Holding

Custody under Section 27 includes any police restriction or surveillance, so a detained but not formally arrested person is deemed in custody, making the disclosure statement admissible and the conviction based on circumstantial evidence valid.

Summary

The appellant, Perumal Raja, was detained during an investigation into a separate murder and gave a disclosure statement that led police to recover the body parts of his cousin, Rajini, and other stolen items. The key issue was whether the appellant was "in custody" for the purposes of Section 27 of the Evidence Act despite not being formally arrested, and whether the statement could be admitted as evidence. The Supreme Court held that "custody" under Section 27 includes any restriction or surveillance by police, so the appellant was deemed in custody and the statement admissible. Applying the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events, the recovered physical evidence and the disclosure statement satisfied the requirements of Section 27, and the circumstantial evidence met the five golden principles for conviction. The Court also rejected the relevance of the appellant's prior acquittal in a different murder case and affirmed that co‑accused could not be convicted on the same statement. Consequently, the appellant's conviction for murder under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

The meaning of "custody" under Section 27 of the Evidence Act when the accused is detained but not formally arrested.
Whether a disclosure statement made under such circumstances is admissible under Section 27.
Whether the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, including the recovered body parts, satisfies the requirements for conviction.
The effect of the appellant's prior acquittal in a related murder case on the present trial.
The applicability of Section 27 to co‑accused and the possibility of their conviction on the same statement.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 24, s. 25, s. 26, s. 27, s. 279
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302

Subjects

Circumstantial evidenceDisclosure statementPolice custodyFormal custodyDoctrine of confirmation by subsequent eventsSpecial knowledgeAdverse inferenceAdditional link in chain of circumstances

Judgment

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 87 : 2024 INSC 13
Case Details

Perumal Raja @ Perumal
v.
State, Rep. by Inspector of Police
(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 863 of 2019)
03 January 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna* and S. V. N. Bhatti, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Accused not formally arrested at the time of giving information if
can be deemed to be in the ‘custody’ of the police, admissibility
of evidence in terms of s.27, Evidence Act, 1872. Conviction and
sentence of the appellant u/ss.302 and 201, Penal Code, 1860,
if justified.

Headnotes
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – “in the custody of a police officer”
– Interpretation – Case based on circumstantial evidence
– Appellant was taken into custody during the course of
investigation for the murder of his Uncle – However, he made a
disclosure statement – Appellant along with other co-accused
had murdered his uncle’s son-deceased (appellant’s cousin)
who was missing for months and his body was first dumped
in the sump tank and later retrieved, cut into two parts,
put in sack bags, and thrown in the river/canal – Appellant
subsequently arrested in the present case – On the basis of
the disclosure statement, parts of the dead body and sack
bags were recovered – Other articles were also recovered –
Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/ss.302 and 201, Penal
Code, 1860, challenged:
Held: The pre-requisite of police custody, within the meaning of
s.27, ought to be read pragmatically and not formalistically or
euphemistically – “custody” u/s.27 does not mean formal custody
– It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance
by the police– Even if the accused was not formally arrested at
the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed,
for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police – Words
“person accused of an offence” and “in the custody of a police

* Author
88 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

officer” in s.27 are separated by a comma and thus, have to be
read distinctively – The wide and pragmatic interpretation of the
term “police custody” is supported by the fact that if a narrow
or technical view is taken, it will be very easy for the police to
delay the time of filing the FIR and arrest, and thereby evade the
contours of ss.25 to 27 – A person giving word of mouth information
to police, which may be used as evidence against him, may be
deemed to have submitted himself to the “custody” of the police
officer – In the present case, the disclosure statement was made
by the appellant when he was detained in another case relating
to the murder of his Uncle– He was subsequently arrested in the
present case – Body parts of the deceased were recovered on the
pointing out of appellant in his disclosure statement – Deceased had
been missing for months and was untraceable – His whereabouts
were unknown– The perpetrator(s) were also unknown – It is only
consequent to the disclosure statement by the appellant that the
police came to know that the Deceased had been murdered – The
homicidal death of Deceased, the disclosure statement and the
consequent recoveries of the motorcycle and other belongings at
the behest of the appellant proved beyond doubt – These facts,
in the absence of any other material to doubt them, establish that
the appellant committed murder of Deceased – The presence
of motive, inter se family property disputes, reinforces the said
conclusion – Conviction of the appellant upheld. [Paras 25, 28,
29, 31, 41]
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25-27 – s.27, an exception to ss.25,
26 – Doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events:
Held: s.27 is an exception to ss.25 and 26 – s.27 makes that part
of the statement which distinctly leads to discovery of a fact in
consequence of the information received from a person accused
of an offence, to the extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby
discovered, admissible in evidence against the accused – The fact
which is discovered as a consequence of the information given is
admissible in evidence – Further, the fact discovered must lead
to recovery of a physical object and only that information which
distinctly relates to that discovery can be proved – s.27 is based
on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events- a fact is
actually discovered in consequence of the information given, which
results in recovery of a physical object – The facts discovered and
the recovery is an assurance that the information given by a person
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 89

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

accused of the offence can be relied – However, s.27 does not
lay down the principle that discovery of a fact is to be equated to
the object produced or found. [Paras 19, 22]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Conditions necessary for
bringing s.27 into operation, discussed – Facts proved by
the prosecution – Duty of the Court – Evidence produced in
terms of s.27 – Evidentiary value:
Held: The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the
admissible portion of the statement of the accused, would give
rise to two alternative hypotheses, (i) that the accused had
himself deposited the physical items which were recovered; or
(ii) only the accused knew that the physical items were lying at
that place – The second hypothesis is wholly compatible with the
innocence of the accused, whereas the first would be a factor
to show involvement of the accused in the offence – The court
has to analyse which of the hypotheses should be accepted in a
particular case – s.27 is frequently used by the police, and the
courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility
of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse – However,
this does not mean that in every case invocation of s.27 must
be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded as perfunctory
and unworthy of credence – Evidentiary value to be attached on
evidence produced before the court in terms of s.27 cannot be
codified or put in a straightjacket formula – It depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the case – A holistic and inferential
appreciation of evidence is required to be adopted in a case of
circumstantial evidence. [Paras 23, 24]
Evidence Act, 1872– ss.24-27 – “accused person”, “a person
accused of any offence”:
Held: The bar u/s.25 applies equally whether or not the person
against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was
in custody at the time of making the confession – For the ban to
be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence
when he made the confession – The reason is that the expression
“accused person” in s.24 and the expression “a person accused
of any offence” in ss.26 and 27 have the same connotation, and
describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led
in a criminal proceeding – The adjectival clause “accused of any
offence” is, therefore, descriptive of the person against whom a
90 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

confessional statement made by him is declared not provable,
and does not predicate a condition of that person at the time of
making the statement. [Para 26]
Criminal Law – Appellant was accused of the murder of his
Uncle and his son – Acquitted in the case relating to the murder
of Uncle – Judgment of acquittal – Evidentiary value, if any:
Held: Except for the fact that the appellant was taken into custody
during the course of investigation for the murder of his Uncle and
thereupon his disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37) was recorded,
there is no connection between the two offences – Murders were
committed on two different dates – Murder trial of his Uncle
was primarily based upon an entirely different set of evidence –
Conviction of the appellant is sustainable in view of the evidence
placed on record in the present case – The judgment of acquittal
would not qualify as relevant and of evidentiary value so as to
acquit the appellant in the present case. [Para 42]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Disclosure statement (Exhibit
P-37) made by the appellant, convicted – Acquittal of the co-
accused – Application of s.27:
Held: Acquittal of the co-accused was for want of evidence against
them – At best, they were found in possession of the articles
connected with the crime on the basis of the disclosure statement
(Exhibit P-37) made by the appellant – s.27 of the Evidence Act
could not have been applied to the other co-accused as the provision
pertains to information that distinctly relates to the discovery of
a ‘fact’ that was previously unknown, as opposed to fact already
disclosed or known – Once information is given by an accused,
the same information cannot be used, even if voluntarily made
by a co-accused who is in custody – s.27 does apply to joint
disclosures, but this is not one such case – This was precisely the
reason given by the trial court to acquit the co-accused – Further,
even if Section 8 of the Evidence Act was to apply, it would not
have been possible to convict the co-accused – The trial court
rightly held other co-accused not guilty. [Para 43]
Evidence – Case based on circumstantial evidence – Five
golden principles to be satisfied as laid down in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88
– Conditions to be fulfilled before the false explanation or a
false defence can be used by the Court as an additional link
to lend an assurance to the court, stated – A distinction has
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 91

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

to be drawn between incomplete chain of circumstances and
a circumstance after a chain is complete and the defence or
explanation given by the accused is found to be false, in which
event the said falsehood is added to reinforce the conclusion
of the court. [Paras 37, 38]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 – s.313:
Held: Appellant in his statement u/s.313 denied all accusations
without furnishing any explanation regarding his knowledge of the
places from which the dead body was recovered – The failure of
the appellant to present evidence on his behalf or to offer any
cogent explanation regarding the recovery of the dead body by
virtue of his special knowledge must lead to a reasonable adverse
inference, by application of the principle u/s.106 of the Evidence Act
thus forming an additional link in the chain of circumstances – The
additional link further affirms the conclusion of guilt as indicated
by the prosecution evidence. [Para 40]
Words and Phrases – ‘distinctly’ in s.27, Evidence Act, 1872:
Held: The word ‘distinctly’ is used to limit and define the scope
of the information and means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’ or
‘unmistakably’ – Only that part of the information which is clear,
immediate and a proximate cause of discovery is admissible.
[Para 22]

List of Citations and Other References
State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1961) 1 SCR
14 – followed.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan
Guru [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79:(2005) 11 SCC 600;
Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [1976] 1
SCR 715:(1976) 1 SCC 828; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State
of Bihar [1966] SCR 134:AIR 1966 SC 119; Dharam
Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2014] 8 SCR
650:(2014) 5 SCC 509; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.
State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88:(1984) 4 SCC
116 – relied on.
State of A.P. v. Gangula Satya Murthy [1996] 8
Suppl. SCR 808:(1997) 1 SCC 272; A.N.Vekatesh
and Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714;
92 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR
215:(2000) 1 SCC 471; Harivadan Babubhai Patel v.
State of Gujarat [2013] 10 SCR 889:(2013) 7 SCC 45;
Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra [2014]
14 SCR 961:(2015) 1 SCC 253; State of Maharashtra
v. Damu S/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors. [2000] 3 SCR
880:(2000) 6 SCC 269; Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of
Assam [2013] 3 SCR 801:(2013) 7 SCC 417; Rajesh
& Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1202; Khatri Hemraj Amulakh v. State of Gujarat
(1972) 3 SCC 671; Vikram Singh and Ors. v. State of
Punjab [2010] 2 SCR 22:(2010) 3 SCC 56; Sandeep
v. State of U.P. [2012] 5 SCR 952:(2012) 6 SCC 107;
Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC
71; Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR
570; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and
Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., [2004] 6 Suppl.
SCR 1054:(2005) 2 SCC 673; Union of India and
Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs., [1989] 3 SCR
316:(1989) 2 SCC 754; Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd.
v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 1247 – referred to.

List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.

List of Keywords
Circumstantial evidence; Disclosure statement; Police custody;
Formal custody; Doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events;
Special knowledge; Adverse inference; Additional link in chain of
circumstances.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and
Appearances

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No.863 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.08.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No.280 of 2016.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 93

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Appearances:
Col R. Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., D. Kumanan, Raghav Gupta, Y.
William Vinoth Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.
Aravindh S., Abbas, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjiv Khanna, J.
Leave granted.
2. The impugned judgment1 by the High Court of Judicature at Madras
affirms the conviction of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal for
murder of Rajini @ Rajinikanth under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, 18602 and Section 201 of the IPC, by the Principal Sessions
Judge, Puducherry in SC No. 22 of 20143, in the charge sheet
arising from the First Information Report4 No. 80 of 2008 registered
on 24.04.2008 in Police Station5 Odiansalai, District – Puducherry.
3. The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal stands sentenced to
imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under
Section 302 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for three years
and fine of Rs.3,000/- for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC.
4. The other co-accused, namely, Saravanan @ Krishnan, Mohan
@ Mohankumar, and Ravi @ Ravichandran were acquitted by the
trial court, which acquittal has become final. One ‘N’ was tried as a
juvenile and acquitted. On 15.02.2013, the case of another co-accused
– Chella @ Mugundhan was split up since he was absconding.
Subsequently, vide judgment dated 04.06.2019, which has been
placed on record as additional evidence, Chella @ Mukundhan has
been acquitted.
5. The prosecution case in brief is as follows:

1 Dated 31.08.2016 passed in Criminal Appeal No.280/2016.
2 For short, “IPC”.
3 Dated 07.04.2016.
4 For short, “FIR”.
5 For short, “PS”.
94 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(i) On 20.04.2008, Rajaram, who was settled in France, returned
to Puducherry as his son Rajini @ Rajinikanth, who was living
in India, had gone missing.
(ii) On 20.04.2008, Rajaram had approached PS Odiansalai,
Puducherry, and made an oral complaint stating that when he
had opened his house No. 13, Chinna Vaikkal Street, Puducherry,
he had found articles to be scattered all over the place. His
motorcycle was missing. He had suspected that his son – Rajini
@ Rajinikanth and his sister’s husband Krishnamurthy could
have taken the bike. He requested the Police to make inquiries.
However, in spite of being asked, he did not make any written
complaint. He stated that he was exhausted and would come
back to lodge written complaint afterwards.
(iii) Next day on 21.04.2008, Rajaram was murdered. FIR No. 204 of
2008 was registered at PS Grand Bazaar, District – Puducherry
under Sections 147, 148, 341 and 302 of the IPC read with
Section 149 of the IPC.
(iv) On 24.04.2008, Arumugam, father of Rajaram, had made a
written complaint at Odiansalai PS, Puducherry that his grandson
Rajini @ Rajinikanth was missing. The complaint was registered
as Diary No. 80 of 2008 for a ‘missing man’ and was taken up
for investigation.
(v) The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, son of Krishnamurthy
(husband of the sister of Rajaram), was detained and taken
into custody during the course of investigation in FIR No. 204
of 2008 for murder of Rajaram.
(vi) On 25.04.2008, the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal made
a disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37).6
(vii) The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, along with other
co-accused, had committed murder of Rajini @ Rajinikanth
on 23.11.2007 at Rajaram’s house at Chinna Vaikkal Street,
Puducherry. His dead body was thrown in the sump tank located
in the same house.

6 We shall be subsequently referring to the admissible portions of the disclosure statement under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and also to a limited extent in terms of Section 8 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 95

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

(viii) The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal had also removed
various belongings from the same house, including iron box,
home theatre, CD player, documents of the house, motorcycle,
RC book, key, Rajini @ Rajinikanth’s passport, Rajini @
Rajinikanth’s passport size photograph, birth registration of the
grandmother, ration card, etc.
(ix) Later on, the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, and other
co-accused, decided to remove the dead body of Rajini @
Rajinikanth from the sump tank as they had learnt that Rajaram
was returning to India as his son Rajini @ Rajinikanth was
missing.
(x) Accordingly, the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal had
bought a knife and sack bags. They opened the sump tank
and took out Rajini @ Rajinikanth’s body, which was in a
decomposed state. They had cut Rajini @ Rajinikanth’s body
into two pieces and put it in two sack bags. The knife and rope
were put in another sack bag. The three sack bags were taken
by them from Chinna Vaikkal Street, and after passing through
Gandhi Street they threw the sack bags in the canal/river from
the Uppanaru Bridge near the railway crossing.
(xi) On the basis of the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37), the sack
bags with the decomposed dead body of Rajini @ Rajinikanth
were recovered on 26.04.2008 from the Uppanaru canal/river.
Knife was also recovered.
(xii) The body parts which were in a decomposed state were sent
for post mortem, which was conducted by Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-
24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,
Government General Hospital, Puducherry on 26.04.2008.
(xiii) On 30.04.2008, eight articles were recovered from the water
sump tank at the house of the deceased, namely, gloves, lower
jaw, rib, cervical vertebrae, tarsal and metatarsal, small and big
size bone pieces, and knee cap.
(xiv) The skull recovered from the canal/river and the lower part of the
jaw recovered from the sump tank were sent for superimposition
test to ascertain whether they belong to the deceased Rajini
@ Rajinikanth. C. Pushparani, Scientific Assistant Grade II,
96 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Anthropology Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai,
who had deposed as PW-29, proves the superimposition test
report dated 20.01.2009 (Exhibit P-25), which confirms that the
skull and mandible were of the deceased – Rajini @ Rajinikanth.
(xv) On the basis of the disclosure statement, various articles,
including the motorcycle, ignition key, original RC book were
recovered from the co-accused Mohan Kumar @ Mohan and
a juvenile.
(xvi) The motive for the crime was inter se family property disputes
and the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal’s desire to acquire
and become owner of the property No. 13, Chinna Vaikkal
Street, Puducherry.
6. Several public witnesses turned hostile and did not support the
prosecution case. This includes Arumugam (PW-20), the grandfather
of the deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth, who had filed the ‘missing
man’ complaint for Rajini @ Rajinikanth, vide Diary No. 80 of 2008.
However, Arumugam (PW-20) did accept that his son, Rajaram,
who was living abroad had come home when he was murdered
on 21.04.2008. Arumugam (PW-20) also accepts that his grandson
Rajini @ Rajinikanth had not attended crematorial rites of his father
Rajaram and was missing.
7. Narayanasamy (PW-12), then head constable, PS Odiansalai, has
testified that he had received the oral complaint of Rajaram on
20.04.2008, in connection with the scattered articles in his house,
and the missing motorcycle. Rajaram had assumed that his son
Rajini @ Rajinikanth could have taken it away.
8. Kaniyakumaran (PW-10), involved in real estate business, did not
specifically implicate the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, but
has accepted that Punitha (PW-3), a relative of the deceased Rajini
@ Rajinikanth, had tried to sell the property in Kurumbapet. Reliance
can be also placed on the documentary evidence to establish that
the property in question in the name of Rajaram was dealt with by
Porkilai (PW-4), mother of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal.
In support, the following documents are relied:
(i) sale deed in favour of Rajaram executed on 26.06.1990 (Exhibit
P-66);
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 97

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

(ii) sale agreement between Porkilai (PW-4) and accused no.5 -
Ravi @ Ravichandran executed on May, 2007 (Exhibit P-66);
(iii) release deed in favour of Rajaram by Porkilai (PW-4), executed
on 27.06.1990 (Exhibit P-68);
(iv) sale agreement in favour of Thangaveni Ammal, mother of
Rajaram, executed on 19.08.1981 (Exhibit P-69).
9. Chinta Kodanda Rao (PW-30), Inspector of Police, PS Grand Bazaar,
the investigating officer in FIR No. 204 of 2008 relating to the murder
of Rajaram by unknown persons, has testified on the disclosure
statement made by the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal (Exhibit
P-37). The relevant portion of the disclosure statement reads:
“…myself and xxx pull Rajni’s xxx, put him in the sump
tank near the bathroom and closed it…
…took xxx, Iron box, Home theatre, xxx, xxx, rental
documents of my uncle’s house at Chittankudi, Hero Honda
CD Dawn motorcycle, RC book and key, Rajini’s passport
book, Rajini’s passport size photo, birth registration of
grandmother, family ration card of uncle and the copy of
documents written in English, bunch of keys of the house
and my uncle Ranjith’s notebook, xxx xxx xxx, took Hero
Honda CD Dawn motorbike of my uncle Rajaram…..one
bag was put by Mohan xxx xxx xxx the house of Mohan
nearby to the Tollgate of Ariyankuppam, kept 2 bags in
Mohan’s house…
…I, immediately, went to N (name withheld) house and
gave him document, ration card, bunch of keys, Rajini’s
passport, by keeping them in Ranjith notebook and stated
to keep them safe…
…I took the already kept 3 sack bags, rope, curry knife,
showed the sump tank to xxx. When he opened the cover
of the sump tank, he bend down and lifted the hand of the
body of Rajini, who was already killed and put in the sump
by us, since Rajini’s body was in decomposed stage, his
hand had alone come. I put the hand in sack bag. Then we
tied rope in chest, myself and xxx pulled the body outside
from sump. Then, head has come alone. I put head in the
98 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

sack bag. Then xxx took knife from me and cut Rajini’s
body into two pieces and put them in two sack bags, then
put knife and xxx in another sack bag and kept the sack
bags near kitchen, then xxx closed the sump…
…via Chinnavaikal Street and Gandhi Street, turned on
the left side of the street, in front of small clock tower,
via Varnarapettai Billu Shop, on the centre of the bridge
of Railway Crossing on the left side, threw the two bags,
containing the decomposed body of Rajini, on the right
side threw the sack bag, containing knife and xxx…
…Also, I gave statement that if I was taken, I would identify
the Chinnavaikal street, which is the place of occurrence,
my maternal uncle’s house which is in the same street..
the place where I had left the motor cycle of my (nc) and
the place where I had put the body of Rajini... ”
10. On the aspect of the recovery of two nylon sack bags with body
parts, we have affirmative depositions of Chinta Kodanda Rao (PW-
30), Inspector of Police, PS Grand Bazaar, public witness Devadass
(PW-21) and Satyamurthy (PW-11). The recovery was photographed
by Selvaganapathy (PW-26), police photographer vide photographs
marked Exhibit P-19. The recovery was duly recorded in the rough
sketch plan (Exhibit P-30) and the mahazar (Exhibit P-31).
11. On 29.04.2008, accused no. 4 - Mohan Kumar @ Mohan was
arrested. On the same day, stolen items including, the motorcycle
and ignition key of motorcycle, original registration book, insurance
certificate of the motorcycle, iron box, home theatre and speaker
box belonging to the deceased were recovered, as recorded vide
seizure mahazar (Exhibits P-44, P-45, P-46 and P-47).
12. On 30.04.2008, eight articles were recovered from the water sump
tank at the house of the deceased, namely, gloves, lower jaw, rib,
cervical vertebrae, tarsal and metatarsal, small and big size bone
pieces, and knee cap. T. Bairavasamy (PW-32), Circle Inspector, PS
Odiansalai has deposed about the recovery and proved the Mahazar
(Exhibit P-48). The recovery was photographed by Subburayan (PW-
25), police photographer vide photographs marked Exhibit P-18 and
duly witnessed by public witness Devadass (PW-21).
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 99

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

13. To determine the identity of the deceased person, some of the
body parts were sent for a superimposition test to C. Pushparani
(PW-29), who was working as a Scientific Assistant Grade II,
Anthropology Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai.
She has deposed about having received the case properties,
consisting of a skull with mandible on 10.09.2008. The mandible
was attached with the skull by means of a spring. For the purpose
of identification, she had two identical colour photographs of a
male individual sent to her in a sealed envelope as Item Nos.
2 and 3. The photographs were enlarged to the size of a self-
portrait. Using the computer aided video superimposition technique,
she had examined the skull and mandible viz. the photographs.
For the purposes of the examination, the flesh thickness and
the anthroposcopic landmarks in the face were also taken into
consideration. C. Pushparani (PW-29), Scientific Assistant Grade
II, Anthropology Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai
opined that the landmarks on the face matched well with those of
the skull. She submitted her forensic report dated 20.01.2009 with
analysis on the anthroposcopy and superimposition test (Exhibit
P-25). The skull, as per C. Pushparani (PW-29), Scientific Assistant
Grade II, Anthropology Division, Forensic Sciences Department,
Chennai belonged to the male individual seen in the photograph
at serial no.4. With the report, Exhibit P-25, C. Pushparani (PW-
29), Scientific Assistant Grade II, Anthropology Division, Forensic
Sciences Department, Chennai had enclosed the computer laser
printouts taken by her at the time of examination to establish and
prove that the photographs of deceased – Rajini @ Rajinikanth
match with the mandible and the skull (Exhibits P-26 to P-28).
We have carefully examined the computer laser print outs, and
are of the opinion that the findings of the High Court affirming the
judgment of the trial court are justified.
14. On behalf of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, it is submitted
that as per Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department
of Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital, Puducherry no
definite cause of death could be ascertained due to decomposition
of the body. However, it is pertinent to note that Dr. S. Diwakar
(PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,
Government General Hospital, Puducherry has also deposed that
the deceased could be between 25-30 years of age and probable
100 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

death could have occurred six months prior to the autopsy. It must
be further noted that the deceased – Rajini @ Rajinikanth was about
30 years of age and he had been missing for about six months prior
to the date on which the autopsy was conducted.
15. It has been submitted with considerable emphasis that Dr. S. Diwakar
(PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,
Government General Hospital, Puducherry has accepted that the
lower jaw (mandible) was not found. Whereas, deposition of C.
Pushparani (PW-29), Scientific Assistant Grade II, Anthropology
Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai and the photo
superimposition done by her specifically refer to the lower jaw. We
have examined this contention. Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior
Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government
General Hospital, Puducherry, in his examination-in-chief, has testified
that the police had sent the skull, sternum and right femur which
were preserved by him from the autopsy material. Dr. S. Diwakar
(PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,
Government General Hospital, Puducherry has also stated that the
lower jaw and the left lower first premolar tooth were preserved by
him from the skeleton remains for onward transmission to Central
Forensic Science Laboratory, Hyderabad, for necessary photo
superimposition and DNA test through the Judicial Magistrate-II,
Puducherry. The mahazar dated 21.5.2008 (Exhibit P-15) was
prepared after collecting the aforesaid body parts.
16. We do not find that any confusion or doubt arises from the deposition
of Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of
Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital, Puducherry.
He had conducted the post mortem examination (Exhibit P-16) on
26.04.2008, wherein he had examined the remains/body parts of the
deceased which were found in the two nylon sack bags on the same
day. Other body parts including, the lower part of the skull i.e. the
mandible and the tooth were found subsequently in the sump tank
on 30.04.2008. Therefore, Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical
Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government General
Hospital, Puducherry, in his deposition, while referring to Exhibit
P-17 dated 19.05.2008, has referred to the lower jaw (mandible)
and the left lower first premolar tooth, to send the said body parts
to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory at Hyderabad.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 101

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

17. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant – Perumal Raja
@ Perumal that Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer,
Department of Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital,
Puducherry, in his cross-examination, has accepted that body parts
were sent to him in two nylon sack bags only once, and nothing was
sent thereafter. The post mortem was completed on 26.04.2008, vide
the post mortem report (Exhibit P-16) of the same date.
18. Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of
Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital, Puducherry had
issued bone-case certificate (Exhibit P-17) on 19.05.2008. Dr. S.
Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic
Medicine, Government General Hospital, Puducherry has clarified that
while he did not mention the lower jaw in the post mortem 26.04.2008
(Exhibit P-16), he had mentioned that the lower jaw was preserved
in the bone-case certificate (Exhibit P-17) dated 19.05.2008. 7
Further, the aforesaid deposition of Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior
Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government
General Hospital, Puducherry has to be read with the testimony
of T. Bairavasamy (PW-32), Circle Inspector, PS Odiansalai, who
had deposed that he had taken the letter written by Dr. S. Diwakar
(PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,
Government General Hospital, Puducherry and had obtained the
signatures of Judicial Magistrate-II, Puducherry for conducting DNA
test. Thereafter, the material objects were sent through Form 95
No. 02876 (Exhibit P-60) to the Judicial Magistrate-II, Puducherry.
The skull and the mandible were sent for photo superimposition test
after addressing a letter to Judicial Magistrate-II, Puducherry which
was signed by Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer,
Department of Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital,
Puducherry (Exhibit P-61).
19. The prosecution’s case, in the absence of eye witnesses, is based
upon circumstantial evidence. As per Section 25 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 8, a confession made to a police officer is
prohibited and cannot be admitted in evidence. Section 26 of the
Evidence Act provides that no confession made by any person whilst

7 The recovery of lower jaw from the sump took place on 30.04.2008. Thus, it could not have been men-
tioned in the post mortem report dated 26.04.2008.
8 For short ‘the Evidence Act’.
102 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

he is in the custody of a police officer shall be proved against such
person, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
Section 279 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Sections 25
and 26 of the Evidence Act. It makes that part of the statement
which distinctly leads to discovery of a fact in consequence of the
information received from a person accused of an offence, to the
extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered, admissible
in evidence against the accused. The fact which is discovered as
a consequence of the information given is admissible in evidence.
Further, the fact discovered must lead to recovery of a physical object
and only that information which distinctly relates to that discovery can
be proved. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is based on the doctrine
of confirmation by subsequent events – a fact is actually discovered
in consequence of the information given, which results in recovery
of a physical object. The facts discovered and the recovery is an
assurance that the information given by a person accused of the
offence can be relied.
20. In Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor10, the Privy Council held that
the fact discovered embraces the place from which the physical object
is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the
information given, must distinctly relate to this fact.
21. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru11, this
Court affirmed that the fact discovered within the meaning of Section
27 of the Evidence Act must be some concrete fact to which the
information directly relates. Further, the fact discovered should refer
to a material/physical object and not to a pure mental fact relating
to a physical object disassociated from the recovery of the physical
object.
22. However, we must clarify that Section 27 of the Evidence Act, as held
in these judgments, does not lay down the principle that discovery
of a fact is to be equated to the object produced or found. The
discovery of the fact resulting in recovery of a physical object exhibits

9 27. How much of information received from accused may be proved. – Provided that, when any
fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any of-
fence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or
not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
10 AIR 1947 PC 67.
11 (2005) 11 SCC 600.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 103

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

knowledge or mental awareness of the person accused of the offence
as to the existence of the physical object at the particular place.
Accordingly, discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place
from which it was produced and the knowledge of the accused as to
its existence. To this extent, therefore, factum of discovery combines
both the physical object as well as the mental consciousness of the
informant accused in relation thereto. In Mohmed Inayatullah v.
State of Maharashtra12, elucidating on Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, it has been held that the first condition imposed and necessary
for bringing the section into operation is the discovery of a fact which
should be a relevant fact in consequence of information received from
a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of
such a fact must be deposed to. A fact already known to the police
will fall foul and not meet this condition. The third is that at the time
of receipt of the information, the accused must be in police custody.
Lastly, it is only so much of information which relates distinctly to
the fact thereby discovered resulting in recovery of a physical object
which is admissible. Rest of the information is to be excluded. The
word ‘distinctly’ is used to limit and define the scope of the information
and means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’ or ‘unmistakably’. Only that
part of the information which is clear, immediate and a proximate
cause of discovery is admissible.
23. The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the admissible
portion of the statement of the accused, would give rise to two
alternative hypotheses, namely, (i) that the accused had himself
deposited the physical items which were recovered; or (ii) only the
accused knew that the physical items were lying at that place. The
second hypothesis is wholly compatible with the innocence of the
accused, whereas the first would be a factor to show involvement
of the accused in the offence. The court has to analyse which of the
hypotheses should be accepted in a particular case.
24. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is frequently used by the police, and
the courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility
of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse. However, this
does not mean that in every case invocation of Section 27 of the
Evidence Act must be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded
as perfunctory and unworthy of credence.

12 (1976) 1 SCC 828.
104 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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25. The pre-requisite of police custody, within the meaning of Section
27 of the Evidence Act, ought to be read pragmatically and not
formalistically or euphemistically. In the present case, the disclosure
statement (Exhibit P-37) was made by the appellant – Perumal Raja
@ Perumal on 25.04.2008, when he was detained in another case,
namely, FIR No. 204/2008, registered at PS Grand Bazar, Puducherry,
relating to the murder of Rajaram. He was subsequently arrested
in this case, that is FIR.No.80/2008, which was registered at PS
Odiansalai, Puducherry. The expression “custody” under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind
of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the police. Even if the
accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information,
the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the
custody of the police.
26. Reference is made to a recent decision of this Court in Rajesh
& Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh13, which held that formal
accusation and formal police custody are essential pre-requisites
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In our opinion, we need not
dilate on the legal proposition as we are bound by the law and ratio
as laid down by the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court
in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya14. The law laid down by
this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is
binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength.15
This Court in Deoman Upadhyay (supra) observed that the bar
under Section 25 of the Evidence Act applies equally whether or not
the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal
trial was in custody at the time of making the confession. Further,
for the ban to be effective the person need not have been accused
of an offence when he made the confession. The reason is that
the expression “accused person” in Section 24 and the expression
“a person accused of any offence” in Sections 26 and 27 have the
same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence

13 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1202.
14 (1961) 1 SCR 14.
15 See Judgments of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community
and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2005) 2 SCC 673 and Union of India and Anr. v. Raghubir Singh
(Dead) By Lrs., (1989) 2 SCC 754. Raghubir Singh (supra) and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Commu-
nity (supra) have been subsequently followed and applied by this Court in Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v.
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1247.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 105

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. The adjectival clause
“accused of any offence” is, therefore, descriptive of the person
against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared
not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person at
the time of making the statement.
27. Elaborating on this aspect, a three judge Bench of this Court in
Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar16 has held that if the FIR is given
by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional
statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25 of the
Evidence Act. The confession includes not only the admission of the
offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the
offence, except to the extent that the ban is lifted by Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. While dealing with the admission of part of confession
report dealing with motive, subsequent conduct and opportunity, this
Court rejected the severability test adopted by some High Courts. The
statement can, however, be relied upon and admitted to identify the
accused as the maker, and the portion within the purview of Section
27 of the Evidence Act is admissible. Aghnoo Nagesia (supra) has
been applied and followed by this Court in Khatri Hemraj Amulakh
v. State of Gujarat.17
28. The words “person accused of an offence” and the words “in the
custody of a police officer” in Section 27 of the Evidence Act are
separated by a comma. Thus, they have to be read distinctively.
The wide and pragmatic interpretation of the term “police custody”
is supported by the fact that if a narrow or technical view is taken, it
will be very easy for the police to delay the time of filing the FIR and
arrest, and thereby evade the contours of Sections 25 to 27 of the
Evidence Act. Thus, in our considered view the correct interpretation
would be that as soon as an accused or suspected person comes
into the hands of a police officer, he is no longer at liberty and is
under a check, and is, therefore, in “custody” within the meaning of
Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act. It is for this reason that the
expression “custody” has been held, as earlier observed, to include
surveillance, restriction or restraint by the police.

16 AIR 1966 SC 119.
17 (1972) 3 SCC 671.
106 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

29. This Court in Deoman Upadhyay (supra), while rejecting the
argument that the distinction between persons in custody and persons
not in custody violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, observed
that the distinction is a mere theoretical possibility. Sections 25 and
26 were enacted not because the law presumed the statements to
be untrue, but having regard to the tainted nature of the source of
the evidence, prohibited them from being received in evidence. A
person giving word of mouth information to police, which may be
used as evidence against him, may be deemed to have submitted
himself to the “custody” of the police officer. Reference can also be
made to decision of this Court in Vikram Singh and Ors. v. State
of Punjab18, which discusses and applies Deoman Upadhyay
(supra), to hold that formal arrest is not a necessity for operation of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. This Court in Dharam Deo Yadav
v. State of Uttar Pradesh19, has held that the expression “custody”
in Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody,
but includes any kind of surveillance, restriction or restraint by the
police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of
giving information, the accused is, for all practical purposes, in the
custody of the police and the bar vide Sections 25 and 26 of the
Evidence Act, and accordingly exception under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, apply. Reliance was placed on the decisions in State
of A.P. v. Gangula Satya Murthy20 and A.N.Vekatesh and Anr. v.
State of Karnataka21.
30. However, evidentiary value to be attached on evidence produced
before the court in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be
codified or put in a straightjacket formula. It depends upon the facts
and circumstances of the case. A holistic and inferential appreciation
of evidence is required to be adopted in a case of circumstantial
evidence.
31. When we turn to the facts of the present case, the body parts of
the deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth were recovered on the pointing
out of appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal in his disclosure

18 (2010) 3 SCC 56.
19 (2014) 5 SCC 509.
20 (1997) 1 SCC 272.
21 (2005) 7 SCC 714.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 107

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

statement. Rajini @ Rajinikanth had been missing for months and
was untraceable. In the present case, as discussed above, the
homicidal death of Rajini @ Rajinikanth, the disclosure statement
marked Exhibit P-37, and the consequent recovery as elucidated
above have been proved beyond doubt and debate.
32. In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh22, this Court in the facts therein
held that recovery of a dead body, which was from the place pointed
out by the accused, was a formidable incriminating circumstance.
This would, the Court held, reveal that the dead body was concealed
by the accused unless there is material and evidence to show that
somebody else had concealed it and this fact came to the knowledge
of the accused either because he had seen that person concealing
the dead body or was told by someone else that the dead body was
concealed at the said location. Here, if the accused declines and
does not tell the criminal court that his knowledge of the concealment
was on the basis of the possibilities that absolve him, the court can
presume that the dead body (or physical object, as the case may be)
was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the person
who can offer the explanation as to how he came to know of such
concealment is the accused. If the accused chooses to refrain from
telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption
is that the concealment was by the accused himself.
33. The aforesaid view has been followed subsequently and reiterated in
Harivadan Babubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat23, Vasanta Sampat
Dupare v. State of Maharashtra24, State of Maharashtra v. Damu
S/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors.25, and Rumi Bora Dutta v. State
of Assam26.
34. Our reasoning, which places reliance on Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, does not in any way dilute the burden of proof which is on the
prosecution. Section 106 comes into play when the prosecution is
able to establish the facts by way of circumstantial evidence. On
this aspect we shall delve upon subsequently.

22 (2000) 1 SCC 471.
23 (2013) 7 SCC 45.
24 (2015) 1 SCC 253.
25 (2000) 6 SCC 269.
26 (2013) 7 SCC 417.
108 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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35. Apart from Section 27 of the Evidence Act, Section 8 of the said
Act would be also attracted insofar as the prosecution witnesses,
namely, the investigating officers, Chinta Kodanda Rao (PW-30),
Inspector of Police, PS Grand Bazaar and T. Bairavasamy (PW-
32), Circle Inspector, PS Odiansalai, have referred to the conduct
of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal with regard to any fact
in issue or a relevant fact when the appellant – Perumal Raja @
Perumal was confronted and questioned.27 Reference in this regard
may also be made to the judgment of this Court in Sandeep v. State
of U.P.28 which held that:
“52. (…) It is quite common that based on admissible
portion of the statement of the accused whenever and
wherever recoveries are made, the same are admissible
in evidence and it is for the accused in those situations
to explain to the satisfaction of the court as to the nature
of recoveries and as to how they came into possession
or for planting the same at the places from where they
were recovered.”
36. On the basis of the prosecution evidence, the following factual
position has been established:
(i) Rajini @ Rajinikanth was missing for months before his father
Rajaram came from France to India, on 20.04.2008.
(ii) On return, Rajaram had noticed that the articles in the property
No.13, Chinna Vaikkal street, Puducherry, where deceased
Rajini @ Rajinikanth used to reside and was owned by Rajaram,
were scattered. The motorcycle owned by Rajaram, which the
deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth used to use, was missing.
(iii) Rajaram was murdered on 21.04.2008.
(iv) The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal is a close relative of
Rajini @ Rajinikanth and Rajaram (son of sister of Rajaram).
(v) Rajaram as the owner of the immovable property No.13, Chinna
Vaikkal street, Puducherry and Rajini @ Rajinikanth, as the
son of Rajaram, were hindrance in the way of the appellant –

27 See State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, ¶¶ 190, 204-206, 219-223, 225.
28 (2012) 6 SCC 107.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 109

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Perumal Raja @ Perumal acquiring the said property. There
were also inter se family disputes relating to the property in
Kurumbapet. This was the motive for the offence.
(vi) On the basis of the disclosure statement made by the appellant
– Perumal Raja @ Perumal on 25.04.2008 (Exhibit P-37) – (a)
two nylon sack bags were recovered containing decomposed
human body parts; and (b) human bones were also recovered
from the sump tank in property bearing No.13, Chinna Vaikkal
street, Puducherry.
(vii) The superimposition report dated 20.01.2009 (Exhibit P-25) by C.
Pushparani (PW-29), Scientific Assistant Grade II, Anthropology
Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai states that
the skull and the mandible which were recovered from the
river and the sump tank were that of the deceased Rajini @
Rajinikanth. The report relies on the computer laser print out of
the skull and the mandible for comparison with the photograph
of the deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth. It is shown that the skull
and the mandible were of the deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth.
(viii) As per the post mortem report (Exhibit P-16), though the cause
of death could not be ascertained due to decomposition of the
body, the bones were that of a person between 25-30 years of
age. Further, the death had probably occurred six months prior
to the autopsy. The deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth was of 30
years in age and he had been missing for about six months.
(ix) Motorcycle bearing registration No. PY 01 X 9857 belonging to
Rajaram (which was then at Rajaram’s house and in possession
of Rajini @ Rajinikanth, as Rajaram was in France), keys,
insurance papers, as well as other personal belongings were
recovered from Mohan Kumar @ Mohan and a juvenile, whose
name is withheld.
37. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra29, this
Court referred to Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh30, and
laid down the five golden principles (‘panchsheel’) that should be
satisfied before a case based on circumstantial evidence against an
accused can be said to be fully established:

29 (1984) 4 SCC 116.
30 (1952) 2 SCC 71.
110 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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(i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established;
(ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty;
(iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency;
(iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one
to be proved; and
(v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.
38. This Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) rejected the
contention that if the defence case is false it would constitute an
additional link as to fortify the case of the prosecution. However, a
word of caution was laid down to observe that a false explanation
given can be used as a link when:
(i) various links in the chain of evidence laid by the prosecution
have been satisfactorily proved;
(ii) circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable
definiteness; and
(iii) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation.
If these conditions are fulfilled only then the court can use the
false explanation or a false defence as an additional link to lend
an assurance to the court and not otherwise. Thus, a distinction
has to be drawn between incomplete chain of circumstances and a
circumstance after a chain is complete and the defence or explanation
given by the accused is found to be false, in which event the said
falsehood is added to reinforce the conclusion of the court.
39. This Court in Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar31 has laid down
the following principle regarding circumstantial evidence and the
failure of accused to adduce any explanation:

31 (1955) 2 SCR 570.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 111

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

“It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence not only
should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly
established, but the completed chain must be such as to
rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the
accused. But in a case like this where the various links
as stated above have been satisfactorily made out and
the circumstances point to the appellant as the probable
assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity
to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he
offers no explanation, which if accepted, though not
proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion
on the entire case consistent with his innocence, such
absence of explanation or false explanation would itself
be an additional link which completes the chain. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that this is a case which satisfies
the standards requisite for conviction on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.”
40. The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal in his statement under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 plainly denied
all accusations without furnishing any explanation regarding his
knowledge of the places from which the dead body was recovered.
In this circumstance, the failure of the appellant – Perumal Raja @
Perumal to present evidence on his behalf or to offer any cogent
explanation regarding the recovery of the dead body by virtue of his
special knowledge must lead to a reasonable adverse inference, by
application of the principle under Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
thus forming an additional link in the chain of circumstances. The
additional link further affirms the conclusion of guilt as indicated by
the prosecution evidence.
41. The whereabouts of Rajini @ Rajinikanth were unknown. The
perpetrator(s) were also unknown. It is only consequent to the
disclosure statement by the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal,
that the police came to know that Rajini @ Rajinikanth had been
murdered and his body was first dumped in the sump tank and after
some months, it was retrieved, cut into two parts, put in sack bags,
and thrown in the river/canal. The police, accordingly, proceeded on
the leads and recovered the parts of the dead body from the sump
tank and sack bags from the river/canal. It has been also established
that Rajini @ Rajinikanth was murdered. In addition, there have been
112 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

recoveries of the motorcycle and other belongings at the behest
of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal. These facts, in the
absence of any other material to doubt them, establish indubitable
conclusion that the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal is guilty
of having committed murder of Rajini @ Rajinikanth. The presence
of motive reinforces the above conclusion.
42. It has been contended before us that the appellant – Perumal Raja
@ Perumal had been acquitted in the case arising out of crime No.
204 of 2008 relating to the murder of Rajaram. The judgment passed
by the trial court32 has been taken on record as additional evidence.
However, we do not find this judgment in any way relevant or negating
the prosecution evidence, which we have referred to and elucidated
earlier in the prosecution case against the appellant, because the
murder trial of Rajaram was primarily based upon an entirely different
set of evidence. The evidence we have mentioned in the present case
is not relevant and directly connected with the murder of Rajaram.
The two occurrences are separate, albeit the appellant – Perumal
Raja @ Perumal was accused of the murder of Rajaram and his
son Rajini @ Rajinikanth. The murders certainly were committed
on two different dates – 23.11.2007 (or thereabout) and 21.04.2008
respectively, approximately five months apart. Except for the fact that
the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal was taken into custody
during the course of investigation in FIR No. 204 of 2008 for murder
of Rajaram and thereupon on 25.04.2008 his disclosure statement
(Exhibit P-37) was recorded, there is no connection between the two
offences. The conviction of the appellant is, therefore, sustainable
in view of the evidence placed on record in the present case. The
judgment of acquittal would not qualify as relevant and of evidentiary
value so as to acquit the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal in
the present case.33
43. Acquittal of the co-accused, as noticed in paragraph 4 above, again
is for want of evidence against them. At best, they were found in
possession of the articles connected with the crime on the basis of
the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37) dated 25.04.2008 made by
the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal. Section 27 of the Evidence

32 Dated 13.06.2017.
33 See §§ 40-43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 113

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Act could not have been applied to the other co-accused for the
simple reason that the provision pertains to information that distinctly
relates to the discovery of a ‘fact’ that was previously unknown, as
opposed to fact already disclosed or known. Once information is
given by an accused, the same information cannot be used, even if
voluntarily made by a co-accused who is in custody. Section 27 of
the Evidence Act does apply to joint disclosures, but this is not one
such case.34 This was precisely the reason given by the trial court
to acquit the co-accused. Even if Section 8 of the Evidence Act is
to apply, it would not have been possible to convict the co-accused.
The trial court rightly held other co-accused not guilty. For the same
reason, acquittal of co-accused Chella @ Mukundhan, who was
earlier absconding, is also of no avail.
44. As far as acquittal of the juvenile is concerned, reference can be
made to the provisions of Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.
45. In view of the above discussion, we have no difficulty in upholding
the conviction of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal. The
appeal is dismissed.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case: Appeal
dismissed.

34 See State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, ¶ 145.