PAWAN KUMAR TIWARY AND OTHERSversusJHARKHAND STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD (NOW JHARKHAND URJA VIKAS NIGAM LIMITED) AND OTHERS

                [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1352 : 2025 INSC 1000

               Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others
                               v.
       Jharkhand State Electricity Board (Now Jharkhand
             Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others
                (Civil Appeal No(s). 10893-10896 of 2025)
                                19 August 2025
            [J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the findings of the Division Bench with respect to illegality
       in the appointment of appellants warrant interference; if the
       appointment is held to be legal, whether they are entitled to any
       consequential benefits.

                                   Headnotes†
       Service Law – Cancellation of appointments, en masse – When
       not justified – Doctrine of severability – Test of individual
       scrutiny – Appellants’ appointments to Class III posts were set
       aside by High Court primarily on the ground that appointments
       were made beyond the sanctioned strength and thus, were
       illegal – Interference with:
       Held: 1.1 The conclusion of the High Court that the appointments
       were made beyond the sanctioned strength is factually incorrect
       and legally unsustainable – The Enquiry Report itself records that
       appointments were within the sanctioned strength – Moreover,
       the respondents have now admitted that the appointments
       of the appellants were within prescribed sanctioned strength.
       [Paras 19, 21]
       1.2 The action of the Board in cancelling the appellants’
       appointments en masse without affording them an opportunity of
       hearing and without considering the legality of each appointment
       separately is not only a violation of principles of natural justice
       but also abdication of the duty to make reasoned, individualized
       decisions. [Para 33]
       1.3 High Court also failed to apply the test of individual scrutiny,
       which is now a bedrock requirement in service jurisprudence and

* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                                1353

Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
      (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

     broadly stated that appointments were made beyond sanctioned
     strength and hence illegal, without distinguishing between individual
     cases – The doctrine of severability is not only available but must
     be invoked to uphold the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment
     u/Arts.14 and 16. [Paras 32, 43]
     1.4 Appellants were appointed against sanctioned vacancies and
     were duly qualified – Appointments were made by the competent
     authority after following due process of selection and at worst, any
     infirmity could only render the appointments irregular, not illegal –
     There is neither any suggestion nor proof of fraud, collusion, or
     misrepresentation on the part of the appellants. [Paras 34, 23]
     1.5 Impugned orders passed by the Division Bench and confirmed
     in review are set aside to the extent they relate to the appellants –
     Appointments of the appellants are legal and valid – They are
     entitled to continuity in service and restoration of seniority w.e.f the
     date of their initial appointment, however, not entitled to arrears of
     salary for the period they were out of service – Appellants also be
     granted notional fixation of pay and other consequential benefits,
     as applicable. [Paras 39, 45]

     Service Law – Constitution of India – Arts.14, 16 – Doctrine
     of severability – Significance – Cancellation of appointments
     en masse:
     Held: Doctrine of severability is grounded in equity and legal logic
     where bad can be separated from good, the good must not perish
     with the bad – The doctrine, though largely applied in constitutional
     and statutory interpretation, has gained considerable traction in
     service jurisprudence where a set of appointments are sought to
     be invalidated en masse – The doctrine of severability is not merely
     a tool of constitutional adjudication but a principle of fairness –
     In service law, it protects deserving employees from the fallout
     of administrative missteps not attributable to them – The right
     to employment, though not a fundamental right, is nevertheless
     protected u/Arts.14 and 16 – The doctrine of severability is not only
     available but must be invoked to uphold the constitutional guarantee
     of equal treatment u/Arts.14 and 16. [Paras 26, 27, 30, 43].

     Service Law – Irregular and Illegal appointments – Distinction –
     Doctrine of severability, applicability of – Appointments of
     large numbers of persons questioned – Test of individual
1354                                                         [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


    scrutiny – Duty of Courts, authorities – Factors to be
    considered, enumerated:
    Held: An irregular appointment is one where procedure is not
    strictly followed but the appointee is otherwise qualified and the
    post is sanctioned – An illegal appointment, on the other hand,
    is void ab initio, such as where the appointee is ineligible or the
    post does not exist – When appointments are questioned on
    grounds of irregularity, the inquiry must not end with detecting
    the infirmity but must proceed further to distinguish those whose
    appointments are unimpeachable – An appointment may be irregular
    if it deviates from established procedure, but it crosses into the
    realm of illegality only where it violates statutory mandates, is
    made without the existence of a sanctioned post, or is tainted by
    fraud – Mechanical application of cancellation orders affecting large
    groups of appointees without differentiation, discouraged – In all
    future cases of large-scale appointment irregularities, authorities
    and courts must mandatorily consider the possibility of segregation
    and apply the doctrine of severability before taking the extreme
    step of cancellation – To mechanically apply the drastic remedy
    of en masse cancellation where the appointments are otherwise
    regular, fall within the sanctioned strength, and are untainted by
    illegality, would be to conflate irregularity with illegality, and to
    punish the innocent for administrative lapses they neither caused
    nor participated in – Doctrines. [Paras 31, 32, 35-37, 43]

    Service Law – Doctrine of severability – Invocation of, when
    not warranted:
    Held: Invocation of the doctrine of severability and the
    imperative of individualized scrutiny in the present case, must
    not be construed as laying down an inflexible rule of universal
    application – Cautionary principles articulated by this Court in
    Baishakhi Bhattacharyya (Chatterjee) case rightly recognizes
    that where the recruitment process is irredeemably marred
    by pervasive fraud or institutional malaise, the Court may be
    compelled albeit reluctantly to nullify the entire selection process
    in the larger interest of constitutional integrity – In such cases,
    exception to the principle of natural justice would not lead to
    potential injustice to untainted candidates and the necessity of
    maintaining public confidence in institutional processes ought to
    take precedence. [Paras 40, 41, 43]
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                               1355

Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
      (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

                               Case Law Cited
     State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya (Chatterjee) and
     Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 719; Vikas Pratap Singh & Others v.
     State of Chhattisgarh & Others [2013] 10 SCR 1114 : (2013) 14
     SCC 494; Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi
     (3) and Others [2006] 3 SCR 953 : (2006) 4 SCC 1; R.S. Garg v.
     State of U.P. and Others [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 120 : (2006) 6 SCC
     430; State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and Others [2009]
     4 SCR 866 : (2009) 5 SCC 65; Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and
     Others v. State of U.P. and Others [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 625 :
     (1991) 1 SCC 212; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another
     [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Union of India and Others v.
     K.V. Jankiraman and Others [1991] 3 SCR 790 : (1991) 4 SCC
     109; Gowramma C. (Dead) by legal representatives v. Manager
     (Personnel), Hindustan Aeronautical Limited and Another [2022]
     1 SCR 734 : (2022) 11 SCC 794 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Constitution of India.

                              List of Keywords
     Appointments; Appointments cancelled en masse; En masse
     cancellation of appointments; Sanctioned cadre strength;
     Appointment was within sanctioned cadre strength; Appointment
     against sanctioned vacancies; Appointment legal and valid;
     Doctrine of severability; Test of individual scrutiny; Equity; Test
     of eligibility; Test of sanctioned strength; Irregular appointment;
     Illegal appointment; Appointment not illegal; Right to employment
     protected under Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India;
     Appointment through internal advertisement; Jharkhand State
     Electricity Board (JSEB); Bihar State Electricity Board; Standing
     Order; Non-Technical Class III; Routine Clerk; Lower Division
     Assistant (LDA); Eligibility conditions fulfilled; Consequential
     benefits; Enquiry Committee; Appointment cancelled; Internal
     notice; No fraud; No misrepresentation; No opportunity of hearing;
     Violation of principles of natural justice; Internal selection process;
     Misconduct; Continuity in service; Restoration of seniority; Void;
     Void ab inito; Notional fixation of pay; Increments and promotion
     eligibility; Absence of actual service rendered; Back wages not
     granted; Service jurisprudence.
1356                                                       [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


                           Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
     10893-10896 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2021 and 07.08.2023
     of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA Nos. 512 and
     647 of 2018 and CR Nos. 5 and 6 of 2022, respectively

                        Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellants:
     Gopal Shankarnarayanan, Puneet Jain, Sr. Advs., Bhaskar Aditya,
     Vishal Singh, Shourya Dasgupta, Ms. Sejal Jain.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Navaniti Prasad Singh, Sr. Adv., Anup Kumar, Ms. Pragya
     Choudhary, Vaibhav Niti.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     Aravind Kumar, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present appeals arise from the common order dated 22.12.2021
     passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at
     Ranchi in LPA Nos. 512 and 647 of 2018, whereby the Division Bench
     allowed the appeals of the respondents and set aside the appellants’
     appointments to Class III posts, reversing the relief granted to them
     by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) Nos. 1248 and 1269 of
     2010. Civil Review Nos. 5 and 6 of 2022 filed thereafter also came
     to be dismissed by order dated 07.08.2023. Hence, the appellants/
     writ petitioners are before this court assailing the correctness of the
     said orders.
     The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeals
     are set forth below:
3.   The appellants, namely, Pawan Kumar Tiwary, Hemant Kumar
     Choubey, and Amar Kumar, were appointed to Class IV posts in the
     Jharkhand State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as “JSEB”)
     during the years 2004–2006.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1357

Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
      (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

4.   On 07.01.1999, the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna issued
     Standing Order No. 812 regarding appointment to Non-Technical
     Class III posts through internal advertisement. The said Standing
     Order referred to Resolution No. 7305 dated 02.12.1998, wherein
     the Board resolved to fill up vacant posts of non-technical Class III
     by departmental candidates. The Standing Order explicitly stated that
     the percentage of vacancies against sanctioned posts to be filled
     through departmental candidates should not exceed the percentage
     indicated against each post.
5.   Pursuant thereto, the Director, Personnel, JSEB vide Letter No. 1341
     dated 25.06.2008 invited applications for appointment to the posts
     of Routine Clerks, Junior Accounts Clerk, Lower Division Assistant
     and other posts through internal process as per the qualifications
     prescribed for the relevant posts. Subsequently, vide Letter No. 144
     dated 19.01.2009, it was notified that candidates who have applied
     for Correspondence Clerk/Junior Accounts Clerk, may also apply for
     appointment to the post of Lower Division Assistant, if interested.
     The appellants submitted their applications in the prescribed format
     for the posts of Routine Clerk and Lower Division Assistant and
     thereafter they appeared in the examination conducted by the Board.
     On 15.02.2009, the Board published the list of successful candidates.
     Appellant No.1(Pawan Kumar Tiwary) and Appellant No.3 (Amar
     Kumar) figured in the list of successful candidates for the post of
     Routine Clerk (hereinafter referred to as “RC”), and Appellant No.2
     (Hemant Kumar Choubey) figured in the list of successful candidates
     for the post of Lower Division Assistant (hereinafter referred to as
     “LDA”). Subsequently, their appointments were made vide Office
     Orders No. 758 and 759 dated 24.04.2009 and the appellants joined
     their respective posts and started working.
6.   The Secretary of JSEB vide office order No.860 dated 07.05.2009
     stated that implementation of all orders related to internal appointments
     on the post of RC, LDA and other posts stood adjourned i.e., stayed
     without assigning any reason. The present appellants along with other
     appointees made representations through their service association
     before the competent authority for redressal of their grievances.
     However, no response was received.
7.   Thereafter, on 27.05.2009, JSEB constituted a three-member
     Enquiry Committee to enquire about all the internal appointments
1358                                                        [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     made, citing certain irregularities and illegalities. On 27.06.2009, the
     Enquiry Committee submitted its report stating appointments were
     not made in adherence to the prescribed rules of qualification, and
     additionally, the appointments were made beyond the sanctioned
     vacancies for internal appointments. Accordingly, the Enquiry
     Committee held all the appointments made through various office
     orders to be unconstitutional, including Office Order No. 758 and 759
     dated 24.04.2009 through which present appellants were appointed.
8.   After the release of the Enquiry Report, the Chairman of JSEB
     issued a directive on 07.10.2009, to take action against the
     administrative personnel responsible for causing the irregular and
     illegal appointments beyond prescribed qualifications and sanctioned
     strength. In the same directive, the Chairman declared three officers
     responsible and cancelled the appointments made internally.
9.   The present appellants made multiple representations for restoring
     the appointments made, however, there was no response from
     JSEB. On 22.07.2010, vide Office Order No.881, JSEB cancelled the
     appointments of the appellants citing the appointments were irregular
     and not in accordance with appointment and reservation rules.
10. The appellants along with other appointees whose appointments
    stood cancelled filed W.P. (S) No. 1248 of 2010 praying for quashing
    of Office Order dated 07.05.2009 whereby their appointments were
    stayed. The Writ Petition came to be amended later to include the
    prayer to quash Office Order No. 881 dated 22.07.2010 whereby
    the appellants’ appointment stood cancelled. It is important to note
    here that another W.P. (S) No. 1269 of 2010 was filed by other
    aggrieved appointees whose appointments were cancelled for being
    in contravention of the sanctioned strength. Both the writ petitions,
    namely, W.P. (S) No. 1248 and 1269 of 2010 came to be disposed
    of by a common judgment/order dated 14.08.2018 passed by the
    Single Judge of High Court of Jharkhand.
11. The Single Judge partly allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed the
    orders impugned therein, namely, Office Orders dated 07.05.2009 and
    22.07.2010 and directed JSEB to issue fresh order of appointment on
    their promotional post on which they were earlier promoted/decision
    was taken to promote, whichever is applicable. However, the Single
    Judge held that their appointment shall for all intent and purpose
    be treated as fresh appointment and they would not be entitled for
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                           1359

    Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
          (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

       any back wages, seniority or other benefit based on their earlier
       appointment/promotion. The Single Judge placed reliance on Vikas
       Pratap Singh & Others. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others1 wherein
       this Court had held that where a wrongful or irregular appointment
       is made without any mistake on the part of the appointee and upon
       discovery of such error or irregularity, the appointee is terminated,
       taking a sympathetic view, order of termination ought to be quashed,
       and appointee should be reinstated. Accordingly, the Single Judge
       observed that candidates/appointees have not committed fraud, and
       having fulfilled all eligibility criteria their appointment cannot be held
       to be unconstitutional or illegal.
12. The findings of the Single Judge were challenged by both JSEB as
    well as the appellants. While JSEB in L.P.A. No. 647 of 2018 sought
    to challenge the direction of fresh appointments to the appellants,
    the appellants in L.P.A. No.512 of 2018 challenged the denial of
    consequential benefits such as seniority and back wages. The
    Division Bench by its order/judgement dated 22.12.2021 allowed
    L.P.A. No. 647 of 2018 and dismissed L.P.A. No.512 of 2018. The
    Division Bench was of the view that even though there is no element
    of fraud but if the process of selection has been found to suffer
    from unfairness and malpractice, then the entire selection process
    is required to be cancelled. Further, it held that appointments were
    held to be illegal since they were beyond the sanctioned strength,
    and in such a situation there is no question of consideration of the
    element of fraud. The Division Bench also distinguished between
    irregular and illegal appointment and reiterated that appointment
    made beyond sanctioned strength is illegal as it is an encroachment
    upon the quotas of posts to be filled up from direct recruitment.
13. The appellants took exception to the above order dated 22.12.2021
    and preferred Civil Review No. 5 & 6 of 2022 to assail the findings
    of the Division Bench. The High Court in exercise of its review
    jurisdiction dismissed the review petitions on the ground that no new
    facts were made out by the appellants and as such, the scope of
    review is extremely limited, and finding no infirmity with the Division
    Bench’s order dated 22.12.2021, the High Court vide Order dated
    07.08.2023 dismissed the Civil Review No.5 & 6 of 2022 filed by the
    appellants. Hence, the appellants are now before us.


1     (2013) 14 SCC 494
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                         Supreme Court Reports


14. We have heard Shri Gopal Shankarnarayanan and Shri Puneet
    Jain, learned Senior Counsels appearing for the appellants and
    Shri Navaniti Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
    the respondents.
15. Shri Gopal Shankarnarayanan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
    for the appellants No.1 and No.3 challenged the findings of the
    Division Bench on various grounds. It was submitted that appointment
    of the appellants Nos.1 and 3 to promoted Class III posts was
    not beyond the cadre strength and even the report of the Enquiry
    Committee found that appointment of Routine Clerk was not beyond
    the cadre strength. The cadre strength of routine clerk posts was
    23, out of which 22 were lying vacant and 50% were to be filled
    through in-service candidates through internal advertisement which
    would come to 11 posts. He would also contend that appellants had
    also fulfilled the criteria of two years’ experience which is very much
    evident from the date of joining of appellants. It was further submitted
    that orders of cancellation of appointment are hit by principles of
    natural justice as before issuance of said orders, appellants were
    not given any notice or show cause. It was also contended that it is
    not a case where any misconduct is alleged to have been committed
    by the appellants, but for no fault on part of the appellants, they
    are subjected to suffer. Additionally, Shri Puneet Jain, the Learned
    Senior Counsel appearing for appellant No.2 submitted that for Lower
    Division Assistant (LDA) 5 posts were available as per rules and the
    approval was given for 25 posts by the Secretary in the interest of
    JESB due to extreme shortage of LDA, and that the approval was
    with the knowledge of the Chairman. Further, it was submitted that
    10% of the vacant posts were allocated for internal recruitment,
    and 51 posts were vacant, hence 10% of that would be minimum
    5 posts which was within the cadre strength. It was further urged
    that appellant No.2 has attained the age of 50 years and has lost
    his eligibility to appear in any departmental examination once he
    attained the age of 50 years, hence this was his last opportunity
    for promotion.
16. Per contra, Shri Navaniti Prasad, learned Senior Counsel for the
    respondents urged that the findings of the Division Bench which
    were confirmed in Review did not call for any interference. It was
    also urged that no substantial question of law was raised in the
    present appeals.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                       1361

Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
      (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

17. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the present appeals
    and considered the submissions of the rival parties and perused
    records. It is relevant to note that while the Enquiry Report held
    various appointments unconstitutional, namely 537 posts which
    were filled up through internal appointment in different cadres such
    as Routine Clerk, Lower Division Assistant, Correspondence Clerk,
    Junior Accounts Clerk, Manpower and Branch Clerk, and Writ Petitions
    and LPAs were preferred by various appointees, our findings and
    observations are confined only to the appellants herein, namely,
    Pawan Kumar Tiwary, Hemant Kumar Choubey, and Amar Kumar.
18. The questions that arise for our consideration are as below:
     I.    Whether the findings of the Division Bench with respect to
           illegality in the appointment of appellants warrant interference?
     II.   If the appointment is held to be legal, whether they are entitled
           to any consequential benefits?

     RE: POINT 1
19. The primary basis on which the Division Bench set aside the
    appellants’ appointments was on the basis of conclusion having
    been arrived at that appointments were made beyond the sanctioned
    strength. However, we find this conclusion to be factually incorrect
    and legally unsustainable as evident from the analysis that follows.
20. The contention that there was an “excess appointment” namely it
    was beyond the sanctioned strength was not substantiated by any
    reliable material by the respondent – Board. No contemporaneous
    record has been shown that contradicts the sanctioned strength
    status at the time of appointments. In fact, the Standing Order
    No.812 highlights the posts were duly sanctioned and advertised
    through proper channels, followed by selection through established
    norms of scrutiny.
21. Evidently, the Enquiry Report itself records that appointments to the
    post of Routine Clerk were within the sanctioned strength. Specifically,
    out of 23 sanctioned posts, 22 were vacant, and internal recruitment
    was permitted for 50%, i.e., 11 posts. The appellants Pawan Kumar
    Tiwary and Amar Kumar were appointed within this quota. Similarly,
    in the case of Hemant Kumar Choubey, the post of LDA had 51
    vacancies, and the 10% quota allowed for at least 5 appointments,
1362                                                        [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     which were duly approved by the competent authority. Despite this, the
     Division Bench broadly stated that appointments were made beyond
     sanctioned strength and hence illegal, without distinguishing between
     individual cases. During oral arguments, this Court demanded an
     explanation regarding this specific finding in the Enquiry Report, at
     which point the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents fairly
     submitted that the appointments of the present appellants was within
     prescribed sanctioned strength. At the outset, this admission during
     the course of hearing would deter us from going into every factual
     aspect, however, given that the Division Bench and the Review Court
     has overlooked these glaring facts, we deem it necessary to satisfy
     our conscience and make our detailed observations.
22. The Division Bench also placed reliance on the procedural deviation
    from the regular advertisement process, by observing that the internal
    notice issued by the Chief Engineer did not amount to a proper
    recruitment notification. While procedural irregularities, if proven to
    be mala fide or substantially affecting fairness, may vitiate a selection
    process, in the present case, the selection was conducted through
    tests and interviews overseen by a selection committee. The entire
    process culminated in formal appointment letters being issued. As
    held by this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v.
    Umadevi (3) and Others2, mere technical irregularities in appointment
    processes and in the absence of evidence of illegality, arbitrariness
    or fraud cannot be a ground to undo appointments, especially when
    the appointees are not at fault.
23. The Division Bench appears to have blurred the distinction between
    irregular and illegal appointments. In Vikas Pratap Singh (supra),
    this Court held that an appointment made without following every
    procedural formality may be irregular, but it does not become
    illegal unless it violates statutory provisions or is made without the
    existence of a post. This Court observed that if the appointment is to
    a sanctioned post, made by a competent authority, and not tainted
    by fraud or deceit, it cannot be labelled illegal merely due to some
    procedural lapse. The facts of the present case are squarely covered
    by this reasoning. The posts were sanctioned, the appellants were
    duly qualified, and the appointments were made by the competent


2   (2006) 4 SCC 1
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1363

    Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
          (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

       authority after following due process of selection and at worst, any
       infirmity could only render the appointments irregular, not illegal.
       In R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. and Others3, this Court held that
       appointments made within sanctioned strength, even if temporary
       or irregular, do not automatically become illegal unless shown to
       be in violation of statutory rules. There is no evidence or even a
       finding that the posts were not available or were created in violation
       of recruitment rules.
24. It is by now well settled in service jurisprudence that the validity of
    an individual appointment must be assessed on the basis of the
    appointee’s own merit, eligibility, and conformity to the applicable
    rules. Courts must resist the tendency to issue blanket invalidations
    of entire batches of appointments merely on the basis of procedural
    infirmities that affect only a portion of the appointments. The principles
    of fairness, proportionality, and individual justice are foundational
    to administrative law and demand that a case-by-case analysis be
    undertaken before issuing sweeping orders of cancellation.
25. This Court has in several decisions, including State of Bihar v.
    Upendra Narayan Singh and Others4 , emphasized that when
    appointments are found to be irregular, the inquiry must focus on
    whether such irregularity amounts to illegality, and whether the
    appointee had any role or knowledge of the deviation. If not, and
    the appointee was otherwise eligible, qualified, and appointed
    against a sanctioned vacancy, there is no justification for nullifying
    such appointment. The present appellants, as evidenced by record,
    fulfilled all eligibility conditions, were appointed within the sanctioned
    strength, and underwent the requisite selection process.
26. It is here that the doctrine of severability assumes great significance.
    The rule is grounded in equity and legal logic: where bad can
    be separated from good, the good must not perish with the
    bad. The doctrine, though largely applied in constitutional and
    statutory interpretation, has gained considerable traction in service
    jurisprudence where a set of appointments are sought to be invalidated
    en masse.



3     (2006) 6 SCC 430
4     (2009) 5 SCC 65
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                          Supreme Court Reports


27. The doctrine of severability is not merely a tool of constitutional
    adjudication but a principle of fairness. In service law, it protects
    deserving employees from the fallout of administrative missteps not
    attributable to them.
28. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others v. State of U.P. and
    Others5, this Court has emphasized that the State, even in contractual
    or administrative matters, cannot act arbitrarily and must be guided
    by constitutional values. These observations gain special relevance
    in cases where authorities, rather than conducting granular scrutiny,
    proceed to cancel entire appointments in a sweeping manner.
29. The case in hand presents a textbook scenario where the appellants’
    appointments were lumped together with others without individualized
    examination. The Enquiry Report itself conceded that appointments of
    Routine Clerks were within the cadre strength, and there is no dispute
    that the appellants fulfilled the prescribed qualifications and eligibility
    norms. There is also no suggestion of mala fides, misrepresentation
    or procedural breach on their part. At this juncture, it is pertinent to
    mention, that learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents
    during the course of hearing fairly submitted that the appointments
    of the present appellants fell within the sanctioned strength.
30. The right to employment, though not a fundamental right, is
    nevertheless protected under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution
    insofar as it requires fair, just, and non-arbitrary treatment of similarly
    situated individuals. The appellants’ dismissal, without issuing a show
    cause or opportunity of hearing, is a clear violation of principles
    of natural justice, and falls afoul of the law laid down in Maneka
    Gandhi v. Union of India and Another6, wherein it was held that
    “even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must
    be made consistently with the rules of natural justice.”
31. The jurisprudence around irregular versus illegal appointments must
    not be blurred. An irregular appointment is one where procedure is
    not strictly followed but the appointee is otherwise qualified and the
    post is sanctioned. An illegal appointment, on the other hand, is
    void ab initio, such as where the appointee is ineligible or the post



5   (1991) 1 SCC 212
6   (1978) 1 SCC 248
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                      1365

Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
      (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

     does not exist. When appointments are questioned on grounds of
     irregularity, the inquiry must not end with detecting the infirmity but
     must proceed further to distinguish those whose appointments are
     unimpeachable. Justice demands separation, not erasure.
32. The High Court failed to apply the test of individual scrutiny, which
    is now a bedrock requirement in service jurisprudence. When
    appointments of large numbers of persons are questioned, courts
    and authorities must:
     (i)    Separate the legally sustainable from the unsustainable
     (ii)   Apply the test of eligibility and sanctioned strength
     (iii) Assess whether there was fraud or misrepresentation
     (iv) Provide an opportunity of hearing before cancellation
33. The action of the Board in cancelling the appellants’ appointments en
    masse without affording them an opportunity of hearing and without
    considering the legality of each appointment separately reflects not
    only a violation of principles of natural justice but also abdication of
    the duty to make reasoned, individualized decisions.
34. As discussed hereinabove, facts upon being evaluated in their
    entirety, reveal that the appellants were appointed against sanctioned
    vacancies, pursuant to an internal selection process, and were fully
    eligible for the posts in question. There is neither any suggestion
    nor proof of fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation on their part. At
    best, the process suffers from procedural lapses not attributable to
    the appointees. Such infirmities, however, render the appointments
    irregular, not illegal.
35. It must be underscored that the jurisprudential divide between
    irregular and illegal appointments is neither artificial nor academic.
    An appointment may be irregular if it deviates from established
    procedure, but it crosses into the realm of illegality only where it
    violates statutory mandates, is made without the existence of a
    sanctioned post, or is tainted by fraud. Conflating the two categories
    leads to manifest injustice, particularly when individuals, who have
    no role in the procedural defect, are visited with the severest
    consequence of termination.
36. There is also an urgent need to discourage the mechanical application
    of cancellation orders affecting large groups of appointees without
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     differentiation. Service jurisprudence in India must evolve to
     reflect a nuanced, fact-specific approach that separates the legally
     sustainable appointments from those that are vitiated. It is neither
     just nor desirable to extinguish the careers of deserving employees
     merely for administrative convenience or to avoid the labour of
     segregation. A practice of indiscriminately declaring entire batches
     of appointments as void undermines not only the morale of sincere
     employees but also the credibility of the public administration. This
     Court deems it necessary to underscore that in all future cases of
     large-scale appointment irregularities, authorities and courts must
     mandatorily consider the possibility of segregation and apply the
     doctrine of severability before taking the extreme step of cancellation.
37. Courts, therefore, must exercise heightened care and adopt
    a calibrated approach, especially in matters involving mass
    appointments. The doctrine of severability must not be relegated
    to a post-facto exercise; it ought to inform the judicial inquiry from
    the threshold. Early-stage discernment of whether appointments
    can be segregated based on sanctioned strength, eligibility, and
    absence of wrongdoing, enables the court to preserve what is lawful
    while excising only what is vitiated. Such an approach aligns with
    constitutional morality, protects institutional credibility, and ensures
    that administrative missteps do not culminate in judicial overcorrection.
38. In the present case, each appellant: (i) fulfilled the eligibility conditions;
    (ii) was appointed through a transparent internal selection process;
    (iii)was within the sanctioned cadre strength; (iv) was not found guilty
    of any misconduct or fraud. To uphold the Division Bench’s order
    would be to punish the innocent for faults not attributable to them.
    This would be a miscarriage of justice.
39. The present case, resting as it does on demonstrably sanctioned
    posts and unblemished individual merit, deserves protection under
    these principles. Accordingly, we have intervened and the impugned
    orders passed by the Division Bench and confirmed in review are
    set aside to the extent they relate to the appellants herein. The
    appointments of the appellants vide Office Orders dated 24.04.2009
    are declared to be legal and valid.
40. Before concluding, we are constrained to clarify that the observations
    made in the present case, particularly our invocation of the doctrine
    of severability and the imperative of individualized scrutiny, must not
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                                1367

    Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
          (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

       be construed as laying down an inflexible rule of universal application.
       We are fully cognizant of the cautionary principles articulated by
       this Court in State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya
       (Chatterjee) and Others7, wherein, after an exhaustive analysis of
       precedent and the evidentiary record, this Court observed:
              “19. The following principles emerge from the aforesaid
              discussion:
               •    When an in-depth factual inquiry reveals systemic
                    irregularities, such as malaise or fraud, that undermine
                    the integrity of the entire selection process, the result
                    should be cancelled in its entirety. However, if and
                    when possible, segregation of tainted and untainted
                    candidates should be done in consonance with
                    fairness and equity.
               •    The decision to cancel the selection en masse must
                    be based on the satisfaction derived from sufficient
                    material collected through a fair and thorough
                    investigation. It is not necessary for the material
                    collected to conclusively prove malpractice beyond a
                    reasonable doubt. The standard of evidence should
                    be reasonable certainty of systemic malaise. The
                    probability test is applicable.
               •    Despite the inconvenience caused to untainted
                    candidates, when broad and deep manipulation in
                    the selection process is proven, due weightage has
                    to be given to maintaining the purity of the selection
                    process.
               •    Individual notice and hearing may not be necessary
                    in all cases for practical reasons when the facts
                    establish that the entire selection process is vitiated
                    with illegalities at a large scale.”
41. The Baishakhi principle rightly recognizes that where the recruitment
    process is irredeemably marred by pervasive fraud or institutional
    malaise, the Court may be compelled albeit reluctantly to nullify



7     (2025) SCC OnLine SC 719
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     the entire selection process in the larger interest of constitutional
     integrity. In such cases, exception to the principle of natural justice
     would not lead to potential injustice to untainted candidates and the
     necessity of maintaining public confidence in institutional processes
     ought to take precedence.
42. However, the case at hand stands on a demonstrably different factual
    and legal footing. There is neither any allegation nor proof of fraud,
    impersonation, or collusion by the appellants. The internal recruitment
    process in question, albeit allegedly irregular in procedural respects,
    was conducted through a structured examination and selection
    mechanism pursuant to duly sanctioned vacancies. The selection
    was made by a competent authority, and the appointments were
    not impugned on grounds of mala fides, corruption, or extraneous
    considerations.
43. It is precisely this material distinction that warrants a calibrated
    approach. To mechanically apply the drastic remedy of en masse
    cancellation in such a scenario where the appointments are otherwise
    regular, fall within the sanctioned strength, and are untainted by
    illegality, would be to conflate irregularity with illegality, and to
    punish the innocent for administrative lapses they neither caused
    nor participated in. The doctrine of severability is not only available
    but must be invoked to uphold the constitutional guarantee of equal
    treatment under Articles 14 and 16.
44. Thus, while we draw guidance from the Baishakhi judgment as to
    the outer limits of judicial tolerance in the face of systemic corruption,
    we hold that in the absence of demonstrable malaise and where
    individual appointments are legally sustainable, we must lean in
    favour of preservation, not obliteration.

     RE: POINT 2
45. While we have held that the appellants’ appointments were legal and
    within the sanctioned strength, we are also mindful of the settled
    principle that in the absence of actual service rendered, back wages
    are not ordinarily granted, particularly where the employee did not
    discharge any duties during the period of cancellation. Accordingly,
    while the appellants shall be entitled to continuity in service and
    restoration of seniority with effect from the date of their initial
    appointment on 24.04.2009, they shall not be entitled to arrears of
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1369

    Pawan Kumar Tiwary and Others v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board
          (Now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited) and Others

       salary for the period they were out of service. However, to protect
       their future service rights, they shall be granted notional fixation of
       pay and other consequential benefits subject to applicable rules such
       as increments and promotion eligibility.
46. We refer to the principles laid down in Union of India and Others v.
    K.V. Jankiraman and Others8, where this Court held that seniority and
    other service benefits can be protected through notional fixation, even
    if back wages are not granted. Similarly, in Gowramma C. (Dead)
    by legal representatives v. Manager (Personnel), Hindustan
    Aeronautical Limited and Another 9, it was held that the doctrine
    of “no work, no pay” does not preclude the grant of notional service
    benefits, particularly where the fault lies not with the employee but
    with the administration.
47. Thus, the appellants shall be deemed to have continued in service
    from the date of their original appointments for the purpose of
    seniority, promotion, and pensionary benefits, but shall not be
    entitled to actual back wages for the intervening period. Their pay
    shall be notionally fixed as per rules, and future emoluments shall
    be computed accordingly.
48. At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that our findings and observations
    made herein above are limited and confined to the appellants only
    and it does not apply to none else of these proceedings.
49. We reiterate for future guidance that where multiple appointments
    are challenged on general grounds, authorities and courts must
    undertake a detailed fact-specific analysis before concluding that all
    such appointments are void. The doctrine of severability must not
    remain a mere theoretical doctrine but must guide real administrative
    action and judicial reasoning in service matters.
50. In consequence to the above discussion, the appeals stand allowed
    and the appointments of the appellants made by Office Order Nos.758
    and 759 dated 24.04.2009 are declared to be legal and valid by
    quashing the Office Order No.860 dated 7.05.2009 and the Office
    Order No.881 dated 22.07.2010 insofar as appellants are concerned.
    In the light of the facts of this case, we make no order as to costs.


8     (1991) 4 SCC 109
9     (2022) 11 SCC 794
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                            Supreme Court Reports


51. We have also considered I.A. No. 184914 of 2024 seeking
    impleadment. The lis before us is confined to the appellants, namely,
    Pawan Kumar Tiwary, Hemant Kumar Choubey and Amar Kumar,
    whose appointments have been examined in detail above and found
    sustainable only because they were within the sanctioned strength.
    The scope of these appeals is thus case-specific and limited to them
    alone. The applicants in the present I.A. are not necessary parties
    for the adjudication of the issues arising here, and their rights, if any,
    are not concluded by this judgment. They are at liberty to pursue the
    remedies available to them in accordance with law and no opinion
    is expressed in that regard. Accordingly, the I.A. stands dismissed.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey