Holding

The order granting anticipatory bail to the accused was not justified and is hereby set aside and cancelled.

Summary

On 23 August 1983 Bhanwaria, the son of Pokar Ram, was shot and later died, leading to an FIR under sections 307, 447, 149, 148, 379 and 827 IPC, and subsequently an offence under section 302 IPC was added. The accused, Chandan Singh, was not arrested until 29 September 1983, when he applied for anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code; the Sessions Judge granted it with conditions of security, assistance to investigation and a restriction on leaving India. Pokar Ram challenged the grant of anticipatory bail before the Rajasthan High Court, which rejected the cancellation, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the distinct considerations applicable to anticipatory bail, emphasizing that such relief should not be granted where the accusation involves murder, the investigation is ongoing, and there is a risk to public confidence. Finding that the Sessions Judge had erred in granting anticipatory bail without proper consideration of the seriousness of the charge and the investigative stage, the Court set aside and cancelled the bail order.

Issues considered

The appropriateness of granting anticipatory bail under section 438 CrPC in a case involving murder and ongoing investigation
What considerations govern the exercise of discretion in granting anticipatory bail
Whether the order granting anticipatory bail should be cancelled

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 438, s. 439, s. 46(1)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 307, s. 379, s. 447, s. 827

Subjects

anticipatory bailsection 438criminal proceduremurderfire-arm injurybail cancellationjudicial discretionpublic interest

Judgment

780

.. POKAR RAM

v.

B STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR
'
April 17, 1985.

[V. D. TULZAPURKAR, D.A. DESAI AND A.P. StN, JJ.]
c
Cri1nina/ Procedure Code 197 3, s.438-Anticipatory bail-Grant of-When
arises.

The son of the appellant, was injured by a fire arm 011. August 23, 1983
at 4 p. m. The F.I.R. wa5 lodged on the next day at 11.30 a.m. In clear and
unambiguous terms it alleged that the respondent was at the relevant time armed
n with a gun and fired at the appellant's son, who suffered injuries by gun shot.
Since he was alive at that time, a ca5e under ss. 307,447 read with s. 149 and
under ss. 148, 379 and 827 of the 1.V.C. was registered. When he succumbed to
injuries, an offcn<.c ur.dcr s.302 J.P.C. \\.<:~ al~o ndded.

·The respondent was not arrested till September 29, 1983, when he appea-
E red before the Sessions Judge, and moved an application under s.438 ·Cr. P.C.
for anticipatory b1il, and by order dated Septernber 30, 1983 it was granted
wi1h a direction that if the re:ipondent was taken into custody by the police he f
niust be released on bail on his furnhhing 'sc~urity in the a1nount of R,s, 5,000
on condition that he will assist in the investigation and will not go out of

F
India.

The appellant moved the High Court questioning the correctnc$S of th;~·
.•
order ,granting anticipatory b~il and for cancel~ation of the same. A Si?~le Judge (
held that he had locus stand1 to move the High Court for cancellatJofJ. of the
anticipatory bail but on merits ]held that ;no ground~ were made out for
ils cancellation, and accordingly rejCcted the application.

The Appellant appeallcd to this Court.
G
Allowing the Appe:il,

HELD : 1. Relevant consideration~ governing the Court's decision in
·granting anticipatory hail under s.438 are materially different from those when
H an application for bail by a person who is arrested in the course of an investi-
sation as also by a person who is convict~1 and his appeal is pendine: b~fo11r th11
POKAR RAM RAJASIHAN . 781
higher court and bail is sought during the pendency of the appeal. In the in-
stant ca'ie. the High Court uofortu:i.ately fell into error in mh:ing up all the
considera~ions, as if all the three become relevant in the present situation.
[78SB-C]

2. The distinction between an ordinary order of bail arid an order of
anticipatory bail is_ th~t wher.eas the former is granted after arrest and, therefore
meanS release from the custody of the police, the latter fa granted in anticipa- B
tion. of arrest and is, therefore, effective at the very moment of arrest. Unlike a
post-arrest order of bail, it is a Pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the
person in whose favour it is' issued is thereafter arrested on the accusati~n in .
reS:pect of ~hich t~e direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. A direc-
·~ tion under s.438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from the touch
- as envisaged by s.46(1) or confinement. [78D-til
- ·,,
c
3. In regare"d to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to
stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior
motive, the object being tO injure and humiliate the 3pplicant by having him
arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his
arrest would generally be m~de. It cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule
that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears
to be actuated by mala fides; and, equal:y, that anticipatory bail mast be granted
if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. Some of the relevant consi-
"
deralions which govern the discretion of the Court while deciding an application
for anticipatory bail are the nature and seriousness of the proposed cl_larges,
the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a rcas~na
ble possibility of the applicant's presence nOt beirig secured at the trial. a rea-
sonable appreherision that witne.;se~ will be tampered With and ' 1 the larger E
·iDterests of the public or the St-1te'.'- In the evaluation of the consideration
whether the applicant is likely to abscond, there can be no presumption that the
wealthy and the mighty will submit them~elves to trial and that the humble and
poor will run away from the counv.: of ju Hice, any more than there can be a
presumption that the former are not likely to ·commit a crime and the latter
~ \ are more likely to commit it. [785G-H ; 786A-D]
! ' F
~
4. The incident in which ~Bhaowaria was injured with fire arm occurred
on August 23, 1983 in respect of which the First Information Report was lodged
on August ·24, 1"983 and it was in clear and unambiguous terms alleged that.the
respond.ent was at the relevant tima armed with a gun aod fired towards Bhan-
waria who suffered injuries by the gunshot. Amongst others the offence registe-
red was under s.307 J.P,C, that is attempt to commit murder. The first informa· (;
tion report thus discloses use of fire-arm with which the respondent attempted to
commit iµurder of Bhanwaria. Surprisingly, the Investigating Officer had not
arrested him till September 29, 1983 when he moved an application for antici·
patory_ bail under s.438 Cr.P.C. presumably after coming to know that injured
has succumbed to his inguries :and the offence would be one of murder punish-
able under s.302 I.P.C. This conduet of the Investigating Officer leaves the
<;ourt .!}:uessing. The affjdavit filC<t ii) the Hight Court st'atcs th~t the ~·~span- (J
7:82 SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS [1985] 3 s.c.R.

.t\. den't ·is· the Scirpanch·o·f the viliag'e and is an infltlential person and that his
father is Eit-M.L.'A, and is at present Pradhan of the Panchayat Samiti. They
are not-relevant considerations for cancelling anticipatory bail, when it appears
to have been granted by a clear miscOnception of the relevanl ~ consider~tions
governing the grant of aoticipatory bail. [786F-H ; 787A-BJ
,,

5. The accusation against the respondent is that he has commited an
offence of n:iurder punish~ble under s.302 I.P.C. Surprisingly, when anticipatory
bail was granted on Seotember 39, 1983 there is not a whisper of it in the order
of the learned Sessions Judge. W.hen a person is accused of an offence of mur-
der by the use of a fire arm t~e Cou'('t ha<; to be careful aad circumspect ia enter-
taining· an application for anticipa"tory bail. Rel~vant coosii;:Icrations
are conspicuous by silence in the order of the Session Judge, In the instant 1
C: case, it cannot be said that the accusation does not appear to stem from
motives of furthering the ·ends of Justice but from some ulterior motive ar,id the
object was to injure and humiliate the respondent by having him arrested. What
prompted the Sessions Judge to grant anticipatory bail leaves the Court guess-
ing- and the Court is none the wiser by the order of the.High Court declinjng to
interfere. f787D-F]

c. 6. The order of the Sessions Judge clearly directs lhat if the- res-
pondent iS taken into custody by the police, he must be released on bail On his
furnishing security in the amount mentioned by him. The order is styled as one
under s.4i8 Cr.P.C. [787H]

7. Unquestionably, no case was made out for granting anticipatory bail
E· in this case. Status in life, affluence or otherwise, are hardly relevant considera·
tions while examining the request for granting anticipatory bail. AnticiPatory
bai! to some· extent intrudes in the sphere of inves.tigation of the crime and the
Court must be cautious and circumspect in exercising such power of a discre..
tionary nature. In the instant case, the power was exercised· sub silentio· as to
reasons or on irrelevant or considerations not germane to the determination.
This Couft, to avoid miscarriage of justice, must interfere. [787D-E]
c
8; ·same very Compelling circumstances-must be made out for gra)lting
bail to a person accused or committing murder and that too when the investi-
gation is ill progress. In the instant case the Investigating Officer did not even
attempt tO arrest the appellant though the initial accusation was under s.307
I.P.C. pun·ishable with imprisonment for life and as soon as the victim of the
G assault succllmbed to his injuries and offence under s.302 was registered, promp-
tly a"n 3pp1iCation for anticipatory bail was made and granted. If such an order
is allowed to StanJ, faith of public in administration of justice is likely to-be
consideriibly Shaken. Therefore, thC order granting anticipatory hail is cancelled.
(789D-F]
.. 9, Setting aside. the order granting anticipatory bail should in no way
H
prejudice the respondent, It is open to him ato move an application for beins
POKAR RAM v. RAiASTHEN (beast. i. )
enlarged on bJ.il and the Court would consider the same on merits wholly un A
influenced.by the earlier orders, the judgment of the lea1ned Single Judg~ of the
High Court and this Judgment: [789G-H]

Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors. v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 S.C.C.
565, relied upon.
B
•
Gurcharan Singh and Ors. v. State (D_elhi Adn1inistration). [t978J 2 S.C.R~
358, State v. Capt. Jagji1singh, AIR 1962 S.C. 253, Delhi Ad1nn. v. Sa11jay j

Gandhi, AIR 1978 S.C. 96t' and Bhagirath Singh Judeja v. State o/Gufar.at,
(1984] I S.C.C. 284, referred to.

~\ii..._ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. · c
~ 324 of 19~5

From the judgment and order datod 7. 7. 1984 of the High
Court of Rajasthan in Cr!. Misc. Appln: No. 758 of 1983.

Sobhag Mal Jain and S.K. Jain for the Appellant. D

-A.N. Mui/a, Surya Kant and B. Sharma for the Respondents. ·
..
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DESAI, J. Special leave granted. E

Unusal though it may appear to be, under a compelling '' .
necessity in the interest of justice, we would depart from the ordinary
response of this Court , to matters 'involving bail. Ordinarily, this
Court is loathe to interfere with the orders granting or refusing /
~.bail_ b~t it cannot be an insurmountable . obstacle i.n the way of
F
, rectifymg an order which tends to disclose miscarriage of
· justice. , · ··

An inicdent occurred on August 23, 1983 in which 'one
Bhanwaria, son of the present appellant received fatal injuries · G
resulting in his death. An information was lodged with the· Police:
Station, Khedapa, District Jodhpur, Rajasthan State about the
occurrence on August 24, 1983 around 11.30 A.M. At that' time·
Bhanwaria was alive and the offence was registerered under Sec'.·
307, 447 read with Sec. 149 ander Sec. 148, 379 and 327'ofthe
Indian Penal Code. When the hospital authority sent the message
H
784 SUPREME COURT ilEPORTs ti 98Sj 3 S.C.R.
A
that Bhawaria, the victim of assault, who was admitted in· the
hospital for treatment has succumbed to his injuries. the Investiga-
ting Officer also added an offence under Sec. 302 IPC. Soon
thereafter.on September 29, 1983, the second respondent Chandan
Singh s/o Shri Ranjit Singh ('respondent' for short) appeared before.
B the learned. Sessions Judge, Jodhpur and moved an application
under Sec. 438, Cr. P. C. for granting him anticipatory bail. The
public prosecutor appearing for the State opposed the application
for grant of anticipatory bail. The learned Judge by his order
dated September 30, 1983 accepted the application and granted
anticipatory bail to the respondent observing that the dispute is
c with regard to the right to cutlivate a certain field from which when ~-
deceased Bhanwaria was comming. out, the respondent fired at him ......., -_
and caused the injuries which proved fatal. The learned Judge
further observed that keeping in view some decisions referred to by
him, he was of the opinion that the application for anticipatory
bail should be granted. The learned Judge then ordered that if the
)J
accused is taken into custody by the police, he must be released on
bail on his furnishing security in the amount of Rs. 5,000 'on condi-
tion that he will assist in investigation and will not interfere in the
investigation and will not go out of India.'

E The present appellant moved the High Court of Rajasthan
questioning the correctness of this order and for cancellation of
the anticipatory bail. A learned Single Judge of the High Court
negatived "the contention that the petitioner had no locu.< standi to
move the High Court for cancellation of anticipatory bail. On
merits, the· learned Judge after referring to several decisions obser-
F ved that while dealing with an application for cancellation of bail <
warranting interference with the discretionary order passed by the ~
learned Sessions Judge granting bail, the considerations which
should weigh with the court were whether : (1) the accused would ·
be readily available during the trial ; (2) he is not likely to abuse the
discretion ,granted his favour by tamporing with the prosecution
G witnesses, concluded that the respondent and his father are infiuen-
tail persons and. hold important posts in the Panchayat or Zita
RParishad furnished no ground for cancelling bail and that it is not
necessary to examine whether anticipatory b1il ought to havo been
granted, but what must be considered is whether a c1se for cancel·
lation of the same is made out. The learned Judgo then held that
R
MK:i1.11. 11.i\.M v. Ril.iil.STHil.N (Deasi, i. ) 785
such grounds are not shown to exist and accordingly rejected the A
application. Hence this appeal by special leave.

Relevant consderations governing the court's decision in· grant-
ing anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 are materially different from
those when an application for bail by a person who is arrested in the
course of inve>tigation as also by a P'~rson. who is convicted_and his · B
appeal is pending before the higher court and bail is ·sought during
the pendency of the appeal. Three situations in which the question
of granting or refusing to grant bail would arise, materially and
substantially dilfer from each other and the relevant considerations·
on which the courts would exercise its discretion, one way or the
other, are substantially different from each other. This is necessary .
c
to be stated because the. learned Judge in the High Court unfor-
tunately fell into an error in mixing up all the considerations, as if
all the three. become relevant in tlie present situation.

The decision of the Constitution Bench in Shri Gurbaksfz Singh D
' Sibbill & Ors. v. State of Punjab(!) clearly lays down that 'the distinc-
t'on between an ordianary order of bail and an order of antici
patory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest .and there
fore means release from the costody of the police, the latter is gran-
ted in anticipation of ~rrest and is therefore effective at the very mo-
ment of arrest." Unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest E
legal process which directs that if th' person in whose favour it is
issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which
' ' the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. A direction
under Sec ..438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from
the touch as_ envisaged by Sec. 46 _(l) or confinement. In para 31,
Chandrachud, CJ clearly demarcated the distinction between F
.....- the relevant considerations while examining an application for
' anticipatory bail and an application for bail after arrest in the
course of investigation. Says the learned Chief J 1stice that 'in regard,
to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not,
from motives of furthering the ends of justice ,but from some ulterior G
motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by
having him arrested, a direction for the release of the appllicant on
bail in the event of his arrest' would generally be made. It was obser-
ved that 'it cannot be laid down. as an inexorable rule that anticipa--

(I) [1980] 2 s.c.c. 565. u'
1s6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [! 98S] 3s.c.R..
A tory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears ·
to be actuated by mala fides; and equally, that anticipatory bail
must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond.'
Some of the relevant considerations which govern the discretion,
noticed therein are the nature and seriousness of the proposed
charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of
B the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not
being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses
will be tampered with and "the larger interests of the public or
the State", are some of the considerations which the court ha·s to
keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail.'
c A caution was voiced that 'in the evaluation of the consideration
whether the applicant is likely to abscond, there can be no presu.mp· ·
tion that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to
trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from the course
of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the
former are not likely to commit a crime and the latter are more
D· likely to commit it.'

Having noticed the relevant considerations which should weigh
with the court in the matter of granting or refusing to grant ·
anticipatory bail, let us first look at the order made by the learned ·
Sessions Judge.
E
The incident in which Bhanwaria was injured with fire arm
occurred on August 23, I 983 in respect of which the first info'rma·
lion report was lodged on August 24, 1983, in which it was in clear
and uaambiguous terms alleged that the respondent was at the rele· ,
F van! time armed with a ~un anJ fired towards Bhanwaria who
sufferred injuries by gun shot. The incident occurred as siated ·~
earlier .around 4.00 P. M. o_n August 23, 1983 andth is information .
is lodged with the Police Station at a distance of 30 k.m. from the
scene of occarrence on August 24, 1983. at 11.30 a.m. Amongst
others, the offence registered was under Sec. 307 IPC i. e. attempt
G to commit murder. The first information report thus discloses use.
of fire arm with which the respondent attempted to commit murder
of Bhanwaria. Surprisingly, the Investigating Officer had not arres·
tcd him tiil September 29, 1983 when he moved an application for
anticipatory bail under Sec.438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
presumably after coming to know that injured Bhanwaria has,
ll succumbed to his injuries and the offence would one of murder
PORAR RAM v. RAJSATHAN (Desai. J.) 787

punishable under Sec. 302 !PC. This conduct of the Investigating A
Officer left us guessing. Some light is shed by some averments from
the affidavit filed .in the High Court and extracted by the learned
Judge in his judgment: It is stated that the respondent is the.
Sarpan·ch of Vil. Danwara and is an influential person and that
his father Ranjit Singh is ex-M.L.A. and is at present Pradhan of
the Panchayat Samiti. Are these relevant considerations for not B
cancelling anticipatory bail when it appears to have been granted
by a clear misconception of the relevant considerations governing ·
of anticipatory bail ? The answer is emphatically in the negative
in view of the extracted observations from the decision of the
Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia's case
c
The accusation against the respondent is that he has committed
an offence of murder-punishable under Sec. 302 !PC. Surprisingly,
when anticipatory bail was granted on September 30, 1983, there
is not a whisper of it in the order of the learned Sessions Judge,
Jodhpur. When e person is accused of a offence of murder by
the use of a fire arm, the Court has to be careful and circumspect
in entertain;ng an application for anticipatory bail. Relevant
considerations are conspicuous by silence in the order of the learned
Sessions Judge. Could it be said in this case that the accusation
appears to stem not from motives of furthering ihe ends of justice
but from some ulterior motive? Could it be said that the object E
being to injure. and humiliate the respondent by having him
arrested ? What prompted the learned Sessions· Judge to grant
antcipatory bail left us guessing and we are none the ·wiser by the
discussion in the order of the learned Single Judge declining to •
,').t-interfere.
F
l . Mr. Mulla, learned counsel who appeared for the respondent ·
urged that the order of the kar~ed Sessions Judge is not of antici-
patory bail under Sec. 438 but it is an order made after looking into
the papers of investigation and therefore, it is an order of bail
under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We remain
G
unconvinced because the order of the learned Sessions Judge
clearly directs that if the respondent is taken into custody by the
police, he must be released on bail on his furnishing security in the
amount mentioned by him. The learned Judge himself styled the order
as one under Sec. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If there
was any doubt about this aspect, the penultimate para of the judg- If
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 3 S.C.R.

··A ment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dispels the
same when it recites that no order for cancelling bail can. be made
when the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Jodhpur has
granted anticipatory bail to the respondent by his order dated
September 30, 1983.

B
Mr. Mulla then attempted to urge that on merits a good case
for granting bail is made out. We are not inclined to examine
this contention becase neither the learned Sessions Judge nor the
learned Single Judge of the High Court has examined the case from
that angle. The only question which we were called upon to decide
c is whether : the learn'd Sessions Judge was justified in granting
anticipatory bail in the facts and circumstances of this case?
Unquestionably, no case was made out for granting anticipatory bail
in this case. Let it be made distinctly clear that status in life,
affluence or otherwise, are hardly relevant considerations while
examining the request for granting anticipatory bail. Anticip.1tory
n bail to some extent intrudes in the sphere of investigation of crime
and the court must be cautious and circumspect in exercising such
power of a discretionary nature. This case amply illustrates that
the power was exercised sub si/entio as to reasons or on irrelevant or
considerations not germane to the determination. This Court, to
avoid miscarriage of justice, must interfere.
E.
The High Court referred to two decision< of the Rajasthan High
Court on the question of low< sta11di of lhe present appellant but
once that was conceded and not questioned before us, we need not
• refer to them. The learned Judge th·on referred to the decision in {
Gurbax Singh Sibba 's case, but failed to take note of the relevant -"',
observations which we have extracted herein before. Referencf to the
decision in Gurcham Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration)<')
by the High Court is hardly apposite because the controversy
centered round the power of the High Court to deal with the
application for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the Code
G of Criminal Procedure and on merits this Court held that the High
Court was not justified in cancelling the bail. The Court was not
concerned with examining •he relevant considerations for granting
or refusing to grant anticipatory bail in that case. The deision in

ll (!) [1973] 2 SCR 358.
PORAR RAM v. RAJATSHAN (iJ, sai. i.) 189
State v. Capt. Jagji1singh<1) would be of n assistance as the provision .A
o( anticipatory bail come ·to be introduced in ·the Code· of 1973.
Similarly the decision in Delhi Admn. v. Sanjay Gandhi(') is of no
asistance because the court was concerned with the question of
cancellation of bail already granted long back in the faets and
circumstances of the case on account of events subsequent to the
order granting bail. The High Court lastly referred to Bhagirath .B
Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat (3) because that was the case in
which accusation was for an offence under Sec. 307 !PC and the
learned Sessions .Judge had granted bail which order was qu~shed
by the High Court. As stated earlier, by reference to these
decisions not of topical interest bearing on the question of grant c
or refusal of anticipatory bail the High Court unfortunately missed
crux of the matter.

Before we conclude this judgment, it must be made distinctly
clear that some very compelling circumstances must be made out
for granting bail to a person accused of committing murder D
and that to when the investigation is in progress. In fact, the Inves-
tigating Officer did not even attempt to arrest the appellant though
the initial accusation was under Sec. 307 !PC punishable with
imprisonment for life. And as soon as the victim of the assault
succumbed to his injuries and an offence under Sec. 302 was
E
registered, promptly an application for anticipatory bail was made
and granted. If such an order is allowed to stand, faith of public
in administration of justice is likely to be considerably .shaken.
J Therefore, we have no option but to cancel the order granting
anticipatory .bail.
F
By our setting aside the order granting anticpatory bail,
respondent should in no way be prejudiced. If consequent upon
the setting aside of the order granting anticipatory bail, the
the respondent is arrested which must ordinarily follow, it is open to
him, if he is so advised, to move an application for being enlarged
G
on bail and the Court would consider the same on merits wholly
nnintluenced by the earlier orders, the judgment of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court and this judgment.

(I) AIR 1962 S.C. 253.
(2) AIR 1978 S.C. 961. H
(3) [1984] I S.C.C, 284.
190 sUPRllME COURTS RBPORLS [1~85J 3 s.c.k.

A Acc.ordingly this appeal is allowed and the order dated
September 30, 1983 granting anticipatory bail to the respo'ndent
Chandan Singh s/o Ranjit Singh is quashed and set aside and the
bond furnished by him is cancelled. We order accordingly.
'
B

1-
Ap}iedlallowed