Supreme Court of India
PADI KAUSHIK REDDY ETC.versusTHE STATE OF TELANGANA AND OTHERS ETC.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 912
- Decided
- 31 July 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The Division Bench erred in setting aside the Single Judge’s order; the Speaker must decide the pending disqualification petitions within three months, and the Supreme Court may issue such a time‑bound direction without violating the immunity provisions of the Tenth Schedule.
Summary
Three BRS MLAs who were elected to the Telangana Legislative Assembly joined the INC, prompting two other BRS MLAs to file disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule. The Speaker delayed issuing notices for over seven months, leading the petitioners to approach the High Court, which only directed the Speaker to fix a hearing schedule within four weeks. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside that order, prompting a special leave petition before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench erred in interfering with the Single Judge’s order and that the Speaker must decide the pending disqualification petitions within a reasonable, three‑month period. It emphasized that the Speaker, as a tribunal, is subject to judicial review but not to pre‑emptive (quia timet) injunctions, and that timely adjudication is essential to the purpose of the Tenth Schedule. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the High Court’s judgment was quashed, and the Speaker was directed to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.
Issues considered
- The Division Bench’s interference with the Single Judge’s order directing the Speaker to fix a hearing schedule.
- Whether the Supreme Court can direct the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions within a specified time‑bound period.
- Whether a Quia Timet action is permissible against the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule.
- The scope of judicial review over the Speaker’s adjudicatory functions under Articles 226, 227 and 136 of the Constitution.
Legislation cited
Headnote
1879 : 2025 INSC 912 Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc. (Civil Appeal No(s). 9932-9933 of 2025) 31 July 2025 [B.R. Gavai,* CJI and Augustine George Masih, J.] Issue for Consideration The matters herein present a challenge to the judgment of the Division Bench of order of the Single Judge of the High Court, as Single Judge had only asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Tenth Schedule – Arts. 122 and 212
Subjects
Election of State Legislative AssemblyDisqualificationDisqualification petitionsDisqualification proceedings within a time-bound periodSpeaker/ChairmanJudicial reviewTribunalReasonable periodTime-bound periodTenth Schedule of ConstitutionJudicial complexionSpeaker acting as an adjudicating authorityQuia Timet
Judgment
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1879 : 2025 INSC 912
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc.
v.
The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 9932-9933 of 2025)
31 July 2025
[B.R. Gavai,* CJI and Augustine George Masih, J.]
Issue for Consideration
The matters herein present a challenge to the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court whereby the judgment dated
09.09.2024 passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in a batch
of Writ Petitions was set aside. Whether the Division Bench erred
in interfering with the order of the Single Judge of the High Court,
as Single Judge had only asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of
hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.)
within a period of four weeks.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Tenth Schedule – Arts. 122 and 212 –
Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification
on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 – Rules 6(1), 6(2) – After
winning election of the State Legislative Assembly, three
members of BRS who won the election from their respective
constituency joined INC which eventually formed the
Government – Appellants in the lead matter filed disqualification
petitions before the Telangana State Legislative Assembly with
a common prayer that MLAs from BRS who joined the INC
be declared as disqualified from continuing as members of
the Telangana Legislative Assembly – Since the petitions for
disqualification filed by the Appellants/Petitioners were kept
pending before the Speaker, writ petitions were filed before the
High Court – The Single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment
and order dated 09.09.2024, had only asked the Speaker for
fixing a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents,
personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks – However,
the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the
Single Judge of the High Court – Correctness:
Held: 1. There was absolutely no occasion for the Judges of the
Division Bench of the High Court to have interfered with the well-
* Author
1880 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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reasoned order of the Single Judge, as Single Judge had only
asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings,
documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks –
The Single Judge had not even issued any direction to decide
the disqualification proceedings within a time-bound period – This
Court, therefore, find that the Division Bench of the High Court
has erred in interfering with the order of the Single Judge of the
High Court. [Para 96]
2. In the instant case, it could be seen that the Speaker did not
even find it necessary to issue notices in the petitions filed by the
present petitioners for a period of more than seven months and
only after the proceedings were filed before this Court, did the
Speaker find it necessary to issue notice – Non-issuance of any
notice for a period of more than seven months and issuing notice
only after either the proceedings were filed before this Court, or
after this Court had heard the matter for the first time cannot by
any stretch be envisaged as acting in an expeditious manner –
In light of the facts of the present case, a failure to issue any
direction to the Speaker, in view of this Court, would frustrate the
very purpose for which the Tenth Schedule has been brought in
the Constitution. [Paras 92, 93, 95]
3. It is pertinent to note that all the judgments of the Constitution
Bench, right from Kihoto Hollohan to Subhash Desai, consistently
hold that the Speaker is the authority who should decide the issue
with regard to disqualification at the first instance – This Court,
however, finds it appropriate to direct the Speaker to decide the
petitions pending before it within a stipulated period – It is clarified
that this Court is inclined to do so in view of the specific finding of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan
and Subhash Desai, that the Speaker, while acting as an adjudicating
authority in Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution,
acts as a Tribunal amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution – There is also a finding of the
Constitution Bench that the Speaker/Chairman, while acting as an
adjudicating authority under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution does not enjoy the constitutional immunity as available
either under Article 122 or 212 of the Constitution. [Paras 99, 100]
4. Therefore, the impugned judgment and final order dated
22.11.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is
quashed and set aside – Further, the Speaker is directed to
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1881
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
conclude the disqualification proceedings pending against the 10
MLAs pertaining to the present appeals/petition as expeditiously
as possible and in any case, within a period of three months from
the date of this judgment. [Para 102(ii), 102(iii)]
Constitution of India – Arts. 226, 227, 136, Tenth Schedule –
Power of Speaker/Chairman to decide disqualification petitions
under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
is pre-eminently of a judicial complexion – Discussed.
[Paras 80 to 87]
Case Law Cited
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others [1992] 1 SCR 686 : (1992)
Supp. 2 SCC 651; Rajendra Singh Rana and Others v. Swami
Prasad Maurya and Others [2007] 2 SCR 591 : (2007) 4 SCC 270;
Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra
and Others [2023] 8 SCR 857 : (2024) 2 SCC 719 – followed.
Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative
Assembly and Others [2020] 2 SCR 132 : (2021) 16 SCC 503 –
relied on.
Sunil Prabhu v. The Speaker, Maharashtra State Legislative
Assembly, Writ Petition (C) No. 685 of 2023; S.A. Sampath
Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah and Others (2021) 16 SCC 528; Nabam
Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh
Legislative Assembly and Others [2016] 6 SCR 1; Surya Devi
Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Others [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 290 :
(2003) 6 SCC 675 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly
(Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986; Constitution
(Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985; Constitution (Fifty-Second
Amendment) Bill, 1984.
List of Keywords
Election of State Legislative Assembly; Disqualification;
Disqualification petitions; Disqualification proceedings within a
time-bound period; Speaker/Chairman; Judicial review; Tribunal;
Reasonable period; Time-bound period; Tenth Schedule of
Constitution; Judicial complexion; Speaker acting as an adjudicating
authority; Tribunal; Quia Timet; operation successful, patient died.
1882 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
9932-9933 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2024 of the High Court
for The State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WA Nos. 1158 and
1160 of 2024
With
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 82 of 2025 and Civil Appeal No. 9934 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
C Aryama Sundaram, Dama Seshadri Naidu, Gandra Mohan Rao,
Sr. Advs., P. Mohith Rao, Ms. J Akshitha, J Venkat Sai, Eugene
S Philomene, Zafar Inayat Ganai, Rahul Jayapala Reddy,
Shubhankar Sharma, Ms. Rohini Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Vikas
Mehta, Basa Mithun Shashank, Anthony Reddy Katakam, R.V.
Pavan Maitreya.
Advs. for the Respondents:
T. Rajnikant Reddy, A.A.G, Mukul Rohatgi, Dr. Abhishek Singhvi,
Gaurav Agarwal, Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, S. Niranjan Reddy,
Sr. Advs., Ms. Priyansha Sharma, Lavkesh Bhambhani, Aniket Singh,
Sravan Kumar Karanam, Hitendra Nath Rath, Kumar Abhishek,
Ms. Laxmi, Ms. Aarati Sah, Ms. Diya Purohit, Ms. Neha Rai,
Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Ms. Akhila Palem Rami Reddy, Meeran
Maqbool, Vivek Rajan D.b, Sumanth Nookala, Ms. Devina Sehgal,
Kumar Vaibhaw, S.uday Bhanu, Vineet George, Ramesh Allanki,
Ms. Aruna Gupta, Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Ankit Agarwal, Koustubh
Desai, Mukesh Kumar, Yashaswi Sk Chocksey, Madhup Kumar
Tiwari, D. Abhinav Rao, Ms. Megha Shaw, Abhisek Das, Raghav
Bherwani.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, CJI
1. Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 2353-2354 of 2025 and SLP (C)
Diary No. 14577 of 2025.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1883
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
2. The appeals in the present set of matters challenge the judgment
and final order dated 22nd November 2024 passed by a Division
Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad1 in
Writ Appeal Nos. 1157, 1158 and 1160 of 2024 whereby the Division
Bench of the High Court set aside the judgment and final order dated
9th September 2024 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High
Court in a batch of Writ Petitions.
FACTS
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts leading to the appeals are
as under:
3.1. On 3rd November 2023, on the recommendation of the Election
Commission of India, the Hon’ble Governor of the State of
Telangana issued the notification for General Election to the
State Legislative Assembly.
3.2. Pursuant to the notification, one Danam Nagender filed his
nomination as a candidate of the Bharat Rashtra Samithi2 from
the Khairatabad Assembly Constituency on 6th November 2023.
Similarly, two others namely Venkata Rao Tellam and Kadiyam
Srihari filed their nomination from Bhadrachalam Assembly
Constituency and Ghanpur Station Constituency as candidates
of BRS on 9th November 2023.
3.3. Thereafter, on 30th November 2023, the elections were held
and the results were declared on 3rd December 2023.
3.4. The aforementioned Danam Nagender, Venkata Rao Tellam
and Kadiyam Srihari won the election from their respective
constituency. The Indian National Congress 3 emerged as
the single largest party and it along with its ally formed the
Government.
3.5. It is the allegation of the appellants that on 15th March 2024,
Danam Nagender joined the INC. It is further their allegation that
the other two BRS Members of Legislative Assembly4 namely
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”.
2 Hereinafter referred to as “BRS”.
3 Hereinafter referred to as “INC”.
4 Hereinafter referred to as “MLA”.
1884 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Kadiyam Srihari and Venkata Rao Tellam also joined the INC
on 31st March 2024 and 7th April 2024 respectively.
3.6. Subsequently, the Appellants in the lead matter namely
Padi Kaushik Reddy and Kuna Pandu Vivekanand, who
are themselves MLAs belonging to BRS, filed separate
petitions under Paragraph 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule read
with Article 191(2) of the Constitution of India and Rules 6(1)
and 6(2) of the Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly
(Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 19865 before
the Telangana State Legislative Assembly on 18th March 2024,
2nd April 2024 and 8th April 2024. The common prayer in all the
three petitions was for a declaration from the Speaker of the
Telangana Legislative Assembly that the MLAs from BRS who
joined the INC be declared as disqualified from continuing as
members of the Telangana Legislative Assembly.
3.7. The Appellant in the connected matter, namely Alleti Maheshwar
Reddy, who is an MLA belonging to Bharatiya Janata Party6, also
filed a petition seeking the disqualification of Danam Nagender
on 1st July 2024.
3.8. Thereafter, aggrieved by the inaction/delay on part of the
Speaker in deciding the disqualification petitions, the Appellants
filed three separate Writ Petitions before the High Court being
Writ Petition Nos. 9472, 11098 & 18553 of 2024. The first two
Writ Petitions were filed on 10th April 2024 and 24th April 2024
and the third Writ Petition was filed on 9th July 2024.
3.9. On 9th September 2024, the learned Single Judge of the High
Court by a common judgment and order directed the Secretary
of the Telangana Legislative Assembly to forthwith place the
disqualification petitions before the Speaker for fixing a schedule
of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing
etc.) within a period of four weeks. It was further directed that
the schedule so fixed, shall be communicated to the Registrar
(Judicial) of the High Court. It was further clarified by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court that if nothing is heard within
5 Hereinafter referred to as “Disqualification Rules 1986”.
6 Hereinafter referred to as “BJP”.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1885
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
four weeks, then the matter would be reopened suo motu and
appropriate orders would be passed.
3.10. Taking exception to the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court, the Secretary of the
Telangana Legislative Assembly preferred three separate
intra-court appeals being Writ Appeal No. 1157, 1158 & 1160
of 2024.
3.11. On 22nd November 2024, the Division Bench of the High Court
by a common judgment and final order disposed of the Writ
Appeals by setting aside the judgment and order passed by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court.
3.12. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeals pertaining to
disqualification petitions pending against three MLAs came
to be filed by way of special leave.
3.13. A Writ Petition has also been filed before this Court by the
Appellants in the lead matter along with a few others pertaining
to disqualification petitions pending against another seven
MLAs. The prayer in the Writ Petition is on the same lines
as the prayer by the original writ-petitioners before the High
Court i.e., to direct the Speaker to decide the disqualification
petitions in a time-bound manner and preferably within an outer
limit of 4 weeks. Accordingly, the Writ Petition was tagged and
heard along with the present appeals.
SUBMISSIONS
4. We have heard Shri C. Aryama Sundaram, Shri Dama Seshadri Naidu
and Shri Gandra Mohan Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Appellants/Petitioners and Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Dr.
Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Shri Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, Shri Gaurav
Agrawal, Shri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Respondents.
5. Shri Sundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellants submitted that till the time the learned Single Judge of the High
Court decided the writ petition on 9th September 2024 i.e., after a period
of almost five months from the date of filing, the Speaker had not even
issued a notice in the disqualification petitions filed by the Appellants.
It is submitted that taking into consideration this factual aspect of
1886 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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the matter, the learned Single Judge had issued a direction only to
the effect that the Speaker should fix a schedule of hearing within
a period of 4 weeks from the date of the said order. It is therefore
submitted that, as such, there was no occasion for the learned
Judges of the Division Bench to have interfered with the order of
the learned Single Judge.
6. Shri Sundaram submitted that even after the order of the learned
Single Judge, for a period of more than 4 months, the Speaker did not
take any action. It is further submitted that only after the present set
of appeals came to be filed before this Court on 15th January 2025,
a notice has been issued to the delinquent MLAs on 16th January
2025. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that under Rule 7 of the
Disqualification Rules, 1986, a copy of the Disqualification Petition is
required to be forwarded to the member in relation to whom the petition
has been made or the Leader of the Legislature Party to which the
member belongs. It is submitted that in spite of a lapse of a period
of more than 11 months from the filing of disqualification petitions,
even the statutory requirement as per Rule 7 of the Disqualification
Rules 1986 has not been complied with. It is further submitted that
since the Speaker was acting in such a lackadaisical manner, the
learned Single Judge of the High Court was completely justified
in issuing directions to the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative
Assembly to place the matter before the Speaker for fixing of the
schedule of the hearing within a period of 4 weeks.
7. Shri Sundaram submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High
Court had rightly applied the principles as laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu
and Others7, Rajendra Singh Rana and Others v. Swami Prasad
Maurya and Others8 and Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary,
Governor of Maharashtra and Others9. The learned Senior Counsel
further submitted that the facts in the present case are squarely
identical to the facts in the case of Keisham Meghachandra
Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Others10.
7 (1992) Supp. 2 651
8 (2007) 4 SCC 270
9 (2024) 2 SCC 719
10 (2021) 16 SCC 503
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1887
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
It is submitted that applying the said case, the learned Single Judge
of the High Court would have been justified even in directing the
disqualification petitions to be decided within a specified period.
However, the learned Single Judge of the High Court, exercising
restraint and showing respect to the high constitutional functionary,
had only issued a direction to the Secretary of the Telangana
Legislative Assembly to place the matter before the Speaker for
fixing up the schedule of the hearing.
8. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that since the directions
issued by the Constitution Bench of this Court on 11th May 2023 in
the case of Subhash Desai (supra) were not complied with by the
Speaker, a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sunil Prabhu v.
The Speaker, Maharashtra State Legislative Assembly11 on 18th
September 2023, directed to place the proceedings before the
Speaker within a period of one week from that date so as to issue
procedural directions for completing the record and setting down
a time schedule for hearing of the disqualification petitions. It is
further submitted that thereafter vide an order dated 30th October
2023, this Court in the said case of Sunil Prabhu (supra) directed
the pending proceedings under the Tenth Schedule to be concluded
and final orders to be passed in respect of Group A petitions on or
before 31st December 2023 and Group B petitions on or before 31st
January 2024. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that
the said directions were issued by a Bench presided over by the
same learned Judge (D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.), who had authored
the judgment in the case of Subhash Desai (supra).
9. Shri Sundaram submitted that the learned Judges of the Division
Bench of the High Court, have erred in setting aside a well-reasoned
and fairly balanced judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High
Court. He further submitted that this is a fit case wherein this Court
should issue directions to the Speaker to decide the disqualification
petitions within a specified period of time. He, therefore, prayed that
the appeals be allowed and appropriate directions be issued.
10. Shri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellants/Petitioners supported the arguments advanced by Shri
Sundaram.
11 Writ Petition (C) No.685 of 2023
1888 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
11. Additionally, Shri Naidu submitted that prolonging the disqualification
proceedings and not taking them to a logical end would frustrate the
very purpose of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. He
submitted that the fear with regard to the Speaker belonging to a
particular political party and as a result acting in a partisan manner
was apprehended when the Parliament was discussing the insertion
of the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution. It is submitted that Shri
A.K. Sen, the then Law Minister, had stated that the Speaker was
expected to act in an impartial manner and decide the disqualification
proceedings without any delay. Not only that but Shri A.K. Sen had
stated that if the amendment to the Constitution was to be effective,
and if the defection was to be outlawed effectively, then it was
necessary to choose a forum which would decide the matter fearlessly
and expeditiously. He further stated that the Speaker was the only
forum that was possible. In that light, the learned Senior Counsel
submitted that a situation has now arisen which would require this
Court to reconsider the issue because in many cases the Speaker
has been acting like a member of a political party and not acting
like a Tribunal. He, therefore, reiterated that this Court should direct
the Speaker to decide the disqualification petitions matter within a
specified period of time.
12. Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the contrary, submitted that the Division Bench of
the High Court has rightly applied the legal position as emanating
from the Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in the cases
of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and
Subhash Desai (supra) and held that a court cannot issue timelines
to the Speaker for deciding the matter within a particular period. He
submitted that the High Court does not have the power of judicial
superintendence over the functioning of the Speaker as a Tribunal
under Article 227 of the Constitution. He submitted that the only
power of judicial review that is available with the High Court is under
Article 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted that while exercising
the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court can only examine the decision arrived at by the Speaker.
It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that it is not
permissible for the High Court to pass any order which would amount
to Quia Timet action. It is submitted that this Court in the case of
Kihoto Hollohan (supra) has categorically held that the High Court
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1889
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot pass any order which
would amount to Quia Timet action. It is, therefore, submitted that as
such any petition prior to the decision made by the Speaker would
not be tenable.
13. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that the three-Judges Bench of this
Court has wrongly decided the case of Keisham Meghachandra
Singh (supra). In that regard, it is submitted that this Court in the
case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) did not take into
consideration the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the
cases of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and Rajendra Singh Rana (supra)
in the correct perspective. It is, therefore, submitted that vide the
impugned judgment and final order, the Division Bench of the High
Court has rightly distinguished the judgment of this Court in the case
of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra).
14. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that, in any case, judicial propriety
demanded that this Court should not have delivered a judgment
as was delivered in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh
(supra) inasmuch as a Bench comprising of two learned Judges on
an earlier occasion had referred the same issue to a larger Bench
by an order dated 8th November 2016 in the case of S.A. Sampath
Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah and Others12. He submitted that as a matter
of fact the judgment in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh
(supra) tries to nullify what has been held by the larger Benches of
this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and Rajendra
Singh Rana (supra).
15. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that even the Constitution Bench
decision in the case of Subhash Desai (supra) does not lay down
any timeline for the Speaker for deciding a disqualification petition.
It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Division Bench of the
High Court was right in reversing the direction of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court to the Speaker to decide the disqualification
petitions within a specified period.
16. Dr. Singhvi, Shri Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, and Shri Gaurav Agrawal,
learned Senior Counsel supplemented the arguments of Shri Rohatgi
on the similar lines.
12 (2021) 16 SCC 528
1890 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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17. Dr. Singhvi submitted that no judgment of this Court, including the three
Constitution Bench judgments, has given directions to the Speaker
for deciding the matter within a specified period. It is submitted
by Dr. Singhvi that the only exception in this regard is the case of
Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), however, it is reiterated
by the learned Senior Counsel that Keisham Meghachandra Singh
(supra) does not lay down a good law.
18. Insofar as the orders passed by the Full Bench of this Court dated
18th September 2023 and 30th October 2023 are concerned, Dr.
Singhvi submitted that the said orders do not lay down a binding
precedent. Next, Dr. Singhvi tried to distinguish the case of Rajendra
Singh Rana (supra) by stating that the facts in the said case are
totally different. It is submitted that in the case of Rajendra Singh
Rana (supra), because the term of the Assembly was coming to an
end, the Court was justified in directly deciding the disqualification
petition itself. It is further submitted that, in the present case, there
is still a long time for the term to expire and as such, there is no
urgency which requires a direction to be issued to the Speaker to
decide the matter within a particular period of time.
19. Shri Agrawal submitted that if the Parliament decides that a particular
time limit is required to be laid down for deciding the disqualification
petitions, nothing prevents the Parliament from doing so. However, the
Parliament has not yet chosen to do so and therefore it is neither the
High Court nor this Court that can issue a writ directing the Speaker
to decide the disqualification proceedings within a particular period.
20. Shri Agrawal further submitted that in any case, the learned Division
Bench of the High Court vide the impugned judgment and final
order has itself directed that the matter should be decided within a
reasonable period and as such, no interference is warranted in the
present proceedings.
21. Shri Sundaram, in rejoinder, submitted that in the present case,
the facts are glaring. It is submitted that one of the MLAs, after
being elected to the Legislative Assembly as a Member of the BRS,
contested and lost the Lok Sabha Election as a Member of the
INC but is still enjoying the Office of MLA, having contested for the
same while belonging to the BRS party. It is submitted that if such
a situation is permitted to continue only on account of not deciding
the disqualification petitions within a particular period, it would be
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1891
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
nothing less than playing a fraud on democracy. The learned Senior
Counsel therefore reiterated that this is a fit case wherein this Court
should direct the Speaker to decide the disqualification petitions
within a specified period of time.
22. Before we proceed to decide the matter on merits, we find it
appropriate to revisit how the matter has reached the present stage.
23. When the matter was firstly listed on 31st January 2025, taking into
consideration that the learned Division Bench of the High Court
had directed the disqualification proceedings to be decided within a
“reasonable period”, we had asked Shri Rohatgi to take instructions
from the Speaker as to within how much time he would decide the
disqualification proceedings. Thereafter, when the matter was listed
on 10th February 2025, Shri Rohatgi submitted that he was not in
a position to make any statement in that regard. The matter, upon
being mentioned on 20th February 2025, was directed to be kept for
hearing on 4th March 2025. On the said date, when the matters were
called out and after we had heard Shri Sundaram and Shri Naidu,
learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants/Petitioners at some length,
an objection was raised by Dr. Singhvi and Shri Rohatgi, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents that no “formal notice”
was issued in these matters and therefore the respondents could
not file any reply. It will be relevant to refer to paras 5 and 6 of the
order dated 4th March 2025, which read thus:
“5. No doubt that the objection is hypertechnical, however
we propose to adjourn the matter so that no objection is
raised at a subsequent point of time by the respondents
that the petitions were decided without following the
principles of natural justice.
6. We, therefore, issue a formal notice to the respondents
in both the matters, returnable on 25.03.2025.”
24. Thereafter, the matter was called on 25th March 2025, 2nd April 2025
and finally on 3rd April 2025 when we concluded the hearing.
25. In this background, we proceed to consider the rival contentions.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
26. To appreciate the rival submissions, it would be apposite that we
first take a close look at the judicial decisions which hold the field.
1892 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
27. The Constitution Bench of this Court, in the case of Kihoto Hollohan
(supra), had an occasion to consider the constitutional validity of
the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution which was introduced by the
Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985. The Constitution
Bench, in the said case specifically considered the validity and scope
of Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It
will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court:
“13. …. A political party goes before the electorate with
a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the
election on the basis of such programme. A person
who gets elected as a candidate set up by a political
party is so elected on the basis of the programme
of that political party. The provisions of Paragraph
2(1)(a) proceed on the premise that political propriety
and morality demand that if such a person, after the
election, changes his affiliation and leaves the political
party which had set him up as a candidate at the
election, then he should give up his membership of
the legislature and go back before the electorate. The
same yardstick is applied to a person who is elected as
an Independent candidate and wishes to join a political
party after the election.”
[emphasis supplied]
28. This Court, amongst other questions, framed the following two
questions for its consideration:
“24. …..
(E) That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the
Tenth Schedule attracts the immunity under Articles 122
and 212. The Speaker and the Chairman in relation to the
exercise of the powers under the Tenth Schedule shall not
be subjected to the jurisdiction of any Court.
The Tenth Schedule seeks to and does create a new and
non-justiciable area of rights, obligations and remedies
to be resolved in the exclusive manner envisaged by the
Constitution and is not amenable to, but constitutionally
immune from, curial adjudicative processes.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1893
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
(F) That even if Paragraph 7 erecting a bar on the
jurisdiction of Courts is held inoperative, the Courts’
jurisdiction is, in any event, barred as Paragraph 6(1)
which imparts a constitutional ‘finality’ to the decision of
the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, and
that such concept of ‘finality’ bars examination of the
matter by the Courts.
29. One of the arguments that was advanced before this Court was that
the concept of “finality” given to the decision of the Speaker excluded
the court’s jurisdiction. This Court therefore considered the question
as to whether the word “final” in paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule
rendered the decision of the Speaker immune from judicial review.
The majority judgment rendered by M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as His
Lordship then was), after referring to various earlier judgments of
this Court, observed thus:
“94. It is, therefore, inappropriate to claim that the
determinative jurisdiction of the Speaker or the Chairman
in the Tenth Schedule is not a judicial power and is
within the non-justiciable legislative area. The classic
exposition of Issacs J., in Australian Boot Trade Employees
Federation v. Whybrow & Co. [(1910) 10 CLR 266, 317]
as to what distinguishes a judicial power from a legislative
power was referred to with the approval of this Court
in Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR
1958 SC 578, 611 : 1959 SCR 12 : (1961) 1 LLJ 339] .
Issacs, J., stated: (CLR p. 317 quoted at AIR p. 611)
“If the dispute is as to the relative rights
of parties as they rest on past or present
circumstances, the award is in the nature of a
judgment, which might have been the decree
of an ordinary judicial tribunal acting under
the ordinary judicial power. There the law
applicable to the case must be observed. If,
however, the dispute is as to what shall in the
future be the mutual rights and responsibilities
of the parties — in other words, if no present
rights are asserted or denied, but a future rule
of conduct is to be prescribed, thus creating
1894 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
new rights and obligations, with sanctions for
non-conformity — then the determination that
so prescribes, call it an award, or arbitration,
determination, or decision or what you will, is
essentially of a legislative character, and limited
only by the law which authorises it. If, again,
there are neither present rights asserted, nor
a future rule of conduct prescribed, but merely
a fact ascertained necessary for the practical
effectuation of admitted rights, the proceeding,
though called an arbitration, is rather in the
nature of an appraisement or ministerial act.”
95. In the present case, the power to decide disputed
disqualification under Paragraph 6(1) is pre-eminently
of a judicial complexion.
96. The fiction in Paragraph 6(2), indeed, places it in the
first clause of Article 122 or 212, as the case may be.
The words “proceedings in Parliament” or “proceedings
in the legislature of a State” in Paragraph 6(2) have
their corresponding expression in Articles 122(1) and
212(1) respectively. This attracts an immunity from mere
irregularities of procedures.
97. That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule
was introduced, the Constitution did not evince any
intention to invoke Article 122 or 212 in the conduct
of resolution of disputes as to the disqualification of
members under Articles 191(1) and 102(1). The very
deeming provision implies that the proceedings of
disqualification are, in fact, not before the House;
but only before the Speaker as a specially designated
authority. The decision under Paragraph 6(1) is not the
decision of the House, nor is it subject to the approval
by the House. The decision operates independently
of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its
creation transcend its own power. There is, therefore,
no immunity under Articles 122 and 212 from judicial
scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman
exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth
Schedule.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1895
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
98. But then is the Speaker or the Chairman acting
under Paragraph 6(1) a Tribunal? “All tribunals are not
courts, though all courts are tribunals”. The word “courts”
is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in
an organised State for the Administration of Justice. By
Administration of Justice is meant the exercise of judicial
power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to
punish “wrongs”……..”
[emphasis supplied]
30. It can thus be seen that this Court, in unequivocal terms, has held
that it was inappropriate to claim that the determinative jurisdiction
of the Speaker/Chairman in the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
was not a judicial power and was within the non-justiciable
legislative area. This Court, in no unclear terms, held that the power
to decide disputed disqualification under Paragraph 6(1) of the
Tenth Schedule to the Constitution was pre-eminently of a judicial
complexion. This Court, thereafter, referred to the provision of
Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution and the fiction in
Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. This
Court observed that these provisions attract immunity from mere
irregularities of procedures. Then, in paragraph 98, this Court posed
a question as to whether the Speaker/Chairman, acting in Paragraph
6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, is a Tribunal or not.
31. Thereafter, this Court referred to various judgments distinguishing
between the Courts and Tribunals and observed thus:
“100. By these well known and accepted tests of what
constitute a Tribunal, the Speaker or the Chairman, acting
under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal.”
32. It can thus be seen that this Court, in unequivocal terms, has held
that the Speaker/Chairman, acting under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution is a Tribunal. The Constitution Bench
thereafter insofar as Questions (E) and (F) are concerned, came to
the following conclusion:
“109. In the light of the decisions referred to above and
the nature of function that is exercised by the Speaker/
Chairman under Paragraph 6, the scope of judicial
review under Articles 136, and 226 and 227 of the
1896 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Constitution in respect of an order passed by the
Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6 would be
confined to jurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities
based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala
fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice
and perversity.
110. In view of the limited scope of judicial review that is
available on account of the finality clause in Paragraph 6
and also having regard to the constitutional intendment and
the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power i.e.
Speaker/Chairman, judicial review cannot be available
at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the
Speaker/Chairman and a quia timet action would not
be permissible. Nor would interference be permissible
at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings. Exception
will, however, have to be made in respect of cases
where disqualification or suspension is imposed
during the pendency of the proceedings and such
disqualification or suspension is likely to have
grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and
consequence.
111. In the result, we hold on contentions (E) and (F):
That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing
for an additional grant (sic ground) for
disqualification and for adjudication of disputed
disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable
constitutional area. The power to resolve such
disputes vested in the Speaker or Chairman is
a judicial power.
That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule,
to the extent it seeks to impart finality to
the decision of the speakers/Chairmen is
valid. But the concept of statutory finality
embodied in Paragraph 6(1) does not detract
from or abrogate judicial review under
Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution
insofar as infirmities based on violations of
constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1897
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
compliance with Rules of Natural Justice
and perversity, are concerned.
That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2)
of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity
analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of
the Constitution as understood and explained in
Keshav Singh case [(1965) 1 SCR 413 : AIR 1965
SC 745] to protect the validity of proceedings
from mere irregularities of procedure. The
deeming provision, having regard to the words
‘be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament’
or ‘proceedings in the legislature of a State’
confines the scope of the fiction accordingly.
The Speakers/Chairmen while exercising
powers and discharging functions under the
Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating
rights and obligations under the Tenth
Schedule and their decisions in that capacity
are amenable to judicial review.
However, having regard to the Constitutional
Schedule in the Tenth Schedule, judicial review
should not cover any stage prior to the making
of a decision by the Speakers/Chairmen. Having
regard to the constitutional intendment and
the status of the repository of the adjudicatory
power, no quia timet actions are permissible, the
only exception for any interlocutory interference
being cases of interlocutory disqualifications
or suspensions which may have grave,
immediate and irreversible repercussions and
consequence.”
[emphasis supplied]
33. The Constitution Bench therefore held that in light of the
decisions referred to above and the nature of function that
was exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6
of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the scope of judicial
review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in
1898 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under
Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution would be
confined to jurisdictional errors only i.e., infirmities based on violation
of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of
natural justice and perversity.
34. This Court thereafter held that in view of the limited scope of judicial
review on account of the finality clause in Paragraph 6 of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution and having regard to the constitutional
intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power
i.e., the Speaker/Chairman, judicial review could not be available at a
stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and a
Quia Timet action would not be permissible. It held that any interference
would not be permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings.
This Court, however, excluded the cases where disqualification or
suspension was imposed during the pendency of the proceedings
and such disqualification or suspension was likely to have grave,
immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequences.
35. In the present case, heavy reliance is sought to be placed on
paragraph 110 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) by both the sides. On
the side of the Appellants/Petitioners, it is contended that judicial
restriction against Quia Timet actions does not interdict in any manner
against the judicial review in aid of Speaker/Chairman to arrive at
a prompt decision of the disqualification petition. Per contra, it is
argued on behalf of the Respondents that no interference would be
warranted by the High Court or this Court at any time prior to the
final decision being rendered by the Speaker/Chairman.
36. Insofar as Shri Rohatgi’s submission that the High Courts cannot
exercise powers under Article 227 of the Constitution is concerned,
the said contention, in our view, lacks merit inasmuch as in Paragraph
109 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) itself, the Constitution Bench
has referred to Article 227 along with Articles 136 and 226 of the
Constitution. In any case, the difference between the jurisdictional
exercise under Article 227 of the Constitution and the jurisdiction of
the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the
Constitution is very thin as per the judgment of this Court in the case
of Surya Devi Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Others13.
13 (2003) 6 SCC 675
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1899
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
37. The next judgment of the Constitution Bench which is required to
be considered by us is the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra).
38. In the said case, on 27th August 2003, 13 MLAs from the Bahujan
Samaj Party14 approached the Hon’ble Governor of the State of Uttar
Pradesh and requested him to call upon the Leader of Opposition i.e.,
Samajwadi Party to form the Government. This was despite the fact
that the ruling coalition Government led by BSP had recommended
the dissolution of the Assembly on 25th August 2003. The leader of
BSP Legislature Party on 4th September 2003 filed a petition in terms
of Article 191 read with Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution for disqualification of the said 13 MLAs. Thereafter, on 6th
September 2003, 37 MLAs from BSP, including the original 13 MLAs,
claimed to have “split” from the BSP. They claimed protection under
Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution since they
formed one-third of the BSP (37 out of 109). The Speaker, instead of
deciding the disqualification petition relating to the original 13 MLAs,
decided that the said 37 MLAs had met the requirements of Paragraph
3 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and therefore did not
incur disqualification under Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule to
the Constitution. However, the Speaker had kept the petition relating
to disqualification of original 13 MLAs pending.
39. Challenging the decision of the Speaker in accepting this split while
keeping the issue with regard to the disqualification of the original 13
MLAs pending, a writ petition came to be filed before the Allahabad
High Court. The matter was adjourned in the High Court on a number
of occasions. At the same time, the petition for disqualification of the
original 13 MLAs which was pending was adjourned by the Speaker
on the ground that the matter was pending before the High Court. The
said petition was pending before the High Court from 29th September
2003 on one pretext or the other. In the meantime, on 7th September
2005, the Speaker passed an order rejecting the petition filed for
disqualification of the original 13 MLAs. Thereafter, the appellants
therein moved an application for amendment of the writ petition
before the High Court. It appears that there were certain unpleasant
happenings as recorded in paragraph 9 of the said judgment between
two Members of the Bench. Thereafter, the matter was assigned to
14 Hereinafter referred to as “BSP”.
1900 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the Full Bench. Ultimately, the matter was decided on 14th February
2007. The learned Chief Justice had dismissed the appeals while
the other two learned Judges quashed the order of the Speaker and
directed him to reconsider the matter with particular reference to
the petition for disqualification of the original 13 MLAs. The learned
Chief Justice took the view that the Speaker was justified in finding
a split on the basis of a claim of split in the original political party
and one-third members of the legislature party separating, by taking
into account all events up to the time of his taking a decision on the
question of split. However, the other two learned Judges took a view
that the Speaker was in error in not deciding the petition seeking
disqualification of the original 13 MLAs first and in proceeding to
decide the application for recognition of a split made by the 37 MLAs
which included the original 13 MLAs already subject matter of the
disqualification petition before him.
40. Aggrieved by the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court to remit
the matter to the Speaker, the set of 37 MLAs filed various appeals
before this Court. There was also an appeal before this Court by
the original writ petitioner wherein it was contended that instead of
remanding the matter, the High Court, on the basis of pleadings and
material, ought to have allowed the writ petition and disqualified the
original 13 MLAs. This is how the matter reached this Court.
41. Before this Court, it was sought to be urged on behalf of the 37 MLAs
who claimed to have split from the BSP that the two learned Judges
who had set aside the decision of the Speaker had exceeded their
jurisdiction. A reliance was sought to be placed on the judgment
of this Court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) in support of
the said argument. Justice P.K. Balasubramanyan, speaking for the
Constitution Bench, however, observed thus:
“40. Coming to the case on hand, it is clear that the Speaker,
in the original order, left the question of disqualification
undecided. Thereby he has failed to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred on him by para 6 of the Tenth Schedule. Such
a failure to exercise jurisdiction cannot be held to be
covered by the shield of para 6 of the Schedule. He
has also proceeded to accept the case of a split based
merely on a claim in that behalf. He has entered no
finding whether a split in the original political party was
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1901
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
prima facie proved or not. This action of his, is apparently
based on his understanding of the ratio of the decision
in Ravi S. Naik case [1994 Supp (2) SCC 641 : (1994) 1
SCR 754] . He has misunderstood the ratio therein. Now
that we have approved the reasoning and the approach
in Jagjit Singh case [(2006) 11 SCC 1 : (2006) 13 Scale
335] and the ratio therein is clear, it has to be held that
the Speaker has committed an error that goes to the root
of the matter or an error that is so fundamental, that even
under a limited judicial review the order of the Speaker has
to be interfered with. We have, therefore, no hesitation in
agreeing with the majority of the High Court in quashing
the decisions of the Speaker.”
42. It can thus be seen that the Constitution Bench came to the
conclusion that since the Speaker in the original order had left the
question of disqualification undecided, he had failed to exercise the
jurisdiction conferred on him by Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule
to the Constitution. This Court held that such a failure to exercise
jurisdiction could not be held to be covered by the shield of Paragraph
6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. This Court also came to
a finding that the Speaker had committed an error that goes to the
root of the matter or an error that was so fundamental that it would
enable this Court to interfere with the order of the Speaker even
under a limited judicial review.
43. After observing the aforesaid, this Court itself, in the peculiar
facts and circumstance, proceeded to decide the question of
disqualification. This Court took note of the fact that the term of
the Assembly was coming to an end and an expeditious decision
by the Court was warranted for protection of the constitutional
scheme and constitutional values. This Court found that the very
fact that the original 13 MLAs gave a letter to the Hon’ble Governor
requesting him to call upon the Leader of Opposition to form
the Government was sufficient enough to incur a disqualification
under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.
This Court therefore took an unprecedented step of holding those
13 MLAs as disqualified.
44. The last of the Constitution Bench judgments which is required to be
considered for the present purpose is that of Subhash Desai (supra).
1902 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
45. Insofar as the said case is concerned, the Constitution Bench firstly
held that the finding of another Constitution Bench in the case of
Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal
Pradesh Legislative Assembly and Others, to the effect that a
notice for the removal of a Speaker restricts him from adjudicating
disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution, was in conflict with another Constitution Bench judgment
in the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and therefore referred the
same to a larger Bench of seven Judges.
46. Thereafter, it can be seen that one of the issues framed by this Court
in the reference order leading to the Constitution Bench judgment in
the said case of Subhash Desai (supra) was as under:
“32. …… The following questions were framed for
consideration:
…….
32.2. (b) Whether a petition under Article 226 or Article 32
lies, inviting a decision on a disqualification petition by the
High Courts or the Supreme Court, as the case may be;”
47. The petitioners therein had urged before this Court that this Court
itself should decide the disqualification petitions at the first instance.
While considering the argument in that regard, the Constitution
Bench observed thus:
“76. In Kihoto Hollohan [Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992
Supp (2) SCC 651] , this Court held that the Speaker is a
Tribunal for the purposes of the Tenth Schedule. Therefore,
the exercise of power under the Tenth Schedule is subject
to the jurisdiction of courts under Articles 136, 226 and 227
of the Constitution. This Court further observed that the
finality clause contained in Para 6(2) did not completely
exclude the jurisdiction of courts. However, it was held that
such a clause limits the scope of judicial review because
the Constitution intended the Speaker or the Chairman
to be “the repository of adjudicatory powers” under the
Tenth Schedule. This Court held that judicial review is not
available at a stage prior to the decision of the Speaker
or Chairman, save in certain exceptional circumstances
detailed in that case. Thus, Kihoto Hollohan [Kihoto
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1903
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651] makes it
evident that the exclusive power to decide the question of
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule vests with the
Speaker or Chairman of the House.
……………
80. This Court should normally refrain from deciding
disqualification petitions at the first instance, having
due regard to constitutional intendment. The question
of disqualification ought to be adjudicated by the
constitutional authority concerned, namely, the
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, by following the
procedure prescribed. Disqualification of a person for
being a Member of the House has drastic consequences
for the Member concerned and by extension, for the
citizens of that constituency. Therefore, any question
of disqualification ought to be decided by following
the procedure established by law. In Kshetrimayum
Biren Singh [Kshetrimayum Biren Singh v. Speaker,
Manipur Legislative Assembly, (2022) 2 SCC 759] , a
three-Judge Bench of this Court set aside the order of
the Speaker disqualifying MLAs under Para 2(1)(a) for
not granting an opportunity to them to lead evidence and
present their case. The Speaker was directed to decide
the disqualification petitions afresh by complying with the
principles of natural justice. Even in cases where the
Speaker decides disqualification petitions without
following the procedure established by law, this Court
normally remands the disqualification petitions to the
Speaker. Therefore, absent exceptional circumstances,
the Speaker is the appropriate authority to adjudicate
petitions for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule.
…………………
82. In a parliamentary democracy, the Speaker is an
officer of the Assembly. The Speaker performs the function
of presiding over the proceedings of the House and
representing the House for all intents and purposes. In
Kihoto Hollohan [Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp
(2) SCC 651] , it was contended that the Speaker does not
1904 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
represent an independent adjudicatory machinery since
they are elected by the majority of the Assembly. Rejecting
the argument, this Court emphasised that the office of the
Speaker is held in high respect in parliamentary tradition.
The Court held that the Speaker embodies propriety and
impartiality and that it was therefore inappropriate to
express distrust in the office of the Speaker : (SCC p.
714, para 118)
“118. It would, indeed, be unfair to the high
traditions of that great office to say that the
investiture in it of this jurisdiction would be vitiated
for violation of a basic feature of democracy. It
is inappropriate to express distrust in the high
office of the Speaker, merely because some
of the Speakers are alleged, or even found, to
have discharged their functions not in keeping
with the great traditions of that high office. The
robes of the Speaker do change and elevate
the man inside.”
(emphasis supplied)
……………….
84. A similar submission was made before this Court in
Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Manipur Legislative
Assembly [Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Manipur
Legislative Assembly, (2021) 16 SCC 503 : 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 55] , wherein it was submitted that this Court
should issue a writ of quo warranto against the appointment
of an MLA as a minister when disqualification petitions
are pending. Rejecting the submission, this Court held as
under : (SCC pp. 513 & 527, paras 10 & 33)
“10. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the Appellant, in the
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 18659
of 2017, has argued that the Speaker in the
present case has deliberately refused to decide
the disqualification petitions before him. … In
these circumstances, he has exhorted us to
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1905
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
issue a writ of quo warranto against Respondent
3 stating that he has usurped a constitutional
office, and to declare that he cannot do so. …
***
33. It is not possible to accede to Shri Sibal's
submission that this Court issue a writ of
quo warranto quashing the appointment of
Respondent 3 as a minister of a cabinet led by
a BJP Government. Mrs Madhavi Divan is right
in stating that a disqualification under the Tenth
Schedule from being an MLA and consequently
minister must first be decided by the exclusive
authority in this behalf, namely, the Speaker of
the Manipur Legislative Assembly. It is also not
possible to accede to the argument of Shri Sibal
that the disqualification petition be decided by
this Court in these appeals given the inaction
of the Speaker. It cannot be said that the facts
in the present case are similar to the facts in
Rajendra Singh Rana [Rajendra Singh Rana
v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270].
In the present case, the life of the Legislative
Assembly comes to an end only in March 2022
unlike in Rajendra Singh Rana [Rajendra Singh
Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC
270] where, but for this Court deciding the
disqualification petition in effect, no relief could
have been given to the petitioner in that case as
the life of the Legislative Assembly was about
to come to an end. The only relief that can be
given in these appeals is that the Speaker of
the Manipur Legislative Assembly be directed
to decide the disqualification petitions pending
before him within a period of four weeks from
the date on which this judgment is intimated to
him. In case no decision is forthcoming even
after a period of four weeks, it will be open to
any party to the proceedings to apply to this
Court for further directions/reliefs in the matter.”
1906 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
85. The incumbent Speaker of the Maharashtra Legislative
Assembly has been duly elected by the MLAs in terms of
the procedure laid down under the Maharashtra Assembly
Rules, 1960. The petitioners have referred to the decision
of the Speaker to cancel the recognition of Mr Sunil Prabhu
as the Chief Whip of the Shiv Sena on 3-7-2022 to argue
that the Speaker is biased and impartial. The decision of
the Speaker to cancel the recognition of Mr Prabhu has
also been challenged in the instant proceedings. Even if
this Court sets aside the decision of the Speaker cancelling
the recognition of Mr Prabhu on merits, it would not be a
sufficient reason for this Court to decide the disqualification
petitions. We are also unable to accept the alternative
submission of the petitioners to direct the Deputy Speaker
to adjudicate the question of disqualification for the simple
reason that the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly has
duly elected the Speaker, who has been entrusted with
the authority to decide disqualification petitions under the
Constitution. The Deputy Speaker can perform the duties of
the Speaker only when the office of the Speaker is vacant.
[ Article 180 of the Constitution.] As observed in Kihoto
Hollohan [Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC
651] and Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil [Shrimanth Balasaheb
Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 595]
, the Speaker is expected to act fairly, independently, and
impartially while adjudicating the disqualification petitions
under the Tenth Schedule. Ultimately, the decision of
the Speaker on the question of disqualification is
subject to judicial review. Therefore, this Court is
of the opinion that the Speaker of the Maharashtra
Legislative Assembly is the appropriate constitutional
authority to decide the question of disqualification
under the Tenth Schedule.”
[emphasis supplied]
48. Finally, in conclusion, this Court observed thus:
“213. In view of the discussion above, the following are
our conclusions:
.....................
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1907
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
213.2. This Court cannot ordinarily adjudicate petitions
for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule in the first
instance. There are no extraordinary circumstances in
the instant case that warrant the exercise of jurisdiction
by this Court to adjudicate disqualification petitions. The
Speaker must decide disqualification petitions within a
reasonable period;
.....................”
49. It can thus be seen that even in the case of Subhash Desai (supra),
this Court reiterated the position that the Speaker is a Tribunal for
the purposes of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and that the
exercise of powers under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
was subject to the jurisdiction of courts under Articles 136, 226
and 227 of the Constitution. This Court reiterated that the finality
clause contained in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution did not completely exclude the jurisdiction of courts.
This Court further reiterated that judicial review is not available at a
stage prior to the decision of the Speaker/Chairman, save in certain
exceptional circumstances. The Constitution Bench held that this
Court should normally refrain from deciding disqualification petitions
at the first instance, having regard to the constitutional intendment.
It held that the question of disqualification ought to be adjudicated
by the constitutional authority concerned i.e., the Speaker.
50. This Court also noticed that in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana
(supra), this Court decided to adjudicate the disqualification petition
since, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly had inter-alia failed
to decide the same in a time-bound manner and also took into
consideration the necessity of an expeditious decision.
51. Though the Constitution Bench also noticed the judgment of three
learned Judges in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh
(supra), it did not disapprove the view taken in the said case and in
subsequent paragraphs observed that the Speaker should act fairly,
independently, and impartially while adjudicating the disqualification
petitions under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. This Court,
therefore, observed that the Speaker of the Maharashtra Legislative
Assembly was the appropriate constitutional authority to decide
the question of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution which decision was ultimately subject to judicial review.
1908 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
52. Having considered the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgments
of this Court, we also find it appropriate to refer to the judgment
of the three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Keisham
Meghachandra Singh (supra).
53. In the said case, Respondent No.3, in one of the appeals, contested
as a candidate nominated and set up by the INC and was duly
elected as such. Immediately after declaration of the results on 12th
March 2017, said Respondent No. 3 along with various BJP MLAs
met the Hon’ble Governor of the State of Manipur in order to stake
a claim for forming a BJP-led Government. On 15th March 2017, the
Governor invited the group led by the BJP to form the Government
in the State. Respondent No. 3, along with others, was sworn in as a
Minister in the BJP-led Government. As many as thirteen applications
for the disqualification of Respondent No.3 were filed before the
Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly between April and
July 2017. Since no action was taken on any of the said petitions by
the Speaker, a writ petition came to be filed in July 2017 before the
High Court of Manipur at Imphal seeking a direction to the Speaker
to decide the disqualification petition within a reasonable time.
On 8th September 2017, the High Court observed that since the
issue as to whether a High Court can direct a Speaker to decide a
disqualification petition within a certain time-frame is pending before
a Bench of Five Judges of this Court, it was unable to pass any
order in the matter. Another writ petition seeking disqualification of
Respondent No. 3 met the same fate. As a result, the writ petitioners
preferred appeals by way of special leave.
54. Since the facts in the present case are somewhat similar to the facts
in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), we find it
appropriate to refer to the arguments advanced on behalf of the
appellants therein which are recorded in paragraph 10 of the said
judgment and which read thus:
“10. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the appellant, in the civil appeal arising out of
SLP (C) No. 18659 of 2017, has argued that the Speaker
in the present case has deliberately refused to decide
the disqualification petitions before him. This is
evident from the fact that no decision is forthcoming
till date on petitions that were filed way back in April
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1909
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
2017. Further, it is clear that notice in the present
disqualification petition was issued by the Speaker
only on 12-9-2018, long after the petition had been filed,
and as correctly stated by the High Court, it cannot be
expected that the Speaker will decide these petitions
at all till the life of the Assembly of 5 years expires.
In these circumstances, he has exhorted us to issue a
writ of quo warranto against Respondent 3 stating that
he has usurped a constitutional office, and to declare that
he cannot do so. For this purpose, he has cited several
judgments of this Court. He has also argued that though
it is correct to state that whether a writ petition can at all
be filed against inaction by a Speaker is pending before
a Bench of five Judges of this Court, yet, it is clear from a
reading of para 110 of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu [Kihoto
Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651] , that all
that was interdicted by that judgment was the grant of
interlocutory stays which would prevent a Speaker from
making a decision and not the other way around. For
this purpose, he read to us Black’s Law Dictionary on
the meaning of a quia timet action, and argued that the
judgment read as a whole would make it clear that if the
constitutional objective of checking defections is to be
achieved, judicial review in aid of such goal can obviously
not be said to be interdicted. He also strongly relied upon
the observations of this Court in Rajendra Singh Rana v.
Swami Prasad Maurya [Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami
Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270] and exhorted us to
uphold the reasoning contained in the impugned judgment
[Mohd. Fajur Rahim v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative
Assembly, 2019 SCC OnLine Mani 127] and then issue
a writ of quo warranto against Respondent 3.”
55. It will also be relevant to refer to paragraph 12 of the said judgment
which sets out the Reference Order made in the case of S.A. Sampath
Kumar (supra) referring the issue to a larger Bench:
“12. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties,
it is important to first set out the reference order of this
Court dated 8-11-2016 in S.A. Sampath Kumar v. Kale
Yadaiah [S.A. Sampath Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah, (2021) 16
1910 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
SCC 528] . A Division Bench of this Court after referring
to Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi
[Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi,
(2015) 12 SCC 381] , and Speaker, Orissa Legislative
Assembly v. Utkal Keshari Parida [Speaker, Orissa
Legislative Assembly v. Utkal Keshari Parida, (2013) 11
SCC 794] , then held : (S.A. Sampath Kumar case [S.A.
Sampath Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah, (2021) 16 SCC 528] ,
SCC p. 532, paras 3-4)
“3. We have considered the aforesaid submissions
of both the learned Attorney General and the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner. We feel that a substantial question
as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises
on the facts of the present case. It is true that
this Court in Kihoto Hollohan case [Kihoto
Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC
651] laid down that a quia timet action would
not be permissible and Shri Jayant Bhushan,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of some of the respondents has pointed out
to us that in P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced
Law Lexicon a quia timet action is the right to
be protected against anticipated future injury
that cannot be prevented by the present action.
Nevertheless, we are of the view that it needs
to be authoritatively decided by a Bench of five
learned Judges of this Court, as to whether the
High Court, exercising power under Article 226
of the Constitution, can direct a Speaker of a
Legislative Assembly (acting in quasi judicial
capacity under the Tenth Schedule) to decide a
disqualification petition within a certain time, and
whether such a direction would not fall foul of
the quia timet action doctrine mentioned in para
110 of Kihoto Hollohan case [Kihoto Hollohan v.
Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651] . We cannot
be mindful of the fact that just as a decision of
a Speaker can be corrected by judicial review
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1911
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226, so prima facie should indecision by a
Speaker be correctable by judicial review so as
not to frustrate the laudable object and purpose
of the Tenth Schedule, which has been referred
to in both the majority and minority judgments
in Kihoto Hollohan case [Kihoto Hollohan v.
Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651] .
4. The facts of the present case demonstrate
that disqualification petitions had been referred
to the Hon’ble Speaker of the Telangana State
Legislative Assembly on 23-8-2014, and despite
the hopes and aspirations expressed by the
impugned judgment [Errabelli Dayakar Rao v.
Talasani Srinivas Yadav, 2015 SCC OnLine
Hyd 418] , the Speaker has chosen not to
render any decision on the said petitions till
date. We, therefore, place the papers before
the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute
an appropriate Bench to decide this question
as early as possible.””
56. It will also be relevant to refer to paragraph 13 of the said judgment,
which reads thus:
“13. We would have acceded to Mrs Madhavi Divan's plea
that in view [S.A. Sampath Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah, (2021)
16 SCC 528] of this order of a Division Bench of this
Court, the hearing of this case ought to be deferred until
the pronouncement by a five-Judge Bench of this Court
on the issues raised in the present petition. However, we
find that this very issue was addressed by a five-Judge
Bench judgment in Rajendra Singh Rana [Rajendra Singh
Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270] and
has already been answered. Unfortunately, the decision
contained in the aforesaid judgment was not brought to the
notice of the Division Bench which referred [S.A. Sampath
Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah, (2021) 16 SCC 528] the matter to
five Hon’ble Judges of this Court, though Rajendra Singh
Rana [Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya,
1912 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(2007) 4 SCC 270] was sought to be distinguished in
Kuldeep Bishnoi [Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha v.
Kuldeep Bishnoi, (2015) 12 SCC 381], which was brought
to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court.”
57. It is pertinent to note that R.F. Nariman, J. who had authored the judgment
in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) was also a
Member of the Bench which passed the Reference Order in the case of
S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra). A perusal of paragraph 13 of the
judgment in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra)
would clearly reveal that the judgment in the case of Rajendra Singh
Rana (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Bench that made
the Reference Order.
58. This Court, in the said case, thereafter, extensively referred to the
Constitution Bench judgment in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan (supra)
and Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), which we have already referred
to hereinabove. This Court, thereafter, observed thus:
“25. Indeed, the same result would ensue on a proper
reading of Kihoto Hollohan [Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu,
1992 Supp (2) SCC 651] . Paras 110 and 111 of the said
judgment when read together would make it clear that what
the finality clause in Para 6 of the Tenth Schedule protects
is the exclusive jurisdiction that vests in the Speaker to
decide disqualification petitions so that nothing should
come in the way of deciding such petitions. The exception
that is made is also of importance in that interlocutory
interference with decisions of the Speaker can only be qua
interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions, which may
have grave, immediate, and irreversible repercussions.
Indeed, the Court made it clear that judicial review is not
available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by
the Speaker either by a way of quia timet action or by
other interlocutory orders.
26. A quia timet action has been described in Black’s Law
Dictionary as follows:
“Quia Timet.— Because he fears or apprehends.
In equity practice, the technical name of a bill
filed by a party who seeks the aid of a court of
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1913
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
equity, because he fears some future probable
injury to his rights or interests, and relief granted
must depend on circumstances.”
27. The leading judgment referred to insofar as quia
timet actions are concerned is the judgment in Fletcher v.
Bealey [Fletcher v. Bealey, (1884) LR 28 Ch D 688 : 54
LJ Ch 424 : 52 LT 541] . In this case, a quia timet action
was asked for to interdict the tort of nuisance in order to
prevent noxious liquid from flowing into a river. Pearson,
J. after referring to earlier judgments on quia timet action
then held : (Ch D p. 698)
“ … I do not think, therefore, that I shall be
very far wrong if I lay it down that there are
at least two necessary ingredients for a quia
timet action. There must, if no actual damage
is proved, be proof of imminent danger, and
there must also be proof that the apprehended
damage will, if it comes, be very substantial. I
should almost say it must be proved that it will
be irreparable, because, if the danger is not
proved to be so imminent that no one can doubt
that, if the remedy is delayed, the damage will
be suffered, I think it must be shown that, if the
damage does occur at any time, it will come in
such a way and under such circumstances that
it will be impossible for the plaintiff to protect
himself against it if relief is denied to him in a
quia timet action.”
28. This statement of the law has subsequently been
followed by recent English decisions reported as London
Borough of Islington v. Margaret Elliott [London Borough
of Islington v. Margaret Elliott, 16 2012 EWCA Civ 56]
(see para 30) and Vastint Leeds BV v. Persons unknown
[Vastint Leeds BV v. Persons unknown, (2019) 4 WLR 2 :
2018 EWHC 2456 (Ch)] in which a quia timet injunction
was described in the following terms : (Vastint Leeds BV
case [Vastint Leeds BV v. Persons unknown, (2019) 4
WLR 2 : 2018 EWHC 2456 (Ch)] , WLR para 26)
1914 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“26. Gee describes a quia timet injunction in the
following terms [Gee, Commercial Injunctions,
6th Edn. (2016) at [2-035]]:
‘A quia timet (since he fears) injunction is an
injunction granted where no actionable wrong
has been committed, to prevent the occurrence
of an actionable wrong, or to prevent repetition
of an actionable wrong.’ ”
The decision in Fletcher [Fletcher v. Bealey, (1884) LR 28
Ch D 688 : 54 LJ Ch 424 : 52 LT 541] was referred to in
approval in para 30 of the aforesaid judgment.
29. The decision in Fletcher [Fletcher v. Bealey, (1884) LR
28 Ch D 688 : 54 LJ Ch 424 : 52 LT 541] was also referred
to by this Court in Kuldip Singh v. Subhash Chander Jain
[Kuldip Singh v. Subhash Chander Jain, (2000) 4 SCC 50]
as follows : (Kuldip Singh case [Kuldip Singh v. Subhash
Chander Jain, (2000) 4 SCC 50] , SCC p. 55, para 6)
“6. A quia timet action is a bill in equity. It is
an action preventive in nature and a specie
of precautionary justice intended to prevent
apprehended wrong or anticipated mischief and
not to undo a wrong or mischief when it has
already been done. In such an action the court,
if convinced, may interfere by appointment of
receiver or by directing security to be furnished
or by issuing an injunction or any other remedial
process. In Fletcher v. Bealey [Fletcher v.
Bealey, (1884) LR 28 Ch D 688 : 54 LJ Ch 424
: 52 LT 541] , Pearson, J. explained the law as
to actions quia timet as follows : (Ch D p. 698)
‘ … there are at least two necessary ingredients
for a quia timet action. There must, if no
actual damage is proved, be proof of imminent
danger, and there must also be proof that the
apprehended damage will, if it comes, be very
substantial. I should almost say it must be
proved that it will be irreparable, because, if
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1915
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
the danger is not proved to be so imminent that
no one can doubt that, if the remedy is delayed
the damage will be suffered, I think it must be
shown that, if the damage does occur at any
time, it will come in such a way and under such
circumstances that it will be impossible for the
plaintiff to protect himself against it if relief is
denied to him in a quia timet action.’ ”
30. A reading of the aforesaid decisions, therefore, shows
that what was meant to be outside the pale of judicial
review in para 110 of Kihoto Hollohan [Kihoto Hollohan v.
Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651] are quia timet actions
in the sense of injunctions to prevent the Speaker from
making a decision on the ground of imminent apprehended
danger which will be irreparable in the sense that if the
Speaker proceeds to decide that the person be disqualified,
he would incur the penalty of forfeiting his membership of
the House for a long period. Paras 110 and 111 of Kihoto
Hollohan [Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2)
SCC 651] do not, therefore, in any manner, interdict
judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt
decision as to disqualification under the provisions of
the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a
tribunal under the Tenth Schedule is bound to decide
disqualification petitions within a reasonable period.
What is reasonable will depend on the facts of each
case, but absent exceptional circumstances for which
there is good reason, a period of three months from
the date on which the petition is filed is the outer limit
within which disqualification petitions filed before the
Speaker must be decided if the constitutional objective
of disqualifying persons who have infracted the Tenth
Schedule is to be adhered to. This period has been
fixed keeping in mind the fact that ordinarily the life
of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly of the
States is 5 years and the fact that persons who have
incurred such disqualification do not deserve to be
MPs/MLAs even for a single day, as found in Rajendra
Singh Rana [Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad
1916 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270] , if they have infracted the
provisions of the Tenth Schedule.”
[emphasis supplied]
59. Thereafter, in paragraph 33 in the case of Keisham Meghachandra
Singh (supra), this Court considered and rejected the contention of
the appellants therein for deciding the disqualification petition itself and
observed that the facts in the said case are not similar to the facts in
the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra). This Court also observed
that the life of the Legislative Assembly in the said case would come
to an end only in March 2022. It, therefore, granted relief to the extent
of directing the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly to decide
the disqualification petitions pending before him within a period of four
weeks from the date on which that judgment was intimated to him.
It also reserved a remedy to the parties to approach the Court in the
event the decision was not taken within a period of four weeks.
60. Having considered the position of law as has been laid down by this
Court in various judgments, we will now consider the issue that falls
for consideration before us.
61. Noticing the evil of political defections, the Parliament had found
it appropriate to amend the Constitution by the Constitution (Fifty-
Second Amendment) Act, 1985 so as to provide for the Tenth Schedule
to the Constitution of India. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
of the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Bill, 1984 reads thus:
“Statement of Objects and Reasons
The evil of political defections has been a matter of national
concern. If it is not combated, it is likely to undermine
the very foundations of our democracy and the principles
which sustain it. With this object, an assurance was given
in the Address by the President to Parliament that the
Government intended to introduce in the current session
of Parliament an anti-defection Bill. This Bill is meant for
outlawing defection and fulfilling the above assurance.”
62. By the said amendment, certain changes were made to Articles
101, 102, 190 and 191. Most importantly, the Tenth Schedule which
provided for disqualification on the ground of defection, came to be
added by the said Amendment Act.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1917
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
63. It will be relevant to note that, when the Bill came up for discussion
before both the Houses of Parliament, the question as to “whether
the adjudication of disqualification petitions should be left to the
discretion of the Speaker/Chairman or to some other authority” was
also extensively debated.
64. It will be relevant to refer to the speech of Shri A.K. Sen, the then
Law Minister, delivered on 30th January 1985 before the Lok Sabha,
which reads thus:
“Shri A.K. Sen - …… Once it goes outside the control
of the House, it will take years and years for the court to
come to a decision, because there will be appeals and
further appeals and the matter will be forgotten, like the
Anti-Defection Bills of the past. Therefore, if we mean
business, we must give authority to decide this serious
matter to the Speaker or the chairman of the House
concerned, who has been elected by the majority vote of
the Hose concerned. With these words, I recommend to
the House the unanimous acceptance of this Bill.”
65. It can thus be seen that the reason for entrusting this important
task to the Speaker/Chairman was that, once such a disqualification
petition goes outside the control of the House, it might take years
and years for the courts to come to a decision due to appeals and
further appeals ultimately leading to the matter being forgotten.
66. It will be relevant to refer to the speech of the then Member of
Parliament Shri Rajesh Pilot, made during the same Lok Sabha
debate, which reads thus:
“Shri Rajesh Pilot - …….. I would also like to make a
submission that when we go through this legislation and
analyse it, there is a lurking fear that the Speaker may
have been given authoritarian powers. The Speaker
or the Chairman is elected through due process and
he belongs to a party. He is elected on the ticket of
a particular party and when he seeks re-election, he
has to look to that party again. A legislation should be
brought in the Parliament that in future nobody would
contest against the Speaker and once his non-political
character has been recognized, he will have to sever
1918 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
all connections with his political party so that nobody
may contest election against him. Then he will contest
election as an independent candidate and return as an
independent candidate to this House. Otherwise, if such
privileges are not given to the Speaker and he is under
pressure from the ruling party, it is feared that the rights
of the Opposition may be adversely affected.”
67. The then learned Member of Parliament expressed his fear that the
Speaker may have been given authoritarian powers. He expressed
that the Speaker/Chairman belongs to a particular party and is
elected through due process. He also expressed his fear that, such a
Speaker/Chairman has to be supported by that particular party when
he seeks re-election. He, therefore, suggested enacting a legislation
providing for re-election of the Speaker/Chairman without contest.
He expressed that it was necessary that the Speaker/Chairman
severs all connections with his political party so that nobody would
contest elections against him and that he contests the election as
an independent candidate and return as an independent candidate
to the House. The learned Member of Parliament expressed that if
such privileges were not given to the Speaker and if he was under
pressure from the ruling party, the rights of the members of the
Opposition may be adversely affected.
68. It will also be relevant to refer to the speech made by one of the
Members Shri Priya Ranjan Das Munshi, wherein he expressed his
apprehension that the petition before the Speaker could face undue
delay, which reads thus:
“Shri Priya Ranjan Das Munshi : ……Now, in regard to
a dispute regarding a member, the matter will be referred
to the Presiding Officer, but no time limit has been fixed.
I would request in the next session the time limit should
be fixed within which the Speaker has to announce his
decision. If he keeps it pending for three to four months,
it should not be allowed.”
69. The learned Member had expressed that no time limit had been fixed
for the Presiding Officer to decide the issue. He suggested that a
time-limit should be fixed, within which the Speaker must announce
his decision. He also expressed that the Speaker/Chairman should
not be allowed to keep the matter pending for three to four months.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1919
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
70. It will be relevant to refer to another extract from the speeches of
Shri A.K. Sen, the then Law Minister delivered during the same
debate, which reads thus:
“Shri A.K. Sen : …..The other questions are about the
Speaker’s authority. It was our clear intention from the
very beginning that we are not going to allow this matter
to be dilly-dallied and tossed about in the courts of law or
in the Election Commission’s office. I had myself appeared
in the Courts along with late Kanhaiya Lal Mishra Ji for
winning our symbol. Babuji is there. He was the President
of our party then. We used to go very regularly and Shri
Siddhartha Shankar Ray was assisting me at that time. But
the time we won back our symbol, it became worthless,
because we had already won the election not on a pair of
bullocks, but on a cow and a calf. Therefore, that type of
delay should not be tolerated any more. We want a quick
decision. If this Bill is to be effective, and if defection is
to be outlawed effectively, then we must choose a forum
which will decide the matter fearlessly and expeditiously.
This is the only forum that is possible. With these words
I commend the Motion for consideration.”
71. It can therefore be seen that the only purpose of entrusting the
work of adjudicating the disqualification petitions to the Speaker/
Chairman was to avoid dilly-dallying in the courts of law or the
Election Commission’s office. The then Law Minister, who was himself
an eminent lawyer, referred to a matter in which he had appeared
before the courts seeking restoration of his party’s rights to use a
party symbol. However, by the time his party’s right was restored by
the courts, his party had already won the election on another symbol.
The then Law Minister expressed that such a type of delay should
not be tolerated and that they wanted a quick decision.
72. It can also be seen that the Parliament decided to entrust the important
question of adjudication of disqualification petitions, on account of
defection, to the Speaker/Chairman expecting him to decide them
fearlessly and expeditiously. As can be seen from the speeches of
the then Law Minister and other Members, Parliament was conscious
of the potential long delays that could arise if the petitions were left
to be decided through court proceedings. To avoid such potential
1920 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
delays, that would defeat the purpose of the Tenth Schedule, the
Parliament therefore intended to have a forum which facilitated the
quick disposal of the disqualification proceedings.
73. With the experience of over 30 years of working of the Tenth Schedule
to the Constitution, the question that we will have to ask ourselves
is as to whether the trust which the Parliament entrusted in the high
office of the Speaker or the Chairman of avoiding delays in deciding
the issue with regard to disqualification has been adhered to by the
incumbents in the high office of Speaker and the Chairman or not?
74. We need not answer this question, since the facts of the various cases
we have referred to hereinabove themselves provide the answer.
75. Now, let us consider the submissions made on behalf of the rival
parties.
76. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents that in view of the
Reference made to a Bench of learned five Judges in the case of
S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra), the question as to whether this Court
can issue a direction to the Speaker to decide the disqualification
proceedings in a time-bound manner should not be decided in
the present proceedings. It has also been argued on behalf of the
respondents that this Court cannot pass any order which would be
in the nature of Quia Timet action.
77. No doubt that the Bench of learned two-Judges of this Court in the
case of S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra) has referred the question with
regard to the issuance of directions to the Speaker, to the Bench of
learned five-Judges. However, in a subsequent case of Keisham
Meghachandra Singh (supra), a Bench of learned three-Judges of
this Court found that when the Reference Order came to be passed
in the case of S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra), the judgment of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Singh
Rana (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench of
this Court. It will also be relevant to note that R.F. Nariman, J., who
had authored the judgment in the case of Keisham Meghachandra
Singh (supra) was also a Member of the Bench which passed the
Reference Order in the case of S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra).
78. Needless to state that in the case of Keisham Meghachandra
Singh (supra), this Court, after referring to various earlier judgments
of this Court, has directed the Speaker of the Manipur Assembly to
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1921
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
decide the disqualification petitions within a period of three months
from date of order.
79. In our considered view, the issue is no more res-integra.
80. The Constitution Bench in the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra),
while considering the challenge to the constitutional validity of the
Tenth Schedule, has held that the power of the Speaker/Chairman
to decide disqualification petitions under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution is pre-eminently of a judicial complexion.
In the majority judgment, M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship
then was) held that the proceedings of disqualification were, in fact,
not before the House, but only before the Speaker as a specially
designated authority. The decision under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution was not the decision of the House, nor
was it subject to the approval by the House. The decision operated
independently of the House. It was therefore held that the decision
of the Speaker/Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1)
of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution does not enjoy immunity
from judicial scrutiny under Articles 122 and 212 of the Constitution.
81. No doubt that the Constitution Bench in the case of Kihoto Hollohan
(supra) observed that the scope of judicial review under Articles 136,
226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by
the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule
to the Constitution would be confined to jurisdictional errors only
i.e., infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala
fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity.
This Court also observed that judicial review would not be available at
a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and
a Quia Timet action would not be permissible. Further, it was observed
that an interference would not be permissible at an interlocutory
stage of the proceedings. However, this Court made an exception in
respect of cases where disqualification or suspension was imposed
during the pendency of the proceedings and such disqualification
or suspension was likely to have grave, immediate and irreversible
repercussions and consequences. A heavy reliance is sought to be
placed on the aforesaid observations by the Respondents.
82. It can be seen from the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the
case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) that what was contemplated by
not permitting a Quia Timet action was to prevent the passing of
1922 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
an order which would have the effect of protracting, interfering or
delaying the proceedings pending before the Speaker/Chairman.
At that point of time, the Constitution Bench was not expected to
anticipate that, in the future, situations may arise where the high
constitutional functionaries, like the Speaker/Chairman, would keep
the proceedings pending for years together and permit them to
die a natural death at the end of the tenure of the members facing
such disqualification proceedings. However, such situations have
subsequently come before this Court in various cases.
83. A glaring example was the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra)
which came before the Constitution Bench of this Court. We have
already narrated the facts of the said case. In the said case, though
the proceedings of disqualification and the split were pending since
4th September 2003 and 6 th September 2003 respectively, the
Speaker chose not to decide the disqualification petition relating
to the original 13 MLAs but decided the question of split under
Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. Meanwhile,
the petition regarding the disqualification of the original 13 MLAs was
kept pending. The pendency of the writ petition before the Allahabad
High Court was taken as one of the grounds by the Speaker for
not deciding the proceedings pending before him. Subsequently,
the matter was heard by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court.
In the Full Bench, the writ petition was dismissed by the learned
Chief Justice, while the other two learned Judges of the Bench took
a view that the Speaker was in error in not deciding the petition
seeking disqualification of the original 13 MLAs first, and instead,
directly deciding the application for recognition of a split made by
the 37 MLAs, which included the original 13 MLAs. Finally, the
matter reached this Court. The Constitution Bench of this Court
ultimately held that the Speaker had committed an error that goes
to the root of the matter or an error that was so fundamental, that
even under a limited judicial review, the order of the Speaker had
to be interfered with.
84. This Court took into consideration the glaring facts in the case. It
found that the term of the Assembly was coming to an end and an
expeditious decision by the Court was warranted for the protection of
the constitutional scheme and constitutional values. This Court further
found that the very fact that the original 13 MLAs had given a letter
to the Hon’ble Governor requesting him to call upon the Leader of
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1923
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
Opposition to form the Government was a ground sufficient enough to
incur disqualification under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule
to the Constitution. This Court therefore took an unprecedented step
of holding those 13 MLAs as disqualified.
85. The view taken by another Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of Subhash Desai (supra) is consistent with the decisions of
the earlier Constitution Bench.
86. This Court, in the case of Subhash Desai (supra), held that the
Speaker of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly was the appropriate
constitutional authority to decide the question of disqualification under
the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It was held that there were
no extraordinary circumstances in the said case that warranted the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court to adjudicate disqualification
petitions in the first instance. This Court therefore held that the
Speaker must decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable
period. It is to be noted that though the Constitution Bench in the case
of Subhash Desai (supra) had noticed the judgment of three learned
Judges in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), it
did not disapprove the view taken in the said case. On the contrary,
it observed that the Speaker should act fairly, independently, and
impartially while adjudicating the disqualification petitions under the
Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.
87. We have also extensively referred to the judgment of learned three
Judges in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra).
This Court, after referring to the earlier judgments, found that what
was meant by passing an order in Quia Timet action in the case
of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) was passing an order injuncting the
Speaker from making a decision in the disqualification petitions
pending before him. It held that it did not, in any manner, interdict
judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision
as to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to
the Constitution. It was observed that the Speaker, in acting as a
Tribunal was bound to decide the disqualification petitions within a
reasonable period.
88. In the present case, the Appellants in the lead matter namely
Padi Kaushik Reddy and Kuna Pandu Vivekanand filed separate
disqualification petitions before the Telangana State Legislative
Assembly on 18th March 2024, 2nd April 2024 and 8th April 2024.
1924 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
89. Since the petitions for disqualification filed by the Appellants/
Petitioners were kept pending before the Speaker, writ petitions were
filed before the High Court.
90. The learned Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated 9 th
September 2024, had only asked the Speaker for fixing a schedule of
hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.) within
a period of four weeks. The learned Single Judge further clarified
that, if nothing was heard within four weeks, then the matter would
be reopened suo motu. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned
Single Judge, the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative Assembly
preferred three separate appeals. Vide impugned judgment and final
order dated 22nd November 2024, however, the learned Division Bench
of the High Court reversed the order of the learned Single Judge.
91. When the matter was firstly listed on 31st January 2025 before this
Court, taking into consideration that the learned Division Bench of
the High Court had directed the disqualification proceedings to be
decided within a “reasonable period”, we had asked Shri Rohatgi,
learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents to take instructions from
the Speaker as to within how much time would the disqualification
proceedings be decided by him. Thereafter, when the matter was
listed on 10th February 2025, Shri Rohatgi submitted that he was not
in a position to make any statement in that regard. Thereafter, upon
the matter being mentioned on 20th February 2025, it was directed
to be kept for hearing on 4th March 2025. On the said date, after we
had heard Shri Sundaram and Shri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel for
the Appellants/Petitioners at some length, a hyper technical objection
was raised by Dr. Singhvi and Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Respondents that no “formal notice” was issued in
these matters and therefore the respondents could not file any reply.
Though we found the objection to be totally hyper technical, in order
to avoid any complications at a subsequent point of time, where a
ground could be raised by the respondents claiming that the petitions
were decided without following the principles of natural justice, we
issued a formal notice to the respondents returnable on 25th March
2025. It is to be noted that the Speaker had issued notices to the
MLAs pertaining to the lead matter only on 16th January 2025 i.e.,
on the next day after the lead matter was filed before this Court on
15th January 2025. Similarly, notices were issued to the remaining
MLAs pertaining to the connected writ petition on 4th February 2025
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1925
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
i.e., on the next day after the connected matters were heard for the
first time by this Court on 3rd February 2025.
92. It could thus be seen that the Speaker did not even find it necessary
to issue notices in the petitions filed by the present petitioners for a
period of more than seven months and only after the proceedings
were filed before this Court, did the Speaker find it necessary to
issue notice.
93. The question, therefore, that we ask ourselves is as to whether the
Speaker has acted in an expeditious manner, when expedition was one
of the main reasons, why the Parliament had entrusted the important
task of adjudicating disqualification petitions to the Speaker/Chairman.
Non-issuance of any notice for a period of more than seven months
and issuing notice only after either the proceedings were filed before
this Court, or after this Court had heard the matter for the first time
cannot by any stretch be envisaged as acting in an expeditious
manner.
94. Though, we do not possess any advisory jurisdiction, it is for the
Parliament to consider whether the mechanism of entrusting the
Speaker/Chairman the important task of deciding the issue of
disqualification on the ground of defection, is serving the purpose
of effectively combating political defections or not? If the very
foundation of our democracy and the principles that sustain it are
to be safeguarded, it will have to be examined whether the present
mechanism is sufficient or not. However, at the cost of repetition, we
observe that it is for the Parliament to take a call on that.
95. In light of the facts of the present case, however, a failure to issue
any direction to the Speaker, in our view, would frustrate the very
purpose for which the Tenth Schedule has been brought in the
Constitution. If we do not issue any direction, it will amount to
permitting the Speaker to repeat the widely criticized situation of
“operation successful, patient died”.
96. In any event, we find that there was absolutely no occasion for the
learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court to have
interfered with the well-reasoned order of the learned Single Judge,
as learned Single Judge had only asked the Speaker to fix a schedule
of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.)
within a period of four weeks. The learned Single Judge had not even
issued any direction to decide the disqualification proceedings within
1926 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
a time-bound period. We, therefore, find that the Division Bench of
the High Court has erred in interfering with the order of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court.
97. We further find that as a matter of fact, there was no occasion for
the Secretary, Telangana Legislative Assembly to have challenged
the order passed by the learned Single Judge inasmuch as nothing
adverse could be found in the said order.
98. Next, it was sought to be urged on behalf of the appellants that taking
into consideration the glaring facts in the present case, we ourselves
should decide the question with regard to the disqualification as was
done by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra
Singh Rana (supra).
99. In that respect, it is pertinent to note that all the judgments of the
Constitution Bench, right from Kihoto Hollohan (supra) to Subhash
Desai (supra), consistently hold that the Speaker is the authority who
should decide the issue with regard to disqualification at the first instance.
We are, therefore, not inclined to accede to the said request. We,
however, find it appropriate to direct the Speaker to decide the
petitions pending before it within a stipulated period.
100. We may clarify that we are inclined to do so in view of the specific
finding of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the cases of Kihoto
Hollohan (supra) and Subhash Desai (supra), that the Speaker,
while acting as an adjudicating authority in Paragraph 6(1) of the
Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, acts as a Tribunal amenable to
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution and of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
While doing so, we are also reminded of the finding of the Constitution
Bench that the Speaker/Chairman, while acting as an adjudicating
authority under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
does not enjoy the constitutional immunity as available either under
Article 122 or 212 of the Constitution.
101. We are therefore inclined to allow the present appeals/petition.
102. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The present appeals/petition are allowed;
(ii) The impugned judgment and final order dated 22nd November
2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is quashed
and set aside;
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1927
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
(iii) We direct the Speaker to conclude the disqualification
proceedings pending against the 10 MLAs pertaining to the
present appeals/petition as expeditiously as possible and in
any case, within a period of three months from the date of this
judgment; and
(iv) We further direct that the Speaker would not permit any of the MLAs
who are sought to be disqualified to protract the proceedings. In
the event, any of such MLAs attempt to protract the proceedings,
the Speaker would draw an adverse inference against such
of the MLAs.
103. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
104. In the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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