Holding

A cryptic telephonic message is not an FIR; the statement recorded by the investigating officer after reaching the hospital constitutes the FIR and is admissible.

Summary

The appellant was acquitted by the trial court of murder (Sec. 302 IPC) but was convicted on appeal by the Gujarat High Court. The conviction rested on the statement of the deceased's brother (PW6) recorded by the investigating officer after a telephonic message about the incident was received. The appellant challenged the admissibility of that statement, arguing that the telephonic note in the police station's diary, which did not name any accused, was the FIR and therefore the subsequent statement could not be treated as an FIR. The Supreme Court held that a cryptic telephonic message is not an FIR under Sec. 154 CrPC; only when the officer records a detailed statement after reaching the scene does it become an FIR, and such a statement is admissible. Consequently, the High Court’s conviction was upheld and the appellant's appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a cryptic telephonic message to the police constitutes a First Information Report under Sec. 154 of the CrPC.
Whether a statement recorded by the investigating officer after receiving such a telephonic message can be treated as an FIR or merely as evidence under Sec. 162 of the CrPC.
Whether the trial court's acquittal should be set aside in view of the admissibility of the statement.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 162
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 325, s. 34

Subjects

First Information Reporttelephonic informationSection 154 CrPCSection 162 CrPCcognizable offenceevidence admissibilityappealconviction

Judgment

RAMSINH BAVAII JADEJA A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT

MARCH 1, 1994

(K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.] B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 154 and 162-First Infor-
mation Report-Commission of cognizable offence-Cryptic information
given on telephone-IVhether and when could be taken as First Information
Report of the occumnce. C

The appellant and two others were tried for offences punishable
under Sections 302, 302 r/w 34 and 325 IPC. The Trial Court gave benefit
of doubt to the accused and acquitted them. On appeal by the State, the
High Court comicted the appellant for an offence under Section 302 and
sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life. However, it did not D
interfere with the order of acquittal against the two co-accused.

The convicted accused preferred the present appeal contending that
the message noted in the telephone book maintained at the Police Station
which was treated as First Information Report did not mention the names E
of the accused, and as such the evidence of the deceased's brother that it
was the appellant who gave the knife blow in the chest of the victim should
not have been accepted.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court
F
HELD : 1. When the information of a cognizable offence has been
given on telephone, and the message is cryptic in nature and the officer
in-charge proceeds to the place of occurrence on the basis of that infor-
mation to find out the details of the nature of the offence itself, then it
cannot be said that the information, which had been received by him on
telephone, shall be deemed to be First Information Report. The object and G
purpose of giving such telephonic message is not to lodge the First Infor·
mation Report, but to request the officer-in-charge of the police station to
reach the place of occurrence. On the other hand, if the information given
on telephone is not cryptic and on basis of that information, the Officer
in-charge, is prima facie satisfied about the commission of a cognizable H
239
I

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 2 S.C.R.

A offence and he proceeds from the police station after recording such l
information, to investigate such u!Tence then any statement made by any
person in respect of the said offence including about the participants, shall
be deemed to be a statement made by a person to the police officer '111 the
course of investigation', covered by Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure
B Code. That statement can be treated as First Information Report. But any
telephonic information about commission of a cognizable offence Irrespec-
tive of the nature and details of such Information cannot be treated as
First Information Report. [243-G, H; 244-A-C)

Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1970) SC 1566 and Soma Bhai
C v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1975) SC 1453, relied on.
2. In the Instant case, the Investigating Officer having received the
telephonic message, immediately reached the hospit11l and he Drst
recorded the statement of PW6; the brother of the deceased. He sent the
said statement to the city police station, for registering a ease. Thereafter
D he held the inquest on the dead body of the deceased; sent the dead body
of the deceased for postmortem; prepared the injury rep•1rt iu respect of
the Injuries on the person of PW6 and sent him for medical examination
and treatment. Then he went to the scene of occurrence and collected
blood-stained crust of cement plaster and examined witm,sses. Under the
E circumstances the statement of PW6, which was recorded by the lnvestigat·
ing Officer, after reaching the hospital should have been treated as the
First Information Report. There is no dispute, that in that statement the
name of the appellant was mentioned by I'W6 and details of the occurrence
as disclosed by him in Court was stated by him. (245-D·f I

F 3. As such the Courts below were in error in treating the cryptic
message given on telephone by the Head Constable to the office in charge,
as First l!>formation Report. [245·H; 246-A)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
G 563 of 1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.4.80 of the Gujarat High
Court in Crl. A. No. 251 of 1978.

Yashank Adhyaru, Mrs. B.K. Brar and P.H. Parekh for the Appel-
H lant.
R.B.JADEJA v. STATE OF GUJARAT (N.P.SJNGH,J.] 241

Anip Sachthey and B.N. Babu for the Respondent. A

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.P. SINGH, J. 1. The appellant, who had been acquitted, by the
Trial Court, for an offence under Section 302 of the Pana! Code, has been B
convicted by the High Court for the said offence and sentenced to im-
prisomnent for life, on an appeal filed on behalf of the State.

The prosecution case is that on 7.5.1977 at about 5.30 p.m. Sanat
Kumar (PW6) the informant, had gone to the Ambar Talkies, along with
his brother, Sharad Kumar (deceased) for the evening show. Both the C
brothers took their cycles to the cycle stand of the appellant. PW6 was
asked to pay 40 paise as the charge for keeping _the cycles in the stand.
Sharad Kumar (deceased), the brother of PW6, said that in other theatres
only 15 paise per cycle was being charged as such why they were being
asked pay 20 paise per cycle. fJ! order to avoid a quarre~ PW6 said his D
brother, sharad Kumar, that they shall not keep the cycles at the said stand.
They took out their cycles from the stand and placed them in charge of a
hotel keeper, just on the opposite side of the theatre. As they were going
inside the cinema ha!~ the appellant called them and_ asked them as to why
they had not kept the cycles al his stand, whereupon PW6, told the
appellant that they did not want to have a quarrel with him. The appellant E
asked PW6 and his brother to get out of the compound. Sharad Kumar
(deceased) told the appellant that as they had purchased the tickets for the
show, why they should go out of the cinema hall. The appellant gave a slap
to Sharad Kn mar (deceased). At that very moment, the two co-accused
(since acquitted) came there. The appellant caught hold of the band of F
PW6, twisted it, gave a first blow on his ribs. Thereafter a scuffle took
place. The appellant took out a knife and gave a knife blow on the left
chest of the Sbarad Kumar, who foll down. The accused persons ran away.
PW6 tried to lift bis brother Sbarad Kumar and tried to take him inside
the Ambar Talkies, but be could not lift him. He left him on the steps of
the Amber Talkies and went into the office and tried to contact the police G
by telephone. The persons present in the office did not permit him to talk
' on the telephone. Then be called a rickshaw and took his brother in
rickshaw to the 1.rwin Hospital, Jamnagar. The doctor who examined bis
brother, declared him to be dead. PW6 was shocked. He sat 011 the bench
of the hospital. Head Constable, Gopinatb (PW19), who was on duty at the H
t

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994j 2 S.C,R.

A Irwin Hospital, informaed the P.S.I. Shimpi by telephone, that a fight had •
taken place in the Amber Talkies and the dead body of one Sharad Kumar
had been brought to the hospital. P.S.I. Shimpi (PW21) having received the
telephonic message aforesaid at abourt 6.50 p.m. rushed to the Irwin
Hospital and recorded first the statement of PW6 and sent the same to the
city police station for registeration of a case. Thereafter, he held inquest
B
on the dead body of the deceased and prepared an inquest report. Then
he sent the dead body,. for postmortem examination. He also prepared an
injury report in respect of the injuries on the person of PW6 and sent him
for medical examination and treatment to the hospital. Then, the Inves-
tigating Officer (PW21 ), went to the scene of occurrence and prepared a
c panchnama of the place of occurrerence. He took possession of chapple
of the deceased, blood-stained crust of cement pla,,ter and recorded the
statement of other witnesses. On 8.5.1977, the Investigating Officer, ar-
rested the appellant. The appellant expressed his willingness to produce
the knife used in the commission of an offence. He took the Investigating
D Officer and the panch witnesses to his house and took out the knife from
the courtyard of his house. ·

After investigation, charges were laid against the appellant and two
others for offences punishable under Sections 302, .l02 read with Section
34 and 325 of the Penal Code. The Trial Court gave benefit of doubt to
E the accused persons and acquitted them of the charges levelled against
them including against the appellant. The High Court on appeal being filed
on behalf of the State did not inte,fere with the order of acquittal against
the two co-accused persons but set aside the order of acquittal passed
against the appellant and convicted him for an offence under Section 302
F and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life.

The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, pointed
out that at about 6.50 p.m., the head Constable, Gopinath (PWI9), in-
formed the Sub-Inspector Shimpi (PW21) on telcp~one that a fight had
taken place in the Ambar Talkies and the dead body of one Sharad Kumar
G had been brought to the hospital; that message was noted down by PW2 I
··in his telephone book (exhibit 58), in which names of the accused persons
had not been mentioned. As that entry in telephone book has been treated
as First Information Report by the Sessions Judge as well by the High
Court, the evidence of PW6 in Court that it was the appellant, who gave
H the knife blow in the chest of the victim should not h\'c been accepted.
R.B.JADFJA v. STATE OF GUJARAT [N.P.SINGH,J.J 2_43

Accordirg to the learned counsel, if PW6 had disclosed the names of the A
appellant and other two co-accused persons to the Head Constable, in
normal course he should have also mentioned that fact in his telephonic
message.

From the judgments of the Sessions judge and the High Court, it
appears that 1t about 6.30 p.m., the Head Constable (PW19) was informed
B
by the Chief Medical Officer of the Hospital that in a fight one Sharad
Kumar had died and his body had been brought to the hospital. He,
accordingly, informed the P.S.I. Shimpi (PW21) by telephone, who having
received the said message noted down the same in the telephone book
(Exhibit 58) before leaving the police station. Head Constable (PW19) has C
denied that be had met PW6 before he telephoned to the police station.
PW6 has al.•o stated that neither he had any occasion to meet the Head
Constable (PW19) at the hospital nor he had given aoy statement in respect
of the occurrence to the said Head Constable.

D
Now the question which has to be examined is as to whether the
cryptic information given on telephone by Head Constable can be held to
be the First Information Report of the occurrence. Section 154 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') requires an
officer in charge of a police station to reduce to writing every information
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to such E
officer. It further requies that such information, which has been reduced
to writing shall be read over to the informaot aod the information reduced
... to writing or given in writing by the person concerned shall be signed by
the person giving it. Section 2(h) defines investigation to include all the
proceeding.• under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a F
police officer or by aoy other person (other thao a Magistrate), who is
authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf.

From time to time, controversy has been raised, as to at what stage
the investigation commences. That has to be considered and examined on
the facts of each case, especially, when the information of a cognizable G
offence has been given on telephone. If the telephonic message is cryptic
ir. nature and the officer in charge, proceeds to the place of occ'ilrrence on
basis of that information to find out the details of the nature of the offence
itself, then it cannot be said that the information, which had been received
by him on telephone, shall be deemed to be First Information Report. The H
I
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994J 2 S.C.R.

A object and purpose of giving such telephonic message is nm lo !"dge the
First Information Report, but to request the officer in charge of the police
station to reach the place of oc:currence. On the other hand, if the infor-
mation given on telephone is not cryptic and on basis of that information,
the officer in charge, is prima facie satislicd about the commission of a
cognizable offence and he proceeds from the police station after recording
B such information, to investigate such offence then any statement made by
any person in res1>ect of the said offence including about the participants,
shall be deemed to be a statement made by a person to the police officer
"in the course of investigation", covered by Section 162 of the Code. 'fhat
statement can not be treated\ as First Information Report. But any
C telephonic information about commi;oion of a cognizable offence irrespec-
tive of the nature and details of such information cannot be treated as First
Information Report. This can be illustrated. in a busy market place, a
murder is committed. Any person in the market, including one of the shop
owners, telephones to the near1:st police station, informing the officer in
D charge, about the murder, without knowing the deiails of the murder, the
accused or the victim. On basis of that information, the officer in charge,
reaches the place where the offence is alleged to have been committed.
Can it be said that before leaving the police station, he has recorded the
Yust Information Report ? In some cases the information given may be
that a person has been shot at or stabbed. it cannot be said that in such a
E situation, the moment the offie<:r in charge leaves the police station, the
investigation has commenced. In. normal course, he has fast to find out the
person who can give the details of the offence, before such officer is
expected to collect the evidence in respect of the said offence. •

F In the case of Tapinder Singh v. Srate of Punjab, AIR (1970) SC 1566,
it was said by this Court, that anonymous telephone message at police
station that firing had taken place at a tmci stand; does not by itself clothe
it with character of first information report, merely because the said
information was first in point of time and the said information had been
recorded in the daily diary of the police station, by the police officer
G responding to the telephone call. Again in the case of Soma Bhai v. State ·
of Gujarat, AIR (1975) SC 1453, in respect of an information given to. the
police station by telephone, is was held :-
(

"The message given to the Surat Police Station was too cryptic
H to constitute a first information report within the meaning of Sec.
R.B.JADFJA v. STATE OF GUJARAT fN.P.SINGH,J.] 245

154 of the Code and was meant to be only for the purpose of A
getting further instructions. Furthermore, the facts narrated to the
P.S.I. Patel which was reduced into writing a few minutes later
undoubtedly constituted the first information report in point of
time made to the police in which necessary facts were given. in
these circumstances, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that B
the telephonic message to the Police Station at Surat cannot
constit Jte the F.1.R. and the High Court was in error in treating
the F.1.R. lodged in the present case as inadmissible in evidence."
•
Recently, in the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee @ Dluma v. State of West
Bengal, J.T. (1994) 1 SC 33, it was said the cryptic telephonic messag~ C
received at the police station from the father of the deceased had only
made police agency run to the place of occurrence aild to record the
statement of the mother of the deceased; the investigation commenced .
thereafter.
D
It is not in dispute that the Investigation Officer (PW21), having
received the telephonic message, immediately reached the hospital and he
first recorded the statement of PW6. He sent the said statement to the city
police station, for registering a case. Thereafter he held the inquest on the
dead body of the deceased; sent the dead body of the deceased for
postmortem; prepared the injury report in respect of the injuries on the E
person of PW6 and sent him for medical examination and treatment. Then
he went to the scene of occurrence and collected blood stained crust of
cement plaster and examined witnesses. Under the circumstances men-
tioned above the statement of PW6, which was recorded by the Investigat-
ing Officer, after reaching the hospital should have been treated as the First F
Information Report. There is no dispute, that in that statement the name
of the_ appellant was mentioned by PW6 and details of the occurrence as
disclosed by him in Court was stated by him. This is apparent because
during the cross examination of PW6, his attention has not been drawn to
his statement recorded by PW21, saying that he did not name the appellant G
as the assailant of his brother during his statement to the Investigating
Officer. As such it has to be held that PW6 immediately after the occur-
rence, made a statement before the Investigation Officer (PW21) and
named the appellant, as the person who gave a knife blow in the chest of
his brother Sharad Kumar (deceased). According to us, the Sessions Judge
as well as the High Court were in error in teating the cryptic message given H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.
'
A on telephone by the Head Constable (PW19) to the officer in charge, as
First Information Report.

PW6 has asserted throughout that he knew the appellant by name
and face. He has been fully corroborated by PWll, who brought the victim
Sharad Kumar and PW6 on his rickshaw from the Ambar Talkies to the
B hospital. PWll was known to PW6 from before. He has stated that PW6
had told on the way to the hospital that the appe II ant had inflicted a knife
blow to his brother, who was in serious condition. The presence of PW6
at the time of the occurrence cannot be disputed because he has also
'
suffered a fracture at the same occurrence, which had been proved by the
C orthopadic surgeon (PW5). The appellant ' 'so produced the knife during
the investigation before PW21, by which he had stabbed sharad Kum&r. On
behalf of the appellant no motive on the part of PW6 has been suggested
for falsely naming the appellant as the assailant of his brother.

The High Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was
D perfectly justified, in setting aside the acquittal of the appellant by the
Sessions Judge. We find no reason to interfere with the said judgment of
the High Court. Accordingly the appeal filed on behalf of the appellant is
dismissed. It appears, the appellant had been enlarged on bail by this
Court. Now he should be taken in custody to serve out the remairung
period of his sentence.

G.N. Appeal dismissed.