PUNJAB & SIND BANKversusSH. RAJ KUMAR

                  [2026] 4 S.C.R. 350 : 2026 INSC 313

                          Punjab & Sind Bank
                                  v.
                            Sh. Raj Kumar
                       (Civil Appeal No. 847 of 2026)
                                02 April 2026
           [Dipankar Datta* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the imposition of lighter punishment on the co-delinquents
       while imposing the punishment of ‘dismissal from service’ upon
       the respondent is in outright defiance of logic.

                                 Headnotes†
       Punjab and Sind Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations,
       1981 – Dismissal from service – Allegation that respondent
       connived with two others (one officer and a gunman) to
       misappropriate money of the customers for their personal
       gain, stealing bank records, etc. – The disciplinary authority
       imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement on the co-
       delinquent gunman while the co-delinquent officer was
       awarded “lowering by two stages” – The punishment of
       dismissal was imposed on the respondent (senior manager
       at the relevant time) – Writ petition – The Single Judge
       of the High Court modified the punishment of ‘dismissal
       from service’ imposed upon the respondent to ‘compulsory
       retirement’ on the ground of discrimination in imposition of
       punishment thereby offending Art.14 of the Constitution –
       Same was affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court –
       Correctness:
       Held: The imposition of lighter punishment on the co-delinquents
       while imposing the punishment of ‘dismissal from service’ upon
       the respondent is not in outright defiance of logic – Sight cannot
       be lost of the fact that the respondent, when he committed the
       offence, was holding the post of “Senior Manager in MMGS-III
       Scale”, which is obviously much higher than the codelinquents



* Author
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                                351

                    Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


     (officer and gunman) – Authority carries accountability; higher the
     authority, higher the accountability – The rank of the respondent
     was not merely titular; it carried with it an increased degree of
     responsibility and integrity – The role of the respondent not only
     necessitated personal obedience but also supervision of the
     actions of the subordinates – The co-delinquents, having limited
     powers and authority, could not have been equated with the
     respondent – The gravity of the misconduct necessarily had to
     be measured with the nature of the misconduct – Thus, grant of
     the benefit of parity to the respondent by the High Court merely
     because the co-delinquents were given lighter punishment was
     entirely misconceived – The disciplinary authority found it prudent
     in the circumstances to impose a harsher punishment on a higher-
     ranking official – The High Court clearly fell in error in the course
     of adjudication of the lis – The interference by the Single Judge
     with the decision of the disciplinary authority, since affirmed by
     the Division Bench vide the impugned order, was uncalled for –
     The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority (namely,
     dismissal from service) imposed on the respondent is restored.
     [Paras 12-14, 17, 18]

     Service Law – Interference with an order of punishment
     imposed – Power of Judicial review:
     Held: Normally, no court in exercise of its power of judicial
     review should interfere with an order of punishment imposed on
     a delinquent as a measure of disciplinary action by the competent
     authority and substitute its own judgment for that of the former –
     This is premised on the reason that the disciplinary authority is the
     best judge of the situation, and the requirements of maintaining
     discipline within the work force – However, interference could
     be warranted if a punishment, which is strikingly or shockingly
     disproportionate and is not commensurate with the gravity of
     misconduct, proved to have been committed in course of inquiry
     or otherwise, would border on arbitrariness and offend Art.14 of
     the Constitution – Judicial scrutiny and interference, if at all, has to
     be based on reasons in support of the court’s ultimate satisfaction
     that the disciplinary authority has faltered in the exercise of his
     discretion. [Paras 9-12]
352                                                                      [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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                                    Case Law Cited
       Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1983) 2 SCC 442;
       Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [1988] 1 SCR 512 : (1987) 4 SCC
       611; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 644 :
       (1995) 6 SCC 749; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [1997] Supp.
       3 SCR 549 : (1997) 7 SCC 463; Om Kumar v. Union of India [2000]
       Supp. 4 SCR 693 : (2001) 2 SCC 386; Union of India v. R.K.
       Sharma [2001] Supp. 3 SCR 664 : (2001) 9 SCC 592; Chairman
       and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar
       [2003] 1 SCR 1034 : (2003) 4 SCC 364; State of Gujarat v. Anand
       Acharya (2007) 9 SCC 310; S.R. Tewari v. Union of India [2013]
       8 SCR 988 : (2013) 6 SCC 602; Rajasthan SRTC v. Bajrang Lal
       (2014) 8 SCC 693 – relied on.
       Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 4 SCC 225 – referred to.

                                       List of Acts
       Punjab and Sind Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1981;
       Constitution of India.

                                   List of Keywords
       Service Law; Judicial review; Disciplinary action; Competent
       Authority; Disciplinary Authority; Dismissal from service; Degree of
       responsibility; Accountability; Judicial scrutiny; Lighter punishment;
       Principle of Parity.

                                  Case Arising From
       C I V I L A P P E L L AT E J U R I S D I C T I O N : C i v i l A p p e a l N o .
       847 of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 11.09.2024 of the High Court
       of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No. 410 of 2023.

                              Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Rajesh Kumar Gautam, Anant Gautam, Deepanjal Chaudhary,
       Ms. Azal Aekram, Ms. Likvi K Jhakalu.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       G.S. Chaturvedi, Shantanu Chaturvedi, Surya Kant.
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                            353

                        Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                    Judgment

      Dipankar Datta, J.

      The greater the trust reposed, the stricter the scrutiny imposed.
1.    The present appeal, by special leave, at the instance of Punjab and
      Sind Bank1 takes exception to the judgment and order dated 11th
      September, 20242 of the High Court of Delhi3. Vide the impugned order,
      a writ appeal4 filed by the P&SB was dismissed and the judgment
      and order5 of the Single Judge, allowing a writ petition filed by the
      respondent, affirmed. The Single Judge modified the punishment of
      ‘dismissal from service’ imposed upon the respondent to ‘compulsory
      retirement’ on the ground of discrimination in imposition of punishment
      thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution.
2.    Facts, triggering this appeal, are these:
      a.      Respondent joined the P&SB as a Clerk/Cashier in the year
              1987 until he was placed under suspension in December of
              2011, followed by disciplinary action of dismissal from service on
              25th November, 2024. At the time of dismissal, the respondent
              held the post of “Senior Manager in MMGS-III Scale”.
      b.      The punishment of dismissal imposed on the respondent (senior
              manager at the relevant time) was preceded by a show cause
              notice, a chargesheet and an inquiry in accordance with the
              Punjab and Sind Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations,
              1981 on the allegation that the respondent connived with
              two others (one officer6 and a gunman7) to misappropriate
              money of the customers for their personal gain, stealing bank
              records, etc. The disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of



1    P&SB
2    impugned order
3    High Court
4    LPA No. 410 of 2023
5    dated 3rd February, 2023
6    Gurjant Singh
7    Sukhdev Singh
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            compulsory retirement on the co-delinquent gunman while the
            co-delinquent officer was awarded “lowering by two stages”.
            The precise import of the said punishment remains unclear;
            however, we assume that the expression denotes a reduction
            in ‘pay’ by two stages.
       c.   Dejected, the respondent unsuccessfully filed an appeal and
            subsequently a review against the order of the disciplinary
            authority but to no avail. Seeking his reinstatement, the
            respondent then approached the writ court by filing a writ
            petition8.
       d.   Initially, the said writ petition was disposed of by a Single Judge
            vide order dated 12th December, 2017. After rejecting the claim
            of the respondent on the merits of the disciplinary proceedings,
            the Single Judge directed the appellate authority to impose
            an appropriate punishment upon the respondent keeping the
            principle of parity in mind. Respondent carried the said order
            in an intra-court appeal9, which was disposed of by a Division
            Bench (vide order dated 8th January, 2019) by setting aside the
            order under appeal and directing the Single Judge to decide
            the writ petition on merits.
       e.   Apart from challenging the decision on merits, the respondent’s
            claim before the High Court was also that he was discriminated
            against in imposition of punishment; while one of the co-
            delinquents was compulsorily retired and the other awarded
            punishment of “lowering by two stages”, he was dismissed
            from service. Later, before the Single Judge who decided the
            writ petition on remand, the respondent limited his challenge
            only to the quantum of punishment, on the ground of parity
            with the co-delinquents. The Single Judge proceeded to allow
            the writ petition after noting that for similar charges, different
            punishments were imposed on the co-delinquents with the
            respondent having been given the most severe punishment
            without any difference in their roles. Relevant paragraphs from
            the judgment of the Single Judge are reproduced below:



8   WP (C) No. 11034/2017
9   LPA No. 708 of 2018
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                             355

                    Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


           11. The only issue that this Court is required to delve into is
           to test the correctness and legality of the action of Punjab
           and Sind Bank in awarding the punishment of dismissal to
           the Petitioner while awarding lesser punishment to those
           alleged and proved to have acted in ‘connivance’……
           16. From a conspectus of the aforementioned judgments,
           it is luminously clear that doctrine of equality enshrined
           in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not an abstract
           doctrine and is enforceable in Court of Law. It is applicable
           to all equally placed even if they are guilty and the principle
           of parity has to be kept in mind by the disciplinary authority
           tasked to decide the quantum of punishment. …………
           19. Having perused the respective charges, it is amply
           clear that the charges against the Petitioner and the two
           co-delinquent employees related to the same transactions/
           incidents and the gravamen of the allegations was the
           same………. This Court is unable to find any substantial
           difference in the charges levelled against the three co-
           delinquents, which would justify a differential treatment
           in punishment, save and except, that the Petitioner in his
           capacity as Bank Manager had signed the documents and/
           or checked the transactions in question. This by itself is not
           an aggravating factor of such a magnitude, which would
           justify one co- delinquent being sent home on compulsory
           retirement, remaining entitled to pensionary and terminal
           benefits for life and thereafter family pension to his family
           and the other being dismissed, entailing forfeiture of the
           entire past service, not only depriving him of all retiral/
           terminal benefits but leaving the dependents in his family
           in a state of penury.
           20. In my view, Bank has been unable to substantiate
           and justify why the Petitioner was awarded the extreme
           punishment of dismissal while the other two have been
           let off with lesser punishment… .
           23. Looking at the punishments awarded to the co-
           delinquents for same incidents/transactions and acts of
           connivance and testing the impugned action on the anvil
           of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as well as keeping
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            in mind the long and unblemished spell of service of the
            Petitioner, save and except, the present delinquency, this
            Court is inclined to convert the punishment from ‘dismissal’
            to one of ‘compulsory retirement’… .
                                                        (emphasis ours)

       f.   This order was carried in an intra-court appeal by the P&SB
            which has been dismissed vide the impugned order. The Division
            Bench found no perversity in the order of the Single Judge.
3.     Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, learned counsel for the P&SB cited
       authorities to buttress his point as to how interference with the order
       of punishment by the High Court is contrary to settled principles of
       law and, thus, merits interdiction by this Court.
4.     Per contra, Mr. G.S. Chaturvedi, representing the respondent,
       supported the impugned order upholding the decision of the Single
       Judge by referring to the invidious discrimination that he was subjected
       to. Additionally, he invited our attention to an observation made by
       a Division Bench of the High Court in its order dated 8th January,
       2019 to the following effect:
            9. It appears that on 2nd January, 2012 while he was still
            under suspension, the Appellant wrote a letter to the Bank
            in Hindi stating that if there was any mistake on his part
            while working as the Branch Manager at Roshanpur, he
            was prepared to make good the loss incurred by the Bank.
            He further stated that on that date he had deposited Rs. 2
            lacs. It appears that a police complaint was also filed. This
            led to the Appellant submitting another handwritten letter
            in Hindi which was received by the Bank on 19th May,2012
            whereby upon the direction of the police, he deposited
            demand drafts worth Rs. 4,19,214.00/-. The last few lines
            of the said letter are significant where he stated “sriman ji
            meri koi galti nahi hai bahut dabav ke karan paise jama
            kar raha hu. Samaaj mein apni izzat bachae rakhne ke
            liye kar raha hu”. Prima facie, therefore, appears that on
            both the occasions, the Petitioner was depositing money
            under pressure and neither of his letters could be actually
            viewed as an admission of guilt by the Appellant.
                                   (italics in original, underlining ours)
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                              357

                        Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


      The plea advanced (though abandoned before the benches of the
      High Court) touches upon the merits of the respondent’s claim of
      innocence and that he was unfairly punished.
5.    Counsel for the parties have been heard and the materials on record
      perused.
6.    The disciplinary action taken by the P&SB having not been assailed
      on its merits by the respondent before the Single Judge except the
      quantum of punishment, we are tasked to decide a limited point.
7.    In light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are
      reminded of the consistent line of decisions of this Court delineating
      the circumstances in which judicial interference is warranted in matters
      concerning imposition of punishment by disciplinary authorities.
8.    We consider it apt to note the relevant passages from a few of these
      decisions, hereunder:-
      a.     Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh10:
             15. …It is equally true that the penalty imposed must
             be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct,
             and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of
             the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the
             Constitution. …
      b.     Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India11:
             25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed
             against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-
             making process”. The question of the choice and quantum
             of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the
             court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and
             the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh.
             It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to
             shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive
             evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part
             of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even
             on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive



10   (1983) 2 SCC 442
11   (1987) 4 SCC 611
358                                                           [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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             province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court
             even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic,
             then the sentence would not be immune from correction.
             Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of
             judicial review… .
                                                        (emphasis ours)

       c.    B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India12 (three-Judge Bench):
             18. A review of the above legal position would establish
             that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate
             authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive
             power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain
             discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose
             appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or
             gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while
             exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally
             substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some
             other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
             authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience
             of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the
             relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority
             to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the
             litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases,
             impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in
             support thereof.
       d.    Union of India v. G. Ganayutham13 (three-Judge Bench):
             Punishment in disciplinary matters: Wednesbury and
             CCSU tests
             32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended
             before us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We
             need not therefore go into the question of “proportionality”.
             There is no contention that the punishment imposed
             is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to
             “irrationality”, there is no finding by the Tribunal that the


12   (1995) 6 SCC 749
13   (1997) 7 SCC 463
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                              359

                    Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


           decision is one which no sensible person who weighed the
           pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding,
           based on material, that the punishment is in “outrageous”
           defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are
           satisfied. We have still to explain “Ranjit Thakur [(1987)
           4 SCC 611 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] ”.
           33. In Ranjit Thakur [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1987 SCC
           (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] this Court interfered with the
           punishment only after coming to the conclusion that the
           punishment was in outrageous defiance of logic and was
           shocking. It was also described as perverse and irrational.
           In other words, this Court felt that, on facts, Wednesbury
           and CCSU tests were satisfied. In another case, in B.C.
           Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996
           SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] a three-Judge Bench
           said the same thing as follows……….
           34. In such a situation, unless the court/tribunal opines in its
           secondary role, that the administrator was, on the material
           before him, irrational according to Wednesbury [(1948) 1
           KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680] or CCSU [1985 AC 374 :
           (1984) 3 All ER 935] norms, the punishment cannot be
           quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back
           to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only
           in very rare cases as pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedi case
           [AIR 1961 SC 418 : (1961) 2 SCR 343] that the Court
           might — to shorten litigation — think of substituting its
           own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place
           of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. (In
           B.C. Chaturvedi [AIR 1961 SC 418 : (1961) 2 SCR 343]
           and other cases referred to therein it has however been
           made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136
           is different.) For the reasons given above, the case cited
           for the respondent, namely, State of Maharashtra v. M.H.
           Mazumdar [(1988) 2 SCC 52: 1988 SCC (L&S) 436 :
           (1988) 6 ATC 876] cannot be of any help.
           35. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the order
           of the Tribunal which has interfered with the quantum
           of punishment and which has also substituted its own
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             view of the punishment. The punishment awarded by the
             departmental authorities is restored. In the circumstances,
             there will be no order as to costs.
                                                         (emphasis ours)

       e.    Om Kumar v. Union of India14:
             67. But where an administrative action is challenged
             as “arbitrary” under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa
             [(1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] (as in cases
             where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged),
             the question will be whether the administrative order
             is “rational” or “reasonable” and the test then is the
             Wednesbury test. The courts would then be confined only
             to a secondary role and will only have to see whether
             the administrator has done well in his primary role,
             whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant
             factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors
             into consideration or whether his view is one which no
             reasonable person could have taken. If his action does
             not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. [In
             G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council [(1991) 3 SCC
             91] (SCC at p. 111).] Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was)
             pointed out that “reasonableness” of the administrator
             under Article 14 in the context of administrative law has
             to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In
             Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651] (SCC
             at pp. 679-80), Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P)
             Ltd. v. Union of India [(1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC
             (Tax) 121] (SCC at p. 691), Supreme Court Employees’
             Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [(1989) 4 SCC 187 :
             1989 SCC (L&S) 569] (SCC at p. 241) and U.P. Financial
             Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P). Ltd. [(1993) 2 SCC 299]
             (SCC at p. 307) while judging whether the administrative
             action is “arbitrary” under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise then
             being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a
             Wednesbury review always.


14   (2001) 2 SCC 386
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                              361

                        Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


             68. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as
             discriminatory under Article 14, the principle of primary
             review is for the courts by applying proportionality. However,
             where administrative action is questioned as “arbitrary”
             under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based
             on Wednesbury principles applies.
             Proportionality and punishments in service law
             69. The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph
             in respect of Article 14 are now to be applied here where
             the question of “arbitrariness” of the order of punishment
             is questioned under Article 14.
             70. In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In
             Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988
             SCC (L&S) 1] this Court referred to “proportionality” in
             the quantum of punishment but the Court observed that
             the punishment was “shockingly” disproportionate to the
             misconduct proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India
             [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC
             44] this Court stated that the court will not interfere unless
             the punishment awarded was one which shocked the
             conscience of the court. Even then, the court would remit
             the matter back to the authority and would not normally
             substitute one punishment for the other. However, in rare
             situations, the court could award an alternative penalty.
             It was also so stated in Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463
             : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806].
                                                         (emphasis ours)

      f.     Union of India v. R.K. Sharma15:
             13. In our view, the observations in Ranjit Thakur case
             [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC
             113] extracted above, have been misunderstood. In that
             case the facts were such that they disclosed a bias on
             the part of the Commanding Officer. In that case the
             appellant Ranjit Thakur had fallen out of favour of the


15   (2001) 9 SCC 592
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             Commanding Officer because he had complained against
             the Commanding Officer. For making such a complaint
             the Commanding Officer had sentenced him to 28 days›
             rigorous imprisonment. While he was serving the sentence
             he was served with another charge-sheet which read as
             follows:
                    “Accused 1429055-M Signalman Ranjit Thakur of 4
                    Corps Operating Signal Regiment is charged with—

                    Army Act,      Disobeying a lawful command given
                    Section 41(2). by his superior officer
                    In that he,
                    at 1530 hours on 29-5-1985 when ordered by JC
                    106251-P Sub Ram Singh, the Orderly Officer of
                    the same Regiment to eat his food, did not do so.”

             On such a ridiculous charge rigorous imprisonment of one
             year was imposed. He was then dismissed from service,
             with the added disqualification of being declared unfit for
             any future civil employment. It was on such gross facts
             that this Court made the observations quoted above and
             held that the punishment was so strikingly disproportionate
             that it called for interference. The above observations are
             not to be taken to mean that a court can, while exercising
             powers under Article 226 or 227 and/or under Article 32,
             interfere with the punishment because it considers the
             punishment to be disproportionate. It is only in extreme
             cases, which on their face show perversity or irrationality
             that there can be judicial review. Merely on compassionate
             grounds a court should not interfere.
                                                       (emphasis ours)

       g.    Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial
             Bank v. P.C. Kakkar16 :
             11. The common thread running through in all these
             decisions is that the court should not interfere with the


16   (2003) 4 SCC 364
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                             363

                        Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


             administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers
             from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
             conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance
             of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been
             stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture
             Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 :
             (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the
             correctness of the choice made by the administrator open
             to him and the court should not substitute its decision to
             that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is
             limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and
             not the decision.
             12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed
             by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
             shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no
             scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it
             may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
             punishment by recording cogent reasons in support
             thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed
             is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to
             direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
             to reconsider the penalty imposed.
                                                        (emphasis ours)

      h.     State of Gujarat v. Anand Acharya17 :
             15. The well-settled proposition of law that a court sitting
             in judicial review against the quantum of punishment
             imposed in the disciplinary proceedings will not normally
             substitute its own conclusion on penalty is not in dispute.
             However, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
             authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience
             of the court, then the court would appropriately mould
             the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate
             authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten
             the litigation it may make an exception in rare cases and
             impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in


17   (2007) 9 SCC 310
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             support thereof (see Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. [(1983)
             2 SCC 442 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 342] , Ranjit Thakur v.
             Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1]
             and U.P. SRTC v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra [(2000) 3 SCC
             450 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 356]).
       i.    S.R. Tewari v. Union of India18 :
             28. The role of the court in the matter of departmental
             proceedings is very limited and the court cannot substitute
             its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived
             at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence
             on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the
             scope for interference by the court is very limited and
             restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed
             by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority
             unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be
             subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons
             as to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure
             to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere
             statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. …
                                                        (emphasis ours)

       j.    Rajasthan SRTC v Bajrang Lal19 :
             21. As regards the question of disproportionate punishment
             is concerned, the issue is no more res integra. …
             22. In view of the above, the contention raised on behalf of
             the respondent employee, that the punishment of removal
             from service is disproportionate to the delinquency is not
             worth acceptance. The only punishment in case of the
             proved case of corruption is dismissal from service.
                                                        (emphasis ours)

9.     What follows from the precedents noted above is that courts should
       exercise restraint while interdicting orders of punishment. Normally,
       no court in exercise of its power of judicial review should interfere


18   (2013) 6 SCC 602
19   (2014) 8 SCC 693
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                         365

                    Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


     with an order of punishment imposed on a delinquent as a measure
     of disciplinary action by the competent authority and substitute its
     own judgment for that of the former. This is premised on the reason
     that the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the situation, and
     the requirements of maintaining discipline within the work force.
     While it is not the law that the courts should invariably stay at a
     distance when legality and/or propriety of a particular punishment
     is questioned, judicial scrutiny of the disciplinary action by way of
     punishment could arise only if the circumstances are such that no
     reasonable person would impose the punishment which is questioned
     and/or such punishment has the effect of shocking the conscience of
     the court. To put in simpler words, interference could be warranted
     if it appeals to the court that the disciplinary authority has ‘used a
     sledgehammer for cracking a nut’. A punishment, which is strikingly
     or shockingly disproportionate and is not commensurate with the
     gravity of misconduct, proved to have been committed in course
     of inquiry or otherwise, would border on arbitrariness and offend
     Article 14 of the Constitution.
10. Where a court, upon due consideration, arrives at the conclusion
    that the punishment imposed is disproportionate, its intervention
    is circumscribed in nature. Judicial scrutiny and interference, if at
    all, has to be based on reasons in support of the court’s ultimate
    satisfaction that the disciplinary authority has faltered in the exercise
    of his discretion. In such a situation, the court may adopt one of
    two courses: it may remit the matter to the competent authority
    for reconsideration of the punishment; or, in the rarest of cases, it
    may substitute the punishment while supporting such a course with
    cogent reasons.
11. After refreshing our memory with these well-established principles, the
    only question that arises for consideration is whether interference by
    the Single Judge with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority,
    in the facts and circumstances of the present case, satisfied the
    requisite threshold. If we find that such interference was not called
    for, then the impugned order (which upheld the view taken by the
    Single Judge) will have to be set aside.
12. Whether the imposition of lighter punishment on the co-delinquents
    while imposing the punishment of ‘dismissal from service’ upon the
    respondent is in outright defiance of logic? We think not.
366                                                          [2026] 4 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


13. Sight cannot be lost of the fact that the respondent, when he committed
    the offence, was holding the post of “Senior Manager in MMGS-III
    Scale”, which is obviously much higher than the co-delinquents (officer
    and gunman). Authority carries accountability; higher the authority,
    higher the accountability. The rank of the respondent was not merely
    titular; it carried with it an increased degree of responsibility and
    integrity. The role of the respondent not only necessitated personal
    obedience but also supervision of the actions of the subordinates. The
    co-delinquents, having limited powers and authority, could not have
    been equated with the respondent. The gravity of the misconduct
    necessarily had to be measured with the nature of the misconduct.
    Thus, grant of the benefit of parity to the respondent by the High Court
    merely because the co-delinquents were given lighter punishment
    was entirely misconceived. The differentiation in rank coupled with
    the increased trust of the employer on the respondent certainly
    constituted a compelling ground for a more stringent punishment to
    be imposed on him.
14. Taking an overall view, the fact that the disciplinary authority found
    it prudent in the circumstances to impose a harsher punishment
    on a higher-ranking official is neither disproportionate, nor shocks
    our conscience. The High Court clearly fell in error in the course of
    adjudication of the lis.
15. Quite apart, equating a branch manager of a bank with its gunman
    seems to us to be in outrageous defiance of logic and reason. This
    is not a case akin to Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab20 where this
    Court interfered with disciplinary action finding that some out of several,
    guilty of the same misconduct, were picked and chosen for harsher
    punishment leaving aside others without any convincing reason.
16. Reference to the observation made by the Division Bench, noted in
    paragraph 4 supra, is of no real consequence. Manifest as it is, the
    Division Bench while remanding the writ petition for a fresh decision
    recorded only a prima facie finding that the respondent might have
    been pressurized to make deposit of a portion of the misappropriated
    amount. Even the Single Judge, on remand, did not finally record
    similar such finding to rule in favour of the respondent. The argument
    made in desperation to salvage the situation is, thus, rejected.


20   (1983) 4 SCC 225
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                        367

                     Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar


17. Considering the facts of the present case, we do not find any perversity
    or irrationality with the punishment imposed. We have, therefore,
    reached the irresistible conclusion that interference by the Single
    Judge with the decision of the disciplinary authority, since affirmed
    by the Division Bench vide the impugned order, was uncalled for.
18. Thus, the impugned order (upholding the order of the Single Judge)
    is set aside together with the order that it upheld. The punishment
    imposed by the disciplinary authority (namely, dismissal from service)
    imposed on the respondent is restored.
19. The appeal is allowed on the aforesaid terms.
20. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan