PRIYA VRAT SINGH & ORS.versusSHYAM JI SAHAI

                           [2008] 11 S.C.R. 897


                      PRIYA VRAT SINGH & ORS.                         A
                                    v.
                            SHYAM JI SAHAI
                   (Criminal Appeal No. 1230 of 2008)
                            AUGUST 5, 2008
                                                                      B
          [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.)

             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 482 - Inherent
       powers of High Court - Criminal proceedings against husband
       uls 494, 120 B and s. 109 /PC and s. 3 and 4 of the Dowry C
       Prohibition Act, 1961 - Appeal uls 482 for quashing criminal
       proceedings - Set aside by High Court - On appeal, held: In
       view of the parameters laid down for exercise of power u/s 482,
       criminal proceedings pending before the Magistrate quashed
       - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 494, 120 B and 109 - Dowry Prohi-
       bition Act, 1961 - ss. 3 and 4.                                 D
             Appellant no. 3 was married to appellant no. 1. The
       relations between the parties became strained and they
       started living separately in the same house. Thereafter,
       appellant no. 3-wife left her matrimonial home and started
       living with her parents. Meanwhile, appellant no. 1-hus- E
       band filed suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground
       of cruelty and harassment meted out to him by wife. The
       suit was decreed ex parte. After the expiry of the limitation
       period for filing appeal, the appellant no. 1 married N. Two
       years later, appellant no. 3 filed a complaint against the F
       appellant no. 1 and his family members alleging re-mar-
       riage by appellant no. 1, dowry demand and harassment
       u/s 494, 120 B and s. 109 IPC and s. 3 and 4 of the Dowry
       Prohibition Act, 1961. Appellant no. 3 also filed restora-
       tion petition for recalling the ex parte order which was al- G
       lowed later. Appellant no. 1 filed application before the
       Special Court of Judicial Magistrate which was dismissed .
...-   Appellant no. 1 then filed petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. High Court
       dismissed the same. Hence, the present appeal.
                                    897                               H
    898      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2008] 11 S.C.R.


A      Appellant no. 1 contended that the marriage of ap-
  pellant No. 1 with appellant no. 3 is protected u/s 15 of the
  Hindu Marriage Act, 1956, thus, the proceedings u/s. 494
  IPC are not maintainable; that the allegation· of alleged
  demand for dowry was made for the first time in Decem-
B ber, 1994 when the complaint was filed; that the dowry
  torture was made some time in 1992; that there is no ex-
  planation as to why for more than two years no action
  was taken.; that in the Complaint Petition apart from the
  husband, other relatives were impleaded as party and no
  role has been specifically ascribed to them except the hus-
c band;  and that inspite of service of notice, none appeared
  on behalf of respondent No.1.
          Allowing the appeal, the Court
        HELD: 1. The powers possessed by the High Court                     t,-
D under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
   are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires     .....
   great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to
   see-that its decision in exercise of this power is based on
  -_sound _principles. The inherent power should not be ex-                ':-
E ercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court
   being the highest court of a State should normally refrain              ..
                                                                           ,-
   from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the
   entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
   evidence has not been collected and produced before the
F Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,
   are of r:nagnitude and cannot be seen in their true per-
   spective without sufficient material. Of .course, no hard-
                                                                  .
   and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which
   the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction
   of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [Para 7] [902-                  )  '·
G F,G, 903-A,B]                                                            ;:--
                                                                            '
       2. In -view of the parameters laid down for exercise of
                                                                      -f ~ I
  power u/s 482 of the Code, the proceedings in the crimi-
  nal case pending before the Special CJM, Varanasi stand
H quashed. [Paras 5 and 9] [901-F, 903-D]
           PRIYA VRAT SINGH & ORS. v. SHYAM JI SAHAI            899
                    [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

         Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary 1992 (4) SCC 305;               A
    Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1; Minu
    Kumari v. State of Bihar 2006 (4) SCC 359; State of Haryana
    v. Bhajan Lal 1952 (supp.) 1 SCC 335 - relied on.
                           Case Law Reference
                                                                       B
         1992 (4) sec 305               Relied on.     Para 7

         AIR 1964 SC 1                  Relied on.     Para 7

         2006 (4) sec 359               Relied on.     Para 7

         1952 (supp.) 1 SCC 335         Relied on.     Para 8         c
         CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 1230 of 2008
          From the final Judgment and Order dated 25.10.2004 of
    the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Ap-   D
    plication No. 4501 of 1996
        K.V. Viswa;iathan, A.S. Rai, Vishal Ranjan Rai and
    Devendra Singh for the Appellants.
         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                    E
         Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.

           2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
    learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissing
    the application filed in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Crimi- F
>   nal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C'). Appellants have
    filed the petition for quashing criminal proceeding against them
    in Complaint Case No. 896 of 1994 subsequently numbered
    as Criminal Case No. 931 of 1995 relating to alleged commis-
    sion of offences punishable under Sections 494, 1208 and 109 G
    of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and Sec-
    tions 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short the 'Dowry
    Act') pending in the Court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate,
    Varanasi. The prayer was rejected by the High Court being of
    the view that the trial court can be directed to conclude the trial H
    900       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008] 11 S.C.R.


A   expeditiously and at the time of framing charges, the appellants
    can raise such points as has been raised in the present dis-
    pute. Liberty was also granted to appear within one month from
    the date of order before the trial court and to obtain bail.
          3. Background facts in a nutshell are as under:
B
          Daughter of the respondent namely Madhulika Singh was
    married to appellant No.1 Priya Vrat Singh. According to the
    appellants, Madhulika started behaving rudely with her husband
    and his family members as Priya Vrat was unemployed. Ten-
C   sion between two reached to such an extent that Madhulika tried
    to commit suicide on 7 .3.1992. She thereafter started giving
    repeated threats to commit suicide and appellant was seriously
    harassed. From 16. 7.1992 onwards appellant No.1 and
    Madhulika started living separately in the same house. How-
D   ever, shortly thereafter Madhulika left her matrimonial house and
    started living in the parental house. In the meantime, appellant
    No.1 filed a suit in Original Suit No. 188 of 1992 in the Civil ·
    Court at Barabanki for dissolution of marriage between him and
    Madhulika on the ground of cruelty and harassment meted out
    to him by Madhulika. The said suit was decreed on 1.1.1993
E   ex parte in favour of appellant No.1. Time for filing appeal against
    the ex-parte decree dated 1.1.1993 under Section 28(4) of the
    Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (in short the 'Marriage Act') expired
    on 31.1.1993. On 21.2.1993 after dissolution of marriage, ap-
    pellant No.1 re-married one Neha alias Sunita at Jalgaon in
F   Maharashtra on 2.3.1993. On 6.12.1994 respondent filed a
    private complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi
    wherein all the appellants were arrayed as accused persons. It
    was alleged that in 21.2.1993 appellant No.1 had re married in
    Sankat Machan Mandir, Varanasi. Allegations of dowry harass-
G   ment were also made. It was submitted that the marriage at-
    tracted punishment under Sections 494, 1208 and 109 IPC and
    Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Act. On 1.6.1995 learned Special
    CJM, Varanasi issued summons. Long thereafter, on 9.7.1996
    Madhulika filed a Restoration Petition before the Civil Judge
H   for recalling the order of ex parte. On 9.8.1996, appellants moved
            PRIYA VRAT SINGH & ORS. v. SHYAM JI SAHAI           901
                     [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
y
     an application before the learned Special CJM, Varanasi, and     A
     protested to the summoning order. However, the same was
     rejected by order dated 9.8.1996. On 24.9.1996 petition under
     Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed which was numbered as Crimi-
     nal Misc. Case No. 4501 of 1996. On 2.3.1997 the restoration
     petition was allowed. On 25.10.2001 the High Court dismissed     B
     the Criminal Misc. Case.
           4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appel-
     lant submitted that the marriage of appellant No. 1 with appel-
     lant No. 3 is protected under Section 15 of the Marriage Act
     and therefore, the proceedings under Section 494 IPC are C
     clearly not maintainable. Further it is pointed out that the alle-
     gation of alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time
     in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that
     the dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been
     explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken. D
     Further it appears that in the Complaint Petition apart from the
     husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently married
     wife, husband's mother's sister, husba:id's brother in law and
     Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has been spe-
     cifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and that too of E
     a dowry demand in February, 1993 when the complaint was
     filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted
     that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf
     of respondent No.1.
          5. The parameters for exercise of power under Section       F
).
     482 have been laid down by this Court in several cases.
            6. The Section does not confer any new power on the High
     Court. It only saves th.e inherent power which the Court pos-
     sessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three G
     circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be ex-
     ercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,
     (ii) to prevent abus.e of the process of court, and (iii) to other-
     wise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desir-
     able to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exer- H
    902        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2008] 11 S.C.R.


A   cise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing
    with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
    Courts·, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express pro-
    visions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of func-
    tions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine
B   which.finds expression in the section which merely recognizes
    and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,
    whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express
    provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as
    are riecessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
C   administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid
    alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse
    non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him
    that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers un-
    der the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal
D   or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide
    has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
    only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
    down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae
    to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which
    alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement
E   of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so
    as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It
    would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action
    which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
    In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any
F   proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
    abuse of the process of court qr quashing of these proceed-
    ings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
         7. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
G Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the
  very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exer-
  cise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise
  of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
  should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution, The
  High Court being the highest court of a State should normally
H
            PRIYA VRAT SINGH & ORS. v. SHYAM JI SAHAI           903
                      [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

    refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the A
    entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evi-
    dence has not been collected and produced before the Court
    and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magni-
    tude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without suffi-
    cient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down B
    in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its ex-
    traordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
    (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305),
    Raghubir Saran (Or.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1) and
    Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359).                 C
          8. The present case appears to be one where the cat-
    egory 7 of the illustrations given in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
    Lal (1952 (supp.) 1 SCC 335) is clearly applicable.
         9. That being so the appeal deseNes to be allowed, which
                                                                       0
    we direct. The proceedings in Case No.896 of 1994 pending
~   before the Special CJM, Varanasi stand quashed.
           10. Appeal is allowed.
    N.J.                                           Appeal allowed.