Supreme Court of India
P. RADHAKRISHNAN & ANR.versusCOCHIN DEVASWOM BOARD & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1183
- Decided
- 6 October 2025
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- DIPANKAR DATTA
Holding
The High Court's directions to fix the licence fee and to order a vigilance inquiry were beyond its jurisdiction and violated natural‑justice principles, and therefore must be set aside.
Summary
The appellants, a trust operating a hall on land allotted by the Cochin Devaswom Board, challenged the Board's unilateral increase of the annual licence fee from Rs.227.25 to Rs.1,50,000 and the subsequent demand for arrears. The High Court upheld the fee increase but, beyond the scope of the writ petition, directed the Board to fix the fee using the precedent in T. Krishnakumar and to order an inquiry by the Chief Vigilance Officer into the lease transaction. The Supreme Court held that such directions exceeded the jurisdiction of the High Court and violated natural‑justice principles because the appellants were not given notice. It emphasized that courts must not place a petitioner in a worse position by issuing extraneous orders without an opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the Court expunged the impugned directions, allowed the appeal in part, and ordered the appellants to pay the balance licence fee within three months.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court's directions to fix the licence fee pursuant to T. Krishnakumar and to order a vigilance inquiry were beyond the scope of the writ petition.
- Whether such directions violated the principles of natural justice by depriving the appellants of notice and an opportunity to be heard.
- Whether a writ court can impose additional obligations that place the petitioner in a worse position than before filing the petition.
Legislation cited
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned directions issued by the High Court were beyond the scope of the writ petition and ought to be set aside. Headnotes† Writ petition – Directions issued beyond the scope of – Impermissibility the annual license fee of the premises let out to the second appellant- Trust from Rs.227.25/- p.a. to Rs.1,50,000/- p.a.; held that there would be no review of the aforesaid order and demanded arrears of Rs.20,46,788/- of licence fee – Challenged – High Court upheld all the
Subjects
Directions issued beyond the scope of writ petitionNatural justiceLicence fee enhancementChief Vigilance Officer inquiryAccess to justiceWrit courtsCochin Devaswom BoardChinmaya Mission Educational and Cultural Trust
Judgment
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 286 : 2025 INSC 1183
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr.
v.
Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 11902 of 2025)
06 October 2025
[Dipankar Datta and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned
directions issued by the High Court were beyond the scope of the
writ petition and ought to be set aside.
Headnotes†
Writ petition – Directions issued beyond the scope of –
Impermissibility – First respondent-Board enhanced the annual
license fee of the premises let out to the second appellant-
Trust from Rs.227.25/- p.a. to Rs.1,50,000/- p.a.; held that there
would be no review of the aforesaid order and demanded
arrears of Rs.20,46,788/- of licence fee – Challenged – High
Court upheld all the aforesaid orders and passed the impugned
directions directing the first respondent to fix the license fee
in respect of the land in question by applying the law laid
down in T.Krishnakumar and to conduct an inquiry through
the Chief Vigilance Officer w.r.t the transaction between the
Board and the appellants and take necessary action based
on the report – Interference with:
Held: 1.1 High Court was not justified in passing the impugned
directions – Directions were far beyond the scope of the writ
petition – Appellants could not have been rendered worse off in
their own writ petition – Directions were made without putting the
appellants on notice. [Para 20]
1.2 A party invokes the jurisdiction of courts being aggrieved by a
certain course of action taken against him/it by the respondent – In
this case, the appellants were aggrieved by the unilateral hike of
the annual charges to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from Rs.227.25/-
* Author
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 287
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.
which they were paying – High Court was justified in examining the
correctness or otherwise of the said decision – High Court found
that the respondents were justified in enhancing the annual license
fee to Rs.1,50,000/- – Having done so, it should have disposed of
the writ petition by simply dismissing it. [Para 21]
1.3 If in an exceptional case the Court feels the need to travel
beyond the scope of the writ petition and make observations, the
least a party is entitled to, is an opportunity to explain and defend
themselves. [Para 22]
1.4 Appellant had no opportunity to explain whether T. Krishnakumar
had application to the transaction in question or not – Further, to
direct the Chief Vigilance Officer to hold an inquiry in the “matter
relating to leasing out the land to the appellant” was not warranted
on the facts and circumstances of the case – Directions of this
nature for a fishing and roving enquiry can seriously impinge upon
reputation and character of the parties – Even in a given case if
the High Court was constrained to pass such directions it ought
to have put the appellants on notice. [Para 25]
1.5 In the facts and circumstances of the case, the observations
were absolutely unjustified apart from the fact that they were made
in violation of principles of natural justice – Impugned directions
expunged and set aside. [Paras 29, 30]
Administration of justice – Duty of Courts:
Held: Litigants go to court for vindicating their rights when they
perceive that there is an infringement – Courts may, after hearing
both parties, grant or deny them relief depending on the facts
and circumstances of the case if without putting parties on notice
(even in the rare and exceptional case where facts warrant) the
court travels beyond the scope of the petition, takes parties by
surprise and makes any strong observations and directions, it will
create a chilling effect on other prospective litigants too – They
will be left to wonder whether by going to court in matters where
they perceive injustice has resulted, they will be rendered worse
off than what they were, before initiating the proceedings – This
could seriously impact access to justice and consequently the very
rule of law – Hence, in such matters, courts must exercise great
caution and circumspection. [Para 28]
288 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
V.K. Majotra v. Union of India and Others [2003] Supp. 3 SCR
483 : (2003) 8 SCC 40; State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim
[1964] 2 SCR 363; Ashok Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P. (2016)
12 SCC 797; Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India (2005) 12
SCC 219 – relied on.
T. Krishnakumar v. Cochin Devaswom Board, 2022 (5) KHC
SN 8 – referred to.
List of Acts
Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950; Indian
Trusts Act, 1882; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Directions issued beyond the scope of writ petition; Beyond the
scope of the issues in question; Writ courts; Cochin Devaswom
Board; Chinmaya Mission Educational and Cultural Trust;
License fee; License fee charges hiked; Annual license fee
enhanced; Unilateral hike; Violation of principles of natural justice;
Chief Vigilance Officer; Inquiry; Fishing and roving enquiry;
Reputation and character of parties; Access to justice; Directions
expunged.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11902
of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.08.2023 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP (C) No. 29089 of 2020
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Gaurav Agrawal, Sr. Adv., Mrs. Anu K Joy, Alim Anvar, Santhosh
K, Mrs. Devika A.L., Ms. Smita Amratlal Vora.
Advs. for the Respondents:
P.V. Dinesh, Sr. Adv., P. S. Sudheer, Ms. Anna Oommen, Rishi
Maheshwari, Ms. Anne Mathew, Bharat Sood, Jai Govind M J,
Jashan Vir Singh, Harshad V. Hameed, Dileep Poolakkot, Mrs.
Ashly Harshad, Anshul Saharan.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 289
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave was granted in this matter on 09.09.2025.
2. The present appeal calls in question the judgment and order dated
09.08.2023 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Writ
Petition (C) No. 29089/2020. At the commencement of the hearing,
Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the
appellants in terms of the Ext.P3-Proceedings dated 16.09.2014 and
Ext.P9-Notice dated 27.11.2020, shall pay the licence fee, at the rate
of Rs.1,50,000/- per annum along with arrears to the first respondent-
Cochin Devaswom Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”).
3. However, the grievance of the appellants is that the further directions
of the High Court have rendered them worse off in their own writ
petition. The further directions in Para 53 of the judgment, which
according to the appellant, are beyond the scope of the writ petition
and with which they are seriously aggrieved are in the following terms:
“The 1st respondent Board shall take necessary steps to fix
the licence fee in respect of the land covered by Exts.P13
to P16 orders, taking note of the law laid down by this Court
in T. Krishnakumar [2022 (4) KLT 798: 2022 (5) KHC SN
8] and also the law laid down in this judgment, with notice
to the 2nd petitioner Chinmaya Mission Educational and
Cultural Trust, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate,
within a period of one month from the date of receipt of
a certified copy of this judgment.”
“In view of the facts noticed by this Court in paragraphs 36
and 37 of this judgment and also the stand taken by the
1st respondent Board before this Court that other than the
copy of Exts.P13 to P16 orders, no other documents are
seen in the relevant files, we deem it appropriate to direct
the 1st respondent Board to conduct an enquiry by the
Chief Vigilance Officer (Superintendent of Police), Cochin
Devaswom Board in the matter relating to leasing out the
land of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom to the 2nd petitioner
290 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Trust and take necessary action, if found necessary, based
on the report of the Chief Vigilance Officer”
4. The appellants filed a writ petition on 21.12.2020 before the High
Court of Kerala praying for the following reliefs:
“a) call for the records of the case leading upto Exts. P3,
P7 and P9 and quash the same by the issuance of writ of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction.
b) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction staying all further proceedings pursuant
to Exhibits P3, P7 and P9 proceedings.
and
c) Pass any other appropriate writ, order or direction which
this Hon’ble Court may deem fit to issue and the petitioner
may pray from time to time.”
5. Ext.P3 under challenge was the order of the first respondent-Board
dated 16.09.2014, enhancing the annual license fee of the premises
let out to the second appellant from Rs.227.25/- per annum to
Rs.1,50,000/- per annum. Ext.P7 is the proceeding dated 02.05.2015
rejecting any review of the order dated 16.09.2014 and further directing
the measurement of the property. Ext.P9 is the communication dated
27.11.2020 demanding arrears totaling to Rs.20,46,788/- within 14
days of the receipt of the communication.
6. To understand the grievance of the appellants before the High
Court, a brief reference to the facts of the case is essential. The
second appellant-Chinmaya Mission Educational and Cultural Trust
was established as a society under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It
functions under the Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, Bombay, and is
involved in social, religious and cultural activities in Kerala for more
than half a century. By a Royal Order (Thittooram), the Maharaja of
Cochin, on the request of Swami Chinmayananda, transferred the
Rama Varma Bhajanamadam, a part of the Bhuvaneswari temple
and situated on the northern side of the Swaraj Round, Thrissur, to
the second appellant.
7. When matters stood thus, on 16.02.1974, the Board allotted six cents
of land adjacent to the Rama Varma Bhajanamadam for constructing
a hall subject to the following conditions:
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 291
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.
“1. The hall constructed by the Mission should be used
only for marriage and religious and cultural activities.
2. Accommodation to the tourist pilgrims coming to the
Wadakunathan temple should be provided in the hall as
per request of the Assistant Commissioner, Trichur free
of rent.
3. For religious and cultural activities of the Devaswom
Department the hall should be spared free of rent as per
the request of the Assistant commissioner, Trichur.
4. The Mission will pay in the Wadakunnathan Devaswom
an annual contribution of Rs. 101/- for the use of this site.
5. The Assistant Commissioner, Trichur should be an ex-
officio member, in the committee for the proper utilization
and maintenance of the hall.
6. Space should be left at the northern end for providing
a pathway of 12 ft wide for entrance from the Devaswom
road to the remaining portion of the vacant space on the
eastern side of the proposed site.
7. The Mission will provide compound wall on the northern
and eastern sides of the site granted to them.
8. The Mission will execute proper agreement on stamp
paper as advised by the Devasom Advocate.”
8. It will be noticed that for the site, an annual contribution of Rs.101/-
was fixed as use charges. On the site a hall was to be constructed
by the second appellant and was to be used only for marriage,
religious and cultural activities. As part of the consideration, in the
hall, tourist pilgrims coming to the Wadakunnathan temple should
be provided accommodation as per the request of the Assistant
Commissioner free of rent. Further, for religious and cultural activities
of the Devaswom Department, the hall should be spared free of rent
as per the request of the Assistant Commissioner. The Assistant
Commissioner was also to be an ex-officio member in the committee
for the proper utilisation and maintenance of the hall. A twelve feet
wide pathway was to be left at the northern end for entrance from
the Devaswom Road to the remaining portion of the vacant site.
Pursuant to the proceedings dated 16.02.1974, an agreement of
292 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
license dated 19.07.1974 was executed incorporating the conditions
set out in the proceeding dated 16.02.1974.
9. By the proceeding dated 13.12.1974, on the request of the second
appellant for additional space, and on being satisfied that the purpose
for which the site was originally allotted can be achieved only if some
additional space is allowed, a further extent of 2½ cents of land lying
vacant on the eastern side of the site already allotted, was allotted
to the second appellant. Consequently, fresh agreement of license
was executed on 25.03.1975. It is averred that the license fee was
revised from Rs.101/- per annum to Rs.142/- per annum with the
very same stipulations as contained in the license agreement dated
19.07.1974. By proceeding dated 09.12.1976, further four cents of
land were allotted, and by the proceeding dated 21.02.1977 a small
bit of land lying vacant on the eastern side was also sanctioned for
the second appellant and it was ordered that the license fee be fixed
on pro-rata basis.
10. The second appellant is in occupation of 13.5 cents of land and is
using the hall constructed by it for religious and cultural purposes
and for conducting marriages. According to the appellants only few
takers are available for the marriage hall since there is no parking
space and further that the hall is not air-conditioned. Though the rent
levied is Rs.50,000/- per day for the marriages, very few marriages
numbering ten or fifteen per year are held and the second appellant-
Trust is running at a loss with its income being compensated from
the money generated from other units. It is also averred that even
now the hall is given free for the programmes of the Board as and
when requested.
11. The license fee was finally revised in the year 1977 to Rs. 227.25/-
per annum. According to the appellants, no period for license having
been fixed, the license continued uninterruptedly.
12. At this stage, by proceeding dated 16.09.2014, unilaterally and without
affording any opportunity the license fee was refixed at Rs.1,50,000/-
with a direction that the license fee shall be renewed every three
years. The appellants, by a letter dated 29.10.2014, sent a reply
to the proceedings dated 16.09.2014. In the reply, the appellants
set out that the order of 16.09.2014 was unauthorized, illegal and
against the terms of entrustment. It denied that the second appellant
was a profit-making institution. It conceded that a reasonable hike
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 293
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.
was justified but questioned the exorbitant hike to Rs.1,50,000/- per
annum. It highlighted the fact that after taking possession they had
developed the same and constructed a two-storey building with
accessories and provided furniture at their expense. They stated
that the hike was unilateral, and no notice was given to them and
prayed that the enhancement be dropped.
13. By its order of 07.02.2015, the Board declared that there was no
need for review of the orders hiking the license fee charges to
Rs.1,50,000/-. The Board further issued orders of 02.05.2015 and
27.11.2020, the details of which have been set out hereinabove.
14. The first appellant filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.29089 of 2020 for
the reliefs stated in the earlier portion of the order. The second
appellant was later impleaded as a party. It is in the said writ
petition that the order as extracted in para 3 above has come to be
passed after the High Court found that there was nothing illegal in
the enhancement of the license fee and the High Court upheld the
proceedings dated 26.09.2014, the order dated 02.05.2015 and the
notice dated 27.11.2020.
15. The High Court, in the impugned order, was called upon to decide
on the validity of Ext.P3, P7 and P9. In the process of adjudicating
the validity, the High Court noticed that the license fee issue was
flagged by the local fund audit and the local fund audit raised objection
against the quantum of license fee as originally fixed. The High
Court observed that there was no validity period fixed for the license
and there was no clause for periodic hike prior to the issuance of
Ext.P3 order. The High Court saw the photographs of the property
in question. The High Court also made a detailed analysis of the
provisions of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act,
1950 and dealt with the powers and duties of a trustee.
16. The High Court, after perusal of the files in question and the
correspondence observed that the appellants themselves had
requested the Board to increase the fee to a reasonable extent.
After observing that the land was situated in a prime locality, the
High Court dealt with the judgment of T. Krishnakumar v. Cochin
Devaswom Board1 and in the end analysis upheld the levy of Rs.
1,50,000/- per annum by observing as follows: -
1 2022 (5) KHC SN 8
294 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“52. In the above circumstances, we find no reason to
interfere with Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 of
the 1st respondent Board whereby the rate of licence
fee of the property covered by Exts.P13 to P16 was
enhanced from Rs.227.25 per annum to Rs.1.50 lakhs
per annum; Ext.P7 proceedings dated 02.05.2015 of the
Board whereby the stand taken in Ext.P5 letter dated
07.02.2015 not to review or reconsider the decision in
Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 was intimated
to the 2nd petitioner Trust; and Ext.P9 notice dated
27.11.2020 issued by the 2nd respondent Secretary of
the Board, whereby the Trust was directed to remit a
sum of Rs.20,46,788/- towards arrears of licence fee at
the rate of Rs.1.50 lakhs per annum, penal interest and
GST, within a period of 14 days.
53. In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is
accordingly dismissed. It is for the 1st respondent Cochin
Devaswom Board to recover the arrears of licence fee
in terms of Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 and
Ext.P9 notice dated 27.11.2020 by initiating appropriate
proceedings, if found necessary, by initiating proceedings
under the Revenue Recovery Act in terms of the G.O.(P)
No.22/2021/RD dated 09.02.2021 published in Kerala
Gazette Extra Ordinary No.668 dated 11.02.2021….”
17. In view of the statement of the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants there is no need to discuss the correctness of the reasons
why the High Court upheld the enhancement of license fee. The
learned Senior Counsel has fairly submitted that the appellants are
ready to deposit the license fee as enhanced along with arrears as
claimed inter alia in the notice of 27.11.2020.
18. However, the appellants have been completely taken by surprise
with the High Court proceeding further and directing fixation of the
license fee in respect of the land in question by applying the law
laid down in T. Krishnakumar (supra). Further, the High Court
directed the first respondent Board to conduct an inquiry through
the Chief Vigilance Officer with regard to the transaction between
the Board and the appellants and take necessary action based
on the report.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 295
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.
19. When the matter came up for admission, this Court on 30.10.2023
granted stay of operation of the order on condition that the appellants
deposit a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- with the first respondent.
20. We are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in passing
the directions extracted at Para 3 hereinabove. The directions were
far beyond the scope of the writ petition. The appellants could not
have been rendered worse off in their own writ petition. What is
more, the directions have been made without putting the appellants
on notice.
21. A party invokes the jurisdiction of courts being aggrieved by a certain
course of action taken against him/it by the respondent. In this case,
the appellants were aggrieved by the unilateral hike of the annual
charges to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from Rs.227.25/- which they were
paying. The High Court was justified in examining the correctness
or otherwise of the said decision. In this case, the High Court found
that the respondents were justified in enhancing the annual license
fee to Rs.1,50,000/-. Having done so, it should have disposed of
the writ petition by simply dismissing it.
22. It is well settled that if in an exceptional case the Court feels the
need to travel beyond the scope of the writ petition and make
observations, the least a party is entitled to, is an opportunity to
explain and defend themselves.
23. Disapproving the practice of catching parties by surprise by the writ
courts travelling beyond the scope of the issues in question, this
Court in V.K. Majotra vs. Union of India and Others2, made the
following telling observations:-
“8. …. The writ courts would be well advised to decide
the petitions on the points raised in the petition and if in
a rare case keeping in view the facts and circumstances
of the case any additional points are to be raised then the
concerned and affected parties should be put to notice
on the additional points to satisfy the principles of natural
justice. The parties cannot be taken by surprise. We leave
the discussion here.”
2 (2003) 8 SCC 40
296 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
24. Though said in the context of expunging adverse comments in an
order or judgment, the following paragraphs from State of U.P. Vs.
Mohammad Naim3,repays study: -
“11. The last question is, is the present case a case of
an exceptional nature in which the learned Judge should
have exercised his inherent jurisdiction under Section
561-A CrPC in respect of the observations complained
of by the State Government? If there is one principle of
cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is
this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and
Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed
to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without
undue interference by any body, even by this Court. At
the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing
their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by
considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not
infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very
purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially
recognised that in the matter of making disparaging
remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct
comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to
be decided by them, it is relevant to consider
(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is
before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or
defending himself;
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that
conduct, justifying the remarks; and
(c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case,
as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct.
It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements
must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart
from sobriety, moderation and reserve.”
25. No doubt, what the High Court has done in the present matter is to
direct the fixing of the license fee, keeping in mind, the judgment of the
3 [1964] 2 SCR 363
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 297
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.
Court in T. Krishnakumar (supra). The appellant had no opportunity
to explain whether T. Krishnakumar (supra) had application to the
transaction in question or not. Further, to direct the Chief Vigilance
Officer to hold an inquiry in the “matter relating to leasing out the land
to the appellant” was not warranted on the facts and circumstances
of the case. Directions of this nature for a fishing and roving enquiry
can seriously impinge upon reputation and character of the parties.
Even in a given case if the High Court was constrained to pass such
directions it ought to have put the appellants on notice.
26. The directions extracted in Para 3 above have rendered the appellants
worse off in their own writ petition. In Ashok Kumar Nigam v. State
of U.P.4, this Court held as under:-
“2. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. D.K. Singh, strenuously
argued that the High Court had misdirected itself in issuing
a notice of enhancement of the punishment awarded to
the appellant. He submitted that by doing so, the High
Court had placed the appellant in a worse-off position,
simply because he had challenged the punishment
awarded to him. That was, according to Mr. Singh, legally
impermissible. In support of his submissions, Mr. Singh
placed reliance upon two decisions of this Court in Pradeep
Kumar v. Union of India and Others - (2005) 12 SCC 219
and Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad
and Another - (2007) 4 SCC 247.
4. The legal position, as to the powers of the High Court
to direct enhancement of punishment in a writ petition
arising out of disciplinary action taken against an employee,
stands concluded by the decisions of this Court, referred to
above. In Pradeep Kumar’s case (supra), in a somewhat
similar circumstances, a similar question had arisen for
consideration before this Court. In that case too the High
Court had found the punishment of reduction in pay
and denial of increments awarded to the appellant to be
inadequate, for the gravity of the misconduct. The High
Court had accordingly remanded the matter back to the
4 (2016) 12 SCC 797
298 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
disciplinary authority to award the maximum punishment of
dismissal from service which direction was then assailed
before this Court on the ground that the High Court had
no such power to direct enhancement of punishment either
by itself or by remanding the matter to the disciplinary
authority. An employee complaining against the punishment
awarded to him could not, observed this Court, be placed
in a worse-off position for coming to the Court.
7. We have, in the light of the above decisions, no hesitation
in holding that the High Court had fallen in a palpable
error in directing issuance of a show cause notice to the
appellant. The appellant could not, as observed earlier,
be placed in a worse-off situation because of his having
sought redress against the punishment awarded to
him by the disciplinary authority which in the instant
case is the High Court itself.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. In Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India5, the Court held: -
“4. Irrespective of the crime/offence with which the appellant
may have been charged, it was not open to the High Court
to have issued such a direction. The scope of judicial
review did not allow the High Court to have interfered with
the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authorities on
the appellant. Besides, a writ petitioner cannot be put
in a worse position by coming to court. The directions
of the High Court are not sustainable and must be set
aside. We are told by the learned counsel for the appellant
that the respondent authority pursuant to the directions
issued by the High Court initiated proceedings against
the appellant for the purpose of imposing the penalty of
dismissal from service. We have held that the direction
of the High Court was wholly outside its jurisdiction. The
appeals are thus allowed and the High Courts directions
are set aside. The disciplinary enquiry initiated on the basis
5 (2005) 12 SCC 219
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 299
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.
of the High Court’s order is consequently also quashed.
However, the writ petitions will stand dismissed. There is
no order as to costs.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Litigants go to court for vindicating their rights when they perceive that
there is an infringement. The court may, after hearing both parties,
grant or deny them relief depending on the facts and circumstances
of the case. As pointed out in V.K. Majotra (supra) and Mohammad
Naim (supra), if without putting parties on notice (even in the rare
and exceptional case where facts warrant) the court travels beyond
the scope of the petition, takes parties by surprise and makes any
strong observations and directions, it will create a chilling effect on
other prospective litigants too. They will be left to wonder whether by
going to court in matters where they perceive injustice has resulted,
they will be rendered worse off than what they were, before initiating
the proceedings. This could seriously impact access to justice and
consequently the very rule of law. Hence, in such matters, courts
must exercise great caution and circumspection.
29. We are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the observations extracted hereinabove at para 3 are absolutely
unjustified apart from the fact that they were made in violation of
principles of natural justice.
30. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, we partly allow the
appeal by expunging and setting aside the following portion of the
impugned order:-
“The 1st respondent Board shall take necessary steps to fix
the licence fee in respect of the land covered by Exts.P13
to P16 orders, taking note of the law laid down by this Court
in T. Krishnakumar [2022 (4) KLT 798: 2022 (5) KHC SN
8] and also the law laid down in this judgment, with notice
to the 2nd petitioner Chinmaya Mission Educational and
Cultural Trust, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate,
within a period of one month from the date of receipt of
a certified copy of this judgment.”
“In view of the facts noticed by this Court in paragraphs 36
and 37 of this judgment and also the stand taken by the
1st respondent Board before this Court that other than the
300 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
copy of Exts.P13 to P16 orders, no other documents are
seen in the relevant files, we deem it appropriate to direct
the 1st respondent Board to conduct an enquiry by the
Chief Vigilance Officer (Superintendent of Police), Cochin
Devaswom Board in the matter relating to leasing out the
land of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom to the 2nd petitioner
Trust and take necessary action, if found necessary, based
on the report of the Chief Vigilance Officer”
31. However, notwithstanding the expunction of the above paragraphs,
if the respondent-Board has legitimate rights to enhance the licence
fee, they may do so independently and in accordance with law.
32. By our interim order of 30.10.2023, we directed the appellants to
deposit a sum of Rs.10 Lakhs with the first respondent. The amount
has since been deposited. In view of the judgment passed today, we
direct that the balance amount be paid by the appellants to the first
respondent, as undertaken before us within three months from today.
33. No order as to costs.
Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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