PRADEEP NIRANKARNATH SHARMAversusSTATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 350
- Decided
- 16 March 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- VIKRAM NATH
Holding
A preliminary inquiry is required only when the information does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence; where a cognizable offence is disclosed, the police must register an FIR under Section 154 CrPC and the court cannot issue a blanket direction mandating a preliminary inquiry.
Summary
The appellant, a retired IAS officer, challenged the registration of multiple FIRs relating to alleged land allotment irregularities during his tenure as Collector of Kachchh. He sought a writ of mandamus directing the police to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering any further FIRs, relying on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that when information discloses a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR under Section 154 CrPC is mandatory and no preliminary inquiry is required. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether Lalita Kumari creates an absolute rule for a preliminary inquiry and whether a blanket direction restraining FIR registration is permissible. The Court reaffirmed that the scope of a preliminary inquiry is limited to cases where the information does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, and that the allegations against the appellant constitute cognizable offences. Consequently, the Court held that the police must register FIRs without a prior inquiry and that the Court cannot issue a blanket order preventing such registrations. The appeal was dismissed, with the Court noting that the appellant may pursue other remedies such as quashing under Section 482 CrPC.
Issues considered
- Does Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted before registration of an FIR in every case?
- Whether the police are obligated to register an FIR without a preliminary inquiry when the information discloses a cognizable offence, specifically in cases of alleged abuse of official position and corruption.
- Whether a court can issue a blanket direction restraining registration of FIRs or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving the appellant.
- Whether the appellant’s fundamental rights under Articles 14, 20 and 21 are violated by successive FIR registrations without a preliminary inquiry.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 482
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 32 : 2025 INSC 350
Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma
v.
State of Gujarat & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1313 of 2025)
17 March 2025
[Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Does the decision in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh
& Ors. [2013] 14 SCR 713 create an absolute rule that a preliminary
inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration
of an FIR.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.154 – The appellant
placed reliance on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors., to argue that the registration of an FIR should
be preceded by a preliminary inquiry in cases involving
allegations of abuse of official position – Correctness:
Held: The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the Lalita
Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., is limited to
situations where the information received does not prima facie
disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification – However,
in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable
offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary
inquiry before registering an FIR – The decision in Lalita Kumari
does not create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must
be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR –
Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities
are obligated to register an FIR when the information received
prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. [Para 12]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.154 – The High Court
dismissed the appellant’s plea seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the respondent authorities to conduct a preliminary
inquiry before registering any First Information Report against
him for acts performed in his official capacity – Correctness:
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 33
Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat & Ors.
Held: In the present case, the allegations against the appellant
pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices
while holding public office – Such allegations fall squarely within
the category of cognizable offences, and there exists no legal
requirement for a preliminary inquiry before the registration of an
FIR in such cases – The appellant’s contention that successive
FIRs have been registered against him with an ulterior motive is
a matter that can be examined during the course of investigation
and trial – The appellant has adequate remedies under the law,
including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs u/s. 482
CrPC, the right to apply for bail, and the right to challenge any
illegal actions of the investigating authorities before the appropriate
forum. [Para 13]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – FIR – Statutory framework –
Judicial overreach – Whether this Court can issue a blanket
direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the
appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future
cases involving him:
Held: This Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the
registration of FIRs against the appellant or mandating a preliminary
inquiry in all future cases involving him – Such a direction would
not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the CrPC but
would also amount to judicial overreach – As rightly observed by the
High Court, courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce
additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by
law. [Para 14]
Case Law Cited
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [2013] 14
SCR 713 : (2014) 2 SCC 1 – relied on.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Section 154 of CrPC; Preliminary inquiry before registering FIR;
Cognizable offences; Statutory obligation; Judicial overreach; Abuse
of official position; Corruption; Financial irregularities; Successive
FIRs; Blanket protection against investigation.
34 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1313 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.01.2024 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCA No. 1321 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Kapil Sibal, Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Advs., Divyesh Pratap Singh,
Ms. Rupali Francesca Samuel, Rajesh Inamdar, Ajay Desai, Amit
Sangwan.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Mitesh Amin, A.A.G., Maninder
Singh, Sr. Adv., Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Kanu Agarwal, Ms. Neha Singh.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Vikram Nath, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and order
dated 31.01.2024 passed by the High Court of Gujarat in R/Special
Criminal Application (Direction) No. 1321 of 2024, whereby the High
Court dismissed the appellant’s plea seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the respondent authorities to conduct a preliminary inquiry
before registering any First Information Report1 against him for acts
performed in his official capacity.
3. The facts leading to the present appeal are that the appellant is
a retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer who served
in various administrative capacities, including as the Collector of
Kachchh District, Gujarat, between 2003 and 2006. Several FIRs
have been registered against the appellant in connection with alleged
irregularities in land allotment orders passed during his tenure as the
1 FIR
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 35
Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat & Ors.
Collector. The allegations against the appellant primarily pertain to
abuse of official position, corrupt practices, and financial irregularities
in the allotment of government land. It is pertinent to note that the
first FIR in this regard was registered in 2010, followed by successive
FIRs lodged against the appellant. The appellant has remained in
judicial custody over the course of this period in connection with
these cases, and trials are ongoing before competent Courts.
4. Aggrieved by the registration of multiple FIRs, the appellant
approached the High Court of Gujarat by way of a writ petition under
Articles 14, 20, 21, 22, and 226 of the Constitution of India. The
primary relief sought in the writ petition was for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction,
directing the respondent authorities to conduct a preliminary inquiry
before registering any further FIRs against him. The appellant
contended that his Fundamental Rights, particularly his right to liberty
under Article 21, were being violated due to successive and arbitrary
registration of criminal cases without conducting a preliminary inquiry.
He further contended that these FIRs were lodged with an ulterior
motive to harass him and prevent him from effectively defending
himself in the pending cases. In support of his submissions, the
appellant placed reliance on the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,2 to argue
that the registration of an FIR should be preceded by a preliminary
inquiry in cases involving allegations of abuse of official position.
5. The State of Gujarat, opposing the petition, argued before the High
Court that the relief sought by the appellant was legally untenable. It
was contended that under the settled position of law, once information
regarding the commission of a cognizable offence is received, the
police authorities are duty-bound to register an FIR under Section 154
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.3 The State further argued
that granting the appellant’s request for a mandatory preliminary
inquiry would amount to granting him a blanket protection against
investigation, which is impermissible under law. The State also
submitted that the appellant’s reliance on Lalita Kumari (supra) was
misplaced, as the judgment itself clarified that preliminary inquiry is
2 (2014) 2 SCC 1
3 CrPC
36 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
required only in limited categories of cases, such as family disputes,
commercial matters, and medical negligence cases, and not where
clear allegations of cognizable offences exist.
6. The High Court, after hearing both parties, dismissed the appellant’s
writ petition. The High Court held that once a cognizable offence is
disclosed in the complaint, the police authorities are under a statutory
obligation to register an FIR and conduct an investigation. Relying
on the principles laid down in Lalita Kumari (supra), the High Court
observed that a preliminary inquiry is warranted only in cases where
there is doubt as to whether a cognizable offence is disclosed. However,
in the present case, where clear allegations of corruption and abuse
of official position have been made against the appellant, the police
authorities have no discretion to withhold the registration of an FIR.
The High Court further observed that granting a blanket direction for
a preliminary inquiry in all cases involving the appellant would amount
to judicial legislation, which is impermissible. The High Court noted
that the CrPC does not provide for an opportunity of explanation to an
accused prior to the registration of an FIR. In view of these findings,
the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the appellant
had failed to make out a case for the interference prayed for.
7. The appellant, aggrieved by the dismissal of his writ petition, has
approached this Court by way of the present appeal. The primary
contention raised by the appellant before this Court is that multiple
FIRs have been registered against him in a sequential manner,
particularly after he secured bail in previous cases, and that the
registration of such successive FIRs without a preliminary inquiry
amounts to an abuse of process. It has been argued that such
arbitrary registration of FIRs violates the principles of fairness and
due process enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. The appellant has once again relied on Lalita Kumari (supra)
to assert that the respondent authorities ought to have conducted
a preliminary inquiry before proceeding with the registration of
successive FIRs against him.
8. We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the appellant
and Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing for the
respondents at length.
9. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that
the appellant, a retired IAS officer, has been subjected to sustained
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 37
Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat & Ors.
and unwarranted harassment through the registration of multiple FIRs,
all of which relate to actions performed in his official capacity while
serving as the Collector of District Kachchh. It was argued that after
the first FIR was lodged in connection with certain land allotment
decisions taken by the appellant in his official tenure, a pattern
emerged wherein successive FIRs were registered immediately upon
his release on bail, thereby ensuring his continued incarceration. Mr.
Sibal submitted that such successive registration of FIRs, without
conducting any preliminary inquiry to assess whether a cognizable
offence was made out, violates the principles of natural justice and
the fundamental right to liberty enshrined under Articles 14, 20,
and 21 of the Constitution. Placing reliance on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (Supra), it was urged
that preliminary inquiry is mandatory in cases where the allegations
do not prima facie disclose a cognizable offense. It was further
argued that the State’s conduct in registering successive FIRs,
despite the appellant’s superannuation in 2015, reflects an ulterior
motive to harass him, rather than a bona fide attempt to investigate
any alleged wrongdoing. It was thus prayed that the respondent
authorities be directed to mandatorily conduct a preliminary inquiry
before registering any further FIR against the appellant and that
he be granted an opportunity to provide his explanation before any
fresh investigation is initiated.
10. Per contra, the learned Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of
the respondent-State, vehemently opposed the appeal, arguing
that the petition itself is legally untenable and misconceived. It was
submitted that the appellant has sought a blanket order directing the
authorities to conduct a preliminary inquiry before the registration
of an FIR, which is impermissible under the settled principles of
law. It was further contended that under Section 154 of the CrPC,
the registration of an FIR is mandatory if the information received
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, and the police
have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry except in limited
circumstances as laid down in Lalita Kumari (supra). The State
also asserted that there is no statutory provision requiring the
accused to be given an opportunity to explain his position before the
registration of an FIR, as such a practice would amount to granting
an undue advantage to persons accused of serious offences and
would hinder the investigation process. Additionally, it was argued
38 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
that the appellant’s plea, if granted, would set a dangerous precedent
wherein public servants accused of corruption or misconduct could
claim immunity by demanding a pre-FIR hearing. The respondent
further contended that adequate legal safeguards are available
to the appellant under the existing legal framework, including the
right to seek anticipatory bail and the right to challenge malicious
prosecution before the appropriate forums. Accordingly, it was urged
that the appeal be dismissed.
11. We have carefully considered the submissions of the appellant and
perused the records. The legal position regarding the registration of
FIRs in cases of cognizable offences is well settled. This Court, in
Lalita Kumari (supra), has categorically held that the registration
of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC if the information
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. The relevant
paragraphs from the judgment of this Court in Lalita Kumari (supra)
are reproduced below:
“114. It is true that a delicate balance has to be maintained
between the interest of the society and protecting the
liberty of an individual. As already discussed above, there
are already sufficient safeguards provided in the Code
which duly protect the liberty of an individual in case of
registration of false FIR. At the same time, Section 154
was drafted keeping in mind the interest of the victim
and the society. Therefore, we are of the cogent view
that mandatory registration of FIRs under Section 154
of the Code will not be in contravention of Article 21
of the Constitution as purported by various counsel.
Exceptions
115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold that Section
154 of the Code postulates the mandatory registration
of FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offences, yet, there
may be instances where preliminary inquiry may be
required owing to the change in genesis and novelty
of crimes with the passage of time. One such instance
is in the case of allegations relating to medical negligence
on the part of doctors. It will be unfair and inequitable to
prosecute a medical professional only on the basis of the
allegations in the complaint.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 39
Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat & Ors.
…
Conclusion/Directions
120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to
ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases
where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint,
a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to
the first informant forthwith and not later than one week.
It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint
and not proceeding further.”
[Emphasis supplied]
12. The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment,
is limited to situations where the information received does not prima
facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However,
in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence,
the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before
registering an FIR. The decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) does not
create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted
in every case before the registration of an FIR. Rather, it reaffirms
the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to
register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses
a cognizable offence.
13. In the present case, the allegations against the appellant pertain to
the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public
office. Such allegations fall squarely within the category of cognizable
offences, and there exists no legal requirement for a preliminary
inquiry before the registration of an FIR in such cases. The appellant’s
contention that successive FIRs have been registered against him
40 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
with an ulterior motive is a matter that can be examined during the
course of investigation and trial. The appellant has adequate remedies
under the law, including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs
under Section 482 CrPC, the right to apply for bail, and the right to
challenge any illegal actions of the investigating authorities before
the appropriate forum.
14. Further, this Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the
registration of FIRs against the appellant or mandating a preliminary
inquiry in all future cases involving him. Such a direction would not
only be contrary to the statutory framework of the CrPC but would
also amount to judicial overreach. As rightly observed by the High
Court, courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional
procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in the present
appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. However, it is clarified
that this order shall not preclude the appellant from availing any other
remedies available to him under the law in respect of the pending
FIRs or future proceedings.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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