Holding

Lands used for growing fire‑wood trees for fuel in estate factories, smoke‑houses and for workers' domestic use are excluded from the definition of 'private forest' under Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) and qualify for exemption, subject to proof of necessity and determination of reasonable area by the Forest Tribunal.

Summary

The appellants, owners of tea, rubber and cardamom estates in Kerala, sought exemption under Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 for lands used to grow fire‑wood trees for fuel in estate factories, smoke‑houses and for workers' domestic use. The Kerala High Court held such lands were "private forests" and vested in the State. The Supreme Court, by a majority, interpreted the statutory definition purposively, holding that lands required for a reasonable amount of fire‑wood to ensure the efficient functioning of the plantations and welfare of workers are excluded from the definition of private forest and therefore qualify for exemption, provided the appellants prove the necessity and that fire‑wood is not readily available in the market. The Court remanded the matters to the appropriate Forest Tribunals to determine the reasonable area of such land. The appeals were allowed and the High Court judgments set aside.

Issues considered

The meaning of 'private forest' under Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971.
Whether land used for growing fire‑wood trees for fuel in factories, smoke‑houses or for workers' domestic use qualifies as 'ancillary to the cultivation of crops' or 'preparation of the same for the market'.
The burden of proof for establishing the necessity of fire‑wood land.
The correctness of the Kerala High Court's interpretation of the Act.
Whether the Forest Tribunals should determine the reasonable extent of land required for fire‑wood.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 133(1)
Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963s. 82
Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971s. 10, s. 13, s. 15, s. 2(f)(1)(i)(B), s. 3, s. 4, s. 8, s. 9
Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949
States Reorganisation Act, 1956s. 5(2)

Subjects

private forestKerala Private Forests Actexemptionancillary purposefire‑woodplantationstatutory interpretationvested landforest tribunalland use

Judgment

PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION NILAMBUR,
A
KERALA STATE ETC. ETC. >--
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND ANR.

AUGUST 24, 1992
.B
[M. H. KANIA, CJ., DR. T. K. THOMMEN AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.]

Kera/a Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act 1971, Section
2(/)(l)(i)(B).
c 'Private Forests'-Land set apart for Crowing firewood trees used as
feel for purpose of manufacturing ntbber or tea in smokehouses or factories
or for personal use of estate employees-Whether excluded.

Statutory Interpretation. .,--
D
Legislative intent-Aid to interpretation.

The appellants in the appeals were owners of Tea, Rubber and
Cardamom estates in the State of Kerala. For a large number of persons
employed in the estates quarters were generally provided and it was in the
E best interest of the estates that such persons were supplied with sufficient
firewood for cooking as well as for keeping themselves warm particularly
in view of the high altitude at which many of the estates were located. As
large quantities of firewood were essential as fuel certain areas in the
estates where generally set apart for growing firewood trees like Eucalyp- =---...
tus or redgum.
F
The appellants approached the Forest Tribunal for granting them ..,..
exemptions under section 2(f)(l)(i)(B) of the Kerala Private Forests
(Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 for the lands which were used for
construction of the quarters as well as for growing fuel trees for supply of
fuel to the workers or for the smokehouses. The Tribunal granted the
G
exemptions.

The State appealed to the High Court and the High Court held the ).;
lands on -which firewood trees were grown for the purpose of fuel for either
the smokehouses or factories or the employees in the estates were not
H lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of the crops or for the
972 ...
I
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE 973

preparate on of the same for the market so as to be excluded from the A·
definition of 'Private forests' under section 2(1) (1) (i) (B) of the Act and
accordingly vested in the State in terms of the Act.

Some of the earlier decisions of this High Court had taken the view;
that lands set apart for growing firewood trees in the estates for the
purpose of fuel did not qualify for exclusion from 'private forests' so as t~ B
prevent their vesting in the State in terms of the Act and this view was also
followed by the High Court in these judgements.

However, a Bench consisting of 5 Judges of the same High Court,
subsequently considered this very question in State of Kera/a v. Moosa C
Haji, (1984) KLT 494, on the ground that the law laid down in the earlier.
decisions on this point was doubted, and this Bench expressed the view
that it was essential for an estate to grow firewood trees for the purpose
1

of fuel for the employees as well as for the smokehouses and factories. In
regard to the requirement of the employees the High Court followed the . D
observations of this Court in Chettiam Veettil Ammad and Anr. v. Taluk '
Land Board and Ors., [1979) 3 SCR839 and held that no exemption could
be claimed in respect of areas utilised for the cultivation of firewood trees !
to supply fuel to the employees, discarded the interpretation put on the
section by earlier decisions and held that a reasonable areas set apart for .
growing firewood trees for the purpose of fuel in the smokehouses or E
factories could be excluded from 'private forests' and such areas were held
qualified as 'lands used for the preparation of the (crops) for the market'.

In the appeals to this Court on the common question: whether land
set apart in estates for growing firewood trees such as eucalyptus or , F
redgum to be used as fuel for the purpose of manufacturing rubber or tea
~ in the smokehouses or factories or for the personal use of the employees ,
in the estates are excluded from the definition of 'private forests' as
contained in Section 2(f) (1) (i) (8) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting
and Assignment) Act, 1971.
G
Allowing the appeals, setting aside the judgment of the High Court
and remanding the cases to the appropriate Forest Tribunals, this court

I
HELD : (Majority M.H. Kania, GI & Dr. T.K Thommen, J. per
Thommen, J.), H
f
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A 1. The definition of 'Private Forests' contained in clause (f) of
Section 2 of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act,
1971 shows that lands which are used principally for the cultivation of tea,
coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any
purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation
of the sam~ for the market are excluded from the definition. [983D-E]
B
2. The entire purpose of exclusion of these items from the scope of the
definition of 'Private Forest' seems to be not to hinder or create any difficulty
in the functioning of plantations of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom and
cinnamon as viable commercial enterprises. In these circumstances, it
C appears reasonable that the minimum area required for the purpose of
growing firewood trees for fuel in the factories and smokehouses as well as
for supply to the employees of the estates for their domestic use should be
excluded from the definition of the term 'private forest'. (983-G]
,•
3. The burden is on the appellants to show that it has been their
D practice to supply firewood to the employees of the estates for their
domestic use. As for the firewood required for the factories and
smokehouses in the estates there seems to be no doubt about the claim of
the appellants. (984-A]

4. However, where evidence had been led to show that firewood \ltllS
E steadily and adequately available .in the market at reasonable rates for use
of the factories or smokehouses as well as for supply fo the workers of a
particular plantation, in such a case no land could be excluded from the
definition of the 'private forest' on the ground that it was required for
growing firewood trees for the purpose of the estate as well as for the
F workers. That, however, is not the position in the instant case. On the
pleadings and evidence no further inquiry on the point is considered
necessary. [984-B-C]

5. Section 2 (t) (1) (i) (B) should be so understood as to grant
G exemption in respect of lands on which firewood trees are necessary to be
grown for steady supply of a reasonable quantity of fuel to the employees
as well as to the smokehouses or factories in the estates. In the absence of
satisfactory evidence to show that firewood is adequately and steadily
available in the market at reasonable prices, such lands, qualify for x·
exemption under section 2(f) (1) (i) (B) of the Act as "lands used for any
H purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation
-<

PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE 975

of the same for the market". This principle, must hold good in relation to A
~ all crops mentioned under the said provision. [984-D-E]
I
6. What exactly is the area which can be reasonably regardl'd as
required for growing firewood trees so as to qualify for exemption from
vesting under the Act is a question of fact which has to be determined with
reference to various factors. (984-G] B

7. No final view is expressed as to what factors are relevant iJ

·• determining the reasonable area that qualifies for exemption under Sec-
tion 2 (f) (1) (i) (8) of the Act. That is a matter for consideration by the
concerned Forest Tribunals.
c
- 8. Ammad is an authority for the proposition that a reasonable'
extent of land can be set apart as fuel area for the purpose of smokehouses
and factories in the estates and such area qualifies for exemption under
Section 2 (f) (1) (i) (8) of the Act. The incidental observation of this Court
T in Ammad that supply of firewood to estate employees 'cannot be said to D
be a purpose ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops', cannot be
taken as an authority to disqualify for exemption a reasonable l'.rea meant
to supply fuel to the employees living in the estate quarters.

9. The Bench in Moosa Hali was right that it would not be in
accordance with the legislative intent to read the provisions in question E
Y' without regard to the purpose for which exemption is specially provided
for lands principally used for the cultivation of certain cash-crops or fof
the preparation of such crops for the market. Bearing in mind that, in
~
granting the exemption, it was the legislative intent not to disregard the
legitimate interests of the estates, namely, their efficient functioning as an
F
industry engaged in the production of cash-crops and the welfare of the
)( concerned employees, it is necessary that a liberal and purposive con•
struction should be put on the section.

[The Forest Tribunals to determine the extent of the land required~
for fuel for the smokehouses or factories as well as for the employees in G
the estates].

x State of Kera/a v. Moosa Haji, (1984) KLT 494, approved.

Chettiam Veettil Ammad and Anr. v. Taluk Land Board and Ors.,
[1979) 3 SCR 839, explained and relied on. H

i ,
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A (Per P.B. Sawant, J., dissenting)

1. The land used for growing fuel • whether for supplying it to the
workers or for its use in the smokehouse • would not fall within the
purview of Section 2 (f) (1) (i) (B) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting •
and Assignment) Act, 1971 as the said use cannot be said to be a purpose
B either "ancillary to the cultivation of the plantation crops" in question or
"for the preparation of the said crops for the market".

2. From the preamble as well as from the other provisions of the Act,
it is clear that the object in enacting the Act was to secure private forests
C and agricultural lands comprised therein to promote agriculture, the
welfare of the agricultural population and purposes ancillary thereto, and
also to assign lands to needy sections of the society who were wither living
on agriculture or who were willing to take up agriculture as the means of
their livelihood.

D In the instant case, the claim for exemption of a certain area of land
is based on the plea that the same is required for growing trees the wood
of which is needed for use as fuel for the domestic use of the workmen.
There is nothing on record to show that unless the fuel-wood is locally
grown on the estate and made available to the workmen, they will have no
E supply of fuel-wood or of any other fuel, making it impossible for them to
live in the estates and work there. In the absence of such finding on
record, it is not possible to concede the claim on the ground that the land
is used for a purpose "ancillary to the cultivation of the crops" in ques-
tion. Similar is the case with regard to the claim for exemption from the
provisions of the Act, of land allegedly required for growing trees, the
F timber of which is used as fuel in the smokehouse, which smokehouse is
needed for preparation of the crop for the market.

3. In the case of claim for land for growing trees for fuel for the
workers, it is necessary to first prove that fuel - wood is actually grown in
the estate and secondly, that but for the locally grown fuel, the workers
G will go without fuel of any kind making it impossible for them to work on
the estate. In the case o( lancl claimed for growing trees for fuel for
smokehouses, it is likewise necessary to prove that fuel is being grown on
the estate for the purpose and no fuel-wood is ayailable from any other
source or no substitute fuel are available to run the smokehouse. 'Ihis is
H more particularly so when the respendent- State Government has pleaded
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE 977

_..(__ that the fuel-wood as well as substitute fuel is available at cheaper price. A
Assuming further that fuel-wood available from other sources or the
substitute fuel is costlier, it is no ground for claiming exemption of land
from the Act for either of the two purposes. It would only lead to increase .
in the cost of production necessitated by appropriate increase in wages of
the workers and by use of such fuel in the smokehouse. Such higher cost
B
if any, may be taken care· of by the market or by suitable crops. That
cannot be a consideration for exemption of the land from the provisions -
of the Act.
~
In the instant appeals, the question whether the land was needed for
the purpose for which it was claimed viz., for growing fuel wood for c
supplying to the workers and to the smokehouse had not been considered
and a finding recorded thereon. Further, in some, there was no claim for
land for growing fuel-wood for suplying to the workers. There was also no
y evidence that any land much less a specific area of land was in fact being
.. used for growing fuel-wood. It must be noted that in spite of the fact that
it was the case of the respondent-State that there was alternative source
D
of supply of fuel-wood and that there also substitute fuel available, the
said contention of the State Government was not dealt with by the Forest
Tribunal. The High court did not think it necessary to consider the said
contention because of its finding that the land required for such purpose
could not be said to fall within the scope of Section 2(1)(l)(i)(B) of the Act. E
Y'
4. This Court in Ammad case had taken the view that the area
-:_
required for growing fuel was not land used for purpose "ancillary to the
cultivation of plantation crops" and that it would not fall within the
definition of 'plantation' as an "ancillary purpose". This is the view of the F
Court on what constitutes "ancillary purpose", though the view is under
~ the relevant definition under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. It is not,
therefore, correct to rely upon this decision to hold that this Court has
taken the view that land used for growing fuel is land used for "ancillary
purpose" under the 1971 Act. This is apart from the fact that even under
the Kerala Land Reforms Act, the view taken is against such contention. G
It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the view taken by the larger
,:A.., Bench of the Kerala High Court in Moosa Haji case;

5. The larger Bench of the Kerala High Court in Moosa Haji case
rejected the claim for land for growing fuel for supply to the workers H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.

·A relying on the decision of this Court in Ammad. However, it had incon-
grilously enough accepted the claim for land for growing fuel for use in the
smokehouse. The Judges themselves have described the view taken by
them as "unorthodox" and which may "almost amount to re-reading of the
latter part of Section 2(f)(l)(i)(B) of the Act differently".

B 6. The view taken by the earlier Benches, and particularly by the Full
Bench in State of Kera/a v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd, (1980) KLT 976
(FB) is therefore preferrable.
4·
State of Kera/av. Malayalam Plantations Ltd., (1980) KLT 976 (FB),
I
C approved.

Chettiam Veettil Ammad and another, etc.etc. v. Taluk Land Board
and others, etc.etc., AIR 1979 SC 1573, considered.

State of Kera/av. Moosa Haji, (1984) KLT 494, disapproved.
~
D CIVIL APPELJ..;\TE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 106-107
of 1982.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.1.1980 of the Kerala High
Court in M.F.A. Nos. 169 and 226 of 1977.
E WITH
~
Civil Appeal Nos. 205Q, 557-61 and 1214-18 of 1981.

T.S. Krishnamurthi Iyer, G. Viswanatha Iyer, S. Sukumaran, J.B.
Dadachanji, Baby Krishnan, K. Prabhakaran, Devan and E.M.S. Anam for
F
the Appellants.
y
A.S. Nambiar and K.R. Nabiar for the Respondents.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
G THOMMEN, J. A common question arises in all these cases. Are
lands set apart in the estates in question for growing firewood trees such
as eucalyptus or redgum to be used as fuel for the purpose of manufactur- ;-.,
ing rubber or tea in the smoke~houses or factories or for the personal use
of the employees in the estates excluded from the definition of 'private
H forests' as contained in section 2(f)(l){i)(B) of the Kerala Private Forests
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE [T,HOMMEN, J.) 979

(Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (Act 26of1971) (hereinafter referred A
41. to as 'the Act')? The Kerala High Court in the three judgments, which are·
impugned in these appeals, held that such lands fell within the expression ·
'private forest' and accordingly vested in the State in terms of the Act. The
High Court rejected the contention of the appellants to the contrary.

We shall now read section 2(t)(l)(i)(B):- B

"2. In this Act, unless the context otherWise requires, -

(f) 'private forest' means -

(1) in relation to the Malabar district referred to in sub- section c
(2) of section. 5 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956
(Central Act 37 of 1956) -

(i) any land to which the Madras Preservation of Private
)r
Forests Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXVII of 1949), applied
immediately before the appointed day excluding -
D

- (B) lands which are used principally for the cultivation
of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon
and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the
cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of E
/ Y' the same for the market."

(emphasis supplied)
~·

The High Court held that the lands on which firewood trees were
grown for the purpose of fuel for either the smoke-houses or factories or f
the employees in the estates were not lands used for purposes ancillary to
'l( the cultivation of the crops or for the preparation of the same for the
..., market so as to be excluded from the definition of 'private forests' which
vested in the State.
I

) It is not disputed that large quantities of firewood are essential as G
fuel for the manufacture of tea or rubber and certain areas in the estates
,JI(_ generally set apart for growing firewood trees like Eucalyptus or redgum.
It is also not disputed that large number of persons are employed in the
estates where quarters are generally provided for them and it is in the best
interests of the estates that such persons are supplied with sufficient H
>--

980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.

A firewood for cooking as well as for keeping themselves warm, particularly
in view of the high altitude at which many estates are located. ~

Some of the earlier decisions of the Kerala high Court had taken the
view that lands set apart for growing firewood trees in the estates for the
purpose of fuel did not qualify for exclusion from 'private forests' so as to
B prevent their vesting in the State in terms of the Act. This was the view
that was followed in the impugned judgments. Significantly, however, a
Bench consisting of 'five Judges of the Kerala High Court subsequently
considered this very question in the State of Kera/a v. Moosa Haji, (1984)
KLT 494, apparently because the law laid down in the earlier decisions on /"
c the point was doubted. The larger Bench expressed the view that it was
essential for an estate to grow firewood trees for the purpose of fuel for
the employees as well as for the smoke-houses and factories. In regard to
the requirement of the employees, the High Court felt constrained by the
observations of this Court in Chettiam Veettil Ammad and Anr. v. Taluk
Land Board and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 839. It was accordingly held that no
D exemption could be claimed in respect of areas utilised for cultivation of
-.,
firewood trees to supply· fuel for the employees. However, discarding the
interpretation put on the section in some of the earlier decisions of the >=
High Court, the learned Judges of the larger Bench held that a reasonable
area set apart for growing firewood trees for the purpose of fuel in the
E smoke-houses or factories could be excluded from 'private forests'. Such
areas, they held, qualified as 'lands used for the preparation of the (crops) ~
for the market'.

Referring to the need for growing firewood trees in an estate, the :=-
F larger Bench of the High Court observed :-

"A practice or custom had thus grown up with the industry y
where it was the obligation of the employers to provide the
employees with drinking water, canteen, creches, umbrellas, /'

G
blankets, rain-coats, foodgrains, provisions, fire-wood and the
like, Fire-wood in particular was an important necessity in the
cold climate on the high ranges. Most of the estate managements
\
had been planting redgum, for example, to ensure a steady
)t,
~upply of firewood to the community, and also for use in the
smoke-houses and estate factories. 'Any purpose ancillary to
H cultivation' in S. 2(t)(l)(i)(B) of the Vesting Act was deliberate-
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE (THOMMEN, J.) 981

ly kept wide by the legislature, because it ~ew that there were A
,..(_
recognised 'uses' other than those specifically enumerated fu
the Explanation. The object of the Act is to improve the lot of
the rural population, and it should have been far from the mind
of the legislators to deprive estate employees of the facilities
they were enjoying at the commencement of the Act. Supply of
B
fire-wood to the employees in accordance with the industry-
wide practice should therefore be taken as ancillary to the
Cultivation of plantation crops ........."
~
(emphasis supplied)
c
I

However, the learned Judges felt constrained by the decision of this
Court in Ammad (suprli'). They observed :-

"These arguments of counsel are no doubt persuasive, but in
'¥ paragraph (54) of its judgment in C. Veettil Ammad v. Taluk
Land Board, AIR (1979) SC 1573, the Supreme Court has hel9 D
that supply of fire-wood to estate employees 'cannot be said to
be a purpose ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops'.

~
That decision was rendered in a case arising from the ceiling
provisions of the Land Reforms Act, but the statutory'
provisions are almost identical. We cannot therefore permit E
y ourselves to be swayed by the reasoning of counsel, and we are
bound to hold that the claim under this sub-head is impermis-1
sible."

This observation indicates that the larger Bench of the High Court
F
1

might have come to the opposite conclusion as regards fuel for the
employees had it not been for a certain observation of this Court in Ammad
''(. [1979) 3 SCR 839.

~
However, the learned Judges felt no such constraint in regard to fuel
for the smoke-houses and factories in the estates. Adopting what they refer
to as a liberal and purposive interpretation, the learned judges of the larger ,
G
Bench held that a reasonable portion of the jungle area set apart for
(II(. purposes of firewood could be regarded as land used to facilitate prepara-
tion of the crops for the market.

We have referred to the decision of the larger Bench of the High H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A Court at some length to show that the final view whicli the High Court has -~
taken subsequent to the impugned judgments supports the contentions of "
the appellants' counset'as regards fuel for the smoke-houses and factories.

We shall now refer to the observation of this Court in Ammad [1979)
3 SCR 839. It is important to remember that the question regarding fuel
B was not one of the main points which arose for consideration in Ammad.
The main points of controversy in that case are correctly summarised in
the headnotes as follows :-

"1. Whether lands converted into plantations between April 1,
c 1%4 and January 1, 1970 qualified for exemption under
s.81{l){e) of the Act.

2. Whether a certificate of purchase issued by the Land
Tribunal under s. 72K of the Act was binding on the Taluk
Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act.
D
3. Whether the validity or ' invalidity of transfers effected by
persons owning or holding lands exceeding the ceiling limit
could be determined with reference to the ceiling area in force
on the date of the transfer or in accordance with the ceiling
area prescribed by Act 35 of 1%9 - whether sub-section {3) of
E s.84 was retrospective in operation".

These three points are in no way connected with the point in issue
in the present cases. T~at judgment was rendered in a batch of cases and
one of the questions which incidentally arose was as regards firewood trees
F grown in the estates. That question arose in C.A. No. 227 of 1978, and it
has been discussed at page 870 of the judgment : (1979) 3 SCR 839, 870.
This Court held that the 'fuel area' claimed for the manufacture of tea was
exorbitant. The High Court had allowed the entire claim of 924.01 acres as
fuel area. Setting aside the High Court order, this Court restored the
G original order of the Land Board and thus limited the exemption to 200
acres as fuel area for the requirement of the factory. Ammad is thus an
authority for the proposition that a reasonable extent of land can be set
apart as fuel area for the purpose of smoke-houses and factories in the
estates and such area qualifies for exemption under section 2{t){l){i)(B)
of the Act. At the same time, the incidental observation of this Court in
H Ammad cannot be taken as an a~thority to disqualify for exemption a
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE [THOMMEN, J.] 983

, reasonable area meant to supply fuel to the employees living in the estate A
quarters.

We agree with the learned Judges of the larger Bench of the Kerala
High Court that it would not be in accordance with the legislative intent
to read the provisions in question without regard to the purpose for which
exemption is specially provided for lands principally used for the cultiva-
B
tion of certain cash-crops or for the preparation of such crops for the
market. Bearing in mind that, in granting the exemption, it was the legis-
,I!, lative intent not to disregard the legitimate interests of the estates, namely,
their efficient functioning as an industry engaged in the production of
cash-crops and the welfare of the concerned employees, it is necessary that c
a liberal and purposive construction should be put on the section.

A perusal of the definition of Private Forests contained in clause (f)
of section 2 of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act,
1971 shows that lands which are used principally for the cultivation of tea, D
coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any
purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of
the same for the market are excluded from the definition. The observations
of the five learned Judges of the Kerala High Court in State of Kera/a v.
..,, Moosa Haji, (1984) KLT page 494 show that all the Judges considered that
it was essential for an estate to grow firewood trees for the purpose of fuel E
< 'f" for the employees as well as for the smoke-houses and factories. This view
was taken particularly in the light of the .fact that the estates concerned
were at a considerable height where it was cold and it would not be feasible
~ for the employees to secure heating material to keep warm and for domes-
tic purposes. F

"( The entire purpose of exclusion of the items set out in the foregoing
paragraph from the scope of the definition of Private Forest seems to be
not to hinder or create any difficulty in the functioning of plantations of
tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom and cinnamon as viable commercial
enterprises. In these circumstances, it appears reasonable that the mini~ G
, mum area required for the purpose of growing firewood trees for fuel in
the factories and smoke-houses as well as for supply to the employees of
~""-- the estates for their domestic use should be excluded form the definition
of the term 'private forest'. We must, however, emphasise that the bl'rden
is on the appellants to show that it has been their practice to supply H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A firewood to the employees of the estates for their domestic use. As for the
firewood required for the factories and smoke-houses in the estates, there
seems to be no doubt about the claim of the appellants.

However, where evidence had been led to show that firewood was
steadily and adequately available in the market at reasonable rates for use
B of the factories or smoke-houses as well as for supply to the workers of a
particular plantation, in such a case no land could be excluded from the
definition of the private forest on the ground that it was required for
growing firewood trees for the purpose of the estate as well as for the
workers. That, however, is not the position in the case before us. On the
c pleadings and evidence before us, we do not consider that any further
inquiry on the point is necessary.

In our view, section 2(f)(l)(i)(B) should be so understood as to grant
exemption in respect of lands on which firewood trees are necessary to be
grown for steady supply of a reasonable quantity of fuel to the employees
D as well as to the smoke-houses or factories in the estates. In the absence
of satisfactory evidence to show that firewood is adequately and steadily
· available in the market at reasonable prices, such lands, in our view, qualify
for exemption under section 2(f)(l)(i)(B) of the Act as "lands used for any
purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of
E the same for the market". This principle, in our view, must hold good in
relation to all crops mentioned under the aforesaid provision. The Tribunal
shall merely ascertain as to what is the minimum reasonable area of land
required for growing firewood trees to be used as fuel in the factories or
smoke-houses and for supply to the employees for their domestic purposes,
if such supply to the latter is proved, and ~o exclude such area in demar-
F eating private forest.
What exactly is the area which can be reasonably regarded as re- y
quired for growing firewood trees for the aforesaid purposes so as to
qualify for exemption from vesting under the Act is a question of fact which
G has to be determined with reference to various factors. Some of these
factors are mentioned by the larger Bench of the High Court in the
following words :-

'.'32. The next point is what area of the jungle land could be
excluded on the above basis ? A precise assessment will almost
H be impossible, because the quantum of fire-wood needed for
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE [SAWANT, J.] 985

smoking purposes will depend on the volume of rubber .to be A
,...(_ processed, the yield of the trees, the quality of the wood and
other factors. The best solution seems to be to make ah ap-
proximate assessment as was made by the Taluk Land Board
in Ammad's case (supra)."

We do not express any final view as to what factors are relevant in B
determining the reasonable area that qualifies for exemption under section
2(t)(l)(i)(B) of the Act. That is a matter for consideration by the 'con-
~ cerned forest tribunals.

In the circumstances, the judgments of the Kerala High Court im-
pugned in these appeals are set aside and the cases are remanded to the
c
-:
· appropriate forest tribunals : namely, the Forest Tribunal, Manjeri 'with
respect to Civil Appeal Nos. 106-107of1982; the Forest Tribuna~ Palghat
with respect to Civil Appeal No. 2050 of 1981; and the Forest Tribunal,
Calicut with respect to Civil Appeal Nos. 557-61 & 1214-18 of 1981. .The
tribunals shall determine the extent of the lands required, as aforesaid1 for D
fuel for the smoke-houses or factories as well as for the employees in the
estates.

The appeals are allowed in the above terms. We do not, however,
make any order as to costs. E
SAWANT, j. I have gone through the judgment of my learned
brother Justice Thommen. Since I am unable to persuade myself to accept
the view taken there, with due deference, I am pronouncing this separate
-.:.
judgment.
F
2. A common question which falls for consideration in all these
~ appeals is the D?eaning of the expression "land used for any purp'ose
ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same
· for the market" in Section 2(t)(l)(i)(B) of the Kerala Private Forests
Vesting and Assignment Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "A~t").
In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to understand the
G
scheme of the Act.

3. As the preamble of the Act states, private forests in the State of
Kerala are agricultural lands and the Government. considered tha.t such
agricultural lands should be so utilised as to increai;e the agricultural H
986 SUPREME COURTREPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A production and to promote the welfare of the agricultural population in
the State. It is with a view to give effect to this objective that it was felt
necessary that the private forests which are nothing but agricultural lands
should vest in the Government. With this end in view, the Act was brought
into force w.e.f. 10th May, 1971 which is also the appointed day under the
Act. Section 2(f) of the Act defines "private forests" as follows :
B
"2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise re-
quires, -

(t) 'private forest' means -
c (1) in relation to the Malabar district referred to in sub-section
(2) of section 5 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Central
Act 37 of 1956)

(i) any land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests
D Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXVII of 1949) applied immediately
before the appointed day excluding -

(A) lands which are gardens or nilams as defined in the Kerala
Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of 1964);

E (B) lands which are used principally for the cultivation of tea,
coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used
for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such Crops or
for the preparation of the same for the market.

Explanation. Lands used for the construction of office build-
F ings, godowns, factories, quarters for workmen, hospitals,
schools and playgrounds shall be deemed to be lands used for
purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops;

( C) lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other
G fruit bearing trees or are principally cultivated with any other
agricultural crop and

(D) sites of buildings and lands appurtenant to and necessary )(
for the convenient enjoyment or use of such buildings;

H (ii) any forest not owned by the Government, to which the
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE [SAWANT, J.] 987

Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 did not apply, A
including waste lands which are enclaves within wooded areas.

(2) in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala,
any forest not owned by the Government, including waste lands
which are enclaves within wooded areas.
B
Explanation. For the purposes of this Clause, a land shall be
deemed to be a waste land notwithstanding the existence there-
on of scattered trees or shrubs."

Section 3 of .the Act provides for vesting of the ownership aad
possession of all private forests [so defined] in the Government free from C
all encumbrances. However, sub-section (2) of this section excludes from
the land to be so vested, so much extent of land comprised in private
forests, which is held by the owner under his personal cultivation as is
within the ceiling limit applicable to him under the Kerala Land Reforms
Act, 1963 or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant D
thereto. The explanation to sub-section (2) states that 'cultivation' would
include cultivation of trees or plants of any species. Likewise, sub-section
(3) of Section 3 excludes so much extent of private forests held by an owner
which is held by him under a valid registered document of title executed
before the appointed day and intended for cultivation by him which
together with other lands held by him does not exceed the extent of the E
ceiling area applicable to him under Section 82 of the Kerala Land
Reforms Act, 1963. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 states that for the purposes
of sub-sections (2) and (3) private forests shall be deemed to be lands to
which the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 is applicable and they shall be
deemed to be 'other dry lands' for the purposes of calculating the ceiling F
limit under that Act.

Section 4 of the Act then States that the private forests shall be
deemed to be reserved forests unde.r the Kerala Forest Act so long as they
remain vested in the Government. Section· 8 provides for settlement of
disputes which ari&e with regard to (a} Whether any land is a private forest G
or not and (b) whether any private forest or portion thereof is vested in
the Government or not. The said dispute is to be resolved by the Tribunal
constituted under Section 7 of the Act. An appeal against the said decision
of the Tribunal lies to the High Court under Section 8 A of the Act. Section
9 of the Act states that no compensation shall be payable for the vesting
in th.e Government of ~y private forest or for the extinguishment of the H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A right, title and interest of the owner or any other person in such private
~
forest.

Section 10 then provides firstly, for reserving such extent of the
private forests vested,in the Government under sub-section (3) or the lands
comprised in such private forests as may be necessary for purposes
B directed towards the promotion of agriculture or the welfare of agricultural
population or for purposes ancillary thereto and secondly, for assigning on
registry or lease, the remaining private forests or the lands comprised in
private forests to (a) agriculturists, (b) agricultural labourers, (c) members
of scheduled castes or scheduled tribes who are willing to take up agricul-
c turel as the means of their livelihood, (d) unemployed young persons
belonging to families of agriculturists and agricultural labourers who have
no sufficient means of livelihood and who are willing to take up agriculture
as the means of their livelihood and ( e) labourers belonging to families of
agriculturists and agricultural labourers whose principal means of
livelihood before the appointed day was income they obtained as wages for
D work in connection with or related to private forests and who are willing
to take up agriculture as means of their livelihood.

Under Section 11, the assignment of the private forests has to be
completed as far as may be within two years from the date of the publica-
E tion of the Act. Section 13 bars jurisdiction of civil courts to decide or deal
with any question or to determine any matter. which is ' required to be . '1"
decided or dealt with or to be determined by the tribunal, the custodian
or any other officer. Section 15 provides for the constitution of an Agricul-
turists Welfare Fund to be utilised for the settlement and welfare of ~

persons to whom private forests or lands comprised in private forests have "\.

F been assigned. It is not necessary to refer· to the other provisions of the
Act. )'
Thus from the preamble as well as from the other provisions of the
Act, it is clear that the object in enacting the said Act was to secure private
forests and agricultural lands comprised therein to promote agriculture,
G
the welfare of the agricultural population and purposes ancillary thereto,
and also to assign lands to needy sections of the society who were either
living on agriculture or who were willing to take up agriculture as the x
means of their livelihood.

H 4. The aforesaid objectives and the provisions of the Act help us
PIONEER RUBBER PLAN'l"ATION v. STATE (SAWANT, J.) 969

._ construe the provisions of Section 2(f)(l)(i)(B) of the Act which fall for
consideration in the present case. What is meant by "ancillary to the
A

cultivation" has been explained by the Explanation to sub-clause (B) which
shows that the lands for the construction ·of office buildin~, godowns,
factories, quarters for workmen, hospitals; schools and playgrounds shall
be deemed to be lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such
crops. No doubt, the Explanation contains a deeming provision and hence
B
a purpose similar in nature to those mentioned therein may also be said to
be included therein. But is it open to expand the meaning of the word
"ancillary'' beyond it, to include in it land which is not required directly for
any such purpose, but for growing provisions needed by those who work
to cultivate the crops ? If yes, the land for growing which of the provisions c
is to be included in the meaning of the said word ? It is true that the
Explanation deems land used for schools, hospitals·and playground meant
for the workers as land ancillary to cultivation of the crops. But precisely
because the said purposes are remotely or mediately connected with the
cultivation of the crops in question that they are specifically mentioned in
D
the Explanation. It also further appears that the needs of education,
medical facilities and sports cannot otherwise be satisfied locally where the
workers are required to live. Food and clothing are more basic needs. It
cannot be suggested that the land needed for growing food grains and
.cotton should on that account be considered as land used for ancillary
purpose. In the present case, the claim for exemption of a certain area of E
'r" land is based on the plea that the same is required for growing trees the
wood of which is needed for use as fuel for the domestic use of the
workmen. There is nothing on record to show that unless the fuel-wood is
'-:X::
locally grown on the estate and made available to the workmen, they will
have no supply of fuel-wood or of any other fuel, making it impossible for
F
them to live in the estates and work there. In the absence of such finding

"' on record, it is not possible to concede the said claim on the ground that
the land is used for a purpose "ancillary to the cultivation of the crops" in
question.

Similar is the case with regard to the claim for exemption, from the G
provisions of the Act, of land allegedly required for growing trees, the
timber of which is used as fuel in the smoke-house, which smoke-house is
~
needed for the prepatation of the crop for the market. The claim is based
on the second leg of the same expression namely" ....... or for the prepara-
tion of the same (i,e. crops) for the market". There is again nothing on H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A record to show that unless the trees for fuel are grown captively on the
estates, no fuel-wood, would be available or no other substitute fuel can be ~
used for the purpose. The land needed for the smoke-house is admittedly
exempted from the Act. The eXemption sought is for the land needed to
grow trees, the timber of which can be used as fuel in the smoke-house.
. The fuei it is claimed is necessary for drying the crop to prepare it for the
B market. Apart from the fact that the relationship between the land required
for growing fuel trees and preparation of crops for the market is remote,
the absolute need for the land for the purpose as stated above, is not
proved. It has further to be remembered in this connection that the .
Explanation while including in it land for such remote purposes as hospi-
c tals, schools and playgrounds has chosen not to include land required for
fuel whether for the workers or for the smoke-house. What is further, while
expressly exempting the land for the smoke-house, it has made no refer-
ence to the land needed for growing fuel for use in the smoke-house. By
the normal rule of interpretation, therefore, it will have to be held that what
is not included is deemed to have been excluded. ~
D
Hence in the case of claim for land for growing trees for fuel for the
workers, it is necessary to first prove that fuel-wood is actually grown in
the estate and secondly, that but for the locally grown fuel, the workers
will go without fuel of any kind making it impossible for them to work on
E the estate. In the case of land claimed for growing trees for fuel for
smoke-houses, it is likewise necessary to prove that fuel is being grown on
the estate for the purpose and no fuel-wood is available from any other
source or no substitute fuel are available to run the smoke-house. This is
more particularly so when the respondent-State Government has pleaded ~

F that the fuel-wood as well as substitute fuel is available at cheaper price. "
Assuming further that fuel-wood available from other sources or the sub-
stitute fuel is costlier, it is no ground for claiming exemption of land from ,)'
the Act for either of the two purposes. It would only lead to increase in
the cost of production necessitated by appropriate increase in wages of the
workers and by use of such .fuel in the smoke-house. Such higher cost if
G any, may be taken care of by the market or by suitable crops. That cannot
be a consideration for exemption of the land from the provisions of the
Act.
x
In Civil Appeal Nos. 106-107of1982, before the Forest Tribunal the
H applicant was the present appellant. The appellant had made two claims.
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTAUON v1 STAIB [S'.AWANT, J.) 991

""-- One related to the land allegedly planted with rubber which land was cut A·
off from the rest of the plantation and which had been trespassed upon by 1

the Survey authorities as having been vested in the Government. The
second claim related to 25 per cent of the total area ()f plantation estimated '
at 44 aeres which was required as "ancillary land". Tlte Tribunal on the 1

admission of the respondent-authorities granted the said claim although , B
in the body of the judgment, it is observed that the claim except that for
5.50 acres of land was being accepted. As regards the second claun, the ·
j. Tribunal found that no land had been specifically earmarked' or allotted to
the appellant as ancillary land; there was a play-ground, smoke-house and
workers' quarters in the estate, though the accommodation required by the '
labourers was not sufficient for accommodating all the labourers. The , C ·
Plantation Officer had issued' a notice to provide quarters to all the
labourers. The Tribunal, in the circumstances, found that the land for '
providing further quarters was necessary. The Tribunal thereafter granted ,
~ an extent of land which would make up the total area of the plantation to
200 acres as being sufficient and necessary for the purpose. That came to, D
according to the Tribunal, in all 23.92 acres. What is necessary to note from
the Tribunal's decision is that no claim for growing fuel trees either for
supply of fuel to the workers or for the somke-house was made before the
Tribunal. The only claim was for more area for constructing sufficient ,
number of quarters to accommodate all the labourers.
y E
Against this decision of the Tribunal, both the present appellants and
the respondent-State Government had preferred appeals to the High Court
which in paragraph 3 of its judgment observed as follows:

"The Forest Tribunal found on the plea for exclusion of 44 acres ,F
as ancillary land that so much extent of land was not required
for the purpose of planting trees to be used as firewood and
for construction of quarters of the labourers."

However, in the Tribunal's decision there is no mention of any claim
for land required for firewood. It appears that the High Court while 9
deciding the appeals had extracted the case of the petitioner from the
petition and the statement accompanying the petition filed before the
Tribunal. In that petition, the petitioner had made a claim for land for
planting trees to use the timber thereof in due course as firewood in
addition to the land for construction of workers' quarters in future. The H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A High Court rejected the claim for both on the ground that the Act did not
envisage exemption of land for the purpose of construction of quarters and
for growing fuel trees in future. According to the High Court, the Act
envisaged the exemption of the land which was being used for such
purposes on the appointed day, viz., 10th May, 1971. The High Court also
gave an additional reason for rejecting the said claim pointing out that
B there was no claim for exclusion of any specific area of land but the
exemption was claimed vaguely. to the extent of 25·per cent of the planta-
tion anywhere adjoining the plantation.

In Civil Appeal No. 2050 of 1981 the crop concerned again was
C rubber and before the Tribunal the exemption of land was sought on the
ground that it was required for growing green manure for the crop and for
growing fuel trees for collecting firewood for use in the smoke-house.
There was no claim for growing fuel for supplying it to the workers. The
stand of the Government was that the lands claimed were never brought
D under cultivation at any point of time and that since the lands were six
miles away from the rubber estate, they did not form part of the estate.
The Tribunal allowed the said claim. On appeal by the State Government,
the High Court rejected the claim relying upon a decision of the Full Bencli
in State of Kera/av. Malayalam Plantations Limited, (1980) KLT 976 (FB).

E In Civil Appeal Nos. 557-61 and 1214-18 of 1981 the crop involved
is tea. These appeals arise out of the orders in original petitions filed before
the Forest Tribunal, viz., Petition Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 26 of 1975. The facts
are as follows:

F In the original petitions the petitioners'[appellants herein] claim was
that the firewood was required for smoke-house because furnace oil was )r
costly. Against this, the respondent-State Government's case was that
firewood and other fuel were available elsewhere and secondly the claim
for land was vague since no particular area was specified. The Tribunal
G allowed the claim of the petitioners. However, in appeal before the High
Court by the State Government, the High Court relying upon a decision of
this Court in Chettiam Veettil Ammad and another, etc. etc. v. Taluk Land
Board and others, etc. etc., AIR 1979 SC 1573 pointed out that supply of
fuel wood could not be said to be a purpose ancillary to the cultivation or
plantation of crops. The High Court repelled the contentions of the present
H appellant that Eucalyptus trees were fruit bearing trees and therefore
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE [SAWANT, J.] 993

exempt under Section 2(t)(l)(i)(C) of the Act. The High Court thus A
allowed the appeals of the State Government and rejected the claim of the
~
appellants. It also appears from the certificate granted by the High Court
under Art!cle 133(1) of the Constitution, that it was granted on the ground
that a substantial question of law of general importance concerning the
interpretation of Section 2(f)(l)(i)(C) of the Act was involved. It thus
appears that the certificate was not asked for and granted on the ground
B
that the land was required for a purpose mentioned in Section 2(t)(l)(i)(B)
of the Act.

I These are the facts in, ciifferent appeals before us. It is, therefore,
clear that as far as the facts involved in th~ appeals before us are con- c
----
...
cerned, the question whether the land was needed for the purpose for
which it was claimed viz., for growing fuel wood for supplying to the
workers and to the smoke-house as stated earlier, had not been considered
and a finding recorded thereon. Further, in some of the matters, there was
no claim for land for growing fuel-wood for supplying to the workers.
D
There was also no evidence that any land much less a specific area of land
was in fact being used for growing fuel"wood. It must be noted that in spite
of the fact that it was the case of. the respondent-State that there was
alternative source of supply of fuel-wood and that there was also substitute
fuel available, the said contention of the State Government was not dealt
with by the Forest Tribunal. The High Court did not think it necessary to E
consider the said contention because of its finding that the land required
for such purpose could not be said to fall within the scope of Section
2(f)(l)(i)(B) of the Act.

The High Court in support of its view that the land required for F
growing fuel-wood for supplying it to the workers or for using in the
smoke-house did not fall within the scope of Section 2(f)~l)(i)(B) of the
Act, as stated above, has also relied upon the decision of this Court in
Chettiam Veettil Ammad & Anr. etc. etc. v. Taluk Land Board & Ors. etc.
etc., AIR 1979 SC 1573: It is necessary to briefly deal with the said decision
and the observations made in the said decision which are relevant to the G I

point before us since the appellants have also tried to take support from
the very same decision to advance their contentions. The controversy in the
'1<- said case related to the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.
~
It was not a decision under the Act which falls for consideration before us.
This Court by the said common decision had disposed of a large number H
y

994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A of civil appeals arising under that Act. The controversy related to three
main points which were as follows: ~
"1. Whether lands converted into plantations between April 1,
1964 and January 1, 1970 qualify for exemption under Section
81 (l)(a) of the Act?
B
2. Whether a certificate of purchase issued by the Land
-.·:.Ji;-: Tribunal under Section 72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk
Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act?
~-\
3. Whether the validity or invalidity of transfers effected by
c
1~
~I'·.~:~
persons owning or holding lands exceeding the ceiling limit
should be determined with reference to the ceiling area in force
on the date of the transfer or in accordance with the ceiling
area prescribed by Act 36of1969-whether sub-section (3) of
Section 64 is retrospective in operation?"
D
The Court negatived the contentions of the appellants on Points 1
and 3 and then proceeded to examine the merits of each of the appeals
with regard to Point No. 2 where the said point was raised. Only in two
appeals, viz., C.A. No. 2811 of 1977 and C.A. No. 227 of 1978 dealt with
in paragraphs 53 and 54 respectively of the decision, the claim for the
E exemption of land used for growing fuel fell for consideration under that
Act and this is how the Court dealt with the said claim in the two appeals:

"C.A. No. 2811 of 1977

F ·····································
53. Mr. Bhatt has argued that the High Court erred in not
granting the exemption for the entire area .as a coffee planta-
tion; but the finding of fact in this respect is against the
appellant. The conversion of the land has also been held to be
illegal. On the claim that the land used for growing fuel was
G
exempt as it fell within the definition of 'plantation' under S.
2(44)(a) as it was an 'ancillary purpose' also, there is a finding
of fact against the Company. The appeal has no merit and is
dismissed. ~

H CA. No. 227 of 1978
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE [SAWANT, J.] 995 i

..................................... A
_,..(_
54. The controversy before us relates to exclusion of 'fuel area'
and 'rested area'. The Company has claimed that it has planted
red gum as fuel in 924. 01 acres as it was required for the !

'manufacture of tea'. The Taluk Board found it to be an
exhorbitant claim and reduced it to 200 acres, but the High B
Court has restored the entire claim. The General Manager of
the Company has stated that firewood is being supplied to the
employees free of cost. So the claim to plant red gum all over
is belied by its Gene<al Manager's statement. Moreover supply I
of fuel wood cannot be said to be a purpose 'ancillary to the c
_.....<. 1. cultivation of plantation crops'. The Land Board has disallowed
the claim for exemption of 136.17 acres, but it has been allowed
in full by the High Court. Here again the High Court was not
justified in interfering with the Board's finding of fact for there I

was nothing to show that it was an area from which crop was
not gathered at the relevant time. If that had been so, it might D
have been an area within the plantation. In fact it appears from
the order of the Board that no other estate had made any such
claim. The appeal is therefore allowed to the extent that thel
Board's decision is restored in both these matters."
E
~ It will be apparent that in C.A. No. 2811 of 1977 the Court held that
there was a finding of fact against the appellant-Company and that the land
used for growing fuel was not exempt from the provisions of the said Act
since such use of land was not for 'ancillary purpose' and did not, also~ fall
within the definition of 'plantation' under Section 2(44)(a) of the said Act.
F
- ~
Similarly, in C.A. No. 227 of 1978 the controversy was whether "fuel
area" among other areas, had to be excluded from the operation of the Act.
The Company's claim was that it had planted red gum as fuel in 924.0li
acres as it was required for the manufacture of tea. The General Manager
of the Company, however, had stated that firewood was being supplied to G
the employees free of cost. This Court held that on the General Manager's
statement the earlier claim for exemption, viz., that the area was required
'/"-- for manufacture of tea, stood belied. But the Court also further held
I.
"moreover supply of fuel-wood cannot be said to be a purpose 'ancillary' to
the cultivation of plantation crops." The Land Board, as is clear from the H
,_
996 • SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.

A discussion, had disallowed the claim to the extent of 136.17 acres but the
,,.
High Court had allowed the claim in full, i.e., 924.01 acres. This Court held _)-.._
that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the Board's finding
of fact for "there was nothing to show that it was an area from which crop
was not gathered at the relevant time ..... In fact it appears from the order
B of the Board that no other estate had made any such claim: The appeal is
therefore allowed to the extent that the Board's decision is restored in both
these matters." It would thus appear from the said disc:Ussion that after
having held that supply of fuel-wood could not be said to be a purpose
ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops, the Co~ ;t merely proceeded

c to restore the finding of the Land Board on the ground that the High
Court's interference with the Board's' finding whereby the Board had
disallowed the claim for exemption of certain acreage was not justified.
"
Thus from paragraphs 53 and 54 of the said decision it is obvious
that this Court had taken the view that the area required for growing fuel
D was not land used for purpose "ancillary to the cultivation of plantation
crops'; ·and that it would not fall within the definition of 'plantation' as an
"ancillary purpose". This is the view of the Court on what constitutes
"ancillary purpose", though the view is under the relevant definition under
the said Act. It is not, therefore, correct to rely upon this decision to hold
E that this Court has taken the view that land used for growing fuel is land
used for "ancillary purpose" under our Act. This is apart from the fact that,
as pointed out above, even under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, the view ~
taken is against such contention.

F In view of what I have discussed above, I am unable to agree with
the view taken by the larger Bench of Kerala High Court in State of Kera/a
v. Moosa Haji, ·(1984) KLT 494. The Bench rejected the claim for land for
growing fuel for supply to the workers relying on the decision of this Court
,.,. --
in Chettiam Veettil Ammad's case [supra]. However, it has. incongruously
enough accepted the claim for land for growing fuel for use in the smoke-
G house. The learned Judges themselves have described the view taken by
them there as "unorthodox" and which may "almost amount to re-reading
of the latter part of Section 2(t)(l)(i)(B) of the Act differently". Instead, I
prefer the view taken by the earlier benches, and particularly by the Full
Bench of the High Court in State of Kera/a v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd., >-< ..
H (1980) KLT 976 (FB) which supports the interpretation that I have placed

- .
PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION v. STATE (SAWANT, J.) 997

on the said provisions. A
For the reasons indicated above, I am of the view that the land used
for growing fuel-whether for supplying it to the workers or for its use in
the smoke house - would not fall within the purview of Section 2{fill}(i)(B)
of the Act as the said use cannot be said to be a purpose eithe~ncillary
to the cultivation of the plantation crops" in question, or "for the pre para- B
tion of the said crops for the market". In the result, I dismiss all the appeals.

The appellants will pay costs to the respondent-State in separate sets.

V.P.R. Appeals allowed.