RAMGOPAL & ANR.versusTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

                          [2021] 6 S.C.R. 249                             249


                       RAMGOPAL & ANR.                                    A
                                  v.
              THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012)
                       SEPTEMBER 29, 2021                                 B
         [N. V. RAMANA, CJI AND SURYA KANT, J.]
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.482 and 320 –
Quashing of criminal prosecution – On basis of compromise/
settlement between the parties – Jurisdiction within framework of
                                                                          C
s.320 CrPC vis-à-vis powers vested in High Court u/s.482 CrPC
or in Supreme Court u/Art. 142 of the Constitution – Held: Limited
jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of s.320
CrPC is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the
High Court vested in it u/s.482 CrPC – As opposed to s.320 CrPC
where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the          D
parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory
framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court
u/s.482 CrPC or vested in Supreme Court u/Art. 142 of the
Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of s.320
CrPC – Nonetheless, such powers of wide amplitude ought to be
exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings,      E
bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the the
society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature
of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct
of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the
purported offence and/or other relevant considerations –                  F
Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 142.
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing of
criminal prosecution – On basis of compromise/settlement between
the parties – Scope of powers exercisable by High Court u/s.482
CrPC – Held: High Court having regard to the nature of the                G
offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute
and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent
powers u/s.482 CrPC, even if the offences are non-compoundable
– Criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where
                                                                          H
                                 249
250            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     the offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature, can be
      annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been
      concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction –
      However, the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the
      High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping
      in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in
B     which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard
      to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct
      of the accused, before and after the incidence.
             Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 142 – Quashing of
      criminal prosecution – Nature of powers vested in Supreme Court
C     u/Art. 142 – Held: Plenary jurisdiction of Supreme Court to impart
      complete justice u/Art.142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted
      by ordinary statutory provisions – Even in absence of an express
      provision akin to s.482 CrPC conferring powers on the Supreme
      Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, jurisdiction
D     exercisable u/Art. 142 embraces the Supreme Court with scopious
      powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure
      complete justice – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482.
            Disposing of the appeals, the Court
             HELD:1. True it is that offences which are ‘non-
E     compoundable’ cannot be compounded by a criminal court in
      purported exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any
      such attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition
      and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive
      domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in
      the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider
F
      interpretation and include such offences in the docket of
      ‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out
      as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to
      compound an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C.
      is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High
G     Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court,
      keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case
      and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid
      to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure
      the ends of justice. [Para 11][260-D-F]

H
 RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                        251


      2. The High Court having regard to the nature of the             A
offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their
dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification
of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise
of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the
offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably
evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body      B
of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to
ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker
with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal
justice system.[Para 12][260-F-H]
      3.1. Criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences         C
or where the offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature,
can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been
concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction.
Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering
justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject     D
to lawful exceptions. The cases where compromise is struck
post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such
discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances
surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise
has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and
seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused,        E
before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising
the extra-ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be
to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line
constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial
justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under           F
Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which
in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead
to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous
offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit
ought to be extended.[Para 13][261-A-D]
                                                                       G
      3.2. Grave or serious offences or offences which involve
moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral
fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy,
cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for
such offences have the potential to impact the society at large.
Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would            H
252           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also
      accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional
      offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats,
      social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. [Para 14][261-
      E-F]
B            4. Given these settled parameters, the order of the High
      Court of Madhya Pradesh culminating into Criminal Appeal No.
      1489 of 2012, to the extent it holds that the High Court does
      not have power to compound a non-compoundable offence, is in
      ignorance of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and
      is, thus, unsustainable. However, the judgment and order of the
C     High Court of Karnataka, giving rise to Criminal Appeal No.
      1488 of 2012 cannot be faulted with on this count for the reason
      that the parties did not bring any compromise/settlement to the
      notice of the High Court. [Para 15][261-G-H; 262-A]
             5. The plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete
D     justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or
      restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. Even in the absence
      of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring
      powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal
      proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of
      the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to
E     quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete
      justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the
      overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice
      system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of
      maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of
      placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.
F     [Para 18][264-F-H]
             6. As opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is
      squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in
      respect of off ences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory
      framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High
G     Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under
      Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the
      metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, such
      powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the
      context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i)
      Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society;
H     (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of
 RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                       253


compromise between the accused and the victim; &(iv) Conduct          A
of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the
purported offence and/or other relevant considerations. [Para 19]
[265-A-C]
      7. Having appraised the afore-stated para-meters and
weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant
                                                                      B
two appeals, this Court is inclined to invoke powers under
Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently
set aside the conviction in both the appeals, for the following
reasons:
      Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be
categorized as purely personal or having overtones of criminal        C
proceedings of private nature;
      Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the
Appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their
mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious
nature that quashing of which would override public interest;         D
      Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is
immaterial that the trial against the Appellants had been
concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed;
      Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any
coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried
                                                                      E
their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s);
      Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way
back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing
on record to evince that either before or after the purported
compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the
parties;                                                              F
      Sixthly, since the Appellants and the complainant(s) are
residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the
quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony,
and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget
and forgive any ill-will and have no vengeance against each other;    G
and
      Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice
system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable
settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the
Appellants; more so looking at their present age.[Para 20][265-
D-H; 266-A-B]                                                         H
254            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A           Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 :
            [2012] 8 SCR 753 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi
            Narayan & Ors. (2019) 5 SCC 688: [2019] 2 SCR
            864 ; Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.
            (2014) 6 SCC 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012 ; Monica
            Kumar & Anr. v. State of U.P. (2008) 8 SCC 781 :
B
            [2008] 9 SCR 943 ; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of
            India (2014) 2 SCC 532: [2013] 17 SCR 1099 ; and
            Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India
            (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795 – relied on.
            Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. v. Union of India
C           & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 584: [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 251-
            followed.
                            Case Law Reference
      [2012] 8 SCR 753                  relied on            Paras 6
D     [2019] 2 SCR 864                  relied on            Para 10
      [2014] 4 SCR 1012                 relied on            Para 13
      [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 251          followed              Para 16
      [2008] 9 SCR 943                  relied on            Para 17
E     [2013] 17 SCR 1099                relied on            Para 17
      [1998] 2 SCR 795                  relied on            Para 17
           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No.1489 of 2012.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.2009 of the High
F
      Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench at Gwalior in Criminal
      Review No.1010 of 2006
            With
            Criminal Appeal No.1488 of 2012.
G           R. Anand Padmanabhan, Debarati Sadhu, Shashi Bhushan
      Kumar, Rajesh Srivastava, Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Advs. for the
      Appellants.
            Shubhranshu Padhi, Ashish Yadav, Rakshit Jain, Vishan Banshal,
      Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Palav Agarwal, Ashutosh Kumar, Ms.
H     Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Advs. for the Respondent.
 RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                               255


       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                             A
       SURYA KANT, J.
       1. These two Criminal Appeals, No. 1489 of 2012 emanating from
the judgment and order dated 27th November, 2009 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench and No. 1488 of 2012 arising out
judgment and order dated 9th January, 2009 passed by the High Court           B
of Karnataka, though, pertain to two different and distinct occurrences,
but are proposed to be disposed of by way of a common order as the
short question of law involved in both these appeals is identical.
       BRIEF FACTS OF CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1489 OF
2012                                                                          C

       2. The prosecution version, arising out of FIR dated 3rd November
2000, Police Station Ambah, Morena, M.P. is that on account of
certain monetary dispute, the Appellants abused and assaulted
Padam Singh (Complainant). Appellant No.1 is alleged to have struck
the Complainant with a pharsa, which resultantly cut off the little           D
finger of his left hand. Appellant No.2 also struck lathi blows on
the body of the Complainant. Appellants were thereafter committed
for trial under Sections 294, 323 and 326 read with 34 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, ‘IPC’) and Section 3 of the Prevention
of Atrocities (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1989. Upon          E
analyzing the evidence, the Learned Judicial Magistrate(FC), Ambah,
convicted the Appellants under Sections 294, 323 and 326 read
with 34 IPC with a maximum sentence of three years under Section
326 read with 34 IPC. They were acquitted of the remaining charges.
       3. The Appellants assailed their conviction before the Court of        F
Additional Sessions Judge, Ambah. During the pendency of that Appeal,
the Appellants and the Complainant reconciled their difference(s) and
a compromise ensued between them on 13th September 2006. Learned
Sessions Judge took notice of the settlement, moved jointly by the parties,
and compounded the offences under Sections 294 and 323 read with
                                                                              G
34 IPC, acquitting the Appellants of the same. The Court, nevertheless,
maintained their conviction under Section 326 read with 34 IPC, since
the said offence is ‘non-compoundable’ within the scheme of Section
320 Cr.P.C. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, taking into consideration
the settlement between the parties, reduced the quantum of sentence
from Rigorous Imprisonment of three years to one year. Still aggrieved,       H
256            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     the Appellants preferred a Criminal Revision before the High Court of
      Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench, challenging their conviction and
      sentence. Alternatively, they sought compounding of offence under
      Section 326 IPC in light of the compromise. However, such a prayer
      was not acceded to by the High Court, re-iterating that the offence is
      ‘non-compoundable’. The High Court, even so, further reduced the
B
      duration of imprisonment to the period already undergone by the
      Appellants. The Appellants are now before this Court, seeking
      compounding of their Actus Reus under Section 326 IPC in view of
      the settlement between parties.
             BRIEF FACTS OF CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1488 OF
C     2012
             4. The incident is charted from FIR No. 24 of 1995, Police Station
      Thirthahalli, Shimoga, Karnataka, dated 28th January 1995. As per
      the allegations, the Appellants and the other accused persons, all of
      whom belong to the same family, were aggrieved against the
D     Complainant as he had imparted some inculpatory information to the
      Forest Department officials, which had caused financial loss to them.
      The disgruntled Appellants lured the Complainant to their house and
      assaulted him with weapons after tying his hands to a window. It is
      further alleged that Accused Nos. 5 to 7 instigated the Appellants to
      assault the Complainant, besides kicking him with fists and legs. The
E
      Complainant’s family members found him semi-conscious lying in a
      pit near their house.
             5. The Appellants, together with Accused Nos. 5 and 7 were tried
      and convicted under Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 342, 324 and 326 read
      with 149 IPC and the maximum sentence awarded to them was two
F     years simple imprisonment under Section 326 IPC. The trial against
      Accused No. 6 was split after filing of the chargesheet, since he
      remained absconding. The Appellants along with the co-accused,
      approached the High Court of Karnataka, challenging their conviction
      and sentence. The High Court acquitted Accused Nos. 5 & 7 finding
G     insufficient evidence to sustain their involvement in the subject crime,
      but maintained the conviction and sentence qua the Appellants. In this
      case as well, the parties entered into a compromise. The said
      compromise was, however, not placed on record before the Trial Court
      or the High Court. The Appellants are now seeking ‘compounding of
      the offences’ and their consequential acquittal on the basis of the
H     compromise reached between them and the Complainant-victim.
    RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                         257
                    [SURYA KANT, J.]

      6. When both these appeals came up for hearing, a                    A
two-Judge Bench of this Court, vide common order dated 21 st
September 2012 granted leave to appeal. The Bench further directed
the appeals to be listed after the disposal of reference made in Gian
Singh vs. State of Punjab1, where a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, at
that point in time, was considering the issue as to whether
                                                                           B
‘non-compoundable’ offences can be ‘compounded’ by a Court or in
the alternative, whether the High Court in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could quash non-compoundable
offences, based on a compromise/settlement arrived at between the
accused and the victim-complainant, and if so, under what circumstances.
       7. The Appellants, in both the appeals, thus seek the Court to      C
invoke powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete
justice to them.
         ANALYSIS:
       8. We have heard learned Counsels for the Appellants and the        D
State(s) at a considerable length. The questions of law concerning the
power of a High Court to quash proceedings emanating from non-
compoundable offences which have no impact or depraving effect
on the society at large, on the basis of a compromise between the
accused and the victim-complainant, are no longer res integra and
the same have been authoritatively settled by this Court in affirmative.   E
Learned Counsel for the Appellants and Complainant(s) in both the
appeals have, therefore, heavily counted on the compromise/
settlement between the parties and seek quashing of the criminal
prosecution in its entirety, Learned State Counsel(s) without
controverting the factum of compromise, vehemently opposed such a          F
recourse and asserted that no substantial question of law is involved in
these appeals.
      9. Before scrutinizing the facts of these cases and rephrasing
the scope of powers exercisable by a High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C., it would be apropos to illuminate the following principles laid   G
down by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh (Supra) case:
         “61. …the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
         proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
         inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the
1
    (2012) 10 SCC 303                                                      H
258     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     power given to a criminal court for compounding the
      offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is
      of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be
      exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such
      power viz. :
B     (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of
      the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the
      criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised
      where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute
      would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
      and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise
C     of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
      the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
      offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
      dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the
      victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled
D     the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and
      have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise
      between the victim and the offender in relation to the
      offences under special statutes like the Prevention of
      Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
      servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot
E     provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings
      involving such offences. But the criminal cases having
      overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on
      a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly
      the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile,
F     civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences
      arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
      disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in
      nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In
      this category of cases, the High Court may quash the
      criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the
G     compromise between the offender and the victim, the
      possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation
      of the criminal case would put the accused to great
      oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
      caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full
H     and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
    RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                        259
                    [SURYA KANT, J.]

         other words, the High Court must consider whether it would       A
         be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue
         with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
         proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law
         despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
         the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,
                                                                          B
         it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and
         if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative,
         the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash
         the criminal proceeding.”
                                                  (Emphasis Applied)
                                                                          C
      10. The compendium of these broad fundamentals structured
in more than one judicial precedent, has been recapitulated by another
3-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi
Narayan & Ors.2 elaborating:
             “(1) That the power conferred under Section 482 of the       D
                  Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-
                  compoundable offences under Section 320 of the
                  Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and
                  predominantly the civil character, particularly those
                  arising out of commercial transactions or arising out
                  of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and      E
                  when the parties have resolved the entire dispute
                  amongst themselves;
              (2) Such power is not to be exercised in those
                  prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
                  offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,   F
                  rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
                  nature and have a serious impact on society;
              (3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the
                  offences under the special statutes like the
                  Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences            G
                  committed by public servants while working in that
                  capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis
                  of compromise between the victim and the offender;

2
    (2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15                                                H
260            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A                (4) xxx    xxx   xxx
                 (5) While exercising the power under Section 482 of the
                     Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect
                     of non-compoundable offences, which are private in
                     nature and do not have a serious impact on society,
B                    on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise
                     between the victim and the offender, the High Court
                     is required to consider the antecedents of the
                     accused; the conduct of the accused, namely,
                     whether the accused was absconding and why he
                     was absconding, how he had managed with the
C                    complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”
                                                        (Emphasis Applied)
             11. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannot
      be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers
D     under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court would amount
      to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is
      the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent
      ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its
      wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of
      ‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out as
E     non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound
      an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an
      embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in
      it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the
      peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons
F     can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process
      of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.
             12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of
      the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute
      and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
G     proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent
      powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-
      compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential
      effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter
      adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes
      unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the
H     administration of criminal justice system.
    RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                            261
                    [SURYA KANT, J.]

       13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving               A
non-heinous offences or where the offences are pre-dominantly of a
private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has
already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction.
Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal
method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions.
                                                                              B
It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck
post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with
rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident,
the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due
regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct
of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for            C
exercising the extra-ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would
be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line
constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A
restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and
                                                                              D
circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the
other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against
perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously
observed by this Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of
Punjab & Ors.3 and Laxmi Narayan (Supra).
       14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which        E
involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral
fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot
be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences
have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable
offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal          F
to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous
habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through
duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well
said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.”
      15. Given these settled parameters, the order of the High Court         G
of Madhya Pradesh culminating into Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of
2012, to the extent it holds that the High Court does not have power to
compound a non-compoundable offence, is in ignorance of its inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and is, thus, unsustainable. However,
3
    (2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29                                                    H
262               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     the judgment and order dated 9th January, 2009 of the High Court of
      Karnataka, giving rise to Criminal Appeal No. 1488 of 2012 cannot be
      faulted with on this count for the reason that the parties did not bring
      any compromise/settlement to the notice of the High Court.
             16. Let us now delve into the nature of powers vested in this
B     Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, with an intent to do complete
      justice. It would be ad rem to outrightly cite the Constitution Bench
      decision in Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. vs. Union of India
      & Ors.4, where this Court has ruled as follows:
               “83. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in
C              the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court
               under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are
               matters of serious public importance. The proposition that a
               provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance
               of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit
               the powers of the apex Court under Article 142(1) is unsound
D              and erroneous. In both Garg [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885,
               899-900 : AIR 1963 SC 996] as well as Antulay cases
               [(1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372] the point was one
               of violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional
               rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency with
E              statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those cases
               as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the
               breach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri Nariman
               that the power of the Court under Article 142 insofar as
               quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not
               exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 CrPC or all of them
F              put together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely
               different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or
               limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot,
               ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the
               constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions
G              or limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect
               the scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature
               and status of the authority or the court on which
               conferment of powers — limited in some appropriate way
               — is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect
      4
H         (1991) 4 SCC 584, 83
    RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                        263
                    [SURYA KANT, J.]

       or be based on any fundamental considerations of public            A
       policy. Sri Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to
       Garg case [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885, 899-900 : AIR 1963 SC
       996] , said that limitation on the powers under Article 142
       arising from “inconsistency with express statutory provisions
       of substantive law” must really mean and be understood as
                                                                          B
       some express prohibition contained in any substantive
       statutory law. He suggested that if the expression
       ‘prohibition’ is read in place of ‘provision’ that would perhaps
       convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such
       prohibition should also be shown to be based on some
       underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy         C
       and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme
       or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that
       powers under Article 142 are subject to such express
       statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that
       statutory provisions override a constitutional provision.
                                                                          D
       Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in
       exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the
       needs of “complete justice” of a cause or matter, the apex
       Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any
       substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental
       principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its       E
       power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not
       relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but only
       to what is or is not ‘complete justice’ of a cause or matter
       and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise
       of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity
                                                                          F
       can arise.”
                                                 (Emphasis Applied)
       17. The afore-quoted precept has been consistently followed by
this Court in numerous subsequent decisions, including in Monica
Kumar & Anr. vs. State of U.P.5, Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Union             G
of India6 and Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India 7,
inter-alia, reiterating that:

5
  (2008) 8 SCC 781, ¶ 45
6
  (2014) 2 SCC 532, ¶ 43
7
  (1998) 4 SCC 409, ¶ 47                                                  H
264            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A           “47. The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142
            of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are
            complementary to those powers which are specifically
            conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not
            limited by those statutes. These powers also exist
B           independent of the statutes with a view to do complete
            justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide
            amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers.
            This power exists as a separate and independent basis of
            jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon the
            foundation and the basis for its exercise may be put on
C
            a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent
            injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete
            justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus,
            the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon
            as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and
D           in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of
            law, to do complete justice between the parties, while
            administering justice according to law. There is no doubt that
            it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free
            from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable
E           weapon in the hands of the Court to prevent “clogging or
            obstruction of the stream of justice”…”
                                                          (Emphasis Applied)
             18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that the plenary jurisdiction
      of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso
F
      facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also
      noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to
      Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to
      abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable
      under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious
G     powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete
      justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching
      objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded
      on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective
      and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at
H     his reformation.
 RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                              265
                 [SURYA KANT, J.]

       19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320            A
Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between
the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory
framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section          B
320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide
amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing
criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the
offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury,
if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and
the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after        C
the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant
considerations.
      20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing
upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before
us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the         D
criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both
the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
      Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be
categorized as purely personal or having overtones of criminal
proceedings of private nature;                                               E

      Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the Appellants
have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or
commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of
which would override public interest;
                                                                             F
       Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is
immaterial that the trial against the Appellants had been concluded or
their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed;
      Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion
or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and   G
wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s);
       Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back
in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to
evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any
untoward incident transpired between the parties;                            H
266            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A            Sixthly, since the Appellants and the complainant(s) are
      residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the
      quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and
      fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive
      any ill-will and have no vengeance against each other; and
B           Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system
      would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement
      between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the Appellants; more
      so looking at their present age.
            CONCLUSION:
C           CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1489 OF 2012
             21. Consequently, and for the reasons stated above, read with
      the settlement dated 13th September 2006, we find it appropriate to
      invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and quash the
      criminal proceedings in the aforesaid case. As a sequel thereto, all
D     offences emanating out of the FIR leading to Criminal Appeal No. 1489
      of 2012 stand annulled, and the judgment and orders passed by the trial
      court, appellate court and the High Court are set aside. Resultantly, the
      Appellants shall be deemed to have been acquitted of the charged
      offences for all intents and purposes.
E           CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1488 OF 2012
             22. In so far as this appeal is concerned, we note that even
      though the Learned Counsel(s) for the Appellants and the
      Complainant-victim have jointly stated before this Court that the parties
      have settled their dispute(s), but no formal settlement has either been
F     brought on record nor has it been even clarified that such a deed of
      settlement has been recorded. Admittedly, the factum of compromise/
      settlement between the parties has been raised for the first time before
      this Court. In the absence of any proof of settlement, we find ourselves
      hard-pressed to take cognizance of the asseverated compromise. We,
      therefore, direct both the Appellants as well as the complainant-victim
G
      to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimoga and submit their
      settlement, if any, in writing within a period of three months. The
      C.J.M. shall send a Report to this Court immediately, recording his
      satisfaction with regard to the genuineness of the compromise. In the
      event, the said Report would reflect a bona-fide settlement between
H     the parties, the present appeal shall also be deemed to have been disposed
 RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                                267
                 [SURYA KANT, J.]

of in same terms as Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012, referred                 A
to above. Further, the incontrovertible corollary in such event would
be that the Appellants shall be treated to have been acquitted of all the
charged offences for all intents and purposes. On the other hand, if no
formal settlement is placed before C.J.M., Shimoga within the stipulated
period or the Report reflects to the contrary, the criminal appeal shall
                                                                               B
stand as dismissed as no other substantial question of law is raised or
involved in this appeal.
       23. Both the Criminal Appeals are disposed of in above terms.


Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                    Appeals disposed of.   C




                                                                               D




                                                                               E




                                                                               F




                                                                               G




                                                                               H