POONJABHAI VARMALIDASversusCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, AHMEDABAD
- Citation
- 1990 INSC 311
- Decided
- 9 October 1990
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- T K THOMMEN
Holding
Under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, an order made under the repealed Section 10(2)(xi) is deemed to be made under Section 36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act, so the recovered amounts are chargeable to tax under Section 41(4).
Summary
The assessee, Poonjabhai Varmalidas, had written off certain debts as bad under Section 10(2)(xi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 in 1959‑60. His business ceased before the amounts were later recovered in the assessment years 1964‑65, 1965‑66 and 1967‑68, after the 1961 Act had repealed the 1922 Act. The Revenue taxed the recoveries under Section 41(4) of the 1961 Act, but the Tribunal held they were not taxable. The Gujarat High Court reversed that view, holding the recoveries were chargeable. On appeal, the Supreme Court applied Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, deeming the order made under the repealed provision to be an order under Section 36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act, and therefore held the amounts taxable under Section 41(4). The Court dismissed the appeals.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 41(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 applies to amounts written off as bad debts under the repealed Section 10(2)(xi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 when the recovery occurs after the repeal.
- Whether the discontinuance of the assessee's business bars the taxability of the recovered amounts under Section 41(4).
- Whether Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deems an order made under a repealed provision to be an order under the re‑enacted provision.
Legislation cited
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. 24, s. 25
- Income Tax Act, 1922s. 10(2)(xi)
- Income Tax Act, 1961s. 36(1)(vii), s. 36(2), s. 41(4)
Subjects
Judgment
POONJABHAI VARMALIDAS
A
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, AHMEDABAD
OCTOBER 9. 1990.
B [T.K. THOMMEN AND R.M. SAHA!. JJ.]
Income Tax Act, 1922: S. !0(2)(xi)!lncome Tax Act, 1961:
"" 36( /)(vii), 36(2) and 41(4): Bad debts written off subsequentlv
recovered-Business discontinued-Amounts whether assessable to tax.
c tion ofSection 10(2)(xi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 provided for deduc-
bad and doubtful debts. The proviso thereto laid down that if the
amount ultimately recovered on any such debt was greater than the
difference between the whole debt and the amount allowed the excess
shall be deemed to be a profit of the year in which it was recovered.
These provisions were re-enacted in the Income Tax, Act, 1961 as
D s. 36(l)(vii) provides, subject to the provisions of sub-s. (2), for deduc-
tion of amount of any debt established to have become a bad debt in the
previous year, whereas s. 41(4) provides for bringing to tax amounts of
such bad debts, if recovered subsequently, as the income of the previous
year in which it was recovered, -~hether the business in r~spect of which
the deduction bad been allowed was in existence in that year or not.
E
Certain amounts which bad been allowed to be written off as bad
debts in terms of s. 10(2)(xi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 in the year
1959-60, but subsequently received by the assessee were sought to be
brought to tax in the assessment years 1964-65, 1965-66 and 1967-68
under s. 41(4) oftbe Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee's business bad
F discontinued prior to the relevant years of recovery of the amounts. The
orders of assessment were confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Com-
missioner. The Tribunal, however, held that the amounts could not be
taxed under s. 41(4) of the 1961 Act for that section bad no application
to amounts written off in 1959-60 in terms of s. 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act
when it was in force.
G
On a reference, the High Court held that the amounts in question
were includible in computing the taxable income of the assessee in
respect of the relevant years under s. 41(4) of the 1961 Act. It took the
view that there was no inconsistency between the relevant provisions of
the two enactments and that s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was
H attracted as a result of which the order in terms of which the amounts
206 (,
P. "v ARMALIDAS v. C.I.T. 207
had been written off was deemed to have been made under the re-
A
enacted provisions, as contained ins. 36(l)(vii).
In these appeals by certificate, it was contended for the appellant
that the relevant provisions of the 1922 Act and 1961 Act were not in
pari materia, that s. 41(4) would he attracted only where the had debt
had been written off in terms of s. 36(l)(vii), and that what has been B
allowed as a deduction in terms of s. 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act could not
on recovery he brought to tax under s. 41(4) of the 1961 Act, unless the
business itself had continued to exist at the time of recovery.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court,
HELD: I. If the amounts had been received prior to the repeal of c
the 1922 Act the entire transaction would have been covered by the
provisions of section 10(2)(xi) of the Act, and the business having been
discontinued prior to the relevant years of receipt, these amounts would
not have been taxable. [209H; 210A]
D
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Express Newspapers
Ltd., 53 ITR 250 referred to.
2.1 The effect of section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, in so
far as it is material, is that where the repealed and re-enacted provi-
sions are not inconsistent with each other, any order made under the
repealed provisions wonld be deemed to be an order made under the
re-enacted provisions. [212B]
2.2 Section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act is equivalent to sections
36(1)(vii), 36(2) and 41(4) of the 1961 Act. The repealed section 10(2)(xi)
is thus a composite section containing the ingredients of the re-enacted
sections 36(1)(vii), 36(2) and 41(4), Consequently, when a debt is writ-
ten off by an order in terms of section 10(2)(xi) 'of the 1922 Act, the
Income Tax Officer exercises the same power as he would have exercised
on the enactment of section 36(l)(vii) of the 1961 Act. These two provi-
sions are, therefore, consistent with each other. Section 36(l)(vii) is
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of that section. Therefore,
both sections 36(1)(vii) and 36(2) of the 1961 Act, being two of the
ingredients of section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act, must be read together
with reference to an order under which debts had been written off.
Accordingly, in the light of section 24 of the General Clause Act, 1897,
the relevant order made under section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act with
reference to which the debt in question had been written off, would be
208 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
deemed to be an order made nnder section 36(l)(vii) of the 1%1 Act and
A
such order is what is contemplated under section 41(4) of that Act. Any
amount which is recovered on any such debt is attracted by the provi-
sions of section 41(4) of the 1961 Act and is, therefore, chargeable to tax
in terms of that sub-section to the extent of the 'excess' specified
therein. [212C-G]
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
143 I-33(NT) of 1976.
Appeals by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated
7.7.2.1976 of· the Ahmedabad High Court in Income Tax Reference
Nos. 129 and 168 of 1974.
c
J.H. Parekh, P.H. Parekh and Ms. Shalini Soni, for the
Appellant.
S.C. Manchanda. K.P. Bhatnagar and Ms. A. Subhashini for the
D Respondent. '
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
THOMMEN, J. These appeals under certificate arise from the
common judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in the Commissioner
E of Income Tax, Gujarat Ill v. Poonjabhai Vamna/idas, 105 ITR 388
Gu j. The assessee is the same in all the cases. The assessment years in
question are 1964-65. 1965-66 and 1967-68. In the relevant previous
vears. the assessee received certain amounts and thev were assessed
~nder section 4 I( 4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (her~inafter referred
to as the .. 1961 Act"). The contention of the assessee was that he was
F not assessable under section 41(4) of the 1961 Act because these
amounts had been written off as bad debts in the•year 1959-60 and his
claim for deduction, though initially disallowed by the Income Tax
Officer. was subsequently allowed by the Income Tax Appellate Tri-
bunal in l.T.A. Nos. 673-676 (AHD) dated 12.7. 1963. The business of
the assessee had discontinued prior to the previous year in which any
G part of the amount was received, and consequently, it was contended.
these amounts when received were not assessable to income-tax under
section 41(4) of the 1961 Act as that section was not in pari materia
with section I0(2)(xi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 (' 1922 Act') in
terms of which the amounts had been written off as bad detbts. This
contention was rejected by the Income Tax Officer and the amounts
H were brought to,tax. The orders of assessment were confirmed by the
P. VARMALIDAS v. C.I.T. ITHOMMEN, J.] 209
Appellate Assistant Commissioner. On further appeal by the assessee,
A
the Tribunal held, accepting the assessee's contention, that the
amounts could not be taxed under section 41(4) of the 1~61 Act, for
that section had no application to amounts written off in 1959-60 in
terms of section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act when it was in force. On a
reference, the High Court held that the amounts in question were
includible in computing the taxable income of the assessee in respect B
of the relevant years under section 41(4) of the 1961 Act. The ques-
tions referred were ·accordingly answered by the High Court against
the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. Hence the present appeals.
Section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act reads:
"10. Business:-( 1) ................................. . c
(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after
making the following allowances. namely:
D
(xi) when the assessees's accounts in respect of any
part of his business, profession or vocation are not kept on
the cash basis, such sum, in respect of bad and doubtful
debts, due to the assessee in respect of the part of his
business, profession or vocation, and in the case of an
assessee carrying on a banking or money-lending business. E
such sum in respect of loans made in the ordinary course of
such business as the Income-tax Officer may estimate to be
irrecoverable but not exceeding the amount actually writ-
ten off as irrecoverable in the books of assessee:
Provided that if the amount ultimately recovered on F
any such debt or Joan is greater than the difference bet-
ween the whole debt or Joan and the amount so allowed,
the excess shall be deemed to be a profit of the year in
which it is recovered and if Jess, the deficiency shall be
deemed to be a business expense of that year;
G
There is no dispute that the assessee's accounts were not kept on
cash basis. There is also no dispute that the assessee's business had
discontinued prior to the year of recovery of the amounts in question.
If the amounts had been received prior to the repeal of the 1922 Act
the entire transaction would have been covered by the provisions of H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
section 10(2)(xi) of that Act, and the business having been discon-
A
tinued prior to the relevant years of receipt, these amounts would not
have been taxable. See Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v.
Express Newspapers Ltd., 53 ITR 250. But the amounts in question
here were recovered after the coming into force of the 1961 Act which
repealed the 1922 Act. The question, therefore, is whether the
B amounts which had been written off in terms of section 10(2)(xi) of the
1922 Act, but subsequently received after the repeal of that provision.
could be brought to tax in terms of the relevant re-enacted provisions.
Tax is sought to be levied under the 1961 Act in terms of section 41(4)
which reads:
"41. Profits chargeable to tax.-
c
4. Where a deduction has been allowed in respect of
a bad debt or part of debt under the provisions of clause
(vii) of sub-section (!)of section 36, then, if the amount
subsequently recovered on any such debt or part is greater
D
than the difference between the debt or part of debt and
the amount so allowed, the excess shall be deemed to be
profits and gains of business or profession, and accordingly
chargeable to income-tax as the income of the previous
year in which it is recovered, whether the business or pro-
fession in respect of which the deduction has been allowed
E is in existence in that year or not.
This sub-section refers to the deduction allowed in respect of a bad
debt under the provisions of section 36(l)(vii) of the 1961 Act which
F reads as follows:
"36. Other deductions-( I). The deductions provided for
in the following clauses shall be allowed in respect of the
matters dealt with therein, in computing the income refer-
red to in section 28-
G
(vii) subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the
amount of any debt, or part thereof, which is established to
have become a bad debt in the previous year:
H
,,
P. VARMALIDAS v. C.l.T. ITHOMMEN, J.] 211
Significantly sub-section (4) of section 41 of the 1961 Act specifically
A
states that tax is attracted whether or not the business or profession in
respect of which the deductions had been allowed continued to be in
existence in the year of receipt. This is a fUndameiltal deviation from
the earlier provision contained in section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act.
Furthermore, sub-section (4) of section 41 specifically says that the
deductions should have been allowed in respect of a bad debt under B
the provisions of section 36( !)(vii) in order to attract section 41(4).
The assessee, therefore, contends that the relevant provisions of
the two enactments are not in pari materia, and what has been allowed
as a deduction in terms of section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act annot be
brought to tax under section 41(4) of the 1961 Act. Any order made
under section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act under which a debt-was wlitten c
off would not attract tax on recovery of the whole or part of such
amount unless the business itself continued to exist at the time of the
recovery. Furthermore, the assessee contends that sub-section (4) of
section 41 of the 1961 Act is attracted only where the bad debt was
written off in terms of section 36(1)(vii) of tjiat Act, and not in terms D
of section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act, the provisions of which are not in
pari materia with either section 36(l)(vii) or section 41( 4).
. -·
I Rejecting the contentions of tke assessee, the High Court held
that there was no inconsistency between the relevant provisions of the
two enactments and that section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 E
was attracted as a result of which the order in terms of which the
amounts had been written off was deemed to have been made under
the re-enacted provisions, as contained in section 36(l)(vii), and con-
sequently the amounts recovered on any such debt were chargeable
under section 41(4).
F
Section 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, in so far as it is
material, reads:
"24. Continuation of orders, etc., issued-under10enactme-nts
repealed and re-enacted-Where any Central AC! or Regu-
lation is, after the commencement of this Act, repealed and G
re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is
otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notifica-
tion, order, scheme, rllle, forin or bye:law~ made or issued
under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall, so far as it is
not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in
force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superse-
ded by any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule,
t · form or bye-law made or issued under the provisions. so
re-enacted ...... "
The effect of section 24 of the General Clauses Act. 1897, in so
B
far as it is material, is that where the repealed and re-enacted provi-
sions are not inconsistent with each other, any order made under the
repealed provisions is deemed to be an order made under 'the re-
enacted provisions. The question, iherefore, is whether the provisi~ns'
of the repealed section 10(2)(xi), under which the bad debts were
written off as irrecoverable in the books of the assessee, are in terms
c re-enacted by the repealing Act. A comparative table furnished in The
Law and Practice of Income Tax, Kanga and Palkiwala (Seventh
Edition-Volume II) shows that section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act is
equivalent to sections 36( !)(vii), 36(2) and 41(4) of the 1961 Act. The
repealed section 10(2)(xi) is thus a composite section containing the
ingredients of the re-enancted sections 36(1)(vii), 36(2) and 41(4).
D Consequently when a debt is written off by an order in terms of section
10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act, the Income Tax Officer exercises the same
power as he would have exercised on the enactment of section
36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act. These two provisions are, therefore, consis-
tent with each other. Section 36(1)(vii) is subject to the provisions of
sub-section (2) of that section. Therefore, both sections 36( !)(vii) and
E 36(2) of the 1961 Act, being two of the ingredients of section 10(2)(xi)
of the 1922 Act, must be read together with reference to an order
under wh.ich debts had been written off. Accordingly, in the light of
section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the relevant order made
under section 10(2)(xi) of the 1922 Act with reference to which the
debt in question had been written off, is deemed to be an order made
F under section 36(1)(vii) of the 1961 Act and such order is what is
contemplated under section 41(4) of that Act. Any amount which is
recovered on any such debt is attracted by the provisions of section
41(4) of the 1961 Act and is, therefore, chargeable to tax in terms of
that sub-se.ction to the extent of the 'excess' specified therein.
G The contentions of the assessee thus fail, and the appeals are
accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
P.S.S. ; Appeals dismissed.
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