Created byFuzzy Cloud

Supreme Court of India

P. SHANTHI PUGAZHENTHIversusSTATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SPE/CBI/ACB/CHENNAI

Citation
2025 INSC 674
Decided
12 May 2025
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The appellant was correctly convicted for abetment of the offence under section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with section 109 IPC.

Summary

The appellant, an Assistant Superintendent at Chennai Port Trust, was convicted for abetting her husband, a public servant, in acquiring assets disproportionate to his known income during the check period 2002-2009. The assets were held in the appellant's name, and she was alleged to have concealed the wealth, thereby facilitating the offence under section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a non‑public servant could be held liable for abetment of that offence and whether the conviction under section 109 IPC read with sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Act was valid. Relying on the precedent set in P. Nallammal v. State and the provisions of Section 107 IPC, the Court held that the appellant’s conduct fell within the illustrations of abetment and that the offence was punishable irrespective of her marital status at the time of trial. The Court also noted that the 2018 amendment to the Act made all offences abettable, confirming the earlier position. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Issues considered

  • Whether a non‑public servant can be convicted for abetment of an offence under section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
  • Whether the appellant’s conviction under section 109 IPC read with sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act is legally sustainable
  • Whether the appellant’s subsequent remarriage affects her liability for the alleged abetment

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of offence u/s.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Headnotes† Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.13(2), 13(1)(e) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.109 – of abetting her then husband (main accused) in acquiring disproportionate assets – Sustainability: Held: Admittedly, the appellant’s husband acquired assets (disproportionate to his income), during the check period, in appellant’s name – Appellant’s case falls

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Public servantDisproportionate assetsAbetting husband in acquiring disproportionate assetsDisproportionate wealthAbetment of offenceAbetment of offence under section 13(1)(e), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by non-public servantConcealing disproportionate wealthChennai Port TrustAssistant SuperintendentDivisional ManagerUnited India Insurance Co. Ltd.RaidsMovable and immovable properties disproportionate to incomeProperty disproportionately purchased by husband in wife’s name

Judgment

                 [2025] 6 S.C.R. 372 : 2025 INSC 674

                       P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi
                                  v.
                State Represented by the Inspector of
                    Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 2581 of 2025)
                                 13 May 2025
           [Sudhanshu Dhulia* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of offence
       u/s.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

                                  Headnotes†
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.13(2), 13(1)(e) – Penal
       Code, 1860 – s.109 – Appellant was held guilty of abetting her
       then husband (main accused) in acquiring disproportionate
       assets – Sustainability:
       Held: Admittedly, the appellant’s husband acquired assets
       (disproportionate to his income), during the check period, in
       appellant’s name – Appellant’s case falls either in the 2nd or 3rd
       illustration in the P. Nallammal case – After the disproportionate
       wealth was amassed, the appellant was actively involved in
       concealing such wealth by keeping assets in her name – Thus,
       the appellant is guilty of offence of abetment falling u/s.109, IPC
       r/w s.13(2) and 13(1)(e), 1988 Act – Appellant’s argument that she
       is no longer the wife of co-accused as he remarried, has no force
       because at the time of commission of offence, she was his wife –
       Appellant allowed the co-accused to accumulate assets in her name
       and thus, assisted him in accumulation of assets disproportionate
       to the known sources of income – Appellant was rightly convicted
       u/s.109 IPC r/w s.13(2) and13(1)(e), 1988 Act – Findings of both
       the courts below not interfered with. [Paras 14-16]

                               Case Law Cited
       P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State, represented by Inspector of Police
       [1999] Supp. 1 SCR 135 : (1999) 6 SCC 559 – relied on.

* Author
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                              373

                         P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
     State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai

                                  List of Acts
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860.

                               List of Keywords
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Public servant; Disproportionate
       assets; Abetting husband in acquiring disproportionate assets;
       Disproportionate wealth; Abetment of offence; Abetment of offence
       under section 13(1)(e), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by
       non-public servant; Concealing disproportionate wealth; Chennai
       Port Trust; Assistant Superintendent; Divisional Manager; United
       India Insurance Co. Ltd.; Raids; Movable and immovable properties
       disproportionate to income; Property disproportionately purchased
       by husband in wife’s name.

                              Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       2581 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 10.01.2018 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 429 of 2013

                           Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Saurabh Jain, Prayag Jain, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee.
       Advs. for the Respondent:
       Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, Arvind Kumar Sharma.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

       Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     The appellant before this Court, who was working as an Assistant
       Superintendent in the Chennai Port Trust assails the judgment
       and order dated 10.01.2018 passed by the High Court of Madras
       (hereinafter ‘High Court’) which has sustained her conviction and
       sentence under section 109 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter
374                                                           [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       ‘IPC’) read with Section 13(2) and Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
       Corruption Act 1988 (hereinafter ‘1988 Act’). The co-accused (husband
       of the appellant, at the time) was also convicted and sentenced by
       the same order under section 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
3.     In June 2009, an FIR was registered against the appellant’s husband
       alleging that he had illegally demanded and received Rs. 3000 for
       handing over a cheque relating to a motor accident claim. While
       investigating the FIR, certain raids were conducted at the appellant’s
       husband’s house and on 31.12.2009 another FIR under section
       13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act was registered against the
       appellant’s husband, while he was serving as a public servant on
       the post of Divisional Manager in United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
       When the search was conducted on the residential premise of the
       appellant’s husband, various incriminating documents relating to
       movable and immovable property in the name of the appellant and
       her husband were found. Primarily, it was alleged that during the
       check period between 1.09.2002 and 16.06.2009, the appellant’s
       husband had acquired movable and immovable properties which
       were disproportionate to his income. The properties were in the
       appellant’s name, as well as of her husband.
4.     On 18.12.2010, a chargesheet was filed and the appellant was
       charged under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the
       1988 Act, while her husband was charged under section 13(2) read
       with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, with details of the various movable
       and immovable assets acquired by them during the check period. It
       was alleged that disproportionate assets amounting to Rs. 60,99,216
       have been acquired by the accused.
5.     After perusing the evidence on record, the Trial Court vide order dated
       27.05.2013 found the appellant and her husband guilty and held that
       the appellant’s husband has acquired disproportionate assets to the
       extent of Rs. 37,98,752 during the check period beyond his known
       sources of income. The appellant was held guilty of abetting her
       husband in acquiring such disproportionate assets. The appellant’s
       husband was convicted under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the
       1988 Act and sentenced to 2 years of R.I. Whereas the appellant
       was sentenced under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e)
       of the 1988 Act and sentenced to 1 year of R.I.
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                           375

                         P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
     State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai

6.     Both the appellant and her husband preferred their criminal appeal
       against the above order of conviction and sentence. On 10.01.2018,
       the High Court dismissed the appeal and found no ground to interfere
       with the findings of the Trial Court. While dismissing the appeal, the
       High Court observed that although there are minor discrepancies
       in the calculation of known sources of income of the accused, the
       disproportionality of assets is hugely excessive. Specifically the High
       Court observed that there is no material to show that the assets
       acquired during the check period, were acquired from their known
       source or sources of income, and even if the explanations provided by
       the accused is accepted it does not still remove the disproportionality.
       Now the appellant is before this Court.
7.     The case of the appellant is that the courts below have grossly erred
       in convicting her for abetting her husband (the main accused) in
       acquiring disproportionate assets during the check period, and that
       any property disproportionately purchased by her husband in her
       name during the check period, cannot be held to be disproportionate
       in the hands of the appellant. Further, the appellant would argue that
       the co-accused is no longer her husband and he has subsequently
       re-married. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that the
       appellant was hand in glove with her husband in commission of the
       crime and she abetted the commission of offence under section
       13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
8.     We have heard both the sides and perused the material on record.
9.     The only question that comes up for our consideration is whether
       the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of offence under
       section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
10. Section 107 of IPC defines and illustrates as to what is abetment.
    Section 107 of IPC reads as follows:
            “107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing
            of a thing, who—
            First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
            Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or
            persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if
            an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
            conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
376                                                           [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


            Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
            the doing of that thing.
            Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation,
            or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound
            to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to
            cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate
            the doing of that thing.
                                        Illustration
            A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court
            of Justice to apprehend Z, B, knowing that fact and also
            that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and
            thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B
            abets by instigation the apprehension of C.
            Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time
            of the commission of an act, does anything in order to
            facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates
            the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”
       Section 108 of IPC defines ‘Abettor’ as follows:
            “108. Abettor—A person abets an offence, who abets
            either the commission of an offence, or the commission
            of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a
            person capable by law of committing an offence with the
            same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.
            Explanation 1.—The abetment of the illegal omission of an
            act may amount to an offence although the abettor may
            not himself be bound to do that act.
            Explanation 2.—To constitute the offence of abetment it is
            not necessary that the act abetted should be committed,
            or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should
            be caused.
                                       Illustrations
            (a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A is
            guilty of abetting B to commit murder.
            (b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of the
            instigation stabs D. D recovers from the wound. A is guilty
            of instigating B to commit murder.
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                            377

                      P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
  State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai

           Explanation 3.—It is not necessary that the person abetted
           should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that
           he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as
           that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge.
                                      Illustrations
           (a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a lunatic to
           commit an act which would be an offence, if committed
           by a person capable by law of committing an offence,
           and having the same intention as A. Here A, whether the
           act be committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence.
           (b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a
           child under seven years of age, to do an act which causes
           Z’s death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the
           act in the absence of A and thereby causes Z’s death.
           Here, though B was not capable by law of committing an
           offence, A is liable to be punished in the same manner as
           if B had been capable by law of committing an offence,
           and had committed murder, and he is therefore subject
           to the punishment of death.
           (c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B, in
           consequence of the unsoundness of his mind, being
           incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is
           doing what is wrong or contrary to law, sets fire to the
           house in consequence of A’s instigation. B has committed
           no offence, but A is guilty of abetting the offence of setting
           fire to a dwelling-house, and is liable to the punishment
           provided for that offence.
           (d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed, instigates
           B to take property belonging to Z out of Z’s possession. A
           induces B to believe that the property belongs to A. B takes
           the property out of Z’s possession, in good faith, believing
           it to be A’s property. B, acting under this misconception,
           does not take dishonestly, and therefore does not commit
           theft. But A is guilty of abetting theft, and is liable to the
           same punishment as if B had committed theft.
           Explanation 4.—The abetment of an offence being an
           offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an
           offence.
378                                                        [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


                                     Illustration
          A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B accordingly
          instigates C to murder Z, and C commits that offence in
          consequence of B’s instigation. B is liable to be punished
          for his offence with the punishment for murder; and, as A
          instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable to the
          same punishment.
          Explanation 5.—It is not necessary to the commission of the
          offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should
          concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is
          sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of
          which the offence is committed.
                                     Illustration
          A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed that A
          shall administer the poison. B then explains the plan to C
          mentioning that a third person is to administer the poison,
          but without mentioning A’s name. C agrees to procure the
          poison, and procures and delivers it to B for the purpose
          of its being used in the manner explained. A administers
          the poison; Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and
          C have not conspired together, yet C has been engaged
          in the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been
          murdered. C has therefore committed the offence defined
          in this section and is liable to the punishment for murder.”
11. The law was laid down by this Court with respect to offences under
    section 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, in P. Nallammal
    & Anr. v. State, represented by Inspector of Police (1999) 6
    SCC 559, where this court was considering whether the appellants
    therein are liable to be convicted of abetting crime under 13(1)(e)
    of the 1988 Act.
12. In P. Nallamal (Supra), it was contended before this Court that an
    offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act cannot be abetted by
    a non-public servant. Further, that there is no provision in the 1988
    Act which provides punishment for abetment of offence under section
    13(1)(e) whereas it provides punishment for abetment of some other
    offences under the 1988 Act. However, after discussing the history
    of Section 13 of the 1988 Act which was a substitute for some of
    the provisions of Chapter-IX of IPC which deals with offences by
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                           379

                      P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
  State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai

     or relating to public servants, this Court held that an offence under
     section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act can be abetted by any other person.
     After reading Section 107 of IPC and accepting suggestions of
     Counsel, this Court gave illustrations that how even a person who
     is not a public servant can abet the offence under section 13(1)(e)
     of the 1988 Act. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:
           “24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain illustrations which,
           according to us, would amplify the cases of abetments
           fitting with each of the three clauses in Section 107 of
           the Penal Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.
           The first illustration cited is this:
           If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of
           how other public servants have become more wealthy by
           receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do
           the same in order to become rich and the public servant
           acts accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be
           any doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation.
           Next illustration is this:
           Four persons including the public servant decide to raise
           a bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons
           prompt the public servant to keep such money in their
           names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons
           are guilty of abetment through conspiracy.
           The last illustration is this:
           If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he
           has acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he
           cannot keep them as he has no known source of income
           to account, he requests A to keep the said wealth in A’s
           name, and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it
           is a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling under
           the “Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.
           25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how the offence
           under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act can be abetted by
           non-public servants. The only mode of prosecuting such
           offender is through the trial envisaged in the PC Act.”
                                                   (Emphasis Provided)
380                                                         [2025] 6 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


13. In other words, any person who persuades a public servant to take
    bribes, decides to raise money through bribes along with a public
    servant and prompts such public servant to keep the wealth with
    him/her or keeps the amassed wealth of a public servant in his/her
    own name is guilty of committing the offence of abetment of offence
    under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. We must also note that the
    2018 Amendment to the 1988 Act has substituted Section 12 of
    1988 Act and made all offences under the 1988 Act abettable. This
    Section 12 of 1988 Act reads as follows:
            “12. Punishment for abetment of offences.—Whoever
            abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not
            that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment,
            shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
            shall not be less than three years, but which may extend
            to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”
       In any case, there is no doubt that offence under section 13(1)(e)
       was abettable even prior to the 2018 Amendment.
14. In the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the appellant’s
    husband has acquired assets (disproportionate to his income), during
    the check period, in appellant’s name. Both the courts below have
    given concurrent findings on this aspect, and it is not required for
    us to deal with that aspect in detail.
15. If we apply the principles laid down in the P. Nallammal case
    (supra), the present appellant’s case would definitely fall either in
    the 2nd or 3rd illustration. It is not clear from the record whether the
    appellant and her husband entered into a prior conspiracy to amass
    a huge bulk of wealth through bribery, but there is no doubt that
    after such disproportionate wealth was amassed, the appellant has
    been actively involved in concealing such wealth by keeping assets
    in her name. By doing so, the appellant is undoubtedly guilty of
    offence of abetment falling under section109 IPC read with 13(2) and
    13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
       Moreover, we would like to note that even the appellant was a
       public servant at the time of commission of the offence, as she was
       holding the post of Assistant Superintendent in the Chennai Port
       Trust, though she has been prosecuted here in her capacity as
       the wife of the main accused. We would also like to note that the
[2025] 6 S.C.R.                                                       381

                      P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
  State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai

     appellant’s argument that she is no longer the wife of co-accused
     as the co-accused has remarried, has no force because at the time
     of commission of offence, she was the wife of the co-accused. Even
     if we assume that she was not the wife at the time of commission
     of crime, then also it is immaterial since it is proven that she had
     allowed the co-accused to accumulate assets in her name and thus,
     assisted the co-accused in accumulation of assets disproportionate
     to the known sources of income. It is a well settled law that even
     a non-public servant can be convicted under section 109 IPC read
     with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. We, therefore, find no reason to hold
     that the appellant could not have been convicted under section 109
     IPC read with 13(2) and13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
16. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
    the opinion that the finding of both the courts below does not require
    any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
17. The appellant, who is on bail, is directed to surrender within four
    weeks from today.
18. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. Pending application(s),
    if any, stand(s) disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey


Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988"Sign in to search

For a digitally signed copy suitable for filing, refer to the court's own website. Only the court can issue one.

P. SHANTHI PUGAZHENTHI versus STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SPE/CBI/ACB/CHENNAI — 2025 INSC 674 - Legal Desk AI