Holding

An acquittal cannot be set aside on speculative inferences; the prosecution failed to prove the appellants' presence and the CDRs were inadmissible, so the conviction was set aside.

Summary

The appellants, Rahil and Noor Ahmed, were convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC after the Delhi High Court reversed their trial‑court acquittal. The prosecution's case was based on circumstantial evidence that the deceased had called the co‑accused Suraiya and allegedly went to her residence, where he was later found dead. The trial court acquitted the appellants due to lack of direct evidence of their presence at the house, but the High Court inferred their presence because they were family members and relied on call‑detail records (CDRs) linking Rahil’s phone to a nearby cell tower. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof, that the CDRs were inadmissible secondary evidence without a Section 65‑B(4) certificate, and that mere inference of presence of all household members cannot substitute for proof. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction of the appellants and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

The appellate court may reverse an acquittal only if the trial court's finding is wholly perverse or against the weight of evidence.
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants were present at Suraiya's residence at the time of the murder.
Whether call‑detail records without a Section 65‑B(4) certificate are admissible as evidence.
Whether an adverse inference under Section 106 of the Evidence Act can be drawn against the appellants in the absence of proven special knowledge.

Legislation cited

Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 65-B(4)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 201, s. 302, s. 34

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal passed by the trial court and convicting the appellants for offence u/s.302, Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing them to life imprisonment. Headnotes† Appeal against acquittal – Reversal of acquittal – co-accused-‘S’ (mother and wife of the appellants) and her associates had a quarrel with deceased and ‘S’ threatened to kill the deceased, however, matter was reported to the police and was amicably settled – Later, on receiving a phone call from ‘S’,

Subjects

Appeal against acquittalAcquittal reversedReversal of acquittal not justifiedQuarrelMissingAmicable settlementPatch upImplicationSuspicionFamily members roped inDirect or circumstantial evidenceIncriminating attending circumstancesIncriminating factAdverse inferencePresence at residence not provedPresence at the place of occurrence not proved/establishedNo direct evidenceSecondary electronic evidenceCall detail records (CDRs)Cell towerCell triangulationTower locationOmission of a material factContradictionAfterthoughtInmates in the houseInmates of the house

Judgment

[2025] 6 S.C.R. 607 : 2025 INSC 858

Rahil & Anr.
v.
State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)
(Criminal Appeal No. 1856 of 2014)
25 June 2025
[Sandeep Mehta and Joymalya Bagchi,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal passed by
the trial court and convicting the appellants for offence u/s.302,
Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing them to life imprisonment.

Headnotes†
Appeal against acquittal – Reversal of acquittal – When not
justified – Prosecution’s case that co-accused-‘S’ (mother and
wife of the appellants) and her associates had a quarrel with
deceased and ‘S’ threatened to kill the deceased, however,
matter was reported to the police and was amicably settled –
Later, on receiving a phone call from ‘S’, the deceased went to
her residence whereafter, he went missing – FIR filed – Trial
court convicted ‘S’ u/s.302/34 with her brother, who was also
convicted u/s.201/34 with another co-accused, however, the
appellants were acquitted – High Court inter alia upheld the
conviction of ‘S’ but, reversed the acquittal of the appellants
and held them guilty u/s.302/34, IPC – Appeals filed by the
appellants and ‘S’, who died in the meantime and her appeal
abated:
Held: Prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence – After
the patch up the deceased returned to his residence – No direct,
credible and reliable evidence that the he had actually gone to
‘S’s residence on the fateful evening – Possibility of the witnesses
implicating ‘S’ and other family members in the crime out of mere
suspicion cannot be ruled out – Further, admittedly, there is no
direct evidence with regard to presence of the appellants at their
residence when the murder is alleged to have occurred – High
Court reversed the acquittal on the specious logic that appellants
being the son and husband of ‘S’ and ordinarily residing with her
ought to be presumed to be present in the house – Furthermore,
* Author
608 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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in absence of medical evidence that murder was committed by a
single person, High Court incorrectly drew its own inference that
‘S’ was assisted by others in committing the crime and roped in
her family members-the appellants – High Court not justified in
reversing the findings of acquittal on the basis of mere surmises –
Impugned judgment set aside to the extent it convicts the appellants.
[Paras 11, 19-22, 26, 29]

Appeal against acquittal – Interference by appellate court –
Scope:
Held: In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court would not
interfere with the finding of the trial court unless it is wholly perverse
or against the weight of evidence on record – In the event acquittal
is based on findings which are reasonable and plausible, appellate
court would be slow to interfere with the same as the presumption
of innocence stands re-enforced by the acquittal. [Para 16]

Criminal Law – Burden of proof – Evidence Act, 1872 –
s.106 – Adverse inference under, when cannot be drawn –
Prosecution’s case that co-accused-‘S’ (mother and wife of the
appellants) and her associates had a quarrel with deceased
and ‘S’ threatened to kill the deceased, however, matter was
reported to the police and was amicably settled – Later, on
receiving a phone call from ‘S’, the deceased went to her
residence whereafter, he went missing – FIR filed – Trial court
convicted ‘S’ u/s.302/34 with her brother, while the appellants
were acquitted – Appellants’ presence at ‘S’s residence when
the murder of the deceased is alleged to have occurred was not
proved – However, High Court reversed the acquittal of both
the appellants and held them guilty u/s.302/34, IPC holding that
they being the son and husband of ‘S’ and ordinarily residing
with her ought to be presumed to be present in the house:
Held: In a criminal case, the burden of proof always rests on the
prosecution – Only when it discharges the initial onus, that is,
proves the incriminating attending circumstances to establish the
cause of death was within the ‘special knowledge’ of an accused
does the onus shift and an adverse inference against such accused
may be drawn if he fails to discharge such onus – In the present
case, in absence of reliable evidence proving the presence of the
appellants at ‘S’s residence when the deceased is said to have
come there, it cannot be said that the prosecution had discharged
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 609

Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

its initial onus and proved the appellants were present in the
house when the murder occurred – Such failure of the prosecution
cannot be bridged by an inferential conclusion of presence of all
inmates in the house to shift the onus on them to explain away the
circumstances leading to the deceased’s homicidal death – High
Court failed to appreciate this lacuna in the prosecution case and
illegally drew adverse inference against the appellants u/s.106 –
Appeal against acquittal. [Paras 42-44]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65-B(4) – Call detail records (CDRs)
between one of the appellants, ‘R’ and co-accused-
‘MF’(appellant’s uncle), being Ex.PW 23/A and 23/B were
produced – Site details of Airtel in Delhi and NCR were
exhibited as Ex.PW23/C – The ownership certificate was also
produced as Ex.PW23/D – All the exhibits were secondary
evidence being computer printouts of the data preserved in
the computers of the service provider concerned – High Court
relied on the CDRs and held that as the tower location of R’s
mobile number was Nizamuddin, his presence at the place of
occurrence was established:
Held: This finding is based on inadmissible evidence and even
otherwise such conclusion on the basis of evidence on record is
too tenuous – Even if the CDRs and other electronic records were
admitted in evidence they merely contain the cell tower location
information, that is to say, which tower mobile phone was connected
to and how long the calls lasted when it was connected to that
tower – These data give an approximate area corresponding to the
operational area of the cell tower and not the exact site where the
phone is located – Reference to Nizamuddin cell tower in CDRs
merely shows that R’s phone was within the operational range of
such tower – This evidence cannot be relied on solely to prove his
presence at his residence beyond doubt – Also, telephonic exchanges
between ‘R’ and ‘MF’ do not lead to an inference of conspiracy to
murder as ‘MF’ was acquitted of the charge of murder which was
not appealed against – Moreover, during the trial appellants raised
objections to admissibility of the secondary electronic evidence
relating to ‘R’ which was marked as exhibit PW23/B-D – The
prosecutor was put on due notice and had opportunity to fill the
lacuna by producing the requisite certificate u/s.65-B(4) but did not
do so – Exhibits are inadmissible in law being secondary evidence
without certification. [Paras 30, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41]
610 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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Criminal Law – Incriminating fact, when proved:
Held: An incriminating fact is said to be ‘proved’ when after
considering the matters before it, the court believes it to exist or
considers its existence so probable that a man of ordinary prudence
would act as if the same existed. [Para 25]
Evidence – Call detail records (CDRs); Dependence of cell
tower ranges on different variables; Cell triangulation –
Discussed. [Paras 37-39]

Case Law Cited
Anvar PV v. PK Basheer [2014] 11 SCR 399 : (2014) 10 SCC 473;
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal [2020] 7
SCR 180 : (2020) 7 SCC 1; Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP [1959]
Supp. 2 SCR 875 : 1959 SCC Online SC 17; Laxman v. State of
Maharashtra [1974] 2 SCR 505 : (1974) 3 SCC 704; Mulak Raj v.
State of Haryana [1996] 1 SCR 791 : (1996) 7 SCC 308; Guru
Dutt Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2021] 6 SCR 573 : (2021)
6 SCC 116 – relied on.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 :
(2005) 11 SCC 600; Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal
Pradesh [2018] 1 SCR 790 : (2018) 2 SCC 801; Sonu v. State
of Haryana [2017] 8 SCR 151 : (2017) 8 SCC 570; Mohd. Arif @
Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022] 7 SCR 792 : (2023) 3 SCC
654; Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police [2023]
5 SCR 1016 : 2023 SCC Online SC 310 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Quinteros, Penny. (2023) Confronting NELOS: cross-examining
the cellphone industry’s secret location technology, Syracuse Law
Review, 73(1) 375.

List of Websites
Millman National Land Services, ‘What is a Cell Tower and How
Does a Cell Tower Work?’(12th May, 2020), <https://millmanland.
com/knowledge/what-is-a-cell-tower-and-how-does-a-cell-tower-
work/> as cited in Bechuram Bag v. State of West Bengal, 2023
SCC OnLine Cal 419.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 611

Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Appeal against acquittal; acquittal reversed; Reversal of acquittal
not justified; quarrel; missing; matter amicably settled; patch
up; implication; suspicion; family members roped in; direct or
circumstantial evidence; Incriminating attending circumstances;
Incriminating fact; Adverse inference; presence at residence not
proved; presence at the place of occurrence not proved/established;
No direct evidence; Secondary electronic evidence; Call detail
records (CDRs); Cell tower; Cell triangulation; Tower location;
omission of a material fact; contradiction; afterthought; inmates
in the house; inmates of the house.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1856 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.05.2014 of the High Court
Of Delhi in CRLA No. 1231 of 2010

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Mohd. Irshad Hanif, Mrs. Shamim Irshad, Mrs. Sushma, Dr. Lakshmi
Prasanna Komara, Ms. Yashika Anand.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Aaditya Shankar Dixit, Abhinav Mishra,
Akshay Amritanshu, Ms. Astha Singh, Praneet Pranav, Mukesh
Kumar Maroria.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Joymalya Bagchi, J

1. By the impugned judgment the High Court had reversed an acquittal
passed by the trial court and convicted the appellants for commission
612 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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of offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 and
sentenced them to life imprisonment.
2. Prosecution case in brief is as follows:-
Co-accused Suraiya had entered into a sale agreement with the
deceased Shakeel ur Rehman for purchase of property number
15/1 Jaipur Estate, Nizamuddin, New Delhi. Prior to the sale deed
being executed, on 6.04.2003 Shakeel ur Rehman started raising a
boundary wall in the property. Suraiya and her associates resisted
and a quarrel ensued. Suraiya threatened to kill Shakeel ur Rehman.
Matter was reported to the police and amicably settled. At 7.30 pm,
Suraiya made a phone call to deceased on the landline and called
him to her residence. Thereafter, deceased went missing. Despite
efforts deceased could not be traced.
3. As a consequence, Aniq ur Rehman (PW3) lodged missing DD
entry No. 27A (Ex. PW3/B) at 7.15 AM on 7.04.2003 at Police
Station, Hazrat Nizamuddin. On the same day at 5:30 pm, a written
complaint was filed by Aniq ur Rehman (PW3) which was treated as
First Information Report under Section 365/34 IPC against Suraiya,
Mohd. Fazal her brother, and the appellants, namely Rahil and Noor
Ahmed who are her son and husband, respectively.
4. During the investigation, Fazal and one Mohan Seth were arrested
on 13.04.2003. On their disclosure statements decomposed body
of deceased was recovered near Haridwar. Dr. Pradeep Kumar,
Postmortem Doctor (PW9) opined that the death was due to asphyxia
as a result of strangulation and had occurred 3 to 5 days ago.
5. In course of trial, charges were framed against Suraiya, Mohd. Fazal,
Mohan Seth and the appellants under Sections 120B and 302/34
read with 120B IPC. Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth were also charged
under sections 201/34 IPC.
6. During trial, prosecution examined 25 witnesses and exhibited a
number of documents. In conclusion of trial, the trial judge while
convicting Suraiya and Mohd. Fazal under Section 302/34 IPC
acquitted the appellants of the charges levelled against them. Mohd.
Fazal and Mohan Seth were also convicted under Section 201/34 IPC.

1 Hereinafter ‘IPC’.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 613

Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

7. Suraiya, Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth preferred appeals against
their conviction while the State challenged the acquittal of appellants
before High Court.
8. By a common order, High Court while upholding the conviction
of Suraiya reversed the acquittal of the appellants and held them
guilty under Section 302/34 IPC along with Suraiya. Mohd. Fazal
was acquitted of the charge of murder but his conviction along with
Mohan Seth under Section 201 IPC was upheld. Appellants as
well as Suraiya appealed against their conviction. We are informed
that Suraiya has died in the meantime and her appeal has abated.
Accordingly, the appellants’ appeal is taken up for hearing.
9. Mr. Mohd. Irshad Hanif, ld. counsel for Appellants argued that High
Court erred in reversing a well-reasoned acquittal on the basis of
vague surmises and inferences. He contended mere suspicion
howsoever high cannot take the place of proof.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, ld. counsel for
Respondent-State argued that findings of trial court were wholly
perverse and against the weight of evidence on record. PW-3, 4 and
6 unequivocally deposed that appellant had received a phone call
and gone to the house of Suraiya. Appellants are son and husband
of Suraiya, their presence at the place of occurrence was most
natural. No plea of alibi was taken by the appellants to probabilise
their absence. CDRs show active phone calls between Rahil and
Mohd. Fazal in the night of 6.04.2003. Tower location of Rahil’s
phone probabilises his presence at Nizamuddin.
11. Prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence. The incriminating
circumstances proposed by the prosecution are as follows:-
(i) Suraiya had entered into a sale agreement with the deceased
Shakeel ur Rehman. On the fateful day, before sale deed
could be executed Shakeel ur Rehman started constructing
a boundary wall on the property. This resulted in a skirmish
between Shakeel ur Rehman and Suraiya and her associates.
(ii) The matter was reported to the police and amicably resolved.
(iii) In the evening of the same day, Shakeel ur Rehman received
a phone call from Suraiya and stated to his relations, PW-3,4
and 6 that he was going to Suraiya’s residence.
614 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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(iv) Thereafter Shakeel ur Rehman went missing. On 7.04.2003,
PW-3 lodged missing diary at 7:15 am being DD No.27A-Ex.
PW 3/B and at 5:30 pm he lodged FIR against Suraiya, Fazal
and the appellants.
(v) On the disclosure statements of Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth
dead body was recovered.
(vi) Postmortem Doctor PW9 opined that the cause of death was
asphyxia due to strangulation.
12. Trial Court analysed the evidence on record and acquitted the
appellants holding as follows:-

Noor Ahmed
“There was a property transaction between the accused’s
wife Suraiya and the deceased; litigation in that regard
is going on; a quarrel between accused, his wife & other
accused on one side and the deceased and his brother
on the other side on the issue of construction of boundary
wall had taken place on 6.4.03 wife Suraiya had called
deceased to their house; deceased had come to Suraiya’s
house. Besides this, no further evidence except his own
disclosure and disclosure statements of co-accused,
(which are inadmissible in evidence against the accused)
has come on record against the accused; Thus, there is
no material on record to establish that the accused had
concerted and conspired with other co-accused and had
participated in the commission of the crime i.e. murder of
the deceased. In view of the above, accused Noor Ahmed
is acquitted of charges U/s 302/ r/w 120B IPC”

Rahil
“Accused is the son of the accused Noor Ahmed and
Suraiya. His concern regarding old property dispute of his
mother was there to the extent as would that be of a son;
His presence and participation in the quarrel on 6.4.03 is
also substantiated. Beyond that, the only other evidence
which has been placed on record against the accused is the
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 615

Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

recovery of deceased’s purse from accused’s residence,
at his instance. The recovery of deceased’s purse at
the instance of accused has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Besides above material, prosecution has
placed on record the phone call details of accused Rahil
which show that accused Rahil made and received phone
calls from accused Suraiya and Fazal. The said calls no
doubt reflect that the accused Rahil was associating with
accused Suraiya and Fazal. Except that no other evidence
has come on record against the accused. Except for his
own disclosure and that of his co-accused admitting to his
complicity in murdering the deceased, no other evidence
has been led by prosecution linking accused Rahil to the
commission of murder. The accused Rahil is therefore
acquitted of charge u/s 302 r/w 120B IPC.”
13. The High Court reversed the finding of the trial court holding as
follows:-
“As far are Suraiya, Noor Ahmed and Rahil are concerned,
their presence in the house at 7/7.30 PM when the
deceased Shakeel ur Rehman was called and came to
their residence, has been proved and should be accepted.
Suraiya being a lady could not have committed the said
offence alone. Presence of her husband and son was
axiomatic and normal. We do not find any explanation has
been given by Noor Ahmed or Rahil as to their absence
from the place of occurrence. In fact, the call details of
Rahil (Ex. PW23/B) and Mohd. Fazal (Ex. PW23/A) as
noticed above, on 6th April, 2003 starting 7.18 PM show
number of calls being exchanged and the presence of
Rahil at Nizamuddin as his mobile was connected through
tower No. 911 in Nizamuddin. The presence of Noor Ahmed
husband of Suraiya with them, when the deceased was
called for discussion was natural and normal. (ii) We do
not agree with the reasoning given by the trial court that
Suraiya and Fazal brother and sister had a property dispute
and the same has no connection with Noor Ahmed and
Rahil, husband and son of Suraiya. The said reasoning
616 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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keeping in view the social and cultural background of the
family, merits rejection and has to be discarded. It is not
acceptable and ignores practical reality.”
14. It may not be out of place to note by the self-same judgment and
order High Court acquitted Mohd. Fazal of the charge of murder,
inter alia holding:-
“his involvement in the offence under Section 302 IPC
would be a matter of debate as he was certainly not in
the premises where Rahil was present, as both of them
were in touch on phone till at least 7.59 PM.”
15. No appeal has been preferred against such acquittal either by State
or the victim’s family.
16. It is trite in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court would not
interfere with the finding of the trial court unless the same finding
is wholly perverse or against the weight of evidence on record. In
the event acquittal is based on findings which are reasonable and
plausible, appellate court would be slow to interfere with the same
as the presumption of innocence stands re-enforced by the acquittal.
These principles have been summarized by this Court after referring
to a catena of decisions in Guru Dutt Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh2
17. Having examined the conclusions of High Court from this perspective,
we are unable to concur with them for the following reasons.
18. High Court recorded that presence of appellants in the house at
7-7.30 PM when the deceased Shakeel ur Rehman was called is
proved and should be accepted. In arriving at such conclusion High
Court had relied on the response of Noor Ahmed to question no.7
in his examination under 313 Cr.PC holding:-
“In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. while replying
to question No. 7, Noor Ahmed had accepted that Shakeel
ur Rehman had come to their house after the police officers
had advised them to patch up, though this has been denied
and not accepted as correct by Suraiya and others”

2 (2021) 6 SCC 116 (paras 15-20).
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 617

Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

19. Such finding of the High Court is incorrect as would appear from
the nature of the question and the answer of the appellant therein.
“7Q. It is in evidence against you that in PS police officials
advised both parties for patch up the matter and thereafter
Shakeel Ur Rehman came to his house. What do you say?
A: It is correct.”
From the tenor of the question it unequivocally appears that after
the amicable settlement at the police station, Shakeel ur Rehman
came to his house. The expression would naturally mean Shakeel
ur Rehman came back to his own residence and not that of Suraiya/
Noor Ahmed. We are further fortified in arriving at such conclusion as
the prosecution evidence on record, particularly that of PW-3,4 and
6, also states that after the patch up Shakeel ur Rehman returned
to his residence.
20. The other aspect which was overlooked by High Court is that there
is no direct evidence that Shakeel ur Rehman had actually gone to
Suraiya’s residence on the fateful evening. Prosecution relied on
PW-3,4 and 6 to prove this fact. No doubt, these witnesses stated
that after receiving a phone call from Suraiya in the evening around
7.30 PM on 6.4.2003 Shakeel ur Rehman left his residence stating
he is going to Suraiya’s house. However, the sole evidence that he
actually went to Suraiya’s residence is an embellished statement
of PW-3 who claims he accompanied the deceased to Suraiya’s
residence. Such version is stated by PW-3 for the first time in court
and is significantly absent either in the missing diary or in the First
Information Report lodged by him. Such omission of a material fact by
PW 3 in the FIR or his previous statement to police would amount to
a contradiction3 or even otherwise would cast doubt on the credibility
of such embellished version introduced as an afterthought4.
21. Conduct of these witnesses and attending circumstances also
improbabilise the fact that Shakeel had gone to Suraiya’s house.
Evidence has come on record that there was a scuffle between
Shakeel ur Rehman and Suraiya in the morning which got settled

3 Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP, 1959 SCC Online SC 17 (para 25).
4 Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 3 SCC 704 (para 10).
618 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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in the police station. Given such animosity had Shakeel ur Rehman
left for Suraiya’s residence in the evening of 06.04.2003, and gone
missing, it would be most natural for these witnesses to go to Suraiya’s
residence and enquire of his whereabouts. None of the witnesses
stated that they either visited Suraiya’s residence or inquired from
her about Shakeel’s whereabouts. In these circumstances, possibility
of the witnesses implicating Suraiya and other family members in
the crime out of mere suspicion cannot be ruled out.
22. Given this situation, it is difficult for us to conclude that there is
credible and reliable evidence on record that the deceased actually
went to the residence of Suraiya on the fateful evening.
23. Even if the prosecution case with regard to the deceased going
to Suraiya’s residence is accepted, prosecution must prove that
appellants were present in the house between 7.30 and 9.00 PM
when it is alleged that Shakeel ur Rehman was murdered.
24. The High Court reversed the acquittal on the specious logic that
appellants being the son and husband of Suraiya and ordinarily
residing with her ought to be presumed to be present in the house.
It is nobody’s case that the incident occurred in the dead hours
of the night when all family members are expected to remain in
the house.
25. An incriminating fact is said to be ‘proved’ when after considering
the matters before it, the court believes it to exist or considers its
existence so probable that a man of ordinary prudence would act
as if the same existed.
26. Admittedly, no direct evidence is forthcoming with regard to presence
of the appellants at their residence when the murder is alleged to
have occurred. High Court drew an inference with regard to their
presence on the ground that being inmates of the house they would
be presumed to be present there.
27. In Mulak Raj v. State of Haryana5 where the dead body was recovered
from the house this Court refused to uphold the guilt of the accused
merely because they were the inmates of the house.

5 (1996) 7 SCC 308 (para 22).
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 619

Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

28. In these circumstances, we are of the view High Court erred in
relying on a speculative inference that all inmates must invariably
be present in the house at all times to reverse the acquittal and
convict the appellants.
29. Whether Suraiya, a lady could have committed the murder alone had
not been posed to the Postmortem doctor. In absence of medical
evidence that murder was committed by a single person High Court
incorrectly drew its own inference that Suraiya was assisted by
others in committing the crime and roped in her family members,
that is the appellants.
30. Against Rahil another circumstance has been relied upon. High Court
referred to call detail records (CDRs) between Rahil and Mohd.
Fazal and observed that as the tower location of Rahil’s mobile
number is Nizamuddin, his presence at the place of occurrence is
established. This finding is based on inadmissible evidence and
even otherwise such conclusion on the basis of evidence on record
is too tenuous.
31. PW23 Nodal Officer Bharti Airtel produced CDRs of the phones of
Fazal and Rahil being Ex. PW 23/A and 23/B, respectively. Site
details of Airtel in Delhi and NCR were exhibited as Ex. PW23/C.
The ownership certificate was also produced as Ex. PW23/D. All
the exhibits were secondary evidence being computer printouts
of the data said to be preserved in the computers of the service
provider concerned. During cross-examination, PW23 admitted he
had neither signed the said documents nor were the documents
certified.
32. Section 65-B(4) requires issuance of a certificate by a person-in-
charge or responsible officer in relation to operations of the relevant
computer network in question stating as per his knowledge or belief
that during the relevant period:-
(a) computer(s) were carrying out regular activities, and were
working properly; and
(b) the relevant information was regularly fed into the computer in
ordinary course of business,
as proof of the facts stated therein.
620 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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33. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu6 this Court held computer
printouts are secondary evidence and may be admitted on mere
production. Production of certificate under section 65-B(4) was not
mandatory for admission of such secondary evidence. However,
in Anvar PV v. PK Basheer7 this Court took a different view and
held Section 65-B laid down a special procedure for admissibility
of electronic records which mandatorily requires production of
certificate under 65-B(4) for admissibility of secondary evidence i.e.
computer printouts. This view was doubted in Shafhi Mohammad v.
State of Himachal Pradesh8. In Sonu v. State of Haryana9, another
bench of this Court, held the ratio in Anvar PV (supra) shall apply
prospectively unless the defence during trial raised objection to
admission of computer printouts. Finally, the issue was settled by a
three-judge bench in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal10, wherein the bench overruling Navjot Sandhu (supra) and
Shafhi Mohd. (supra) upheld the ratio in Anvar PV (supra) and held
issuance of certificate under section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent
for admissibility of computer-generated secondary evidence. It cannot
be supplemented through oral evidence.
34. It would be argued that Navjot Sandhu (supra) which did not insist
on production of certificate for admissibility of computer-generated
printouts was prevailing at the time when the case was decided by
the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. The judgement in Anvar
PV (supra) was delivered subsequently and cannot be a ground to
render the CDRs inadmissible. It is also brought to our notice that
issue of retrospective application of the ratio in PV Anvar (supra) is
pending for consideration before this Court11.
35. Be that as it may, it is relevant to note the larger bench in Khotkar
(supra) while reiterating PV Anvar (supra) did not hold that its ratio
shall apply prospectively. Furthermore, in Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v.

6 (2005) 11 SCC 600.
7 (2014) 10 SCC 473.
8 (2018) 2 SCC 801.
9 (2017) 8 SCC 570.
10 (2020) 7 SCC 1.
11 M.A. No. 1563/2017 in C.A. No. 4226/2012.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 621

Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

State (NCT of Delhi)12 this Court while hearing a review petition in a
death penalty case retrospectively applied the ratio in Anvar PV to
cases decided earlier and eschewed secondary electronic evidence
dehors certificate under section 65-B(4), holding as follows:-
“23. Navjot Sandhu was decided on 4-8-2005 i.e. before
the judgment was rendered by the trial court in the instant
matter. The subsequent judgments of the High Court
and this Court were passed on 13-9-2007 and 10-8-2011
respectively affirming the award of death sentence. These
two judgments were delivered prior to the decision of this
Court in Anvar P.V. which was given on 18-9-2014. The
judgments by the trial court, High Court and this Court
were thus well before the decision in Anvar P.V. and were
essentially in the backdrop of law laid down in Navjot
Sandhu. If we go by the principle accepted in para 32 of
the decision in Sonu, the matter may stand on a completely
different footing. It is for this reason that reliance has been
placed on certain decisions of this Court to submit that
the matter need not be reopened on issues which were
dealt with in accordance with the law then prevailing.
However, since the instant matter pertains to award of
death sentence, this review petition must be considered
in light of the decisions made by this Court in Anvar P.V.
and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar.
24. Consequently, we must eschew, for the present
purposes, the electronic evidence in the form of CDRs
which was without any appropriate certificate under Section
65-B(4) of the Evidence Act.”
Similar view was taken in Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector
of Police13.
36. Though the present case does not involve death penalty, it is
undeniable that appellants were facing a criminal trial and the
prosecutor was required to prove a fact beyond reasonable doubt

12 (2023) 3 SCC 654.
13 2023 SCC Online SC 310.
622 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

strictly in accordance with law. Appellants during trial raised objections
to admissibility of the secondary electronic evidence relating to Rahil
which was marked as exhibit PW23/B-D. Thereby the prosecutor was
put on due notice and had opportunity to fill the lacuna by producing
the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4) but did not do so.
In Sonu (supra), this court held if an objection is taken to CDRs being
marked without a certificate and the same was not cured by the
prosecutor at relevant stage the document shall be inadmissible in law.
In these circumstances we are inclined to apply the ratio in PV Anvar
and Khotkar to the case and hold that the exhibits are inadmissible
in law being secondary evidence without certification.
37. Even if the CDRs and other electronic records were admitted in
evidence they merely contain the cell tower location information, that
is to say, which tower mobile phone was connected to and how long
the calls lasted when it was connected to that tower. These data
give an approximate area corresponding to the operational area of
the cell tower and not the exact site where the phone is located.
38. In the present case, the CDRs show Rahil’s phone was connected to
the cell tower at Nizamuddin (Ex. PW/23 C). Cell towers can reach
approximately a half mile to two miles in city location14. No evidence
is led regarding the range of the said tower. It needs to be borne
in mind that cell tower ranges widely vary and are dependent on a
number of variables such as:-
a) how high the antenna is over the surrounding landscape;
b) frequency of the signal in use;
c) rated power of the transmitter;
d) directional characteristic of the antenna array on the site;
e) nearby buildings and vegetation absorbing and reflecting radio
energy;
f) local geographical or regulatory factors and weather conditions.15

14 Quinteros, Penny. (2023) Confronting NELOS: cross-examining the cellphone industry’s secret location
technology, Syracuse Law Review, 73(1) 375.
15 Millman National Land Services, ‘What is a Cell Tower and How Does a Cell Tower Work?’(12th May,
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 623

Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

39. Cell triangulation identifies at least three towers to which the cell
phone at a particular time is connected and determines the location
of the phone by overlapping the ranges of these towers. This is a
better and comparatively more precise method than reference to a
single tower. The issue may be better elucidated by the diagrams
(Figure 1 and Figure 216) set out herein below.

Single Tower Range Cell Triangulation Range

40. Given these circumstances reference to Nizamuddin cell tower
in CDRs would merely show that Rahil’s phone was within the
operational range of such tower and it is hazardous to rely solely on
this evidence to prove his presence at his residence beyond doubt.
41. Finally, telephonic exchanges between Rahil and Mohd. Fazal would
not lead to an inference of conspiracy to murder as Mohd. Fazal
has been acquitted of the charge of murder which has not been
appealed against.
42. It is settled law in a criminal case whether based on direct or
circumstantial evidence, the burden of proof always rests on the
prosecution. Only when the prosecution discharges the initial onus,
that is, proves the incriminating attending circumstances to establish
the cause of death are within the ‘special knowledge’ of an accused
does the onus shift and an adverse inference against such accused
may be drawn if he fails to discharge such onus.

2020), <https://millmanland.com/knowledge/what-is-a-cell-tower-and-how-does-a-cell-tower-work/> as
cited in Bechuram Bag v. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 419, (para 52).
16 Supra note 12 at 396.
624 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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43. In the absence of reliable and convincing evidence proving the
presence of the appellants at Suraiya’s residence when Shakeel
ur Rehman is said to have come there, it cannot be said that the
prosecution had discharged its initial onus and proved the appellants
were present in the house when the murder occurred.
44. Such failure of the prosecution cannot be bridged by an inferential
conclusion of presence of all inmates in the house to shift the onus
on them to explain away the circumstances leading to Shakeel’s
homicidal death. High Court failed to appreciate this lacuna in the
prosecution case and illegally drew adverse inference against the
appellants under Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
45. Accordingly, we hold that High Court was not justified in reversing the
findings of acquittal on the basis of mere surmises and the impugned
judgment to the extent that it convicts the appellants is liable to be
set aside. Consequently, appeal is allowed. Pending application(s),
if any, is disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey