Supreme Court of India
RAJESH CHADDHAversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 671
- Decided
- 12 May 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B V NAGARATHNA
Holding
A conviction under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 DP Act cannot be sustained where the allegations are vague, lack specific factual particulars, and are not supported by independent evidence, leading to the setting aside of the conviction.
Summary
The appellant Rajesh Chaddha was convicted under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act for alleged cruelty and dowry demands by his wife, who claimed physical and mental torture, including a miscarriage. The High Court, exercising revisionary jurisdiction, upheld the conviction despite the appellant's claim that the FIR was filed after a divorce petition and lacked specific details. The Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had proved the elements of cruelty and dowry demand beyond reasonable doubt, focusing on the absence of concrete dates, medical evidence, and specific incidents. It held that the allegations were vague, omnibus, and unsupported by independent evidence, rendering the FIR not genuine. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order, acquitted the appellant of all charges, and emphasized the misuse of Sections 498A and the Dowry Act in matrimonial disputes. The judgment also warned against indiscriminate roping in of family members without specific allegations.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court erred in upholding the conviction under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act in the absence of specific, corroborated evidence of cruelty and dowry demand.
- Whether the FIR and prosecution evidence were sufficient to establish the elements of cruelty and dowry harassment under the respective statutes.
- Whether the revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court permits setting aside a conviction when the FIR is deemed not genuine and the allegations lack material particulars.
Legislation cited
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 323, s. 34, s. 498A, s. 506
Subjects
Section 498APenal Code, 1860Sections 3, 4Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961CrueltyMisuse of Section 498AAllegations vagueOmnibusBereft of material particularsMalicious criminal prosecution of family membersMatrimonial disputesDowryNo particular instance of harassmentFIR not genuineRevisionary jurisdictionMissing specifics in a criminal complaintMalicious roping in of every relative of husbandCo-accused parents-in-lawSection 323 IPC read with Section 34 & Section 506HurtMiscarriageCriminal intimidation
Judgment
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 382 : 2025 INSC 671
Rajesh Chaddha
v.
State of Uttar Pradesh
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 2635-2636 of 2025)
13 May 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction
erred in upholding the conviction of the appellant under Section
498A, Penal Code, 1860 and Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – s.498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 –
s.4 – Conviction under – When not sustainable:
Held: The term “cruelty” is being misused and cannot be
established simpliciter without specific instances – The tendency
of roping sections 498A, IPC and 3 & 4, DP Act, 1961 without
mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, weakens the case
of the prosecution casting serious suspicion on the viability of the
version of a complainant – In the present case, the allegations
made by the complainant-wife were vague, omnibus and bereft of
any material particulars to substantiate the threshold of offences
u/s.498A, IPC and s.4, DP Act, 1961 – A cursory or plausible view
cannot be conclusive proof to determine the guilt of an individual
under the aforesaid Sections, especially to obviate malicious
criminal prosecution of family members in matrimonial disputes –
FIR registered by the complainant was not genuine – Nothing
incriminatory against the appellant to sustain conviction u/s.498A,
IPC or s.4, DP Act, 1961 – Impugned order set aside – Appellant
acquitted. [Paras 9, 11, 12, 14, 15]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 –
ss.3, 4 – Threshold of offences under:
Held: An act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose of s.498A, corresponds
to a willful conduct of such nature, that may cause danger to the
life, limb and health of the woman, which is inclusive of the mental
and physical health and the harassment caused to her, by coercing
* Author
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 383
Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh
her to meet unlawful demands or impossible standards – Further,
the demand for dowry in terms of ss.3 and 4 of the DP Act, 1961
refers to both a direct or indirect manner of demand for dowry made
by the husband or his family members – To meet the threshold
of the offences u/s.498A, IPC and ss.3 and 4, DP Act, 1961, the
allegations cannot be ambiguous or made in thin air. [Para 8]
Judicial Deprecation – Penal Code, 1860 – s.498A – Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Practice of maliciously
roping in of every relative of husband, deprecated – Misuse
of s.498A – Discussed. [Paras 13, 14]
Case Law Cited
Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr. [2024]
12 SCR 559 : (2025) 3 SCC 735 – relied on.
Bhagwan Jagannath Markad v. State of Maharashtra [2016] 5 SCR
452 : (2016) 10 SCC 537; Arun Vyas & Anr. v. Anita Vyas [1999] 3
SCR 719 : (1999) 4 SCC 690; Surendran v. State of Kerala [2022]
4 SCR 675 : (2022) 15 SCC 273 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
List of Keywords
Section 498A, Penal Code, 1860; Sections 3, 4, Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961; Cruelty; Misuse of Section 498A, Penal Code, 1860;
Allegations vague; Omnibus; Bereft of any material particulars;
Malicious criminal prosecution of family members; Matrimonial
disputes; Dowry; No particular instance of harassment; FIR not
genuine; Revisionary jurisdiction; Missing specifics in a criminal
complaint; Malicious roping in of every relative of husband;
Co-accused parents-in-law; Section 323, Penal Code, 1860 read with
Section 34 & Section 506; Hurt; Miscarriage; Criminal intimidation.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No(s). 2635-2636 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2018 and 28.11.2018
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in
CRR No. 612 of 2004 and CRMA No. 131658 of 2018, respectively
384 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Petitioner:
Ms. Preetika Dwivedi.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Shaurya Sahay, Aditya Kumar, Ms. Ruchil Raj.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Satish Chandra Sharma, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These Appeals by special leave are directed against Order
dt.14.11.2018 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal
Revision No. 612/2004 filed against the judgment and order dt.
18.11.2004 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow
[hereinafter “Sessions Court”] whereby the Criminal Appeal No.
88/2004 filed by the Appellant was dismissed and the conviction of the
Appellant under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter
“IPC” & Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [hereinafter
“DP Act, 1961”] vide Judgment dt. 28.08.2004 passed by the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow [hereinafter “Magistrate”] was upheld.
The Order dt. 28.11.2018 dismissing the recall application against the
said Order dt.14.11.2018 is also under challenge before this Court.
3. The captioned Appeal arises out of Case Crime No. 60/1999 lodged
by the PS Women Police Station, Lucknow under Sections 498A,
323, 506 IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, on the basis
of a Complaint dt. 20.12.1999 filed by the Complainant wife, against
the Appellant husband and her in-laws alleging mental and physical
torture for not bringing enough dowry. The factual conspectus in
brief is as under:
3.1 The marriage of the Appellant with the Complainant, Ms. Mala
Chaddha, had taken place on 12.02.1997. The Appellant resided
separately with the Complainant wife only for a period of 12
days, from 08.09.1998 to 20.09.1998.
3.2 The Complainant who was working as a teacher with St.
Thomas School prior to her marriage had allegedly resigned
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 385
Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh
from her job on the advice of the Appellant husband; and her
family had spent more than Rs. 5 lakhs towards the wedding.
However, the Appellant, her in-laws, and the brother-in-law
(Jeth) were constantly unhappy & dissatisfied, and subjected
her to constant taunts, and inflicted upon her physical and
mental atrocities. It is alleged that the Appellant husband and
her in-laws forced the Complainant to consume milk mixed with
some narcotic/alcoholic substances, and forced upon her to
attend parties with his friends, where alcohol was served, and
if the Complainant refused, the Appellant and his family would
humiliate her. Allegedly, the parents-in-laws, in conspiracy with
the Appellant, had planned to kill her, and had kept her in a
safe house, separately from the matrimonial home, the keys
for which were with the parents-in-law. On 23.09.1998, when
the father of the Complainant was invited to the matrimonial
house, the Appellant and her in-laws had allegedly assaulted the
Complainant with kicks and punches in front of her father. The
Appellant and his family purportedly expelled the Complainant,
while she was pregnant. Thereafter, on 10.02.1998, the
Appellant and her family again while ousting her out of the
house, allegedly gave her a strong push, and as a result she
fell down, and owing to the injury, had suffered a miscarriage.
It is the case of the Complainant in the FIR that she made
several requests for reconciliation including efforts through
Family Counselling Centre till 16.12.1999, but it has been in
vain, and as a consequence she registered the Complaint dt.
20.12.1999 against the Appellant and his family.
3.3 In her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter “CrPC”), before the Magistrate,
the Complainant reiterated the allegations in the FIR and stated
for the first time that she was forced by the Appellant and his
family to join service in St. Fidelis School, Aliganj, Lucknow and
the in-laws would snatch her entire month’s salary, which was
only Rs. 4,000/- at the time. On 23.09.1998, when the Appellant
raised a demand of Rs. 2 Lacs, and her parents were unable to
arrange the money, the Appellant and the in-laws allegedly beat
her up. The Complainant asserts that she only took with her
four gold bangles and one ring, while leaving her matrimonial
home in July 1997 and rest all jewellery and list of items were
with the Appellant or his family.
386 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3.4 The Complainant and her father were examined as PW-1 and
PW-2, respectively. PW-2, has fully supported the testimony of
PW-1, and in both the statements, the demand of Rs. 2 lakhs
as dowry by the in-laws & the mental and physical atrocities
inflicted on her, is persistent. However, both the witnesses could
not substantiate the allegations of hurt or physical assault. The
Trial Court vide Judgment dt. 28.08.2004, upon duly considering
the testimony of both the witnesses and the material on record,
observed that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt, the commission of offences under Sections 323 and 34
IPC, rendering the following opinion:
“It is evident from perusal of the evidence available
on record that both the fact witnesses have not
made it clear in their evidence that any simple hurt
was caused to the Complainant as a result of the
physical assault by accused persons. Even if it is
believed that the accused committed mar-pit with
the Complainant, I think had the Complainant been
subjected to physical assault by all the accused
persons by kicks and punches, yet she would have
sustained serious injuries and in such a situation, I
am of the opinion that medical examination of the
Complainant must have been done so as to prove
that she has sustained injuries due to the assault by
accused persons, but it appears from the perusal of
the record that the prosecution did not attempted to
adduce any such evidence before the court as any
medical certificate/injury report with regard to the
injuries of the Complainant has not been filed. In
this context, the evidence of the complainant is the
only strong evidence regarding the injuries, as she
was subjected to physical assault by the accused
persons but it appears from perusal of the testimony
of the witness that she has nowhere mentioned in
her statement that she sustained injuries on such
and such part of her body due to the physical assault
committed by accused persons.
Besides, it is also evident from record that the
prosecution has further stated that the complainant
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 387
Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh
had miscarriage due to physical assault committed
by accused persons. In my opinion, if such an
incident had actually taken place, the complainant
was required to get her medical examination done
so as to prove that the miscarriage took place due to
physical assault committed by the accused persons
as a miscarriage is not a normal/ordinary course
of events but it is clear from perusal of record that
prosecution has not adduced any cogent evidence
with regard to the miscarriage. Therefore, the
allegation of miscarriage due to physical assault
proves to be concocted story. In light of the foregoing
discussion, I reach the conclusion that the prosecution
has failed to prove the allegation of physical assault
of the complainant and resultant simple hurt beyond
reasonable doubt.”
3.5 The Trial Court vide Judgment dt. 28.08.2004, observed that
although the prosecution had failed to prove its case against
the Appellant & the co-accused persons, for offences under
Section 323 r/w 34 and Section 506 IPC; it had proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the case under Section 498A IPC and Section
4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 against the Appellant alone. The Trial
Court acquitted the Appellant for offences under Section 323
r/w 34 and Section 506 IPC and convicted him for offences
under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961.
Accordingly, the Trial Court sentenced the Appellant as under:
Offence(s) under Period of Fine imposed
Section Sentence
498A IPC, 1860 2 years RI Rs. 5000/-
4 DP Act, 1961 1 year RI Rs. 2000/-
3.6 The Criminal Appeal No. 88/2024 preferred by the Appellant
against the Judgment dt. 28.08.2024 passed by the Magistrate,
was dismissed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, vide its
Judgment/Final Order dt. 18.11.2004 and the conviction under
Section 498A of IPC & Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 & the
quantum of sentence qua the Appellant was upheld.
388 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3.7 The Appellant had preferred a Criminal Revision No. 612/2004
against the Judgment/Final Order dt. 18.11.2004 before the High
Court, which has been dismissed vide Impugned Judgement
and Final Order dt. 14.11.2018. The High Court within its
powers of revision, upheld the conviction of the Appellant under
Section 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 with
the observation that there was no error of law or perversity
in the orders passed by the lower courts. The said portion is
reproduced as under:
“I have perused the judgment and orders dated
18.112004 and 28.08.2004, passed by learned courts
below. The learned courts below have considered all
aspects of the matter in detail and I do not find any
error of law or perversity in the aforesaid impugned
judgment and orders. The instant revision lacks merit,
and deserves to be dismissed.”
3.8 Further, vide Order dt. 28.11.2018, passed by the High Court, the
Application seeking recall of the Impugned Order dt.14.11.2018
was also rejected at the threshold, as being misconceived in law.
4. It has been vehemently argued by the learned Counsel for the
Appellant that the Impugned Judgment dt. 14.11.2018 passed by
the High Court, suffers from non-application of mind, and non-
consideration of the merits of the case. Learned Counsel for the
Appellant submitted that the allegations under Section 498A IPC
and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, were unsustainable qua the
Appellant, as there is no independent evidence on behalf of the
prosecution, and the entire case hinges upon the deposition of the
father of the Complainant and Complainant herself. It was argued that
the Complainant who cohabited with the Appellant only for a period
of about a year, had made bald allegations without any specifics of
date, time or event, in the FIR in Case Crime No. 60/1999, which
has only been registered as a counter-blast to the Divorce Petition
preferred by the Appellant. It is brought to our notice that the divorce
decree in lieu of their marriage, has already been passed, and the
same has never been challenged by the Complainant, and hence
has attained finality.
5. It has also been urged by the learned Counsel for the Appellant,
that the High Court passed the Impugned Order in absence of
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 389
Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh
representation of a Counsel on behalf of the Appellant, which is not
permissible. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that in the
absence of a Counsel for the Appellant, the High Court could have
appointed an amicus-curiae to represent the case of the Appellant,
rather than passing an adversarial order against him.
6. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of the State that to
establish cruelty within the threshold of Section 498A, the evidence
of the relatives of the Complainant wife cannot be brushed aside.
The deposition of the father of the Complainant does establish that
the Complainant was time and again harassed, and beaten her up
for not bringing enough dowry. Reliance was placed on Bhagwan
Jagannath Markad v. State of Maharashtra1, Arun Vyas & Anr. v.
Anita Vyas2, Surendran v. State of Kerala3.
ANALYSIS
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and
having perused the record, the question remains whether the High
Court vide Impugned Order dt. 14.11.2018 whilst exercising its
revisionary jurisdiction, was correct in upholding the conviction of
the Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 D.P. Act, 1961.
In that respect, it is prudent to examine the statutory provisions,
which are as under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this
section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is
of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)
harassment of the woman where such harassment is with
a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
1 (2016) 10 SCC 537
2 (1999) 4 SCC 690
3 (2022) 15 SCC 273
390 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If any
person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or
takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less
than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value
of such dowry, whichever is more. Provided that the Court
may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in
the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a
term of less than five years. (2) Nothing in sub-section
(1) shall apply to, or in relation to,— (a) presents which
are given at the time of a marriage to the bride without
any demand having been made in that behalf: Page 12
of 26 Provided that such presents are entered in a list
maintained in accordance with the rules made under this
Act; (b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage
to the bridegroom without any demand having been made
in that behalf: Provided that such presents are entered in
a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under
this Act: Provided further that where such presents are
made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related
to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature
and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to
the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose
behalf, such presents are given.
4. Penalty for demanding dowry.—If any person demands,
directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or
guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be,
any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than six months, but which
may extend to two years and with fine which may extend
to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the Court may, for
adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the
judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term
of less than six months.”
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 391
Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh
8. At the outset, an act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose of Section 498A,
corresponds to a willful conduct of such nature, that may cause
danger to the life, limb and health of the woman, which is inclusive
of the mental and physical health and the harassment caused to her,
by coercing her to meet unlawful demands or impossible standards.
Further, the demand for dowry in terms of Section 3 and Section
4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 refers to both a direct or indirect manner of
demand for dowry made by the husband or his family members. In
order to meet the threshold of the offences under Section 498A IPC
& Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, the allegations cannot be
ambiguous or made in thin air.
9. In the present case, the allegations made by the Complainant are
vague, omnibus and bereft of any material particulars to substantiate
this threshold. Apart from claiming that Appellant husband harassed
her for want of dowry, the Complainant has not given any specific
details or described any particular instance of harassment. The
allegations in the FIR, and the depositions of the prosecution
witnesses suggest that on multiple occasions, the Complainant wife
was ousted from the matrimonial house, and kicked and punched
in the presence of her father, PW-2 herein and she was repeatedly
tormented with dowry demands, and when she was unable to honor
them, the Appellant and her family physically beat her up; whereas
she has not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which
the alleged harassment occurred. It is alleged that the Complainant
suffered a miscarriage, as she fell down, when the Appellant and
her family who pushed her out of the house; however, no medical
document from any medical institution or hospital or nursery was
produced to substantiate the allegations.
10. Upon carefully considering the record, we find that apart from the
statements of PW-1 and PW-2, there is no evidence to substantiate
the allegations of harassment and acts of cruelty within the scope of
Section 498A of IPC, and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. For this
reason, we find merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the
Appellant, and are of the considered view that there is no material on
record to establish the allegations of hurt or miscarriage, and of hurt
and criminal intimidation in terms of Section 323 r/w 34 and Section
506 IPC respectively. The Trial Court has rightly held that evidence
of the Complainant is the only strong evidence that she sustained
injuries on various parts of her body due to the physical assault by
392 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the accused persons, and that there was no medical examination
conducted by the Complainant, so as to prove that the miscarriage
was a consequence of the physical assault.
11. The Trial Court has indeed applied its judicial mind to the material on
record whilst acquitting the Appellant and the co-accused parents-
in-law for offences under Section 323 r/w 34 & Section 506 IPC.
However, it appears that the Trial Court had passed the order of
conviction of the Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4
of the D.P. Act, 1961, merely on the possibility that the allegations
and the depositions of the PW-1 corroborated by PW2, are true and
correct. Although one cannot deny the emotional or mental torture
that the Complainant may have undergone in the marriage, however
a cursory or plausible view cannot be conclusive proof to determine
the guilt of an individual under Section 498A & Section 4 of the D.P.
Act, 1961, especially to obviate malicious criminal prosecution of
family members in matrimonial disputes. In this respect, we also
cannot ignore that the FIR dt. 20.12.1999 was registered after the
Appellant had filed the Divorce Petition under Section 13 of Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 on 06.02.1999. In consideration thereof and that
the Complainant had cohabited with the Appellant only for a period of
about a year, it appears that the FIR registered by the Complainant
was not genuine.
12. In respect thereof, the High Court while exercising its revisionary
jurisdiction ought to have examined the correctness of decision of the
Trial Court in light of the material on record, which reveals nothing
incriminatory against the Appellant to sustain a conviction under
Section 498A IPC or Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. Although we
do not agree with the submission on behalf of the Appellant that the
Impugned Order dt. 14.11.2018 was passed in absentia, however the
High Court was well within its revisionary powers to discern whether
an FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom were sustainable.
In all certainty, it could have saved 6 years’ worth of time for the
Appellant, who has endured litigation for over 20 years as of today.
13. Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are distressed with the
manner, the offences under Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4
of the D.P. Act, 1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant
wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married sisters
living separately, are arrayed as accused, in matrimonial matters.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 393
Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh
This growing tendency to append every relative of the husband,
casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations made by
the Complainant wife or her family members, and vitiates the very
objective of a protective legislation. The observations made by this
Hon’ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v.
State of Telangana & Anr.4 appropriately encapsulates this essence
as under:
“25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a
criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without
specific allegations indicating their active involvement
should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact,
borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a
tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s
family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations
unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised
allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution.
Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent
misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid
unnecessary harassment of innocent family members.
In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the
members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living
in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial
house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein.
Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution
and the same would be an abuse of the process of the
law in the absence of specific allegations made against
each of them.”
14. The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel misuse by the parties,
and cannot be established simpliciter without specific instances,
to say the least. The tendency of roping these sections, without
mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, weakens the case of
the prosecutions, and casts serious suspicion on the viability of the
version of a Complainant. We cannot ignore the missing specifics
in a criminal complaint, which is the premise of invoking criminal
machinery of the State. Be that as it may, we are informed that
4. (2025) 3 SCC 735
394 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved and the
divorce decree has attained finality, hence any further prosecution
of the Appellant will only tantamount to an abuse of process of law.
15. We accordingly allow the Appeals and the Order dt.14.11.2018 passed
by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 612/2004
convicting the Appellant under Section 498A of IPC & Section 4 of
D.P. Act, 1961, is set aside and the Appellant is acquitted of all the
charges.
16. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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