Holding

A single sanction under Section 199(4) of the CrPC is sufficient to prosecute all persons involved in the same alleged defamation transaction, and the sanction granted by the State Government is valid.

Summary

The appellants, a group of journalists and media houses, were charged with defamation for publishing a news item that alleged the Additional Commissioner of Police, Rajiv Trivedi, facilitated the Sohrabuddin encounter. The second respondent obtained a previous sanction under Section 199(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) from the Andhra Pradesh State Government, which was used to file complaints against the appellants. The appellants challenged the sanction, arguing that each accused must be individually named and that the sanction lacked the State Government's application of mind. The Supreme Court held that a single sanction is sufficient to prosecute all persons involved in the same transaction and that the State Government’s exercise of power under Section 199 is administrative, requiring only subjective satisfaction. The Court also rejected the contention that the alleged statements were unrelated to the public servant’s functions, leaving that question to trial. Consequently, the High Court’s dismissal of the petitions under Section 482 was upheld and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The adequacy of a single previous sanction under Section 199(4)(b) of CrPC to prosecute multiple media entities and individuals without naming each accused.
Whether the State Government must specifically mention each accused in the sanction order.
Whether the alleged news item constitutes defamation under Section 199, i.e., is it made in connection with the public servant’s official functions.
Whether the State Government applied its mind while granting the sanction.
Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the petitions filed under Section 482 of CrPC.

Legislation cited

All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 132, s. 188, s. 196, s. 197, s. 199, s. 199(4)(b), s. 308, s. 473, s. 482, s. 484
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898s. 1988(3)(a)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 499, s. 500, s. 501, s. 502
Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867s. 7
Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955

Subjects

defamationSection 199 CrPCprevious sanctionmedia lawfreedom of presspublic servantAll India Services Conduct Rulescriminal procedureappeal dismissed

Judgment

[2015] 7 S.C.R. 10

A RAJDEEP SARDESAI
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 857of2012)
B
MAY 14, 2015
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
C s.199(4)(b) - Prosecution for defamation - Previous
sanction - Second respondent, the Additional Commissioner
of Police aggrieved with the news item allegedly making false
implication against him with regard to Sohrabuddin encounter
case published by appellants in their respective publications
D and/or telecasted on their channel - Second respondent
sought previous sanction u/s.199(4)(b) for prosecution of
appellants which was accorded and complaints were filed
against appellants through State Public Prosecutor -
Magistrate took cognizance of offence and passed
E summoning orders - s.482 petition by appellants on the
ground that they were not individually named in the said
sanction order-High Court refused to quash the proceedings
- Held: It was not necessary for the State Government to
F separately issue sanction order against each one of the
appellants when they were all responsible for telecasting and
publishing the said news Item in electronic and print media
and also when the names of the said electronic and print
media were already mentioned in the said sanction order- It
G is sufficient if one sanction is accorded to prosecute all the
concerned persons involved in that occurrence.
s. 199 - Exercise of power under - Held: Is in
administrative and ministerial capacity and such sanction is
as per the subjective satisfaction on the part of the State
H Government - Discussed.
10
RAJ DEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 11
PRADESH & ORS.

s. 199 - Contention for the appellants that the act of the A
second respondent allegedly aiding the Gujarat Police
Officers to facilitate taking Sohrabuddin from Bidar to
Ahmedabad, has nothing to do with the discharge of his
public functions, hence, the said statement in the news item
allegedly defaming the second respondent does not attract B
s. 199 - Held: Such contention wholly untenable in law, for
the reason that determining the question on whether or not
the second respondent while aiding the Gujarat Police at that
point of time was in the capacity of his official discharge of
his public functions or otherwise, is to be determined by C
regular trial after examining the facts, circumstances and
evidence on record - All India Services (Conduct) Rules,
1968.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court D

HELD: 1. The previous sanction was accorded to
launch necessary prosecution against the channel and
the newspaper. Section 199 of Cr.P.C., r/w the All India
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 provides that previous E
sanction must be accorded, authorising the initiation of
criminal prosecution against the accused, however, the
said provisions do not state that it is necessary to
mention the names of each one of the accused who are
alleged to have committed the offence in the same F
alleged transaction. Therefore, in the case on hand, when
the previous sanction iwas accorded by the State
Government against those who were responsible for the
telecast/publication of the news both in electronic and
print media which according to the second respondent G
damaged his reputation, it was not necessary for the
State Government to separately issue sanction order
against each one of the appellants, when they are all
responsible for telecasting and publishing the said news H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.~.

A item in the electronic and print media and also when the
names of the said electronic and print media have
already been mentioned in the said sanction order.
Therefore, there is no merit in the contention on behalf
of the appellants that their names have not been
B specifically mentioned in the said sanction order. [Para
26] [28-G-H; 29-A-E]

2. The exercise of power by the State Government
under Section 199 of Cr.P.C. is in the administrative and
C ministerial capacity and such sanction is as per the
subjective satisfaction on the part of the State
Government. [Para 27] [29-G]

Gour Chandra Rout & Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor,
D Cuttack AIR 1963 SC 1198: 1963 Suppl. SCR 447;
PC. Joshi &Anr. v. The State of UttarPradesh AIR 1961
SC 387: 1961 SCR 63; Mansukhlal Vitha/das
Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 705:
(1997) 7 SCC 622- Held inapplicable.
E
3. The sanction was accorded by the State
Government after appreciating that the statements
telecast/published by the appellants in the electronic and
print media as well as the statement given by the
F appellant in the Urdu Daily on the basis of which the
news is published by its Editor, which were all
statements defaming the second respondent while he
was discharging his public function as a public servant.
Therefore, the contention on behalf of the appellants that
G there was no application of mind on the part of the State
Government in according the said sanction is wholly
untenable in law. [Para 28] [30-H; 31-A-C]

4. The contention was urged by the appellants that
H the act of the second respondent allegedly aiding the
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF AN DH RA 13
PRADESH & ORS.

Gujarat Police Officers to facilitate taking Sohrabuddin A
from Bidar to Ahmedabad, has nothing to do with the
discharge of his public functions, hence, the said
statement in the news item allegedly defaming the
second respondent being telecast and published in
electronic and print media do not attract Section 199 of B
Cr.P.C. This contention is also wholly untenable in law,
for the reason that determining the question on whether
or not the second respondent while aiding the Gujarat
Police at that point of time was in the capacity of his
official discharge of his public functions or otherwise, is C
to be determined by regular trial after examining the facts,
circumstances and evidence on record. [Para 29] [31-
C-G]

5. By careful reading of Section 199(4) of the Cr.P.C., D
it does not indicate that in order to initiate criminal
proceedings against the accused, the public servant
needs to obtain sanction from the State Government in
respect of each one of the persons against whom the
same transaction of offence is alleged and the names of E
the accused are required to be mentioned specifically in
the sanction order accorded by the State Government.
It is sufficient if one sanction is accorded to prosecute
all the concerned persons involved in that occurrence. F
[Para 32] [33-A-C]

Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 2010
(1) SCR 991: 2010(2) SCC 200- Distinguished.

Master Girdhari Lal, Printer & Publisher of Na ya Bharat G
v. The State 1969 CriLJ P&H 1318; Pachhalloor
Noohu v. Public Prosecutor1975 CriLJ Kerala 1304;
Sant Lal v. Krishan Lal 1976 CriLJ Delhi 215; B.
Basavalingappa and Anr. v. \/. Narasimhan 1974 Cri
LJ Karnataka 66 - approved. H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A Urmila Deviv. YudhvirSingh(2013) 15 SCC 624: 2013
SCALE 513; Madan Lal v. The State of Punjab AIR
1967 SC 1590: 1967 SCR 439; Jagir Singh v. Ranbir
Singh andAnr. AIR 1979 SC 381: 1979 (2) SCR 282;
Kartar Singh & Ors. v. The State of Punjab AIR 1956
B SC 541: 1956 SCR 476; R. Rajagopal & Anr. v. State
of T.N. & Ors. (1994) 6 sec 632 : 1994 (4) Suppl.
SCR 353- referred to.
Case Law Reference
c 1963 Suppl. SCR 447 held inapplicable. Para 12
1961SCR63 held inapplicable. Para 12
1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 705 held inapplicable. Para 12
2013 SCALE 513 referred to. Para 12
D
1967 SCR 439 referred to. Para 13
1979 (2) SCR 282 referred to. Para 15
2010 (1) SCR 991 distinguished Para 18
1956 SCR 476 referred to. Para 22
E
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 353 referred to. Para 22
1969 CriLJ P&H 1318 . . approved Para 25
1975 CriLJ Kerala 1304 approved Para 25

F 1976 CriLJ Delhi 215 approved Para 25
1974 CriLJ Karnataka 66 approved Para 25
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 857 of2012.
G From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2011 of the
High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in
Criminal Petition No. 1638 of 2008.
WITH
H Criminal Appeal Nos. 853, 854, 855, 856, 858, 851, 850
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 15
PRADESH & ORS.

and852of2012. A

Guru Krishna Kumar, Sait Mahmood, Abhinav Mukerji,
Sumoto de, Tanya Shree, VivekAgarawal, Aruneshwar'gupta,
Manish Raghav, Nikhil Singh, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Abhimanue
Shrestha, Shilpi Dey (For Kamini Jaiswal) for the Appellant. B

P. Vishwanath Shetty, P. Venkat Reddy (For Venkat Palwai
Law Associates), D. Mahesh Babu, T. N. Rao, Pappu
Nageshwar Rao, Bina Madhavan (For Lawyer S Knit & Co)
for the Respondents. c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. The present group of appeals
is directed against the final common judgment and order dated
29.4.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra D
Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No. 1638 of 2008
and batch matters whereby, the High Court dismissed all the
criminal petitions except Criminal Petition No. 7592 of 2007,
which were filed against the order of summoning in various
complaints filed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh on E
behalf of the second respondent. Th~ following table would be
apposite to clarify which appeal is filed against which criminal
petition/complaint case:-
QI, Appeal Nos. before this QI. Petns. aising Canplairt filed Permission F
Colrt fran~airt fa' defamltion giwn for filing
Nos. inler Section carpairt vidl .
(s)against Sanction Nos.
i.DMl1ns
857/2012 (R<jdeep Sa'desai QI. P. Nos. 1874, 199(2) Cr.PC G.O. Rt.
v. State of AP. &as.) 1590, 1646 & 1638 before the Coi.t No.6581 daied
ll®a!!lil (Sidhartha Gat.t<m rl 2008 f~e:l befae IV, "'1dl. 27.10.2007
v. State of AP. &O's.) Hgh Cm.fl against Mltrc:polltai G
~ (9Nati Vastistha CCNo.1/l!J08- Sessims Ju:!ge,
&Mr. v. Staie d AP. &O's.) reg. telecasting a Na:rpally
~ (V.K rews prograrrrre in irpa;ing charges
Shastikuarrrv. Stated AP. & ~IBN~lish lllder Sections
O's.) r>e.w dlamel 499, 500and
855/2012 (AhrredAli lllder the c:ai:tion 120BoflPC
Shai< &Mr. v. Staie d AP. & "20 rrin.rtes-
Ors.) Sotrabu:!cin
85612012 (Hemender Inside Story" on
H
Sharrra &Ors. v. State d AP. 13.5.2007at1730 i
&O's.I tYS. i
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A !<r:!,Ml!l§.l!li~/2!!12 (Guiab Crl. P. No. 264 of 199(2) r/w Sec. G.O.RI.
Kolhari & Ors. v. State of AP. 2008 before High 200 Cr. PC before No.6582 dated
&Anr.) Court against CC !he Court of II 27.10.2007
and 85812012 (Hemender No.3/2008-reg. Adct.
a
Sharma & Ors. v. State A.P. publication ri news ~tropolttan
&Ors. ttem in Rajasthan Sessions Judge,
Patrika, Sctll"day Ncvnpally,
Edn. dated irllJosing charges
B 12.5.2007 under under Ss. 499,
the Heading 500,501, 502
- 'Varjara Par and 120Bof IPC
Kastha Phanda
Crl.A.851/2012 (L.ateef Crl. P. No.1252 of 199(2) r/w G.O.RI.
Mohammad Khan v. State ri 2008 filed before Sec.200 Cr.PC No.6580and
A.P. &AIT.) High Court against before the court dated
c cc No.24/2007- of I Addi. 27.10.2007
reg. publication of ~tropolttan
news ttems in Sessions Judge,
Siasath Urdu Daily, H,Uerabad
dated 85.2007 inlJosing
allegations under
Sections 499,
500, 501, 502
and 120B of IPC
D

2. Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder:

A news item on various dates in the year 2007, allegedly
E making false implication against the second respondent-Rajiv
Trivedi, Additional Commissioner of Police (Crimes and SIT),
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, with regard to the Sohrabuddin
encounter case was published by the appellants in the
respective publications and was telecast on CNN-IBN. A
F representation was given by the second-respondent to the
Andhra Pradesh State Government seeking previous sanction
under Section 199(4)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(in short 'Cr. P. C.') for prosecution of the appellants for offences
punishable under the provisions referred to supra. Accordingly,
G the previous sanction was accorded by the State Government
vide G.O. Rt. Nos. 6581, 6582, 6583 and 6580 dated
27.10.2007 in favour of the second respondent permitting him
to file complaints against the appellants through the State
H Public Prosecutor before the appropriate court of law against
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 17
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

the individuals connected with electronic and print media as A
herein below:

a) Siyasat Urdu Daily: Sri Latif Mohammad Khan

b) CNN-IBN English News Channel
B
c) Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) Hindi daily

d) The Deccan Chronicle English Daily

e) The Etemaad Urdu Daily c
(points (a)-(e) are hereinafter referred to as
'individual print and electronic media')

3. One of the above mentioned news items which was
telecast on CNN-IBN English News channel under the caption D
"30 minutes- Sohrabuddin the Inside Story" on 13.5.2007 at
1730 hours, which is subject matter of CC No. 1 of 2008, is
extracted hereunder for our examination:-

"Police sources say Vanjara and Pandian nabbed E
Kousarbai in Bidar with help from S.P. Rajiv Trivedi of
the Hyderabad Special Investigation Unit. ........ Rajiv
Trivedi provided cars with fake number plates in which
Sohrabuddin was brought to Ahmadabad and then killed
in a fake encounter." F

4. Pursuant to the above said sanction accorded by the
State Government ofAndhra Pradesh, the criminal proceedings
were initiated by the State Public Prosecutor on behalf of the
State of Andhra Pradesh against the appellants. The State of G
Andhra Pradesh represented by the State Public Prosecutor
filed the complaints against the accused-appellants for the
offences referred to supra. The Additional Metropolitan
Sessions Judge bef,ore whom complaints were instituted by
the State Public Prosecutor, has taken the cognizance of the H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A offences alleged against the appellants and passed orders
summoning them to appear before the Court for further
proceedings in the respective cases.

5. Aggrieved by the summoning orders passed by the
s Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge in C.C. No. 27 of
2007, C.C. NO. 3 of 2007, and C.C. No.24 of 2007, the
appellants filed Crl. P. Nos. 7592 of 2007, 264 of 2008 and
1252 of 2008 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High.
Court of Andhra Pradesh, seeking to quash the same, urging
C various legal contentions.

6. The High Court after hearing all the above said petitions
together, adverting to the previous sanction order accorded in
favour of respondent No. 2 by the State Government under
D Section 199(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C., permitting the State Public
Prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings for the offences
alleged against the appellants referred to supra and after
dealing with the contentions with regard to the legality and
validity of the said sanction orders read with the Rules and
E adverting to various judgments of this Court, allowed only
Criminal Petition No. 7592 of 2007 (M.J. Akbar &Anr. v. The
State of AP.) and dismissed all other criminal petitions holding
that the news telecast in th~ eiectronic media by CNN-IBN and
other news items published in various newspapers of the
F appellants per se are integrally connected with the official
discharge of duties of the second respondent and held that
whether the same amounts to defamatory, libel or scandalous
statements is a matter that has to be decided on the evidence
to be adduced by the parties. The High Court further held that
G in the absence of any privilege to the broadcaster on par with
Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867,
the appellants cannot claim to quash the criminal proceedings
initiated against them and there was no merit to quash the
H said criminal proceedings against the appellants. Aggrieved
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 19
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

by the common order of the High Court, these appeals are A
filed by the appellants raising certain substantial questions of
law for consideration of this Court.

7. Learned senior counsel Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar
' appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos. B
appearing on behalf of the
850, 852, 853, 855, 856, 857 of2012 has contended thatthe
State Public Prosecutor cannot make a complaint under
Section 199(2) of Cr.P.C. against an individual in respect of
whom no sanction has been accorded by the State
Government as required under Section 199(4) of the Cr. P. C. C

8. It is further contended by him on behalf of the appellants
that they have been summoned on the complaint instituted by
the State Public Prosecutor on behalf of the second respondent
on the basis of the previous sanction order accorded by the o
State Government under Section 199(4) of the Cr.P.C. for
prosecuting the individual electronic and print media involved
in the case on hand and not for the prosecution of any named
individual in the said sanction order and therefore, there is no
• application of mind on the part of the State Government while E
according the previous sanction orders in favour of the second
respondent to initiate criminal proceedings under the said
provisions referred to supra against the appellants herein.

9. It is further contended on behalf of the appellants that F
the High Court has erred in dismissing the criminal petitions
of the appellants and not quashing the criminal proceedings
against the orders of summons passed by the Additional
Metropolitan Sessions Judge after taking cognizance of the
complaints filed by the public prosecutor against the appellants, G
which are not maintainable in law. It is contended by him that
the High Court has also not considered the relevant fact that
telecasting the story by the appellant is not in connection with
discharge of public functions of the second respondent being
a public servant and. this aspect of the matter has not been H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A dealt with by the High Court thereby, it has rendered the findings
as erroneous in law and therefore, the same are liable to be
set aside.

10. Further, it is contended by him that the High Court has
B failed to take into consideration an important aspect of the
matter namely, the State Government while examining the
representation submitted by the second respondent for
according previous sanction as required under Section 199(4)
of the Cr.P.C. and All India Services (Conduct) Rules of 1968,
C in his favour authorising the State Public Prosecutor to initiate
criminal proceedings against the appellants does not reflect
application of mind on the part of the State Government as
they have failed to find out whether or not the comments made
against the second respondent by the individual electronic and
D print media have got content which are defamatory, scandalous
or libellous and whether the same warrant the State
Government to permit such institution of criminal proceedings
against the appellants under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. Therefore, it is contended that the above explained
E reasons would show lack of application of mind on the part of
the State Government to the facts presented to it and therefore,
the impugned sanction order accorded by it in favour of the
second respondent to initiate criminal proceedings against
F the appellants under the provisions of Cr.P.C. referred to supra
is vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside.

11. Further, it is contended by the learned senior counsel
that the High Court has also failed to take into consideration
another relevant fact that the criminal complaints instituted by
G respondent No. 1-State Government against the appellants,
is silent about their role in committing the alleged offence of
telecasting/publishing comments and allegations against the
second respondent which are allegedly defamatory, libellous
H and scandalous.
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 21
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

12. It is also contended on behalf of the appellants that A
the High Court has failed to appreciate that to arraign the
appellants as the accused, the complainant ought to have
made positive averments against them in the complaints and
attributed a specific role to each one of them in committing
the alleged offence, warranting initiation of criminal B
proceedings, the same has not been done, therefore, the
summoning order issued by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge
and the complaints filed against the appellants by the State
Public Prosecutor are not sustainable in law and are liable to
be quashed. The learned senior counsel in support of his C
contentions has placed reliance upon the following judgments
of this Court in the cases of Gour Chandra Rout &Anr. v.
The Public Prosecutor, Cuttack1, P.C. Joshi & Anr. v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh 2, Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan D
v. State of Gujarat1 -and Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh4 .

13. Further, the learned senior counsel placing reliance
upon Section 196(2) of Cr.P.C. contended that a specific
sanction order is required to prosecute in respect of each
person to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 120-8 E
of l.P.C., the same has not been obtained by the second
respondent. In support of this contention he placed reliance
upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Madan Lal v.
The State of Punjab 5 .
F
14. Mr.AruneshwarGupta, the learned counsel appearing
for the appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos. 854 and 858 of
2012, reiterated the aforesaid legal submissions made by Mr.
Guru Krishna Kumar, the learned senior counsel on behalf of
the appellants referred to supra.' It is further contended by him G
in Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2012 that it is evident from the
1
AIR1963 SC 1198
2
AIR 1961SC387
3
(1997) 1 sec
622
4
(2013) 15 sec
624 / 2013 SCALE 513 H
5 AIR 1967SC1590
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A notice dated 13.8.2007 that the sanction for the prosecution
was sought against the Editor, News Reporter and Printer and
Publisher of Rajasthan Patrika newspaper, however, no
sanction was sought against the Appellant Nos.1, 2 and 3 in
Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2012 who are the Editor in Chief,
B Advisor and printer and publisher of the said newspaper. After
perusal of all the documents and material on record, the State
Government granted sanction only against the Editor of
Rajasthan Patrika Newspaper (the appellant in Criminal
Appeal No. 858 of 2012) by its order dated 27.10.2007, after
C proper application of mind. The application for grant of sanction
against appellant Nos.1-3 who are the Editor in Chief, Advisor
and Printer and Publisher was specifically rejected by the State
Government, therefore, the criminal proceedings initiated
D against them is not valid in law.

15. It is further contended by him that since the
respondents have not challenged the sanction accorded by
the State Government dated 27.10.2007, authorising the
criminal proceedings against the Editor and rejecting grant of
E sanction order against appellant Nos.1-3 in Cr1. Appeal No.854
of 2012, the same has become final, therefore, the public
prosecutor has no authority to file any criminal complaint
against the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.854of2012 who
F are the Editor-in-Chief, Advisor and Printer and Publisher of
Rajasthan Patrika. He contended that what cannot be derived
directly cannot be obtained indirectly by the process of court
proceedings. He further placed reliance on the decision of this
Court in the case of Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh and Anr. 6,
G contending that in the absence of sanction to prosecute a
named person, the public prosecutor cannot file a complaint
and the Trial Court has no jurisdiction to judicially review the
sanction order and issue summons against those persons
whose name do not specifically appear as accused in the order
H 6 AIR 1979 SC 381
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 23
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

of sanction accorded by the State Government. It is further A
contended that this aspect of the matter has not at all been
considered by the High Court even though the legal submission
was made in this regard before it.

16. Both the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants s
contended that there must be valid and cogent material before
the State Government for according previous sanction in favour
of the second respondent permitting him to initiate criminal
proceedings against the appellants. It is contended by them
. that the State Government should have examined the facts, C
allegations and names of the accused and then should have
reasonably applied its mind to conclude whether or not the
reputation of the second respondent while discharging his
public function as a public servant was intended to be harmed.
Only after such reasonable application of mind by the State D
Government to the facts placed before it, the sanction can be
accorded by it in favour of the second respondent to initiate
criminal proceedings and only then the court of sessions shall
take cognizance of such offence in the criminal proceedings
initiated against the appellants. This aspect of the matter has E
not been considered by the learned Judge of the High Court
while passing the impugned Judgment. Therefore, the
impugned judgment and order is vitiated in law and liable to
be set aside.
F
17. It is further urged by the learned counsel on behalf of
the appellants that the High Court has erroneously held that
under the scheme of Section 199 of the Cr. P. C., the previous
sanction is required against all such persons who have
allegedly committed the offence and not necessarily against G
specific individuals in order to prosecute them for the offences
committed against a person in respect of his conduct in the
discharge of his public functions who at that time was a public
servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A State. Therefore, it is contended on behalf of the appellants in
CriminalAppeal No. 858 of2012 thatthe criminal proceedings
initiated by the first respondent on behalf of the second
respondent should have been confined to only against those
persons named in the Government sanction order for the
B offences referred to supra.

18. Mr. Aruneshwar Gupta, the learned counsel for the
appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos.854 and 858 of 2012 further
contended that several investigations were carried out
C pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in the Sohrabuddin
case and on 12.5.2007, a report was submitted by Ms. Johri
which finds reference in judgment of this Court in the case of
Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 7• The
fact of the investigation by the CBI in Sohrabuddin's case was
D in public domain and ifthat is published in the print media by
the appellant (in Crl. A. Nos. 854 & 858 of 2012), the same
cannot be made the basis of any defamation as it has referred
to the judgment in the aforesaid case which is a public record.

E 19. It is also further contended by him that Rajasthan
Patrika is a subscriber of United News of India (UNI) which is
one of the largest News Agencies in India, providing news to
several news papers in India. The UNI published and
broadcastthe news item dated 12.05.2007 and the appellants
F in Criminal Appeal No. 858 of 2012, being the Editor of
Rajasthan Patrika got the same translated in Hindi and
published it in their news paper which is allegedly defamatory
to the second respondent. It is further contended by him that
United News of India is the source and first broadcaster of the
G alleged defamatory news to its subscribers including the
newspaper for which the appellant is the Editor, who acted
and published in bona fide the alleged offending news believing
it to be true and correct. Therefore, in the absence of any
H 7 201 o (2) sec 200
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 25
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] ·

prosecution of UNI, the appellant cannot be prosecuted for the A
offence of defamation as the same is covered under the
Explanatior, 3 of Section 499 of l.P.C.

20. It is further contended that freedom of expression
demands that criminal defamation in relation to publication of B
news items and articles may not be invoked in all the cases
but should be limited to Oflly exceptional cases to redress the
immediate harm done to the reputation of the individuals who
have been defamed and shall not be allowed to be used as
remedy to serve the ulterior goal as the same will have a C
negative and damaging effect on the freedom of expression
guaranteed to the press.

21. It is further contended by him that Section 499of l.P.C.
defines the offence of defamation as spoken or written, Section o
501 of l.P.C. is for defamatory printing or engraving of
defamatory matter and Section 502 of l.P.C. is for sale of printed
or engraved substances containing defamatory material.
Therefore, Section 499 of l.P.C. would cover the Editor while
Section 501 will cover the Publisher and Printer and Section E
502 of l.P.C. covers the seller.As the offences mentioned under
Sections 501 and 502 of l.P.C. are specifically distinct offences
which are against the Publisher and the Seller, therefore, the
previous sanction order was granted in favour of the second
respondent against the Editor of the Newspapers and rejected F
against the Printer and Publisher. Therefore, in these appeals,
the appellants cannot be tried for the offences under Section
499, 501, 502 of l.P.C. with the aid of Section 120-B of l.P.C.
as the liability of defamation is only limited to the Editor.
G
22. In CriminalAppeal No. 851 of2Q12, Mr.Abhimanue
Shrestha, the learned counsel appearing for appellant-Mr.
Lateef Mohd. Khan, General Secretary, Civil Liberties
Monitoring Committee, who has allegedly made certain false·
and baseless statements against the second respondent under H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A the news item "Rajiv Trivedi-Hyderabad Ka Vanjara" "Fauri
Bharkhast Kame Ka Mutalika" published on 8.5.2007 in Siyasat
Urdu Daily, contended thatthe appellant is neither the Publisher
nor the Seller of the said Urdu Daily, therefore, one would
believe that he made such statements on the basis of the
B information through electronic and print media. It is therefore,
contended that in view of the nature of the allegations against
the second respondent, the appellant who is the Secretary of
the Civil Liberties Monitoring Committee made the above
statements published in Siyasat Urdu Daily to make the public
C aware of the same. The alleged offences are not attracted
against him as the allegations in the complaint do not constitute
any of the offences under Sections 500, 501, 502 and 120-B
of l.P. C. The learned counsel questioned the legality and validity
D of previous sanction accorded by the State Government in
favour of the second respondent to prosecute the appellant in
the said appeal by placing reliance on the decisions of this
Court in the cases of Kartar Singh & Ors. v. The State of
Punjab8 and R. Rajagopal & Anr. v. State of T.N. & Ors. 9
E 23. On the other hand, Mr. P. Vishwanath Shetty, the
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State has
sought to justify the sanction order authorising the Public
Prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against the
F appellants herein, the same was accorded after applying its
mind to the facts stated in the representation given by the
second respondent that the statements telecast and published
in the electronic and print media by the appellants were
defamatory and affected his reputation and the same were in
G connection with the discharge of his public functions as an IPS
Officer. The State Government after applying its mind was
satisfied that the reputation of the second respondent was
harmed by printing and telecasting the defamatory statements
by the appellants herein. Therefore, it accorded the sanction
H 8 AIR 1956 SC 541 : 1956 SCR 476
9 (1994) 6 sec 632
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 27
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

order under Section 199(4) of Cr.P.C. in favour of the second 'A
respondent to initiate criminal proceedings against the
appellant, which provision does not speak of mentioning the
names against whom the criminal prosecution has to be
instituted by the State Public Prosecutor.
B
24. He has further contended that the learned Additional
Metropolitan Sessions Judge, after applying his mind with
regard to the allegations made against the appellants took
cognizance of the matter and issued order of summons to the
appellants to appear before the sessions court with their C
respective counter to the criminal proceedings initiated against
them. The same was stalled by the appellants herein by
initiating proceedings before the High Court and this Court. It
is contended by him that the challenge before the High Court
has been rightly rejected after dealing with each one of the D
rival legal contentions urged in the Criminal Petitions filed by
the appellants, which do not warrant interference by this Court
in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, as the appellants are
required to face the trial in the proceedings initiated against
them by respondent No. 1- the State Government._ E

25. Mr. Pappu Nageshwar Rao, the learned counsel
appearing for the second respondent, sought to justify the
sanction accorded in favour of the second respondent by
drawing our attention to the provisions of Sections 132, 188, F
196, 197, 199 of Cr.P.C. He sought to distinguish previous
sanction provided under Section 194 and placed reliance upon
the judgments of various High Courts in the cases of Master
Girdhari Lal, Printer & Publisher of Naya Bharat v. The
State 10, Pachha/loor Noohu v. Public Prosecutor11, Sant G
Lal v. Krishan Lal12 and B. Basavalingappa and Anr. v. V.
Narasimhan 13 in support of the proposition of law that previous
10
1969 CriLJ P&H 1316
11
1975 CriLJ Kerala 1304
12
1976 CriLJ Delhi 215 H
13
1974 CriLJ Karnataka 66
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A sanction order by the State Government can be granted under
Section 1988 (3)(a)of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
by any Secretary or authorisation of the Government in favour
of a public servant to prosecute the persons who have
committed offences of defamation against him. He further
B placed reliance upon Section 308 proviso 2 and Section 473
of Cr.P.C., regarding the limitation for sanction and Section
484 of Cr.P.C. regarding sanction saving clause to justify that
the sanction accorded by the State Government to prosecute
the appellants herein is perfectly legal and valid. He therefore
C urged that in vi:3W of the above, the sanction accorded by the
State Government in favour of second respondent cannot be
found fault with by the appellants and prayed for dismissal of
these appeals.

D 26. We have heard the rival legal contentions urged on
behalf of learned counsel for both the parties and answer the
same by assigning the following reasons.

With regard to the contention urged by learned senior
E counsel Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar on behalf of the appellants in
Criminal Appeal No.857of2012 and connected appeals that
the High Court has not considered all the issues raised before
it in the criminal petitions filed by the appellants seeking for
quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated against them,
F is wholly untenable in law for the reason that from perusal of
the impugned order of the High Court, it is clear that the sanction
was accorded by the State Government under the relevant
Government order in favour of the second respondent. On
examining the facts, circumstances and evidence on record,
G the previous sanction is accorded to launch necessary
prosecution against the CNN-IBN channel, Siyasat Urdu Daily:
Sri Latif Mohammad Khan, Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) Hindi
daily, Deccan Chronicle English Daily and Etemaad Urdu Daily.
H By careful reading of the provision under Section 199 of Cr. P. C.,
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 29
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

read with the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968, it A
provides that previous sanction must be accorded, authorising
the initiation of criminal prosecution against the accused,
however, the said provisions do not state that it is necessary
to mention the names of each one of the accused who are
alleged to have committed the offence in the same alleged B
transaction. Therefore, in the case on hand, when the previous
sanction was accorded by the State Government against those
who were responsible for the telecasVpublication of the news
both in electronic and print media which according to the
second respondent damaged his reputation, it is not necessary C
for the State Government to separately issue sanction order
against each one of the appellants, when they are all
responsible for telecasting and publishing the said news item
in the electronic and print media and also when the names of D
the said electronic and print media have already been
mentioned in the said sanction order. Therefore, there is no
merit in the contention urged on behalf of the appellants that
their names have not been specifically mentioned in the said
sanction order. The said contention is untenable in law and E
therefore, liable to be rejected. The same is accordingly
rejected.

27. Further, the reliance placed by the learned counsel on
behalf of the appellants upon the judgments of this Court F
referred to supra while according sanction in favour of the
second respondent to initiate the criminal proceedings against
the appellants the State Government has not applied its mind,
this contention is also wholly untenable in law as the exercise
of power by the State Government under Section 199 of Cr.P.C. G
is in the administrative and ministerial capacity and according
of such sanction is as per the subjective satisfaction on the
part of the State Government. The learned senior counsel on
"behalf of the appellants has placed reliance upon the judgments
of this Court in the cases of Gour Chandra Rout & Anr. v. H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A The Public Prosecutor, P.C. Joshi &Anr. v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh and Mansukhlal Vitha/das Chauhan v. State
of Gujarat (all referred to supra). With regard to the above
referred cases, the first two cases have not dealt with the
exercise of power under Section 199 of Cr.P.C., except stating
B the ministerial exercise of power by the State Government while
exercising its power under Section 1988 (3)(a) of Cr.P.C, 1898.
In so far as the third case referred to supra upon which the
reliance placed upon by the learned senior counsel on behalf
of the appellants, the same is in relation to the previous
C sanction to be accorded by the State Government for the
purpose of prosecution underthe provisions of the Prevention
of Corruption Act. Therefore, none of the above cases on which
reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on behalf of
the appellants have any relevance to the fact situation on hand.
0
28. Having regard to the scheme of the Protection of Civil
Rights Act, 1955, the complainant-second respondent during
the relevant point of time was the Police Officer in the services
of the State Government and he cannot prosecute the
E appellants in a court of law without obtaining previous sanction
from the State Government as contemplated under the
aforesaid provisions ofCr.P.C. Therefore, in order to prosecute
the appellants, the second respondent made a representation
F to the State Government along with a petition with regard to
initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellants under
the provisions referred to supra in respect of which he has
sought the sanction of the State Government. On appreciation
of the same, the State Government in exercise of its
G administrative powers appreciated the facts of the matter,
rightly applied :ts mind and accorded the sanction under
Section 199(4) of Cr.P.C. in favour of the second respondent
to initiate criminal proceedings under the provisions referred
to supra against the appellants. The said sanction was
H accorded by the State Government after appreciating that the
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OFANDHRA 31
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

statements telecast/published by the appellants in the A
electronic and print media as well as the statement given by
the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 853 of2012 in the Urdu
Daily on the basis of which the news is published by its Editor,
which are all statements defaming the second respondent while
he was discharging his public function as a public servant. B
Therefore, the contention on behalf of the appellants that there
was no application of mind on the part of the State Government
in according the said sanction is wholly untenable in law, liable
to be rejected and the same is accordingly rejected.
c
29. Further, the contention urged by the appellants' counsel
placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgements that the act of
the second respondent allegedly aiding the Gujarat Police
Officers to facilitate taking Sohrabuddin from Bidar to
Ahmedabad, has nothing to do with the discharge of his public D
functions, hence, the said statement in the news item allegedly
defaming the second respondent being telecast and published
in electronic and print media do not attract Section 199 of
Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is contended on behalf of the appellants
that the sanction accorded by the State Government is beyond E
its jurisdiction as the said act of aiding the Gujarat Police is an
independent act and it is not in relation to the discharge of
public functions of the second respondent though he, at that
relevant point of time, was discharging his public functions.· F
This contention on behalf of the appellants is also wholly
untenable in law, for the reason that determining the q~estion
on whether or not the second respondent while aiding the
Gujarat Police at that point of time was in the capacity of his
official discharge of his public functions or otherwise, is to be G
determined by regular trial after examining the facts, .
circumstances and evidence on record.

30. The reliance placed upon the judgment of this Court in
the case of Rubabbuddin Sheikh (supra), contending that H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A the fact of the investigation by the CBI in Sohrabuddin's case
was the subject matter before this Court at para 2 of the
judgment in the case referred to supra, therefore, by publishing
the same in the newspaper by the appellants (in Crl. A. Nos.
854 & 858 of 2012) cannot be made the basis of any
B defamation as the said news item was published after referring
to the aforesaid judgment which is a public record. This
contention urged on behalf of the appellants is wholly untenable
in law for the reason that at para 2 of the said judgment of this
Court in the above referred case is only with regard to the facts
C of that case, whereas, the allegations made against the
appellants herein are for publishing and telecasting defamatory
statements against the second respondent, which question of
fact has to be examined, considered and answered only after
regular trial proceedings before the learned Additional
0
Metropolitan Sessions Judge. Therefore, the above contention
urged in this regard is wholly untenable and the same is rejected.

31. Further, the learned counsel in Criminal Appeal Nos.
854 and 858 of 2012, plqced reliance upon the judgment of
E this Court in the case of Urmila Devi (supra), in support of the
proposition of law that only the Editor-In-Chief is responsible
for the telecast or publication of the alleged defamatory
statements against whom the sanction order is accorded and
F that there is no sanction order accorded to initiate prosecution
against others. Further, the contention on behalf of the
appellants that there must be specific mention of persons in
the sanction order against whom prosecution can be launched
and in the absence of the same, a single sanction order
G accorded by the State Government against all the other
appellants in the connected appeals amounts to giving a wider
interpretation of the provision under Section 199(4) of Cr.P. C.,
which is not the object of the aforesaid provision under the
Cr.P.C. This aspect of the matter has not been examined by
H the High Court; therefore, impugned order is vitiated in law
RAJDEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 33
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

and is contrary to the provisions of Section 199(4) of the Cr.PC. A

32. By careful readin,g of Section 199(4) of the Cr.P.C., it
does not indicate that in order to initiate criminal proceedings
against the accused, the public servant needs to obtain
sanction from the State Governmentl~t. in respect of each one of B
the persons against whom the same transaction of offence is
alleged and the names of the accused are required to be
mentioned specifically in the sanction order accorded by the
State Government. It is sufficient if one sanction is accorded
to prosecute all the concerned persons involved in that C
occurrence, thus, the contention on behalf of the appellants in
this regard is also liable to be rejected and is accordingly
rejected.

33. The contention urged by the learned counsel Mr. D
Abhimanue Shrestha on behalf of the appellants in Criminal
Appeal No.851 of2012 is also untenable in law for the reasons
stated that the appellant has made a statement on the basis
of the news items telecasUpublished in electronic and print
media. The same cannot be accepfei::I by us for the reason E
that it is a matter that has to be examined by the trial court
after recording the findings of fact on the basis of valid and
cogent evidence to be adduced by the State Public Prosecutor
on behalf of the respondent. Therefore, there is no substance
in the said contention urged on behalf of the appellants and F
the same is rejected.

34. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second
respondent rightly sought to justify the findings and reasons of
the High Court in its impugned judgment, placing reliance on G
Sections 132, 188, 196, 197 and 19'9 of Cr.PC., inter alia
contending that for prosecution of an accused in the case of
defamation of a public servant, sanction can be accorded
under the old Section 198B(3b) of Cr.P.C.,1898, by any
Secretary or authorisation by the Government. He has also H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R.

A placed reliance upon Section 2U of Cr.P.C. which defines a
Public Prosecutor as any person appointed under Section 24
and included any person acting under the directions of a Public
Prosecutor. The learned counsel on behalf of the second
respondent has rightly justified that the sanction accorded by
B the State Government to prosecute the appellants is perfectly
legal and valid by placing reliance on Section 308 proviso 2,
Section 473 of Cr.P.C. regarding the limitation for sanction
and Section 484 of Cr.PC. The learned counsel has also rightly
placed reliance upon the judgments in the cases of Master
C Girdhari Lal, Printer & Publisher of Naya Bharat v. The
State, PachhalloorNoohuv. Public Prosecutor and Sant
Lal v. Krishan Lal and B. Basavalingappa and Anr. v.
Narasimhan all referred to supra. Therefore, the submission
made by him is well founded and the same must be accepted.
0
35. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants by
placing reliance on Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of
India contended that the initiation and continuance of the
criminal proceedings in the present cases hinder and hamper
E the very freedom of press which is most precious and constitute
an affront to the aforesaid provisions under the Constitution of
India. The said contention has been rightly rebutted by the
learned counsel on behalf of the respondents by strongly urging
F that the reputation of an individual is also equally important
and that the said aspect of the matter must be considered
after adducing cogent and valid evidence on record by the
Public Prosecutor before the learned trial Judge who shall then
appreciate the same and record his findings on merits of the
G case.
36. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion
that the impugned judgment passed by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh in rejecting the petitions for quashing the
H initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellants under
RAJ DEEP SARDESAI v. STATE OF ANDHRA 35
PRADESH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is perfectly legal and valid, the same A
does not call for interference by this Court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction as there is no substantial question of law
framed in the appeals nor is there any miscarriage of justice
for the appellants to interfere with at this stage. In our considered
view, having regard to the nature of the complaint, the B
respondents are required to prove the allegations against the
appellants by adducing valid and cogent evidence, the same
has to be considered by the trial court and accordingly record
the findings on the merits of the case. The appeals are devoid·
of merit, liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. C
The orders granting stay offurther proceedings before the trial
court shall stand vacated.

Devika Gujral Appeals dismissed.
D