Supreme Court of India
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA & ORS.versusMANHABALA JERAM DAMODAR & ANR.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 534
- Decided
- 13 August 2013
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- K S RADHAKRISHNAN
Holding
Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, as amended, includes gratuitous licensees within its ambit, making a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee maintainable before the Small Causes Court.
Summary
The appellants, who were occupying a flat in Bombay as a gratuitous licensee, were evicted by a decree of the Small Causes Court under s.41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 (as amended by the Maharashtra Act of 1976). They appealed, arguing that the term "licensee" in the statute should be limited to the definition in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, which excludes gratuitous licensees. The Supreme Court examined the legislative history, the objects and reasons of the 1976 amendment, and applied rules of statutory interpretation such as contemporanea expositio, the golden rule, and noscitur a sociis. It held that "licensee" in s.41(1) is a term of wider import, intended to include gratuitous licensees, and that the provision does not draw its meaning from the Rent Act definition. Consequently, a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is maintainable before a Small Causes Court. The Court dismissed the appeals.
Issues considered
- The scope of the term "licensee" in s.41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 as amended by the Maharashtra Act of 1976
- Whether a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee falls within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court
- Whether s.41(1) should be interpreted in light of the definition of "licensee" in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947
Legislation cited
- Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955
- Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948
- Bombay Municipal Corporation Act
- Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947s. 15A, s. 28, s. 5(11), s. 5(4A)
- Indian Easements Act, 1882s. 52
- Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976 (Amendment to PSCC Act)
- Maharashtra Act No. XLI of 1963 (Amendment to PSCC Act)
- Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882s. 41(1)
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Subjects
evictiongratuitous licenseeSmall Causes Court jurisdictionstatutory interpretationlicensor-licensee relationshippari materianoscitur a sociiscontemporanea expositioPresidency Small Causes Courts ActBombay Rent Act
Judgment
[2013) 9 S.C.R. 52
A PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA & ORS.
v.
MANHABALA JERAM DAMODAR & ANR.
(Civil Appeals Nos. 6726-6727 of 2013)
AUGUST 13, 2013
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT, 1882:
c s. 41 (1) - Suits or proceedings between licensors and
licensees - Suit for eviction of gratuitous licensee - Held: Is
maintainable before the Small Causes Courl ., Expression
'licensee' used in PSCC Act is a term of wider imporl intended
to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well and is used in general
sense of term as defined in s. 52 of Easements Act - It does
0
not derive its meaning from the expression 'licensee' as used
in sub-s. (4A) of s. 5 of Rent Act Bombay Rents, Hotel and .
Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 - ss. 5(4-A) and 15-
A - Interpretation of statutes - Contemporenea exposition -
E Easements Act, 1882 - s.52 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
s.41(1) -Suits or proceedings between licensors and
licensees and landlord and tenant- Jurisdiction - Held: s.41(1)
confers jurisdiction on Small Causes Court to entertain and
try all suits and proceedings between a "licensor" and a
F "licensee" relating to recovery of possession of any
immovable property or relating to recovery of licence fee --
High Courl has correctly noticed that the clubbing of the
expression "licensor and licensee" with "landlord and tenant"
in s. 41(1) and clubbing of causes relating to recovery of
G licence fee is only with a view to bring all suits between
"landlord and tenant" and "licensor and licensee" whether
under Rent Act or under PSCC Act under one umberalla to
avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardship.
H 52
·-
P RAB HU DAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 53
JERAM DAMODAR
BOMBAY RENTS, HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE A
RATES (CONTROL) ACT, 1947:
ss. 5(4-A) and 15-A - 'Licensee" - Held: Under sub-s. (4A)
of s. 5, "licensee" means a person who is in occupation of the
premises or such part as the case may be, under a subsisting 8
agreement for licence given for a "licence fee or charge" --
The definition of "licensee" under sub-s. (4A) of s. 5 is both
exhaustive as well as inclusive -- But licensee under sub-s.
(4A) must be a licensee whose licence is supported by
material consideration meaning thereby a gratuitous licensee C
is not covered under the definition of 'licensee' under sub-s.
(4A) of s. 5.
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:
Contemprenea expositio - Held: Is a recognized rule of D
interpretation -- Concept of licence and lease were dealt with
by contemporary statutes: Easements Act, Transfer of
Property Act ands. 41 of PSCC Act -- Therefore, s. 41(1) of
PSCC Act could not have contemplated any other meaning
of the term "occupation with permission" but only the E
permission as contemplated by s. 52 of Easements Act.
Provisions 'pan· materia' - Held: Bombay Rent Act, 1947
and Chapter VII of PSCC Act cannot be said to be pari pateria
statutes- s.5(4-A) of Bombay Rent Act and s.52 of Easements
Act reflecting the expression 'licensee' are not pari material. F
Noscitur a sociis - Held: When the intention of legislature
in using the expression 'licensee' ins. 41(1) of the PSCC Act
is clear and unambiguous, the principle of noscitur a sociis
is not to be applied. G
Statement of objects and Reasons - Relevance of
interpreting a provision - Explained.
Respondent Nos.1 and 2 along with other plaintiffs
filed a suit uls 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A Act, 1882 before the Small Causes Court, Bombay against
the appellants (original defendants) for recovery and
vacant possession of the suit premises and also for other
consequential reliefs. It was the case of the plaintiffs that
the defendants were in use and occupation of the suit
B premises as their guest-house and in this regard no
monetary consideration was charged by them from the
defendants. Permission granted to the defendants to use
the premises was later revoked and since they did not
vacate the suit flat, the suit was filed for eviction. The '.
c Small Causes Court decreed the suit and ordered .
eviction of the defendants-appellants with a specific ·
finding that they were gratuitous licensees. The appeal
of the appellants was dismissed by the Appellate Bench
of Small Causes Court. The appellants as well as the
respondents filed writ petitions before the High Court; the
0
respondents' writ petition was for claiming mesne profits.
The matter was referred to a Full Bench, which held that
the expression 'licensee' would include a 'gratuitous
licensee' and the suit was tenable before the Small
Causes Court u/s 41 of PSCC Act.
E
In the instant appeals, the question for consideration
before the Court was: "whether a suit filed by a licensor
against a gratuitous licensee u/s 41(1) of the Presidency
Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, as amended by the
F Maharashtra Act No.19 of 1976 is maintainable before a
Small Causes Court."
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. "Licensees" were brought within the
G purview of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (Bombay Rent Act) by adding
s. 5(4A) and s.15A by way of amendment in the year 1973.
The expression "licensee" was inserted by sub-s. (4A) in
s. 5 which provided that a person in occupation of the
H premises or of such part thereof which is not less than a
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 55
JERAM DAMODAR
room, as the case may be, in a subsisting agreement for A
license given only for a license fee or charge but
excluded from its sweep a gratuitous licensee. [para 21
and 23) [74-C-D; 75-D-E]
1.2 Maharashtra Act 19 of 1976 made drastic changes 8
and Chapter VII was substituted for the original Chapter
VII (ss. 41 to 49) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts
Act, 1882 (PSCC Act). Under Chapter VII of the 1976
Amendment, the proceedings for recovery of possession
u/s 41 no more remained summary and they were given
status of regular suits. The expressions "licensor" and C
"licensee" were introduced ins 41(1) of the PSCC Act by
the 1976 Amendment. The statement of Objects and
Reasons of the 1976 Amendment, inter alia, states that in
order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings between a
landlord and tenant or a licensor and licensee in different D
courts, it was considered expedient to make the required
supplementary provisions in the Presidency Small
Causes Court. Act. [para 24-26) [75-F-G; 76-F; 77-G-H; 78-
A-C]
E
1.3 It is trite law that if the words of a statute are
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can
be necessary than to expound those words in their
natural and ordinary sense. [para 28) [78-G]
Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. L. V.A. F
Dixitulu and Others 1979 (1) SCR 26 = (1979) 2 SCC 34,
Kehar Singh and Others v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1988 (2)
Suppl. SCR 24 =AIR 1988 SC 1883, District Mining Officer
and Others v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. and Another 2001 (1)
Suppl. SCR 147 = (2001) 7 SCC 358, Gurudevdatta VKSSS G
Maryadit and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others 2001
(2) SCR 654 =AIR 2001 SC 1980, State of H.P. v. Pawan
Kumar 2005 (3) SCR 417 = (2005) 4 SCC 350 and State of
Rajasthan v. Babu Ram 2007 (7) SCR 939 = (2007) 6 SCC
55 - referred to. H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A 1.4 In Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain's case while
interpreting s. 41 (1) of the PSCC Act, the Court stated that
before taking the view that jurisdiction of regular
competent civil court is ousted, the conditions that must
be satisfied are: (i) it must be a suit or proceeding
B between the licensee and licensor; (ii) or between a
landlord and a tenant; and (iii) such suit or proceeding
must relate to the recovery of possession of any property
situated in Greater Bombay; or (iv) relating to the
recovery of the licence fee or charges or rent thereof. For
C the purpose of the instant case, condition nos. (i) and (iii)
are relevant. [para 29-30) [79-C-F)
Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vitha/ Ogale 1995 (1)
SCR 996 = (1995) 2 SCC 665 - referred to.
D 1.5 In view of sub-s. (2) of s. 41 of the PSCC Act,
s.41(1) takes in its compass "licensees" who do not fall
within the ambit of s. 5(4A) read with s. 5(11) and s. 15A
of the Rent Act 1947. Gratuitous licensee does not fall
within s. 5(4A) read with ss. 5(11) and 15A of the Rent Act
E 1947. The provisions of s. 41(1) also do not specifically
exclude a gratuitous licensee nor does it make any
distinction between the licensee with material
consideration or without material consideration. Further,
s. 28 of the Rent Act 1947 does not confer jurisdiction on
F the Small Causes Court to entertain a suit against a
gratuitous licensee. Section 28 read with s.5(4A) would
show that a party who claims to be a gratuitous licensee
is not entitled to any protection under the Rent Act 1947.
[para 31-32) [80-C-F]
G 2.1 "Pari materia" words are used in s. 28 of the
Bombay Rent Act, 1947 ands. 41(1) of PSCC Act and
referring to the nature of suits in both the provisions
would indicate that those provisions confer exclusive
jurisdiction on Small Causes Court meaning thereby it
H alone can entertain suits or proceedings relating to
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 57
JERAM DAMODAR
recovery or possession of the premises. Section 28 of the A
Bombay Rent Act deals with the suits between landlord
and tenant and between licensor and licensee relating
only to recovery of licence fee or charge while s. 41 of
the PSCC Act deals with such suits between licensor and
licensee also. Where the premises are not governed by B
the Rent Act, the provisions of s. 41 of the PSCC Act
would apply, at the same time where the premises are
governed by the provisions of Rent Act, the provisions
of s. 28 would be attracted. From a reading of both the
provisions, it is clear that the nature of such suits as C
envisaged by both the sections is the same. However,
keeping in view the provisions of the two Statutes, it
cannot be said that the Rent Act and Chapter VII of the
PSCC Act are pari materia statutes. [para 34, 35 and 37]
[81-C-G; 83-D-E] D
State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.
Okara 1964 SCR 387 =AIR 1964 SC 669 Shah & Co.,
Bombay v. State of Maharashtra 1967 SCR 466 = AIR 1967
SC 1877- relied on.
E
Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Assn. V.
Administrative Officer and Ors. 2004 (1) SCR 470 = (2004) 1
sec 755 - cited.
A.G. v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957)
1 All ER 49; R. v. Loxda/e (1758) 97 ER 394; and R v. Herrod F
(1976) 1 All ER 273 (CA) - referred to.
2.2 "Noscitur a sociis" is merely a rule of construction
and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the
wider words are intentionally used by the legislature in
order to make the scope of the defined word G
correspondingly wider. The expression "licensee" in s.
41 of the PSCC Act has been used to fully achieve the
· o.bject and purpose especially of 1976 Amendment Act;
and legislature has used clear and plain language and the
principle noscitur a sociis is inapplicable when intention H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A is clear and unequivocal. It is only where the intention of
the legislature in associating wider words with words of
a narrow significance is doubtful or otherwise not clear, -
the rule of noscitur a sociis can be applied. When the
intention of the legislature in using the expression
B 'licensee' in s. 41 (1) of the PSCC Act is clear and
unambiguous, the principle of noscitur a sociis is not to
be applied. [para 38-39] [83-G-H; 84-A, C-E]
The State of Bombay and Others v. The Hospital
Mazdoor Sabha and Others (1960) 2 SCR 866 =AIR 1960
C SC 610, Bank of India v. Vijay Transport and Others, (1988)
1 SCR 961 = AIR 1988 SC 151, Mis Rohit Pulp and Paper
Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1990 (2) SCR 797 =
(1990) 3 SCC 447, Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1997
(2) Suppl. SCR 305 = (1997) 8 SCC 191, Mis Brindavan
D Bangle Stores & Ors. v. The Assistant Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes & Another, 2000 (1) SCR 97 = (2000) 1
sec 674 - referred to.
2.3 Contemporenea expositio is the best and most
E powerful_ law and it is a recognized rule of interpretation.
The PSCC Act came into force on 01.07.1882. In that year,
the Transfer of Property Act and the Easements Act were
also enacted. In the instant case, the concept of licence
and lease were dealt with by contemporary statutes:
F Easements Act, Transfer of Property Act ands. 41 of the
PSCC Act. Therefore, s. 41(1) of the PSCC Act could not
have contemplated any other meaning of the term
"occupation with permission" but only the permission as
contemplated by s.52 of the Easements Act. The PSCC
G Act is a procedural law and the expressions "licensor"
and. "licensee" or "landlord" and "tenant" used in s. 41
of the PSCC Act (as amended by Maharashtra Act No.
XIX of 1976) relate to immovable property ands. 52 of the
Easements Act which defines a licence has an
inseparable connection to immovable property and
H
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 59
JERAM DAMODAR
property law. Legislature was well aware of those A
contemporaneous statutes, that was the reason, why the
expression licence as such has not been defined in the
PSCC Act with the idea that the expression used in a
contemporaneous statute would be employed so as to
interpret s. 41 of the PSCC Act. The principle of B
contemporenea expositio would apply to the instant
case. [para 17, 40 and 41) [71-B; 84-F, G-H; 85-A-D]
National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Municipal
=
Corporation of Greater, Bombay 1969 (3) SCR 565 (1969) C
1 SCC 541 and The Tata Engineering and Locomotive
Company Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat 1977 (1) SCR 306 =
(1976) 4 sec 177 • referred to.
2.4 The PSCC Act does not define the expressions
"licensor" and "licensee". Both these expressions find D
a place ins. 41(1) of the PSCC Act. Section 41(1) confers
jurisdiction on Small Causes Court to entertain and try
all the suits and proceedings between a "licensor" and
a "licensee" relating to recovery of possess.ion of any
immovable property or relating to recovery of licence fee. E
Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act defines the term "licensee"
so also s.52 of the Easements Act, 1882. Sub-s. (4A) of
s. 5 of the Rent Act provides that "licensee" means a
person who is in occupation of the premises or such part
as the case may be, under a subsisting agreement for F
licence given for a "licence fee or charge". The definition
of "licensee" under sub-s. (4A) of s. 5 is both exhaustive ·
as well as inclusive. But it is relevant to note that the
licensee under sub-s. (4A) must be a licensee whose
licence is supported by material consideration, meaning G
thereby, a gratuitous licensee is not covered under the
definition of licensee under sub-s. (4A) of s. 5 of the Rent
Act. [para 42] [85-D-H]
2.5 Keeping in view the meaning of the term 'licensee'
as defined in s.52 of the Easements Act, and in various H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A other situations, it is evident that the word 'licence' is not
popularly understood to mean that it should be on
payment of licence fee, it can also cover a gratuitous ·
licensee as well. A licensor can permit a person to enter
into another's property without any consideration, it can
B be gratuitous as well. [para 46) [87-C-D]
State of Punjab v. Brig. Sukhjit Singh 1993 (3) SCR 944
= (1993) 3 SCC 459; and Surendra Kumar Jain v. Royce
Pereira 1997 (5) Suppl. SCR 221 = (1997) 8 SCC 759. -
relied on.
c
C.M. Beena and Anr. v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao 2004
=
(3) SCR 306 (2004) 3 SCC 595; Sohan Lal Naraindas v.
Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit (1971) 1 SCC 276, Union of India
(UOI) v. Prem Kumar Jain and Ors. 1976 (Suppl.) SCR 166
D = (1976) 3 SCC 743, Chandy Varghese and Ors. v. K. Abdul
Khader and Ors. 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 322 = (2003) 11 SCC
328 - referred to.
P.R. Aiyar's the Law Lexicon, Second Edition 1997;
E Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition; and Stroud's Judicial
Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Sixth Edition, Vol. 2 -
referred to.
2.6 The expression "licence" as reflected in the
definition of licensee under sub-s. (4A) of s. 5 of the Rent
F Act and s. 52 of the Easements Act are not pari materia.
Under sub-s. (4A) of s. 5, there cannot be a licence
unsupported by the material consideration; whereas uls
52 of the Easements Act payment of licence fee is not an
essential requirement for subsistence of licence. The
G legislature in its wisdom has n.ot defined the word
"licensee" in the PSCC Act. The purpose is evidently to
make it more wide so as to cover gratuitous licensee as
well with an object to avoid multiplicity of proceedings in
different courts causing unnecessary delay, waste of
H money and time etc. The object is to see that all suits and
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 61
JERAM DAMODAR
proceedings between a landlord and a tenant or a licensor A
and a licensee for recovery of possession of premises or
for recovery of rent or licence fee irrespective of the value
of the subject matter should go to and be disposed of by
Small Causes Court. The object behind bringing the
licensor and the licencee within the purview of s. 41(1) by B
the 1976 Amendment was to curb any mischief of
unscrupulous elements using dilatory tactics in
prolonging the cases for recovery of possession
instituted by the landlord/licensor and to defeat their right
of approaching the court for quick relief, and to avoid c
multiplicity of litigation with an issue of jurisdiction
thereby lingering the disputes for years together. [para
47] [87-D-H; 88-A-B]
Km. Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1981) 2 SCC
585 - relied on. D
2.7 The interpretation of the expressions 'licensor' and
'licensee' used in s. 41 (1) is in tune with the objects and
reasons reflected in the amendment of the PSCC Act by
the Maharashtra Act (XIX) of 1976. The objects and reasons E
as such may not be admissible as an aid of construction
to the statute but it can be referred to for the limited purpose
of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time of
introduction of the bill and the extent and urgency of the
evil which was sought to be remedied. This Court, F
therefore, cannot restrict the meaning and expression
'licensee' occurring in s. 41(1) of the PSCC Act to mean
the licensee with monetary consideration as defined u/s
5(4A) of the Rent Act. [para 49] [88-E-G; 89-8-C]
M. K. Ranganathan and Anr. v. Government of Madras G
and Ors. 1955 SCR 374 = AIR 1955 SC 604; and Bhaiji v.
Sub Divisional Officer, Thandla and Ors. 2002 (5) Suppl. SCR
116 = (2003) 1 sec 692 -- referred to.
2.8 The High Court has correctly noticed that the H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 9 S.C.R.
A clubbing of the expression "licensor and licensee" with
"landlord and tenant" in s. 41(1) of the PSCC Act and
clubbing of causes relating to recovery of licence fee is
only with a view to bring all suits between the "landlord
and tenant" and the "licensor and licensee" under one
B umberalla to avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and
hardship. The act of the legislature was to bring all suits
between "landlord and tenant" and "licensor and
licensee" whether under the Rent Act or under the PSCC
Act under one roof. It cannot be said that the legislature
C after having conferred exclusive jurisdiction in one court
in all the suits between licensee and licensor should have
carved out any exception to keep gratuitous licensee
alone outside its jurisdiction. The various amendments
made to Rent Act as well the Objects and Reasons of the
Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976 would clearly indicate that
0
the intention of the legislature was to avoid unnecessary
delay, expense and hardship to the suitor. In such a
situation, courts also should give a liberal construction
and attempt should be to achieve the purpose and object
of the legislature and not to frustrate it. This Court,
E therefore, holds that the expression 'licensee' employed
in s. 41 of PSSC Act is used in general sense of term as
defined in s. 52 of the Easements Act. Looking from all
angles, the expression 'licensee' used in s.4(1) of the
PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the
F expression 'licensee' as used in sub-s. (4A) of s. 5 of the
Rent Act, but is a term of wider import intended to bring
in a gratuitous licensee as well. Since the expression
'licensee' means and includes a 'gratuitous licensee' also,
the Small Causes Court will have jurisdiction to entertain
G the suit in question. [para 30, 50,51 and 52] [79-F; 89-D-
G; 90-A-D]
Ramesh Dwarikadas Mehra v. lndirawati Dwarika Das
Mehra AIR 2001 Bombay 470 - disapproved.
H Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Ors. v. Manhabala
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 63
JERAM DAMODAR
Jeram Damodar & Anr. 2007 (5) Maharashtra Law Journal A
341 - affirmed.
Case Law Reference:
AIR 2001 Bombay 470 disapproved para 3
B
2007 (5) Maharashtra Law
Journal 341 affirmed para 5
1995 (1) SCR 996 referred to para 11
(1976) 1 All ER 273 (CA) referred to para 11 c
2004 (1) SCR 470 cited para 11
1979 (1) SCR 26 referred to para 28
1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24 referred to para 28 D
2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 147 referred to para 28
2001 ( 2 ) SCR 654 referred to para 28
2005 (3) SCR 417 referred to para 28
E
2007 (7) SCR 939 referred to para 28
(1957) 1 All ER 49 referred to para 33
(1758) 97 ER 394 referred to para 33
F
1964 SCR 387 relied on para 33
1967 SCR 466 relied on para 33
(1960) 2 SCR 866 referred to para 38
(1988) 1 SCR 961 . referred to para 38 G
1990 (2) SCR 797 referred to para 38
1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 referred to para 38
2000 (1) SCR 97 referred to para 38 H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A 1969 (3) SCR 565 referred to para 40
1977 (1) SCR 306 referred to para 40
1993 (3) SCR 944 relied on para 43
2004 (3) SCR 306 referred to para 44
B
(1971) 1 sec 216 referred to para 44
1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 166 referred to para 44
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 322 referred to para 44
c
1997 (5) Suppl. SCR 221 relied on para 45
(1981) 2 sec 585 relied on para 48
1955 SCR 374 referred to para 49
D 2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 116 referred to para 49
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6726-27 of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.07.2007 of the
E High Court of Bombay in W.P. Nos. 148 of 2004 & 561 of 2005.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Pretesh Kapoor, R.N. Karanjawala,
Manik Karanjawala, Nandini Gore, Abhishek Roy, Tahira
Karanjawala, Mehernaz Mehta for the Appellants.
F
Shekhar Naphade, Ranjana Parikh, Siddharth Bhatnagar,
T. Mahipal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. We are, in these appeals, concerned with the question
whether a suit filed by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee
. under Section 41 (1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts
H. Act, 1882 (for short "the PSCC Act"), as amended by the
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 65
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Maharashtra Act No.XIX of 1976 (for short "1976 Amendment A
Act") is maintainable before a Small Causes Court, Mumbai.
3. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in
Ramesh Dwarikadas Mehra v. lndirawati Dwarika Das Mehra
(AIR 2001 Bombay 470) held that a suit by a licensor against B
a gratuitous licensee is not tenable before the Presidency Small
Causes Court under Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act, and it
should be filed before the City Civil Court or the High Court ·
depending upon the valuation. The Division Bench held that the
expression "licensee" used in Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act C
has the same meaning as in Section 5 (4A) of the Bombay
Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947
(in short "the Rent Act"). Further it was held that the expression
"licensee" as used in Section 5(4A) does not cover a gratuitous
licensee. The Division Bench in that case rejected the ejectment
application holding that the Small Causes Court at Bombay D
lacked jurisdiction.
4. In Bhagirathi Lingawade and others v. Laxmi Silk Mills,
in an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court dated
03.09.1993, another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court E
expressed the view that Section 5(4A) and Section 13(1) of the
Rent Act, 1947 are not at all relevant in interpreting the scope
and ambit of Section 41 of the PSCC Act, under which suit was
filed.
F
5. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, which is the.
Judgment under appeal, reported in 2007 (5) Maharashtra Law
Journal 341, answered the question in the affirmative overruling
the Ramesh Dwarikadas Mehra case (supra), the legality of
which is the question, that falls for our consideration.
G
FACTUAL MATRIX
6. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 along with other plaintiffs (who
are now deceased) filed a suit LE. and C. No.430/582 of 1978
under Section 41 of the PSCC Act before the Small Causes H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A Court, Bombay against the appellants (original defendants) for
recovery and vacant possession of one bed room in Flat No.16,
Ram Mahal, Churchgate, Mumbai and also for other
consequential reliefs. Plaintiffs submitted that the defendants
were in use and in occupation of the above premises as their
B guest-house and so far as hall and kitchen are concerned,
family members of the plaintiff and defendants were using it as
common amenities. The plaintiffs also claim that they are in
occupation of another bed-room in the suit flat and no monetary
consideration was charged by them from the defendants for
c exclusive use and occupation of one bed-room and joint use
of the hall and kitchen as common amenities. Permission
granted to the defendants to use the premises was later
revoked and since they did not vacate the suit flat and
continued to hold possession wrongfully and illegally, suit was
D filed for eviction.
7. The Small Causes Court decreed the suit on
07.02.1997 and ordered eviction of the appellants with a
specific finding that they are gratuitous licensee. The appellants
preferred an appeal before the Appellate Bench of Small
E Causes Court, which was dismissed on 05.04.2003. Against
that order both the appellants and respondents filed writ
petitions before the High Court, Bombay and the respondents'
writ petition was for claiming mesne profits.
F 8. The Defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the Small ·
Causes Court, Mumbai to entertain and try the suit before the
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, placing
reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench in Ramesh
Dwarkadas Mehra's case (supra) contending that the licence
G created by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants was
gratuitous, i.e. without consideration, hence the suit is not
maintainable in that Court. Learned Single Judge vide his order
dated 16.01.2006 referred the matter to a larger bench.
Consequently, a Full Bench was constituted.
H
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 67
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
9. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court formulated A
the following questions for its co.nsideration:
(i) Whether the expression "Licensee" used in section
41 (1) in Chapter VI I of PSCC Act, not having been
defined therein, would derive its meaning from the
B
expression "licensee" as used in sub-section (4A)
of section 5 of the Rent Act and/or whether the
expression "licensee" used in section 41 (1) of
PSCC Act is a term of wider import so as to mean
and include a "gratuitous licensee" also?
c
(ii) Whether a suit by a "licensor'' against a "gratuitous
licensee" is tenable before the Presidency Small
Cause Court under section 41 of PSCC Act'(
Both the above mentioned questions, as already indicated, D
were answered by the Full Bench in the affirmative, the
correctness of otherwise of those findings is the issue that falls
for our consideration.
Arguments
E
10. Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellants, submitted that the Full Bench was in error in
overturning a well-reasoned judgment of the Division Bench of
the High Court in Ramesh Dwarkadas Mehra's case and
contended that the licence created by the plaintiffs in favour of F
the defendants was admittedly gratuitous and hence a suit for
eviction of such a licensee is not maintainable in a Small
Causes Court. Further, it was pointed out that the intention of
the Legislature was that the "licence" contemplated in Section
41 of PSCC Act must take its colour from Section 5(4A) of the G
Rent Act 1947, which specifically excludes a gratuitous
licensee, hence, such a suit is maintainable only before a
competent civil court. Learned senior counsel also pointed out
that it is an established position of law that, under Section 9 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the jurisdiction of a Civil
H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A Court cannot be ousted unless such an ouster is expressed or
clearly implied and such a provision has to be strictly construed.
Shri Sorabjee also submitted that Section 41 of the PSCC Act,
as initially enacted, used the expression "permission" and not
"licence", despite the Easements Act, 1882, which is indicative
B of the legislative intent that Section 52 of the Easements Act,
not being pari materia, ought not be relied on in determining
the scope and meaning of the term "licensee" in Section 41 of
PSCC Act.
11. Shri Sorabjee also pointed out that, till 1976, the PSCC
C Act continued to use the expression "permission" and the 1976
Amendment to the PSCC Act was inspired only by 1973
Amendment to the Rent Act 1947. Further, it was also
submitted that 1976 Amendment was specifically made to
PSCC Act to harmonize it with the Rent Act 1947. Shri Sorabjee
D also submitted that Section 41 of the PSCC Act, by virtue of
the 1976 Amendment, was completely reworded to specifically
reflect the language used in Section 28 of the Rent Act 1947
so as to make it pari materia. In other words, it was submitted
that, after the 1976 Amendment, the Rent Act 1947 and PSCC
E Act, are cognate and pari materia statutes which form part of
the same system. Learned senior counsel pointed out that the
statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming part
of the same system are pari materia statutes. Reference was
made to the judgments of this Court reported in Mansukhlal
F Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vitha/ Oga/e (1995) 2 SCC 665, R v.
Herrod (1976) 1 All ER 273 (CA) and Ahmedabad Pvt.
Primary Teachers Assn. V. Administrative Officer and Ors.
(2004) 1 sec 755.
G 12. Shri Sorabjee also submitted that the Statement of
Objects and Reasons of 1976 Amendment proceeds on the
premise that the "licence" contemplated by Section 41 of
PSCC .A:ct is a non-gratuitous one which provides that, under
the existing law, the licensor had to go to different Courts for
recovery of possession and licence fee and that the intention
H
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 69
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
of the Legislature was always to confine the jurisdiction of the A
Small Causes Court to eviction proceedings and proceedings
for the recovery of rent/licence fee, not to evict a gratuitous
licensee. Shri Sorabjee also submitted that the expression
"licence" contemplated in Section 41 of PSCC Act does not
include a gratuitous licensee, which is also in consonance with B
the principle of Nocitur a sociis, which provides that words must
take colour from words with which they are associated. In
support of this contention, reliance was placed on the judgment
of this Court in Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Assn. 's
case. c
13. Shri Sorabjee also submitted that the respondents
have proceeded on a wholly incorrect premise that the Rent Act
1947 only protects the licensees who were in possession on
01.02.1973. It was pointed out that by virtue of 1973 Amendment
to the Rent Act 1947, protection was given to all "licensees" D
defined in Section 5(4A). It was also submitted that certain
licensees were given the status of deemed tenants under
Section. 15A and that only those licensees who had subsisting
license on 01.02.1973. were given the status of deemed
tenants. Learned senior counsel pointed out that if all the E
licensees were deemed tenants, there would not have been any
need to insert the word "licence" in various provisions of the
Act. Learned senior counsel also pointed out that these
aspects were overlooked by the judgment in appeal, unsettling
the law laid down by the Division Bench of the High Court in F
Ramesh Dwarkadas Mehra's case (supra).
14. Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents, submitted that the Full Bench
of the Bombay High Court is right in holding that the expression G
"licensee" used in Section 41 (1) of PSCC Act does not derive
its meaning from the expression "licensee" as defined in
Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act 1947 and that the expression
"licensee" used in Section 41 (1) of PSCC Act is a term of wide
import so as to mean and include a gratuitous licensee.
H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A Learned senior counsel also submitted that the argument of the
appellants that the Rent Act 1947 is pari materia with Section
41 of PSCC Act or same system statute, is totally
misconceived. Shri Naphade also submitted that the "licence"
contemplated in Section 41(1) of PSCC Act be considered as
B licence, as defined in Section 52 of the Easements Act. Shri
Naphade also pointed out that though Section 41 (1) of PSCC
Act, as originally enacted, refers to occupation of premises with
permission, such permission means permission as referred to
in Section 52 of the Easements Act which is a
c contemporaneous statute, i.e. Easements Act, the Transfer of
Property Act and Section 41 of PSCC Act. In support of that
principle, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the
judgment of this Court in National & Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1969) 1 SCC 541
and Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. The
0
Gram Panchayat, Pimpri Wachere (1976) 4 SCC 177.
15. Shri Naphade also submitted that the expression
"licensor" or "licensee" or "landlord" and "tenant" used in
Section 41 of PSCC Act, as amended by the Maharashtra Act
E No. XIX of 1976, relate to "immoveable property" and Section
52 of the Easements Act which defines a "licence" has a
inseparable connection to immoveable property and property
law. Learned senior counsel pointed out that the expression
"licensee" is used as an antithesis to the concept of tenant and,
F therefore, the licensee under Section 41 (1) must mean a person
having a licence as defined in Section 52 of the Easements
Act. Shri Naphade also submitted that the Maharashtra Act of
1976 made necessary changes in Chapter VII of PSCC Act
which contained Sections 41 to 49 and by virtue of the
. G amendment, the pecuniary restriction on the jurisdiction of the
Small Causes Court placed by Section 18 has been removed
to speed up the proceedings for eviction and to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings. The Legislature also intended that
all cases of licensees and tenants should be tried only by the
H Small Causes Court under Section 41(1) of PSCC Act.
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v: MANHABALA 71
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
16. Before considering the rival contentions raised by the A
counsel on either side and the reasoning of the Full Bench, it
is necessary to examine .the historical settings of the various
legislations.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
B
PSCC Act:
17. The PSCC Act came into force on 01.07.1882. In that
year, the Transfer of Property Act as well as the Easements Act
was also enacted. Under the PSCC Act, Small Causes Courts c
were established in Calcutta, Madras, Ahmedabad and
Bombay and the PSCC Act was enacted to consolidate and
amend the law relating to Courts of Small Causes established
in the Presidency Towns. Small Causes Court was conferred
with the jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature where value
0
of the subject matter did not exceed Rs.10,000/- as per Section
18, subject to exceptions in Section 19 of PSCC Act. S.mall
Causes Courts, at that time, were treated as a Civil Courts in
the hierarchy of the Courts. Chapter VII of PSCC Act, as it stood
prior to the Maharashtra Amendment Act, 1976, contained
Sections 41 to 46 conferring limited jurisdiction of recovery of E
possession of immoveable property on Small Causes Court
giving summary remedy for recovery of possession of
immoveable property of the prescribed value. Section 41 of
PSCC Act then stood as follows:
F
"41. Summons against persons occupying
property without leave.- When any person has had
possession of any immovable property situate within the
local limits of the Small Cause Court's jurisdiction and of
which the annual value at a rack-rent does not exceed two G
thousand rupees, as the tenant, or by permission, or
another person, or of some person through whom such
other person claims,
and such tenancy or permission has determined or
been withdrawn, H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A and such tenant or occupier or any person holding
under or by assignment from :1im (hereinafter called the
occupant) refuses to deliver up such property in
compliance with a request made to him in this behalf by
such other person,
B
such other person (hereinafter called the applicant)
may apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons
against the occupant, calling upon him to show cause, on
a day therein appointed, why he should not be compelled
to deliver up the property.
c
18. Proceedings at that time were initiated by filing an
application, not a suit. Even the Bombay Rent Act, 1939 and
Bombay Rent Act, 1944, did not give exclusive jurisdiction to
any Court. Legislative history indicates that in respect of
D premises having annual rack rent up to Rs.2,000/-, the
proceedings for recovery of possession between landlord and
tenant were to be filed in Small Causes Court under Chapter
VII of the PSCC Act and in case where the annual rack rent
exceeded Rs.2,000/-, the recovery suits were to be filed in the
E Original Side of the High Court.
19. Bombay Rent Act 1947 also brought lot of changes to
the Rent Act of 1939 and 1944 and Section 28 of the 1947 Act
provided that exclusive jurisdiction was conferred on the Small
Cause Court in respect of all the suits between landlord and
F tenant relating to recovery of rent or possession irrespective
of value of the subject-matter. Suits between landlord and tenant
pending on the original side of the High Court were transferred
to the Presidency Small Cause Courts, Mumbai and were to
be tried under the provisions of the Rent Act. Even landlords
G were prohibited from recovering any amount in excess of
standard rent which was pegged down at the level of rent in
September, 1940 or on the date of first letting. Even the
landlord's right of evicting tenant was also severely curtailed and
the landlords could recover possession only on proof of grounds
H of eviction enumerated under the Rent Act, therefore, they
P~ABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 73
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
started letting out their premises under an agreement of leave A
and license. Proceedings for recovery of possession against · ·· -
the licensee though started filing suits under Section 41 of the
Small Cause Courts Act, the defendants in those cases starting
denying that there were licensees but tenants and that the
agreement of leave and licence was sham and bogus and B
hence not binding. Even the findings rendered by the Small
Cause Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 41 on
the question of tenancy was not final and the aggrieved party
had a right to file a regular suit for declaration of the title resulting
in multiplicity of the proceedings. Chapter VII of the PSCC Act c
was later amended by the Maharashtra Act No. XLI of 1963.
The object of the Amendment in a nutshell is as follows:
"In view of the fact that the provisions of Section 47
of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 are
abused by the parties in an application under Section 41 D
and the litigation is protracted on account of parties in
certain cases claiming the right to be tried under the
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, 194 7, the Act deletes sections 45 to 4 7 of the
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and empowers E
the Small Cause Court to decide as a preliminary issue
the question whether an occupant is entitled to the
protection of the Rent Control Act and to lay down that only
one appeal can be preferred against the order and no
further appeal can lie. New Section 49 provides that F
recovery of possession shall be a bar to a suit in any court
except on the basis of title to the immovable property other
than as title."
20. Section 42A which provided that if in an application G
made under Section 41, the occupant raises a defence that he
is a tenant within the meaning of Bombay Rent Act, 1947 then
notwithstanding anything contained in that Act, the question
shall be decided by the Small Cause Court as a preliminary
issue. The question of filing civil suits against licensee even
H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A after the introduction of Section 42A depended upon the value
of subject matter.
Bombay Rent Act
21. Bombay Rent Act, 1925 was repealed by the Bombay
B Rent Protection Act, 1939. Both the Acts did not contain any
special or separate definition of "license" nor did they deal with
"licensees". In the year 1944, Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging
House Rates (Control) Act 1944 was enacted followed by the
1947 Act. Rent Act, 1947 also did not deal with expressions
C "license" or "licensee" and their rights and there were
widespread attempts to evade the rigour of the rent control
legislation by entering into "leave and licence" agreements in
order to prevent rampant evasion. Bombay Rent Act was
amended in the year 1973 to bring "licensees" within the
D purview of the Rent Act, 1947 by adding Section 5(4A) and
Section 15A.
22. Statement of Objects and Reasons of Maharashtra Act
19 of 1973 reads as follows:
E "It is now notorious that the Bombay Rents, Hotel and
lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, is being avoided
by the expedient of giving premises on leave and license
for some months at a time; often renewing from time to time
at a higher license fee. Licensees are thus charged
F excessive license fees' in fact, several times more than the
standard rent, and have no security of tenure, since the
licensee has no interest in the property like a lessee. It is
necessary to make provision to bring licensees within the
purview of the aforesaid Act. It is therefore provided by
G c1.:14 in the Bill that persons in occupation on the 1st day
of February 1973 (being a suitable anterior date) under
subsisting licenses, shall for the purposes of the act, be
treated as statutory tenants and will have all the protection
that a statutory tenant has, under the Act. It is further
H provided in Cl. 8 that in the case of other licenses, the
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 75
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
charge shall not be more than a sum equivalent to standard A
rent and permitted increases, and a reasonable amount
for amenities and services. It is also provided that no
person shall claim or receive anything more as license fee
or charge, than the standard rent and permitted increases,
and if he does receive any such excessive amounts, they B
should be recoverable from the licensor."
23. Section 15-A introduced in the said Act stated that a
person as on 1st February, 1973 in occupation of any premises
or any part of which is not less than a room as licensee under
a subsisting agreement of leave and license, he shall on that C
day deemed to have become tenant of the landlord for the
purpose of Bombay Rent Act, 1947 in respect of the premises
or part thereof in his occupation. The definition of the
expression "tenant" in Section 5(11) was also amended to
include such licensee as shall be deemed to be the tenant by D
virtue of Section 15A. The expression "licensee" was also
inserted by Sub-section (4A) in Section 5 which provided that
a person in occupation of the premises or of such part thereof
which is not less than a room, as the case may be, in a
subsisting agreement for license given only for a license fee E
or charge but excluded from its sweep a gratuitous licensee.
Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976
24. Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976 made drastic changes
F
in Chapter VII of PSCC Act by which Chapter VII was
substituted for the original Chapter VII (Sections 41 to 49).
Under Chapter VII of the 1976 Amendment, the proceedings
for recovery of possession under Section 41 no more remained
summary and they were given status of regular suits. For easy
reference, we may refer to both sub-sections (1) and (2) of G
Section 41, which reads as follows:
41. Suits or proceedings between licensors and
licensees or landlords and tenants for recovery of
H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A possession of immovable property and licence fees or
rent, except to those to which· other Acts apply to lie in
Small Cause Court.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this
Act or in any other law for the time being in force, but
B
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the Court of
Small Causes shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try all
suits and proceedings between a licensor and licensee,
or a landlord and tenant relating the recovery of
possession of any immovable property situated in Greater
c Bombay, or relating to the recovery of the licence fee or
charges or rent therefor, irrespective of the value of the
subject-matter of such suits or proceedings.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to suits
D or proceedings for the recovery of possession of any
immovable property or of licence fees or charges of rent
thereof, to which the provisions of the Bombay Rents,
Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the
Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, the
E Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the Bombay Housing
Board Act, 1948 or any other law for the time being in
force, applies.
25. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1976
Amendment is also relevant and same is extracted hereunder:
F
"STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
At present in Greater Bombay, all suits and proceedings
between a landlord and tenant relating to recovery of
G possession of premises or rent, irrespective of the value
of the subject matter lie in the Court of Small Causes,
Bombay under Section 28 of the Bombay, Rent, Hotel and
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Under that
section, suits and proceedings for the recovery of the
license fee between a licensor and licensee as defined in
H
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 77
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
that Act also lie in the Court of Small Causes, irrespective A
of the value of the subject matter. Under Chapter VI I of the
Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882 a~ application
can be made by a licensor for recovery of possession of
premises, of which the annual value at a rack rent does not
exceed three thousand rupees. If the rack rent exceeds B
three thousand rupees, the licensor has to take
proceedings in the City Civil Court where the rack rent does
not exceed twenty five thousand rupees and for higher rents
in the High Court. Similarly, for recovery of license fees to
which the provisions of the Bombay Rent Control Act do c
not apply, the licensor has to seek his remedy in the Small
Causes Court, the City Civil Court or the High Court, as
the case may be, according to the value of the subject
matter. Under the existing law, the licensor has to go to
different Courts for recovery ofpossession of premises and o
license fees and if the plea of tenancy is raised by the
defendant and succeeds, the matter has again to go to the
Small Causes Court. Similarly, where proceedings on the
basis of tenancy are started in the Small Causes Court and
subsequently the plea of license is taken and succeeds, E
the plaint is returned and has to be represented to the City
Civil Court or the High Court as the case may be,
depending on the valuation. Thus, there is unnecessary
delay, expense and hardship caused to the suitors by
going from one Court to another to have the issue of
jurisdiction decided. Moreover, Chapter VII of the F
Presidency Small Causes Courts Act envisages
applications which culminate in orders and are always
susceptible of being challenged by separate suits on title
· where relationship is admittedly not between a landlord and
tenant. G
2. In order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings in different
Courts and consequent waste of public time and money
and unnecessary delay, hardship and expense to the
suitors, and to have uniformity of procedure, it is considered H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A expedient to make the required supplementary provisions
in the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, so that all suits
and proceedings between a landlord and tenant or a
licensor and licensee for recovery of possession of
premises or for recovery of rent or license fee, irrespective
B of the value of the subject matter should go to and be
disposed of by the Small Causes Court, either under that
Act or the Rent Control Act.
3. The Bill is intended to achieve these objects."
C 26. We may, on the basis of the above legal and historical
settings, examine the exact intent of the Legislature in inserting
the expressions "licensor'' and "licensee" in Section 41(1) of
the PSCC Act by the 1976 Amendment and also whether all
disputes between licensors and licensees are intended to be
D tried only by the Small Causes Courts. Before embarking upon
such an exercise, we have to deal with the basic principles of
interpretation of the expressions which figures in the Statutes
under consideration.
E Golden Rule
27. Golden-rule is that the words of a statute must be prima
facie be given their ordinary meaning when the language or
phraseology employed by the legislature is precise and plain.
This, by itself proclaims the intention of the legislature in
F unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to and it is
unnecessary to fall upon the legislative history, statement of
objects and reasons, frame work of the statute etc. Such an
exercise need be carried out, only when the words are
unintelligible, ambiguous or vague.
G
28. It is trite law that if the words of a Statute are
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be
necessary than to expound those words in their natural and
ordinary sense. The above principles have been applied by this
H Court in several cases, the judgments of which are reported in
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 79
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. L. V.A. Dixitulu A
and Others (1979) 2 SCC 34, Kehar Singh and Others v.
State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1988 SC 1883, District Mining
Officer and Others v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. and Another
(2001) 7 SCC 358, Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and
Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others AIR 2001 SG 8
1980, State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350 and
State of Rajasthan v. Babu Ram (2007) 6 SCC 55.
29. Section 41(1), as such, came up for consideration
before this Court in Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain's case (supra).
While interpreting the said provision, the Court stated that the
c
following conditions must be satisfied before taking the view
that jurisdiction of regular competent civil court is ousted:
(i) It must be a suit or proceeding between the
licensee and licensor; or D
(ii) between a landlord and a tenant
(iii) such suit or proceeding must relate to the recovery
of possession of any property situated in Greater
Bombay; or E
(iv) relating to the recovery of the licence fee or
charges or rent thereof.
30. We are primarily concerned with the condition nos. F
(i) and (iii) and if we hold that both the above conditions are
satisfied, then Small Causes Courts will have the jurisdiction
to entertain the suit in question, provided the expression
"licensee" means and include "gratuitous licensee" also. In that
context, we have also to examine whether the expression
G
"licensee" in Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act would mean only
"licensee" within the meaning of sub-section (4A) of Section
5 of the Rent Act 1947.
31. Let us, in this context, make a brief reference to Sub-
section (2) of Section 41 of the PSCC Act, which states, H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply to suit or
proceeding for the recovery of possession of any immovable
property or of licence fee or charges or rent thereof, to which
provisions of Rent Act 1947 apply. A plain reading of this sub-
section shows that the provisions of sub-section shall not apply
B to suit or proceeding for recovery of possession of any
immovable property or licence fee to which Rent Act 1947
apply, meaning thereby, if the provisions of Sub-section (4A)
and Sub-section (11) of Section 5 read with Section 15A of the
Rent Act 1947 are attracted, the provisions of Sub-section (1)
c of Section 41 of the PSCC Act cannot be resorted to to institute
a suit between the licensor and licensee, relating to recovery
of licence fee, therefore, if a licensee is covered by Section
15A read with Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act 1947, the suit under
Section 41(1) would not be maintainable. Section 41(1),
therefore, takes in its compass "licensees" who do not fall within
0
the ambit of Section 5(4A) read with Section 5(11) and Section
15A of the Rent Act 1947.
32. Gratuitous licensee, it may be noted, does not fall
within Section 5(4A) read with Sections 5(11) and 15A of the
E . Rent Act 1947. The provisions of Section 41(1) also do not
specifically exclude a gratuitous licensee or makes any
distinction between the licensee with material consideration or
without material consideration. Further, it may also be noted
that Section 28 of the Rent Act 1947 do not confer jurisdiction
F on the Small Causes Court to entertain a suit against a
gratuitous licensee. Section 28 read with Section 5(4A) would
show that a party who claims to be a gratuitous licensee is not
entitled to any protection under the Rent Act 1947.
G PARI MATERIA:
33. Viscount Simonds in A.G. v. HRH Prince Ernest
Augustus of Hanover (1957) 1 All ER 49, conceived the above
mentioned principle to be a right and duty to construe every
word of a statute in its context and used the word "context" in
H its widest sense, including "other statutes in pari materia".
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 81
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Earlier, same was the view taken in R. v. Loxdale (1758) 97 A
ER 394 stating that when there are different statutes in pari
materia, though made at different times, or even expired and
not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed
together as one system and as explanatory to each other. This
Court in State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd. B
Okara Al R 1964 SC 669 held that when two pieces of
legislation are of different scopes, it cannot be said that they
are in pari materia. In Shah & Co., Bombay v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1877, this Court held that the Rent
Act 1947 and the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 were c
not held to be the acts in pari materia, as they do not relate to
the same person or thing or to same class of persons of things.
34. "Pari materia" words, it is seen, are used in Section
28 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 and Section 41(1) of PSCC
Act referring to the nature of suits in both the provisions would D
indicate that those provisions confer exclusive jurisdiction on
Small Causes Court meaning thereby it alone can entertain
suits or proceedings relating to recovery or possession of the
premises. Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act deals with the
suits only between landlord and tenant and between licensor E
and licensee relating only to recovery of licence fee or charge
while Section 41 of the PSCC Act deals with such suits between
licensor and licensee also. Where the premises are not
governed by the Rent Act, the provisions of Section 41 of the
PSCC Act would apply, at the same time where the premises F
are governed by the provisions of Rent Act, the provisions of
Section 28 would be attracted.
35. When we look at both the provisions, it is clear that
the nature of such suits as envisaged by both the sections is G
the same. In this connection, a reference may be made to the
judgment of this Court in Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain's case
(supra) wherein this court has dealt with a question whether the
suit filed by the plaintiff claiming the right to possess the suit
. .
premises as a licensee, against defendant alleged licensor who
H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A is said to be threatening to disturb the possession of the plaintiff
- licensee without following due process of law is cognizable
by the Court of Small Causes Bombay as per Section 41(1) of
the PSCC Act or whether it is cognizable by City Civil Court,
Bombay? This Court while dealing with that question held that
B the Court of Small Cause have jurisdiction and that in Section
41 (1) of the PSCC Act and Section 28 of the Bombay Rent
Act, 1947, pari materia words are used, about the nature of the
suits in both these provisions, for conferring exclusive
jurisdiction on Small Causes Courts. Paragraphs 17 and 18 of
c that judgment would make it clear that in that case this Court
only observed that some expressions in Section 28 of the Rent
Act only are pari materia with the expressions employed in
Section 41(1) of the Small Cause Court and not stated that the
PSCC Act and the Rent Act are pari materia statutes.
D 36. We may in this respect refer to Section 51 of the Rent
Act which provides for the removal of doubt as regards
proceedings under Chapter VII of the PSCC Act which states
that for removal of doubt, it is declared that unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context references to suits
E or proceedings in this Act shall include references to
proceedings under Chapter VII of the PSCC Act and
references to decrees in this Act shall include references to final
orders in such proceedings. The Full Bench of the Bombay
High Court, in our view, is right in holding that Section 51 of
F the Rent Act will have to be read with Section 50. The Court
rightly noticed that on the date when the Rent Act came into
force, there were two types of proceedings for recovery of
possession pending in two different courts in the City of
Bombay, that is proceedings under Chapter VII were pending
G in the Small Causes Court and also suits were pending on the
original side of the High Court. Section 50 provides that suits
pending in any court which also includes the High Court shall
be transferred to and continued before the courts which would
· have jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under the Rent
H Act and shall be continued in such Courts as the case may be
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 83
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
and all provisions of the Rent Act and the Rules made A
thereunder shall apply to all such suits and proceedings. In other
words, the suits pending in the High Court would be transferred
to the Small Causes Court and would be heard and tried there
and all the provisions of the Rent Act and the Rules made
thereunder would apply to such suits. Section 50 also provided B
that all proceedings pending in the Court of Small Cause under .
Chapter VII shall be continued in that court and all provisions
of the Rent Act and the Rules made thereunder shall apply to
such proceedings. Pending proceedings under Chapter VII
were to be continued as proceedings under the Rent Act and c
all provisions and the Rules under the Rent Act were to apply
to such proceedings.
37. Section 51 in that context states that references to
suits or proceedings under the Rent Act shall include references
to the proceedings under Chapter VII of the PSCC Act and D
references to decrees in the Rent Act shall include references
to final order in such proceedings. When· we make a
comparative analysis of the abovementioned provisions, it is
not possible to hold that the Rent Act and Chapter VII of the
PSCC Act are pari materia statutes. E
Noscitur a sociis Principle
38. The Latin maxim "noscitur a sociis" states this
contextual principle, whereby a word or phrase is not to be
construed as if it stood alone but in the light of its surroundings F
- Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, Fifth Edition. A-G Prince
Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, Viscount Simonds
has opined that "a word or phrase in an enactment must always
be ~onstrued in the light of the surrounding text. " ....words and
particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation; their G
colour and their content are derived from their context." Noscitur
a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in
cases where it is clear that the wider words are intentionally
used by the legislature in order to make the scope of the
H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A defined word correspondingly wider. The above principle has
been applied in several judgments of this Court like The State
of Bombay and Others v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and
Others [AIR 1960 SC 610, {1960) 2 SCR 866] Bank of India
v. Vijay Transport and Others, [AIR 1988 SC 151, (1988) 1
B SCR 961], Mis Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector
of Central Excise, ( 1990) 3 SCC 44 7, Samatha v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 8 SCC 191, Mis Brindavan Bangle
Stores & Ors. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial
Taxes & Another, (2000) 1 SCC 674 etc.
c 39. We find the expression "licensee" in Section 41 of the
PSCC Act has been used to fully achieve the object and
purpose especially of 1976 Amendment Act and legislature has
used clear and plain language and the principle noscitur a
sociis is inapplicable when intention is clear and unequivocal.
D It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating
wider words with words of a narrow significance is doubtful or
otherwise not clear, the rule of Noscitur a Sociis can be applied.
When the intention of the legislature in. using the expression
'licensee' in Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act is clear and
E unambiguous, the principle of Noscitur a Sociis is not to be
applied.
Contemporenea Expositio
40. Contemporenea Expositan is the best and most
F powerful law and it is a recognized rule of interpretation.
Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court in
National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Municipal
Corporation of Greater, Bombay (1969) 1 SCC 541 and The
Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram
G Panchayat (1976) 4 SCC 177.
41. We notice in the instant case that the concept of licence
and lease were dealt with by contemporary statutes - Indian
Easement Act, Transfer of Property Act and Section 41 of the
H PSCC Act and, as already indicated, all those statutes were
1
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 85
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
enacted in the year 1882. Therefore, Section 41(1) of the A
PSCC Act could not have been contemplated any other
meaning of the term "occupation with permission" but only the
permission as contemplated by Section 52 of the Indian
Easements Act. The PSCC Act is a procedural law and as
already indicated, the expression "licensor" and "licensee" or B
"landlord" and "tenant" used in Section 41 of the PSCC Act
(as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976) relate to
immovable property and Section 52 of the Indian Easements
Act which defines a licence has an inseparable connection to
immovable property and property law. Legislature was well C
aware of those contemporaneous statutes, that was the reason,
why the expression licence as such has not been defined in the
PSCC Act with the idea that the expression used in a
contemporaneous statutes would be employed so as to
interpret Section 41 of the PSCC Act. Above-mentioned
principle, in our view, would apply to the instant case.
D
Licensor - Licensee
42. The PSCC Act, as already indicated, does not define
the expression "licensor" and "licensee" Both these E
expressions find a place in Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act.
Section 41 (1) confers jurisdiction on Court of Small Causes to
entertain and try all the suits and proceedings between a
"licensor" and a "licensee" relating to recovery of possession
of any immovable property or relating to recovery of licence fee.
F
Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act defines the term "licensee" so
also Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882. Sub-section
(4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act provides that "licensee"
means a person who is in occupation of the premises or such
part as the case may be, under a subsisting agreement for
licence given for a "licence fee or charge". The definition of G
"licensee" under sub-section (4A) of Section 5 is both
exhaustive as well as inclusive. But it is relevant to note that
the licensee under sub-section (4A) must be a licensee whose
licence is supported by material consideration meaning thereby
a gratuitous licensee is not covered under the definition of H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 9 S.C.R.
A licensee under sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act.
43. Let us now examine the definition of "licence" under
Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act which provides that
where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of
other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the
B immovable property of the grantor, something which would; in
the absence of such right be unlawful and such right does not
amount to easement or an interest in the property, the right is
called a licence. This Court in State of Punjab v. Brig. Sukhjit
Singh (1993) 3 SCC 459 has observed that "payment of
c licence fee is not an essential attribute for subsistence of
licence. Section 52, therefore, does not require any
consideration, material or non material to be an element, under
the definition of licence nor does it require the right under the
licence must arise by way of contract or as a result of a mutual
0 promise.
44. We have already referred to Section 52 of the Indian
Easement Act and explained as to how the legislature intended
that expression to be understood. The expressions "licensor''
and "licensee" are not only used in various statutes but are also
E understood and applied in various fact situations. The meaning
of that expression "licence" has come up for consideration in
several judgments. Reference may be made to the judgment
of this Court in C.M. Beena and Anr. v. P.N. Ramachandra
Rao (2004) 3 SCC 595, Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas
F Raghunath Gadit {1971) 1 SCC 276, Union of India (UOI) v.
Prem Kumar Jain and Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 743, Chandy
Varghese and Ors. v. K. Abdul Khader and Ors. (2003 ) 11
sec 328.
45. The expression "licensee" has also been explained by
G this Court in Surendra Kumar Jain v. Royce Pereira (1997) 8
SCC 759. In P.R. Aiyar's the Law Lexicon, Second Edition
1997, License has been explained as "A license in respect to
- real estate is pefined to be an authority to do a particular act
or series of acts on another's land without possessing any
H estate therein". The word "licensee" has been explained in
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. MANHABALA 87
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition to mean a person who has _ A
a privilege to enter upon land arising from the permission or
consent, express, or implied, of the possessor of land but who
goes on the land for his own purpose rather than for any purpose
or interest of the possessor. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of
Words and Phrases, Sixth Edition, Vol. 2 provides the meaning B
of word "licensee" to mean a licensee is a person who has
permission to do an act which without such permission would
be unlawful.
46. We have referred to the meaning of the expressions
"licence" and "licensee" in various situations rather than one C
that appears in Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act only to
indicate that the word licence is not popularly understood to
mean that it should be on payment of licence fee, it can also
cover a gratuitous licensee as well. In other words, a licensor
can permit a person to enter into another's property without any D
consideration, it can be gratuitous as well.
47. We have already indicated the expression "licence" as
reflected in the definition of licensee unger sub-section (4A) of
Section 5 of the Rent Act and Section 52 of the Indian E
Easement Act are not pari materia. Under sub-section (4A) of
Section 5, there cannot be a licence unsupported by the material
consideration whereas under Section 52 of the Indian
Easement Act payment of licence fee is not an essential
requirement for subsistence of licence. We may indicate that F
the legislature in its wisdom has not defined the word "licensee"
in the PSCC Act. The purpose is evidently to make it more wide
so as to cover gratuitous licensee as well with an object to
avoid multiplicity of proceedings in different courts causing
unnecessary delay, waste of money and time etc. The object G
is to see that all suits and proceedings between a landlord and
a tenant or a licensor and a licensee for recovery of possession
of premises or for recovery of rent or licence fee irrespective
of the value of the subject matter should go to and be disposed
qf by Small Cause Court. The object behind bringing the H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A licensor and the licencee within the purview of Section 41 (1)
by the 1976 Amendment was to curb any mischief of
unscrupulous elements using dilatory tactics in prolonging the
cases for recovery of possession instituted by the landlord/
licensor and to defeat their right of approaching the Court for
B quick relief and to avoid multiplicity of litigation with an issue
of jurisdiction thereby lingering the disputes for years and years.
48. We may in this connection also refer to the judgment
of this Court in Km. Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. and Ors.
(1981) 2 sec 585, wherein this Court was concerned with the
C ambit of expression "transfer" and "consideration" occurring in
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. Both the
expressions were not defined in the Act. In such circumstances,
this Court observed that the word "transfer" has been used by
the legislature in general sense of the term as defined in the
D Transfer of Property Act. This Court also observed that the word
"transfer" being a term of well known legal significance having
well ascertained incidents, the legislature did not think it
necessary to define the term "transfer" separately. The ratio laid
down by the apex court in the above-mentioned judgment in our
E view is also applicable when we interpret the provisions of the
PSCC Act because the object of the Act is to suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy.
49. The interpretation of the expressions licensor and
F licensee which we find in Section 41 (1 ), in our view, is in tune
with the objects and reasons reflected in the amendment of the
PSCC Act by the Maharashtra Act (XIX) of 1976 which we have
already extracted in the earlier part of the judgment. The objects
and reasons as such may not be admissible as an aid of
,G construction to the statute but it can be referred to for the limited
purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time of
introduction of the bill and the extent and urgency of the evil
which was sought to be remedied. The legal position has been
well settled by the judgment of this Court in M.K. Ranganathan
and Anr. v. Government of Madras and Ors. Al R 1955 SC 604.
H
PRABHUDAS DAMODAR KOTECHA v. M!\NHABALA 89
JERAM DAMODAR [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
It is trite law that the statement of objects and reasons is a key A
to unlock the mind of legislature in relation to substantive
provisions of statutes and it is also well settled that a statute is
best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. This Court
in Bhaiji v. Sub Divisional Officer, Thandla and Ors. (2003) 1
sec 692 stated that the weight of the judicial authority leans B
in favour of the view that the statement of objects and reasons
cannot be utilized for the purpose of restricting and controlling
statute and excluding from its operation such transactions which
it plainly covers. Applying th.e above-mentioned principle, we
cannot restrict the meaning and expression licensee occurring c
in Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act to mean the licensee with
monetary consideration as defined under Section 5(4A) of the
Rent Act.
ONE UMBERALLA POLICY
D
50. We are of the considered view that the High Court has
correctly noticed that the clubbing of the expression "licensor
and licensee" with "landlord and tenant" in Section 41 (1) of the
PSCC Act and clubbing of causes relating to recovery of
licence fee is only with a view to bring all suits between the E
"landlord and tenant" and the "licensor and licensee" under one
umberalla to avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardship.
The act of the legislature was to bring all suits between "landlord
and tenant" and "licensor and licensee" whether under the Rent
Act or under the PSCC Act under one roof. We find it difficult F
to accept the proposition that the legislature after having
conferred exclusive jurisdiction in one Court in all the suits
between licensee and licensor should have carved out any
exception to keep gratuitous licensee alone outside its
jurisdiction. The various amendments made to Rent Act as well
G
the Objects and Reasons of the Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976
would clearly indicate that the intention of the legislature was
to avoid unnecessary delay, expense and hardship to the suitor
or else they have to move from the one court to the other not
o_nly on the question of jurisdiction but also getting reliefs.
H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 9 S.C.R.
A 51. We are of the view that in such a situation the court
also should give a liberal construction and attempt should be
to achieve the purpose and object of the legislature and not to
frustrate it. In such circumstances, we are of the considered
opinion that the expression licensee employed in Section 41
B is used in general sense of term as defined in Section 52 of
the Indian Easement Act.
52. We have elaborately discussed the various legal
principles and indicated that the expression 'licensee' in Section
41 (1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well.
C The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately
discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. Looking from all
angles in our view the expression 'licensee' used in the PSCC
Act does not derive its meaning from the expression 'licensee'
as used in Sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and
D that the expression "licensee" used in Section 41 (1) is a term
of wider import intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well.
53. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the
reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court. In such
. E circumstances, the appeals lack merits and are, therefore,
dismissed. There is no order as to costs.
R.P. Appeals dismissed.
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