PRADEEP KUMARversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                   [2014] 9 S.C.R. 191


                   PRADEEP KUMAR                               A
                            v.
                   STATE OF HARYANA
            (Criminal Appeal No. 292 of 2011)
                      JULY 02, 2014
                                                               8
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

     PENAL CODE, 1860: ss.304-8, 498A - Dowry death -
Presumption u/s.3048 - Essential ingredients, discussed - C
In the instant case, victim-deceased died of burn injuries
within 9 months of marriage - Dying declaration - In the first
part of her dying declaration, she stated that it was the case
of accident, however, in second part, she alleged that her
husband was harassing her for bringing dowry and doused her D
in kerosene and set her on fire - Conviction of appellant-
husband by courts below - Challenged - Held: First part of
the dying declaration was tutored by the husband as was
apparent from the second part of dying declaration which
inspired confidence - Evidence of the father of the deceased E
and dying declaration proved that there was demand of dowry
and harassment soon before her death - There was no reason
for deceased to falsely implicate her husband - Prosecution
proved dowry death - No interference called for with the order
of conviction - Crime against women.                           F
    The prosecution case was that the victim-deceased
was subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection
with demand of dowry. Nine months after the marriage,
she received burn injuries. The next day, she made dying
declaration before the Magistrate. In first part of the said   G
dying declaration, she asserted that it was a case of
accident whereas in the second part, she alleged that her
husband had been forcing her to fetch Rs. 1 lakh from
her parents and threatening to kill her if she did not bring
                           191                                 H
    192      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A the money. She declared that her husband doused her
  in kerosene from behind and set her on fire. She died 12
  days after the incident.

      The trial court convicted the appellant-husband
  under Sections 304-8 and 498-A, IPC. The High Court
8
  upheld the conviction. The instant appeal was filed
  challenging the order of conviction.

          qismissing the appeal, the Court

c      HELD: 1. PW-7 who conducted the postmortem
  examination on the dead body of the victim-deceased
  stated that there was superficial to deep burns all over
  the body except face, scalp, both legs and feet and a part
  of left upper arm. Pockets of pus were present at some
0 places. Liver, spleen, kidneys and both lungs were
  congested. In his opinion the cause of death in this case
  was burns which were ante mortem in ordinary cause of
  events. In his cross-examination, PW-7 stated that since
  the body of the deceased had been burnt it was unlikely
E that marks of the other injuries could be seen. If the
  deceased was sitting in fr~nt of the stove and the stove
  got burst, she could have received injuries on her face
  and scalp which were not there in this case. He agreed
  with the suggestion that if kerosene was poured from
  behind the deceased and she was put on fire there would
F be injuries on the back side of the deceased. It is possible
  that the deceased could receive burn injuries if on
  account of pinning of the stove the oil and the flame left
  from the stove but in that case also the face and scalp
  should have been burnt which was not there in this case.
G [Para 12] (201-F-G; 202-A-C]
      2. A perusal of the dying declaration would show that
  the second part of dying declaration inspired confidence
  so as to consider it to be a dying declaration of the
H deceased. The first part of dying declaration was tutored
    PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                   193

by the accused-husband as apparent from the said part          A
of the dying declaration. [Para 13] [202-C-D]
     3. PW-6, the mother of the deceased stated that the
deceased had told her that there was a quarrel in the
family because the accused had been making a demand
                                                               B
of Rs. One lakh for .running a piggery farm. The deceased
had also sent a letter to her father making a demand of
Rs.5,000/-. PW-8, the father of the deceased also deposed
with regard to the .demand of the appellant. Although,
appellant donated blood to save the life of his wife but it
was of no use as it was too late. The deceased in the          C
dying declaration stated that her husband had stated that
he would hang her to death if his demand for Rs.1 lakh
was not met by her parents and on 1st March, 1996, her
husband tried to hang her. The appellant had initially tried
to set her on fire during the night and when in the            D
morning at 5.30 a.m. she went to bathroom he sprinkled
the oil on the clothes from her back side and set her on
fire. She categorically stated that earlier part of the
statement was made at the instigation of her husband.
The deceased had no reason to falsely implicate her            E
husband particularly when she had suffered from burn
injury. The evidence of PW-8 and dying declaration
proved that there was a demand of dowry and
harassment soon before the death. [Paras 14, 15 and 16]
[202-D-H; 203-A]                                               F
     4. For the purpose of Section 304-B IPC, a
presumption can be raised only on the proof of the
following essentials: Death of a woman took place within
seven years of her marriage. Such death took place not
under normal circumstances. The woman was subjected            G
to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives.
Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry and such cruelty or
harassment was soon before her death. [Para 17] [203-
B-D]                                                           H
    194      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A      Hira Lal & Ors. Vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi (2003) 8
    sec 80: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734 - relied on.
         5. In the instant case, the marriage took place on 20th
    June, 1995. The deceased got burnt on 1st March, 1996
    and died on 12th March, 1996 within nine months of her
8
    marriage. The death of the deceased was caused by
    burns i.e. otherwise than under normal circumstances. It
    is already seen that soon before her death she was
    subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with
    demand of dowry. All the five ingredients were proved by
C   the prosecution. Under Section 113-8 of the Evidence Act
    when a question arises whether a person committed
    dowry death and it is proved that the death of woman
    took place within seven years of marriage; such death
    took place not under normal circumstances and soon
D   before the death deceased was subjected to cruelty or
    harassment by such person for or in connection with any
    demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
    person had caused the dowry death. The prosecution
    having successfully proved the dowry death, the trial
E   court and the High Court correctly held the accused guilty
    of the offence under Section 3048. As regards conviction
    under Section 498A, the evidence of PW-8 and dying
    declaration clearly proved that the accused had
    subjected the deceased to harassment as defined under
F   Clause (b) of explanation to Section 498-A. [Paras 19, 21,
    22] [206-C-G; 207-E]
                        Case Law Reference:
      2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734        relied on      Para._ 18
G
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 292 of 2011.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 03.02.2010 of the
  High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal
H No. 909-SB of 1997.
     PRADEEP KUMAR v. ·STATE OF HARYANA                    195


    K. K. Mohan for the Appellant.                                 A

    Anil Kaushik, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. This appeal                B
is directed against the judgment ·dat~d 3rd February, 2010,
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
in CRA No.909-SB of 1997. By the impugned common
judgment the High Court dismissed the revision application
preferred by the appellant and affirmed the conviction and         c
sentence for the offence punishable under Section 498-A and
304-B IPC passed by tne Sessions Judge, Kamal vide
judgment dated 1st August, 1997.

     2. The case of the prosecution is that Manju alias Uma
Devi had been married to the accused Pradeep Kumar on 20th         D
June, 1995. On 1st March, 1996 she received burn injuries and
was got admitted ln the Medical College Hospital, Rohtak. On
2nd .~arch, 1996, she made her dying declaration before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak. In the first part of the said
dying declaration she asserted that it was a case of accident,     E
whereas in the latter part she alleged that her husband had
been pressing to fetch a sum of Rs. One lakh from her parents
and had been threatening to kill her if she did not bring the
money. She also alleged that around 5.30 r-m. on 1st March,
1996 her husband doused her in kerosene from behind and set        F
her on fire and later on he tried to save her when she raised
alarm and on doing so his hands got burnt.

     On the basis of this statement, First Information Report
was recorded against the accused. The matter was                   G
investigated. On 12th March, 1996 Manju alias Uma died.
Thereafter, the case was converted under Section 304-B IPC
and after completion of investigation challan was presented in
the Court and on commitment, the accused was charged in the
manner noticed above.
                                                                   H
    196       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A        3. In support of their case, prosecution examined 9
    witnesses. Usha (PW-6), mother of the deceased and Sapattar
    Singh (PW-8), father of the deceased are the material
    witnesses.

         4. On appreciation of evidence and hearing the parties
8
    learned Sessions Judge, Kamal, observed as follows:

          "20. From the totality of the discussion noticed herein
          above it would appear that the accused had been
          responsible for the murder of his wife and also of causing
c                                                         '
          torture and harassment to her. However, since       he has
          been charged only under Section 498-A and 304-B
          Indian Penal Code, I would hold him guilty for the said
          offence and convict him there under which are lesser
          offences than Section 302 Indian Penal Code. I call upon
D         the accused to address argument and to show the
          extenuating circumstances and to address arguments on
          the quantum of sentence."

        5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
E medical evidence is contrary to the prosecution story and does
  not support the case of the prosecution. In this regard it was
  contended that if kerosene oil was poured on the deceased
  from behind then the burns would have been on the back of the
  deceased. However, the medical report/postmortem report
  does not find any burn injuries on the back of the deceased. It
F was further contended that the Trial'Court and the High Court
  failed to appreciate that the occurrence was an accident as
  injuries were on the face, chest, and legs of the deceased which
  show and prove that the kerosene oil fell on her after bursting
  of kerosene stove.
G
        6. Learned counsel further submitted that so called dying
  declaration cannot be relied upon, as first part of it is
  contradictory to the second part.

          7. In the present case, Usha Devi (PW-6), mother Of the
H
     PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                      197
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
deceased and Subedar Sapattar Singh (PW-8), father of the           A
deceased are the material witnesses.

     8. Usha Devi (PW-6), in her deposition stated that Manju,
her daughter was married to the accused Pradeep Kumar on
20th June, 1995. In the evening of 1st March, 1996 at about 7       a,
p.m. Jal Singh came to her and told her that the health of Manju
was not proper and that she was admitted in Medical College
Hospital, Rohtak. She reached Medical College Hospital,
Rohtak around 1·2/12.30 a.m. In the Hospital the accused
Pradeep Kumar and Santosh met her and told that Manju had           C
received burns from a stove. When she went to see her
daughter, Manju told her that she had got up around 5.30 a.m.
when the accused Pradeep Kumar doused her in kerosene and
set her on fire. She then stayed with her daughter, who died
on 12th March, 1996. She stated that she did not know whether
her· daughter ever made a statement to the Magistrate. She          D
further stated that her daughter had told her that there used to
be quarrel in the family as the accused used to demand for
Rs.1 lakh for running a piggery farm.

      In her examination-in-chief, Usha Devi (PW-6),mother of       E
the deceased deposed that when she reached the Hospital to
see her daughter, the accused and other persons were present
there so her daughter could not disclose anything to her. The
Police did not record her statement so long she was admitted
in the Me.dical College Hospital, Rohtak. She further stated that   F
on 24th March, 1996 she had stated before the Police that her
daughter .Manju had told her that she received burn injuries from
stove .. Earlier she had a statement before Police on 13th March,
 1996 wherein she stated that she had faith in the statement of
Manju made before the Magistrate. She denied the suggestion         G
that she had deposed before the Police that her daughter told
her that she received burn injuries on account of bursting of
 stove. However, when she was confronted with portion 'A' to
 A' in Ex.DA it was found to have been so recorded.

     9. Subedar Sapattar Singh (PW-8), stated that on 3rd           H    ..
     198      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


 A March, 1996, he received a telephonic call from his wife from
   Rohtak that his daughter had been burnt and that he should
                  .
   come immediately. After obtaining . leave from his Company
   Commander, he·came to Rohtak by the evening of 4th March,
   1996. He talked to his daughter (deceased). She told him that
 B she had already_ made a statement to the Magistrate which
   should be accepted by them. When he talked to his daughter
   in the absence of others she told him that she and her husband
   wanted to open a piggery farm, and that Santosh Devi came
   to their house and told Pardeep Kumar-accused to obtain a
 c sum of rupees one lakh from his father-in-law i.e himself and
   that he should not apply for a loan. Pardeep at the instance of
   Santosh pressurized his wife(deceased) and also abused her
   physically in order to coerce her to meet the demand. PW.8
   further stated that on 20th January, 1996, he received a letter
 D from his daughter stating that the accused wanted a colour
   television. In the month of January his daughter and Pradeep
   came to his house and his daughter told him that she needed
   her Matriculation Certificate as she had to apply for a loan for
   piggery farm. She told that mother of Pradeep did not provide
 E food to her. On 12th, his daughter died and on 13th the dead
   body was take11 to village Ardana because the people from
   Ardana were in large number and in Rohtak he himself and his
   wife were only present.

         During the cross-examination, Sapattar Singh (PW-8),
. f stated that on 4th March, 1996 his daughter did not tell anything
    ~yond the fact that she had already made a statement before
    the Magistrate which should be accepted by them. He.remained
    with his daughter from 4th March, 1996 till her death. During
    this period no police officer met him. Police came to the
  G Medical College Hospital on 13th March, 1996 and he made
    a statement before the Police.

          10. Shri AK. Bimal, CJM, Rohtak in his deposition stated
     that on 2nd March, 1996, ASI, Jai Prakash moved an
     application Ex.PA to him to record the statement of Manju wife
 H
     PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                      199
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
of Pradeep Kumar, who was admitted in the Medical College           A
Hospital, Rohtak. He proceeded to the Hospital and reached
there at about 2 p.m. He obtained the opinion of the Doctor
regarding the fitness of the patient. The Doctor gave his opinion
Ex.PA/1 that the patient was fit to make a statement.
Thereupon, he recorded the statement of Manju alias Uma Devi        B
- EX.PB. It was read out to her and she gave thumb mark on
it in token of its correctness. The Doctor attending u·pon the
patient gave his endorsement Ex.PB/1 fhat the patient
remained fit to make statement throughout the period of making
the statement. After recording the statement he allowed a copy      c
of it to be taken by the Police and made his endorsement
Ex.PB/2 in this connection. The patient was identified by the
Doctor attended upon the patient. The patient had made two
statements at the same time. Both these statements were made
by her in sequence and were recorded at the same time one
                                                                    0
after the other.

      In his cross-examination, CJM stated that after recording
 of the first part of the statement when he asked the patient to
 put her thumb impression the patient told him that she wanted
 to make a truthful statement provided he did not say to anybody    E
,else. He asked the patient to put her signatures. But she was
 not in a position to put her signatures, therefore, her thumb
 impressions were taken.

     11. Ex.PA is the dying declaration which reads as follows:     F

     "Copy of writing in as under:-

      Q.    Are you married?

      Ans. I am married and having pregnancy of 7 month.            G
           After getting myself examined in ultra-sound, I have
           come to know that the foetus has been smashed.

      Q.    How many years of your marriage have passed?

      Ans. My marriage was performed on 20.6.95.                    H
    200         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A          Q.    How you caught fire?

           Ans. Yesterday.at 5.30/6.00 a.m. I started preparing tea
                outside the varandah. My husband was sleeping in
                the last room. When the pump of stove was pressed
                to air and match stock was lit on, the stove at once
B
                got burst and the terrycot suit worn by me caught
                fire and when I raised alarm

           RO& AC

c                                                          Sd/- C.J.M.

                                                              2.3.1996

          Again said my statement be recorded again, because this
          statement was tutored to me by my husband. Now I want
D         to make the statement again. You may not show the
          statement to anybody.

           Q.    What happened with you?

           Ans. A dispute was going on with my husband for the last
E                 10/15 days and he used to beat me and used to
                  remain at the house and was doing nothing. One
                 day my husband tried to hang me to death and
                  demanded Rs.One Lakh from my parents otherwise
                  he would hang me to death. He first tried to burn
F                 me in the night and when in the morning at 5.30
                  a.m. I went to bathroom he sprinkled the oil on the
                  clothes from myback side and lit on the match stick
                  and rushed towards inside. I raised noise upon
                  which other persons saved me. Thereafter, my
G                 husband came there. He torn my clothes at the
                  spot. I have been brought to Rohtak because I had
                  been told that I shall narrate aJI this to the police.
                  My mother-in-law prepares the meals herself. She
                . prepares meals for my sister-in-law but she does
H                 not provide meals to me.
     PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                     201
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
     Q.    Why did you make wrong statement earlier?               A

     Ans. I was made to understand to make such statement.

     Q.    Are you literate?

     Ans. Yes. I am matriculate.                                   B

     RO & AC.

     RT.I. of Manju

     Certified that patient remained fit throughout her            C
           statement.

     Sd/-A.K. Vimal,

     S:J.M. Rohtak,
                                                                   D
    . 2:3.96 at 2.30 P.M."
     On going through the dying declaration, we find that the
second part of dying declaration inspires confidence so as to
consider it to be a dying declaration of the deceased. The first
                                                                   E
part of the dying declaration is tutored by the accused-husband
as apparent from the said part of the dying declaration.

    12. Dr. S.S. Dahiya (PW-7) conducted postmortem
examination on the dead body of Manju wife of Pradeep. Kumar.
He stated that there was superficial to deep burns all over the    F
body except face scalp, both legs and feet and a part of left
upper arm. Pockets of pus were preset at some places. Liver
spleen kidneys and both lungs were congested. In his opinion
the cause of death in this case was burns which were ante
mortem in ordinary cause of events. Probable time that elapsed     G
between injury and death was within few hours to few days and
between death and.postmortem was about 24 hours.

     In his cross-examination, Dr.S.S.Dahiya (PW-7) stated that
since the body of the deceased had been burnt it was unlikely      H
    202       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   that marks of the other injuries could be seen. If the deceased
    was sitting in front of the stove and the stove got burst she could
    have received injuries on her face and scalp which were not
    there in this case. He agreed with the suggestion that if
    kerosene was poured from behind the deceased and she was
s   put on fire there would be injuries on the back side of the
    deceased. It is possible that the deceased could receive burn
    injuries if on account of pinning of the stove the oil and the flame
    left from the stove but in that case also the face and scalp should
    have been burnt which was not there in this case.
c       . 13. On going through the dying declaration, we have held
    that the second part of dying declaration inspires confidence
    so as to consider it to be a dying declaration of the deceased.
    The first part of dying declaration is tutored by the accused-
    husband as apparent from the said part of the dying declaration.
D
         14. Usha Devi (PW-6), mother of the deceased-Manju
    stated that Manju had told her that there was a quarrel in the
    family because the accused had been making a demand ofRs.
    One lakh for running a piggery farm. Manju had also sent a letter ·
E   to her father making a demand of Rs.5,000/-. Letter is Ex.PJ.

        15. Sapattar Singh (PW-8), father of the deceased has also
  deposed with regard to the demand of the appellant. Although,
  appellant donated blood to save the life of his wife but it was
  of no use as it wa.s too late. The deceased in the dying
F declaration stated that her husband had stated that he would
  hang her to death if his demand for Rs.1 lakh is not met by her
  parents and on 1st March, 1996, her husband tried to hang her.
  The appellant had initially tried to set her on fire during th~ night
  and when in the morning at 5.30 a.m. she went to bathroom he
G sprinkled the oil on the clothes from her back side and set her
  on fire. She categorically stated that earlier part of the statement
  was made at the instigation of her husband. The deceased had
  no reason to falsely implicate her husband particularly when she
  had suffered from burn injury.
H
    PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                     203
     [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
     16. From the aforesaid, evidence of Sapattar Singh (PW-     A
8) and dying declaration, we find that there was a demand of
dowry and harassment soon before the death.

    17. For the purpose of Section 304-B IPC, a presumption
can be raised only on the proof of the following essentials: ·
                                                                 B
    "(a) Death of a woman took place within seven years of
    her marriage.

    (b) Such death took place not under normal circumstances.

    (c) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
                                                                 c
    her husband or his relatives.

    (d) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection
    with, any demand for dowry and
                                                                 D
    (e) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

     18. The expression "soon before her death" used in the
substantive Section 304-8 /PC and 113-8 of the Evidence Act
was considered by this Court in Hira Lal & Others Vs. State      E
(Govt. of NCT),-Delhi, (2003)8 SCC 80, which reads as
follows:

    "8. Section 304-B IPC which deals with dowry death, reads
    as follows:
                                                                 F
    "304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman
    is caused by a~y burns or bodily injury or occurs
    otherwise than.under normal circumstances within seven
    years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before
    her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by G
    her husband or any relative of her husband for, or ir>
    connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
    be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative.
    shall be deemed to have caused her death.

    Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, 'dowry'    H
    204       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the
          Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

        (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
        imprisonment for a term' which shall not be less than seven
      . years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
B
          The provision has application when death of a woman is
          caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
          than under normal circumstances within seven years of her
          marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
c         was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
          any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any
          demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section
          304-B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:

D         M The death of a woman should be caused by burns or
          bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal
          circumstance.                                ··

          (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years
          of her marriage.
E
          (iii) She must have b!Jen subjected to cruelty or
          harassment by her husband or any relative of her
          husband.

          (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in
F
          connection with demand of dowry.

          (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been
          meted out to the woman soon before her death.

G         Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the
          case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-
          B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by
          Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a
          view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths.
          Section 113-B reads as follows:
H
PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                       205
 [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
"113-B. Presumption as ·to dowry death.-When the                A
question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman had been subjected by such person
to cruelty or harassme·nt for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such             B
person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, 'dowry
death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-
B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
                                                                c
The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been
amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st
Report dated 10-8-1988 on "Dowry Deaths and Law
Reform". Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-
existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related        D
deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision
relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain
essentials. It is in this background that presumptive Section
113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the
definition of "dowry death" in Section 304-B IPC and the        E
wording in the presumptive Section 113-8 of the Evidence
Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in
both the provisions is that the woman concerned must
have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or
harassment "for or in connection with the demand of             F
dowry". Presumption under Section 113-B is a
presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned
therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a
presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The
presumption shall be ra·ised only on proof of the following     G
essentials:

(1) The question before the court must be whether the
accused has committed the dowry death of the woman.
(This means that the presumption can be raraed only if
                                                                H
    206       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A         the accused is being tried for the offence under Section
          304-8 /PC.)

          (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment
          by her husband or his relatives.
8         (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection
          with any demand for dowry.

          (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her
          death."
c      19. In the present case, it is not in dispute that marriage
  took place on 20th June, 1995. Manju, wife of the accused
  Pradeep Kumar got burnt on 1st March, 1996 and died on 12th
  March, 1996 within nine months of her marriage. Death of Manju
  was caused by burns i.e. otherwise than under normal
0
  circumstances. It has already been seen that soon before her
  death she was subjected to cruelty and harassment in
  connection with demand of dowry. All the five ingredients were
  proved by the prosecution. Under Section 113·8 of the
  Evidence Act when a question arises whether a person
E committed dowry death and it is proved that the death of woman
  took place within seven years of marriage; such death took
  place not under normal circumstances and soon before the
  death deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by such
  person for or in connection with any demand for dowry, the
F Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry
  death. The prosecution having successfully proved the dowry
  death, the Trial Court and the High Court correctly held the
  accused Pradeep Kumar guilty of the offence under Section
  3048.
G
       20. Section 498-A IPC reads as follows:

          "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
          subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the husband
          or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
H
      PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                      207
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
     woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for        A
     a term which may extend to three years and shall also be
     liable to fine.

     Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty"
     means-                                                          B
     (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
     to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
     injury or danger to life, limb or heaith (whether mental or
     physical) of the woman; or
                                                                     c
     (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
     with a view to coercing her .or any person related to her to
     meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
     security or is on account of failure by her or any person
     related to her to meet such demand."                            o
     21. In the present case, on the basis of the evidence of
Subedar Sapattar Singh (PW-8) and dying declaration, it can
be clearly concluded that the Trial Court and the High Court
rightly held that the accused Pradeep Kumar had subjected
Manju to harassment as defined under Clause (b) of                   E
explanation to Section 498-A.

     22. In view of the aforesaid observation and finding, we
find no ground to interfere with impugned judgment. In absence
of any merit, the appeal is dismissed. Bail bond stands              F
cancelled. Appellant is directed to be taken into custody
forthwith to serve the remainder period of sentence.
Devika Gujral                                    Appeal dismissed.