Holding

The detention order under the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 is valid and not liable to be set aside.

Summary

R.K. Singh was detained under section 12(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 on the ground that he was an anti‑social element habitually committing offences under Chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code. The detention order was based on several incidents, including a raid in which he opened fire on police and pending murder and arms‑related cases. Singh challenged the order through a writ petition and a criminal appeal; the High Court dismissed both. The Supreme Court examined whether the executive’s satisfaction was reasonable, whether the material relied upon was relevant and proximate, and whether procedural safeguards were observed. It held that the authority acted on proper material, the conclusion was neither irrational nor unreasonable, and the order was within the statutory limits. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition and the criminal appeal, upholding the detention.

Issues considered

Whether the detention order under section 12(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 is valid and within the statutory authority.
Whether the executive’s satisfaction that the petitioner is an anti‑social element is reasonable and based on relevant and proximate facts.
Whether the procedural safeguards, including supply of material to the detainee, were complied with.
Whether the order amounts to an arbitrary or illegal exercise of preventive detention power.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 26, s. 27, s. 28, s. 29
Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981s. 12(1), s. 12(2), s. 22, s. 2(d)
Explosive Substances Act
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Chapter XVI, s. Chapter XVII
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956

Subjects

preventive detentionanti‑social elementpublic orderexecutive satisfactionreasonablenessprocedural safeguardspreventive detention jurisprudenceBihar Control of Crimes Act

Judgment

A
RAJ KUMAR SINGH
v.
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

SEPTEMBER 26, 1986
B
[R.S. PATHAK AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.]
'
Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981-Section 12(2)-Detention
'{ order-Valid of.

The Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 was enacted to make c
special provisions for the control and suppression of anti-social ele'
ments with a view to maintenance of public order. Section 2(d) defines
"Anti-Social Element" and s. 12 deals with power to make orders for
detaining certain persons.
/
D
Upon the materials, the District .Magistrate, in his order of deten-
tion nnder s. 12(2) has stated that he was satisfied that the petitioner
was an a~ti-social element and was habitually committing offences
punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code and
as such his movements and acts adversely affected the public order. The
incidents referred to in the grounds of detention showing criminal pro- E
pensity of the petitioner had taken place one year prior to the date of
passing of the detention order.

The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged his detention before the
High Court.
F
Dismissing the writ petition as well as the appeal, this Court,

HELD: l. Preventive Detention for social protection of the com- ·
munity is a hard law but, it is a necessary evil in the modern society and'
must be pragmatically construed, so that it works. That is how law
serves the society but does not become an impotent agent. Anti-social G
elements creating havoc have to be taken care of by law. Lawless multi-
tude bring democracy and Constitution into disrepute. Bad facts bring
hard laws-but these should be properly and legally ~pplied. It should
be so construed that it does not endanger social defence or the defence
of the community, at the same time does not infringe the liberties of the
citizens. A balance should always be struck. [920B-D] · . H

913
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A 2. The executive authority is not the sole judge of what is
required for national security or public order. But, the court cannot
substitute its decision if the executive authority or the appropriate
authority acts on proper materials and reasonably and rationally comes
to that conclusion even though a conclusion with which the court might
B not be in agreement. It is not for the court to put itself in the position of
the detaining authority and to satisfy itself that untested facts reveal a
path of crime provided these facts are relevant. [920E-F] ).

3. If, in the background of a case, and having regard to the
definition of 'anti-social element' in s. 2(d) of the Bihar Control of
Crimes Act, 1981, an appropriate authority charged with the imple-
c mentation of the Act, comes to the satisfaction that the detenu is one
who is habitually committing or abetting the commission of offences,
such a conclusion is neither irrational nor unreasonable. [919C-D l

4. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the power of preven-
D tive detention has been used to clip the 'wings of the accused' who was
involved in a criminal prosecution. The fact that the petitioner was iu
jail has been taken into consideration and all the relevant documents
were in fact supplied to him. Judged by all relevant standards the order
of detention cannot be said to be either illegal or beyond the authority of
law. Therefore, there was no ground for interference with the order of
E detention. [920H; 921A-G]

5. While adequacy or sufficiency is no ground of a challenge,
relevancy or proximity are grounds of challenge and proximity would
be relevant in order to determine whether an order of detention was
arrived at irrationally or unreasonably. [919G-H]
F
Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1984] 3 SCR 435 and
The Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. "· The Company Law Board and
Others, [1966] (Supp.) SCR 311, followed.

/chchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] l SCR 640
G
at 651, Ibrahim Ahmed Batti v. State of Gujarat and Others, [1983] l
SCR 540 at 558 and State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, [1984] 2
SCR at 62 & 63 inapplicable.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 353 of 1986
H
R.K. SINGH v. STATEOFBIHAR [MUKHARJI,J.J 915

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.2.1986 of the Patna High A
Court in C.W.J.C. No. 227 of 1985.

R.K. Garg and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.

D. Goburdhan for the Respondents.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SABYASA CHI MUKHARJI, J. This Appeal and the Writ Peti-
tion challenge the order passed by the District Magistrate, Dhanbad
under section 12(2) of The Bihar Control of· Crimes Act, 1981 ·
(hereinafter called the said 'Act'). The order was passed on 15th c
January, 1985 and was served on the petitioner on 7th December;
1985. The impugned order was approved by the Government on 15th
January, 1985. · ·

The said Act was an Act to make special provisions for the con-
trol and suppression of anti-social elements with a view to mainte- D
nance of public order. Section 12 deals with power to make orders for
detaining persons, Clause (d) of section 2 of the said Act states "Anti-
social Element' as a person who is:

(i) either "y himself or as a member of or leader of a gang,
habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the E
commission of offences, punishable under Chapter XVI or
Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code; or

(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences
under the Suppression of Immoral Tra.ffic in Women and
Girls Act, 1956; or F

(iii) who by words or"otherwise promotes or attempts to
fromote on grounds of religion, race, language caste or
community or any other grounds whatsoever, feelings of
enmity of hatred between different religions, racial or
language groups of castes or communities; or G

(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks
to, or teasing women or girls; or

(v) who has been convicted of an offence under Section 25,
26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959. H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3S.C.R.

A Under section 3, the power is thereof externment on certain
conditions. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 12 of the said Act pro-
vides as follows:

"12. Power to make orders detairiing certain persons-(!)
B The State Government may if satisfied with respect to any
person that with a view to preventing him from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social
elements can not be prev.ented otherwise than by the im-
mediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that
such anti-social element be detained.
c
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or
likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the
jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State Government
is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in
D writing direct, that during such period as may be specified
in the order, such District Magistrate may also, if satisfied
as provided in sub-section ( 1) exercise the po)Ver conferred
upon by the said sub-section:

Provided that the period specified in an order made
E by the State Government under this sub-section shall not,
in the first instance exceed three months, but the State
Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is neces-
sary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from
time to time by any period not exceeding three months at
any one time."
·F
The other provisions are not material for the present purpose. In
so far as these are relevant have been dealt with in the judgment under
appeal and it is not necessary to reiterate these again.

The High Court in the judgment under appeal has ref~rred to the
G order of detention exhaustively.

The High Court has narrated the facts in the judgment under
appeal and stated as follows: '

"On 11.3.84 on a confidential information a raid was
H organised under the leadership of the officer-in-charge of
R.K. SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR[MUKHARJI, J. I 917

Dhanbad Police Station to apprehend one Sri Raghunath A
Singh an absconder detenu of the National Security Act.
According to the ~onfidential information he was going to
witness a Qwali programme at Sijua gate within Jagota .
Police station. As soon as the raiding party reached the
Sijua gate they saw that Raghunath Singh was coming out B
of club and was going towards Sijua More. The police
cordoned him and told him about his arrest under the
;{ National Security Act. On this the aforementioned Raghu-
nath Singh ca\led one Sakaldeo Singh who was coming
towards him alongwith his associates duly armed. Sakaldeo

0 Singh immediately reached the spot and asked the detenu
and his other associates to open fire. As ordered the detenu ·C
opened fire on the police party. The police party, however,
escaped injury. Meanwhile Raghunath Singh took the posi-
tion and opened fire from his revolver which hit the S.l.
Sri. R.K. Verma, a member of the raiding party who fell on
the ground. The police party also opened fire but the
D
detenu and his associates, quite in number, under the
coverage of firing fled away by breaking the cordon of the
police party. The incident took place at about 1.50 a.m. in
presence of a large gathering which .was witnessing .the
Qwali programme. This created great panic and alarm
amongst the people who were witnessing the programme
-< and they started running helter and skelter for their lives.
E
A complete confusion prevailed in the programme and the
police had a hard time to control the situation. This

- ') adversely affected the public" order. The people were so ·
much afraid that they stopped moving freely in the area. It
_is alieged that the detenu is a terror in the area and nobody
F
dares to speak against him. He is an uncrowned king of the
Mafia World and the people living in the area are under the
-<, constant threat of life and property. A case bearing Jogta
P.S. Case No. 22 date.ct 11.3.84 under section 142/149/307/
326/353/333/224/225 l.P:C./27 Arms Act was registered for
this incident and charge-sheet had already been submitted
G
in the case. Besides the aforesaid ground two cases have
been referred to in the order of detention as background to
show the criminality of the detenu:
y
I. Kenduadih P.S. Case No. 43 dated 11.3.83 under sec-
tion 302/34 J.P.C./25(1A)/27 of the Arms Act/3/5 of the H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
[1986] 3 S.C.R.

A Explosive Substance Act. In this case the detenu with his
associates is alleged to have murdered one Sri Nagendra
Singh in broad day light and a charge-sheet in this case had
already been submitted.

2. The other case referred to as a background is that num-
B
bered as Kenduadih P.S. Case No. 31 dated 11.3.84 under
section 25(1A)/35 Arms Act. In this case a DBBL gun
looted in Keswar P.S. Case No. 5/84 under section 395 of
the Indian Penal Code was recovered from the detenu's
house besides cartridges of various Arms. A charge-sheet
in this case had also been submitted."
c
Upon these materials, the District Magistrate, in his order of
detention, has reiterated that he was satisfied that the petitioner is an
anti-social element and habitually commits offences punishable under
Chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code and as such his
movements and acts adversely affect the public order.
D
The District Magistrate further stated that he was satisfied on
ground No. 1 referred to hereinbefore.

In so far as Jogta P.S. Case No. 22 dated 11.3.84 is concerned, it
was with regard to the same incident which resulted in the detention of
E
the petitioner/appellant. So far as the background was concerned, the
incident No. 2 mentioned therein was Kunduadih P.S. Case No. 31
dated 11.3.84 with regard to the same date i.e. 11:3.84 but with regard
to a different occurrence. In that case a gun was looted and a case
under I.P.C. was instituted under section 395 of the Indian Penal
F
Code. Said gun was recovered from the petitioner's/appellant's house (
beside cartridges of various arms and a charge-sheet had been submit-
ted in connection with Jogta P.S. Case No. 22 dated 11.3.84. T.hese
cases were pending at the relevant date. Therefore, there was no ques-
tion of the acquittal or termination of the petitioner one way or the
other in respect of both the incidents of the same date. In respect of
Incident No. 1 referred to hereinbefore i.e. Kenduadih P.S. Case No.
G
43 dated 11.3.84 under section 302/34 I.P.C./25(1A)/27 Arms Act/3/5
Explosive Substance Act in which the petitioner/appellant and his
associates are alleged to have murdered Sri Nagendra Singh in the
broad day light, a charge-sheet had been submitted but the case had
not been tried or terminated in any manner. All these cases were
H pending disposal.
..
R.K. SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR [MUKHARJI, l.[ · 919

There is a proximity between these incidents betraying a nature A
and a tendency of committing these offences. But it cannot be denied
that these indicate, in the facts of this case, that the petitioner/appel-
!ant was one who habitually committed offences which are at least
punishable under I. P. C.
B
We have noted who is an anti-social element under the Act. The
petitioner/appellant has not yet been convicted under any of these

"' sections referred to hereinbefore .. So far as the incidents referred to
hereinbefore betray criminal propensity. The first incident is of a case
which was one year prior to the date of the detention order and the

71 other ·incident was of the same date. If in this background, an
appropriate authority charged with the implementation .of the Act c
comes to the satisfaction that the petitioner/appellant is· one who is
habitually committing or abetting the commission of offences, such a
~
conclusion· is neither irrational nor unreasonable.

In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1984] 3 SCR 435, D
this Act came up for consideration by this Court. But in that case the
facts were entirely different. In that case the petitioner was facing trial
for offences under section 302 read with section 120B, 386 and 511 of
the Indian Penal Code and was allowed to be· enlarged on bail by the
High Court. But before the petitioner was released in that case the
~ District Magistrate passed an order on 16th August, 1983 under sec- E
tion 12(2) of the said Act for detention of the petitioner. The grounds
of detention supplied to the petitioner related to the incidents which
took place in 1975 and 1982. There is a gap of 6-7 years in between the
=-l. majority of the judges in that decision (0. Chinnappa Reddy and E.S.
Venkataramiah, JJ) observed that the law of preventive detention is
~ hard law and therefore should be strictly construed. Care should,
F
therefore, be taken that liberty of a person is not jeopardized unless
. his case fell squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. A. P.
'-\
Sen, J. disagreed. It is not necessary to discuss the decision in detail in
view of the facts of that case and difference of the facts in this case. We
only reiterate that what the majority of the learned judges said was
that while adequacy or sufficiency was no ground of a challenge, rele- G
vancy or proximity were grounds of challenge. We may respectfully
add that proximity would be relevant in order to determine whether an
order of detention was arrived at irrationally or unreasonably. It is .
'r well-settled that the detaining authority is not the sole judge of what
national security or public order requires. But neither is the court the
sole judge of the position. When power is given to an authority to act H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A on certain facts and if that authority acts on relevant facts and arrives
at a decision which cannot be described as either irrational or un-
reasonable, in the sense that no person instructed in law could have
reasonably taken that view, then the order is not bad and the Court
cannot substitute its decision or opinion, in place of the decision of the
authority concerned on the necessity of passing the order. See in this
B
connection the observations of The Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. v.
The Company Law Board and Others, [1966] Suppl. SCR 311.

Preventive detention for the social protection of the community
is, as .noted and observed in Vijay Narain Singh's case (supra), a hard
law but, it is a necessary evil in the moderq society and must be
c pragmatically construed, so that it works. That is how law serves the
society but does not become an impotent agent. Anti-social elements
creating havoc have to be taken care of by law. Lawless multitude
bring democracy and constitution into disrepute. Bad facts bring hard
laws-but these should be properly and legally applied. It should be so
construed that it does not endanger social defence or the defence of
D
the community, at the same time does not infringe the liberties of the
citizens. A balance should always be struck.

The executive authority is not the sole judge of what is required
for national security or public ord~r. But the court cannot substitute its·
decision if the executive authority or the appropriate authority acts on
E
proper materials and reasonably and rationally comes to that conclu-
sion even though a conclusion with which the court might not be in
agreement. It is not for the court to put itself in the position of the
detaining authority and to satisfy itself that untested facts reveal a
path of crime provided these facts are relevant. See in this connection
the observations of 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Vijay Narain Singh's
F
case (supra) at pages 440 and 441.

In the facts of this case and having regard to the nature of the
offences, the impugned order cannot be said to be invalid and impro-
per one. The High Court has very exhaustively dealt with this aspect
·G and we respe~tfully agree with the High Court's view.

There is no analogy between the instant case and the facts of
Vijay Narain Singh's case (supra) decided by this Court.

On materials on record it cannot be said as the High Court has
H rightly pointed out that the power of preventive detention has been
R.K. SINGH v. STATEOFB!HAR [MUKHARJI,J.J 921

used to clip the 'wings of the accused' who is involved in a criminal A
prosecution. Certain allegations had been made that all materials_ had
not been supplied to the accused. This is not true because as the High
Court noted that all relevant F.l.Rs were received by the petitioner
and in token whereof he had put his signature in black and white in his
own hand. B

The fact that the petitioner was in jail has been taken into consi-
deration. How these factors and to what extent these should be taken
into consideration have been discussed by this Court in Writ Petition
(Criminal) No. 296 of 1986 (With SLP (Criminal) No. 1265of1986). It
is not necessary to reiterate them. In the instant case the limits have
not been transgressed. c
In the background of the facts of this case. that all the relevant
documents were in fact supplied and no other document was asked for,
the observations of this Court in Ichchu Devi Choraria v. Union of ·
India & Ors., [1981] 1SCR640 at 651 on which reliance was placed by D
Mr. Garg on-behalf of the petitioner/appellant do not apply.

Mr. Gobenlhan, on behalf of the State of Bihar, rightly pointed
out that in the facts and circumstances of this case and the background
of the scheme of this Act, there was no scope of the application of the
principles reiterated by this Court in Ibrahim Ahmed Batti v. State of E
Gujarat and Others, I1983] 1 SCR 540 at 558. Similarly the observa-
tions of this Court in State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi [1984] 2
SCR 50 at 62 & 63, upon which Mr. Garg relied can have no applica-
tion. All the relevant documents were supplied. All the statutory safe-
guards were complied with. · ·
F
In view of the backgrounds in the facts and circumstances of this
case a?d the grounds m_entioned in the affidavit of t~e District Magis-
trate filed before the High Court in the case under appeal as well as in
Writ Petition in this Court and the facts found by theHigh Court which
~re based on _cogent and reliable evidence, there is no ground for
mterference with the order of detention.
G
Preventive detention as reiterated is hard law and must be
applied with circumspeciion rationally, reasonably and on relevant
materials. Hard and ugly facts make ·application of harsh laws impera-
tive. The detenu's rights and privileges as a free man should not be
unnecessarily curbed. H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A No other points were urged before us. This Court has reiterated
in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 296 of 1986 with SLP (Criminal) No.
1265 of 1986 the relevant aspect of the preventive detention law. In
that view of the matter it is not necessary to reiterate those principles
again here.
B
Preventive detentiion is a necessary evil in the modem restless
society. But simply because it is an evil, it cannot be so interpreted as ).
to be inoperative in any practical manner. Judged by all relevant
standards, the impugned order of detention in the case of the peti-
tioner cannot be said to be either illegal or beyond the authority of
law.
c
Before we conclude we must point out that another point was
taken that in the order there was no mention of the period of deten-
tion. There could not be an indefinite detention. The State Govern-
ment has clearly. notified the period of detention of the petitioner and
indicated that he should be in detention till 6th December, 1986. This
D
appears at Annexure I at page 52 of the Paper Book of Criminal
Appeal No. 353 of 1986. The said order was passed under section 22 of
the said Act by the State Government.

In the premises the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed. The
Criminal Appeal is also dismissed.
E

A.P.J. Petition and Appeal dismissed.