Holding

The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary proceedings were fair, the dismissal was proportionate, and judicial review does not extend to re‑appraising the evidence, so the appeal was dismissed.

Summary

Pravin Kumar, a CISF Sub‑Inspector, was accused of fabricating a General Diary entry, intimidating a subordinate to give false testimony, and collecting bribes from BPCL contractors. An enquiry under CISF Rules found him guilty and recommended dismissal; the disciplinary authority dismissed him, and the appellate authority upheld the order. The appellant challenged the dismissal before the High Court, arguing violations of natural justice, lack of evidence, and disproportionate punishment, and further appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the enquiry officer’s questioning of witnesses was permissible under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, that the disciplinary process complied with natural‑justice requirements, and that the dismissal was proportionate to the proven misconduct. It reiterated that judicial review under Articles 32, 226 and 136 is limited to procedural fairness and not a re‑appraisal of facts, and that disciplinary action can proceed independently of criminal proceedings. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

The scope of judicial review under Articles 32, 226 and 136 in service disciplinary matters
Whether the enquiry officer’s questioning of witnesses violated the principle of nemo judex in sua causa and other natural‑justice norms
Whether the dismissal order was disproportionate and violative of Article 14’s proportionality requirement
Whether the absence of a criminal chargesheet or acquittal in criminal proceedings precludes disciplinary dismissal
Whether the disciplinary authority exercised its discretion lawfully in imposing dismissal for the alleged corruption, fabrication and intimidation

Legislation cited

CISF Rules, 1969s. Rule 29(a), s. Rule 31(a) Schedule II, s. Rule 34
Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 14, s. Article 226, s. Article 311, s. Article 32
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. Section 165
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary proceedingsjudicial reviewnatural justiceproportionalitycorruptionCISFevidencecriminal vs civil standard of proofArticle 14

Judgment

1078 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 7 S.C.R. 1078 [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A PRAVIN KUMAR
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6270 of 2012)
B SEPTEMBER 10, 2020
[N. V. RAMANA, S. ABDUL NAZEER AND
SURYA KANT, JJ.]
Service Law – Appellant, a paramilitary officer posted at local
unit of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL) was entrusted
C
with conducting surprise searches of personnel and taking strict
action against corruption –Dismissed by disciplinary authority on
charges of corruption – FIR registered with CBI – Appellate authority
dismissed appellant’s appeal against dismissal order – Writ petition
filed by appellant – Dismissed – On appeal, held : Present case is
D neither one where there is no evidence, nor is it one where this
Court can arrive at a different conclusion than the disciplinary
authority – Appellant received a fair trial – Plea that he should be
exonerated in the disciplinary proceedings as no criminal
chargesheet was filed by CBI after enquiry, rejected – Employer
always retains the right to conduct an independent disciplinary
E
proceeding, irrespective of the outcome of criminal proceeding –
Disciplinary Authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment
for a proved delinquency subject to principles of proportionality
and fair play – Punishment of dismissal from service is far from
disproportionate to the charges of corruption, fabrication and
F intimidation unanimously proved against the appellant – Armed
Forces – Principles of Natural Justice –Doctrine of Proportionality
– Penal Code, 1860 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – CISF
Rules, 1969 – r.34; r.29(a) r/w r. 31(a)- Schedule II – Constitution
of India – Art.14.
G Constitution of India – Arts. 32, 136 and 226 – Scope of
judicial review – Service matters – Held: Constitutional Courts while
exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the
role of an appellate authority – Their jurisdiction is circumscribed
by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to
manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice –
H Service Law – Principles of Natural Justice.
1078
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1079

Service Law – Principles of Natural Justice – “nemo judex in A
sua causa” – When not violated – Discussed – Evidence Act, 1872 –
s.165.
Service Law – Disciplinary proceedings vis-à-vis criminal
proceedings – Distinction between standards of proof – Discussed.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court B

HELD: 1. The power of judicial review discharged by
Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in
appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power
exercised by a departmental appellate authority. Judicial review
is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits C
of the decision itself. Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in
treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to
correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result
in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross
unreasonableness of outcome. The Constitutional Courts while D
exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the
role of an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed
by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to
manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. The
conclusion obtained by High Court was based upon evidences
and was detailed and well-reasoned. Furthermore, the High Court E
didn’t restrict the scope of judicial review, rather adopted a liberal
approach, and delved further to come to its own independent
conclusion of guilt. The appellate authority had carefully dealt
with each plea raised by the appellant in his appeal and had given
detailed responses to all the contentions to satisfy the appellant’s F
mind. The disciplinary authority too was impeccable and no
infirmity can be found in the report of the enquiry officer either.
Even in general parlance, where an appellate or reviewing Court/
authority comes to a different conclusion, ordinarily the decision
under appeal ought not to be disturbed in so far as it remains
plausible or is not found ailing with perversity. The present case G
is neither one where there is no evidence, nor is it one where
this Court can arrive at a different conclusion than the disciplinary
authority. [Paras 25, 28-30][1090-B-E][1092-B-G]
2. Plea of the appellant that the fact that the enquiry officer
had put his own questions to the prosecution witness and cross- H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A examined the witnesses brought forth by the defence, amounted
to making the prosecutor the judge, in violation of the natural
justice principle of “nemo judex in sua causa” is misplaced. Under
Section 165, Evidence Act, judges have the power to ask any
question to any witness or party about any fact, in order to discover
or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts. While strict rules of
B
evidence are inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry
officers often put questions to witnesses in such proceedings in
order to discover the truth. Indeed, it may be necessary to do
such direct questioning in certain circumstances. No specific
malice or bias was alleged against the enquiry officer, and even
C during the enquiry no request was made to seek a replacement;
thus, evidencing how the objections were nothing but an
afterthought. Rather it appears that the delinquent person
received a fair trial. [Paras 31, 32][1092-H][1093-A-D]
Union of India v. T.R. Varma [1958] SCR 499 – relied
D on.
3. Criminal proceedings are distinct from civil proceedings.
It is both possible and common in disciplinary matters to establish
charges against a delinquent official by preponderance of
probabilities and consequently terminate his services. But the
E same set of evidence may not be sufficient to take away his liberty
under criminal law jurisprudence. Such distinction between
standards of proof amongst civil and criminal litigation is
deliberate, given the differences in stakes, the power imbalance
between the parties and the social costs of an erroneous decision.
Thus, in a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of evidence and
F procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like, statements
made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain
instances. Thus, the appellant’s contention that he should be
exonerated in the present proceedings as no criminal chargesheet
was filed by the CBI after enquiry, is discarded. The employer
G always retains the right to conduct an independent disciplinary
proceeding, irrespective of the outcome of a criminal proceeding.
Furthermore, the CBI report does recommend major disciplinary
action against the appellant. [Paras 34, 35][1094-A-E]

H
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1081

Karnataka SRTC v. MG Vittal Rao (2012) 1 SCC 442 : A
[2011] 14 SCR 1089; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corp
Ltd (2005) 7 SCC 764 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 314; BHEL
v. M Mani (2018) 1 SCC 285 : [2017] 11 SCR 933 –
relied on.
4. The Disciplinary Authority has wide discretion in B
imposing punishment for a proved delinquency, subject of course
to principles of proportionality and fair play. Such requirements
emanate from Article 14 itself, which prohibits State authorities
from treating varying-degrees of misdeeds with the same broad
stroke. Determination of such proportionality is a function of not
only the action or intention of the delinquent, but must also factor C
the financial effect and societal implication of such misconduct.
But unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary proceedings
Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when they
find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree,
or if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked. Thus, whereas D
imposition of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction
in rank) would be discriminatory and impermissible for trivial
misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need to send a clear
message of deterrence to the society. Charges such as corruption,
misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of
the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly. The E
punishment of dismissal from service is far from disproportionate
to the charges of corruption, fabrication and intimidation which
have unanimously been proven against the appellant. Appellant’s
actions would most probably have caused huge consequential
losses to BPCL and lowered the reputation of the CISF amongst F
members of the public. [Paras 36-38][1094-F-G][1095-A-D]
Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 12 SCC 532 :
[2009] 15 SCR 712; Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union
of India (2012) 6 SCC 369 : [2012] 5 SCR 1029; Govt
of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd Nasrulla Khan (2006) 2 G
SCC 373 : [2006] 1 SCR 911; BC Chaturvedi v. Union
of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644;
State of Tamil Nadu v. S Subramaniam (1996) 7 SCC
509; Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583 :
[2003] 2 SCR 100; Himachal Pradesh State Electricity
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A Board Ltd v. Mahesh Dahiya (2017) 1 SCC 768 : [2016]
9 SCR 879– relied on.
Shashi Prasad v. CISF (2019) 7 SCC 797 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
B (2019) 7 SCC 797 referred to Para 23
[2006] 1 SCR 911 relied on Para 23
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644 relied on Para 26
(1996) 7 SCC 509 relied on Para 27
C [2003] 2 SCR 100 relied on Para 27
[2016] 9 SCR 879 relied on Para 27
[1958] SCR 499 relied on Para 32
[2011] 14 SCR 1089 relied on Para 34
D [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 314 relied on Para 34
[2017] 11 SCR 933 relied on Para 35
[2009] 15 SCR 712 relied on Para 36
[2012] 5 SCR 1029 relied on Para 38
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6270
of 2012.
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.05.2009 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1001 of 2001.
F P.N. Mishra, Sr.Adv., K. L. Janjani, Ayush Puri, Ms. Seema
Bengani, B. V. Balaram Das, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURYA KANT, J.
1. The present civil appeal, which has been heard over video-
G
conferencing, is directed against the order dated 05.05.2009 passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in WP No. 1001/2001,
whereby appellant’s plea for quashing disciplinary proceedings and
setting-aside a dismissal order on charges of corruption and extra-
constitutional conduct while employed as a paramilitary officer, was
H rejected.
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1083
[SURYA KANT, J.]

FACTUAL MATRIX A
2. The appellant joined the Central Industrial Security Force
(“CISF”) in January, 1995 as a Sub-Inspector. After completing requisite
training in Hyderabad, he was allocated to Mumbai Office of the Western
Zone and posted at the local unit of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd
(“BPCL”) in March, 1996. Although he was initially deputed to perform B
shift duty, but since July, 1997 he was deployed in the Crime and
Intelligence Wing. As evidenced by an office order dated 08.05.1998,
the appellant was specifically entrusted with conducting surprise searches
of personnel and taking strict action against anyone indulging in
corruption.
C
3. On 28.02.1999 at around 6PM, Constable Ram Avtar Sharma
(CW-1; hereinafter “Sharma”) was commuting in a CISF bus near the
BPCL compound when Inspector Hiralal Chaudhary (PW-1; hereinafter,
“Chaudhary”) noticed a large bundle of high-denomination notes in
Sharma’s pocket. Suspicious, Chaudhary got the bus turned back towards
the BPCL compound, and forcibly made Sharma deboard near the North- D
gate. Amidst witnesses, Chaudhary searched Sharma’s person, during
which a total sum of Rs 10,780 in the form of 100 notes of Rs 100 and
the rest in smaller denominations was recovered. No explanation for the
large sum of unaccounted cash was forthcoming from Sharma, except
for a plea for mercy, post which the amount was seized and the incident E
recorded in the General Diary (“GD”) kept at the North-gate of the
BPCL compound.
4. Later, it was found that a conflicting GD entry had been made
at the Main-gate of the BPCL compound a little earlier at around 6:05PM,
noting how an amount of Rs 9,000 had been handed over by dog-handler F
Constable KK Sharma (PW-2) on behalf of another official, as personal
loan to Sharma (CW-1). It was discovered over the course of investigation
that this entry was false and had been registered at the instance of the
present appellant who made numerous phone calls between 6:30 and
7PM to ASI Surjan Singh (PW-5) who was stationed at the Main-gate
and was in-charge of the other GD register. G
5. The following morning, KK Sharma (PW-2) who was projected
to have delivered the cash to Sharma, was pressurised by the appellant
to falsely support his alternate ‘loan’ theory by deposing that he indeed
had delivered the impounded sum of money.
H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A 6. An FIR was thus registered by the respondent-authorities with
the regional Anti-Corruption Branch of the Central Bureau of Investigation
(“CBI”) on 06.03.1999 under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Simultaneously, an
enquiry under Rule 34 of CISF Rules, 1969, with Assistant Commandant
PB Patil as the enquiry officer, was also initiated and the appellant was
B
placed under suspension vide order dated 31.05.1999.
a. Chargesheet
7. The chargesheet contained three charges against the appellant,
first, gross misconduct and indiscipline by virtue of ordering of a false
C GD Entry (No. 257, on 6:05PM at 28.02.1999); second, becoming an
extra-constitutional authority by issuing unlawful orders to Constable
KK Sharma to give false statement to substantiate the aforementioned
fake GD entry; and third, corruption for illegally collecting bribes from
contractors of BPCL through his subordinates. All these charges were
contested by the appellant, who sought and was provided a detailed list
D of evidence and documents.
b. Investigation and Enquiry Report
8. The enquiry officer submitted a self-speaking report on
17.09.1999, which contained written statements and depositions of six
E witnesses who were substantiating the charges, as well as evidence led
by the appellant in the form of five defence witnesses. Inspector Hiralal
Chaudhary (PW-1) testified to the search of Sharma, the seizure of a
sum of Rs 10,780 from his person, and the lack of any explanation by
him on the spot regarding source of the suspicious sum. Head Constable
KK Sharma (PW-2), who as per the appellant’s defence had handed
F over the seized amount as loan amount to Sharma, negated this alternate
version and instead implicated the appellant by mentioning that not only
did he not give any money to anyone, but that he had instead been
threatened by the appellant into giving a false statement. Head Constable
RK Sharma (PW-3) claimed to have witnessed the search and seizure,
G and denied any talk of a loan during such event. ASI Karan Singh
(PW-4) deposed that two empty garbage trucks had entered the BPCL
premises earlier in the afternoon. ASI Surjan Singh (PW-5) testified that
at around 6:30PM when he was on duty at the BPCL Main-gate, he
received a call from the appellant intimidating him into registering a false
GD Entry with earlier time of 6:05PM to substantiate a fictitious loan
H transaction with the stated objective of protecting Sharma (CW-1).
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1085
[SURYA KANT, J.]

9. Additionally, the enquiry officer examined Constable Ram Avtar A
Sharma (CW-1) who testified that at around 2PM on 28.02.1999 he
received a bundle of notes totalling Rs 10,000 on behalf of the appellant
from one DK Parmar, who was contracted by BPCL for the job of
lifting garbage/waste. These notes were in his possession, in addition to
his personal cash of Rs 780, when he was caught around 6:15PM by
B
Chaudhary (PW-1) while he was travelling in the CISF Bus. He admitted
that he had falsely claimed that the money had been given to him by KK
Sharma (PW-2), and in response to a question disclosed that bribes were
illegally collected from BPCL’s contractors at the rate of Rs 20 per
vehicle entering the plant and Rs 5 per vehicle exiting. The seized sum
of money, particularly, was to be handed over to the appellant for C
facilitating theft of ‘iron scrap’ and ‘brass’ which was smuggled out of
the compound in the middle of the garbage. CW-1, later on though,
retracted and claimed that the record reflected something other than
what he had stated, and that his signatures ought not to be relied upon as
he had not read the document.
D
10. The appellant in his defence evidence examined Constable
MN Dhanwat (DW-1) who deposed that although he was posted at
North-gate on the date of the incident, he had left for personal work
during duty hours with the permission of the appellant. Constable Jaimal
Singh (DW-2) testified that he had witnessed the search of Sharma and
recording of the GD Entry by Chaudhary when he reached the North- E
gate at around 6:40PM. Further, he claimed that Sharma was repeatedly
trying to get in touch with the appellant, but could only get through at
around 7PM and then informed him that he was caught carrying his own
money. ASI SP Mishra (DW-3) who was on duty at the CISF Control
room in Vashi stated that in his presence no message had been conveyed F
to the appellant regarding the incident. PK Nashkar (DW-4) states that
during his duty at the ‘Quarter Guard’ in the Vashi Complex at 7PM, he
was directed by ASI SP Mishra (DW-3) to convey a message to the
appellant that there was a phone call for him from Jaimal Singh (DW-2).
Finally, Pravin Dhanji Parmar (DW-5), who had been performing house-
keeping work at the BPCL refinery for the past twenty years on behalf G
of contractor DK Parmar & Co, stated that he did not hand over any
money to Sharma. In addition, the enquiry officer perused the relevant
GD entries and other documents on record.
11. Based on these numerous evidences and after according the
appellant an opportunity to cross-examine all the witnesses as well as H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A leading his own substantive arguments, the enquiry officer through report
dated 17.09.1999 held the appellant guilty under each of the three charges.
The enquiry officer found as a matter of fact that the GD No. 257,
entered at 6:05PM on 28.02.1999, was a false entry made at the instance
of the appellant by Surjan Singh (PW-5), so that an alternate version
could be crafted in which Sharma (CW-1) had allegedly received the
B
seized money as loan. Qua the second charge, it stood established from
the version of KK Sharma (PW-2) that he had not advanced any loan
and that he was approached by the appellant to give a false statement to
substantiate the GD No. 257. Finally, upon a holistic interpretation of all
evidence, that is, falsification of GD, threatening of KK Sharma (PW-
C 2), as well as indications of wrongdoing from the statements of other
witnesses like DW-1; the enquiry officer concluded that illegal sums
were being collected by the appellant from BPCL’s contractors through
his subordinate officers and therefore, the third charge of corruption too
had been proved.
D c. Proceedings before the Disciplinary Authority
12. This voluminous enquiry report was placed before the
disciplinary authority, which gave the appellant both a copy of the report
as well as an opportunity to respond to it. Detailed rebuttals put forth by
the appellant through his written submission dated 14.10.1999 were
E examined at length by the disciplinary authority. Preliminary objections
of the enquiry officer being biased and of being pre-disposed to convict
the appellant, were rejected by the disciplinary authority with cogent
reasons. It was noted that not only had proper opportunity of cross-
examining witnesses and of availing assistance been accorded to the
appellant, but that sufficient opportunities of seeking explanations,
F clarifications and records of testimonies and documents had in fact also
been availed of by him.
13. The disciplinary authority noted that no material contradictions
could be pointed out in the witnesses’ testimonies, and no compelling
alternate evidence had been produced. Keeping in mind the nature of
G the allegations which entailed surreptitious corruption amongst members
of the paramilitary, the disciplinary authority observed that it was unlikely
that there would be independent witnesses to many incidents like the
charge of intimidating KK Sharma (PW-2) to give false testimony, or of
collecting bribe from BPCL’s contractors.
H
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1087
[SURYA KANT, J.]

14. The disciplinary authority noticed that it was an undisputed A
fact that a sum of Rs 10,780 had been recovered from Sharma (CW-1),
which was far in excess of the maximum permissible amount of Rs 10.
The testimonies of different officials revealed the appellant’s modus
operandi of collecting illegal monies through a network of subordinate
officers; and more crucially, his attempts at supressing witnesses and
B
fabricating evidence when caught. The disciplinary authority noted that
the enquiry officer had followed the prescribed procedure and no
challenge had been made earlier to his impartiality and no request to
change the enquiry officer was ever made. Therefore, no malice or bias
could even be suggested at this stage of the disciplinary proceedings.
Similarly, the appellant’s attempt to implicate other officials was held to C
be irrelevant, as the present enquiry was limited only to the appellant’s
conduct.
15. Thus, considering the serious nature of the misconduct and
the rank and duty bestowed upon the appellant, and the multiplicity of
the charges which called into question both the personal integrity of the D
delinquent officer and the collective image of the force, the Disciplinary
Authority passed the order dated 20.11.1999, imposing exemplary
punishment of dismissal from service under Rule 29(a) read with Rule
31(a) - Schedule II of CISF Rules, 1969.
d. Decision of the Appellate Authority E
16. The appellant preferred departmental appeal against the order
of his dismissal from service before the Deputy Inspector General of
the CISF Western Zone. In addition to highlighting contradictions in
testimonies and re-interpreting the evidence on record, the appellant also
raised a new defence that the entire proceedings were at the behest of F
a particular superior officer.
17. The appellate authority went into each and every contention
of the appellant and after re-appreciating the evidence on record, it
dismissed the appeal vide order dated 12.07.2000, concluding that:
“Further I find that there is no material irregularity or G
miscarriage of justice in the departmental enquiry
proceedings. After considering the gravity of proven
misconduct, the petitioner is not found fit for retention in an
armed force of the Union of India like CISF. The contentions
made in his appeal petitions are totally devoid of merits both
H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A in fact and in law. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority is not excessive in view of proven misconduct. As
such I do not find any reason to interfere with the orders
passed by the disciplinary authority and do hereby reject the
appeal petition being devoid merits.”
B e. Writ before the High Court
18. A further challenge was laid to the orders passed by the
Disciplinary and Appellate authorities by way of a writ petition under
Article 226 before the High Court of Bombay. The appellant sought in
sum and substance, re-appraisal of the evidence on record, claiming that
C it was qualitatively insufficient to hold him guilty of the charges levelled
against him. Additionally, the appellant raised a new ground of non-
compliance with Rule 34(10)(ii)(b) of CISF Rules, 1969 which specified
serving of a second show cause notice and opportunity of hearing
regarding the proposed penalty. The appellant fairly submitted before
the High Court that it was not his case that the penalty imposed against
D him was disproportionate, if the charges against him were held to be
proved.
19. The High Court, through the order-under-challenge, conducted
a detailed re-examination of the facts and material-on-record, expanding
the scope of judicial review under Article 226 and concluded that there
E existed ample evidence to establish the appellant’s involvement in the
organised collection of illegal monies from BPCL’s contractors and his
role in fabricating official records and intimidating subordinate officers
to falsely testify to support his alternate version.
20. The High Court categorically held that the domestic enquiry
F followed all procedures and was in conformity with principles of natural
justice and the appellant had been accorded numerous opportunities of
putting forth his version of events. The CISF Rule sought to be relied
upon by the appellant, was found to have been amended in 1981,
therefore, leaving no requirement for a separate show cause notice at
G the stage of penalty. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed on
05.05.2009.
CONTENTIONS OF P ARTIES
21. The instant appeal being the last resort, learned senior counsel
for the appellant, once more, took us through the enquiry-record and
H highlighted how the main witness (CW-1) had retracted his statement,
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1089
[SURYA KANT, J.]

and how there was no corroboration between witnesses and documents. A
The conduct of the enquiry officer was called into question, contending
that his decision to put questions to witnesses was unfair. Acting as both
the judge and prosecutor, the enquiry officer was alleged to have vitiated
the entirety of the proceedings. Till the last minute, the appellant
vehemently stuck to his alternate version that the recovered sum of
B
Rs 10,780 was nothing but a loan extended between two officials in a
private capacity, and that the false charges were levelled on him with
oblique motives at the instance of certain superiors. Finally, the appellant
sought leniency and urged that given another 21 years of remaining
service, imposition of the severest punishment of dismissal from service
was highly disproportionate which ought to shock the conscience of this C
Court.
22. These contentions have dexterously been countered by the
learned counsel for the respondents, who highlights through specific
reference to the impugned order that retraction of CW-1’s statement
had been noted by all prior authorities and that no significant reliance D
had been placed on it while holding the appellant guilty. Adequate
opportunities were granted and had been availed by him. Attention was
drawn to the fact that the present proceedings constituted the fifth venue
where the appellant was pleading his case, with the first four and the
CBI having found his guilt concurrently.
E
23. The deliberate and planned manner of the falsifications, and
the blatant threats made to subordinate officials was highlighted by the
respondents, and the loan theory propounded by the appellant was shown
as having been recurrently agitated and discarded by all the previous
forums. Given the concurrent findings of the enquiry officer, disciplinary
authority, appellate authority, and the High Court; as well as the detailed F
evaluation and reasoned order passed by each, it was submitted that
there remained little scope of re-appreciation or further adjudication.
The ratio of Shashi Prasad v. CISF1 was distilled to drive home the
argument that departmental enquiries don’t stand on the same pedestal
as criminal proceedings. Acquittal in one would not pre-judge the other G
owing to a difference in standards of proof. It was claimed that there
could be no re-appreciation of evidence as per Govt of Andhra Pradesh
v. Mohd Nasrulla Khan2, and that Constitutional Courts ought not to
1
2019 7 SCC 797.
2
2006 2 SCC 373. H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A act as appellate authorities against disciplinary proceedings of government
employees. Finally, given the delicate nature of employment in paramilitary
forces and breach of the high trust reposed in him by society, the strict
punishment of dismissal of the appellant from service was justified.
ANALYSIS
B 24. At the outset, it may be noted that the appellant has chosen to
raise some new grounds before this Court, despite those issues involving
questions of fact. Nevertheless, a few pertinent questions of service
jurisprudence do arise in this appeal, which we deem appropriate to
answer.
C I. Scope of Judicial Review in Service Matters
25. Learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time
taking us through the various evidences-on-record with the intention of
highlighting lacunas and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise
was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present proceedings
D is quite high. The power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional
Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article
136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental
appellate authority. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an
evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the
E decision itself. Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment
and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest
errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or
in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome.3
26. These principles are succinctly elucidated by a three-judge
F Bench of this Court in BC Chaturvedi v. Union of India4 in the following
extract:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of
judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
G
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine
whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether
3
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373, ¶ 11.
4
H (1995) 6 SCC 749 ¶ 12.
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1091
[SURYA KANT, J.]

rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings A
or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction,
power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion.
But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the
technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence
B
as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When
the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives
support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/
Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive C
at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/
Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the
proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the
D
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority
is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such
as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/
Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and
mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
each case. E
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive
power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of
punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. F
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be
permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union
of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364
: (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if the
conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by
the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent G
error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at
all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
27. These parameters have been consistently reiterated by this
Court in a catena of decisions, including:
H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A (i) State of Tamil Nadu v. S Subramaniam, (1996) 7 SCC 509.
(ii) Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC 583.
(iii) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd v. Mahesh
Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768.
B 28. It is thus well settled that the Constitutional Courts while
exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of
an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of
correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice
or violation of principles of natural justice. Put differently, judicial review
is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate
C authority.
29. The High Court was thus rightly concerned more about the
competence of the enquiry officer and adherence to natural justice, rather
than verifying the appellant’s guilt through documents and statements. It
clearly noted that evidence was led, cross-examination was conducted
D and opportunities of addressing arguments, raising objections, and filing
appeal were granted. The conclusion obtained was based upon these
very evidences and was detailed and well-reasoned. Furthermore, the
High Court didn’t restrict the scope of judicial review, rather adopted a
liberal approach, and delved further to come to its own independent
E conclusion of guilt. Similarly, we have no doubt in our minds that the
appellate authority had carefully dealt with each plea raised by the
appellant in his appeal and had given detailed responses to all the
contentions to satisfy the appellant’s mind. The disciplinary authority too
was impeccable and no infirmity can be found in the report of the enquiry
officer either.
F
30. Even in general parlance, where an appellate or reviewing
Court/authority comes to a different conclusion, ordinarily the decision
under appeal ought not to be disturbed in so far as it remains plausible or
is not found ailing with perversity. The present case is neither one where
there is no evidence, nor is it one where we can arrive at a different
G conclusion than the disciplinary authority, especially for the reasons stated
hereunder.
II. Appropriateness of procedure and PNJ
31. Significant emphasis has been placed by the appellant on the
fact that the enquiry officer put his own questions to the prosecution
H
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1093
[SURYA KANT, J.]

witness and that he cross-examined the witnesses brought forth by the A
defence. This, it is claimed, amounts to making the prosecutor the judge,
in violation of the natural justice principle of “nemo judex in sua causa”.
However, such a plea is misplaced. It must be recognized that, under
Section 165, Evidence Act, judges have the power to ask any question to
any witness or party about any fact, in order to discover or to obtain
B
proper proof of relevant facts. While strict rules of evidence are
inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry officers often put
questions to witnesses in such proceedings in order to discover the truth.
Indeed, it may be necessary to do such direct questioning in certain
circumstances. Further, learned counsel for the appellant, except for
making a bald allegation that the enquiry officer has questioned the C
witnesses, did not point to any specific question put by the officer that
would indicate that he had exceeded his jurisdiction. No specific malice
or bias has been alleged against the enquiry officer, and even during the
enquiry no request had been made to seek a replacement; thus,
evidencing how these objections are nothing but an afterthought.
D
32. Rather it appears that the delinquent person received a fair
trial, which can illustratively be determined by analysing whether he
received an opportunity of adducing evidence, cross-examining witnesses
and whether depositions were recorded in his presence.5 The record
clearly elucidates that all these essentials had been duly observed in the
present proceedings. Opportunity to seek assistance of another officer E
was accorded, right of making representation was granted before each
authority, multiple opportunities were granted to lead evidence, cross-
examine witnesses, and raise objections. The appellant exercised most
of these options, though some were given up despite reminders. Minor
delays on part of the appellant were ignored and each concern of his F
had been addressed through detailed reasons.
III. Effect of criminal enquiry on disciplinary proceedings
33. The incident of 28.02.1999 raised serious questions of
criminality under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption
Act, as well as of violation of Service Regulations and administrative G
misconduct. Thus, in addition to appointment of enquiry officer, the
authorities also registered a criminal complaint with the CBI. After
investigation, the CBI though did not find adequate material to launch
criminal prosecution against the appellant but through its self-speaking
5
Union of India v. T.R. Varma, 1958 SCR 499 ¶ 10. H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A report dated 07.03.2000, the CBI recommended major disciplinary action
against the appellant and a few others.
34. It is beyond debate that criminal proceedings are distinct from
civil proceedings. It is both possible and common in disciplinary matters
to establish charges against a delinquent official by preponderance of
B probabilities and consequently terminate his services. But the same set
of evidence may not be sufficient to take away his liberty under our
criminal law jurisprudence.6 Such distinction between standards of proof
amongst civil and criminal litigation is deliberate, given the differences in
stakes, the power imbalance between the parties and the social costs of
an erroneous decision. Thus, in a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of
C evidence and procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like say,
statements made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain
instances.7
35. Thus, the appellant’s contention that he should be exonerated
in the present proceedings as no criminal chargesheet was filed by the
D CBI after enquiry, is liable to be discarded.8 The employer always retains
the right to conduct an independent disciplinary proceeding, irrespective
of the outcome of a criminal proceeding. Furthermore, the CBI report
dated 07.03.2000 does recommend major disciplinary action against the
appellant. The said report also buttresses the respondent’s case.
E IV. Punishment and plea of leniency
36. In our considered opinion, the appellant’s contention that the
punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the allegation of
corruption, is without merit. It is a settled legal proposition that the
Disciplinary Authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment for a
F proved delinquency, subject of course to principles of proportionality and
fair play. Such requirements emanate from Article 14 itself, which
prohibits State authorities from treating varying-degrees of misdeeds
with the same broad stroke. Determination of such proportionality is a
function of not only the action or intention of the delinquent, but must
G also factor the financial effect and societal implication of such
misconduct.9 But unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary
proceedings Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when
6
Karnataka SRTC v. MG Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442, ¶ 11.
7
Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corp Ltd (2005) 7 SCC 764, ¶ 11.
8
BHEL v. M Mani, (2018) 1 SCC 285, ¶ 20-22, 33.
H 9
Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 12 SCC 532, ¶ 14-16.
PRAVIN KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1095
[SURYA KANT, J.]

they find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree, or A
if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked. Thus, whereas imposition
of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) would be
discriminatory and impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave
offences there is a need to send a clear message of deterrence to the
society. Charges such as corruption, misappropriation and gross
B
indiscipline are prime examples of the latter category, and ought to be
dealt with strictly.
37. Applying these guidelines to the facts of the case in hand, it is
clear that the punishment of dismissal from service is far from
disproportionate to the charges of corruption, fabrication and intimidation
which have unanimously been proven against the appellant. Taking any C
other view would be an anathema to service jurisprudence. If we were
to hold that systematic corruption and its blatant cover-up are inadequate
to attract dismissal from service, then the purpose behind having such
major penalties, which are explicitly provided for under Article 311 of
the Constitution, would be obliterated. D
38. Still further, the appellant’s actions would most probably have
caused huge consequential losses to BPCL and lowered the reputation
of the CISF amongst members of the public. Given the paramilitary
nature of the appellant’s force, a sense of integrity, commitment, discipline,
and camaraderie is paramount.10 This expectation is only heightened in E
the case of the appellant given how he was specifically tasked with
weeding out corruption and conducting surprise raids. Once shattered
through acts of intimidation, forgery, and corruption; only the severest
penalty ought to be imposed.
CONCLUSION F
39. In light of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in
this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.
G

10
Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 369, ¶ 40.
H