RAJESH BAJAJversusSTATE NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.

A                                RAJESH BAJAJ
                                          v.
                      STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.

                                 MARCH 12, 1999

B    [K.T. THOMAS AND S. SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.]

        · Criminal Procedure Code, 1973--Section 482--Quashing of criminal
  complaint-Complainant induced to enter into a commercial transactioJt-
  Payment as per the invoice was not made after delivery of goods-complaint
C lodged containing all relevant facts-High Co wt quashed the complaint hold-
  ing, it did not disclose offence of cheating and that it was purely a commercial
  transaction where payment assured was not made-011 appeal Held, if factual
  foundation is laid then complaint need not reproduce ingredients of offence
  alleged-Court should not hasten to quash proceedings at investigation
D stage--Quashing of complaint 011 ground that it disclosed only a commercial
  transaction not justified-Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 415 and 420.

        Constitution of India-Article 226-Quashing of criminal Com-
  plaint-Meticulous scrntiny of all ingredients of offence not needed--Hyper-
  technical approach adopted by court may be justified during trial but not
E during the stage of investigation--lndian Penal Code, 1860-Sectir:ms 415 and
    420.

          The appellant belongs to a company manufacturing and exporting
    garments. Respondent No. 5 approached him as a representative of a
    German company to purchase garments for export. He induced the appel-
F   lant to believe that payments shall be made on receiving the invoice. The
    goods were delivered along with the invoices by the appellant, but only a
    part of the payment due was received. Respondent agreed under a second
    understanding reached between the parties to pay the aruount due. This
    understanding was also not honoured. The appellant filed a complaint
G   stating all the relevant facts and also alleged that the respondent had
    duped many other manufacturers through this modus operandi.

        High Court quashed the FIR as it found that the complaint did not
  disclose commission of any offence of cheating punishable under Section
  420 I.P.C., that there was nothing to indicate a dishonest or fraudulent
H intention and that.it was purely a commercial transaction where balance
                                     1012
                         RAJESH BAJAJ v. STATE                          1013

amount of the goods received was not paid as per the assurance made.            A
Hence this appeal by the complaint.

      Allowing the appeal, this Court

       HELD : 1. It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim
reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he    B
is alleging. Nor is it necessary that he should state in so many words that
the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the
definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous
scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the
complaint, is not needed at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence
has been laid in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash
                                                                                c
criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that
one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an
FIR the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic
facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. [1016-A-C]
                                                                                D
      State of Ha1ya11a v. Bhajan Lal, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335, relied on.

       2. The facts narrated in the complaint would as well reveal a commer-
cial transaction or money transaction but that is hardly a reason for
holding that offence of cheating would elude from such transactions. It is
the intention of the person who induces the victim of his representation and    E
not the nature of the transaction which would become decisive in discerning
whether an offence was committed or not. [1016-F]

      3. The hyper-technical approach adopted by the High Court for test-
ing ingredients under Section 415 IPC may be justified during trial but
certainly not during the stage of investigation. [1017-C]                       F

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
295 of 1999.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.98 of the Delhi High Court          G
in Crl. W. No. 640 of 1998.

     R.K. Jain, Aseem Mehrotra and A.P. Medh for the Appellant.

     K.N. Rawal, Additional, Solicitor General, Anil Katiyar, S.W.A.
Quadri, Ms. Sushma Suri for the Respondents Nos. 1-2.                           H
                                                                                    '\


    1014                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (1999] 1 S.C.R.
A         Arun Jaitley, A.K. Sinha and Neeraj Choudhary for the Respondent
    No. 5.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
B
        Appellant lodged an FIR with the police for the offence under
  Section 420, Indian Penal Code. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
  quashed the FIR on the premise that the complaint did not disclose the
  offence. The Division Bench reminded themselves that jurisdiction under
C Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure "should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection" for
  quashing criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, learned judges found that the
  case on hand could not pass the test laid down by this Court in State of
  Harya11a v. Bhaja11 Lal, (1992] Suppl. 1SCC335]. The appellant is obviously
  aggrieved by the aforesaid course of action adopted by the High Court and
D hence he filed the special leave petition.
           In the complaint filed by the appellant before the police, on the
    strength of which the FIR was prepared, the following averments, i11ter alia,
    were made. Appellant belongs to a company (M/s Passion Apparel Private
    Limited) which manufactures and exports Readymade garments. On
E 15.11.1994 fifth respondent (Gagan Kishore Srivastava) Managing Director
    of Mis Avren Junge Mode Gumbh Haus Der Model approached the
    complainant for purchase of Readymade garments of various kinds and
    induced the appellant to believe that 5th respondent would pay the price
     of the said goods on receiving the invoice. Such payment was promised to
F. be made within fifteen days from the date of invoice of the goods which
     complainant would despatch to Germany. Appellant believed the aforesaid
     representation as true and on that belief he despatched goods worth
   · 4,46,597.25 D.M. (Deutsch Marks). In March/April 1995 respondent on
     receipt of 37 different invoices got the goods released and sold them to
     others. But the respondent paid only a sum of 1,15,194 D.M. Appellant
G further alleged in the complaint that respondent induced him to believe
     that he is a genuine dealer, but actually his intentions were not clear.

         Appellant also mentioned in the complaint that one of the repre-
  sentatives of appellant's company went to Germany in October 1995 for
H realising the amount on the strength of an understanding reached between
/'


                       RAJESH BAJAJ v. STATE [THOMAS, J.]                      1015

     them that respondent would pay 2,00,000 D.M. in lieu of the remaining part       A
     of the price. However, the respondent did not honour even that subsequent
     understanding.

           Appellant further mentio:ied in the complaint that he came to know
     later about the modus operandi which respondent adopted in regard to
     certain other manufacturers who too were duped by the respondent to the           B
     tune of rupees ten crores.

            Learned Judges of the High. Court have put forward three premises
     for quashing the FIR. First is that the complaint did not disclose commis-
     sion of any of!ence of cheating punishable under Section 420 of the Indian        C
     penal Code. Second is that there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that
     the petitioner had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the respon-
     dent exported goods worth 4,46,597.25 D.M. by 37 different invoices. There
     is also nothing to indicate that the respondent, by deceiving the com-
     plainant, induced him to export goods worth 4,48,597.25 D.M. The third is        D
     that on the face of the allegations contained in the complaint "it is purely
     a commercial transaction which in a nut- shell is that the seller did not pay
     the balance amount of the goods received by him as per his assurance."

           After quoting Section 415 of IPC learned judges proceeded to con-
     sider the main elements of the offence in the following lines:
                                                                                      E

             "A bare reading of the definition of cheating would suggest that
             there are two elements thereof, namely, deception and dishonest
             intention to do or omit to do something. In order to bring a case
             within the first part of Section 415, it is essential, in the first place, F
             that the person, who delivers the property should have been
             deceived before he ih'ilkes the delivery; and in the second place
             that he should have been induced to do so fraudulently or
             dishonestly. Where property is fraudulently or dishonestly ob-
             tained, Section 415 would bring the said act within the ambit of G
             cheating provided the property is to be obtained by deception."

 -        It was thereafter that the High Court scanned the complaint and
     found out that "there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that the accused
     had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time of export of goods."        H
      1016                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1999] l S.C.R.
· A         It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in
      the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging.
      Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that
      the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of
      the definition into different components of the offence to make a
 B    meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled
      out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for
      the offence has been laid in the complaint the court should not hasten to        r-
      quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the
      premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For
      quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases)
 C    the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts
      which are absolutely necessary for making out the offe"nce. In State of
      Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) this Court laid down the premise on which
      the FIR can be quashed in rare cases. The following observations made in
      the aforesaid decisions are a sound reminder:
 D             "We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of
               quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly
               and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases;
               that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry
               as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
 E             made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or
               inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court
               to act according to its whim or caprice."

            It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as
      well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is
  F hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from
      such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course
    . of commercial and also money transactions. One of the illustrations set out
      under Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code (illustrations "t") is worthy of
      notice now:
  G
               "(t) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay
               any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces
               Z to lend him money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats."

             The crux of the postulate is the' intention of the person who induces
  H the victim of his representation and not the nature pf the transaction which
                  RATESH BATAT v. STATE [THOMAS, J.]                      1017

would become decisive in discern!ng whether there was commission of               A
offence or not. The complainant has stated in the body of the complaint
that he was induced to believe that respondent would honour payment on
receipt of invoices, and that the complainant realised later that the inten-
tions of the respondent were not clear. He also mentioned that respondent
after receiving the goods have sold them to others and still he did not pay
the money. Such averments would prima facie make out a case for inves-
                                                                                  B
tigation by the authorities.

       The High Court seems to have adopted a strictly hyper-technical
approach and sieved the complaint through a cullendar of finest gauzes for
testing the ingredients under Section 415, IPC. Such an endeavour may be          C
justified during trial, but certainly not during the stage of investigation. At
any rate, it is too premature a stage for the High Court to step in and stall
the investigation by declaring that it is a commercial transaction simplicitor
wherein no semblance of criminal offence is involved.

      The appellant is, therefore, right in contending that the FIR should        D
not have been quashed in this case and the investigation should have been
allowed to proceed.

       We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order.

A.Q.                                                         Appeal allowed.      E