RAGHUNATH SHARMA & ORS.versusSTATE OF HARYANA & ANR.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 723
- Decided
- 16 May 2025
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Bench
- PANKAJ MITHAL
Holding
A High Court cannot use its inherent powers under Section 482 to alter or review a final judgment quashing an FIR, as Section 362 imposes an almost absolute bar except in extraordinary circumstances, which were absent here.
Summary
The appellants entered into a series of sale agreements and a compromise deed, after which an FIR (No.432/2014) for offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC was filed. The High Court, invoking its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, quashed the FIR on the basis of the compromise. The complainant later applied for revival of the FIR; the High Court recalled its earlier order and ordered the FIR to be reinstated. The Supreme Court examined whether a court can alter or review a final judgment quashing an FIR under Section 482, given the bar in Section 362 which permits alteration only for clerical errors, and held that such power is unavailable absent extraordinary circumstances. It concluded that the violation of a compromise deed does not constitute a ground to invoke inherent powers, and the High Court acted without authority. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the High Court’s order restoring the FIR was set aside.
Issues considered
- The scope of Section 482 CrPC: can it be used to recall or alter a judgment that quashed an FIR?
- Whether Section 362 CrPC bars any alteration or review of a final judgment except for clerical errors.
- Whether a breach of the terms of a compromise deed justifies the exercise of inherent powers to revive a quashed FIR.
- Whether the High Court can invoke inherent powers to meet the ends of justice in the absence of statutory provision.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 362, s. 482
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Correctness and legality of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court restored FIR previously quashed, recalling the order of quashment. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.362, 482 – Power under – Scope – Criminal cases were entered into between the parties – However, the complainant, filed an application for revival of the FIRs – High Court ordered revival of the FIRs – Impermissibility: Held: 1.1 s.362 provides that a Court shall not, once it has signed the judgment or final order disposing
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2128 : 2025 INSC 723
Raghunath Sharma & Ors.
v.
State of Haryana & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 2656-2657 of 2025)
16 May 2025
[Pankaj Mithal and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Correctness and legality of the impugned judgment whereby the
High Court restored FIR previously quashed, recalling the order
of quashment.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.362, 482 – Power
under – Scope – Criminal cases were quashed u/s.482
on the ground of compromise entered into between the
parties – However, the complainant, filed an application
for revival of the FIRs – High Court ordered revival of the
FIRs – Impermissibility:
Held: 1.1 s.362 provides that a Court shall not, once it has signed
the judgment or final order disposing of a case, alter or review
the same, except to correct an error clerical or arithmetic – Bar
u/s.362 is almost absolute – The only exceptions to the bar, which
would then permit the invocation of inherent powers, would be if it
is necessary to meet the ends of justice; or to remedy the abuse
of the process of law – In such extraordinary circumstances, the
Court should record reasons for exercising such power, justifying
the invocation thereof. [Paras 8, 14]
1.2 Once a judgment has been passed, the powers u/s.482 do
not permit its alteration or review – Such power is meant solely to
secure the ends of justice and it cannot be taken to mean doing
something that is expressly prohibited by statute – The role of
the Court, after a judgment has been delivered, is circumscribed
by the law itself – In the present facts, the only provision of
law, that permits an alteration in the judgment, in its own terms,
was not resorted to – What was done was a review of the
* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2129
Raghunath Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
judgment quashing the proceedings which was not permissible.
[Paras 10, 11]
1.3 Impugned judgment was passed by the High Court without any
authority or basis – Once the criminal cases had been quashed,
u/s.482 on the ground of compromise entered into between the
parties, one of the parties violating terms thereof is a ground entirely
foreign to law, to once again invoke such powers and recall the
order of quashing – Impugned judgment and the consequences
flowing from such revival, set aside and quashed. [Paras 12, 13]
Words and Phrases – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 –
ss.362, 482 – “Save as otherwise provided by this Code” in
s.362, if permits alterations u/s.482. [Paras 9.3, 9.3.4]
Case Law Cited
State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [2002] 1 SCR 275 : (2002) 3
SCC 89; Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor [2020] 1 SCR 663 :
(2020) 13 SCC 172; Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa
[2000] Supp. 4 SCR 313 : (2001) 1 SCC 169; Sankatha Singh v.
State of U.P. [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 817 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC
165; Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal [1981] 2 SCR 485 : (1981) 1 SCC
500; State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [2011] 15 SCR
540 : (2011) 14 SCC 770; State of M.P. v. Man Singh [2019] 13
SCR 570 : (2019) 10 SCC 161; Narayan Prasad v. State of Bihar
(2019) 14 SCC 726 – relied on.
State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [1977] 3 SCR 113 : (1977)
2 SCC 699; Sunder Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu [2009] 3 SCR
326 : (2009) 14 SCC 244; Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P. [2017] 6
SCR 922 : (2017) 13 SCC 369; Ahmad Ali Quraishi & Anr. v. State
of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. [2020] 1 SCR 170 : (2020) 13 SCC 435;
Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee [1990] 1 SCR 788 : (1990) 2 SCC
437; Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012)
10 SCC 303; Telangana Housing Board v. Azamunnisa Begum
[2018] 4 SCR 797 : (2018) 7 SCC 346; New India Assurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krishna Kumar Pandey (2021) 14 SCC 683; State of
Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan Nair [2001] 3 SCR 203 : (2001) 4 SCC
752 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2130 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
List of Keywords
Section 362, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482, Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Order of quashing recalled; Revival
of FIRs ordered; Quashed FIR restored; Order of quashment
recalled; Review of judgment quashing the proceedings; Criminal
cases quashed; Compromise; Alteration or review of judgment;
Judgment; Violations of term of compromise.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
2656-2657 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2018 and 29.04.2019
of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM No.
11903 of 2018 and CRM No. 13134 of 2019 respectively
With
Criminal Appeal No(s). 2658-2659 and 2660-2661 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
A.R.Takkar, Puthuvel Palani, A. Venayagam Balan, Mrs. Shriya
Takkar, Ms. Shriya Takkar, Manan Takkar, Mrs. Unnati Anand,
Gaurav Pal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Dr. Hemant Gupta, A.A.G., Prasenjit Keswani, Sr. Adv., Samar Vijay
Singh, Ms. Payal Gupta, Ms. Nitikaa Guptha, Ms. Sabarni Som,
Fateh Singh, Kishore Kumar Pandey, Upmanyu Tewari, Devajyoti
Bhattacharya, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, Ajay Verma.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl.)Nos.8101-8102/2019 :
Leave Granted.
2. These appeals by special leave, call into question the correctness
and legality of the judgment and orders dated 8th October 2018
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2131
Raghunath Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
in CRM No.11903 of 2018 in CRM No.M-23727 of 2015 and dated
29th April 2019 in CRM No.13134 of 2019 in CRM No.M-23727 of
2015, whereby FIR No.432 of 2014 dated 15th July 2014 which had
earlier been quashed and set aside vide order 21st March 2016, was
restored to file and concerned authorities were directed to restart the
investigation. In other words, the order of quashment was recalled.
Further, a review against this order of recall was also dismissed vide
order dated 29th April 2019.
3. These appeals present a question of justified use or lack of the
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
19731 using which the High Court restored First Information Report
previously quashed.
4. The genesis of the dispute is an agreement to sell entered into
between the parties dated 21st May 2013, an agreement dated
25th May 2013, and the Memorandum of Understanding dated 15th
August 2013 as also agreement to sell dated 3rd January 2014.
Various disputes arose in regard to these agreements and finally,
with the intervention of elders and others, a fresh agreement to sell
dated 15th April 2015 was entered into in supersession of all other
agreements. Accordingly, the sale consideration was decided at
Rs.2,25,00,000/-. Various methods were decided upon to transfer
part of the said amount totalling to Rs.35 lakhs. The remaining
Rs.1,90,00,000/- was to be paid at the time of registry along with
interest @ 1% per month. Also, pursuant to the fresh agreement to
sell a compromise deed dated 14th July 2015 was inked with a view
to bring all litigations between the parties to an end. Consequently,
the order dated 21st March 2016 which quashed the proceedings
came to be passed. The order is extracted in toto as under :
“This petition has been preferred under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of FIR No.432
dated July 15, 2014, under Sections 406, 420 of IPC,
registered at Police Station Sector 10, Gurgoan, District
Gurgaon (Annexure P-1) along with all consequential
proceedings arising out of the same on the basis of
compromise dated July 14, 2015 (Annexure P-2).
1 Hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C.’
2132 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
2. In compliance of order dated September 07, 2015,
statement of the parties have been recorded by the
trial Court. Report of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st
Class, Gurgaon, has been received, in which it has
been categorically observed that parties have arrived at
compromise without any pressure or coercion from any
quarter. Even otherwise, matter involved is personal in
nature, which has been amicably put at rest.
4. Consequently, instant petition stands allowed, and FIR
No.432, dated July 15, 2014, under Sections 406, 420 of
IPC, registered at Poli Station Sector 10, Gurgaon, District
Gurgaon and all other subsequent proceedings arising
therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.”
5. It, however, appears that the spirit of the compromise deed was lost
upon the parties as soon after the order dated 21st March 2016, the
complainant, namely, Krishan Kumar Gandhi filed an application
dated 10th September 2016 praying for revival of the FIRs. Vide
order dated 24th September 2016 said prayer was rejected. On 27th
March 2018, another prayer of a similar nature seeking the revival of
the FIRs was made before the High Court. By way of the impugned
judgment and order dated 8th October 2018, the revival of the FIRs
was ordered.
6. Aggrieved, the appellants are before us. We have heard the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record and written
submissions filed.
7. The scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. has engaged this Court
on numerous occasions [Ref: State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy2;
Sunder Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu3; Vineet Kumar v. State of
U.P.4; Ahmad Ali Quraishi & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.5.]
The observations made in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa6
by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges encapsulate the purpose of this
power most aptly in the following terms :
2 (1977) 2 SCC 699
3 (2009) 14 SCC 244
4 (2017) 13 SCC 369
5 (2020) 13 SCC 435
6 (2002) 3 SCC 89
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2133
Raghunath Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
“6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in
a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule.
The section does not confer any new powers on the High
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages
three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction
may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule
which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No
legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide
for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore,
have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law
which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and
duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which
finds expression in the section which merely recognizes
and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All
courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence
of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution,
all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to
undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the
principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere
videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when
the law gives a person anything it gives him that without
which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the
section, the court does not function as a court of appeal
or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though
wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the
tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice
and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as
to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse.
It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion
of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified
2134 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance
of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing
of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the
court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint
is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations
are accepted in toto.”
8. Chapter XXVII of the Cr.P.C. deals with ‘judgment’. It defines what
a judgment is; in what language it should be delivered; its contents;
effect (arrest, payment of compensation, release, etc.). Section 362
provides that a Court shall not, once it has signed the judgment or
final order disposing of a case, alter or review the same, except to
correct an error clerical or arithmetic.
9. The scope of this power has been discussed in several judgments
of this Court.
9.1 Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor7 discusses the scope
of this power in the following terms:
“19. The legislative scheme as delineated by Section
369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as well
as legislative scheme as delineated by Section 362
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is one and
the same. The embargo put on the criminal court to
alter or review its judgment is with a purpose and
object. The judgments of this Court as noted above,
summarised the law to the effect that criminal justice
delivery system does not clothe criminal court with
power to alter or review the judgment or final order
disposing of the case except to correct the clerical or
arithmetical error. After the judgment delivered by a
criminal court or passing of the final order disposing
of the case the court becomes functus officio and
any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected
only by appropriate forum in accordance with law.”
7 (2020) 13 SCC 172
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2135
Raghunath Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
9.2 In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa8, this Court
observed:
“10. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no
court, when it has signed its judgment or final order
disposing of a case shall alter or review the same
except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The
section is based on an acknowledged principle of law
that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court,
the said court in the absence of a specific statutory
provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to
entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the
former order of final disposal is set aside by a court
of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by
law. The court becomes functus officio the moment
the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such
an order cannot be altered except to the extent of
correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error. ...”
9.3 It is clear from the above extracts that Section 362 Cr.P.C.
provides for a fairly limited scope of the exercise of such power.
Next, what is required to be seen is whether the phrase, “Save
as otherwise provided by this Code” permits such alterations
under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
9.3.1 In terms of the Old Code, i.e., the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 this Court in Sankatha Singh v. State
of U.P.9 through Raghubar Dayal, J., observed that :
“7. A criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for
the default of the appellants or their counsel.
The court has either to adjourn the hearing of
the appeal to enable them to appear, or should
consider the appeal on merits and pass the final
order. Shri Tej Pal Singh was aware of this as
his order itself indicates. He did not dismiss
the appeal for default. He himself perused the
judgment of the Magistrate and the record and
8 (2001) 1 SCC 169
9 1962 SCC OnLine SC 165
2136 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
did consider the merits, as he says in his order
“I find no ground for any interference”. The mere
fact that he had not expressed his reasons
for coming to that opinion does not mean that
he had not considered the material on record
before coming to the conclusion that there was
no case for interference. His omission to write a
detailed judgment in the circumstance may be
not in compliance with the provisions of Section
367 of the Code and may be liable to be set
aside by a superior court, but will not give him
any power to set it aside himself, and rehear
the appeal. Section 369, read with Section 424
of the Code, makes it clear that the appellate
court is not to alter or review the judgment once
signed, except for the purpose of correcting a
clerical error.”
9.3.2 In Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal10, it was categorically held
that :
“5. The appellant points out that he invoked
the inherent power of the High Court saved by
Section 482 of the Code and that notwithstanding
the prohibition imposed by Section 362 the High
Court had power to grant relief. Now it is well
settled that the inherent power of the court
cannot be exercised for doing that which is
specifically prohibited by the Code (Sankatha
Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1962 SC 1208 : 1962
Supp 2 SCR 817 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 288] ). It is
true that the prohibition in Section 362 against
the court altering or reviewing its judgment is
subject to what is “otherwise provided by this
Court or by any other law for the time being in
force”. Those words, however, refer to those
provisions only where the court has been
expressly authorised by the Code or other law
10 (1981) 1 SCC 500
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2137
Raghunath Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
to alter or review its judgment. The inherent
power of the court is not contemplated by the
saving provision contained in Section 362 and,
therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can
be of no avail.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9.3.3 The position in Sooraj Devi (supra) stands referred to/
followed in Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee11; State of
Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar12; Gian Singh v.
State of Punjab13; and Telangana Housing Board v.
Azamunnisa Begum14.
9.3.4 The law, therefore, is no longer res integra. The exception
to this position has been reorganized in Davinder Pal
Singh Bhullar (supra) in the following terms :
“46. If a judgment has been pronounced without
jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural
justice or where the order has been pronounced
without giving an opportunity of being heard to
a party affected by it or where an order was
obtained by abuse of the process of court
which would really amount to its being without
jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised
to recall such order for the reason that in such
an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and
the provisions of Section 362 CrPC would not
operate. In such an eventuality, the judgment is
manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem
rule of natural justice. The power of recall is
different from the power of altering/reviewing
the judgment. However, the party seeking
recall/alteration has to establish that it was not
at fault....”
11 (1990) 2 SCC 437
12 (2011) 14 SCC 770
13 (2012) 10 SCC 303
14 (2018) 7 SCC 346
2138 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The ‘exceptions’ of a) the violation of audi alteram partem; and
b) abuse of process of law which would affect the jurisdiction of
the Court to deal with the matter and, in such cases the exercise
of the inherent powers under the code has been approved by
a Bench of three Judges in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Krishna Kumar Pandey15. These aren’t the circumstances of
the present case.
10. It can be seen from the above pronouncements that the role of the
Court, after a judgment has been delivered, is circumscribed by the
law itself. In the present facts, the only provision of law, that permits an
alteration in the judgment, in its own terms, was not resorted to. What
was done was a review of the judgment quashing the proceedings.
That, in the considered view of this Court, was not permissible.
10.1 State of M.P. v. Man Singh16, with reference to a decision
rendered by a three-Judge Bench in State of Kerala v. M.M.
Manikantan Nair17, makes this position clear as follows :
“7. It is well settled law that the High Court has no
jurisdiction to review its order either under Section
362 or under Section 482 CrPC [State of Kerala v.
M.M. Manikantan Nair, (2001) 4 SCC 752 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 808] . The inherent power under Section 482
CrPC cannot be used by the High Court to reopen
or alter an order disposing of a petition decided on
merits [State v. K.V. Rajendran, (2008) 8 SCC 673 :
(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 600 : 2009 Cri LJ 355] . After
disposing of a case on merits, the Court becomes
functus officio and Section 362 CrPC expressly bars
review and specifically provides that no court after
it has signed its judgment shall alter or review the
same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error
[Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1
SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] . Recall of judgment
would amount to alteration or review of judgment
which is not permissible under Section 362 CrPC. It
15 (2021) 14 SCC 683
16 (2019) 10 SCC 161
17 (2001) 4 SCC 752
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 2139
Raghunath Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
cannot be validated by the High Court invoking its
inherent powers [Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1
SCC 500 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 188 : AIR 1981 SC 736].”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Again, in Narayan Prasad v. State of Bihar18 this Court reiterated
that once a judgment has been passed, the powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C. do not permit its alteration or review. Such power is
meant solely to secure the ends of justice and it cannot be taken to
mean doing something that is expressly prohibited by statute.
12. In view of the above discussion of law, the conclusion is that the
impugned judgment was passed by the High Court without any
authority or basis. Once the criminal cases had been quashed,
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground of compromise entered
into between the parties, one of the parties violating terms thereof
is a ground entirely foreign to law, to once again invoke such
powers and recall the order of quashing. Violations of a term of a
compromise have their own avenues of law from which they can
be enforced.
13. The appeals, therefore, succeed and are, accordingly, allowed. The
impugned judgment and orders, as described in para 2, and the
consequences flowing from such revival, shall stand set aside and
quashed.
14. At the end, we may record our surprise that the High Court adopted
the course it did without reference to the well-established position
of law, as demonstrated above. We summarize the findings/issue
directions, as follows :
1. The bar under Section 362 Cr.P.C. is almost absolute;
2. The only exceptions to the bar, which would then permit the
invocation of inherent powers, would be if it is necessary to
meet the ends of justice; or to remedy the abuse of the process
of law. Other than the above two circumstances, such inherent
powers do not permit the doing of what stands prohibited by
the text of the statute;
18 (2019) 14 SCC 726
2140 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3. To clarify, it may be stated that when a Court finds itself in such
extraordinary circumstances, the reasons for exercising such
power should be recorded, justifying the invocation thereof.
15. We direct the Registry to circulate a copy of this judgment to all High
Courts, for necessary dissemination to all concerned. It is our hope
that lending clarity, coupled with the necessary information being
supplied would curb such unjustified use of power.
16. In view of the discussion made in Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl.)
Nos.8101-8102 of 2019, matters connected therewith, i.e., Criminal
Appeals @ Special Leave Petitions @ Diary No.34946/2019 and
Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl.)Nos.10274-10275/2019, shall also
stand similarly disposed of.
Pending applications, if any, shall be closed.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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