PUDHU RAJA & ANR.versusSTATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 411
- Decided
- 19 September 2012
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's conviction, holding that the circumstantial evidence, including a proven dowry motive, formed a complete chain of events and the trial court's acquittal was perverse.
Summary
The case involved the murder of Jayalakshmi, who was set on fire in a house she shared with her husband Pudhu Raja (A-1) and his mother (A-2). The prosecution alleged that the accused killed her to extort dowry, invoking Sections 302 r/w 34, 304(b) and 201 of the IPC, while the trial court acquitted them citing contradictions in eyewitness testimony and delay in filing the FIR. On appeal, the High Court convicted the accused, rejecting the suicide theory and holding that the circumstantial evidence, including motive and the chain of events, was sufficient. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in overturning the acquittal, the relevance of minor inconsistencies, the impact of FIR delay, and the necessity of establishing motive in circumstantial cases. It held that the inconsistencies were immaterial, the delay did not prejudice the prosecution, and the motive of dowry harassment completed the chain of circumstances, thereby affirming the conviction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the trial court's acquittal in a case based solely on circumstantial evidence.
- Whether the evidence, despite contradictions and delay in FIR, establishes the elements of murder under Sections 302 r/w 34, 304(b) and 201 IPC.
- Whether the theory of suicide is tenable in light of medical and forensic findings.
- Whether a delay in lodging the FIR defeats the prosecution's case.
- Whether motive, specifically dowry harassment, is essential and sufficiently proved to complete the chain of circumstantial evidence.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 304(b), s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
(2012] 8 S.C.R. 740
A PUDHU RAJA & ANR.
v.
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
(Criminal Appeal No. 1517 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 19, 2012
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860- ss. 302 rlw. s. 34, 304(b) and 201 -
c Prosecution under - Death caused of a woman by her
husband (A-2) and mother-in-law - By putting her on fire -
Circumstantial evidence - Demand of dowry by accused
alleged as motive - Trial court acquitting the .accused on the
grounds of contradictions in the deposition of-eye-witnesses,
0 delay in lodging FIR and concluding that it was a case of
suicide - High Court convicting the accused - On appeal,
held: High court rightly convicted the accused - There was
sufficient evidence to indicate possibility of dowry harassment
and death - Theory of suicide negated by the medical
E evidence - Delay in lodging FIR would not materially affect
prosecution case in the facts of the case - The discrepancies
were not material and did not go to the root of the case.
Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Appreciation of -
Held: In a case of circumstantial evidence, prosecution must
F establish each instance of incriminating circumstance by
clinching evidence - Circumstances so proved must form a
complete chain of events on the basis of which, no conclusion
other than one of guilt of accused can be reached - Court can
take note of explanation u/s. 313 Cr.P. C. in a case of
G circumstantial evidence in order to decide whether the chain
of circumstances is complete - Suspicion, however grave
cannot be treated as substitute for proof - Motive assumes
great significance in a case of circumstantial evidence - Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 313 - Motive.
H 740
PUDHU RAJA & ANR. v. STATE, REP. BY 741
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
The Transport Commissioner, A.P. Hyderabad and Anr. A
v. Sardar Ali and Ors. AIR 1983 SC 1225; State of
Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCG 471: 1983 (3) SCR
729; Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2
SCC 748: 2010 (2) SCR 119 - referred to.
B
Criminal Trial - Contradictions and omissions in
evidence - Held: Minor contradictions, inconsistencies,
\ embellishments or improvements, which do not affect the core
of the prosecution case, must not be made ground for
rejection of evidence in its entirety.
c
State v. Saravamam AIR 2009 SC 152: 2008 (14)
SCR 405 - relied on.
Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Power of appellate
court - Held: Appellate court can interfere with the order of D
acquittal only in exceptional cases, where the order is found
to be perverse - Interference in a routine manner should be
avoided.
Case Law Reference:
E
AIR 1983 SC 1225 Referred to Para 10
1983 (3) SCR 729 Referred to Para 10
2010 (2) SCR 119 Referred to Para 10
F
2008 (14) SCR 405 Relied on Para 11
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1517 of 2008.
From the Judgment & Order dated 21.8.2008 of the High G
Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 337 of
2005.
Dr. A. Francis Julean, Sumi! Kumar, Danish Zubair Khan
for the Appellants.
H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 8 S.C.R.
A S. Gurukrishnakumar, AAG, B. Balaji A. Prasanna Venkat,
Krishnamoorthy for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered
ORDER
B
1. This appeal has been preferred against the final
judgment and order dated 21.8.2008, passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No.337 of 2005,
by way of which, the High Court has allowed the State appeal
c against the judgment and order dated 22.12.2004 in Sessions
Case No.618 of 2003 passed by the Additional District &
Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court No.1 }, Chengalpet,
Kachipuram District, by which, the Trial Court had acquitted the
appellants of the charges under Sections 302 r/w 34, 304(b)
D and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred
to as the 'IPC').
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal
as per prosecution are as follows:
E A. Padhu Raja (A-1), son of Smt. Angammal (A-2), got
married to one Jayalakshmi (deceased}, on 6.9.1998 at
Gudalur. At the time of marriage the appellant (A-1) demanded
50 Sovereigns of jewels and Rs.2 lacs in cash, however the
parents of the deceased gave 35 sovereigns of jewels and
F cash to the tune of Rs.50,000/-. Thereafter, there were
persistent demand for dowry by the appellants from time to
time, particularly on festive occasions. Those demands were
even met. Appellant (A-1) made a demand for a motor bike
which was also met by the parents of the deceased in the
G presence of several villagers, including the village Head, namely
Bose, (PW.6). However, even after this, the demands
continued. In July 2000, Jayalakshmi came to her parent's
house and told them that a demand had been made by the
husband for 15 sovereigns of jewels, without fulfilling which, she
H must not return.
PUDHU RAJA & ANR. v. STATE, REP. BY 743
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
B. A Panchayat was convened and thereupon, the A
appellant (A-1), and Jayalakshmi (deceased}, started living
separately in a house belonging to Chandran (PW.2}, at 9, C.N.
Krishna Street, Bharathi Nagar, Perianatham. Karthikeyan
(PW.4} and his wife Mrs. Malliga (PW.3) were living in close
proximity to the appellants. Jayalakshmi had told Mrs. Malliga B
(PW.3) on certain occasions, that the appellants had been
torturing her.
C. On 17.4.2001, at about 1 A.M., Mrs. Malliga (PW.3},
noticed smoke rising up from the ground floor where the
appellants and deceased were living. She immediately C
informed Karthikeyan. (PW.4) and then also came out to
ascertain the cause for the smoke alongwith her husband,
Karthikeyan (PW.4). Chandran (PW.2) and his wife also came
out of their house. Chandran (PW.2) found the appellants
standing outside the gate. On being asked by Chandran (PW.2) D
about the key of the house, as the same was locked from the
outside, the appellant (A-1), replied that the second appellant
had thrown away the key. Chandran (PW.2) went upstairs,
brought a duplicate key and opened the door of their house.
Chandran (PW.2) found the room full of smoke and Jayalakshmi E
lying dead on the bed, with burn injuries. The Fire Brigade was
informed. Mr. Mahalingam, Station Officer, Fire Department
Chengalpet, (PW.8) arrived at the spot with his personnel, at
1.45 A.M. and extinguished the fire. Mr. Ezhamparuthi (PW.1),
a close relative of the deceased came to the spot upon being F
informed, and thereafter went to the Police Station at 8.30 A.M.
on 18.4.2001 and made a complaint to Mr. Kotteswaran
(PW.12), on the basis of which, a case in Crime No.157 of
2001 was registered. The said FIR was handed over to Mr.
Durairaj (PW.13), the Investigating Officer who then took up the G
investigation.
0. Durairaj (PW.13) recovered the dead body of
Jayalakshmi (deceased}, after taking photographs of the place
of occurrence and also of the dead body of the deceased,
H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A through the photographer Balaji (PW.11 ). Durairaj (PW.13) also
recovered all material objects and prepared the mahazar.
E. As Jayalakshmi had died within 2-1/2 years of her
marriage, the matter was reported to the Sub-Collector, Ms. Pila
Rajesh, IAS (PW.10) who came to the spot and conducted
B inquest on the dead body in the presence of witnesses and a
panchnama was prepared. Ms. Pila Rajesh (PW.10) also
recorded the statements of the witnesses after which, the dead
body was sent for post-mortem.
c F. Prof. Muguesan (PW.9), who is attached to the Govt.
Hospital Chengalpet, conducted the post-mortem and opined
that the deceased had died of smothering and burn injuries.
G. The case was converted into one under Section 302
IPC and both the appellants were arrested and sent into judicial
0
remand. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was
filed. Before the trial court, both the appellants pleaded not guilty
and, therefore, claimed trial. In the course of the trial, the
prosecution examined 13 witnesses, and relied upon 14 exhibits
and 3 material objects. The defence also examined one
E witness, and relied upon 4 documents for the purpose of their
defence. The Trial Court after the conclusion of the trial, upon
considering the material on record, and after appreciating the
available evidence, acquitted both the appellants vide judgment
and order dated 22.12.2004.
F
H. Aggrieved, the State preferred an appeal before the
High Court and the High Court vide its impugned judgment and
order, convicted and sentenced both the appellants, thereby
reversing the judgment of the Trial Court, as referred to
G hereinabove.
Hence, this appeal.
3. Dr. A. Francis Jullian, learned Senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellants has submitted that the High Court
H
PUDHU RAJA & ANR. v. STATE, REP. BY 745
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
committed an error by interfering with the order of acquittal as A
was recorded by the Trial Court. While reversing the judgment
of acquittal, the High Court has not complied with the
parameters laid down by this Court in such matters. This is
because there is no direct evidence on any issue, and the case
is one of circumstantial evidence wherein, several links are B
missing in the chain of events. The Trial Court recorded
acquittal, as it came to the conclusion that there were a large
number of material inconsistencies that went to the root of the
case. There is also considerable embellishment/improvement
in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. There was also c
an inordinate delay after the incident, in lodging the FIR. The
appellant (A-1), had been arrested immediately, however, such
arrest was shown to have taken place at 9 A.M. on 18.4.2001.
There could have been absolutely no motive on the part of the
appellants, to commit the murder of the deceased. Thus, the
0
present appeal deserves to be allowed.
4. Shri Rakesh Sharma with Shri 8. Balaji, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State, opposed
the appeal contending that, the High Court had most certainly
appreciated the evidence as a whole and dealt with the case E
in the correct perspective. The deceased had died in the house
where only the appellants were residing with her. Despite this,
they were unable to furnish any reasonable explanation with
respect to the circumstances under which Jayalakshmi had
died. The conduct of the appellants, therefore, points only F
towards their guilt. At the relevant time when the deceased was
burning, both the appellants were found standing outside their
house. The gate was locked from the outside. The appellants
did not even produce the key of the house upon being asked
to do so. It was Mr. Chandran (PW.2), who brought a duplicate G
key from his house and opened the door to the said house. The
appellants did not inform the police, or the fire brigade when
the deceased was burning. No attempt was made by either of
them, to extinguish the said fire and they made no efforts to
inform the family members of the deceased. Had the H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A. prosecution witnesses not come out after noticing the smoke
coming from the house of the appellants, they would have
walked away scot free, as they had already locked the house,
from the outside. The appellants had further, also been
demanding dowry and harassing the deceased in this context.
B Thus, they most definitely had a very strong motive to get rid of
the deceased. The inconsistencies on the basis of which, the
trial Court had accorded acquittal to the appellants, were all
trivial in nature and none of them could be so material, that it
could be termed to go to the root of the case. The impugned
c judgment of the High Court, therefore, does not warrant any
interference and thus, the present appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
D
6. The following injuries were found on the person of the
deceased:
Scratches:
E 1. An injury on the right side of the upper lip
measuring 1 x 0.5 c.m.
2. An injury on the central part of the upper lip
measuring 1 x 0.5 c.m. The cells below these
F injuries were with clots and there was also swelling.
Clotted injuries:
1. A clotted injury on the centre part of the lower lip
and its surrounding, measuring 2 x 1 x 0.5 c.m.
G
2. A clotted injury on the right cheek, on the upper part
of the right jaw, measuring 3 x 2 x 0.5 c.m.
3. A clotted injury on the left cheek, on the upper part
of the left jaw, measuring 2 x 1 x 0.5 c.m.
H
PUDHU RAJA & ANR. v. STATE, REP. BY 747
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
4. A clotted injury on the central part to the upper part A
of the breast, measuring 6 x 5 x 0.5 c.m.
5. A clotted injury on the front side and the outer part
of the left leg 3 c.m. above the left heel, measuring
6 x 4 x 0.5 c.m. B
Injuries by fire:
The upper skin, inner skin and two types of fire injuries.
The body skin was burnt and the fat and cells under the skin
appeared to be red and heated. All over the body, including c
the upper side of the neck, the lower side of the neck, the upper
part of both hands, palms, both legs in entirety, the back portion
of the breast, the entire front and back portions of the stomach,
and the female organ bore injuries by fire. All these injuries by
fire, were suffered by her while she was alive. o
7. The law on the issue of interference with an order of
acquittal is to the effect that only in exceptional cases where
there are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal
is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with
the order of the acquittal. The appellate court should bear in E
mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further
that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of
innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view
is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons
for interference. F
8. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution
must establish each instance of incriminating circumstance, by
way of reliable and clinching evidence, and the circumstances
so proved, must form a complete chain of events, on the basis G
of which, no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused
can be reached. Undoubtedly, suspicion, however grave it may
be, can never be treated as a substitute for proof. While dealing
with a case of circumstantial evidence, the court must take
H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A utmost precaution whilst finding an accused guilty, solely on the
basis of the circumstances proved before it.
9. Furthermore, in such a case, motive assumes great
significance and importance, as the absence of motive puts the
8 court on its guard and causes it to scrutinize each piece of
evidence very closely in order to ensure that suspicion, emotion
or conjecture do not take the place of proof. The evidence
regarding existence of motive which operates in the minds of
assailants is very often, not known to any other person. The
motive may not even be known, under certain circumstances,
C to the victim of the crime. It may be known only to the accused
and to none other. It is therefore, only the perpetrator of the crime
alone, who knows as to what circumstances prompted him to
adopt a certain course of action, leading to the commission of
the crime.
D
10. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some
explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances
associated with him, and the Court must take note of such
E explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence, in order
to decide, as to whether or not, the chain of circumstances is
complete. When the attention of the accused is drawn to
circumstances that inculpate him in relation to the commission
of the crime, and he fails to offer an appropriate explanation,
F or gives a false answer with respect to the same, the said act
may be counted as providing a missing link for completing the
chain of circumstances. (See : The Transport Commissioner,
A.P., Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors., AIR 1983 SC
1225; State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471; and
G Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC
748).
11. While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take
into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were
of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. Minor
H contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or
PUDHU RAJA & ANR. v. STATE, REP. BY 749
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
improvements in relation to trivial matters, which do not effect A
the core of the case of the prosecution, must not be made a
ground for rejection of evidence, in its entirety. The trial court,
after going through the entire evidence available, must form an
opinion about the credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate
court in the normal course of action, would not be justified in B
reviewing the same again, without providing justifiable reasons
for the same. (Vide: State v. Saravanan, AIR 2009 SC 152).
12. VVhere the omission(s) amount to a contradiction,
creating a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, C
and the other witness also makes material improvements
before the court, in order to make the evidence acceptable, it
would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. The
discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found not to
be minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and
discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, the D
witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is
found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence
available or with a statement that has already recorded, then,
in such a case it cannot be held that the prosecution has
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. E
13. The present case requires to be examined in light of
the aforesaid settled legal propositions.
The trial Court decided in favour of the accused, and
F
acquitted them on ground of material contradictions in the
deposition of the eye-witnesses, as Karthikeyan (PW.4) had
deposed that he had gone along with Mr. Chandran (PW.2) to
inform the police and also the fire service station. On the
contrary, Mr. Chandran (PW.2): deposed that at the time of
occurrence he did not accompany Karthikeyan (PW.4), to the G
police station. According to the deposition of Karthikeyan
(PW.4), regarding the opening of the door of the house of the
deceased, the statements of Mr. Chandran (PW.2), and
Karthikeyan (PW.4), were found to be contrary to the statement
of Mr. Mahalingam (PW.8), Fire Service Officer as he stated H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A that, he reached the place of occurrence at about 1.45 A.M.
and found the house to be locked. Mr. Chandran (PW.2),
brought the key, opened the door and it was then that the fire
was put out. Mr. Mahalingam (PW.8) has further deposed that
the body of the deceased was on the cot and the fire had burnt
B the said cot also. However, the photographs taken by the police
proved to be contrary to the said deposition. The photograph
revealed that the body was lying on the floor while the cot was
lying upside down. The trial court further relied upon the
statement of Devaraj (DW.1) who deposed, that after the said
c incident, Kodirasu, father of the deceased Jayalakshmi, had
fraudulently taken away land from the father of the appellant (A-
1) by filing Suit No. 14/2002 in the Civil Court and further that
Jayalakshmi had been in love with one Selvam and further that,
her marriage to the appellant (A-1), was against her wishes and
was the reason for her committing suicide. More so, the trial
0
court doubted the time taken for recording FIR, and found the
explanation furnished for the delay regarding the same, totally
unacceptable. The explanation so furnished by the prosecution
was that, Ezhamparuthi (PW.1), was informed by the incident
and, thereafter, he went to the place of occurrence and upon
E seeing the place, he then went to the police station and lodged
the said FIR.
14. The High Court noted that it is an admitted fact that,
at the time of occurrence of the incident, the appellants were
F in the said house. Mr. Chandran (PW-2), saw them both
standing outside the house of the deceased. Appellant (A-2)
even tried to explain the situation by stating that, they were
watching TV in an adjoining room and came out to find fumes
coming from the next room, and also further stated that the
G deceased had committed suicide.
The High Court did not accept the story of suicide, saying
that the same was not plausible, in the given situation. It stated
that as the appellants were present at the place of occurrence,
H they should have been able to give a reasonable answer
PUDHU RAJA & ANR. v. STATE, REP. BY 751
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
regarding the manner in which the deceased died, but failed A
to do so. Instead, they all attempted to screen the offence.
15. The trial court did not take note of the fact that there
was sufficient evidence on record, to indicate the possibility and
the likelihood of dowry harassment and death, caused due to
B
failure to give dowry, as demanded.
16. The trial court did not consider that, if the deceased
had in fact committed suicide, the natural reaction of the co-
accused would not have been to rush out of the h.ouse, after
locking her inside, but to make an attempt to rescue her. C
Further, when Mr. Chandran (PW-2) asked for the house key,
the same was not provided, stating that the appellant (A-2) had
thrown it away. Mr. Chandran (PW-2), had to then fetch a
duplicate key to enter the house. This is a clear indication of
the fact" that the accused were trying to lock up the house and D
leave.
17. The theory of suicide can further be negated by the fact
that the doctor who conducted the post-mortem, did not mention
the possibility of suicide at all.
E
18. All the circumstances, therefore, clearly indicate that
the deceased did not die a natural death, nor was she the victim
of an accident and neither did she commit suicide. She was
therefore killed and no one except the accused could have
committed the said offence. F
19. A delay in the registration of the case would not
materially affect the case of the prosecution in any way, as PW-
1 was first summoned, then he went to the spot of the incident,
after which he went to the police station. Such a delay was G
therefore, natural and acceptable.
20. So far as the discrepancies and contradictions pointed
out by the trial court are concerned, the same are not material
and none of them can be held to go to the root of the case.
Further, even if there has been a transfer of property in favour H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 8 S.C.R.
A of Kodirasu, father of Jayalakshmi, the deceased, from the
father of the appellant (A-1), as the same is a transaction,
subsequent to the incident. it can have no bearing on the case.
The trial court unnecessarily gave advantage to the appellants
in this regard, even though the vendor himself was not
B examined. Thus, no motive can be attributed to the complainant
on this count. Furthermore, had Jaya1akshmi been in love with
Selvam, the same could not have been a ground for her to
commit suicide 2 % years from the date of her marriage, as
she would have in all likelihood, attempted the said act, either
c at the time of her marriage, or immediately thereafter.
21. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason
to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The
appeal has no merit and is, therefore, accordi(lgly dismissed.
D The appellant no.2 is on bail. Her bail bonds are cancelled.
She is directed to surrender within a period of four weeks from
today before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. In case she does
not surrender, we direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take
her into custody and send her to jail to serve out the remaining
E sentence.
A copy of the order may be sent to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Chengalpet, Tamil Nadu, by the Registry of this
Court for compliance.
F K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.