 became MLA in the year 1991 and minister in the year 1993
and then the acquisition of properties, moveable and immovable,
also starts. After perusing the document showing the properties
acquired by the accused, the Trial Court observed how land was
purchased in the name of the appellant or in the name of minor
children through the appellant, on more than one occasion. This is
what was observed by the Trial Court:
“(5) On 25.11.92, the 2nd Accused purchased 0.45 Acres
of land for a sale consideration of Rs.16,875 situated at
Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.2, Stamp fee is Rs.2,030,
PW-1, PW-46 deposed about sale. (6) On 14.02.1992,
the 2nd Accused purchased 9 cents of land for a sale
consideration of Rs. 4500 situated at Kodikulam Village
under Ex. P.11, Stamp fee is Rs.540, PW-2, PW-48
deposed about sale. (7) On 16.04.1993, the 2nd Accused
purchased 1.45 acre of land for a sale consideration of
1864 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Rs.64,980 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian situated at
Kodikulum Village under Ex.P.3, Stamp fee is Rs.7860,
PW-1, PW-47 deposed about sale. (8) On 22.09.1993,
the 2nd Accused purchased a house situated at K.K
Nagar, Madurai and 1 cents of land situated at Kerala,
for a sale consideration of Rs1,50,000 under Ex.P.16,
Stamp fee is Rs.9050, PW-4, PW-44 deposed about
sale. On 04.04.1994, the 2nd Accused purchased 2.48
acres of Nanja land for a sale consideration of Rs.80,600
on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam
Village under Ex.P.4, Stamp fee is Rs.9680, PW-1,
PW-54 deposed about sale. (10) On 12.09.1994, the 2nd
Accused purchased 2.43 acres of Nanja land for a sale
consideration of Rs.1,23,160 on behalf of Selvakumar
Pandian situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.5, Stamp
fee is Rs.14,860, PW-1, PW-45 deposed about sale. (11)
On 23.09.1994, the 2nd Accused purchased 1.29 acre of
Nanja land for a sale consideration of Rs.70,950 on behalf
of Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam Village under
EX.P.6, Stamp fee is Rs.8520, PW-1, Pw-49 deposed
about sale…..(14) On 11.04.1996, the 2nd Accused
purchased 4.27 acres Nanja land for a sale consideration
of Rs.2,32,210 on behalf of daughter Suriyakala situated
at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.7, Stamp fee is Rs.28000,
PW-1, PW-51 deposed about sale….(16) On 06.05.1996,
the 2nd Accused purchased 1.61 acre of Nanja land for
a sale consideration of Rs.87,620 on behalf of Rajkumar
Pandian situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.6, Stamp
fee is Rs.10,680, PW-1, PW-50 deposed about sale….”
Not only this, but additionally, two cars and other movable and
immovable properties were also purchased in the name of the
appellant and the minor children through the appellant.
20. Thus, it is not the case that there were only one or two transactions
in the name of the appellant for which the appellant can say that she
acted in a bona fide manner without knowing that the funds which
were used for acquiring these assets were from unlawful sources. In
my considered opinion, these transactions during the check period
demonstrate how the appellant aided her husband in the accumulation
of disproportionate assets by allowing him to register the same in her
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1865

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

name. The High Court notes that the total salary drawn by accused
No.1 during the check period was Rs. 2,17,178, and considering
this, it is impossible to imagine that the appellant was not aware of
her husband’s legitimate income. It is very hard to believe that she
was not aware that these assets which were in her name were not
acquired from her husband’s legitimate sources of income.
21. Moreover, it was never the appellant’s case that she was not aware
that her husband had been purchasing the properties in her name
by using the funds gained from illegitimate sources. From the Trial
Court to this Court, what the appellant has only been unsuccessfully
arguing is that her independent income was not taken into account
and her assets prior to the check period were not properly assessed.
All these grounds have already been dealt with by the Trial Court and
High Court, and the appellant has failed to show that there has been
any discrepancy in the evaluation of assets. Even on re-evaluation
by the High Court, the High Court has only found a discrepancy of
around Rs.2 lacs and even by reducing that amount from the total
worth of disproportionate assets, the percentage of disproportionality
remained above 400% of the accused’s known sources of income.
There is no doubt that the appellant intentionally aided her husband
in the accumulation of disproportionate assets.
22. The Trial Court as well as the High Court have rightly relied upon
the decision of this Court in P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State (1999) 6
SCC 559 to hold the appellant guilty of abetment of the offence of
Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. In that case, this Court had accepted
the submission of the State that a person who is not a public servant,
can also be an abettor for the offences under Section 13 of the PC
Act. Accepting and reiterating the illustrations suggested by the
State’s Counsel, it was observed by this Court as follows:
“24.…
The first illustration cited is this:
If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of
how other public servants have become more wealthy by
receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do
the same in order to become rich and the public servant
acts accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be
any doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation.
1866 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Next illustration is this:
Four persons including the public servant decide to raise
a bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons
prompt the public servant to keep such money in their
names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons
are guilty of abetment through conspiracy.
The last illustration is this:
If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he
has acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he
cannot keep them as he has no known source of income
to account, he requests A to keep the said wealth in A’s
name, and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it
is a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling under
the “Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.
25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how the offence
under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act can be abetted by
non-public servants. The only mode of prosecuting such
offender is through the trial envisaged in the PC Act.”
It is clear that the appellant’s case squarely falls within the third
illustration produced above. Interestingly, the case cited above i.e. of
P. Nallamal (Supra) relates to none other but the present appellant
and her deceased husband, who had earlier approached this Court
seeking quashing of the present criminal case.
23. My learned brother has also discussed two other cases of this Court,
though in my humble opinion, these are distinguishable on facts and
would be of no help to the appellant.
24. The first case is K. Ponnuswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 6
SCC 674. In this case, the High Court upheld the conviction of the
main accused for acquiring disproportionate assets while his wife
and daughter were acquitted. When the main accused came before
this Court, this Court dismissed his criminal appeal, whereas in
relation to the acquittal of wife and daughter, this Court did not say
anything since the State had submitted that they are going to file an
appeal challenging the acquittal of the daughter and wife of the main
accused. No such appeal was filed by the State. On the contrary, the
wife and daughter of the main accused therein approached this Court
challenging the order confiscating their properties. This Court remitted
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1867

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

the matter to the High Court on the ground that the Courts below did
not record proper reasons for confiscating the properties belonging to
the wife and daughter. Finally, the High Court gave directions for the
exclusion of their assets from the order of confiscation, considering
that they stand acquitted in the matter. However, that case cannot
be read as a decision in favour of the daughter and wife, since the
innocence or guilt of the daughter and wife of the public servant
involved in that case was never an issue before this Court. Hence,
that case cannot come to the aid of the present appellant.
25. The second case which my learned brother relies upon is State v.
Uttamchand Bohra (2022) 16 SCC 663. The facts of this case are
also totally distinguishable from the case at hand. In that case, a
public servant (main accused) working for the Central Government
was accused of buying some property, in the name of a company
named M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd., using the money from
his unknown sources of income. There one Uttamchand Bohra
(respondent therein) was also made an accused, alleging that he had
abetted the public servant in the accumulation of disproportionate
assets inasmuch as Uttamchand Bohra’s employee was the witness
of the sale deed, and title deeds were also recovered from his house.
The respondent moved a discharge application, which was dismissed
by the Trial court. Later, in revision, the High Court quashed the case
against Uttamchand Bohra. Thereafter, the State approached this
Court against the order of the High Court. This Court dismissed the
State’s appeal and affirmed the order of the High Court. The relevant
portion of the judgment is as follows:
“25. The charge-sheet further does not contain any
allegation which can amount to an offence under Section
109IPC. The prosecution has not suggested that he
abetted A-1 to acquire disproportionate assets in any
manner; the only allegation is that the title deeds to the
flat, which is in the name of M/s Raviteja Trading Co.
Pvt. Ltd. was seized from his custody and that he had
instructed his employee to witness the document. An
allegation of the existence of signatures of Uttamchand’s
employee, as a witness to the sale deed cannot amount
to his aiding or abetting A-1 to acquire disproportionate
assets. Witnessing a sale deed is a formal requirement.
Likewise, the fact that the sale deed was in Uttamchand’s
1868 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any of the
offences alleged against him.
26. The statements of the approvers, A-3 and A-4, who
were tendered pardon by the Court, do not reveal any
involvement by Uttamchand in commission of the alleged
offence. During the pendency of the present proceedings
the recording of depositions of 74 witnesses was
completed. Those were part of this Court’s record; they do
not show any incriminating material as far as Uttamchand
is concerned. Furthermore, crucially, the money trail for
the property bought under the sale deed, does not show
Uttamchand’s involvement. It may implicate A-3 and A-4,
however as stated before, the Court has granted a pardon
to them, for which they have turned approvers.
….
29. CBI cannot deny that Uttamchand’s name was included
in the present case, although the sale deed was seized
during a search conducted in relation to another FIR (the
earlier case) — and not in relation to the present case,
which relates to the disproportionate assets case. The
FIR in the present case names only A-1 and A-2 as the
accused. The sale deed had already been seized from
Uttamchand’s house by then.
….
36. An entire overview of the material produced before the
trial court, with the charge-sheet and final report, as well as
deposition of the 74 witnesses who were examined during
the trial, does not support CBI›s allegation of Uttamchand.
He did not directly or indirectly finance the transaction
by which property was sold to M/s Raviteja Trading Co.
Pvt. Ltd., which, according to that prosecution, was in
fact by A-1. The respondent also is not alleged to have
facilitated the flow of money to fund acquisition of the flat.
The material put against him is that the sale deed was
seized, prior to the present case. The other circumstance
put against him is that his employee witnessed the sale
deed. The respondent is concededly neither the owner,
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1869

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

nor has any links with M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd.
In these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that no
material which can prima facie support an inference that
Uttamchand was either a conspirator or had abetted the
commission of the offences alleged against the accused
A-1 is made out.”
(Emphasis Provided)

Thus, it is clear that the facts of the above case are entirely distinct
from the present matter. The accused in that case had no involvement
in the offence as the assets were allegedly purchased by the
public servant in the name of a company with which the accused
(Uttamchand Bohra) had nothing to do. The only allegations against
Uttamchand Bohra were that the title deeds were recovered from his
residence, and that one of his employees was a witness to the sale
deed by which assets disproportionate to known sources of income
were purchased by the public servant.
26. In no way can the facts of the above cases be compared to the case
at hand. In the present case, the appellant actively participated in
the purchase of various movable and immovable properties in her
name. It has come in unrebuttable evidence of the prosecution that
the present appellant had visited the office of the concerned Registrar
for getting the sale deeds registered. And this had happened on
more than one occasion for different sale deeds. The Trial Court and
the High Court had rightly accepted the prosecution’s case that the
appellant knowingly allowed her husband to accumulate illegal wealth
in her name and thus, committed an offence under Section 109 of
the IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
27. In view of the above, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned
order dated 20.11.2023 passed by the High Court. Also, like my
brother Judge, I do not see any fault in the administrative order
dated 03.03.2022 passed by the High Court. Accordingly, I dismiss
all these appeals.
28. The appellant is directed to surrender within ten weeks from today
to undergo her remaining sentence.
29. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
30. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
1870 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Leave granted.
2. The present appeals arise from a common set of facts and have,
therefore, been heard together, and are disposed of by this Judgment.
It is necessary to first advert to the relevant factual background,
wherefrom the instant appeals have traversed to this Court.

FACTUAL LENS:
3. A. M. Paramasivam (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘1st Accused’)
was an elected Member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly
during the period 16.06.1991 to 09.05.1996. He also served as the
Minister for Labour Welfare, Government of Tamil Nadu during the
period 17.05.1993 to 09.05.1996. On 20.08.1996, CR No.5/AC/96/
Headquarters was registered against him and his wife, P. Nallamal
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘2nd Accused’) alleging acquisition
of properties beyond known pecuniary resources, which were
disproportionate to the extent of Rs.38,72,545/- during the Check
Period i.e., between 16.06.1991 to 09.05.1996. The 1st Accused and
2nd Accused are hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘Accused’.
4. A. M. Paramasivam was charged for the offence under Section 13(2)
read with 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Act’) for acquiring properties and pecuniary resources
which were disproportionate to his known sources of income to the
extent of Rs.38,72,545/-, which he had not satisfactorily accounted
for. Whereas, P. Nallamal was tried for offence under Section 109
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’)
read with Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(c) of the Act for abetting the
offence by permitting the 1st Accused to acquire a substantial portion
of the properties in her name and in the names of her minor children
and for holding such properties on his behalf.
5. Before the learned III Special Judge/XIII Additional Judge, Chennai
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’), on behalf of the prosecution,
62 witnesses (PW1 to PW62) were examined, 160 Exhibits (Ex.P1
to Ex.P160) were marked along with 31 material objects (MO1 to
MO31). On the side of the defence, 30 witness (DW1 to DW30) were
examined and 15 Exhibits (Ex.D1 to Ex.D15) were marked.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1871

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

6. The Trial Court vide Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2000 determined
the value of the assets acquired by the 1st Accused disproportionate to
his known source of income as being Rs.35,25,136/- for the purpose of
action under Section 12 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance
Act, 1944, and convicted both the 1st and 2nd Accused:

Accused Offence Conviction and Sentence
[under the Act as it
then stood]

1st Accused Section 13(2) r/w 13(1) To undergo two years Rigorous
(c) of the Act Imprisonment and to pay fine of
Rs.10,000/. In default of payment
of fine, to undergo 2 months
further Simple Imprisonment.

2nd Accused Section 109, IPC r/w To undergo one year Rigorous
13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) of Imprisonment and to pay fine of
the Act Rs.5000/-. In default of payment
of fine, to undergo 1 month further
Simple Imprisonment.

7. In view of the above conviction, the learned Principal Sessions
Judge, Madurai by Order dated 03.01.2001 in Crl. O.P. No.2 of 1997
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Attachment Order’) made the earlier
interim attachment order dated 06.03.1997 of the schedule-mentioned
properties in Crl. M.P. No.1168/1997, absolute and ordered that the
amount of Rs.35,25,136/- shall be recovered by forfeiture of the
attached properties.
8. The 1 st and 2 nd Accused filed Criminal Appeal No.1170/2000
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Criminal Appeal’) before the High
Court of Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High
Court’) challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the
Trial Court. Along with this Criminal Appeal, the accused filed Civil
Miscellaneous Application No.425/2001 challenging the Attachment
Order. With the leave of the High Court, the accused marked two
additional documents as Ex.D16 & Ex.D17.
9. The story takes a rather interesting turn from here. It would be material
to note the case of the appellants. According to them, between
08.02.2013 and 20.02.2013, the Criminal Appeal was listed before
the High Court and elaborate arguments were advanced by both
sides, subsequent to which the judgment was reserved by a learned
1872 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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Single Judge. On 30.04.2013, as put forth by the appellants, the
learned Single Judge pronounced Judgment and acquitted both the
accused. Thereafter, the counsel for the accused filed applications
dated 30.04.2013, 09.12.2013 and 16.02.2015 praying for a Certified
Copy of the Judgment/Order dated 30.04.2013, which was not made
available. On 23.03.2015, the 1st Accused passed away. Later, the
2nd Accused also made a complaint to the Registrar General of
the High Court to the effect that a Certified Copy of the Judgment/
Order dated 30.04.2013 had not been furnished by the Registry
and no reason was assigned for the same. The Assistant Registrar
(Administration) of the High Court, on 19.08.2015, replied to the 2nd
Accused, stating that no action could be taken in judicial proceedings
on letters received by post.
10. After over five years, the High Court, on 19.07.2018, listed the
criminal appeal for ‘fresh hearing’. The 2nd Accused filed Writ Petition
(Criminal) No.437/2021 titled P Nallammal v The Registrar General
High Court of Judicature at Madras before this Court challenging
the fresh listing of the Criminal Appeal, which was disposed of vide
Order dated 13.12.2021 with a request to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of
the High Court to conduct an enquiry on the administrative side and
to take a decision. Pursuant to this Order, an enquiry was conducted
by the learned Chief Justice on 23.02.2022, in which the 2nd Accused
participated. By an order dated 03.03.2022 in R.O.C. No.2/2022/Crl.
Sec. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Administrative Order’),
the Chief Justice, in the absence of a judgment on record, directed
the appeal to be listed for fresh hearing.
11. Pursuant to the Impugned Administrative Order, the appeal along
with CMA No.425/2001 challenging the Attachment Order, was re-
heard. Vide Final Judgment and Order dated 20.11.2023 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’), the High Court dismissed the
Criminal Appeal and confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed
by the Trial Court. The High Court, in the Impugned Order, found the
value of the assets disproportionate to the known source of income
of the accused to be Rs.33,25,136. Accordingly, CMA No.425/2001
was dismissed and the Attachment Order was confirmed with a
modification to the effect of recovering a sum of Rs.33,25,165/- instead
of Rs.35,25,136/- with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of
interim attachment viz. 06.03.1997.
12. For the sake of clarity, the three appeals before us presently are:
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1873

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

(i) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2127/2024 filed by the
2nd Accused challenging the conviction and sentence imposed
by the Impugned Order.
(ii) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2288/2024 filed by the
2nd Accused and the Legal Heirs of the 1st Accused (children of
the 1st and 2nd Accused), challenging the Attachment Order as
modified by the Impugned Order.
(iii) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) Nos.5196-5197/2024 filed by
the Legal Heirs of the 1st Accused (2nd Accused and children of
the 1st and 2nd Accused) challenging the Impugned Administrative
Order directing fresh hearing of the Criminal Appeal as well as
the Impugned Order.

APPELLANTS’ SUBMISSIONS:
13. At the outset, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that
after the acquittal of the appellants by the High Court by pronouncing
a Judgment in open court on 30.04.2013, it was not constitutionally
permissible to rehear the disposed of appeal only on the ground that
the Judgment which was pronounced in open court was not found in
the case bundle, that too after over five years of the pronouncement
of the judgement and almost three years after the death of the 1st
Accused. It was submitted that the Judgment dated 30.04.2013
had properly appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the
accused, and this, in itself, would prove that the Impugned Order is
erroneous and illegal.
14. It was submitted that in terms of DSP v K Inbasagaran, (2006) 1
SCC 420, when there is evidence that the wife had independent
income and the same is proved, it cannot be included with the assets
of the husband-public servant. In the present case, in Statement-II,
the prosecution had admitted that at the time of marriage, the 2nd
Accused was given 100 sovereigns of gold. The properties acquired
in the name of the 2nd Accused during the Check Period were
valued at Rs.5,42,375/-. It was submitted that Item 19 (second-hand
Ambassador Car) was valued at Rs.1,30,000/- whereas PW55 (the
vendor) stated that he had sold it for only Rs.40,000/-. Thus, the
total amount of properties acquired in the name of the 2nd Accused
is only Rs.4,52,375/-.
15. It was contended that way before the Check Period, the 2nd Accused
had agricultural lands as per Ex.P93 and her father/DW29 had given
1874 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

1.18 acres and 1.35 acres of Nanja land to her as stridhana. For some
lands, the patta stands in her name. Further, DWs 3, 6, 11, 14, 19, 23,
and 25 have given evidence stating that they borrowed money from
the 2nd Accused before the Check Period and were paying interest for
the same. The income from agriculture and by way of interest also
stands corroborated from Ex.D2 and Ex.D3, which are the returns
recovered from PW62 (auditor) during the course of investigation.
16. Next, it was argued that the Income Tax Department has assessed
the agricultural income and the income by way of interest and the
Trial Court has disbelieved the defence witnesses and documents
in this behalf, without assigning any cogent reasons. It was argued
that the 2nd Accused was not a pauper, that she was a daughter of
a rich family and also paying income tax of her own. Learned senior
counsel submitted that the Courts below had rejected the explanation
so offered by the 2nd Accused without any reasoning. Further, it was
pointed out that there is no evidence that the 1st Accused contributed
anything ever to the 2nd Accused to purchase any assets. Instead,
the purchases made by the 2nd Accused were from her own income
and from the contributions of her father/DW29.
17. It was further contended that if the assets standing in the name of the
2nd Accused are excluded, then the assets held by the 1st Accused
at the end of the Check Period itself would be within limits. It was
urged that there was no disproportionality in the assets held by him.
There were as many as fifteen documents and 30 witnesses on the
side of the defence, which would discharge the 1st accused from the
burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The
Impugned Order failed to refer to the defence documents. As per
Ex.D3, Ex.D16 and Ex.D17 and the oral evidence of the defence
witnesses, it has been clearly established that the 1st Accused had
an agricultural income of Rs.13,55,715/- and the 2nd Accused had
an agricultural income of Rs.1,59,250/-. Furthermore, the Impugned
Order failed to note the evidence of PW29 and Ex.P60 which would
prove that the income of the 2nd Accused from the sale of sugarcane
at the mill and the amounts earned by the sugarcane mill were to
the tune of Rs.4,21,349/-. The Travelling Allowance and Dearness
Allowance paid to the 1st Accused totalling Rs.1,20,779/- has also
not been taken into account by the Courts below. Kartarey v State
of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 76 and Reena Hazarika v State
of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289 were referred to in support of the
propositions canvassed by the learned senior counsel.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1875

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

18. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Accused have discharged
the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and
established their lawful sources of income and the acquisitions made
by them. In such scenario, the Impugned Order is liable to be set aside
and the 2nd Accused is entitled to be acquitted. As a consequence,
the Impugned Attachment Order in CMA No.425/2001, upholding
the Attachment Order is also liable to be set aside in the absence of
proof that such properties were acquired by committing a scheduled
offence. It was prayed to allow the respective appeals as aforesaid.
19. We may also note that though, in the pleadings, there is an argument
that the ingredients of Section 107 of IPC are not made out and hence,
the 2nd Accused cannot be punished for abetment by invoking Section
109 of IPC, the same was not canvassed during oral submissions.

RESPONDENT-STATE’S SUBMISSIONS:
20. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that the
appeals are without merit and the prosecution had proved the charges
beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted that the prosecution
had demonstrated, through witness testimonies and documentary
evidence, that the accused, particularly the 1st Accused, Late Mr. A. M.
Paramasivam, who held public office as a Member of the Legislative
Assembly and later as Minister for Labour Welfare, Government of
Tamil Nadu, had amassed wealth significantly beyond his disclosed
income sources. Despite claims by the Accused that their incomes
were from agricultural lands and independent sources of income of
the 2nd Accused, these claims had not been substantiated by reliable
documentation or testimony.
21. The assessment of the Accuseds’ assets, submitted learned counsel,
as determined by the Trial Court, was accurate and based on
credible evidence, which led to a determination that the appellants
were in possession of assets worth Rs.37,71,590/-, significantly
disproportionate to their known income sources, amounting to a 442%
disparity, which justified conviction. It was submitted that except for
about 5 acres of land in possession at the beginning of the Check
Period, the accused had not produced any acceptable evidence to
show that they had other lands that they were cultivating or owned.
22. It was contended that the 2nd Accused had no independent income
and aided the 1st Accused in illegally acquiring wealth in her and her
children’s name. It is submitted that the Accused relied heavily on
1876 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Income Tax Returns and agricultural income claims, but the returns
alone cannot substantiate the claim of legal acquisition of assets.
The income disclosed in the Income Tax Returns and the findings
of the Income Tax Department are confined to income assessable
to tax and is not proof that the assets from which the income is
derived, were acquired legally. It was submitted that Ex.D1, Ex.D2
and Ex.D3 were self-serving documents which surfaced after the
search conducted at the residential premises of the Accused, and
would be of no evidentiary value.
23. It was further submitted that the self-serving evidence testified by
interested witnesses in respect of the Accuseds’ immovable properties
are hard to believe. Particularly, when the 1st Accused himself claims
that he was a full-time politician, his tall claim of cultivating about 6.61
acres of land under lease besides owning 5 acres of land, has rightly
been disbelieved by the Trial Court as lacking evidence.
24. For the sake of argument, even if the explanation of the Accused
is accepted, assuming that the relatives of the Accused presented
household articles during the house-warming ceremony, the entire
value of such house-hold appliances like Colour Television, Fridge
etc. being only a sum of Rs.1,24,740/- could be reduced from the
total value of the assets acquired during the Check Period. At the
most, the dispute in valuation can be only in respect of Architect fees
(less Rs.75,000/-) and the value of the household articles alleged to
have been gifted by known persons and relatives (less Rs.1,24,740/-).
At this, the value of assets acquired during the Check Period would
reduce, from Rs.37,70,590/- to Rs.35,71,330/.
25. Moreover, the marriage of the Accused took place in 1983, whereas
the Check Period commenced from 16.06.1991. It was submitted that
no document was placed before the Courts to indicate that, after the
marriage and till soon before the Check Period, the 1st Accused had
any source of income other than 5 acres of land shown in Statement-I
or had purchased any property. It is submitted that the Act shifts the
burden of proof to the public servant when disproportionate assets
are found. The Accused attempted to rely on Income Tax Returns
and self-serving testimony regarding gifts and agricultural income,
but these efforts failed to meet the required standards. Reliance
was placed on State of Karnataka v J Jayalalithaa, (2017) 6 SCC
263. In the context of burden of proof when disproportionate assets
are found being on the defence, learned counsel cited Kedari Lal v
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1877

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

State of Madhya Pradesh, (2015) 14 SCC 505 and State of Tamil
Nadu v R Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768.
26. With regard to the grievance of the appellants regarding the fresh listing
of the Criminal Appeal, learned counsel stated that it is pertinent to
mention that the appellants had not pursued the matter immediately in
the year 2013 itself, when the Judgment is said to have been delivered
on 30.04.2013. No explanation was given by the appellants, except
stating that repeated prayers were made to the learned Single Judge
concerned for obtaining Certified Copy(ies) of the said Judgment. It
was thus within the appellants’ knowledge that the Judgment dated
30.04.2013 had not been furnished. Moreover, the contention urged
was that the Impugned Administrative Order cannot be challenged
directly via filing a Special Leave Petition and the appellants should
have approached the High Court by filing a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. In this backdrop, the State sought
dismissal of all the appeals.

ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
27. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the material on
record. At the outset, we may indicate that we do not intend to
undertake the exercise of re-evaluation/re-assessment of the quantum
insofar as the disproportionate assets are concerned. The Impugned
Order has rightly considered the material on record and is well-
reasoned in that regard. Therefore, we circumscribe our enquiry to
the question of culpability of the 2nd Accused under Section 109 IPC
read with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Act. The 2nd Accused
was charged with colluding with the 1st Accused and purchase of
properties in her name, in the names of her daughter and sons and
keeping the said properties on behalf of the 1st Accused.
28. It would be profitable to set out Sections 107 and 109 of the IPC at
the outset:
‘107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of
a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if
an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
1878 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing.
xxx
109. Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is
committed in consequence and where no express
provision is made for its punishment.—Whoever
abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed in
consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is
made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment,
be punished with the punishment provided for the offence.
Explanation.—An act or offence is said to be committed
in consequence of abetment, when it is committed in
consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the
conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment.
Illustrations
(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward
for showing A some favour in the exercise of B’s official
functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence
defined in S. 161.
(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence
of the instigation, commits that offence. A is guilty of abetting
that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as B.
(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the
conspiracy, procures the poison and delivers it to B in
order that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of
the conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in A’s absence
and thereby causes Z’s death. Here B is guilty of murder.
A is guilty of abetting that offence by conspiracy, and is
liable to the punishment for murder.’
29. The question as to whether offences under the Act are abettable
by non-public servants and whether they can be prosecuted by the
Special Courts under the Act is no longer res integra. Interestingly,
the position of law was also expounded in an earlier round of litigation
wherein the 2nd Accused had approached this Court seeking pre-trial
exoneration. The decision is reported as P Nallamal v State, 1999
6 SCC 559, wherein the Court cited illustrations fitting within each
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1879

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

of the three clauses in Section 107 of the IPC vis-à-vis Section
13(1)(e) of the Act. They are:
‘24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain illustrations which,
according to us, would amplify the cases of abetments
fitting with each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the
Penal Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.
The first illustration cited is this:
If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of
how other public servants have become more wealthy by
receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do
the same in order to become rich and the public servant
acts accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be
any doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation.
Next illustration is this:
Four persons including the public servant decide to raise
a bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons
prompt the public servant to keep such money in their
names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons
are guilty of abetment through conspiracy.
The last illustration is this:
If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he
has acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he
cannot keep them as he has no known source of income
to account, he requests A to keep the said wealth in A’s
name, and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it is
a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling under the
“Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.’
30. Although the illustrations supra were cited by the prosecution/
respondents therein, the Court was ad idem therewith. Ultimately,
this Court held that the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act can
be abetted by a non-public servant.
31. We may note that it is not the case of the prosecution that the 2nd
Accused instigated the 1st Accused to amass wealth disproportionately
or that she is holding the properties benami. No material has been
brought on record by the prosecution to suggest so. Therefore, the
act of abetment as alleged is either one of conspiracy or one of
intentionally aiding. The properties acquired in the name of the 2nd
1880 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Accused during the check period were valued at Rs.5,34,179/- (Rupees
Five Lakhs Thirty Four Thousand One Hundred and Seventy Nine)
by the Impugned Order. The question, therefore, before us is whether
the 2nd Accused is liable for abetment merely by reason of the fact
that she was the wife of the 1st Accused and some properties were
acquired/purchased in her name.
32. At this juncture, it is expedient to understand the scope of Section
109 of the IPC vis-à-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the Act and the evidentiary
burden to be discharged by the prosecution. In K Ponnuswamy v
State of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 6 SCC 674, which lies in a similar factual
scenario, the main accused therein challenged his conviction by the
High Court, which challenge was negatived by this Court. The High
Court convicted the main accused (A1) for being unable to satisfactorily
account for the disproportionate assets, while acquitting his wife (A2)
and daughter (A3), in whose name the bulk of the properties were
held. While doing so, the High Court [vide its Judgment and Order
dated 12.04.2001 in Criminal Appeal No.749/2000] returned the
following findings:
‘45. It has been clearly found that the properties and
resources standing in the name of A2 and A3 were not
satisfactorily accounted for by A1. A4’s explanation was
already found to be not acceptable. A2 and A3 are not the
earning members of the family, except they get a meagre
income from agricultural property. The defence of A2 is
that she purchased movable and immovable property by
using the gift cheques received by her through A4. This
theory was not accepted for the reasons already recorded.
So far as A3 is concerned she could not say anything as
to how the properties came in her name. She being a
student may not be knowing naturally. Therefore, merely
because A2 & A3 have acquired properties in their names
whether they can be held to have abetted the first accused
to commit the offence? The offence of abetment can be
established only by proving that the abettor instigated the
main offender to do the offence or conspired together or
intentionally aided by any act or illegal omission, for the
commission of the offence. Insofar as the first limb of Section
107 I.P.C. is concerned, there is no evidence that either
A2 or A3 instigated A1 to acquire properties and resources
disproportionate to his known sources of income. There is
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1881

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

also no evidence of any conspiracy for that end. The last
limb of Section 107 is intentional aid by any act or illegal
omission. Nodoubt [sic], A2 & A3 are holding properties
rather purchased properties in their names. There is ample
proof to that effect. Whether mere purchase of properties
including jewels would amount to intentional aid is a point
to be decided. This last limb can be held to be established
only either when A1 informs A2 and A3 or A2 & A3 have
knowledge that the ill-gotten money was being used for
the purpose of purchasing properties in their names. In
the absence of such a proof, A2 & A3 cannot be held to
be liable for the offence of abetment…
46. Though Section 13(1)(e) of the Act was abettable still
there is no evidence to bring A2 to A5 within the ambit of
abetment. Therefore, benefit of doubt has to be given to
them…’
(emphasis supplied)

33. K Ponnuswamy (supra), however, noted that ‘…As we are told that
the State is going to file an appeal against the acquittal of Accused 2
and 3, we are not making any comments thereon.’ Yet, the same was
not filed as is apparent from Order dated 31.03.2009 passed by this
Court in Criminal Appeals No.849-850 of 2001, where A2 and A3
had approached this Court challenging the order of the High Court in
ordering confiscation of the properties in their name despite acquitting
them of all charges. By the said Order dated 31.03.2009, this Court
allowed their appeals and remitted the matter to the High Court for
fresh consideration, on the ground that no tangible or sustainable
reasons were recorded by the Courts below in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 4521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with

1 ‘452. Order for disposal of property at conclusion of trial.—(1) When an inquiry or trial in any Criminal
Court is concluded, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal, by destruction,
confiscation or delivery to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any
property or document produced before it or in its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to
have been committed, or which has been used for the commission of any offence.
(2) An order may be made under sub-section (1) for the delivery of any property to any person claiming
to be entitled to the possession thereof, without any condition or on condition that he executes a bond,
with or without sureties, to the satisfaction of the Court, engaging to restore such property to the Court if
the order made under sub-section (1) is modified or set aside on appeal or revision.
(3) A Court of Session may, instead of itself making an order under sub-section (1), direct the property
to be delivered to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who shall thereupon deal with it in the manner provided
in Sections 457, 458 and 459.
1882 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

regard to the confiscation of properties owned and possessed by
A2 and A3. Post-remand, on fresh consideration, the High Court by
its Judgment dated 28.07.20182 in Criminal Appeals Nos.882/2000
and 884/2000 allowed the appeals and held that having acquitted
A2 and A3, assets standing in their names had to be excluded from
the order of confiscation and ordered accordingly. In Kishori Lal v
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 10 SCC 797, this Court explained:
‘6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence
of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided
in IPC. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he
instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages
with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the
doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential
to complete abetment as a crime. The word “instigate”
literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about
by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by
instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in
the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides
that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of
abetment and there is no provision for the punishment
of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished
with the punishment provided for the original offence.
“Abetted” in Section 109 means the specific offence
abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which
a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked
with the proved offence.’
(emphasis supplied)

34. Relevant reference can be made to the discussion in State v
Uttamchand Bohra, (2022) 16 SCC 663 which although not in
reference to a family member of the principal accused but explains

(4) Except where the property is livestock or is subject to speedy and natural decay, or where a bond has
been executed in pursuance of sub-section (2), an order made under sub-section (1) shall not be carried
out for two months, or when an appeal is presented, until such appeal has been disposed of.
(5) In this section, the term “property” includes, in the case of property regarding which an offence
appears to have been committed, not only such property as has been originally in the possession
or under the control of any party, but also any property into or for which the same may have been
converted or exchanged, and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately
or otherwise.’
2 This Judgment was amended by the Madras High Court by Order dated 11.03.2019.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1883

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

in-depth the requirements of conspiracy and abetment vis-à-vis a
charge of accumulation of disproportionate assets by a public servant:
‘22. As is evident from the discussion of the facts,
Uttamchand is accused of abetting and/or conspiring
with the principal accused, a public servant (A-1), so as
to permit him to accumulate assets disproportionate to
his known sources of income. A-1 was a senior official
of the Central Government, working in the Income Tax
Department. According to the prosecution, he acquired
the flat, through the Company. Two other accused,
who facilitated the acquisition, turned approver; they
also deposed during the trial. The role attributed to the
respondent is that he helped in the execution of the sale
deed of the property, and kept custody of the title deed to
it. The document was in fact seized from his house. The
seizure took place over a year before the present case
was initiated; in fact, CBI had initiated another criminal
proceeding, in which A-1 too was implicated. In that case,
CBI had seized Rs 50 lakhs from him. In the present
case, the recovery from Uttamchand’s custody of the
sale deed of the property, owned by the Company led to
initiation of separate proceeding; inter alia, Uttamchand
was charged with “criminal conspiracy”, defined under
Section 120-A IPC and punishable under Section 120-B
IPC and “abetment”, defined by Section 107 IPC and
punishable under Section 109 IPC.
xxx
25. The charge-sheet further does not contain any allegation
which can amount to an offence under Section 109 IPC.
The prosecution has not suggested that he abetted A-1 to
acquire disproportionate assets in any manner; the only
allegation is that the title deeds to the flat, which is in the
name of M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. was seized
from his custody and that he had instructed his employee
to witness the document. An allegation of the existence
of signatures of Uttamchand’s employee, as a witness
to the sale deed cannot amount to his aiding or abetting
A-1 to acquire disproportionate assets. Witnessing a sale
deed is a formal requirement. Likewise, the fact that the
1884 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

sale deed was in Uttamchand’s residence cannot satisfy
the ingredient of any of the offences alleged against him.
xxx
31. This Court explained the essence of conspiracy in
the context of acts or omissions, and allegations relating
to conspiracy along with offences under the PCA, in
K. Narayana Rao [CBI v. K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC
512: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 737: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1183],
and observed that: (SCC p. 530, para 24)
“24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal
conspiracy are that there should be an agreement
between the persons who are alleged to conspire
and the said agreement should be for doing of
an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an
act which by itself may not be illegal. In other
words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is
an agreement to do an illegal act and such
an agreement can be proved either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both
and in a matter of common experience that direct
evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available.
Accordingly, the circumstances proved before
and after the occurrence have to be considered to
decide about the complicity of the accused. Even
if some acts are proved to have been committed,
it must be clear that they were so committed
in pursuance of an agreement made between
the accused persons who were parties to the
alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved
circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn
only when such circumstances are incapable of
any other reasonable explanation. In other words,
an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to
have been established on mere suspicion and
surmises or inference which are not supported
by cogent and acceptable evidence.”
32. The material to implicate someone as a conspirator
acting in concert with a public servant, alleged to have
committed misconduct, under the PCA, or amassed assets
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1885

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

disproportionate to a public servant’s known sources of
income, thus, has to be on firm ground. In the present case,
only two circumstances — the custody of the sale deed (of
the property allegedly belonging to A-1) and the fact that it
was witnessed by Uttamchand’s employee — are alleged
against the respondent. These are wholly insufficient to
raise a reasonable suspicion, or make out a prima facie
case against him, for conspiracy.
33. It would be useful, in the context of the present case,
to recollect the decision of this Court, in P. Nallammal v.
State [P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559: 1999
SCC (Cri) 1133] which observed, as follows: (SCC pp.
564-65, para 15)
“15. Thus, the two postulates must combine
together for crystallisation into the offence,
namely, possession of property or resources
disproportionate to the known sources of
income of public servant and the inability of the
public servant to account for it. Burden of proof
regarding the first limb is on the prosecution
whereas the onus is on the public servant to
prove the second limb. So it is contended that a
non-public servant has no role in the trial of the
said offence and hence he cannot conceivably
be tagged with the public servant for the offence
under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.”
34. As far as the respondent Uttamchand is concerned,
the initial burden of showing that a conspiracy existed,
cannot even be alleged against him, given the nature of
the material presented along with the charge-sheet.
xxx
36. An entire overview of the material produced before the
trial court, with the charge-sheet and final report, as well as
deposition of the 74 witnesses who were examined during
the trial, does not support CBI’s allegation of Uttamchand.
He did not directly or indirectly finance the transaction by
which property was sold to M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt.
Ltd., which, according to that prosecution, was in fact by
A-1. The respondent also is not alleged to have facilitated
1886 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the flow of money to fund acquisition of the flat. The material
put against him is that the sale deed was seized, prior to
the present case. The other circumstance put against him is
that his employee witnessed the sale deed. The respondent
is concededly neither the owner, nor has any links with M/s
Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. In these circumstances, this
Court is of the opinion that no material which can prima
facie support an inference that Uttamchand was either a
conspirator or had abetted the commission of the offences
alleged against the accused A-1 is made out.’
(emphasis supplied)

35. In the above light, let us turn back to the facts of the instant case.
The defence put forth by the 2nd Accused before the Trial Court has
been noted in its Judgment dated 15.11.2000 as below:
‘The summary of the written statement filed by the 2nd
Accused: During the time of marriage of the Accused, to the
2nd Accused the family of him had given 100 sovereigns
of gold and lands as Sreedhanam. Through which the
Accused family got income. During the time of marriage,
the gift amount of Rs.10,000/- has acquired. The above
said incomes were all shown in the list which is annexed
herewith. The 1st Accused was head of the family and he
maintained the income and expenditure of the family. A
false case is filed to take revenge and to cause disgrace
against the Accused.’ (sic)
(emphasis supplied)

36. The 2nd Accused is the widow of the 1st Accused-public servant. The
assets standing in her name are three immovable properties, two cars,
share certificates and some cash balance in the bank. Pausing here,
we may note that the Trial Court has observed that the 2nd Accused
showed interest to purchase the land, that she had given the sale
consideration which is proved by witnesses and therefore her acts
fall within the third limb of Section 107 of the IPC, which is one of
intentional aid. Regard being had to the fiduciary relationship shared
between the Accused, mens rea cannot ipso facto be presumed by
the mere fact that some assets stood in the name of the 2nd Accused,
and she had extended consideration for the same. This Court cannot
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1887

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

be oblivious to human realities, especially the usual course of human
conduct in marital relationships. We are cognizant of the presumptions
provided for in criminal law, but the same by itself cannot supplant
evidence. We reiterate that suspicion, however strong, cannot take
the place of evidence. To presume culpability of a close relative of
the public servant merely on the ground that certain transactions
were made in such relative’s name would be akin to reversing the
burden of proof. This may have dangerous consequences and result
in diluting the presumption of innocence, beyond what the statute in
question contemplates.
37. Another striking feature in the present case is that during the entire
trial, the prosecution never took the line of proving that the 2nd
Accused was all along aware that the money from which the assets
were being bought in her name was obtained through ill-gotten
or unlawful sources. Thus, under bonafide belief, she has tried to
defend the acquisition of the assets trying to explain the sources from
various means which cannot lead to the presumption in law that she
was party ab initio to such illegal acquisition(s) as ultimately she is
a housewife and, from the record, it can be safely stated that it was
the late husband-1st Accused who arranged for the money from which
the assets, disproportionate to the known sources of the income of
the family, have been bought in her name. Thus, the role of the 2nd
Accused, in our opinion, does not fall within the three illustrations
taken note of by this Court in P Nallamal (supra).
38. It is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable
doubt and a solitary circumstance of name-lending, such as the
one at present, cannot lead us to draw and sustain an inference
which unerringly points to the guilt of the 2nd Accused. There has to
be something more in the form of positive evidence to satisfy the
essential requirements for the offence of abetment. Life and liberty
are not things to be trifled with on the basis of conjectures and
surmises. Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v State of Maharashtra, 2023
SCC OnLine 1038 held:
‘18. On a deeper and fundamental level, when this Court
is confronted with a situation where it has to ponder
whether to lean with the Prosecution or the Defence, in
the face of reasonable doubt as to the version put forth
by the Prosecution, this Court will, as a matter of course
and of choice, in line with judicial discretion [Although in
1888 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the context of bail jurisprudence, for a working idea as
to what ‘judicial discretion’ entails, peruse the views of a
learned Single Judge (sitting as Judge-in-Chambers) of
this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240.], lean
in favour of the Defence. We have borne in mind the
cardinal principle that life and liberty are not matters to
be trifled with, and a conviction can only be sustained in
the absence of reasonable doubt. The presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused and insistence on the
Prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt are
not empty formalities. Rather, their origin is traceable to
Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution of India. Of course,
for certain offences, the law seeks to place a reverse onus
on the accused to prove his/her innocence, but that does
not impact adversely the innocent-till-proven-guilty rule for
other criminal offences.
19. In Coffin v. United States, 156 US 432 (1895), the
United States’ Supreme Court held:
‘The principle that there is a presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is the
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.’
20. We see no quarrel with the afore-noted statement
as the same applies on all fours to our criminal justice
system. The presumption of innocence is also a human
right, per the pronouncement in Narendra Singh v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, (2004) 10 SCC 699. In Ranjeetsing
Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005)
5 SCC 294, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, at Paragraph
35, had opined that ‘… Liberty of a person should not
ordinarily be interfered with unless there exist cogent
grounds therefor. …’’
(emphasis supplied)

39. The presumption of innocence is a basic tenet of criminal jurisprudence
and it gets dislodged only by presenting cogent and reliable evidence.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1889

P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and
Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu

Not for nothing is it stated that the accused is the favourite child of
the law and to him/her enure all the benefits of doubt as available
in law. There is absolutely no evidence on record, much less any
evidence to satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to
establish that the 2nd Accused conspired/colluded with or intentionally
aided the 1st Accused in committing offence(s) under Sections 13(2)
r/w 13(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, we hold that the acts of the 2nd
Accused do not fall within the ambit of Section 107 of the IPC and
in such circumstances, it would be unsafe to sustain her conviction
with the aid of Section 109 of IPC.
40. Accordingly, the Impugned Order is set aside to the extent of conviction
of the 2nd Accused and she stands discharged of the liability of her
bail bonds and sureties. As we have acquitted the 2nd Accused, we
see no reason to interfere in the Attachment Order as it attaches
the assets standing in her name beyond the value which has been
explained by her and accepted by the Courts below. Further, the
Impugned Administrative Order, having worked itself out, does not
call for any interference. However, the learned Single Judge who
pronounced the ‘Judgment’ dated 30.04.2013, as revealed by the
Impugned Administrative Order, is already under appropriate scrutiny.
The conduct of this learned Single Judge in not making available
copies of his judgments/orders at all, or having made them available
much after his date of retirement (26.05.2017) has been adversely
commented upon by this Court in State through Inspector of Police
CBI Chennai v Naresh Prasad Agarwal, (2024) 3 SCC 515 and State
through the Inspector of Police CBI, ACB, Chennai v S Murali
Mohan, Criminal Appeal No.4166/2024 [Order dated 01.10.2024].
We say no more. As evincible from the Impugned Administrative
Order, there did not exist any ‘Judgment’ dated 30.04.2013. The
learned then Chief Justice of the High Court, thus, cannot be faulted
for restoring the criminal appeal for fresh hearing.
41. Consequently, the appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2127/2024]
is allowed; the appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2288/2024 is
dismissed, and; the appeals arising from SLP (Criminal) Nos.5196-
5197/2024 are dismissed.
42. No order as to costs.
43. Pending I.A.s/Crl. M.P.s are closed.
1890 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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Order

We have authored separate judgments, though we differ only with
respect to the appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2127/2024.
2. We are though unanimous as to the appeals emanating from SLP
(Criminal) No.2288/2024 and SLP (Criminal) Nos.5196-5197/2024
and these are hereby dismissed.
3. In view of the above, Registry to place the relevant papers of the
appeal arsing from SLP(Criminal) No.2127/2024, before Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions.

Result of the case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2489 OF 2025: Registry
to place the papers of the appeal before Chief
Justice of India for appropriate directions.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2490 OF 2025:
Dismissed.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2491-2492 OF 2025:
Dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain