PUNIT BERIWALAversusTHE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.

                 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2421 : 2025 INSC 582

                            Punit Beriwala
                                  v.
                  The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 1834 of 2025)
                                  29 April 2025
                [Dipankar Datta and Manmohan,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the subject
       FIR against Respondent Nos.2 and 3 and whether a cognizable
       offence against them is prima facie made out from a reading of
       the subject complaint.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code,
       1860 – ss.467 468, 471, 420, 120B – Cross-FIRs filed – Subject
       FIR registered by the appellant against the accused persons,
       quashed qua the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 – Interference with:
       Held: Impugned judgment set aside – Power of quashing of a
       complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection –
       Mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing
       the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute –
       Only because the offence was committed during a commercial
       transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did
       not warrant a further investigation and if necessary, a trial – As per
       the allegation in the complaint/FIR, right from the inception of the
       transaction between the parties, the Appellant was misrepresented,
       defrauded, deceived with dishonest and fraudulent intent by
       Respondent Nos.2 and 3 – As per the complaint/FIR, there was
       misrepresentation by Respondent Nos.2 and 3 right from the
       inception – All accused persons acted in conspiracy to deceive
       and cheat the Appellant with no intention of selling the subject
       property to the Appellant and by misrepresentation and deception
       they entered into multiple transactions w.r.t the subject property –
       FIR/complaint reveals commission of cognizable offences by the
       respondent Nos. 2 and 3 – Furthermore, in view of the contradictory
       defences of the accused as well as the registration and pendency
       of the cross FIRs, the High Court should not have limited the scope
* Author
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    of investigation – Impugned judgment set aside – FIR against
    respondent nos. 2 and 3 revived. [Paras 28, 29, 31, 35, 39, 43, 46]

    Criminal Law – Cross FIRs – Need for holistic investigation:
    Held: Cross FIRs are to be holistically investigated – In cases
    involving cross-FIRs, it would be prudent and fair if the investigation
    is carried out in a comprehensive manner – The object of the
    investigation is the discovery of truth – In the present case, in view
    of cross-FIRs, the investigating authority will conclude that either
    the receipts in favour of the appellant are forged and fabricated
    or that the receipts are genuine – Complicity of the respondent
    nos. 2 and 3 can only be ascertained once the investigation is
    permitted to reach its logical conclusion. [Para 45]

    Agreement to Sell – Agreement to Sell in question if a Contract/
    Agreement to Sell – Specific performance thereof, if can be
    sought:
    Held: Yes – Plea that the agreement to Sell in question is not a
    written but an oral Agreement is contrary to facts and untenable
    in law – The Delhi High Court whose judgments bind the parties
    has repeatedly treated receipts, like the receipt dated 12.04.2004,
    as a Contract/Agreement to Sell whose specific performance can
    be sought. [Para 27]

    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Exercise of power:
    Held: Power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised
    sparingly with circumspection – While exercising this power, the
    Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint
    to be true and correct – Save in exceptional cases where non-
    interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the
    judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
    offences – Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not
    be used in a routine manner according to whims or caprice. [Para 29]

    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.482, 468, 469 – Penal
    Code, 1860 – ss.467 468, 471, 420, 120B – Quashing of FIR
    on ground of delay – When not proper:
    Held: Delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with
    imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of
    interdicting a criminal investigation – Delay will assume importance
    only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                            2423

          Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


     and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided
     by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence – The fact of
     misrepresentation and deception at the inception, that is, at the
     time of execution of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated
     12.04.2004 came to the knowledge of the Appellant (according to
     the complaint) only on 28.12.2021 and he filed the complaint on
     12.01.2022 – Prima facie there is no delay in filing the criminal
     proceedings – On facts, FIR could not have been quashed on
     the ground of delay – Moreover, in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C.,
     there is no period of limitation for offences which are punishable
     with imprisonment of more than three years. [Paras 37, 38, 40]

                              Case Law Cited
     Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.)
     [2009] 3 SCR 1017 : (2009) 5 SCC 528; Lee Kun Hee v. State of
     UP [2012] 4 SCR 287 : (2012) 3 SCC 132; Trisuns Chemicals v.
     Rajesh Aggarwal [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 686 : (1999) 8 SCC 686;
     Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra [2021] 4 SCR
     1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401; Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private
     Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2020] 11 SCR 786 :
     (2021) 5 SCC 795; Nathi Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1990) SCC
     (Cri) 638 – referred to.
     M/s. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd. v. Sh. Vinod Kumar
     Alag, ILR (1991) I Delhi 303 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                             List of Keywords
     Cross FIRs; Quashing of complaint/FIR; Commission of cognizable
     offences; Misrepresentation, Fraud; Deception; Dishonest and
     fraudulent intent; Receipt-cum-agreement to sell; Suit for specific
     performance; Multiple transactions with respect to the subject
     property; Commercial transaction; Conspiracy to deceive and cheat;
     HUF; Karta; Misrepresentation; Suit for specific performance; Sale
     deed; Agreement to sell; Public notice; Clear title of the property;
     Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court; No delay in FIR;
     Forged or fabricated; Conspiracy to deceive and cheat; No intention
     of selling the subject property; Misrepresented; Decepted; Part
     physical possession; Paper possession; Intention to cheat present
     since inception.
2424                                                       [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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                           Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     1834 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2022 of the High Court
     of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No. 4189 of 2022

                        Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Ms. Mukta Gupta, Sr. Adv., Ms. Misha Rohatgi, Lokesh Bhola,
     Nakul Mohta, Abhishek Singh Chauhan, Ms. Nitya Gupta, Ms.
     Aditi Gupta, Ms. Riya Dhingra.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Mrs. Archana Pathak Dave, A.S.G., Shyam Diwan, Sr. Adv., Karan
     Khanuja, Kunal Khanuja, Pushpendra Singh Bhadoriya, Jasmeet
     Singh, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Rajan Kumar
     Chourasia, Digvijay Dam, Gaurang Bhushan, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     Manmohan, J

1.   The present appeal has been filed challenging the judgment dated
     17th October 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge, Delhi High
     Court in Crl. M.C. 4189/2022 (“impugned judgment”), whereby the
     petition under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (“Cr.P.C.”) filed
     by the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein, was allowed and the First
     Information Report (“FIR”) No. 94/2022 registered at Police Station
     Economic Offences Wing, Mandir Marg, New Delhi (“subject FIR” or
     “FIR”) for offences punishable under Section 467/468/471/420/120B
     of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”), was quashed against Vikramjit
     Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3).
2.   The issue which arises for consideration in the present appeal is
     whether the learned Single Judge, Delhi High Court, was justified
     in quashing the subject FIR against Vikramjit Singh and Maheep
     Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) and whether a cognizable offence
     against them is prima facie made out from a reading of the subject
     complaint?
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                         2425

          Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


3.   The relevant facts of the present case are as under:
     3.1. It is the case of the Appellant that a Receipt-cum-Agreement
          to Sell dated 12 th April, 2004 (“Agreement to Sell”) was
          executed by Bhai Manjit Singh, Vikramjit Singh (Respondent
          No. 2) and Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) (collectively
          referred to as “accused persons”) in favour of the Appellant
          for sale of the property i.e. 28-A, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi
          admeasuring 3727 sq. yds. (“property” or “subject property”)
          for a total sale consideration of Rs. 28,00,00,000/- (Rupees
          Twenty-Eight Crores). The accused persons, in the Receipt-
          cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12th April 2004, represented
          that Bhai Manjit Singh was Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF.
          It was further represented by Bhai Manjit Singh that the
          property would be free from all encumbrances and that he
          would get the subject property converted to freehold before
          the transfer of the property in favour of the Appellant. The
          Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12 th April 2004 is
          reproduced hereinunder:
                                      “Receipt
                Received a sum of Rs.31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty
                One Lacs Only) as earnest money from Mr. Punit
                Beriwala, S/o Shri S.S. Beriwala, r/o 15/10 Sarvapriya
                Vihar, New Delhi, against the sale of property No.28-A
                Prithiviraj Road, New Delhi, admeasuring 3727 sq.
                yards. The total sale consideration agreed upon is
                Rs.28 Crores (Rupees Twenty Eight Crores only).
                Further a sum of Rupees Thirty lakhs to be made
                by Thursday.
                The sale is subject to the said property being free
                from all kinds’ charges, lien, encumbrances, prior
                sales, mortgages, litigation, claims, etc. The seller
                has agreed to get the said property freehold from
                the concerned authorities at his own expense
                before the transfer of the said property in favor of
                the PURCHASER i.e. Shri Punit Beriwala or his
                nominees.
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                                                                -SD-
                                                       SELLER
              Dated: 12.04.2004         Bhai Manjit Singh HUF
                            Through karta Bhai Manjit Singh S/o
                               r/o 2 south End Lane, New Delhi
              WITNESS
              1. -SD-
                  Maheep Singh
                  2 South End Lane, New Delhi
              2.    SD/-
                    Vikramjit Singh
                    2 South End Lane, New Delhi”
    3.2. As per the complaint, from 12th April 2004 to 03rd January 2005,
         the Appellant paid a sum of Rs.1,64,50,000/- (Rupees One
         Crore Sixty-Four Lacs Fifty Thousand) to Bhai Manjit Singh,
         which was acknowledged by various receipts, some of which
         were signed by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent
         Nos. 2 and 3) as witnesses. In pursuance of the Agreement
         to Sell, part physical possession of the servant quarter of
         the property was handed over to the Appellant vide letter of
         possession dated 22nd April 2004. It is the Appellant’s case that
         the possession was mere paper possession, and he was not
         put in actual physical possession of any part of the property.
    3.3. On 24th June 2016, one Ashok Gupta lodged an FIR No.
         105/2016 against the accused persons alleging therein that an
         Agreement to Sell dated 29th December 2010 for the subject
         property had been executed in his favour and that he was also
         put in possession of the servant quarter of the subject property.
         The said FIR was subsequently quashed by the Delhi High
         Court vide its Order dated 13th December 2019 in W.P. (Crl.)
         465/2019 in view of the settlement between the parties.
    3.4. Upon the alleged failure of the accused person to provide
         documents for clear title of the property, the Appellant published
         a notice dated 18th July 2020 in the Hindustan Times declaring
         to the public at large that an Agreement to Sell for the subject
         property had been executed between the Appellant and the
         accused persons.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                       2427

            Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


     3.5.    In response to the said public notice, Punjab and Sind Bank,
             Rajendra Place, New Delhi issued an objection letter dated
             20th July 2020 stating therein that the subject property had
             been mortgaged on 15th January 1996 by Bhai Manjit Singh
             for securing the loan granted to Montari Industries Limited.
     3.6.    Thereafter, SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI
             Equipment Finance Limited issued letters dated 22nd July
             2020 stating that the subject property had been mortgaged
             with them as well.
     3.7.    Bhai Manjit Singh HUF issued a letter dated 23rd July 2020 in
             response to the public notice dated 18th July 2020, denying the
             existence of any Agreement to Sell for the subject property,
             followed by a public notice dated 13th August 2020 in Hindustan
             Times refuting the contents of the Appellant’s notice dated
             18th July 2020.
     3.8.    Surprisingly, on 22nd September 2020, a reply was issued by
             Bhai Manjit Singh HUF stating that Bhai Manjit Singh had
             returned the amount paid by the Appellant.
     3.9.    The aforementioned events led to filing of a suit for specific
             performance by the Appellant before the Delhi High Court
             being CS(OS) No. 598 of 2021 (“civil suit”). On the first date
             of hearing on 21st November 2021, the civil suit was adjourned
             to 8th December 2021 directing the Appellant to file requisite
             court fees. On 8th December 2021, counsel for the accused
             persons informed the Court that the subject property had
             been sold by Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. The Appellant thereafter
             obtained a copy of the sale deed dated 2nd December 2021,
             which revealed that the subject property had been sold by Bhai
             Manjit Singh HUF to a company, J.K. Paper Limited.
     3.10. In the sale deed dated 2nd December 2021, it was stated that
           Bhai Manjit Singh resigned as Karta of the Bhai Manjit Singh
           HUF and transferred all rights, claim, title and entitlements in
           favour of the remaining members of the HUF and Vikramjit
           Singh (Respondent No. 2) was recognized as Karta of Bhai
           Manjit Singh HUF from 10 th March 2000. It was further
           stated that an equitable mortgage was created in favour of
           SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI Equipment
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           Finance Limited against the credit facility for an amount of
           Rs.87,00,00,000/- (Rupees Eighty-Seven Crore) availed by
           ADIZAA Investment Private Limited, in which Vikramjit Singh
           and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) were Directors.
     3.11. The Appellant thereafter filed a complaint dated 12th January
           2022 against the accused persons before the Economic
           Offences Wing, which led to registration of the subject FIR
           on 16th June 2022.
     3.12. In the meanwhile, the application under Order VII Rule 11 filed
           by the accused persons was dismissed by a learned Single
           Judge of the Delhi High Court vide Order dated 7th February
           2022. The said Order dated 7th February 2022 was challenged
           by the accused persons in FAO (OS) 20/2022, wherein the civil
           suit filed by the Appellant was stayed by the Division Bench
           of the Delhi High Court vide its Order dated 29th March 2022.

     ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
4.   Ms. Mukta Gupta, learned senior counsel for the Appellant, stated
     that the learned Single Judge while allowing the quashing petition
     had erroneously laid great emphasis on the delay in registration of
     the FIR and the fact that the FIR was registered after the civil suit
     had been stayed by the Division Bench.
5.   She contended that there was no delay in lodging the FIR. She stated
     that from 2004 to 2020, the accused persons kept representing that
     they were getting the subject property converted from leasehold to
     freehold, even though the property had already been converted to
     freehold. She stated that the accused persons denied the existence
     of the Agreement to Sell for the very first time through their letter
     dated 23rd July 2020.
6.   She stated that the Appellant became aware of further sale of property
     on 8th December 2021 and thereafter obtained a copy of the sale deed
     dated 2nd December 2021 in favour of J. K. Paper Limited, on 28th
     December 2021. She, therefore, stated that the dishonest intention
     of the accused persons was revealed for the very first time upon
     the discovery of sale deed and the mortgages mentioned therein,
     which were both prior and subsequent to the Agreement to Sell in
     favour of the Appellant.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                     2429

          Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


7.   She pointed out that the FIR finally came to be registered on 16th
     June 2022; however, the Appellant had filed the complaint before the
     Economic Offences Wing without any delay on 12th January 2022.
     She submitted that the period of limitation in terms of Section 469
     of the Cr.P.C. commences from the first day on which such offence
     comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved. She, therefore,
     stated that in the present case, the period of limitation commenced
     on 28th December 2021 and the complaint was filed within fifteen
     days on 12th January 2022.
8.   Even otherwise, she submitted that in terms of Section 468
     Cr.P.C., there is no limitation period prescribed for offences which
     are punishable with imprisonment of more than 3 (three) years.
     She pointed out that the offences alleged in the present case are
     punishable with imprisonment of more than 3 (three) years; thus,
     there is no period of limitation in lodging the FIR.
9.   She also submitted that delay in registration of the FIR cannot be
     the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. She emphasized
     that the consequences for any alleged delay in registration of the
     FIR ought to be adjudicated after appreciation of evidence and entire
     material on record.
10. She stated that at the time of execution of the Receipt-cum-Agreement
    to Sell dated 12th April 2004, accused persons represented that Bhai
    Manjit Singh is the Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. She pointed out
    that the said Agreement to Sell-cum-Receipt was executed by Bhai
    Manjit Singh in his capacity as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF and
    was witnessed by Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) and Vikramjit
    Singh (Respondent No. 2) even though Vikramjit Singh (Respondent
    No. 2) was the Karta at the relevant time, which was revealed to the
    Appellant through sale deed dated 2nd December 2021 in favour of JK
    Paper Limited, which stated that Respondent No. 2 herein became
    Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF on 10th March, 2000.
11. She stated that the fact that the property was already mortgaged
    with Punjab and Sind Bank on 15th January 1996, was revealed for
    the very first time through the letter dated 20th July 2020 issued by
    Punjab and Sind Bank in response to the Appellant’s public notice
    dated 18th July 2020 published in the Hindustan Times.
12. She stated that the misrepresentation, deception and dishonesty
    to induce the Appellant commenced from the date on which the
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     receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12th April 2004 was executed
     and therefore, the element of deception had existed from the very
     inception of the transaction. She stated that the accused persons
     deceived the Appellant into parting with a sum of Rs.1,64,50,000/-
     (Rupees One Crore Sixty-Four Lacs Fifty Thousand) between
     12th April 2004 and 3rd January 2005, which had been acknowledged
     by receipts, wherein Bhai Manjit Singh had signed as Karta and
     Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) had
     signed as witnesses despite fully knowing that Bhai Manjit Singh
     was not the Karta of the HUF.
13. She stated that the deception continued even after the execution
    of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12th April 2004 as Bhai
    Manjit Singh, Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh had executed
    another Agreement to Sell dated 29th December 2010 in favour of
    one Ashok Gupta, who was also allegedly put in part possession
    of the servant quarter of the subject property. She emphasised that
    identical modus operandi had been adopted by the accused persons
    with Ashok Gupta as well.
14. She stated that subsequent thereto, the property was once again
    mortgaged with possession to SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited
    and an equitable mortgage had been created in favour of SREI
    Equipment Finance Limited on 7th January 2019. She stated that
    the said mortgage was cleared on the same day as the sale deed
    dated 2nd December 2021 was executed in favour of J.K. Paper
    Limited.
15. She emphasized that the Sale Deed dated 2nd December 2021
    categorically states that the property is free from all encumbrances,
    third-party claims, disputes, litigation even though the Appellant’s
    suit for specific performance was pending before the learned Single
    Judge of the Delhi High Court. She highlighted that the sale deed
    had been executed during the pendency of the suit for specific
    performance filed by the Appellant.
16. She stated that the accused persons acting in collusion had created
    various chains of documents in favour of various persons. She pointed
    out that the Agreements in favour of the Appellant and Ashok Gupta
    had been executed by Bhai Manjit Singh, acting as Karta of Bhai
    Manjit Singh HUF, whereas the sale deed dated 2nd December 2021
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          Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


     in favour of J.K. Paper Limited had been executed by Vikramjit Singh
     acting as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. She further pointed out that
     all accused persons are parties to the documents created in favour
     of various persons, thereby showing a well-planned conspiracy to
     cheat, misrepresent and deceive.
17. She highlighted that on 23rd July 2020 Bhai Manjit Singh HUF denied
    the existence of any Agreement to Sell. However subsequently, on
    22nd September 2020, Bhai Manjit Singh stated that the advance
    consideration had been returned to the Appellant and that except Bhai
    Manjit Singh, no other person from the HUF had met the Appellant.
    She pointed out that subsequently vide notice dated 09th October
    2020, the Appellant sought copies of receipts showing the alleged
    repayment; however, till date no such receipts have been provided
    to the Appellant. She stated that on 22nd August 2022, an FIR was
    registered by Bhai Manjit Singh against the Appellant, alleging for
    the first time that the receipts of payment in favour of the Appellant
    were forged and fabricated. She emphasized that such contradictory
    stands of all three accused persons are required to be investigated
    by the police authorities.
18. She stated that the Appellant was never handed over possession
    of any part of the subject property. According to her, the letter of
    possession dated 22nd April 2004 was only intended to give paper
    possession to the Appellant and not the actual physical possession.
19. She contended that institution of civil proceedings cannot act as a
    bar to the investigation of cognizable offences. She submitted that
    it is settled law that civil and criminal proceedings can proceed
    simultaneously.
20. She pointed out that the present case involves two cross-FIRs. On
    the one hand is the subject FIR dated 16th June 2022 registered by
    the Appellant against the accused persons, which has been quashed
    qua the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 vide the impugned judgment.
    Whereas the other FIR dated 22nd August 2022 registered by Bhai
    Manjit Singh against the Appellant with respect to the same transaction
    is still subsisting even though the subject FIR was registered prior
    to the FIR against the Appellant. According to her, cross-FIRs are
    required to be investigated and tried together, and investigation ought
    not to be stifled at a nascent stage.
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     ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 2
21. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for Vikramjit Singh
    (Respondent No. 2), stated that the subject FIR had been rightly
    quashed by the learned Single Judge. He stated that there is not a
    single representation or correspondence on record which shows that
    the Appellant from 2004 to 2020 had taken any steps for purchase
    of the property. He stated that it was unbelievable that the sale of a
    prime and valuable property was done by way of an oral Agreement
    to Sell. He further stated that no reasonable person would wait for a
    period of more than 16 (sixteen) years to affect the sale of property in
    his favour. He stated that no complaint or FIR should ‘be entertained
    at this distance of time’.
22. He pointed out that it is only the first alleged receipt dated 12th April
    2004 which bears the signature of Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh
    (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) as witnesses. He stated that the only
    allegation against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is that they had signed
    the alleged Agreement to Sell as witnesses and that they were aware
    that Bhai Manjit Singh was not Karta of the HUF. According to him,
    mere signatures of Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent
    Nos. 2 and 3) on a receipt as witnesses is not sufficient to initiate
    criminal proceedings against them and the same does not constitute
    any of the offences alleged in the FIR.
23. He emphasized that the criminal proceedings against Bhai Manjeet
    Singh, who is the alleged executor of the Agreement to Sell, are
    continuing till date and the FIR has been quashed only qua Vikramjit
    Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3). He stated that
    in addition to the FIR against Bhai Manjeet Singh, the suit for specific
    performance of the alleged Agreement to Sell is also pending before
    the Delhi High Court and the Appellant can seek appropriate relief
    qua the subject property in the said civil suit.
24. He submitted that an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating
    is that the intention to deceive must exist at the very inception. He
    stated that as part physical possession was handed over to the
    Appellant, there was no intention of deceiving the Appellant from
    the inception. He pointed out that even alleged possession letter
    dated 22nd April 2004 is signed only by Bhai Manjit Singh, ruling out
    any involvement of Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent
    Nos. 2 and 3).
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                      2433

          Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


     ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 3
25. Learned senior counsel for Maheep Singh (Respondent No. 3) stated
    that Maheep Singh is a 73-year-old lady, who had signed on only
    two of the alleged receipts of payments made by the Appellant. He
    pointed out that Maheep Singh was not the Karta of the HUF at any
    point of time. He therefore stated that Maheep Singh (Respondent
    No. 3) cannot be treated at par with either Bhai Manjit Singh or
    Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2).

     ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 1/STATE OF
     NCT OF DELHI
26. Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, learned ASG appearing for the State
    (Respondent No. 1), stated that the FIR had been quashed at the
    nascent stage of investigation. She stated that Vikramjit Singh and
    Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) had refused to furnish
    their specimen signatures and refused to comply with Section 91
    Cr.P.C. notices issued by the Police.

                                 REASONING

     SIMILAR RECEIPTS TREATED AS CONTRACT/AGREEMENT TO
     SELL
27. The common foundation underlying the submissions of learned
    senior counsel for Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent
    Nos.2 and 3) and the impugned order that the Agreement to Sell
    in question is not a written but an oral Agreement, is contrary to
    facts and untenable in law. The Delhi High Court, whose judgments
    shall bind the parties including the police/investigating agency, has
    repeatedly treated receipts, like the receipt dated 12th April 2004, as
    a Contract/Agreement to Sell whose specific performance can be
    sought. In M/s. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sh.
    Vinod Kumar Alag, ILR (1991) I Delhi 303, Justice Arun Kumar, a
    learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court (as his Lordship then
    was) has held, “Mere heading or title of a document cannot deprive
    the document of its real nature. Law is well settled in such matters
    that it is the substance which has to be seen and not the form
    the document though titled as a ‘receipt’ contains all the essential
    ingredients of a ‘contract’ and therefore, this is a contract and the
    plaintiff can seek specific performance thereof.”
2434                                                            [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


     MERE INSTITUTION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ACT AS
     A BAR TO INVESTIGATION OF COGNIZABLE OFFENCES
28. It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for
    quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute.
    This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there
    is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself
    clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy,
    and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be
    an abuse of the process of the court. This Court is of the view that
    because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction,
    it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant
    a further investigation and if necessary, a trial. [See: Syed Aksari
    Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.) (2009) 5 SCC
    528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns
    Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal (1999) 8 SCC 686]

     WHILE QUASHING, MUST BELIEVE ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT
29. It is settled law that power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should
    be exercised sparingly with circumspection and while exercising
    this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations
    in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held
    that save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result
    in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should
    not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary
    and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine
    manner according to its whims or caprice.
30. In Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19
    SCC 401, this Court has held as under:-
           “33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated
           above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue,
           whether the High Court would be justified in passing an
           interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive
           steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing
           petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226
           of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and
           whether the High Court would be justified in passing the
           order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps
           to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                            2435

          Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


           report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while
           dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the
           criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers
           under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
           Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
           33.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the
           relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
           contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into
           a cognizable offence.
           33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
           cognizable offences.
           33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or
           offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information
           report that the Court will not permit an investigation to
           go on.
           33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly
           with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the “rarest
           of rare cases” (not to be confused with the formation in
           the context of death penalty).
           33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which
           is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to
           the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
           made in the FIR/complaint.
           33.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the
           initial stage.
           33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
           rather than an ordinary rule.
           33.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
           jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State
           operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought
           not to tread over the other sphere.
           33.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
           complementary, not overlapping.
           33.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference
           would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and
2436                                                      [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


        the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
        investigation of offences.
        33.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court
        do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
        according to its whims or caprice.
        33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia
        which must disclose all facts and details relating to the
        offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the
        police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits
        of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted
        to complete the investigation. It would be premature to
        pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the
        complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that
        it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if
        the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in
        the application made by the complainant, the investigating
        officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the
        learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
        Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
        33.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide,
        but conferment of wide power requires the court to be
        more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty
        on the court.
        33.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks
        fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing
        and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly
        the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur
        and Bhajan Lal, has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/
        complaint.
        33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
        alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power
        under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether the
        allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable
        offence or not. The court is not required to consider on
        merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make
        out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the
        investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations
        in the FIR.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                             2437

          Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


           33.16. The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/
           or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by
           the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing
           petition in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/
           or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However,
           an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency
           of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection.
           Such an interim order should not require to be passed
           routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when
           the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy
           and the entire evidence/material is not before the High
           Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing
           the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to
           be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply
           for anticipatory bail under Section 438CrPC before the
           competent court. The High Court shall not and as such
           is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or
           “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the
           investigation is completed and/or till the final report/charge-
           sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/
           disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC
           and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
           33.17. Even in a case where the High Court is prima
           facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made
           out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after
           considering the broad parameters while exercising the
           powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226
           of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the
           High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim
           order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that
           it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court
           and the higher forum can consider what was weighed
           with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
           33.18. Whenever an interim order is passed by the High
           Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the
           aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what
           does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the
           term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be
           too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/
           or misapplied.”
2438                                                       [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     AS PER THE COMPLAINT/FIR, RIGHT FROM THE INCEPTION,
     THERE WAS MISREPRESENTATION BY VIKRAMJIT SINGH AND
     MAHEEP SINGH
31. This Court is of the view that the conclusion of the learned Single
    Judge that the complaint / FIR on its face did not disclose offences
    under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 120-B IPC against Vikramjit
    Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3), is factually
    incorrect. If the averments in the complaint are to be believed, which
    is the norm that is to be followed at this stage, then the subject FIR/
    complaint reveals commission of cognizable offences by (son and
    mother) Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3)
    also as they despite being aware that Bhai Manjit Singh (father of
    Vikramjit Singh and husband of Maheep Singh) had no authority to
    enter into an Agreement to Sell on behalf of the HUF (as he was
    not the Karta of HUF on the said date), allowed Bhai Manjit Singh
    to misrepresent with dishonest and fraudulent intent that he was the
    Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. This misrepresentation assumes
    serious connotation as at the relevant time i.e. 12th April 2004, the
    Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF to the knowledge of Vikramjit Singh
    and Maheep Singh (witnesses to the receipt) was none other than
    Vikramjit Singh. It was due to this deception/misrepresentation/fraud
    that the Appellant parted with a sum of Rs.1,64,50,000/- (Rupees One
    Crore Sixty-Four Lakhs Fifty Thousand Only) from 12th April 2004
    to 03rd January 2005 – some receipts of which were also witnessed
    by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2 and 3).
    Consequently, as per the allegation in the complaint/FIR, right from
    the inception of the transaction between the parties, the Appellant was
    misrepresented, defrauded, deceived with dishonest and fraudulent
    intent by Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2 3).
    Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that all accused persons acted
    in conspiracy to deceive and cheat the Appellant with no intention
    of selling the subject property to the Appellant.

     MISREPRESENTATION BY ALL THREE ACCUSED IS THE
     OFFENCE COMPLAINED OF
32. This Court is of the view that the learned Single Judge misdirected
    himself by concluding that the only allegation against Vikramjit Singh
    and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) is that they were
    witnesses to the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12th April 2004,
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                     2439

          Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


     whereas, the gravamen of the allegation was that Vikramjit Singh
     and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) were equally guilty
     of misrepresentation as, despite their knowledge to the contrary (as
     they were all closely related as well as members of the said HUF and
     Vikramjit Singh was actual Karta), they allowed Bhai Manjit Singh
     who was not competent to execute the Receipt-cum-Agreement to
     Sell on behalf of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF to represent himself as the
     Karta and execute the same. Consequently, the underlying act of
     misrepresentation by Bhai Manjit Singh, Vikramjit Singh and Maheep
     Singh (all three) is the offence by which the Appellant is aggrieved,
     and not the mere act of signing the receipt as witnesses. However,
     the learned Single Judge has neither dealt with nor examined the
     said aspect in the impugned judgment.

     DEFENCE OF PART POSSESSION INSPIRES NO CONFIDENCE
33. The learned Single Judge has also held that the intention to cheat
    was not present since inception because as per the FIR, part
    possession of servant quarter of the property was handed over to
    the Appellant. However, what the learned Single Judge has failed
    to appreciate is that the Appellant had categorically alleged that the
    possession of the property is still with the accused persons, thereby
    rendering a mere paper possession. Further, the factum that the said
    possession was not treated seriously even by Vikramjit Singh and
    Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2 and 3) is apparent from the fact
    that when a similar Agreement to Sell was subsequently executed
    with Mr. Ashok Gupta, similar possession of the servant quarter was
    handed over to him also. Moreover, the fact that a Sale Deed was
    ultimately executed in favour of J.K. Paper Limited without reference
    to any such possession being handed over to Appellant shows that
    even the accused treated the said possession as a mere paper
    possession and a formality.
34. The learned Single Judge further failed to notice that admittedly
    Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos.2 and 3)
    continued to deal with the property after executing the Receipt-cum-
    Agreement to Sell by executing a registered mortgage, Agreement
    to Sell and Sale Deed. It is pertinent to mention that the mortgage
    with possession with SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and an
    equitable mortgage in favour of SREI Equipment Finance Limited
    was created for availing credit facility by ADIZAA Investment Private
2440                                                     [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     Limited, wherein Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent
     Nos. 2 and 3) were Directors. This Court is of the view that if the
     Appellant had indeed parted with part possession of the property to
     the Appellant, then a registered mortgage with possession could not
     have been created in favour of SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited
     or an Agreement to Sell with Mr. Ashok Gupta or Sale Deed with
     J.K. Paper Limited.
35. Admittedly, the property was sold to J.K. Paper Limited vide sale
    deed 2nd December 2021, which was executed by Vikramjit Singh
    (Respondent No.2) as Karta of Bhai Manjit Singh HUF. The fact that
    the said sale deed had been executed after the Appellant filed the
    suit for specific performance of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell
    dated 12th April 2004 lends credence to the allegations made by
    the Appellant that the accused persons by misrepresentation and
    deception had entered into multiple transactions with respect to the
    subject property.

     DELAY CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR QUASHING THE PRESENT
     FIR
36. Further, accepting the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge
    in the impugned order that ‘there had been a delay in registration
    of the FIR and because of such delay, the allegations made by the
    Appellant are unbelievable’ and the submissions of learned senior
    counsel for Respondent Nos.2 and 3 that no complaint/FIR should
    be entertained ‘at this distance of time’, would mean in effect in
    accepting the argument that delay is a sufficient ground for quashing
    of the present FIR/complaint.
37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences
    punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the
    basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume
    importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible
    explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to
    be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In
    this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India)
    Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2021) 5 SCC
    795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent
    complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to
    quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant
    any reference to precedents…..”
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                         2441

           Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


38. Further, as per the allegations in the complaint/FIR during 2004-2020
    the accused persons kept representing that they were in the process
    of getting the property unencumbered and converted to freehold. Upon
    the failure of the accused persons to show documents for clear title
    of the property, the Appellant had initially instituted a suit for specific
    performance, and it was only during the suit proceedings that it
    came to light that after the Agreement to Sell with the Appellant, the
    property was subsequently mortgaged to SREI Infrastructure Finance
    Limited and SREI Equipment Finance Limited and the same was
    subsequently sold to J.K. Paper Limited vide sale deed dated 02nd
    December 2021. The fact that Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2)
    was the Karta of the Bhai Manjit Singh HUF at the relevant time was
    also allegedly revealed for the very first time through the aforesaid
    sale deed dated 02nd December 2021, certified copy of which was
    obtained by the Appellant on 28th December 2021. Consequently,
    the fact of misrepresentation and deception at the inception, that is,
    at the time of execution of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated
    12th April 2004, came to the knowledge of the Appellant (according
    to the complaint) only on 28th December 2021.
39. The Appellant had, admittedly, filed the complaint before the Economic
    Offences Wing on 12th January 2022. Section 469 Cr.P.C. provides
    that the period of limitation commences from the date on which the
    offence comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved. In the
    present case, as noted above, the Appellant became aware of the
    offence only on 28th December 2021. Consequently, prima facie there
    is no delay in filing the criminal proceedings.
40. Even otherwise, as the learned senior counsel for the Appellant has
    rightly pointed out, in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C., there is no period
    of limitation for offences which are punishable with imprisonment of
    more than three years.

     COMPLAINT WAS FILED MUCH BEFORE THE SUIT WAS STAYED
41. The learned Single Judge has also clearly erred in concluding that the
    FIR was lodged after only after the civil suit filed by the Appellant had
    been stayed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. However,
    the record reveals that the application under Order VII Rule 11 filed
    by the accused persons was dismissed by a learned Single Judge
    of the Delhi High Court on 7th February 2022. The said Order dated
2442                                                      [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     7th February 2022 was challenged by the accused persons, wherein
     the civil suit filed by the Appellant was stayed by the Division Bench
     of the Delhi High Court on 29th March 2022. The complaint against
     the accused persons was filed by the Appellant on 12th January 2022
     i.e. much before the civil suit was stayed.

     CROSS FIRs ARE REQUIRED TO BE HOLISTICALLY INVESTIGATED
42. The accused persons have taken various inherently contradictory
    stands with respect to the transaction with the Appellant. On 23rd
    July 2020 Bhai Manjit Singh and Bhai Manjit Singh HUF denied the
    existence of any Agreement to Sell. On 22nd September 2022, Bhai
    Manjit Singh and Bhai Manjit Singh HUF stated that the advance
    consideration had been returned to the Appellant and that except Bhai
    Manjit Singh, no other person from the HUF had met the Appellant.
    Finally, after the registration of the subject FIR dated 16th June
    2022, Bhai Manjit Singh and Bhai Manjit Singh HUF registered an
    FIR dated 22nd August 2022, alleging that the receipts of payment
    in favour of the Appellant and relied upon by him in his civil suit as
    well as the FIR dated 16th June 2022, were forged and fabricated.
43. Keeping in view the contradictory defences of the accused as well
    as the registration and pendency of the cross FIRs, this Court is of
    the view that the learned Single Judge should not have limited the
    scope of investigation.
44. In the context of cross cases, this Court in Nathi Lal v. State of
    Uttar Pradesh (1990) SCC (Cri) 638 has held as under:-
          “2. We think that the fair procedure to adopt in a matter
          like the present where there are cross cases, is to direct
          that the same learned Judge must try both the cross cases
          one after the other. After the recording of evidence in one
          case is completed, he must hear the arguments but he
          must reserve the judgment. Thereafter he must proceed to
          hear the cross case and after recording all the evidence he
          must hear the arguments but reserve the judgment in that
          case. The same learned Judge must thereafter dispose of
          the matters by two separate judgments. In deciding each
          of the cases, he can rely only on the evidence recorded
          in that particular case. The evidence recorded in the cross
          case cannot be looked into. Nor can the judge be influenced
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          2443

             Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.


             by whatever is argued in the cross case. Each case must
             be decided on the basis of the evidence which has been
             placed on record in that particular case without being
             influenced in any manner by the evidence or arguments
             urged in the cross case. But both the judgments must be
             pronounced by the same learned Judge one after the other.”
45. Even though the above decision was rendered in respect of trial
    of cross cases, this Court is of the opinion that in cases involving
    cross-FIRs, it would be prudent and fair if the investigation was
    carried out in a comprehensive manner. After all, the object of the
    investigation is the discovery of truth. In the present case, in view of
    cross-FIRs, the investigating authority will conclude that either the
    receipts in favour of the Appellant are forged and fabricated or that
    the receipts are genuine. The complicity of Respondent Nos. 2 and
    3 herein can only be ascertained once the investigation is permitted
    to reach its logical conclusion.

                                   CONCLUSION
46. Keeping in view the aforesaid findings, the impugned judgment and
    order dated 17th October 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge
    in Crl. M.C. 4189/2022 is set aside and FIR No.94/2022 registered
    at Police Station Economic Offences Wing, Mandir Marg, New Delhi
    for offences punishable under Section 467/468/471/420/120B IPC
    against Vikramjit Singh and Maheep Singh (Respondent Nos. 2 and
    3) is revived. Accordingly, the present Appeal is disposed of.
47. It is clarified that the aforesaid findings have been given in the context
    of quashing of the complaint/FIR and shall not bind the Courts below
    while deciding the matter.

     Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey