RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU ETC.versusSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.

                  [2015] 2 S.C.R. 961


          RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU ETC.                     A

                           v.
                STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

       (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1279-1281 of 2011)           B

                 FEBRUARY 27, 2015

     [VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ.]

      Penal Code, 1860:                                   c
       s.3048 - Interpretation of - Held: The use of word
'shown' instead of 'proved' in s.3048 indicates that the
onus cast on the prosecution would stand satisfied on the
anvil of a mere preponderance of probability - Thereafter, D
the word 'deemed' used in that Section is to be read down
to require an accused to prove his innocence, but beyond
reasonable doubt.

        s.3048 - Dowry death - Conviction of husband and E
brothers-in-law and sister-in-law on the ground that
prosecution proved that due to non-fulfl1/ment of demand
of dowry the deceased was harassed, tortured and treated
with cruelty- Defence challenged conviction by relying .on
the exculpatory dying declaration - Held: Since the burden F
of proving innocence beyond reasonable doubt shifted to
the accused, it was imperative for the defence to prove the
sequence of events which led to the recording of the
alleged dying declaration by the Tehsi/dar - Neither the
Doctor who      certified that the deceased was in a fit G
condition to make a statement nor the Tehsildar who wrote
down the alleged Dying Declaration stated the
circumstances in which the Dying declaration was recorded
                          961                             H
962         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A     - Dying Declaration had mysteriously popped up and was
      referred to at the time of consideration of bail application
      - The alleged exculpating Dying Declaration was,
      therefore, shrouded in suspicion - Defence having failed
      to give credible version of their innocence, interference with
B     the order of conviction not called for.

          Criminal law: Dying declaration - Concept Proof
  of its authenticity - Procedure to be followed when a
  person is brought to the hospital in serious injured
C condition - Discussed.

             Dismissing the appeals, the Court

           HELD: 1. The prosecution has 'shown' that
      Section 3048 stood attracted since the death of the
D     wife occurred within seven years of the solemnization
      of the marriage; indubitably, it was an unnatural death.
      It also came in evidence that immediately after her
      marriage a demand for a scooter was made and this
      demand recurred with regularity and that about fifteen
E     days prior to the unnatural death of the hapless young
      wife, her Grandfather PW1 first did not accede to the
      request of the Accused to send the deceased/victim to
      her matrimonial house because of their harassment
      and cruelty towards her for not meeting their demands
F     of dowry. Only when the Accused assured her
      Grandfather that she would not be ill-treated, that she
      was sent back to her matrimonial house. The
      statement of the Mother PW2 was also to the same
      effect. Therefore, the requirement of Section 3048, IPC
G     that the dowry demand should have been made soon
      before the death stood satisfied. [Para 4] [968-F-H; 969-
      A-C]

      2. The risks while admitting a Dying Declaration
H and the state.merits falling within the domain of Section
     RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU v. STATE OF U.P.            963


32(1) run higher in contrast to other sundry evidences, A
and this entails a huge bearing on their admissibility
and credibility. Such statements are neither made on
oath nor the maker of the statement would be available
for cross-examination nor are they made under the
influence of the supremacy and the solemnity of the B
court-room. However, once a Dying Declaration is held
to be authentic, inspiring full confidence beyond the
pale of doubt, voluntary, consistent and credible,
barren of tutoring, significant sanctity is endowed to
it; such is the sanctitude that it can even be the C
exclusive and the solitary basis for conviction without
seeking any corroboration. [Para 5] [969-G-H; 970-A-
C]
      3. Whenever a person is brought to a hospital in D
an injured state which indicates foul-play, the hospital
authorities are enjoined to treat it as a medico-legal
case and inform the police. If the doctor, who has at-
tended the injured, is of the opinion that death is likely
to ensue, it is essential for him to immediately report E
the case to the police; any delay in doing so will al-
most never be brooked. The police in turn should be
alive to the need to record a declaration/statement of
the injured person, by pursuing a procedure which
would make the recording of it beyond the pale of F
doubt. This is why an investigating officer (1.0.) is
expected to alert the jurisdictional Magistrate of the
occurrence, who in turn should immediately examine
the injured. When this procedure is adopted, condi-
tional on the certification of a doctor that the injured, G
is in a fit state to make a statement, a Dying Declara-
tion assumes incontrovertible evidentiary value. Only
if it is impossible for the Magistrate to personally per-
form this duty, should he depute another senior offi·
cial. Non-adherence to this procedure would need· H
964        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2015] 2 S.C.R.


A lessly and avoidably cast a shadow on the recording
  of a Dying Declaration. The prosecution, therefore,
  would be expected to prove that every step was dili-
  gently complied with. [Paras 8, 9] [972-E-H; 973-A-E]

8          4. Since the burden of proving innocence beyond
      reasonable doubt shifts to the Accused in the case of
      a dowry death, as it was in the present case, it was
      imperative for the defence to prove the sequence of
      events which led to the recording of the alleged Dying
C     Declaration by the Tehsildar DW1. This burden was not
      even faintly addressed. At the time of seeking bail, the
      accused had requested the Sessions Court to call for
      the alleged Dying Declaration. Keeping in perspective
      that none of the Accused was present when the de-
D     ceased was receiving medical treatment in the hospi-
      tal, or when the Dying Declaration was allegedly re-
      corded, or at the time of death, or even at the time of
      cremation, the manner in which the Accused learnt of
      the existence of the Dying Declaration was not dis-
E     closed. The burden and necessity of proving this se-
      quence of events stood transferred to the shoulders of
      the Accused since Section 3048 of the IPC was at-
      tracted. The 1.0. deposed that all the Accused, includ-
      ing the late father-in-law, had absconded after the in-
F     cident. Neither the Doctor DW2 who allegedly certi-
      fied that the deceased was in a fit condition to make
      a statement nor the Tehsildar who had allegedly writ-
      ten down the alleged Dying Declaration stated the
G     manner in which the Tehsildar had been conscripted
      or located to perform this important recording. The
      Dying Declaration appeared to have mysteriously
      popped up and referred to at the time of praying for
      bail. The chain or sequence of events which led to its
H     recording remained undisclosed. In his statement, the
    RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU v. STATE OF U.P.                  965


 Tehsildar did not clarify the manner in which he hap-        A
 pened to record the Dying Declaration and the timing
 of its transmission to the Court. Since the onus of
 proof had shifted to the Accused, this alleged se-
 quence of events should have been proved beyond
 reasonable doubt by them. The Tehsildar as well as the       B
 Doctor who allegedly certified that the deceased was
 in a fit state to make the Dying Declaration was pro-
 duced by the defence. The Doctor should have spoken
 of the sequence of events in which the Tehsildar came
 to record the Dying Declaration. The alleged exculpat-       C
 ing Dying Declaration was, therefore, shrouded in sus-
 picion. The Accused were present on the scene at the
 time of the occurrence, which turned out to be fatal,
 and that added to their responsibility to give a cred-
                                                              0
 ible version of their innocence in tt:ie dowry death.
 [Para 10] [973-H; 974-A-H; 975-A-D]
    Sher Singh v. State of Punjab (2008) 4 SCC .265:
 2008 (2) SCR 959 - relied on.
                                                              E
      Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474: 1992
  ( 2 ) SCR 197; Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of
  Gujarat (1992) 4 SCC 69; Vithal v. State of Maharashtra
  (2006) 13 SCC 54; Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi
  v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 15 SCC 455: 2007 (11 ) F
. SCR 1; Samadhan Dhudaka Kofi v. State of Maharashtra
  (2008) 16 SCC 705: 2008 (17 ) SCR 1025; Surinder
  Kumar v. State of Punjab (2012) 12 SCC 120: 2012 (9)
  SCR 1019 - distinguished.
                                                          G
      Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 155:
  2008 (17) SCR 379 - referred to.
    Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition); Shepard v. U.S.,
Kan., 290 U.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 - referred
to.                                                           H
966        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A                       Case Law Reference

         2008 (2 ) SCR 959        relied on.          Para 3

         2008 (17) SCR 379        referred to.        Para 4
B        1992 ( 2 ) SCR 197       distinguished.      Para 11

         (1992) 4 sec 69          distinguished.      Para 11

         (2006) 13 sec 54         distinguished.      Para 11
c        2007 (11 ) SCR 1         distinguished.      Para 11

         2008 (17 ) SCR 1025      distinguished.      Para 11

         2012 (9) SCR1019         distinguished.      Para 11
D
         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
      Appeal Nos. 1279-1281 of 2011.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 13.07.2010 of the
      High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow bench in
E     Criminal Appeal No. 184, 186 & 187 of 1999.

          P. N. Misra, T. N. Singh, V. K. Singh for the Appellant.

          Abhishek Singh, Amit Kumar Singh Samir Ali Khan, for
F     the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. These Appeals assail the
  Judgment dated 13.07.2010 of the learned Single Judge,
G High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow, who had
  affirmed the conviction of the Appellants and the sentencing
  under Sections 498A and 3048 of the IPC pronounced by
  the VII Ith Additional District & Sessions Judge, Faizabad on
H 15.4.1999. The essay, therefore, is to reverse the
   RAMAKANT MISHRA@ LALU v. STATE OF U.P.                        967
            [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.)

concurrent findings and sentence of the Courts below.             A

     2. The endeavour of the learned counsel for the
Appellants is almost entirely predicated on an exculpatory
Dying Declaration allegedly made by the deceased, who
was the wife of the 1'1 Appellant and the sister-in-law of the    B
2nct Appellant and the 3rct Appellant. The deceased Vijay
Lakshmi was married to the 1st Appellant, Ramakant Mishra,
in 1989 and from that wedlock a son named Sonu was
begotten. Sonu has been living with his maternal
grandparents who have cared for all his requirements,             C
without any efforts on the part of the Accused towards taking
over his custody or making any contribution for his
expenses. The prosecution has shown/proved that due to
non-fulfillment of demands of dowry the deceased was
harassed, tortured and treated with cruelty. The exact date       D
of the marriage is not forthcoming, but it avowedly took
place much before the expiry of seven years of the
unnatural death of Vijay Lakshmi. On the morning of
21.9.1994 she has been shown by the prosecution to have
been put on fire after sprinkling kerosene oil on her body.       E
The husband/Appellant No.1 and the other Accused appear
to have admitted her in a hospital and, thereafter,
disappeared from the scene, not even being bothered to
be present at her cremation. She succumbed to 90-95 per           F
cent burn injuries at 11.30 p.m. that very day. Jagdamba,
Appellant No.2 and brother-in-law of the deceased, has
stated that when the deceased was preparing milk on the
ehulah, Sonu toppled the container of kerosene oil and its
contents spilled on the floor; in her endeavour to pick up        G
her son Sonu, her saree allegedly got caught in the chulah,
resulting in the saree catching fire and her receiving 90-95
per cent burns. In the Impugned Order it has been noted
that the opinion of the Doctor was that death resulted from
burn injuries. The Chargesheet was submitted against four H
968        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015) 2 S.C.R.


A Accused named in the FIR, one of whom (the father-in-law
  of the deceased) has died.

           3. Very recently, this Court had the opportunity of
      interpreting Section 3048 of the IPC in Criminal Appeal
8     No.1592 of 2011, titled Sher Singh v. State of Haryana,
      [reported in (2015) 1 SCR 29) which was authored by one
      of us (Vikramajit Sen,J.). Succinctly stated, it had been
      held therein that the use of word 'shown' instead of
      'proved' in Section 3048 indicates that the onus cast on
C     the prosecution would stand satisfied on the anvil of a
      mere preponderance of probability. In other words, 'shown'
      will have to be read up to mean 'proved' but only to the
      extent of preponderance of probability. Thereafter, the word
      'deemed' used in that Section is to be read down to require
D     an accused to prove his innocence, but beyond reasonable
      doubt. The 'deemed' culpability of the accused leaving no
      room for the accused to prove innocence was, accordingly,
      read down to a strong 'presumption' of his culpability.
      However, the accused is required to dislodge this
E     presumption by proving his innocence beyond reasonable
      doubt as distinct from preponderance of possibility.

       4. In harmony with the ratio of Sher Singh, so far as
  the present case is concerned, there can be no cavil that
F the prosecution has 'shown' that Section 3048 stands
  attracted since the death of the wife occurred within seven
  years of the solemnization of the marriage; indubitably, it
  was an unnatural death. It has also come in evidence that
  immediately after her marriage a demand for a scooter was
G made and this demand recurred with regularity. It is in
  evidence that about fifteen days prior to the unnatural
  death of the hapless young wife, her Grandfather PW1 first
  did not accede to the· request of the Accused to send the
H deceased/victim to her matrimonial house because of the;,
     RAMAKANT MISHRA@ tALU v. STATE OF U.P.                      969
              [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

 harassment and cruelty towards her for not meeting their         A
 demands of dowry. Only when the Accused assured her
 Grandfather that she would not be ill-treated, that she was
                            '
 sent back to her matrimonial house. The statement of the
 Mother PW2 is also to the same effect. We are not
 persuaded, therefore, to hold that there was no live link        B
 between the dowry demand and the death or that the
 Accused have succeeded in proving that the demand, if
 any, was of a much earlier vintage, on which count no
 support can be rallied from the judgment in Tarsem Singh
 v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 155. Therefore, the             C
 requirement of Section 3048 of the IPC that the dowry
 demand should be made soon before the death stands
 satisfied. Accordingly, it appears to us that the prosecution
 has succeeded in showing, or proving prima facie, that           D
 dowry demands had been made by the Accused even
 shortly before the death of the deceased.

       5. The defence has rested very heavily nay, almost
  entirely, on the alleged Dying Declaration attributed to the
  deceased. The admissibility of a Dying Declaration as a E
  piece of evidence in a Trial is governed by Section 32(1)
  of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 32, as a whole,
  enunciates the exceptions to the rule of non-admissibility
. of hearsay evidences, eventuated out of necessity to give F
  relevance to the statements made by a person whose
  attendance cannot be procured for reasons stipulated in the.
  section. Postulating the essential ingredients to define what
  exactly would constitute a hearsay is an arduous task, and
  since we are only concerned with one of its exceptions, we G
  should forbear entering into the entire arena. The risks while
  admitting a Dying Declaration and the statements falling
  within the domain of Section 32(1) run higher in contrast to
  other sundry evidences, and this entails a huge bearing on
  their admissibility and credibility. Such statements are H
970       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A neither made on oath nor the maker of the statement would
  be available for cross-examination nor are they made under
  the influence of the supremacy and the solemnity of the
  court-room. This is the reason why this Court has
  consistently underlined the necessity to examine this specie
B of evidence with great circumspection and care. However,
  once a Dying Declaration is held to be authentic, inspiring
  full confidence beyond the pale of doubt, voluntary,
  consistent and credible, barren of tutoring, significant
  sanctity is endowed to it; such is the sanctitude that it can
C even be the exclusive and the solitary basis for conviction
  without seeking any corroboration. At this juncture, it is
  worthwhile noting that the sanctity attached to a Dying
  Declaration springs up from the rationale that a person
D genuinely under the sense of imminent death would speak
  only the truth. In addition to the Dying Declaration, which
  is only one of the species of the genus of Section 32(1),
  there could be other statements, written or verbal, which
  also would be encompassed within the sweep of this
E section, and at this point the Indian law drifts from the
  English law. This is further evident from the usage of
  phraseology in the section, embracing not only statements
  made about "cause of death" but also about "any of the
  circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the
F death", whether or not the person making the statement was
  under "expectation of death". These statements could be
  in the form of a suicide note, a letter, a sign or a signal, or
  a product of any reliable means of communication; their
  genuineness and credibility shall, of course, be reckoned
G by the Court entertaining the concerned matter. A Dying
  Declaration enjoys a higher level of credence vis-a-vis any
  other statement abovementioned, which is on account of
  the former being made in the "contemplation of death".
  "Contemplation of death" is the primal factor to segregate
H Dying Declarations from other statements. But no hard-and-
    RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU v. STATE OF U.P.                       971
             [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.)

fast rule can be laid down to confine the contemplation A
within the circumference of few hours or a few days in which
death of the maker of the statement must happen so as to
elevate that statement to the level of a Dying Declaration.
Moreover, the state of mind of the maker would also be
material in discerning completely as to whether the maker B
was mentally fit to make the statement and whether the
maker actually could have contemplated death.

     6. Definition of this legal concept found in Black's Law
Dictionary (5 1" Edition) justifies reproduction: Dying            C
Declarations - Statements made by a person who is lying
at the point of death, and is conscious of his approaching
death, in reference to the manner in which he received the
injuries of which he is dying, or other immediate cause of
his death, and in reference to the person who inflicted such       D
injuries or the connection with such injuries of a person who
is charged or suspected of having committed them; which
statements are admissible in evidence in a trial for homicide
(and occasionally, at least in some jurisdictions, in other
cases) where the killing of the declarant is the crime             E
charged to the defendant. Shepard v. U.S., Kan., 290 U.S.
96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196. Generally, the admissibility
of such declarations is limited to use in prosecutions for
homicide; but is admissible on behalf of accused as well           F
as for prosecution. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil
action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while
believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause
or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending
death is not excluded by the hearsay rule. Fed.Evid.R.             G
804(b)(2).

    7. When a person makes a statement while being
aware of the prospect that his death is imminent and
proximate, such a statement assumes a probative value              H
972         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A which is almost unassailable, unlike other statements which
  he may have. made earlier, when death was not lurking
  around, indicating the cause of his death. That is to say
  that a person might be quite willing to implicate an innocent
  person but would not do so when death is knocking at his
B door. That is why a Dying Declaration, to conform to this
  unique specie, should have been made when death was
  in the contemplation of the person making the statemenU
               •
  declaration.

C      8. In the case before us, the statement, if made by the
  deceased, would .qualify to be treated as a Dying
  Declaration because she was admitted in the hospital,
  having sustained 90-95 per cent burn injuries, and because
  of this grave burn injuries, she would be expecting to
D shortly breathe her last.

           9. The central question, however, remains as to
      whether the alleged Dying Declaration attracts authenticity.
      Since the prosecution has succeeded in showing/proving
E     by preponderance of probability that a dowry death has
      occurred, the burden of proving innocence has shifted to
      the accused. It appears to us to be unexceptionable that
      whenever a person is brought to a hospital in an injured
      state which indicates foul-play, the hospital authorities are
F     enjoined to treat it as a medico-legal case and inform the
      police. If the doctor, who has attended the injured, is of the
      opinion that death is likely to ensue, it is essential for him
      to immediately report the case to the police; any delay in
G     doing so will almost never be brooked. The police in turn
      should be alive to the need to record a declaration/
      statement of the injured person, by pursuing a procedure
      which would make the recording of it beyond the pale of
      doubt. This is why an investigating officer (1.0.) is expected
H     to alert the jurisdictional Magistrate of the occurrence, who
    RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU v. STATE OF U.P.                      973
             [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

 in turn should immediately examine the injured. When this        A
 procedure is adopted, conditional on the certification of a
doctor that the injured is in a fit state to make a statement,
a Dying Declaration assumes incontrovertible evidentiary
value. We cannot conceive of a more important duty cast
on the Magistrate, since the life & death of a human being        B
 is of paramount importance. We think that only if it is
 impossible for the Magistrate to personally perform this
duty, should he depute another senior official. Non-
adherence to this procedure would needlessly ar.d
avoidably cast a shadow on the recording of a Dying               C
Declaration. The prosecution, therefore, would be expected
to prove that every step was diligently complied with. The
 prosecution would have to produce the doctor or the
medical authority to establish that on the examination of         D
the injured/deceased, the police had been immediately
 informed. The 1.0. who was so informed would then have
to testify that he alerted the Magistrate, on whose non-
 availability, some responsible person was deputed for the
 purpose of recording the Dying Declaration. We are not           E
 in any manner of doubt that where medical opinion is to
the effect that a person is facing death as a consequence
of unnatural events, the responsibility of the Magistrate to
record the statement far outweighs any other responsibility.
There may be instances where there was no time to follow          F
this procedure, but that does not seem to be what has
transpired in the case in hand. In cases where some other
person is stated to be recipient of a Dying Declaration,
doubts may reasonably arise.
                                                                  G
    10. Since the burden of proving innocence beyond
reasonable doubt shifts to the Accused in the case of a
dowry death, as it has in the present case, it was imperative
for the defence to prove the sequence c• events which lead
to the recording of the alleged Dyin~ Declaration by the H
974         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A     Tehsildar DW1. This burden has not even been faintly
      addressed. It appears that at the time of seeking bail the
      accused had requested the Sessions Court to call for the
      alleged Dying Declaration. Keeping in perspective that none
      of the Accused was present when the deceased was
B     receiving medical treatment in the hospital, or when the
      Dying Declaration was allegedly recorded, or at the time of
      death, or even at the time of cremation, the manner in which
      the Accused learnt of the existence of the Dying Declaration
      has not been disclosed. The statement of the 1.0. also does
C     not clarify the position; he has stated that he learnt of the
      existence of the Dying Declaration from the relatives of the
      deceased. On the application of Sher Singh, the burden
      and necessity of proving this sequence of events stood
D     transferred to the shoulders of the Accused since Section
      3048 of the IPC had been attracted. The 1.0. has deposed
      that all the Accused, including the late father-in-law, Gorakh
      Nath, had absconded after the incident. In fact, in the cross-
      examination, the 1.0. states that - "there is no reliable
E     information about the Dying Declaration... On keeping this
      information that the Dying Declaration of Vijay Lakshmi was
      recorded by the Magistrate I did not consider any need of
      this thing". Neither the Doctor DW2 who had allegedly
      certified that the deceased was in a fit condition to make a
F     statement nor the Tehsildar who had allegedly written down
      the alleged Dying Declaration has stated the manner in
      which the Tehsildar had been conscripted or located to
      perform this important recording. The Dying Declaration
      appears to have mysteriously popped up and referred to
G     at the time of praying for bail. The chain or sequence of
      events which lead to its recording remains undisclosed. In
      his statement, the Tehsildar has not clarified the manner in
      which he happened to record the Dying Declaration and the
      timing of its transmission to the Court. Since the onus of
H     proof had shifted to the Accused, this alleged sequence of
    RAMAKANT MISHRA@ LALU v. STATE OF U.P.                       975
             [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

 events.should have been proved beyond reasonable doubt           A
 by them. We may emphasise that the Tehsildar as well as
 the Doctor who allegedly certified that the deceased was
 in a fit. state to make the Dying Declaration has been
 produced by the defence. The Doctor should have spoken
 of the sequence of events in which the Tehsildar came to         B
 record the Dying Declaration. The alleged exculpating Dying
 Declaration is, therefore, shrouded in suspicion and we
 have not been persuaded to accept that it is a genuine
 document. The defence has failed to comply with Section
 1138 of the Evidence Act. The Accused being charged of           C
 the commission of a dowry death ought to have entered the
 witness box themselves. The Accused were present on the
·scene at the time of the occurrence, which turned out to
 be fatal, and that added to their responsibility to give a       D
 credible version of their innocence in the dowry death.

      11. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474,
Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat (1992) 4 SCC
69, Vithal v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 13 SCC 54,
Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of E
Maharashtra (2007) 15 SCC 455, Sher Singh v. State of
Punjab (2008) 4 SCC 265, Samadhan Dhudaka Kali v. State
of Maharashtra (2008) 16 SCC 705 and Surinder Kumar v.
State of Punjab (2012) 12 SCC 120, are distinguishable on F
facts because in the case in hand we are not convinced of
the authenticity of the Dying Declaration; in contradiction
to its form, or the mental stability or lucidity of the deceased
at the time when she allegedly made the statement
attributed to her.                                               G

    12. The Appeals are dismissed in the above terms.
The interim Order is recalled.
Devika Gujral                                Appeal dismissed.
                                                                  H