Supreme Court of India
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERSversusUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 1239
- Decided
- 14 November 2019
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
Section 13‑B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, its amendment and its extension to Chandigarh are constitutionally valid, as the amendment is within the State’s competence under the Concurrent List and the executive extension is a permissible conditional delegation, and the classification of NRI landlords satisfies Article 14.
Summary
The petitioners, tenants in Chandigarh and Punjab, challenged Section 13‑B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which gives Non‑Resident Indian (NRI) landlords a preferential right to evict tenants, and the extension of this provision to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by a 2009 notification under Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. The Court examined whether the Punjab State Legislature had competence to amend the Act, whether the executive could extend the amendment to Chandigarh without violating the doctrine of excessive delegation, and whether the classification of NRI landlords was arbitrary or violative of Article 14. Relying on the pith‑and‑substance doctrine, the Court held that the amendment falls within the Concurrent List and is within the State’s competence, and that the executive extension is a permissible conditional delegation. The Court also found that Section 13‑B contains adequate safeguards, is limited to a single use per lifetime, and therefore is a reasonable classification that satisfies Article 14. Consequently, the constitutional validity of Section 13‑B and its extension to Chandigarh was upheld and the appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- The validity of the 09.10.2009 notification extending Section 13‑B to Chandigarh under Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, and whether it amounts to excessive delegation.
- Whether the Punjab State Legislature was competent to enact the 2001 Amendment inserting Section 13‑B, given the subject‑matter of citizenship and foreign exchange.
- Whether Section 13‑B is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 by creating a special class of NRI landlords.
- Whether Section 13‑B denies any legal remedy to tenants and is therefore unconstitutional.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 246(4), s. Article 254
- East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949s. 13-B, s. 18-A, s. 19
- East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 2001s. 13-B
- Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966s. 87
Subjects
rent controlevictionnon‑resident Indianconstitutional validityArticle 14pith and substanceconditional delegationexcessive delegationlandlord‑tenantChandigarhPunjab Reorganisation Act
Judgment
[2019] 17 S.C.R. 1 1
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 8597 of 2019)
B
NOVEMBER 14, 2019
[RANJAN GOGOI CJI, NAGESWARA RAO AND
SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Rent Control and Eviction:
C
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949:
s.13-B – Notification dated 09.10.2009 by Central
Government, extending Section 13-B and other related sections
(inserted in the Rent Act vide East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001) to the Union Territory of Chandigarh – D
Provision of s. 13-B giving preferential right to claim eviction to
non-resident Indian – Constitutional validity of s. 13-B – Held:
Section 13-B is constitutional valid as also its extension and
applicability to the Union Territory of Chandigarh – East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 2001 – Punjab
E
Re-organisation Act, 1966 – s. 87.
s. 13-B – Issuance of Notification dated 09.10.2009, u/s. 87
of the Re-organisation Act, extending Section 13-B in the
Amendment Act to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by executive
action – Validity of – Held: Extension of the Amendment Act to the F
Union Territory of Chandigarh falls within the ambit of conditional
delegation and is valid and permissible – Once a policy of
extension of laws has been laid down by the Parliament and is
clear and permissible, it would only seem as an inevitable fallout
that the executive should be permitted to extend future amendments
to the existing laws – Thus, the challenge predicated on the G
doctrine of excessive delegation, separation of powers, doctrine
of the law of agency, cannot be accepted – Administrative law –
Conditional delegation – East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001 – Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 –
s. 87. H
1
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A s. 13-B – Amendments made vide the Amendment Act with
regard to the rights of Non-Resident Indians by the State Legislature
of Punjab – Legislative competence of the State – Held:
Amendment Act enacted by the State legislature was well within its
competence – Amendment Act on its true construction and by
reference to the doctrine of “pith and substance” is relatable to
B
the relationship of landlord and tenant for housing and
accommodation and falls under the Concurrent List – Dominant
intention or “pith and substance” of the legislation is to regulate
the relationship between Non-Resident Indian landlords and tenants
for housing and accommodation – Merely because the Amendment
C Act to achieve its object touches upon the subject matter in respect
of Non-Resident Indian landlords in the Rent Act, does not make
the Amendment or the Rent Act ultra vires the Constitution – In the
context of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and as the subject
matter falls within the Concurrent List, it would be immaterial to
decide on the competence of the legislating body – Power to make
D
laws in respect of a Union Territory vests with the Parliament under
Art.246(4) – In terms of s. 87 of the Re-organisation Act, the power
to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh vests with the
Central Government, that is the Parliament or the Central
Executive, as the case may be, and is permissible – Constitution
E of India – Art. 246(4) – East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001 – Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 –
s. 87.
s. 13-B – Plea that s. 13-B creates a special class of NRI
landlords, however, does not afford any legal remedy to the tenants
F – Reasonability of – Held: By providing for a simplified procedure
of eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, s. 13-B does not dilute
the rights of tenants – It gives a chance to the tenants on merits to
establish their case and when justified and necessary to take the
matter to trial – Thus, s. 13-B cannot be held to be arbitrary and
unreasonable.
G
s. 13-B – s. 13-B classifying non-Resident Indian landlords
as a separate category – Validity of Section 13-B – Held: Section
13-B cannot be treated as an arbitrary classification that infringes
and violates Article 14 – It cannot be held to be unconstitutional
because it grants a right to claim eviction for bona fide need by
H summary procedure to a certain group of landlords-Non-Resident
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 3
AND OTHERS
Indians subject to and on the satisfaction of statutory conditions A
which incorporate a check on frivolous evictions – It rests with
the legislature to make laws and extend it to other similarly situated
persons – Rent Act(s) invariably give similar rights by a controlled
mechanism and alluded riders to various other classes/groups of
landlords, namely, government servants, members of armed forces,
B
the retired or soon to retire employees of the Central and the State
Governments, widows, etc – Constitution of India – Art.14.
s. 13-B – Restrictions and conditions imposed on landlord
seeking eviction under – Purpose of – Held: In terms of Section
13-B, the condition imposed upon the landlord is that he should
have been the owner of the premises for five years before the C
eviction petition is filed – Such landlord/owner is permitted to file
an eviction petition only once during the lifetime and in respect of
one building – Landlord cannot sell or give the premises on lease
for a period of five years from the date of taking possession from
the tenant – On breach of the same, the tenant has a right to seek D
restoration of possession – In case the landlord does not occupy
the premises for a continuous period of three months after getting
an eviction order or lets out the whole or any part of the premises
to a third person other than the tenant in contravention of the
provisions of s. 13 B(3), punishment is imposed-– Thus, these
restrictions and conditions are strong in-built checks to ensure that E
the need of the landlord should be genuine and bona fide and the
tenant should not be subjected to frivolous and dubious eviction
order by relying on false assertions.
s.18-A and s.13-B – Right of Non-Resident Indians to initiate
eviction under the summary procedure – Nature of – Held: Is not F
an unfettered and absolute right – It is subject to satisfaction of
various pre-requisites and imperatives that ensure and check
potential abuse by resorting to a short-circuit procedure –
Requirement should arise from a genuine need of the Non-Resident
Indian landlord or his dependent – Furthermore, these
G
pre-conditions and post possession restrictions stated therein
suggest that s. 13-B serves a specific policy objective to ensure
the right of Non-Resident Indians to occupy their property in the
Union Territory of Chandigarh and the State of Punjab as the case
may be, after “returning” to their country – This right has to be
balanced with the right of the tenants to establish their case on H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A merits by disproving the genuine requirement of the Non-Resident
Indians – Constitution of India – Art. 14.
Doctrines/Principles: Doctrine of Pith and substance –
Meaning of – Held: Pith and substance doctrine states that if the
legislation is covered by an entry, that is, it is within the permitted
B jurisdiction of the legislature, any incidental encroachment in the
rival field has to be disregarded – Only when wide construction
of an entry leads to heads-on-clash with another entry in the same
or different List, the principle of harmonious construction is
applied to reconcile the conflict and to give effect to each of them.
C Constitution of India: Art. 254 – Repugnancy – When
attracted – Held: Repugnancy arises between a Central and a State
Act when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between the
two enactments and in that case, the Central Legislation prevails
by virtue of Art. 254 – Such repugnancy or inconsistency is not to
D be readily inferred as the entries in the three Lists permit incidental
encroachment – Thus, every attempt must be made to placate the
conflict and only when and in case of oppugnant clash, the court
should proceed to strike down the legislation as trespassing beyond
its legitimate and legal confines.
E Legislature: Function of – Held: Primary function of the
legislature is to make laws for all or different groups or classes of
persons – Lawmakers as elected representatives are in a better
position to know the needs, requirements and expectations of
citizens – Thus, the legislature possesses the power to distinguish
and classify persons or things subjected to such laws – Such a
F classification, however, must pass the muster of Art. 14 which
proscribe hostile and invidious discrimination – Art. 14 does not
entirely prohibit classification by grouping certain persons with
special peculiarities in a special category to meet certain specific
ends.
G Legislation: Rent control legislation – Object of – Stated.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The constitutional validity of Section 13-B of the
Rent Act and its extension and applicability to the Union
H Territory of Chandigarh is upheld. [Para 46] [45-B]
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 5
AND OTHERS
Whether Notification dated 09.10.2009 issued under A
Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 extending
Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 to Chandigarh by executive action is invalid?
2.1 The extension of the Amendment Act to the Union
Territory of Chandigarh falls within the ambit of conditional B
delegation and is valid and permissible. [Para 18] [26-A]
2.2 It cannot be accepted that the Notification dated
09.10.2009 which extends the Amendment Act to Chandigarh
by an executive action in exercise of powers under Section 87
of the Re-organisation Act amounts to and suffers from the vice C
of excessive delegation as it amends the rent legislation in force
in Chandigarh, that is, the Extension Act were enacted by the
Parliament in exercise of powers under Article 246(4) of the
Constitution. Once a policy of extension of laws has been laid
down by the Parliament and is clear and permissible, it would D
only seem as an inevitable fallout that the executive should be
permitted to extend future amendments to the existing laws.
Therefore, the challenge predicated on the doctrine of excessive
delegation, separation of powers, doctrine of the law of agency,
fails and must be rejected. Such challenge must also be rejected
E
in view of the large number of eviction suits filed by Non-
Resident Indian landlords on the strength of Notification dated
09.10.2009 who would be left remediless if contentions to the
contrary are accepted. [Paras 15, 19] [20-A-B; 26-B-C]
Ramesh Birch v. Union of India (1989 Supp) 1 SCC F
430 : [1989] 2 SCR 629 – relied on.
Re Delhi Laws Act 1912, Ajmer Merwara (Extension
of Laws) Act, 1947 and Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950
AIR 1951 SC 332 : [1951] SCR 747 ; R v Burah
(1878) 5 Ind App 178 (PC) ; Vasu Dev Singh v. Union G
of India (2006) 12 SCC 753 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR
535 – referred to.
Whether amendments made vide the Amendment Act with
regard to the rights of Non-Resident Indians by the State
Legislature of Punjab were beyond its competence? H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A 3.1 The entries in the three Lists: List I – Entry 17 & 18,
List II – Entry 18, List III Entry 6, 7 & 13 are not mutually
exclusive. Further, the entries are fields of legislation that
demarcate the area and heads of legislation. Thus, they should
receive the widest construction unless their rigour and import
B need to be castrated by competing entries and other parts of
the Constitution. Interpretation of each entry has to be fair and
liberal so as to cover all incidental and subsidiary matters which
can reasonably be said to have been comprehended in it. The
entries should not be interpreted in a narrow and pedantic sense.
“Pith and substance” doctrine states that if the legislation is
C covered by an entry, that is, within the permitted jurisdiction of
the legislature, any incidental encroachment in the rival field has
to be disregarded. Only when wide construction of an entry leads
to heads-on-clash with another entry in the same or different
List, the principle of harmonious construction applies to
D reconcile the conflict and to give effect to each of them. [Para
22] [27-D-F]
3.2 Repugnancy arises between a Central and a State Act
when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between the
two enactments. It is when there is an irreconcilable conflict
E between the two legislations that the Central Legislation
prevails by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution. Such
repugnancy or inconsistency is not to be readily inferred as the
entries in the three Lists permit incidental encroachment.
Consequently, every attempt must be made to placate the
conflict and only when and in case of oppugnant clash, the Court
F should proceed to strike down the legislation as trespassing
beyond its legitimate and legal confines. [Para 23] [27-F-H]
Vijay Kumar Sharma and Others v. State of Karnataka
and Others (1990) 2 SCC 562 : [1990] 1 SCR 614 ;
Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi and
G Another (1969) 2 SCC 289 : [1970] 1 SCR 443 ;
Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi and Others v. Mamanchand
Ratilal Agarwal and Others (1980) 3 SCC 162 : [1980]
3 SCR 224 ; V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal
(1979) 4 SCC 214 : [1980] 1 SCR 334 ; Accountant
H and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Union
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 7
AND OTHERS
of India and Others (1988) 4 SCC 324 : [1988] 1 A
Suppl. SCR 493 – referred to.
3.3 The Amendment Act on its true construction and by
reference to the doctrine of “pith and substance” is relatable
to the relationship of landlord and tenant for housing and
accommodation and falls under the Concurrent List. The B
dominant intention or “pith and substance” of the legislation is
to regulate the relationship between Non-Resident Indian
landlords and tenants for housing and accommodation. Merely
because the Amendment Act to achieve its object touches upon
the subject matter in respect of Non-Resident Indian landlords C
in the Rent Act, does not make the Amendment or the Rent Act
ultra vires the Constitution. The Rent Act as amended by the
Amendment Act and the Central legislations relating to
citizenship, regulation of the right of non-residents to own and
acquire immovable property, cover different subject matters and
serve different objects and there is no repugnancy between the D
Rent Act and any Central enactment like Citizenship Act,
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, etc. The view that the
legislative lists under the Seventh Schedule envisage and
mandate separate legislation by the Central Government for Non-
Resident Indian landlords cannot be accepted. [Para 27] [29-G- E
H; 30-A-B]
3.4 The Amendment Act enacted by the State legislature
was well within its competence. In the context of the Union
Territory of Chandigarh and as the subject matter falls within
the Concurrent List, it would be immaterial to decide on the F
competence of the legislating body. The power to make laws in
respect of a Union Territory vests with the Parliament under
Article 246(4). In terms of Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act,
the power to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh
vests with the Central Government, that is the Parliament or G
the Central Executive, as the case may be, and is permissible.
[Para 28] [30-C-D]
Whether Section 13-B of the Rent Act is arbitrary and
unreasonable inasmuch as it does not afford any legal remedy
to the tenants? H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A 4.1 Section 19 (2-B) incorporates statutory safeguards to
check and penalise deceitful and two-faced landlords and gives
the right of restitution to the defrauded tenant. Section 18-A of
the Rent Act prescribes a summary procedure for recovery of
possession applicable to eviction petitions filed by Non-Resident
B Indian landlords under Section 13-B of the Rent Act. Section 18-
A of the Rent Act requires the Controller to take up the matter
on a day-to-day basis until the hearing on an application for leave
to defend is concluded. No litigant can possibly object to a
provision stipulating day-to-day hearing which ensures speedy,
expeditious and effective decisions. Section 18-A also states that
C the decision of the Controller is final as no appeal or second
appeal lies against the order of eviction except that the High
Court could, to satisfy itself of the correctness of the decision,
examine the matter by calling for the records of the case. [Paras
29, 30, 33] [30-H; 31-A; 33-E-F]
D Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava (1984) 2 SCC
75 : [1984] 2 SCR 614 ; Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti
(1980) 1 SCC 290 : [1980] 1 SCR 854 – referred
to.
4.2 In terms of Section 13-B of the Rent Act, the landlord
E should have been the owner of the premises for five years before
the eviction petition is filed. Such landlord/owner is permitted
to file an eviction petition only once during the lifetime and in
respect of one building. Sub-section (3) to Section 13-B of the
Rent Act imposes a restriction on sale or lease of the premises
F for a period of five years from the date of taking possession from
the tenant. On breach of the conditions/ restrictions mentioned
in sub-section (3) to Section 13-B, the tenant has a right to seek
restoration of possession. Sub-section (2-B) to Section 19
imposes a maximum punishment of six months imprisonment or
a fine of one thousand rupees or both in case the landlord does
G
not occupy the premises for a continuous period of three months
after getting an eviction order or lets out the whole or any part
of the premises to a third person other than the tenant in
contravention of the provisions of sub-section (3) to Section 13-
B. These restrictions and conditions are strong in-built checks
H to ensure that the need of the landlord should be genuine and
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 9
AND OTHERS
bona fide and the tenant should not be subjected to frivolous A
and dubious eviction order by relying on false assertions. [Para
35] [36-D-G]
Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC
778 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26 – relied on.
B
4.3 The presumption raised with regard to the genuine
need of the landlord as pleaded in the petition should not be read
as an axiom or self-evident truth, which entitles the landlord and
mandates the Court to pass a decree of eviction. The
requirement of a ‘strong case’ for obtaining leave to defend
means a good case that brings to fore reasonable and well- C
grounded basis on which the tenant seeks leave to contest the
eviction proceedings. It does not mean setting up and
establishing at that stage a case beyond any scintilla of doubt
and debate. The grounds and pleas raised should reflect clear
and strong defence and relate to the grounds mentioned in
Baldev Singh Bajwa’s case. Each case has to be decided on its D
merits and not on the basis of any pre-conceived suppositions
and presumptions. By providing for a simplified procedure of
eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, Section 13-B does not
dilute the rights of tenants. It gives a chance to the tenants on
merits to establish their case and when justified and necessary E
to take the matter to trial. By no means, therefore, Section 13-
B can be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. [Para 36] [36-
H; 37-E-G; 38-A]
Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC
778 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26 ; Inderjeet Kaur v. F
Nirpal Singh (2001) 1 SCC 706 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR
707 – relied on.
Swami Nath v. Nirmal Singh (2010) 9 SCC 452 : [2010]
10 SCR 1002 – referred to.
Whether classifying Non-Resident Indian landlords as a G
separate category renders Section 13-B invalid and ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution ?
5.1 Legislature’s primary function is to make laws for all
or different groups or classes of persons. The lawmakers as
elected representatives are in a better position than any other H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A body which is removed from local and other circumstances, to
know the needs, requirements and expectations of citizens. It,
therefore, seems only logical that the legislature possesses the
power to distinguish and classify persons or things subjected to
such laws. Such a classification, however, must pass the muster
of Article 14 which proscribes hostile and invidious
B
discrimination. Recognising that Article 14 does not entirely
prohibit classification by grouping certain persons with special
peculiarities in a special category to meet certain specific ends.
Two conditions which must be satisfied for a classification to
withstand a challenge under Article 14, the classification should
C be founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons
or things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group; and the differentia must have a rational relation or nexus
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
A classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically
complete and would be justified unless it is palpably arbitrary.
D The test to judge the validity of any classification has to be
practical and pragmatic by looking beyond the classification to
the purpose of the law, that is, the purpose or object of the
legislation and the circumstances which had prevailed when the
law was passed and which had necessitated passing of that law.
E Not only this, there is a presumption as to constitutional validity
of an enactment predicated on the belief that the legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people
and is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its
restriction to only those cases where the need is deemed to be
the clearest. The hardship that may result from the classification
F cannot be the basis for determining the validity of any statute.
This requires distinguishing between under-inclusiveness and
over-inclusiveness. The former classification does not confer the
same benefit or place the same burden on others who are
similarly situated whereas over-inclusiveness includes not only
G those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but
others who are not so situated as well. The latter is frowned upon
but the former may pass the judicial test for the courts do
exercise tolerance to under-inclusiveness unless it is clear that
there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with
equal force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched.
H [Para 38] [39-B-G; 40-A-B]
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 11
AND OTHERS
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959] A
SCR 279 ; State of A.P. and Others v. Nallamilli Rami
Reddi and Others (2001) 7 SCC 708 : [2001] 2 Suppl.
SCR 287 ; Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure
Limited and Another v. Union of India and Others
(2019) 8 SCC 416 – referred to.
B
5.2 Rent control legislation are quintessentially social
legislation that were enacted in the 1940’s and 1950’s to protect
and curb exploitation of tenants in view of the prevailing socio-
economic conditions due to large scale immigration to towns and
cities, increase in population, lack of housing facilities as landed C
property was owned by a few well-off and wealthy persons. The
rent control legislation, thus, interfered with the general
freedom of contract and right of the landlord to seek eviction
under the Transfer of Property Act. However, all such legislations
invariably also provide for balancing the conflicting rights of the
landlords. There is a need for balancing the two rival interests. D
[Para 40] [42-D-E]
Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others v. State of
Maharashtra and Another (1998) 2 SCC 1 : [1997] 6
Suppl. SCR 717 ; Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal
(2002) 5 SCC 397 : [2002] 3 SCR 1078 ; Satyawati E
Sharma (Dead) By LRs v. Union of India and Another
(2008) 5 SCC 287 ; Vinod Kumar v. Ashok Kumar
Gandhi (2019) 10 SCALE 357 ; Kewal Singh v. Smt.
Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290: [1980] 1 SCR 854 ; Ravi
Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava (1984) 2 SCC 75: F
[1984] 2 SCR 614 – referred to.
5.3 Section 13-B of the Rent Act cannot be held to be
unconstitutional because it grants a right to claim eviction for
bona fide need by summary procedure to a certain group of
landlords, that is, Non-Resident Indians subject to and on the G
satisfaction of statutory conditions which incorporate a check on
frivolous evictions. The plea that Section 13-B ought to be
struck down on the ground that similar rights can be extended
to other landlords is without substance and is rejected. It rests
with the legislature to make laws and extend it to other similarly H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A situated persons. The Rent Act(s) invariably give similar rights
by a controlled mechanism and alluded riders to various other
classes/groups of landlords, namely, government servants,
members of armed forces, the retired or soon to retire
employees of the Central and the State Governments, widows,
B etc. [Para 43] [44-B-C]
5.4 The right of Non-Resident Indians to initiate eviction
under the summary procedure provided in Section 18-A is not
an unfettered and absolute right. It is subject to satisfaction of
various pre-requisites and imperatives that ensure and check
C potential abuse by resorting to a short-circuit procedure. The
requirement should arise from a genuine need of the Non-
Resident Indian landlord or his dependent. Such landlord should
be an owner for five years preceding the date of filing of the
eviction petition. There is a cap on permitting the use of the
provision which is available only once in a lifetime and only in
D
respect of one building. There are restrictions and constraints
on the re-sale and re-letting and a further requirement to possess
the property for a continuous period of three months after the
possession is taken. These pre-conditions and post possession
restrictions suggest that Section 13-B serves a specific policy
E objective to ensure the right of Non-Resident Indians to occupy
their property in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the State
of Punjab as the case may be, after “returning” to their country.
This right has to be balanced with the right of the tenants to
establish their case on merits by disproving the genuine
F requirement of the Non-Resident Indians. [Para 44] [44-D-G]
5.5 Section 13-B cannot be treated as an arbitrary
classification that infringes and violates Article 14 of the
Constitution. The challenge predicated on the basis of
unconstitutionality of the classification is rejected. [Para 45] [44-
G H]
Harkishan Singh v. Union of India AIR 1975 Punj.
& Har 160 (FB) – referred to.
Case Law Reference
H AIR 1975 P & H 160 (FB) referred to Para 7
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 13
AND OTHERS
[1951] SCR 747 referred to Para 16 A
(1878) 5 Ind App 178 (PC) referred to Para 16
[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 535 referred to Para 18
[1989] 2 SCR 629 relied on Para 19
B
[1990] 1 SCR 614 referred to Para 24
[1970] 1 SCR 443 referred to Para 25
[1980] 3 SCR 224 referred to Para 25
[1980] 1 SCR 334 referred to Para 25 C
[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 493 referred to Para 26
[1984] 2 SCR 614 referred to Para 32
[1980] 1 SCR 854 referred to Para 33 D
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26 relied on Para 35, 36
[2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 707 referred to Para 36
[2010] 10 SCR 1002 referred to Para 37
E
[1959] SCR 279 referred to Para 38
[2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 287 referred to Para 38
(2019) 8 SCC 416 referred to Para 38
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 717 referred to Para 40 F
[2002] 3 SCR 1078 referred to Para 40
(2008) 5 SCC 287 referred to Para 40
(2019) 10 SCALE 357 referred to Para 40
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8597
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2011 of the High
Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ
Petition No. 15378 of 2011. H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A With
Civil Appeal Nos. 8598, 8599, 8600, 8601, 8602, 8603, 8604, 8605
of 2019.
Sanjay Jain, ASG, Nidhesh Gupta, Narender Hooda, Rakesh
B Kumar Khanna, Sr. Advs., Gopal Balwant Sathe, Siddharth Bhatnagar,
Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Nakul Gandhi, Navandeep Matta, Mrs. Manik
Karanjawala (for M/s Karanjawala & Co.), A. Venayagam Balan, Ankit
Swarup, Vipul Jindal, Rohit Kumar Singh, Shyamal Kumar, Tarun Gupta,
Rishi Malhotra, Alok K. Agarwal, Vikas Jain, Amit Kumar, Ms. Kaveeta
Wadia, Ms. Garima Prashad, Ms. Apoorv Rastogi, Ms. Vriti Gujral,
C Ms. Pallavi Singh, Ms. Japneet Kaur, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Anand
Srivastava (for M/s. Lex Regis Law Offices), Subhasish Bhowmick,
Ms. Nida Doon, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,
Yogesh Malhotra, P. S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Ms. Anne Mathew,
Ms. Shruti Jose, Udit Grover, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, P.S. Khurana,
D Mohit Kumar Singh (for Ram Naresh Yadav), Ram Naresh Yadav,
Ms. Manju Jetley, Sanjai Kumar Pathak, Ms. Shashi Pathak, Arvind
Kumar Tripathi, Rajat Bhardwaj, Bhal Singh Malik, Mrs. Kamaldeep
Gulati, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Vikas Mahajan, Vinod Sharma,
Aakash Varma, Anil Kumar, Ravinder Singh, Ms. Dimple Nagpal, (for
E Ms. Astha Sharma), Ms. Astha Sharma, Shree Pal Singh, Ms. Upasana
Nath, Arvind Kumar Gupta, Tarunvir Singh Khehar, Sandeep Mishra,
Vishal Tripathi (for Ashok K. Mahajan), Ashok K. Mahajan,
Shubhranshu Padhi, Ajit Singh Pundir, Arijeet Singh, D. V. Singh,
Bhupendra Kumar Bhardwaj, Ritesh Khatri, Anil Kumar Mishra,
Anurag Singh, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, S. L. Aneja, Senthil Jagadeesan,
F
Sudhir Bisla, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Pawan K. Bahl, Rakesh K. Sharma,
Ashok Arora, Yadav Narender Singh, Anandan A., Jatinder Kumar
Bhatia, Naresh Bakshi, Yash Pal Dhingra, Dinesh Verma, Munish
Bhardwaj, S.K.S. Bedi (for Subhasish Bhowmick), Deepak Goel, P. N.
Puri, Satinder S. Gulati, Mrs. Kamaldeep Gulati, Anand Mishra,
G Amrendra Kumar Singh, Anil Kumar Tandale, Shashank Tripathi,
Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Ms. Binu Tamta, B.V. Balram Das,
B. Krishna Prasad, Pankaj Pandey, Vishal Bhatnagar, Ashwani Kumar,
Ms. Iti Sharma, Ms. Kumud Lata Das, Jay Kumar, Arvind Gupta,
Himanshu Gupta, Ms. Uttara Babbar, Ashok Panigrahi, Anmol Tayal,
H S. Vinay Ratnakar, Advs. for the appearing parties.
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 15
AND OTHERS
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The afore-captioned appeals are by tenants of different
residential and non-residential buildings in the Union Territory of B
Chandigarh and urban areas in the State of Punjab, who have challenged
the constitutional validity of Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 (for short, the ‘Rent Act’) and its extension to
the Union Territory of Chandigarh by the Central Government vide
Notification dated 09.10.2009 in exercise of powers under Section 87
of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (for short, the ‘Reorganisation C
Act’).
3. Section 13-B of the Rent Act, reads as under:
“13-B. Right to recover immediate possession of
residential building or scheduled building and/or non- D
residential building to accrue to Non-resident Indian.— (1)
Where an owner is a Non-Resident Indian and returns to India
and the residential building or scheduled building and/or non-
residential building, as the case may be, let out by him or her, is
required for his or her use, or for the use of any one ordinarily
living with and dependent on him or her, he or she, may apply to E
the Controller for immediate possession of such building or
buildings, as the case may be:
Provided that a right to apply in respect of such a building under
this Section, shall be available only after a period of five years
from the date of becoming the owner of such a building and shall F
be available only once during the life time of such an owner.
(2) Where the owner referred to in sub-section (1), has let out
more than one residential building or scheduled building and/or
non-residential building, it shall be open to him or her to make
an application under that sub-section in respect of only one G
residential building or one scheduled building and/or one non-
residential building, each chosen by him or her.
(3) Where an owner recovers possession of a building under this
Section, he or she shall not transfer it through sale or any other
means or let it out before the expiry of a period of five years H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A from the date of taking possession of the said building, failing
which, the evicted tenant may apply to the Controller for an order
directing that he shall be restored the possession of the said
building and the Controller shall make an order accordingly.”
The expression ‘Non-Resident Indian’ has been defined in clause
B (dd) to Section 2 of the Rent Act and reads:
“(dd) “Non-resident Indian” means a person of Indian origin, who
is either permanently or temporarily settled outside India in either
case –
C (a) for or on taking up employment outside India; or
(b) for carrying on a business or vocation outside India; or
(c) for any other purpose, in such circumstances, as would
indicate his intention to stay outside India for an
uncertain period;”
D
Section 13-B of the Rent Act gives a right to Non-Resident
Indians to recover immediate possession of residential/ scheduled/non-
residential buildings situated in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and
urban areas in the State of Punjab on the satisfaction of the conditions
stated. We shall elaborate the provisions subsequently and would first
E
refer to the legislative history and procedure adopted for enforcement
of the challenged provisions in the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
4. In 1956, the unified State of Punjab was created by merging
the erstwhile States of Pepsu and Punjab. In 1966, a new State of
F Haryana was created and carved out of certain territories from the
State of Punjab. Certain hill areas of Punjab were merged in the Union
Territory of Himachal Pradesh. A new Union Territory of Chandigarh
was created and became the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana. The
Reorganisation Act, that is, the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 gave
effect to the proposals vide provisions relating to the delimitation of
G territories. Another important aspect of the Reorganisation Act dealt
with the applicability of laws in territories that had undergone
reorganisation. This was effected by Part X of the Reorganisation Act
comprising of Sections 86 to 97. Sections 87, 88 and 89 of the
Reorganisation Act are relevant for the present decision and are
H reproduced below:
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 17
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
“87. Power to extend enactments to Chandigarh – The Central A
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend
with such restrictions or modifications as it thinks fit, to the Union
territory of Chandigarh any enactment which is in force in a State
at the date of the notification.
88. Territorial extent of laws.—The provisions of Part II shall B
not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to
which any law in force immediately before the appointed day
extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to
the State of Punjab shall, until otherwise provided by a competent
legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning
the territories within the State immediately before the appointed C
day.
89. Power to adapt laws.—For the purpose of facilitating the
application in relation to the State of Punjab or Haryana or to
the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh or Chandigarh of any
law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government D
may, before the expiration of two years from that day, by order,
make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by
way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient,
and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the
adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or
amended by a competent legislature or other competent E
authority.”
We shall subsequently elucidate on the sections, with specific
reference to Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act.
5. Territories originally comprised in the former province of East
F
Punjab and later designated as the State of Punjab were governed by
the Rent Act, which applied to all “urban areas” defined in Section 2(j)
as any area administered by a municipal committee, a cantonment
board, a town committee or an area notified by the State Government
as an “urban area” for the purposes of the Rent Act.
6. Central Government in exercise of power under Section 89 G
of the Reorganisation Act had issued the Punjab Reorganisation
(Chandigarh) (Adaptation of Laws on State and Concurrent Subjects)
Order, 1968 with effect from 1.11.1966 whereby in all the “existing laws”
in its application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, any reference
to the State of Punjab should be read as a reference to the Union H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A Territory of Chandigarh. The expression “existing laws” was defined
in para 2(1)(b) of the Order. It is an accepted position that the Rent
Act was not a part of the “existing laws” as the area forming the Union
Territory of Chandigarh was not an “urban area” within the Rent Act.
7. The Central Government by Notification dated 13.10.1972 and
B published in the Official Gazette on 04.11.1972 had declared the area
comprising of the Union Territory of Chandigarh to be an “urban area”
for the Rent Act. This Notification was struck down by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Harkishan Singh v. Union of India1, on the
short ground that no notification extending the Rent Act to the Union
Territory of Chandigarh as an “urban area” under Section 2(j) of the
C Rent Act could have been issued post reorganisation on 1.11.1966. The
Rent Act was not operative in Chandigarh in terms of Section 88 of
the Reorganisation Act nor any part would become operative by a
notification under Section 87 without necessary adaptation. Thus, neither
the Order nor the Notification dated 13.10.1972 could have the effect
D of making the Rent Act applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
8. The Parliament had thereupon to rectify the defect exercised
its power under Article 246(4) of the Constitution by enacting the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974
(for short, the ‘Extension Act’) to extend the Rent Act, subject to
modification specified in the Schedule, to the Union Territory of
E
Chandigarh. This enactment had stipulated that the Rent Act would be
deemed to be in force from 04.11.1972, that is the day on which the
earlier Notification that was quashed in Harkishan Singh’s case
(supra), was made effective. Thereby all proceedings for eviction
initiated in view of the Notification dated 04.11.1972 were regularised.
F The Extension Act was in principle and substance a Parliamentary
enactment to incorporate by reference and to avoid repetition all the
provisions of the Rent Act to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
9. On 17.12.1976, when the Parliament was not in session, the
President had promulgated Ordinance 14 of 1976 by which the Rent
G Act was amended by the introduction of an Explanation and addition
of sub-section (4A) to Section 13 and sub-section (2A) to Section 19.
New sections 13A, 18A and 18B were inserted and in Schedule II the
form of summons to be issued under Section 13A was added. This
Ordinance was allowed to lapse and was not enacted as law thereafter.
1
H AIR 1975 Punj. & Har 160 (FB)
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 19
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
10. In 1982, the Parliament passed the East Punjab Rent A
Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act replacing the words “East
Punjab” with the word “Punjab” and by substituting the definition of
“non-residential building” in the Rent Act as applicable to Chandigarh.
Lapsed amendments to the Rent Act vide Ordinance 14 of 1976 were
not incorporated.
B
11. In 1985, the provisions of the Rent Act as applicable to the
State of Punjab were amended by the Legislature of the State of Punjab
vide Punjab Act 2 of 1985 by inserting new Sections 13A, 18A and
18B, a new Second Schedule and amendments in Sections 13 and 19
substantially similar to those that had been effected by Ordinance 14
C
of 1976. A new definition of “specified landlord” was also added. These
amendments came into force on 16.11.1985.
12. Central Government thereafter issued Notification dated
15.12.1986 purportedly in exercise of the power under Section 87 of
the Reorganisation Act extending the provisions of the Punjab Act 2 of
D
1985, subject to the modifications mentioned therein, to the Rent Act
applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, that is, the Extension
Act.
13. The extension whether permissible by means of a notification
issued under Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act was challenged, but
E
rejected by this Court in Ramesh Birch v. Union of India2. We shall
subsequently refer to this judgment.
14. The provision under challenge before us, namely Section 13-
B was inserted in the Rent Act vide East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001 (for short, the ‘Amendment Act’) as enacted F
by the State Legislature of Punjab. Section 13-B and other related
sections in the Amendment Act were extended to the Union Territory
of Chandigarh by the Central Government vide Notification dated
09.10.2009 in purported exercise of powers under Section 87 of the
Reorganisation Act.
G
15. To avoid prolixity, we do not propose to refer to the factual
matrix as after hearing arguments we had declined to interfere on facts
and had heard arguments on legal issues that can be summarised as
under:
2
1989 Supp (1) SCC 430 H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A (i) The Notification dated 09.10.2009 which extends the
Amendment Act to Chandigarh by an executive action
in exercise of powers under Section 87 of the
Reorganisation Act amounts to and suffers from the vice
of excessive delegation as it amends the rent legislation
in force in Chandigarh, that is, the Extension Act were
B
enacted by the Parliament in exercise of powers under
Article 246(4) of the Constitution.
(ii) The State Legislature of Punjab was incompetent to
enact the Amendment Act, for the subject matter and
rights of Non-Resident Indians fall under the field of
C ‘Citizenship, Naturalization and Aliens’ under Entry
17 of List I; ‘Extradition’ under Entry 18 of List I and
‘Admission into, and Emigration and Expulsion from
India; Passports and Visas’ under Entry 19 of List I
of the Seventh Schedule. The subject matter of
D legislation is in direct conflict with and repugnant to
various Central enactments concerning the rights of
Non-Resident Indians including the Citizenship Act, 1955
and the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, etc.
(iii) Section 13-B which gives a preferential right to claim
E eviction to Non-Residents, including foreigners, is
arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, and creates
an artificial classification for benefit of Non-Residents
vis-à-vis Indian Residents and thus, violates Article 14
of the Constitution.
F For the sake of convenience and clarity, we shall deal with each
of the respective submissions and give our reasons separately.
A. Whether Notification dated 09.10.2009 issued under
Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act extending Section
13-B of the Rent Act to Chandigarh by executive action
G is invalid?
16. In Ramesh Birch (supra), earlier Constitutional Bench
judgment of this Court in Re Delhi Laws Act 1912, Ajmer Merwara
(Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 and Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 3
was examined and elucidated after considering seven different opinions
H 3
AIR 1951 SC 332
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 21
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
of Kania, CJ., Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das and A
Bose JJ. All the Judges except Kania, CJ. and Mahajan, J. had upheld
provisions of Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, Section 2 of the
Ajmer Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 and the first portion
of Section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act. However, Bose and
Mukherjea, JJ. had for reasons stated by them formed the majority with
B
Kania, CJ. and Mahajan, J. in striking down second part of Section 2
of Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 by which the executive had been
given the power to make a provision in any enactment so extended for
the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central
Act) which was for the time being applicable to that Part C State. This
part of Section 2, it was observed, suffers from the vice of excessive C
delegation and abdication of power by the Legislature. On the
touchstone of an earlier decision of the Privy Council in R. v. Burah4,
this Court in Ramesh Birch (supra) had upheld constitutional validity
of Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act, holding it to be valid on the
‘policy and guideline’ theory if one has proper regard to the context of
D
the Reorganisation Act and the object and purpose sought to be
achieved by Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act. It was observed:
“23. But, these niceties apart, we think that Section 87 is quite
valid even on the “policy and guideline” theory if one has proper
regard to the context of the Act and the object and purpose E
sought to be achieved by Section 87 of the Act. The judicial
decisions referred to above make it clear that it is not necessary
that the legislature should “dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s” of
its policy. It is sufficient if it gives the broadest indication of a
general policy of the legislature. If we bear this in mind and have
regard to the history of this type of legislation, there will be no F
difficulty at all. Section 87, like the provisions of Acts I, II and
III, is a provision necessitated by changes resulting in territories
coming under the legislative jurisdiction of the Centre. These are
territories situated in the midst of contiguous territories which
have a proper legislature. They are small territories falling under
G
the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament which has hardly sufficient
time to look after the details of all their legislative needs and
requirements. To require or expect Parliament to legislate for
them will entail a disproportionate pressure on its legislative
4
(1878) 5 Ind App 178 (PC). H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A schedule. It will also mean the unnecessary utilisation of the time
of a large number of members of Parliament for, except the few
(less than ten) members returned to Parliament from the Union
territory, none else is likely to be interested in such legislation.
In such a situation, the most convenient course of legislating for
them is the adaptation, by extension, of laws in force in other
B
areas of the country. As Fazl Ali, J. pointed out in the Delhi Laws
Act case [AIR 1951 SC 332 : 1951 SCR 747] it is not a power
to make laws that is delegated but only a power to “transplant”
laws already in force after having undergone scrutiny by
Parliament or one of the State legislatures, and that too, without
C any material change. There is no dispute before us — and it has
been unanimously held in all the decisions — that the power to
make modifications and restrictions in a clause of this type is a
very limited power, which permits only changes that the different
context requires and not changes in substance. There is certainly
no power of modification by way of repeal or amendment as is
D
available under Section 89.”
17. Ramesh Birch (supra) had held that once a policy of
extension of the Rent Act is clear and permissible, it would seem only
natural as a necessary corollary that the executive should be permitted
to extend future amendments in the Rent Act to the Union Territory of
E Chandigarh. After extensively examining the different judgments and
the views expressed in Re Delhi Laws Act (supra), the notification was
upheld with the following findings:
“31. There is certainly a good deal of force in these arguments
but we think that they proceed on an incorrect view of the effect
F of the notification impugned in the present case. We might have
been inclined to accept the submissions of the learned Counsel
had the effect of the notification been to extend law which is in
“actual conflict” with any parliamentary enactment or which has
the effect of “throwing out” any existing law in the Union territory.
G To borrow an expression used in an analogous context, we would
have considered the validity of the extension doubtful had the
extended provisions been repugnant to an Act of Parliament in
force in the Union territory. So long as that is not the effect or
result, we think, there is no reason to construe the scope of
Section 87 in the restricted manner suggested by counsel. It is
H no doubt true that Section 87 permits an extension because there
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 23
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
is no law in the Union territory in relation to a particular subject A
and Parliament has not the requisite time to attend to the matter
because of its preoccupations. But this purpose does not require
for its validity that there should be no existing law of Parliament
at all on a subject. Again the concept of “subject” for the
purposes of this argument is also an elastic one the precise scope
B
of which cannot be defined. The concept of vacuum is as much
relevant to a case where there is absence of a particular provision
in an existing law as to a case where there is no existing law at
all in the Union territory on a subject. For instance, if Parliament
had not enacted the 1974 Act but had only enacted an extension
of the Transfer of Property Act to Chandigarh, could it have been C
said that a subsequent notification cannot extend the provisions
of the 1949 Act to Chandigarh because the subject of leases is
governed by the Transfer of Property Act which has been already
extended and there is, therefore, no “vacuum” left which could
be filled in by such extension ? Again, suppose, initially, a Rent
Act is extended by Parliament which does not contain a provision D
regarding one of the grounds on which a landlord can seek
eviction — say, one enabling the owner to get back his house
for reoccupation — and then the Government thinks that another
enactment containing such a provision may also be extended, can
it not be plausibly said that the latter is a matter on which there E
is no legislation enacted in the territory and that the extension of
the latter enactment only fills up a void or vacancy ? Again,
suppose the provisions of a general code like, say, the Code of
Civil Procedure are extended to the Union territory, should we
construe Section 87 so as to preclude the extension of a later
amendment to one of the rules to one of the orders of the CPC F
merely on the ground that it will have effect of varying or
amending an existing law? We think it would not be correct to
thus unduly restrict the scope of a provision like Section 87. The
better way to put the principle, we think, is to say that the
extension of an enactment which makes additions to the existing G
law would also be permissible under Section 87 so long as it does
not, expressly or impliedly, repeal or conflict with, or is not
repugnant to, an already existing law. In this context, reference
can usefully be made to the observations in Hari Shankar Bagla
[Harishankar Bagla v. State of M.P., (1955) 1 SCR 380] at p.
391, which seem to countenance the “bypassing” of an existing H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A law by a piece of delegated legislation and to draw the line only
at its attempt to repeal the existing law, expressly or by necessary
implication. In a sense, no doubt, any addition, however small,
does amend or vary the existing law but so long as it does not
really detract from or conflict with it, there is no reason why it
should not stand alongside the existing law. In our view Section
B
87 should be interpreted constructively so as to permit its object
being achieved rather than in a manner that will detract from its
efficacy or purpose. We may also note, incidentally in legislative
practice also, such successive changes have been allowed to stand
together. Lachmi Narain v. Union of India [(1976) 2 SCC 953]
C narrates how the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 extended
to Delhi under Act III was subsequently amended by Parliament
Acts of 1956 and 1959 but was also sought to be modified by
various notifications from time to time. These notifications were
challenged on the ground that the power to extend by notification
could be exercised only once and that the impugned notification
D did not merely extend but also effected modifications of a
substantial nature in the Act sought to be extended. No contention
was, however, raised that after the intervention of Parliament in
1956 and 1959 there could have been no extension of the Bengal
Act as it would have the effect of adding to or varying the
E Parliamentary legislation apparently because they could stand side
by side with each other. We, therefore, think that since the
extension of the 1985 Act only adds provisions in respect of
aspects not covered by the 1974 Act and in a manner not
inconsistent therewith, the impugned notification is quite valid and
not liable to be struck down.”
F
18.The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated
legislation was explained by this Court in Vasu Dev Singh v. Union of
India5 in the following words:
“16. … The distinction between conditional legislation and
G delegated legislation is clear and unambiguous. In a conditional
legislation the delegatee has to apply the law to an area or to
determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect or at
such time, as it decides or to understand the rule of legislation, it
H 5
(2006) 12 SCC 753
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 25
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
would be a conditional legislation. The legislature in such a case A
makes the law, which is complete in all respects but the same is
not brought into operation immediately. The enforcement of the
law would depend upon the fulfilment of a condition and what is
delegated to the executive is the authority to determine by
exercising its own judgment as to whether such conditions have B
been fulfilled and/or the time has come when such legislation
should be brought into force. The taking effect of a legislation,
therefore, is made dependent upon the determination of such fact
or condition by the executive organ of the Government.
Delegated legislation, however, involves delegation of rule-making
C
power of legislation and authorises an executive authority to bring
in force such an area by reason thereof. The discretion conferred
on the executive by way of delegated legislation is much wider.
Such power to make rules or regulations, however, must be
exercised within the four corners of the Act. Delegated legislation,
thus, is a device which has been fashioned by the legislature to D
be exercised in the manner laid down in the legislation itself...
17. In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India 6 this Court
stated:
“The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated E
legislation is this that in the former the delegate’s power is that
of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall
become effective; Hampton & Co. v. U.S. and the latter involves
delegation of rule-making power which constitutionally may be
exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the F
legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in
the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the
administrative authority. In other words by delegated legislation
the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within
the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional
G
legislation the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature
conditionally leaving to the discretion of an external authority the
time and manner of carrying its legislation into effect as also the
determination of the area to which it is to extend;””
6
AIR 1960 SC 554 H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A In the present case, the extension of the Amendment Act to the
Union Territory of Chandigarh falls within the ambit of conditional
delegation and is valid and permissible.
19. In light of the aforesaid decisions and for the same reasons
as stated in Ramesh Birch (supra), we would reject the first contention
B raised by the appellants. Once a policy of extension of laws has been
laid down by the Parliament and is clear and permissible, it would only
seem as an inevitable fallout that the executive should be permitted to
extend future amendments to the existing laws. Therefore, the challenge
predicated on the doctrine of excessive delegation, separation of powers,
doctrine of the law of agency, fails and must be rejected. Such challenge
C must also be rejected in view of the large number of eviction suits filed
by Non-Resident Indian landlords on the strength of Notification dated
09.10.2009 who would be left remediless if contentions to the contrary
are accepted.
B. Whether amendments made vide the Amendment Act
D with regard to the rights of Non-Resident Indians by
the State Legislature of Punjab were beyond its
competence?
20. The contention that the Amendment Act enacted by the State
Legislature of Punjab has overstepped the jurisdiction assigned to it or
E has encroached upon a forbidden field is determinable by finding out
the true nature and character or pith and substance of the Amendment
Act which turns upon construction of the entries in the legislative Lists
under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
21. Relevant entries from the three Lists which are germane to
F the determination of nature and character of the Amendment Act are:
List I
Entry 17 – Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens.
Entry 18 – Extradition.
G Entry 19 – Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from,
India; passports and visas.
List II
Entry 18 – Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land
H tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 27
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; A
land improvement and agricultural loans; and colonization.
List III
Entry 6 – Transfer of property other than agricultural land;
registration of deeds and documents.
B
Entry 7 – Contracts including partnership, agency, contracts
of carriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not including
contracts relating to agricultural land.
Entry 13 – Civil procedure, including all matters included in
the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this C
Constitution, limitation and arbitration.
22. The entries in the three Lists are not mutually exclusive.
Further, the entries are fields of legislation that demarcate the area and
heads of legislation. Accordingly, they should receive the widest
construction unless their rigour and import need to be castrated by D
competing entries and other parts of the Constitution. Interpretation of
each entry has to be fair and liberal so as to cover all incidental and
subsidiary matters which can reasonably be said to have been
comprehended in it. The entries should not be interpreted in a narrow
and pedantic sense. “Pith and substance” doctrine states that if the E
legislation is covered by an entry, that is, it is within the permitted
jurisdiction of the legislature, any incidental encroachment in the rival
field has to be disregarded. Only when wide construction of an entry
leads to heads-on-clash with another entry in the same or different List,
the principle of harmonious construction applies to reconcile the conflict
and to give effect to each of them. F
23. Repugnancy arises between a Central and a State Act when
there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between the two enactments.
It is when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two legislations
that the Central Legislation prevails by virtue of Article 254 of the
Constitution. Such repugnancy or inconsistency is not to be readily G
inferred as the entries in the three Lists permit incidental encroachment.
Consequently, every attempt must be made to placate the conflict and
only when and in case of oppugnant clash, the Court should proceed
to strike down the legislation as trespassing beyond its legitimate and
legal confines. H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A 24. In Vijay Kumar Sharma and Others v. State of Karnataka
and Others7, this Court referring to the “pith and substance” doctrine
had held that a provision in a particular legislation in order to give effect
to its dominant purpose may incidentally encroach on the same subject
matter as covered by the provision of another legislation. Such partial
coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a
B different purpose does not bring about the repugnancy which is intended
to be covered by Article 254(2). Both the legislations must be
substantially on the same subject matter for repugnancy to arise and
to attract Article 254. If the subject matters covered by the legislations
are different, then merely because the two legislations refer to some
C allied or cognate subjects, they do not cover the same field.
25. A Constitutional Bench judgment of this Court in Indu
Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi and Another8 had inter alia
examined Entry 3 in List I, Entry 18 in List II and Entries 6, 7 and 13
in List III to observe that the general power of legislating in respect of
D relationship between landlord and tenant can be traced either under
Entry 18 of List II or Entries 6 and 7 of List III. The expression ‘land
tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant’ appearing in
Entry 18 of List II, it was observed, was used only with reference to
the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands and
does not cover tenancy of buildings or house accommodation.
E Nevertheless, the Court did not give a finding in definite terms as the
relationship of landlord and tenant in question was in respect of a house
accommodation situated in a cantonment area and therefore was
covered by Entry 3 of List I which vests exclusive power to make laws
for the cantonment areas in the Parliament. Subsequent decision in
Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi and Others v. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal
F
and Others9 and a Constitution Bench judgment in V. Dhanapal
Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal 10 substantially follow Indu Bhushan
(supra) to hold that the subject matter of housing and accommodation
falls within the purview of the Concurrent List.
26. In Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. and
G Another v. Union of India and Others11, this Court had examined the
7
(1990) 2 SCC 562
8
(1969) 2 SCC 289
9
(1980) 3 SCC 162
10
(1979) 4 SCC 214
11
H (1988) 4 SCC 324
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 29
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
question of repugnancy and interplay between the Central enactment, A
viz. the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971
based on the pattern of the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962 and the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956 and the question which of these enactments would
prevail. The Court had interpreted Entries 3, 32, 43 and 44 of List I,
B
Entry 18 of List II and Entries 5, 6 and 7 of the List III and the
corresponding entries in the Government of India Act, 1935 to hold that
all the three legislations were passed in exercise of powers conferred
with respect to matters contained in the Concurrent List. In view of
the repugnancy and conflict between the Central enactment on one hand
and the State law on the other, in terms of Article 254, the Central C
enactment shall prevail. Further, notwithstanding the earlier precedents,
the Court had examined the question of the relevant entry applicable
to the tenancy legislation and rejected the contention that Entry 18 of
List II should be interpreted as encompassing within its ambit legislation
on the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard to housing and
D
buildings. Setting out several reasons it was observed that the power
to legislate in respect of tenanted premises would fall within the ambit
and scope of Entries 6, 7 and 13 of the Concurrent List and would not
be referable to Entry 18 of List II. The expression ‘land’ in Entry 18
of List II should be given as wide a construction as possible, but has to
be read with the relevant entries in other Lists to give meaning and E
content to all of them. Inclusion of buildings and housing in the
Concurrent List is appropriate and to place buildings and housing within
the ambit of the expression ‘land’ in Entry 18 of List II would denude
other entries in Lists I and III concerning transfer of property, devolution
and succession of land and buildings, etc. of their vigour and would
F
render them otiose.
27. The Amendment Act on its true construction and by reference
to the doctrine of “pith and substance” is relatable to the relationship
of landlord and tenant for housing and accommodation and falls under
the Concurrent List. The dominant intention or “pith and substance”
of the legislation is to regulate the relationship between Non-Resident G
Indian landlords and tenants for housing and accommodation. Merely
because the Amendment Act to achieve its object touches upon the
subject matter in respect of Non-Resident Indian landlords in the Rent
Act, does not make the Amendment or the Rent Act ultra vires the
Constitution. The Rent Act as amended by the Amendment Act and H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A the Central legislations relating to citizenship, regulation of the right of
non-residents to own and acquire immovable property, cover different
subject matters and serve different objects and there is no repugnancy
between the Rent Act and any Central enactment like Citizenship Act,
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, etc. We do not subscribe to the view
that the legislative lists under the Seventh Schedule envisage and
B
mandate separate legislation by the Central Government for Non-
Resident Indian landlords.
28. Keeping in view the aforesaid position, the Amendment Act
enacted by the State legislature was well within its competence. We
would, however, note that in the context of the Union Territory of
C
Chandigarh and as the subject matter falls within the Concurrent List,
it will be immaterial to decide on the competence of the legislating body.
The power to make laws in respect of a Union Territory vests with
the Parliament under Article 246(4). In terms of Section 87 of the
Reorganisation Act, the power to extend laws to the Union Territory
D of Chandigarh vests with the Central Government, that is the Parliament
or the Central Executive, as the case may be, and is permissible.
C. Whether Section 13-B of the Rent Act is arbitrary and
unreasonable inasmuch as it does not afford any legal
remedy to the tenants?
E
29. Before we delve into this question, we would reproduce
Section 19(2-B) of the Rent Act which reads as under:
“19. (2-B) The owner, who is a Non-Resident Indian and who
having evicted a tenant from a residential building or a scheduled
F building and/or non-residential building in pursuance of an order
made under Section 13-B, does not occupy it for a continuous
period of three months from the date of such eviction, or lets
out the whole or any part of such building from which the tenant
was evicted to any person, other than the tenant in contravention
of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 13-B, shall be
G punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to
six months or with fine which may be extended to one thousand
rupees or both.”
The provision incorporates statutory safeguards to check and
penalise deceitful and two-faced landlords and gives the right of
H restitution to the defrauded tenant.
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 31
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
30. Section 18-A of the Rent Act prescribes a summary procedure A
for recovery of possession applicable to eviction petitions filed by Non-
Resident Indian landlords under Section 13-B of the Rent Act. Sub-
sections (4), (5), (6) and (8) to Section 18-A of the Rent Act are
reproduced:
“18-A. (4) The tenant on whom the service of summons has been B
declared to have been validly made under sub-section (3), shall
have no right to contest the prayer for eviction from the residential
building or scheduled building and/or non-residential building, as
the case may be, unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds
on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and
C
obtains leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided, and in
default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his
obtaining such leave, the statement made by the specified landlord
or, as the case may be, the widow, widower, child, grandchild or
the widowed daughter-in-law of such specified landlord or the
owner, who is a non-resident Indian in the application for eviction D
shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant
shall be entitled to an order for eviction of the tenant.
(5) The Controller may give to the tenant leave to contest the
application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts
as would disentitle the specified landlord or, as the case may be, E
the widow, widower, child, grandchild or widowed daughter-in-
law of such specified landlord or the owner, who is a non-resident
Indian, from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession
of the residential building or scheduled building and/or non-
residential building, as the case may be, under Section 13-A or
F
Section 13-B.
(6) Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application,
the Controller shall commence the hearing on a date not later
than one month from the date on which leave is granted to the
tenant to contest and shall hear the application from day to day
G
till the hearing is concluded and application decided.
xx xx xx
(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for
the recovery of possession of any residential building or scheduled
building and/or non-residential building, as the case may be, made H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in
this section:
Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying
itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is
in accordance with law, call for the records of the case and pass
B such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.”
31. In Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini 12, this Court
referring to the provisions of Section 18-A of the Rent Act had observed:
“11. [...] These provisions indicate that in order to obtain leave
to contest the application of the landlord, the tenant has to file
C an affidavit taking the grounds on which he wants to contest that
application. If the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts
as would disentitle the NRI landlord from obtaining an order for
the recovery of immediate possession, the Controller would grant
leave to the tenant to contest the landlord’s application for
D eviction. Once the leave is granted, the application is required to
be disposed of as per the procedure applicable to the Court of
Small Causes. The Controller is required to commence the
hearing within one month from the date on which the leave is
granted to the tenant to contest. The application shall be heard
day to day till hearing is concluded and application decided. The
E order to direct recovery of possession of the suit accommodation
made by the Controller is not subject to appeal or second appeal.
However, the High Court may call for the record of the case to
satisfy itself that the order passed by the Controller is in
accordance with law and may pass such order as it thinks fit.”
F 32. In Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava13, this Court
had discussed the object of rent control legislation and also insertions
made to provide expeditious, effective and speedy remedy for a class
of landlords who require the premises for bona fide use, to hold:
“7. […] The dominant object of the amending act [is] to provide
G a speedy, expeditious and effective remedy for a class of
landlords contemplated by Sections 14(1)(e) and 14-A and for
avoiding unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by the Rent
Act. It is common experience that suits for eviction under the
12
(2005) 12 SCC 778
13
H (1984) 2 SCC 75
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 33
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
Act take a long time commencing with the Rent Controller and A
ending up with the Supreme Court. In many cases experience
has indicated that by the time the eviction decree became final
several years elapsed and either the landlord died or the necessity
which provided the cause of action disappeared and if there was
further delay in securing eviction and the family of the landlord
B
had by then expanded, in the absence of accommodation the
members of the family were virtually thrown on the road. It was
this mischief which the Legislature intended to avoid by
incorporating the new procedure in Chapter III-A. The
Legislature in its wisdom thought that in cases where the landlords
required their own premises for bona fide and personal necessity C
they should be treated as a separate class along with the
landlords covered by Section 14-A and should be allowed to reap
the fruits of decrees for eviction within the quickest possible time.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the classification of such
landlords would be an unreasonable one because such a
D
classification has got a clear nexus with the objects of the
amending Act and the purposes which it seeks to subserve.”
33. Section 18-A of the Rent Act requires the Controller to take
up the matter on a day-to-day basis until the hearing on an application
for leave to defend is concluded. No litigant can possibly object to a
provision stipulating day-to-day hearing which ensures speedy, E
expeditious and effective decisions. The observations of this Court in
Ravi Dutt Sharma (supra) are apposite. Section 18-A also states that
the decision of the Controller is final as no appeal or second appeal
lies against the order of eviction except that the High Court could, to
satisfy itself of the correctness of the decision, examine the matter by F
calling for the records of the case. Repelling a similar challenge on the
ground that 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 does not provide
for an appeal or second appeal against an order of eviction, in Kewal
Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti14 it was observed:
“19. […] An appeal is purely a creature of the statute and this G
right has not been given in order to cut out unnecessary delay.
Instead the highest Court of the State has been given a wide
power of revision where the said Court can examine the case
of the tenant and the landlord and the validity of the order passed
14
(1980) 1 SCC 290 H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A by the Controller. The right of the tenant, therefore, is sufficiently
safeguarded by the proviso to sub-section (8) of S. 25B of the
Act referred to above. In order to give relief to the tenant against
any apparent error of law or fact where no revision has been
filed in the High Court the statute confers power of review on
the Controller.”
B
34. On the requirement of ‘bona fide need’ of Non-Resident
Indian landlords under Section 13-B in Baldev Singh Bajwa (supra),
it was elucidated:
“14. The phrase “bona fide requirement” or “bona fide need” or
C “required reasonably in good faith” or “required”, occurs in almost
all Rent Control Acts with the underlying legislative intent which
has been considered and demonstrated innumerable times by
various High Courts as also by this Court, some of which we
would like to refer to. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander it is
said that the bona fide need should be genuine and honest,
D
conceived in good faith. It was also indicated that the landlord’s
desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has
inevitably a subjective element in it, and that desire, to become
a “requirement” in law must have the objective element of a
“need”, which can be decided only by taking all the relevant
E circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded
to a tenant is not rendered illusory or whittled down.
15. In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan it was held by this
Court that the words “reasonable requirement” undoubtedly
postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a
F mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need
should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the
genuine need as nothing but a desire.
16. In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India a three-Judge
Bench of this Court has held as under:
G “20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant
contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords. The
fact that there is no reference to the words bona fide requirement
in Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the landlord from
proving that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from
H showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 35
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough A
indication in support of this construction from the title of Section
25-B which states ‘special procedure for the disposal of
applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide
requirement’.”
17. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta this B
Court while dealing with the aspect of bona fide requirement has
said that the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere,
honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext
to evict a tenant, refers to a state of mind prevailing with the
landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of the landlord
C
is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placing himself
in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to
himself — whether in the given facts, substantiated by the
landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural,
real, sincere and honest.
D
18. From the aforesaid decisions the requirement of the landlord
of the suit accommodation is to be established as a genuine need
and not a pretext to get the accommodation vacated. The
provisions of Sections 18-A(4) and (5) concede to the tenant’s
right to defend the proceedings initiated under Section 13-B
showing that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine or E
bona fide. The legislative intent for setting up of a special
procedure for NRI landlords is obvious from the legislative text
which has been deliberately designed making distinction between
the ordinary landlords and special category of landlords. The
Controller’s power to give leave to contest the application filed F
under Section 13-B is restricted by the condition that the affidavit
filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. It
is needless to say that in the summary proceedings the tenant’s
right to contest the application would be restricted to the
parameters of Section 13-B of the Act. He cannot widen the G
scope of his defence by relying on any other fact which does
not fall within the parameters of Section 13-B. The tenant’s
defence is restricted and cannot go beyond the scope of the
provisions of the Act applicable to the NRI landlord. Under
Section 13-B the landlord is entitled to eviction if he requires the H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A suit accommodation for his or her use or the use of the dependant,
who ordinarily lives with him or her. The requirement would
necessarily have to be genuine or bona fide requirement and it
cannot be said that although the requirement is not genuine or
bona fide, he would be entitled to the ejectment of the tenant
B nor can it be said that in no circumstances will the tenant not be
allowed to prove that the requirement of the landlord is not
genuine or bona fide. A tenant’s right to defend the claim of the
landlord under Section 13-B for ejectment would arise if the
tenant could be able to show that the landlord in the proceedings
is not an NRI landlord; that he is not the owner thereof or that
C his ownership is not for the required period of five years before
the institution of proceedings and that the landlord’s requirement
is not bona fide.”
35. In terms of Section 13-B of the Rent Act, the landlord should
have been the owner of the premises for five years before the eviction
D petition is filed. Such landlord/owner is permitted to file an eviction
petition only once during the lifetime and in respect of one building. Sub-
section (3) to Section 13-B of the Rent Act imposes a restriction on
sale or lease of the premises for a period of five years from the date
of taking possession from the tenant. On breach of the conditions/
E restrictions mentioned in sub-section (3) to Section 13-B, the tenant has
a right to seek restoration of possession. Sub-section (2-B) to Section
19 imposes a maximum punishment of six months imprisonment or a
fine of one thousand rupees or both in case the landlord does not occupy
the premises for a continuous period of three months after getting an
eviction order or lets out the whole or any part of the premises to a
F third person other than the tenant in contravention of the provisions of
sub-section (3) to Section 13-B. The reasoning in Baldev Singh Bajwa
(supra) exposits that these restrictions and conditions are strong in-built
checks to ensure that the need of the landlord should be genuine and
bona fide and the tenant should not be subjected to frivolous and
G dubious eviction order by relying on false assertions.
36.The presumption raised with regard to the genuine need of
the landlord as pleaded in the petition should not be read as an axiom
or self-evident truth, which entitles the landlord and mandates the Court
to pass a decree of eviction. This is clear from subsequent elucidation
H by this Court in paragraphs 20 and 21 in Baldev Singh Bajwa (supra).
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 37
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
The true ratio, in our opinion, is reflected in paragraph 25 which reads A
as under:
“25. On the interpretation given by us and on a plain reading of
the provisions, once in a lifetime possession is given to an NRI
to get one building vacated in a summary manner. A non-resident
Indian landlord is required to prove that: (i) he is an NRI; (ii) B
that he has returned to India permanently or for a temporary
period; (iii) requirement of the accommodation by him or his
dependant is genuine; and (iv) he is the owner of the property
for the last five years before the institution of the proceedings
for ejectment before the Controller. The tenant’s affidavit asking
for leave to contest the NRI landlord’s application should confine C
itself to the grounds which NRI landlord is required to prove, to
get ejectment under Section 13-B of the Act. The Controller’s
power to give leave to contest the application filed under Section
13-B is circumscribed to the grounds and inquiry on the aspects
specified in Section 13-B. The tenant would be entitled for leave D
to contest only if he makes a strong case to challenge those
grounds. Inquiry would be confined to Section 13-B and no other
aspect shall be considered by the Controller.”
The requirement of a ‘strong case’ for obtaining leave to defend
means a good case that brings to fore reasonable and well-grounded E
basis on which the tenant seeks leave to contest the eviction
proceedings. It does not mean setting up and establishing at that stage
a case beyond any scintilla of doubt and debate. The grounds and pleas
raised should reflect clear and strong defence and relate to the grounds
mentioned in paragraph 25 in Baldev Singh Bajwa (supra). The
standard applied is similar to parameters elucidated in Inderjeet Kaur F
v. Nirpal Singh15, in which this Court had held that the leave to defend
should not be granted on mere asking but when the pleas and contentions
raise triable issues and the dispute on facts demands that the matter
be properly adjudicated after ascertaining the truth of affidavits filed
by the witnesses in their cross-examination. Each case has to be decided G
on its merits and not on the basis of any pre-conceived suppositions
and presumptions. By providing for a simplified procedure of eviction
by the Non-Resident Indians, Section 13-B does not dilute the rights of
tenants. It gives a chance to the tenants on merits to establish their
15
(2001) 1 SCC 706 H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A case and when justified and necessary to take the matter to trial. By
no means, therefore, Section 13-B can be held to be arbitrary and
unreasonable.
37. The expression ‘one building’ appearing in sub-clause (2)
to Section 13-B was examined by a three Judge Bench of this Court
B in Swami Nath v. Nirmal Singh16 by referring to the earlier judgment
of this Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa (supra), to observe:
“13. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Baldev
Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini where the same question had
come up for consideration and it was observed that on a plain
C reading of the provisions of Section 13-B, it would be obvious
that once in a lifetime possession is given to an NRI to get one
building vacated in a summary manner. It was also submitted that
the ownership of the respondent landlord in respect of only one
building had not been disputed by the petitioners and the only
contention that was raised on their behalf was that each separate
D tenancy in a building would amount to a separate unit and after
exhausting the right of summary possession once, it was no longer
available to the NRI landlord to exercise such an option for the
second time to a particular building, which contention had been
negated by the courts below.
E 14. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf
of the respective parties and we are unable to agree with the
submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. The interpretation
sought to be given to the proviso to Section 13-B(1) of the 1949
Act would lead to an absurd situation which was not
contemplated by the legislature while introducing the provisions
F of Section 13-B by way of amendment in 2001. The very object
of the amendment would be frustrated if the narrow and
constricted meaning being canvassed on behalf of the petitioners
is to be accepted.
15. The provisions of Section 13-B of the 1949 Act have been
G correctly interpreted and dealt with in Baldev Singh Bajwa case
and in that view of the matter, the special leave petitions must
fail and are dismissed. …”
The third contention is accordingly rejected.
16
H (2010) 9 SCC 452
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 39
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
D. Whether classifying Non-Resident Indian landlords as A
a separate category renders Section 13-B invalid and
ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution?
38. Legislature’s primary function is to make laws for all or
different groups or classes of persons. The lawmakers as elected
representatives are in a better position than any other body which is B
removed from local and other circumstances, to know the needs,
requirements and expectations of citizens. It, therefore, seems only
logical that the legislature possesses the power to distinguish and classify
persons or things subjected to such laws. Such a classification, however,
must pass the muster of Article 14 which proscribes hostile and invidious
discrimination. Recognising that Article 14 does not entirely prohibit C
classification by grouping certain persons with special peculiarities in a
special category to meet certain specific ends, this Court in Ram
Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar 17 had postulated two
conditions which must be satisfied for a classification to withstand a
challenge under Article 14, namely: i) the classification should be D
founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things
that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) the
differentia must have a rational relation or nexus to the object sought
to be achieved by the statute in question. In State of A.P. and Others
v. Nallamilli Rami Reddi and Others 18, this Court had further
elucidated that a challenge on the ground of denial of equal treatment E
will not sustain when the legislature intends to classify persons under a
well-defined class. A classification need not be scientifically perfect or
logically complete and would be justified unless it is palpably arbitrary.
The test to judge the validity of any classification has to be practical
and pragmatic by looking beyond the classification to the purpose of F
the law, that is, the purpose or object of the legislation and the
circumstances which had prevailed when the law was passed and which
had necessitated passing of that law. Not only this, there is a
presumption as to constitutional validity of an enactment predicated on
the belief that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the
need of its own people and is free to recognise degrees of harm and G
may confine its restriction to only those cases where the need is deemed
to be the clearest. The hardship that may result from the classification
17
1959 SCR 279: AIR 1958 SC 538
18
(2001) 7 SCC 708 H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A cannot be the basis for determining the validity of any statute. This
requires distinguishing between under-inclusiveness and over-
inclusiveness. The former classification does not confer the same benefit
or place the same burden on others who are similarly situated whereas
over-inclusiveness includes not only those who are similarly situated with
respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well. The
B
latter is frowned upon but the former may pass the judicial test for the
courts do exercise tolerance to under-inclusiveness unless it is clear
that there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with
equal force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched (See
Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Limited and Another v.
C Union of India and Others in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 43 of 2019
decided on 09.08.2019).
39.The object and reasons for enacting Section 13-B in the Rent
Act vide the Amendment Act were explained in Baldev Singh Bajwa
(supra) in the following words:
D “The State Government had been receiving representations from
various NRI individuals and through their associations highlighting
the plight of Indian residents returning to India after long years
abroad. It was represented that the NRIs having spent long years
of their life abroad did not find conditions congenial in their own
E country on their return either to settle down or to take up any
business. On account of rigid legal provisions of the existing rent
laws, the NRIs were unable to recover possession of their own
residential building from the tenants. The Government having
considered the situation had decided that the existing rent
legislation viz. the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
F should be amended to provide relief to NRIs to enable them to
recover possession of a residential or scheduled building and/or
one non-residential building for their own use.”
The effect of Section 13-B and other provisions of the Rent Act
was explained as:
G
“10. The amendment introduced in the Act created a special
class of NRI landlords and reposed special rights in them to
recover immediate possession from the tenants occupying their
premises, provided such premises were required by them. Section
13-B intends to provide immediate possession of the
H accommodation to the NRI landlord which is in possession of
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 41
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
the tenant if the landlord requires the same for his or her use or A
for the use of anyone ordinarily living with him/her and is
dependent on him or her. Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B
postulates that the NRI landlord should be the owner of the
building from which he has asked ejectment of the tenant. He
should require the same for his or her use or for the use of anyone
B
ordinarily living with him/her and is dependent on him or her. He
should be the owner of that building for five years before he
applied to the Controller for possession of such building. The right
under Section 13-B of immediate possession could be availed of
only once during the lifetime of such an owner/NRI landlord.
Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B gives a choice to the NRI C
landlord to select one among several other residential buildings
or scheduled buildings and/or non-residential buildings for the
purpose of eviction of the tenant from that premises. Residential
building is defined in Section 2(g) to mean a building which is
not a non-residential building. Scheduled building is defined in
D
Section 2(h) of the Act which means a residential building being
used by a person engaged in one or more of the professions,
namely, lawyers, architects, dentists, engineers, veterinary
surgeons, medical practitioners including practitioners of
indigenous systems of medicine and who occupies the same partly
for his business and partly for his residence. Sub-section (3) of E
Section 13-B puts a restriction on the landlord to deal with
building of which he has taken possession by virtue of the order
passed under Section 13-B of the Act of 1949. Under this section
the owner who recovers the possession of the building by virtue
of the order passed under Section 13-B shall neither transfer it
F
either by sale or by any other mode nor shall he let it out for the
period of five years from the date he took possession of the
building. In case there is a breach on the part of the owner who
took possession of the building, of any of the conditions, the tenant
who had been evicted would be entitled to apply to the Controller
for an order directing that the tenant be restored back possession G
of that building and on such a petition being moved, the Controller
would pass an appropriate order. Apart from the restriction which
is imposed by sub-section (3) of Section 13-B on the landlord’s
right to deal with the building of which he took possession under
the provisions of Section 13-B, a further restriction has been
H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A imposed on the landlord under Section 19(2-B) of the Act of
1949. Section 19(2-B) contemplates that when the order for
possession is being passed in favour of the owner-landlord under
Section 13-B, he is required to occupy the premises continuously
for the period of three months from the date of eviction of the
tenant. He is prohibited from letting out the whole or any part of
B
that building from which the tenant was evicted to any other
person except the tenant who had been evicted by virtue of the
order passed under Section 13-B. In contravention of these
restrictions, the landlord is liable for a penal action and can be
imposed punishment of imprisonment for a term which may
C extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rupees
one thousand or with both.”
40. Rent control legislation are quintessentially social legislation
that were enacted in the 1940’s and 1950’s to protect and curb
exploitation of tenants in view of the prevailing socio-economic
D conditions due to large scale immigration to towns and cities, increase
in population, lack of housing facilities as landed property was owned
by a few well-off and wealthy persons. The rent control legislation,
therefore, interfered with the general freedom of contract and right of
the landlord to seek eviction under the Transfer of Property Act.
However, all such legislations invariably also provide for balancing the
E conflicting rights of the landlords. In several decisions, this Court has
emphasised that there is a need for balancing the two rival interests as
has been observed in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others v. State
of Maharashtra and Another 19, Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore
Behal20, Satyawati Sharma (Dead) By LRs v. Union of India and
F Another21 and in the recent decision in Vinod Kumar v. Ashok Kumar
Gandhi in Civil Appeal No. 3793 of 2016 decided on 05.08.2019.
41. In Kewal Singh (supra) this Court had rejected the challenge
of discrimination and arbitrariness predicated on Article 14 to the
summary procedure under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
G 1958 applicable in cases of personal necessity of landlords. The
contention that Section 25-B creates a special class of landlords who
are given favourable treatment for speedy eviction of tenants was
19
(1998) 2 SCC 1
20
(2002) 5 SCC 397
21
H (2008) 5 SCC 287
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 43
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
rejected as without any substance. The rent control legislation should A
be just and fair to the landlords. Accordingly, it was observed that it is
always open to the legislature to check, regulate and also confer rights
upon the landlords to enable them to seek eviction in certain
circumstances. Referring to the ground of personal necessity, it was
observed:
B
“17. [...] Thus, such a landlord becomes a class by himself. The
statute thus puts personal necessity of the landlord as a special
class requiring special treatment for quick eviction of the tenant
and cuts out all delays and plugs all the loopholes which may
cause delay in getting the relief by the landlord. It is obvious,
therefore, that the classification made by the legislature is in public C
interest and is in complete consonance with the objectives sought
to be achieved. The landlords having personal necessity have
been brought together as a separate class because of their special
needs and such a classification cannot be said to be unreasonable
particularly when the legislature in its wisdom feels that the D
landlords should get this relief as quickly as possible.”
42. The following observations in Ravi Dutt Sharma (supra)
relating to the right given to the landlords for eviction in context of the
rent control legislation are pertinent:
“7. […] Tenants cannot complain of any discrimination because E
the Rent Act merely gave certain protection to them in public
interest and if the protection or a part of it afforded by the Rent
Act was withdrawn and the common law right of the tenant
under the Transfer of Property Act was still preserved, no genuine
grievance could be made.” F
Similar views were also expressed in Kewal Singh (supra) in
the following words:
“22. Thus, we do not see how can the tenant challenge the
validity of such a provision enacted by the legislature from which
the tenant itself derived such rights. G
23. In the instant case, the legislature has not taken away the
right of the tenant at all but has merely simplified the procedure
for eviction of the tenant in cases falling within the ambit of
Sections 14-A and 14(1)(e) of the Act as discussed in the
judgment. In these circumstances, therefore, any challenge by H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R.
A the tenant to the constitutionality of the Act must necessarily fail
and hence Section 25-B is constitutionally valid.”
43. Section 13-B of the Rent Act cannot be held to be
unconstitutional because it grants a right to claim eviction for bona fide
need by summary procedure to a certain group of landlords, that is,
B Non-Resident Indians subject to and on the satisfaction of statutory
conditions which incorporate a check on frivolous evictions. The plea
that Section 13-B ought to be struck down on the ground that similar
rights can be extended to other landlords is without substance and should
be rejected. It rests with the legislature to make laws and extend it to
other similarly situated persons. The rent act(s) invariably give similar
C
rights by a controlled mechanism and alluded riders to various other
classes/groups of landlords, namely, government servants, members of
armed forces, the retired or soon to retire employees of the Central
and the State Governments, widows, etc.
44. The right of Non-Resident Indians to initiate eviction under
D
the summary procedure provided in Section 18-A of the Rent Act is
not an unfettered and absolute right. It is subject to satisfaction of
various pre-requisites and imperatives that ensure and check potential
abuse by resorting to a short-circuit procedure. The requirement should
arise from a genuine need of the Non-Resident Indian landlord or his
E dependent. Such landlord should be an owner for five years preceding
the date of filing of the eviction petition. There is a cap on permitting
the use of the provision which is available only once in a lifetime and
only in respect of one building. There are restrictions and constraints
on the re-sale and re-letting and a further requirement to possess the
property for a continuous period of three months after the possession
F
is taken. These pre-conditions and post possession restrictions suggest
that Section 13-B serves a specific policy objective to ensure the right
of Non-Resident Indians to occupy their property in the Union Territory
of Chandigarh and the State of Punjab as the case may be, after
“returning” to their country. This right has to be balanced with the right
G of the tenants to establish their case on merits by disproving the genuine
requirement of the Non-Resident Indians.
45. Section 13-B cannot, therefore, be treated as an arbitrary
classification that infringes and violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
The challenge predicated on the basis of unconstitutionality of the
H classification is rejected.
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA 45
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
46. Before reserving the judgment, we had heard counsel for the A
appellants on merits and had expressed that we were not inclined to
interfere with the factual findings. Accordingly, we have not dealt with
the factual matrix in each case and have examined and answered the
legal issues raised. In view of the findings upholding the constitutional
validity of Section 13-B of the Rent Act and its extension and
B
applicability to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, we would dismiss
the afore-captioned appeals by the tenants. There would be no order
as to costs.
Nidhi Jain Appeals dismissed.
C
D
E
F
G
H
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