RAMYASH @ LAL BAHADURversusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER ETC. ETC
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 544
- Decided
- 23 April 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
A court cannot alter its substantive judgment, such as converting a murder conviction to culpable homicide, under Section 362 CrPC; only clerical or arithmetical errors may be corrected.
Summary
The complainant Ramyash lodged a FIR alleging that the accused Bhupendra Singh, Moti Lal and Prahlad assaulted his family, resulting in the death of his father. The trial court convicted the accused under Sections 302, 323, 324 (with 34) and other offences, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The Allahabad High Court initially upheld this conviction, but later, on a correction application under Section 362 CrPC, altered its own judgment, converting the murder conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part II) and reducing the sentences. The Supreme Court examined whether such alteration was permissible, holding that Section 362 allows correction only of clerical or arithmetical errors and does not empower a court to revisit substantive findings. It found the High Court’s modification to be a substantive change, not a clerical error, and therefore invalid. Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the impugned judgment, allowed the complainant’s appeals and dismissed the accused’s separate appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether a court may alter its earlier judgment by converting a conviction under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC under the correction provision of Section 362 CrPC.
- Whether the High Court’s modification of its judgment can be characterized as a correction of a clerical or arithmetical error.
- The scope of the inherent powers of a court vis‑à‑vis the statutory prohibition in Section 362 CrPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 362
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304 Part II, s. 323, s. 324, s. 34, s. 452, s. 504, s. 506
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred in allowing the Correction Application filed under Section 362, CrPC by the accused persons and modifying its earlier judgment by converting the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part Code, 1973 – s.362 – Court not to alter judgment – Accused were convicted by the trial court u/ss.302, 323 r/w 34, 452, 504, 506 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life – High Court dismissing the criminal appeals thereagainst affirmed the conviction – However,
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1630 : 2025 INSC 544
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur
v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1153-55 of 2021)
23 April 2025
[B.R. Gavai* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in allowing the Correction Application
filed under Section 362, CrPC by the accused persons and
modifying its earlier judgment by converting the conviction under
Section 302 to Section 304 Part II, IPC.
Headnotes†
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s.362 – Court not to alter
judgment – Accused were convicted by the trial court u/ss.302,
323 r/w 34, 452, 504, 506 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for
life – High Court dismissing the criminal appeals thereagainst
affirmed the conviction – However, subsequently on a
correction application filed by the accused persons u/s.362,
CrPC, High Court modified its earlier judgment and converted
the conviction u/s.302 to s.304 Part II, IPC – Sustainability:
Held: Impugned judgment quashed and set aside – Under s.362,
CrPC, once the judgment and final order is signed disposing of
a case, no Court is allowed to alter or review the same except to
correct a clerical or arithmetical error – High Court while delivering
the impugned judgment said that it was only correcting a clerical
error however, it can be seen that in the first judgment, the High
Court rejected the contention raised on behalf of the appellants
therein and confirmed the conviction u/s.302, IPC, but later, the
entire reasoning is changed in the impugned judgment – In the
impugned judgment, High Court came to a finding that the incident
appeared to be a result of a sudden provocation and occurred
in the heat of a moment and therefore converted the conviction
from s.302, IPC to Part-II of s.304, IPC – Procedure adopted by
the High Court was untenable – It was not competent for the High
Court to have reviewed its earlier judgment. [Paras 10, 14, 21]
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1631
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
Case Law Cited
Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal and Another [1981] 2 SCR 485 :
(1981) 1 SCC 500; Naresh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(1981) 3 SCC 74 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Section 362 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Court not to
alter judgment; Correction application; Clerical or arithmetical error;
Earlier judgment; Previous judgment; Modification of first judgment;
Conviction under Section 302 IPC converted to Section 304 II IPC;
Clarification of previous judgment; Correcting a clerical error; Alter
or review of earlier judgment.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
1153-55 of 2021
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.02.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLA No. 1078 and 1691 of 2015
and CRLA No. 1094 of 2016
With
Criminal Appeal No. 1175 of 2021
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Narender Singh Yadav, Ashutosh Yadav, Surjeet Singh,
Dr. Amardeep Gaur, Dr. Nbv Srinivasa Reddy, Vishal Tiwari,
M/s. V. Maheshwari & Co.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Vishnu Shankar Jain, Shaurya Krishna, Dr. Sushil Balwada,
Nagendra Singh, Dr. Sanjay Gupta, Naman Raj Singh, Mohit
Kumar Singh, M/s. V. Maheshwari & Co., Mrs. Nanita Sharma,
Ms. Aswathi M.K.
1632 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
1. These criminal appeals challenge the judgement and final order dated
8th February 2019 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Criminal Misc. Correction Application No. 2 of 2019
which had been preferred by the accused persons namely, Bhupendra
Singh, Moti Lal and Prahlad.
2. The Correction Application purportedly sought a clarification of a
previous judgment and final order passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court on 21st May 2018,1 by which the High Court had
dismissed the criminal appeals preferred by the accused persons
and had affirmed the judgment passed by the Court of Additional
Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Jaunpur in Sessions Trial No. 277 of
20122 wherein the trial court had convicted the accused persons for
the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 323 read with 34,
and Sections 452, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603
and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life.
3. Subsequently however, the High Court by way of the impugned
judgment and order allowed the Correction Application preferred
by the accused persons and modified its First Judgment. While
so modifying its First Judgment, the High Court partly allowed the
criminal appeals thereby converting the conviction awarded to the
accused persons to one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and
consequently sentenced accused Bhupendra Singh to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and sentenced accused Moti Lal
and Prahlad to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years.
4. We have two sets of criminal appeals before us. The first set of
criminal appeals being Criminal Appeal Nos. 1153-1155 of 2021
has been preferred by one Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur, the original
complainant, taking exception to the modification undertaken by
1 Hereinafter referred to as “First Judgment”.
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘trial court’.
3 ‘IPC’ for short.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1633
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
the High Court in the impugned judgment and order. The second
appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 1175 of 2021 has been filed by
accused Bhupendra Singh with a plea for acquittal. For the sake of
convenience and to avoid confusion, the parties will be referred to
as per their positions in the first set of appeals.
5. The brief facts leading to the present appeals are as follows:-
5.1 On 13th May 2012 at about 7:30 a.m., the appellant lodged a
complaint at P.S. Sikrara, District Jaunpur against the accused
persons, alleging therein that owing to a previous enmity between
the families of the appellant and the accused persons, on that
very morning at around 06:30 a.m., the accused persons had
verbally and physically assaulted the appellant and his family
members with various weapons which led to severe injuries
being suffered by the appellant and his family members. On the
basis of the complaint, a First Information Report4 being Case
Crime No. 290 of 2012 was registered against the accused
persons for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324,
452, 504 and 506 of the IPC.
5.2 According to the prosecution story, the families of the appellant
and the accused persons were related by blood and there was a
long-standing land dispute between the two families. The dispute
had led to a lot of litigation between the parties, pursuant to
which the land belonging to the appellant’s grandmother was
set to be measured and demarcated on the date of the incident.
Owing to the existing animosity, in the early morning of 13th May
2012, the accused persons arrived at the appellant’s house
armed with various weapons such as gandasi, danda and lathi
and started verbally abusing the appellant and his family. On
objections being raised to the verbal abuse, accused Bhupendra
Singh instigated the co-accused to beat up the appellant and
his family and thereafter all the accused persons attacked the
appellant and his family with the various weapons that they
were carrying. On hearing their cries, the appellant’s father
Jeet Lal, his sister-in-law Amrawati, his cousin Kalawati and his
niece Priyanka ran out to rescue them, however, they were also
beaten up. The appellant ran into the house in order to save
4 ‘FIR’ for short.
1634 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
himself, however, the accused persons rushed into the house
and severely assaulted him with lathi, danda and gandasi. Upon
cries of alarm being raised, several persons reached the spot
and intervened, thereby putting an end to the matter.
5.3 As a result of the assault, the appellant and his family members
and particularly his father Jeet Lal sustained serious injuries.
The injured persons were initially taken to the primary health
centre at Sikrara wherefrom the appellant’s father Jeet Lal was
referred to the Sadar Hospital considering his severe condition.
However, the appellant’s father Jeet Lal died on the way to the
hospital. As per the post-mortem report, the cause of death was
haemorrhage, shock and coma caused by ante-mortem injuries.
5.4 Upon the death of the appellant’s father, the offence punishable
under Section 304 of the IPC was added to the FIR.
5.5 Upon completion of the investigation, the chargesheet was filed
before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur.
5.6 As the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, it
was committed to the Court of the Learned Sessions Judge,
Jaunpur where it was registered as Sessions Trial No. 277 of
2012 and was subsequently made over to the Court of the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Jaunpur for trial.
5.7 The trial court framed charges against the accused persons for
the offences punishable under Sections 302, 323 and 324 read
with Section 34 and Sections 452, 504 and 506 of the IPC.
5.8 The accused persons denied the charges and asked to be
tried. To bring the charges home, the prosecution examined 8
witnesses and produced several documents. In their defence,
the accused persons submitted that the incident was false and
fabricated and they had been falsely implicated in the matter
owing to the ongoing land disputes between the parties.
5.9 On the conclusion of the trial, the trial court vide judgment and
order dated 10th March 2015 convicted the accused persons
and sentenced them as aforementioned.
5.10 Aggrieved thereby, the accused persons preferred three
criminal appeals before the High Court being Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1078 and 1691 of 2015 and 1094 of 2016.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1635
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
5.11 A Division Bench of the High Court by the First Judgment
dismissed the criminal appeals and upheld the judgment of
the trial court dated 10th March 2015.
5.12 Thereafter, the accused persons preferred an application under
Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 18735 being
Criminal Misc. Correction Application No. 2 of 2019 seeking that
the criminal appeals be partly allowed. It was pleaded in the
Correction Application that when the aforesaid judgment had
been pronounced in open court, to the extent of the sentence
awarded, the criminal appeals had been partly allowed and
the convictions for the offence punishable under Section 302
of the IPC had been converted to one under Section 304 Part
II of the IPC. Accordingly, the sentence awarded to each of
the accused persons had been reduced as aforementioned.
However, it was further pleaded when the First Judgment was
delivered by the High Court, the criminal appeals had been
dismissed. It was subsequently found that despite the dismissal,
the case status showed that the criminal appeals had been
partly allowed. Therefore, the accused persons prayed that
the last five paragraphs of the First Judgment be corrected to
reflect the order which had been pronounced in open court.
5.13 The High Court by the impugned judgment and order allowed
the Correction Application and modified its First Judgment as
aforementioned.
5.14 Being aggrieved thereby, these appeals.
6. We have heard Mr. Narender Singh Yadav, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant, Mr. Shaurya Krishna, learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No.1, Mr. Sushil Balwada, learned counsel appearing
for Respondent No.2, and Ms. Nanita Sharma, learned counsel
appearing for Respondent No.3.
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that
the procedure adopted by the learned Judges of the Division Bench
of the High Court is totally contrary to the provisions of Section 362
of the Cr.P.C. It is submitted that by the impugned judgment, the
High Court has totally changed its earlier judgment. It is submitted
5 Hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”
1636 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
that, under Section 362 of Cr.P.C., it is not permissible for any Court
to alter or review its earlier judgment except to correct a clerical or
arithmetical error.
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the
contrary, tried to support the impugned judgment.
9. For appreciating the issue, it will be relevant to refer to Section 362
of Cr.P.C., which reads thus:
“362. Court not to alter judgment.- Save as otherwise
provided by this Code or by any other law for the time
being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment
or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the
same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.”
10. It can thus be seen that, under Section 362 of Cr.P.C., once the
judgment and final order is signed disposing of a case, no Court is
allowed to alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or
arithmetical error. No doubt that the High Court while delivering the
impugned judgment has said that it was only correcting a clerical
error. However, for testing the correctness of the said finding, it will
be pertinent to refer to certain paragraphs of both the judgments of
the High Court.
11. In its first judgment, the High Court referred to various injuries
sustained by the deceased Jeet Lal and the injured victims. It is
to be noted that insofar as the injuries of deceased Jeet Lal is
concerned, as many as 11 injuries are recorded. Thereafter, the High
Court also referred to the autopsy report conducted by the Medical
Expert, wherein 10 injuries were recorded. Thereafter, the High Court
referred to the evidence of 8 witnesses. It is to be noted that in the
arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants therein before the
High Court, it was submitted that the evidence of eye witnesses
was not reliable and truthful. Rejecting the said argument, the High
Court has observed thus:
“We are not impressed with the said argument of learned
counsel for the appellants in view of the fact that P.W. 1
informant Lal Bahadur @ Ramyash Maurya is an injured
witness of the incident. His presence on the date, time
and place of incident has been cogently and unerringly
established by the prosecution. Even his injuries have
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1637
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
not been seriously challenged by the prosecution and he
in a natural and truthful manner has narrated the entire
incident and has assigned specific role to each of the
accused persons of wielding blows by lathi and danda
and assaulting the deceased by gadansi. Merely because
in the later part of his testimony instead of assigning the
role of assault by gadansi, the weapon ‘ballam’ has been
used, will not discredit his entire testimony. Moreover from
a meticulous scrutiny of his entire evidence as a whole,
in our opinion, he is a truthful and reliable witness and
except minor contradictions which do not go to the root
of the case, his testimony inspires confidence and cannot
be discredited. Furthermore, his testimony finds complete
corroboration from the statement of P.W.2 Amrawati,
who in her statement has clearly stated that she has not
witnessed any accused-appellant holding a ballam and
stated that her father in law Jeet Lal and Lal Bahadur
received injuries by gadansi.
Now coming to the testimony of P.W.2 Amrawati, who in her
statement has clearly stated that on account of dispute over
the measurement of land on the date of incident at 6:30
a.m, appellants Bhupendra, Moti Lal and Prahlad along
with non-appellant Sunil had on instigation of Bhupendra,
assaulted them and at the time of incident, Bhupendra was
holding a gadansi whereas Moti Lal, Sunil and Prahlad were
armed with lathi. She has further stated that on account of
alarm raised by her father in law and brother in-law, she,
her daughter Priyanka and sister-in law Kalawati (nanad)
rushed to rescue them and intervened in the matter and
they were also assaulted by the assailants and when ·his
brother in-law P.W. l Lal Bahadur@ Ramyash Maurya with
an intention to rescue them, entered in the house followed
by the assailants who also assaulted his dewar with gadansi
and lathi because of which they received serious injuries
and when the assailants had left the scene of incident, she
along with her father-in-law, brother-in-law, daughter and
sister-in law (nanad) were brought at the police station and
after registration of the case, they were sent for medical
examination and on account of serious injuries received
1638 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by her and her father-in-law, they were referred to Sadar
Hospital where his father-in-law succumbed to his injuries.
The said witness has also been subjected to rigorous
cross-examination. However, the defence has not been
able to elicit any material contradictions in her statement
and she has corroborated the prosecution story on material
particulars and nothing could be elicited by the defence
to doubt his credibility. The defence has not challenged
her presence at the time of incident and the injuries on
her person completely establishes the complicity of the
appellants in the present case.
As such we are of the opinion that she is a reliable witness
and has completely corroborated the prosecution story and
the trial court has rightly relied upon her evidence. The
defence has not been able to point out any inconsistency
or material contradictions in her statement and finds
corroboration from the medical evidence as well as the
testimony of P.W. l informant Lal Bahadur @ Ramyash
Maurya. In the backdrop of said circumstances, the
argument of learned counsel for the appellants that the
testimony of P.W.2 Amrawati does not inspire confidence,
is not tenable and is liable to be discarded.”
12. Thereafter, the High Court referred to the arguments advanced on
behalf of the appellants therein with regard to discrepancies in the
medical examination report prepared by Dr. Manoj Kumar Chaurasiya
(PW-3). Rejecting the said contention, the High Court observed that the
opinion of a medical expert should be accepted to support the direct
evidence in the case. Thereafter, finally the High Court concluded thus:
“From the ocular testimony, it is clinchingly established that
the victim was assaulted by lathi, danda and gadansi and
even from careful perusal of the postmortem report, the
injuries of the said weapons find corroboration. Therefore,
in view of inconsistency in the nature of injuries found in the
medical examination and postmortem report, the otherwise
consistent testimony of the injured witnesses cannot be
thrown over board. As such, we are of the opinion that the
said argument of the learned counsel for the appellants
also does not shake the credibility of the witnesses.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1639
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
The next argument of learned counsel for the appellants is
that since the weapon of assault could not be recovered
by the police and even the blood-stained clothes have not
been handed over to the police, therefore, the prosecution
story becomes doubtful. The said argument of learned
counsel for the appellants also does not appeal to us in
view of the fact that ocular testimony of the witnesses
clearly establishes the prosecution story beyond any
reasonable doubt and, therefore, in view of the lapses on
the part of the Investigating Officer in making the recovery
of the weapon and producing the clothes, whole of the
prosecution story supported by the witnesses cannot be
thrown over board. The two injured witnesses whose
injuries and presence has been clearly established by
the prosecution and when the defence has not been able
to elicit any material contradictions in their statements
pointing towards the guilt of the accused, the prosecution
story cannot be discarded.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion
that the prosecution has successfully proved its case
beyond all reasonable doubt against the appellants and
their conviction is liable to be affirmed.
This appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Bhupendra Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1078
of 2015 is in jail. He shall serve out the remaining part of
his sentence.
Moti Lal, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1691 of 2015
and Prahlad, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1094 of
2016 are on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled and their
sureties discharged. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur is
forthwith directed to take them into custody and send them
to jail for serving out the remaining part of their sentences.”
13. Whereas, in the impugned judgment, the High Court observed thus:
“We have perused the record and the court register
maintained by the Bench Secretary which briefly records
the order passed by the Court in different cases and upon
perusing the relevant page of the court register dated
1640 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
21.05.2018, we find that the Bench Secretary had also
recorded in the register that all the three appeals had been
partly allowed. The notes made by us on the paper books
also support the case of the applicants/ appellants. To us,
it appears that the last five paragraphs of the judgement
and order sought to be corrected were wrongly typed out
inadvertently.
Thus, since the facts that the mistakes which have crept into
the final judgement and order and the last five paragraphs
of the judgement and order sought to be corrected are not
in consonance with the operative order pronounced in the
court, are admitted to the learned counsel for the informant
and learned A.G.A. for the State who had made similar
notes on their file after hearing had been concluded, the
correction application is allowed.
The last five paragraphs of the judgement and order
sought to be corrected are deleted and substituted by the
following paragraphs :-
Thus, in view of the foregoing discussion, it follows that
although in the F.I.R. it was alleged that the accused-
appellants were present at the place of occurrence armed
with lathis and gandasi and had attacked the deceased
and the injured namely Jeet Lal, Amrawati, Lal Bahadur,
Priyanka and Kalawati. However, their injury reports (Ext.
Ka.2 to Ka. 6) do not contain any injuries which could
be caused by spears. Moreover, the doctor has opined
that the injuries received by the deceased as well as the
injured were caused by blunt objects except injury no. 4
sustained by the deceased which could have been caused
by a ballam as deposed by the prosecution witnesses
which was not assigned to any of the accused in the F.I.R.
Upon a wholesome consideration of the facts of the case,
the attending circumstances and the evidence on record,
both oral as well as documentary, we find that a dispute had
taken place between the parties over the measurement of
the land of the informant’s grand mother which the accused-
appellants claimed to be their property and although it has
been alleged by the prosecution that on the date of the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1641
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
incident, the measurement of the land in dispute was to
be carried out by an Officer of the Revenue Department
but the prosecution failed to lead any evidence to show
that the date on which the occurrence had taken place
was fixed for measurement of land of informant’s grand
mother by an officer of the Revenue Department which
thus, indicates that the prosecution has suppressed the
true genesis of the occurrence. The incident, in our opinion,
appears to be a result of sudden provocation and at the
heat of the moment and thus, the recorded conviction of
the accused-appellants deserves to be converted to one u/
s 304 Part II I.P. C. and the imprisonment of life awarded
to them palliated to a lesser period of imprisonment.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part.
The conviction of Bhupendra Singh, Moti Lal and Prahlad,
appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1078 of 2015, 1691 of
2015 and 1094 of 2016 respectively is converted to one u/s
304 Part II I.P.C. The sentence of life imprisonment awarded
to Bhupendra Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1078
of 2015 is reduced to ten years rigorous imprisonment.
However, he shall pay a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- as cost
to the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased
Jeet Lal within six months of his release from jail without
prejudice to the right of the relatives of the deceased to
seek compensation under the provisions of The Uttar
Pradesh Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014.
Considering the fact that the appellants, Moti Lal and
Prahlad, appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1691 of 2015
and 1094 of 2016 respectively were aged around 50 years
at the time of the occurrence, we are of the opinion that
the ends of justice shall be met if the the sentences of life
imprisonment awarded to them is palliated to five years
rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5, 000/- each
and in case of default in payment of fine, three months
additional rigorous imprisonment each.
Bhupendra Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1078
of 2015 is in jail. He shall be released after serving out
the remaining part of his sentence.
1642 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Moti Lal and Prahlad, appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos.
1691 of 2015 and 1094 of 2016 respectively who were taken
into custody and sent to jail on account of the mistakes
in the operative portion of the judgement and order, shall
be released forthwith if they have served the sentence of
five years imprisonment.”
14. It could thus clearly be seen that whereas in the First Judgment, the
High Court clearly rejected the contention as raised on behalf of the
appellants therein and confirmed the conviction under Section 302
of IPC, the entire reasoning is changed in the impugned judgment.
The High Court, in the impugned judgment, came to a finding that
the incident appeared to be a result of a sudden provocation and
occurred in the heat of a moment and therefore converted the
conviction from Section 302 of IPC to Part-II of Section 304 of IPC.
15. We have already referred to the provisions of Section 362 of Cr.P.C.
Even upon a plain reading of the provisions of Section 362 of Cr.P.C.,
the procedure adopted by the High Court was totally untenable.
16. In the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal and Another,6 this
Court has considered what would fall within the meaning of a clerical
and arithmetical error and observed thus:
“4. ………A clerical or arithmetical error is an error
occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the court.
It represents that which the court never intended to say. It
is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not
depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An
arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical
error is a mistake in writing or typing. Master Construction
Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1047 : (1966)
3 SCR 99 : (1966) 17 STC 360].”
17. Thereafter, this Court observed thus:
“5. The appellant points out that he invoked the inherent
power of the High Court saved by Section 482 of the Code
and that notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section
362 the High Court had power to grant relief. Now it is
6 [1981] 2 SCR 485 : (1981) 1 SCC 500
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1643
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
well settled that the inherent power of the court cannot
be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited
by the Code (Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1962
SC 1208 : 1962 Supp 2 SCR 817 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 288]).
It is true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the
court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to
what is “otherwise provided by this Court or by any other
law for the time being in force”. Those words, however,
refer to those provisions only where the court has been
expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or
review its judgment. The inherent power of the court is not
contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section
362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can
be of no avail.”
18. An exercise similar to the one done by the Allahabad High Court in
the instant matter had come up for consideration before this Court
in the case of Naresh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh.7 In
the said case also, the High Court had pronounced the judgment on
25th February 1980 confirming the conviction as recorded by the trial
court under Section 302 of IPC. Subsequently however, the High
Court by its judgment dated 14th April 1980 converted the conviction
to one under Section 304 Part I of IPC and reduced the sentence to
rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. It will be relevant to refer to the
following observations of this Court:
“2. …..Thereafter on an application filed by the appellant
Naresh, the High Court made the following order on April
14, 1980:
“The application is allowed as there is a clerical
mistake in the operative part of the judgment in
Criminal Appeal No. 674 of 1975 regarding the
conviction and sentence of appellant Naresh.
The sentence, “but his conviction under Section
302 of the IPC and sentence of imprisonment
for life awarded thereunder are affirmed” be
substituted by the sentence: “He is convicted
under Section 304 (Part I) of the IPC instead
7 (1981) 3 SCCC 74
1644 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years”.
We are entirely at a loss to understand the order dated
April 14, 1980. In their judgment dated February 25, 1980
while discussing the case against Naresh the learned
Judges had given a specific and express finding that he
intended to kill the deceased Bahadur and, therefore, had
committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of
the Penal Code, 1860. The operative part of the judgment
also said the same thing. We do not understand what the
learned Judges mean when they state in their order dated
April 14,1980, “there is a clerical mistake in the operative
part of the judgment”. The High Court was wholly wrong
in altering the judgment pronounced by them disposing
of the criminal appeals. That was clearly in contravention
of the provisions of Section 362 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. What was worse, the High Court acted in
purported exercise of the power to correct clerical mistakes
when in fact there was none. The conviction under Section
302 of the Penal Code, 1860 was perfectly correct and
the conviction had been rightly affirmed by the High Court
in the first instance. There was no occasion at all for the
purported exercise of power to correct a clerical mistake
and alter the conviction under Section 302 to one under
Section 304 of the Penal Code, 1860. We are greatly
concerned that the High Court should have committed
this grievous error. There is, however, nothing that we can
do about it at this juncture as the State has not chosen
to file any appeal against the order dated April 14, 1980.”
19. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court had observed that the
similar exercise undertaken by the High Court in that case was in
contravention of the provisions of Section 362 of Cr.P.C. This Court
had expressed its great concern that the High Court should have
committed this grievous error. We fail to understand as to how
the High Court, in the present case also, in spite of the plain and
unambigious words used in the provisions of Section 362 of Cr.P.C.,
has committed such an error.
20. We have no other option but to allow the appeals filed by the
complainant.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1645
Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Etc. Etc.
21. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) Criminal Appeal Nos.1153-1155 of 2021 are allowed;
(ii) Criminal Appeal No.1175 of 2021 is dismissed;
(iii) The impugned judgment and order dated 8th February 2019 is
quashed and set aside inasmuch as it was not competent for
the High Court to have reviewed its judgment and order dated
21st May 2018;
(iv) The accused, if they have not undergone their sentence as
recorded by the High Court in its first judgment dated 21st
May 2018, are directed to surrender before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Jaunpur within a period of 4 weeks from the date
of this judgment, after which they shall undergo the remaining
period of sentence;
(v) We, however, reserve the right of the accused persons to
challenge the judgment and order dated 21st May 2018. If such an
appeal is filed, the same shall be considered on its own merits.
22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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